CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001700060001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2005
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• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
T
17
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
*40
P /r p
COPY NO. 14
OCI NO. 1785/58
17 April 1958
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
^ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATER
AUT}i_: NR 70;
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
co FIDth
DIA review(s) completed.
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
GAILLARD'S FALL
Firm rightist opposition
to any further concessions on
North Africa, coupled with Com-
munist obstructionism, brought
down French. Premier Gaillard
on 15 April. The deepened
cleavage.between-the right and
non-Communist left presages a
long crisis, and another funda-
mentally weak coalition govern-
ment is likely to result. If
Such a makeshift solution does
not materialize within a reason-
able period, renewed pressure
for the recall of General de
Gaulle or for some other extra-
parliamentary solution can be
expected.
The crisis bids to be a
prolonged one because the as-
sembly has already recessed
and will not reconvene until 29
April, following the cantonal
elections scheduled for 21 and
27 April. Recall of the assem-
bly prior to 29 April for an
investiture debate is unlikely,
since negotiations for a suc-
cessor government will be dif-
ficult in any case, and, if the
usual crisis pattern prevails,
several unsuccessful investiture
attempts will be made prior to
a compromise solution.
President Coty, in accord-
ance with tradition, is-ex-
pected to call, first those most
responsible for the government's
overthrow--Gaullist Jacques
Soustelle, Independent Antoine
Pinay, and Popular Republican
George Bidault, who split with
his party majority in an appar-
ent effort to make a political
comeback with rightist support.
position, and, at least until
the crisis ripens, Pinay would
encounter immediate hostility
from the key Socialist party
because of his economic and so-
cial views. Although Bidault's
domestic policies would normally
attract Socialist support, his
recent swing to the right on
North African issues runs direct-
ly counter to an evolution with-
in the Socialist party toward
a more liberal position.
Since Socialist leader Guy
Mollet would fare little better
at the hands of the rightist
groups, Coty may turn at an
early stage of the crisis to a
center party leader. Rene Pleven
of the Democratic Resistance
Union is one of the most likely
candidates and might be able to
form a narrowly based center
coalition with Socialist and
Independent support, and per-
haps even the participation of
one or the other.
The duration and serious-
ness of the crisis will depend
on whether the quarreling as-
sembly factions can be brought
to accept an early compromise.
There are already signs of new
pressure for the recall of Gen-
ral de Gaulle. The new high
enrol of anti American sentiment
m nifested during the 15 April
d bate will probably lend impe-
tus to pressure either for De
Ga ille or for a "government of
nattlional safety," held together
more by anti-US sentiment than
by internal agreement on North
African and domestic policy.
One of the leading lobby
Soustelle's prospects seem groups, the National Association
dim because of his extremist I of Small Businessmen, has called
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY `SUMMARY
17 April 195$
for dissolution of parliament
and new general elections. The
outcome of the cantonal elec-
tions, in which rightists ex-
pect to make significant gains,
may have an important bearing
on the development of pressure
in this direction.
North African Reaction
In Tunisia, President
Bourguiba declared in a radio
speech on 17 April that if
France has not formed a gov-
ernment in a week he will again
press his charges of French ag-
gression in the UN Security
Council. This public position
is probably designed to allay
the impatience of extremist
factions within his government
and party and also within the
Algerian National Liberation
Front. While he is unlikely
to take precipitate action, the
longer the French political
crisis continues, the greater
is the possibility in Tunisia
of incidents involving French
troops or civilians.
In Algeria, the fall of
Gaillard apparently removed the
immediate danger of serious
civil disturbances by European
extremists who had been aroused
by the 12 April French cabinet
As the preparatory talks
on a summit conference begin at
the ambassadorial' level, the
USSR continues to insist it does
not want to enter serious sub-
stantive negotiations prior to
a summit meeting. It regards
as a stalling tactic Western
insistence that preparatory
talks make some progress toward
SECRET
emanating from Algiers. Such
an attempt by irresponsible
rightist elements is unlikely.
decision to resume talks with
Tunisia on the basis suggested
by the US-UK good offices team. .
Settler extremists sent letters
protesting the American "atti-
tude" toward North African
problems to American authorities
in Algiers and were almost cer-
tainly responsible for the ex-
plosion on 17 April at the build-
ing housing the United States
Consulate General. However,'
the general strike of resident
Europeans and "massive" street
demonstrations which the ex-
tremists had threatened to in-
stigate failed to materialize.
Rumors that certain young
army officers, acting in collu-
sion with local civilian ex-
tremists, will attempt to take
over control of the Algerian
Government have again been
25X1
the French Army. 25X1
governments is widespread in
Never- 25X1
theless, dissatisfaction over
the handling of the Algerian
problem by a succession of weak
SOVIET SUMMIT TACTICS
agreement before a summit meet-
ing is called.
The USSR does not look on
a summit conference as an op-
portunity for concluding agree-
ments worked out in detailed
preliminary negotiations.
Rather, it views it as a forum
in which to publicize its stand
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TAW Thor
SECRET .
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
on a few key issues, especially
the suspension of nuclear weap-
ons tsts, on which it believes
the. Western position is most
vulnerable.
The Soviet leaders evident-
ly recognize that their campaign
for a summit conference has not
generated enough public pressure
in the West to force the Western
powers to accept Soviet terms.
Recognizing that cannot avoid
Indonesian government forces
have reported they occupied Pa-
dang on 17 April within hours
after marines and paratroops
landed near the city. Resist-
ance was described as light.
Djakarta expects it will also
have.Bukittinggi by 22 April.
some substantive discussions in
the preparatory stage, the.USSR
is seeking to limit any substan-
tive considerations to a foreign
ministers' meeting.
foreign.. ministers' level.
The Soviet aide-memoire of
11 April said that the ministers
could "exchange opinions" on
some substantive issues but that
the only purpose of the Western
ambassadors' talks in Moscow
would be to arrange the proced-
ural details of a ministers'
meeting. The USSR evidently
believes that Soviet proposals
at a ministers' conference
would receive wide publicity
and that the Western ministers
could not resist Soviet pressure
to set the date for a summit
conference. If necessary to
achieve this, the USSR might
make minor concessions at the.
Overland, government forces
are continuing' their advance
from the north through:Tapanuli
toward Bukittinggi and from the
west across the Barisan Mountains
toward Padang and Bukittinggi.
Resistance in the Tapanuli area
apparently is from defected reb-
els who had taken sanctuary
there and not from the Third Reg-
iment, which is stationed there.
Recently stiffened resistance
continues in the- mountainous
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1058
area of Central Sumatra, where
the dissidents apparently are
exploiting the terrain to good
25X1 advantage.
In North Celebes, the gov-
ernment claims to have occupied
four more small towns in the
Donggala area. Troop movements
continue preparatory to a major
operation against Celebes)
no political approach to
the dissident problem will be
considered by the central gov-
ernment until after the occupa-
tion of North Celebes.
CAMBODIA + ar, FTC
(ISia$ SINGAPORE 41
Bukittinggi Pakanbaru~
Lubukckjam'b,} . 1. Riau Is.
Q Padang
o .~
Palembang
INDONESIA
SECRET
The bombing b - a dissi-
dent two-engine aircraft of
the Makassar airport on 13
April reportedly has been fol-
lowed by an air Attack on
the airfield at Balikpapan,
Borneo, on 17 April. These
strikes followed closely an.
announcement of the formation
of a revolutionary air force.
Colonel Jani, vice chief
of staff of the army, has
told the. American assistant
army attachd he. is worried
over the growing belief in
the army that the United
States is helping the.dissi-
dents, He is further con-
cerned that the expected de-
livery of, Soviet bloc weap-
ons may weaken the army's
generally anti-Communist at-
titude.
PHILIPPINES
P A C I F I C
OCEAN
Manokwari
} 'G
NETHERLANOSL
NEW GUINEAI
91 (Status in Dispute) I
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CURRENT.INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
NOTES AND COMMENTS
MIDDLE EAST
Israel's Anniversary Parade
UN truce officials fear
the military parade to be held
in Jerusalem on 24 April cele-
brating Israel's tenth anni-
versary may result in clashes
between Israelis and Jordanians
despite precautionary measures
taken by the two governments.
Israel has held similar parades
on previous anniversaries, but
this year's event will be on a
larger scale and will draw
larger crowds, since the tenth
anniversary is being publicized
by the Israelis as especially
significant.
The armistice
agreement between
Israel and Jordan
limits the number of
troops either side
may have in the Jeru-
salem area to 1,600
men and bars heavy
equipment such as
tanks and armored
cars. An Israeli of-
ficial has stated
that 5,000 members
of the Israel Defense
Force will partici-
pate in the parade
along with most types
of armament. Forty-
nine tanks already
have been moved into
Jerusalem. Moreover,
if the Israelis stage
a fly-by over the
city, they can avoid
trespassing Jordanian
air space only by
exercising great care.
Jordan may well
feel compelled to
respond in some fash-
ion to this violation
to avoid criticism
from Nasir's United
ISRAEL
CONFIDENTIAL
DEVELOPMENTS
Arab Republic
still unsettled issues involv-
ing Mt. Scopus and Israeli
tree-planting activities in the
neutral zone surrounding Gov-
ernment House, two high posi-
tions commanding the Jerusalem
area, could add to whatever
tensions might develop.
Israel has avoided raising
the issue of Jerusalem's dis-
puted status by not issuing
formal invitations to the
JORDAN
DEMILITARIZED
ZONE
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
parade to foreign diplomats.
Most of the diplomats gave
prior indications that they
could not attend because of
the implied recognition their
presence would give to Israel's
claim to Jerusalem as its cap-
ital. The United Nations res-
olution of 1947, reaffirmed
in 1949, calls for the inter-
nationalization of the city
and its environs.
Nasir's Trip to Moscow
Nasir appears to be try-
ing to mend some of his rela-
tions with the Western powers
before he leaves for Moscow at
the end of April, probably so
that he can be in as strong a
negotiating position as possi-
ble when he arrives in the So-
viet capital. Word is said
to have been passed to the
Egyptian press to soften its
normally virulent anti-American
line, and cartoons and edi-
torials now appear somewhat
milder. However, Nasir's
propagandists, taking their
cue from his statements that
nine clandestine radio trans-
mitters supported by the West
are attacking him, are still
heavily engaged in assaulting
the pro-Western governments of
Iraq and Jordan. Despite his
apparent contempt for these
Arab monarchies, Nasir seems
to have been stung by some of
the charges their broadcasts
have brought against him.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
Saudi Arabia
The Saudi..Government con-
tinues to be preoccupied with
its financial problems. The
"austerity budget" decreed
last year by King Saud has
failed to achieve the hoped-
for economies, since it was
promulgated several months af-
ter the fiscal year had begun
and many government departments
had already spent more than
their total allocations under
the new budget. As a major
step toward restoring the Saudi
currency to its official parity,
International Monetary Fund
officials have advocated a cur-
rency stabilization fund, pos-
sibly as large as $100,000,000.
A foreign loan would be re-
quired for the fund, and even
this would not guarantee suc-
cess unless Saudi Arabia's
archaic monetary system is
completely changed.
The financial crisis, par-
ticularly the decline in the
value of the currency and the
government's attempts to con-
trol it, may lead to labor un-
rest. Symptoms of trouble have
been observed in the Eastern
Province, where Aramco's opera-
tions are centered. There are
rumors there that a strike, in
the form of a simple nonreturn
to work, might occur after the
holidays which mark the end of
the Moslem holy month of Rama-
dan on 19 April. If trouble
of this kind materializes, it
might be an occasion for a test
of whatever "new look" the gov- 25X6
ernment may have taken on from
25X6
Crown 'bra
' . _ _ s _
nce
THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS
King Mohamed V dissolved
the Moroccan Government during
the night of 16 April follow-
ing the resignation of all
nine Istiglal ministers in the
14-member cabinet. The King
may select as premier either"
former Foreign Minister Ahmed
Balafrej, whom he has recalled
from the Accra conference, or
former Minister of Justice
Abdelkrim Benjelloun, both of
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
remain in Morocco.
whom are leaders of Istiglal's
moderate wing and able support-
ers of the King's own moderate
views.
The mass resignation is
the latest tactic in a campaign
begun by Istiglal in the summer
of 1956 to force the King to
form an all-Istiglal government.
The King has resisted these .ef -
forts, but has tacitly acknowl-
edged the need for a cabinet
reshuffle, particularly replace-
ment of his long-time friend,
former Premier Bekkai, who had
aroused the antagonism of Istiq-
lal by encouraging, probably
with the King's approval, the
formation of a strong opposi-
tion party. The King may still
hope to retain some portfolios
in the hands of his non-Istiq-
lal supporters.
SINO-SOVIET BLOC AID PROGRAM TO YEMEN
Sino-Soviet bloc commit-
ments under the economic aid
program in Yemen now stand at
over $50,000,000, and several
projects have already been
started. A Soviet credit which
and Spanish ground forces which
The new government--even
an all-Istiglal cabinet--can be
expected to maintain its policy
of aloofness between East and
West. The King and Istiqlal
leaders are reported to recog-
nize the economic importance of
military bases in Morocco, but,
as a sop to Moroccan sensitivi-
ties, will continue to insist
on the formula recently enunci-
ated by the King--that Morocco's
privilege to demand evacuation
be recognized when base rights
are granted. The government
will certainly continue to press
for the evacuation of the French
Moscow officials value at $35,-
000,000 is being utilized, and
some 70 Soviet bloc economic
technicians are now active in
Yemen. In late March a Soviet
vessel delivered a cargo of
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*NW SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
~.~ protectorate boundary
KAMA
RAN 1.
(U.K.)
-oo Najran
Oilconcuss ion area granted
Lto the Soviet bloc by Yemen y
EMEN -'~
SANA?
00al Katib
AL Hudaydah
Maribor
ib I -`''C EASTERN
Haro ;
ADEN PROTECTORATE
FADEN COLONY
06 III K)
FRENCH "Udeb
SOMAULAND
machinery and equipment for the
harbor improvement project be-
ing carried out by the USSR at
the port of Ras al Katib near
Al Hudaydah. This is the first
of a series of public works
projects being implemented by
Moscow under this credit.
Supplementing the Soviet
credit, Communist China in Jan-
uary signed a technical aid and
loan agreement worth about
$16,00-0.000, most of which is
to be allocated for a public
works improvement program. In
addition, Communist China and
Yemen concluded a long-term
trade agreement in January un-
der which Peiping will supply
industrial and manufactured
goods in return for agricul-
tural products.
The European satellites
for their part are constructing
some industrial establishments
in Yemen. Czechoslovakia is
building cement plants and a
water supply system for Al Hud-
aydah. East Germany is con-
structing a power plant at Sa.na,
The total cost of these projects
and how they are financed are
not known. East Germany and
Czechoslovakia have opened com-
mercial agencies in Yemen. For
its part, Yemen granted the
bloc an oil concession in an
area covering most of the Red
Sea coast from Al Hudaydah north
to the Saudi Arabian border in
February.
over and above the economic
aid being received by Yemen from
the Sino-Soviet bloc, the Imam
has accepted substantial amounts
of military aid and at least 60
military technicians from the
USSR, and Czechoslovakia. The
cost of this aid to the Yemeni
Government has not. yet been de-
termined, but the value of the
arms already received may be as
much as $30,000,000.
(Prepared by ORR)
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o'SULTANATE OF-MUSCAT? ? MILES
.Shibam
ADEN PROTECTORATE
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
The Soviet press, in a re-
cent article entitled "A Worthy
Gift for 1 May," attempted to
create the impression that the
atomic icebreaker Lenin would
be completed in the
very near future.
It is not likely,
however, to be com-
pleted until the
spring of 1959, when
it will join the
fleet on the North-
ern Sea Route. The
Russians apparently
had hoped to arrange
for the vessel to
visit some Western
European cities in-
cluding London this
fall.
versary celebration in early
November, actually took place
on 5 December and was heralded
as part of the observation of
Constitution Day. It was noted
Work on the 440-foot, 16,-
000.-ton icebreaker, the largest
in the world, began in the
spring of 1956 at the Admiralty
(formerly Marti) Shipyard in
Leningrad. The launching, which
the Russians may have hoped to
time as part of the 40th anni-
in the Soviet press at the time
that this was only the first
phase of construction and that
much work remained to be done.
Because the draft
of the completed vessel will ex-
ceed the depth of the Leningrad
shipyard's exit through the
Morskoy Canal, the vessel has
been equipped with bow and stern
pontoons. The existence of the
pontoons seems to indicate that
the Lenin will be completed in
Leningrad and then floated
through the canal, possibly to
Kronshtadt. It may be some
time before the reactor is in-
stalled.
The usefulness of the new
icebreaker to Northern Sea Route
operations should be consider-
able, since it will need refuel-
ing only about once a year and
will be able to break ice up to
six feet thick.
(Prepared by ORR; Concurred in
by OSI)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
LABOR PROBLEMS IN THE
The highly industrialized
satellites of Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, and Poland are
taking steps to correct in-
efficiencies in the use of la-
bot'and to improve productivity
as a part of their general pro-
grams of economic reform. Some
of these measures have caused
unemployment, lowered morale,
and increased the workers'
antagonism toward their lead-
ers. Labor dislocations stem-
ming from these reforms will
make more difficult the achieve-
ment of established production
targets and may cause wide-
spread worker unrest. In Poland
this could result in bitter
strikes, even though strikes
have recently been discouraged
by Gomulka.,
Czechoslovakia
The campaign to rationalize
the allocation of labor in
Czechoslovakia calls for the
discharge of over half the per-
sonnel employed by the Produc-
tion, Communications, and
Health Ministries in Prague and
by corresponding commissariats
in Bratislava. Other agencies
will be affected as well. In
addition, pensioners and some
industrial workers are said to
be destined for transfer to'
labor-short areas. This dis-
location will affect over 100,-
000 persons.
Large numbers of the dis-
charged white-collar workers,
balking at the prospect of
manual labor, are remaining in
the urban areas, creating an
unemployment 'problem in Czech-
osiovakia.for the first time
since World War Il. Because
inflationary pressures are in-
creasing, the regime may be
forced to cut purchasing power;
NORTHERN SATELLITES
some wage cuts have been re-
ported already, and workers
have been warned that they may
expect few increases in wages
before 1960. The resulting
decrease in the standard of
living presumably will cause
greater labor unrest.
Poland
An influential Polish
editor informed the American
Embassy in Warsaw that approxi-
mately 230,000 workers will be
dismissed or retired. An esti-
mated 200,000-300,000 are al-
ready unemployed. Although
the regime maintains that there
is a job for every person dis-
charged, the reluctance of white-
collar and industrial workers
to do farm labor keeps urban
areas congested with unemployed.
Over 400,000 people enter the
labor market in Poland each
year, aggravating the problem.
Gomu .ka has already adopted
a harder labor line--exemplified
by his sudden curtailment of
the management role of workers'
councils and his statement last
December that no raise in wages
might be expected in the first
half of 1958.
These factors, plus the
uncertainty attending Poland's
worker redistribution campaign,
will probably intensify labor
unrest and result in a growing
number of strikes.
East Germany
The effects of the economic
reorganization now under way in
East Germany. havenot yet caused
workers to suffer appreciably,
because the labor shortage
caused by the flight of refugees
has kept,down the featherbedding
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
in factories, extensive in
Czechoslovakia and Poland, How-
ever, the East German worker is
unusually antagonistic to the
regime at present because the
reduction of the 48-hour week
to 45 hours-cut wages in some
instances, while extensive
propaganda favoring a possible
increase in work norms has ir-
ritated the workers.
Serious shortages of per-
sonnel in some production
sectors and the large num-
ber of "unproductive" white-
collar workers ensure that
sooner of later a "campaign
will be launched toy ration- 25X1
East German labor.
(Prepared by ORR)
SOVIET JOURNAL DISCUSSES SATELLITE COLLECTIVIZATION
An article in the latest
issue of the Soviet theoretical
journal Kommunist discusses the
inevitabffity o complete col-
lectivization in all Socialist
countries and appears to call
for an accelerated campaign in
at least four of the Eastern
European satellites. The four
countries singled out--Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and
Albania--have been pushing col-
lectivization and a campaign to
overcome peasant opposition
during the past year. In addi-
tion, the article sezves to re-
mind the other satellites that
they must eventually collectiv-
ize.
The article could be the
forerunner of more direct and
open Soviet intervention in
satellite affairs. Such a
marked reversal, however, of
the USSR's post-Stalin policy
of permitting each of the satel-
lites a limited degree of lati-
tude in determining for itself
the speed and manner of achiev
ing the goals of socialization.
seems unlikely. Moscow un-
doubtedly is aware that this
could lead to unrest, andad-
verse reactions could be ex-
pected both within the Commu-
nist parties and among the
populations.
The article acknowledges
that collectivization is a
"complicated and difficult"
process which must be carried
through "gradually.". It points
out that such a policy cannot
proceed "peacefully" since it
requires the "inevitable" liqui-
dation of peasant (kulak) op-
position. It implies that the
satellites must be ready to
deal with violent peasant re-
action in the final stages of
collectivization. The article
goes on to cite the USSR and
Communist China as "useful
models" and then says that Bul-
garia and Czechoslovakia "in
particular" and Albania and
Rumania secondarily are coun-
tries where "conditions" are
now favorable for an intensified
campaign against the remaining
kulaks.
These "conditions" are not
enumerated but they probably in-
clude achievement of at least
50-percent socialization of the
agricultural' sector and a re-
gime secure enough to put down
any resistance. While Khru-
shchev's recent speech in Hun-
gary made clear the USSR would
not hesitate to intervene in
any satellite to preserve the
socialist system, the USSR
would be unlikely deliberately
to initiate a program in a coun-
try where it felt intervention
would be necessary.
The omission of any refer-
ence to East Germany, Poland,
and Hungary is a recognition
that these countries do not meet
the.required "conditions."
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17 April 1958
None of them is over 40-percent
socialized, all have poor eco-
nomic conditions, and all have
internal situations which do
not permit a rapid increase in
collectivization at this time.
In East Germany and Hungary,
the regimes might not be able
to control peasant resistance
without Soviet'intervention;
and Khrushchev specifically
told the Hungarians to continue
their moderate agricultural
policy on his recent visit.. In
Poland, Gomulka's popular sup-
port is based in part on his
own agricultural policy, which
calls for collectivization much
later, and in some form suitable
to the country's peculiar con-
ditions.
There should be no diffi-
culty in carrying out the recom-
mendations of this article in
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and
Albania. Bulgaria is.already
approximately 90-percent social-
ized, and the regime is deter-
mined to push ahead as rapidly
as possible. In Czechoslovakia,
last year's collectivization
offensive is being renewed this
summer, with a goal of greater
than 80-percent socialization
by the end of 1959 as against
68-percent at -presenti iThe
Czechs are working toward com-
pletion of the agricultural so-
cialization program in. `scree years
and have initiated a strong prop-
aganda campaign against kulaks.
In Albania, approximately
65 percent of the arable land
is now socialized, a rise from
38 percent since the end of
1956. The Albanians are work-
ing toward a goal of 85 percent
by the end of 1960.
The Rumanian regime has
been actively pushing collectivi-
zation, now more than 50 per-
cent, but has apparently been
meeting peasant resistance.
There have been reports of ac-
tive resistance in eastern Ru-
mania in the provinces of Galati,
Iasi, and Constanta in January
and in Iasi in March, includ-
ing one which said Soviet
troops were required in a vil-
lage in Galati. Perhaps as a
result of this, party First Sec-
retary Gheorghiu-Dej in a speech
at Constanta on 3 April stressed
the need for "consolidation" of
the existing gains in collectivi-
zation and an increase in mecha-
nization and agricultural produc-
tion, thus implying a slackening
in the rate of collectivization.
Therefore, if Rumania is per-
mitted to carry out this slow-
down, the article would not have
been meant to indicate a Soviet
policy change toward the satel-
lites. On the other hand, if
Rumania reverts to active col-
lectivization, this would indi-
cate that the article was meant
to.signal more direct Soviet in-
terference in satellite affairs.
Concurred in by ORR) 25X1
.CHINESE COMMUNISTS INVITE-NEHRU TO VISIT TIBET
Peiping?ss.invitation to
Indian Prime Minister Nehru for
a visittoTibet, announced in
the Indian Parliament last week,
probably results from persist-
ent though cautious pressure on
the Chinese Communists from
Lhasa, which looks. hopefully
to India as a moderating in-
fluence-on Peiping ' s ambitions
to consolidate its domination
over.Tibet. Requests by Lhasa
that the Indian leader be per-
mitted to come may have been
circumspectly seconded by New
Delhi,.which historically has had
close ties in Tibet. Tibetan
resistance leaders in India
were reportedly seeking help
from the Indians earlier
this year in promoting a
visit.
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17 April 1958
Stories in the Indian
press have tentatively estab-
lished the date for Nehru's
ten-day trip, returning the
Dalai Lama's three-month state
visit to India in the winter
of 1956-57, as "sometime in
September." Peiping's willing-
ness to have the Indian leader
come to Tibet suggests that
the Chinese Communists are con-
fident they will be able to
put on a convincing show for
their visitor.
Peiping's objectives will
probably be to impress the
Indians with the "progress"
achieved in Tibet under Commu-
nist guidance and to create an
impression of friendly coopera-
tion between the Chinese and
Tibetans. The Indian politi-
cal officer in Lhasa has pre-
sumably reported to New Delhi
the sporadic armed resistance
to Chinese rule which has con-
tinued in eastern Tibet since
1956, and Peiping is probably
anxious to discredit reports
of this activity.
The Chinese can be ex-
pected to shepherd the Indian
leader through a tour of the
Lhasa area, where they are
in firm control, and to
demonstrate the peaceful de-
velopment of the country. He
will probably be shown the
new airfield, the expanded
electric power plant, and
other construction projects.
Nehru's contacts with the
Dalai Lama and other Tibetan
leaders will be closely
chaperoned to preclude any ex-
pression of Tibetan hostility
toward Peiping. The Chinese
can be expected to foster
the illusion of "autonomy"
which Peiping has sought to
create by withdrawing a num-
ber of Chinese technicians
and political cadres during
the past year and replacing
them with Tibetans.
PEIPING AND MOSCOW APPLY PRESSURE ON JAPAN
Communist China's refusal
to carry out its private trade
agreement with Japan and the
USSR's intransigence on terms
for Japanese fishing rights in
northwest Pacific waters have
put Japanese Prime Minister
Kishi in an extremely diffi-
cult position just before a
general election..
After reaching an under-
standing with Taipei on the
Communist-flag issue, Kishi
announced on 9 April he would
support the trade agreement,
but without recognizing Commu-
nist China or its "right" to
fly its flag in Japan. Kishi
apparently believed Peiping
would accept his unofficial as-
surance that Japan legally
could not prevent the flag's
flying.
Peiping, however, which
has regarded the agreement as
a major breakthrough in its
efforts to establish official
relations with Tokyo, took par-
ticular exception to Tokyo's
emphasis on the agreement's
unofficial character. The Chi-
nese Communists apparently be-
lieve they can force Kishi to
reverse himself and thus keep
alive the Japan-Taiwan rift.
To intensify pressure from
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it CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY A Y
17 April 1958
Japanese business groups on
Kishi., Peiping may stall pres-'
ent Sino-Japanese iron and
steel negotiations; it has al-
ready delayed the departure of
a trade mission staff which was
to prepare for the projected
Tokyo office.
Japan has responded to
Peiping's attack by asserting
it cannot change its stand and
Peiping seems determined not
to concede. Kishi thus is vul-
nerable to charges of frustrat-
ing Japanese sentiment for trade
with the mainland. This is cer-
tain to cost him support if
elections are held in May and
may ultimately cause his down-
fall as prime minister. His
successor presumably would be
a Liberal-Democrat more inclined
toward closer relations with
Communist China.
Kishi thus may be forced to
seek a new solution, but any
breach of his understanding with
Taipei probably would result in
severance of diplomatic rela-
tions by Chiang Kai-shek.
Japan's strong stand against
Soviet pressures on the fishery
issue appears to have wide pub-
lic support. Japan and the USSR
appear to be nearing agreement
on a salmon quota of approxi-
mately 100,000 tons, but still
disagree as to whether the Sea
of Okhotsk will be closed to
Japanese fishing after this year.
Moscow apparently expects Tokyo's
stand on this issue to weaken as
elections and the fishing season
draw near.
WEST GERMAN - SOVIET TRADE AND REPATRIATIONS AGREEMENT
The West German - Soviet
trade, repatriation, and consu-
lar agreement, to be formally
signed in Bonn on 25 April, is
being welcomed by all German
political parties and the press
as an important step toward pro-
moting "detente and cooperation"
between the two countries. For-
eign Ministry officials are more
cautious in their appraisal,
since the repatriation under-
standing depends entirely on
Soviet good faith.
Bonn appears to have made
substantial concessions in the
negotiations, probably because
of the desire to use the treaty
in countering opposition party
allegations that Moscow would
not deal with the Adenauer gov-
ernment after the Bundestag de-
cision to accept nuclear weap-
ons. The repatriation agreement
takes the form of a Soviet oral
commitment to give "benevolent
consideration" to the return,
with certain exceptions, of
those in the USSR who were Ger-
man citizens on 21 June 1941--
possibly 15,000--a considerable
reduction from the 100,000 eth-
nic Germans Bonn demanded last
summer. The return of even a
few thousand, however, would be
a major political advantage for
Adenauer as was the return of
the German prisoners of war af-
ter his 1955 Moscow trip.
Bonn acceded to the Soviet
desire for a large increase in
trade targets for 1958 through
1960. The new agreement sets
tdtal trade goals for the three
years at $750,000,000, reaching
an annual level in 1960 of
$300,000,000, compared to the
1P57 trade volume of $157,000,-
000. A Soviet trade office, to
be established in Cologne, will
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
allow Moscow to increase the
already
large
force of over
150
Soviet
many.
personnel in West Ger-
Although Soviet negotia-
tors had hinted in late March
that the Bundestag decision:to
accept nuclear weapons would
make a trade agreement virtually
impossible, Moscow was evidently
more. concerned with its long-run
objectives of a trade agreement
and establishing close contacts
with a country it expects to
see exerting increasing influ
once in Europe. Indicative of
Soviet interest in the agree-
ment is First Deputy Premier
Mikoyan's scheduled appearance
in Bonn to sign it. Moscow
probably hopes that eventually
a post-Adenauer government in
Bonn may take a more neutralist
position and expects that in
any case the trade agreement
will tend to increase pressure
by German business groups on
the government for even further
improvements in relations with
the USSR.
THE SITUATION IN CUBA
The Cuban rebels are con-
tinuing their hit-and-run at-
tacks against scattered towns
and army garrisons and appear
determined to carry on their
"war.to the death" against
President-Batista, despite the
losses sustained in the abor-
tive uprising and general strike
attempt of 9-10 April. Estimates
of fatalities in last week's
disturbances range from 50 to
350;''more damaging to the rebel
movement, however, was the
weakening of its underground
organization in Havana as a re-
sult of arrests and killings
during police mop-up operations,
and internal dissension arising,
from efforts to fix the blame
for the failure of the Havana
uprising.
Although rebel leader Fidel
Castro'has charged that the anti-
Batista movement is receiving
inadequate support from abroad,
exile groups in several middle
American. countries have appar- 25X1
to the rebels.
The size and military capa-
bility of the Castro forces remain
sigicant in relation to Batista's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
rCUBA
military establishment of more
than 35,000 troops. As in the
past 16 months, Castro can prob-
ably carry on little more than
a war of nerves. His most seri-
ous handicap is probably the
weakness of his movement in
Havana. It is unlikely that
either an armed uprising or
general strike could succeed
without strong support in the
capital; both the attempt last
week and a general strike in
August 1957 failed in Santiago,
capital of rebel-infested
Oriente Province, after word
arrived that there had been
little response in Havana,
LAOTIAN ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS
Prospects for the Commu-
nist-front Neo Lao Hak Zat
(NLHZ) candidates in the elec-
tion on 4 May for 21 Laotian
National Assembly seats appear
to be fairly good.. French Am-
bassador Gassouin, who depre-
ciates the Communist threat in
Laos, is advocating the elec-
tion of several NLHZ candidates
and "fervently hopes" that
NLHZ leader Prince Souphannou-
vong, whom he classifies as a
nationalist and "head and
shoulders" above his non-
Communist Lao colleagues, will
be included in the new govern-
ment.
The conservative leaders,
despite the discipline and ef-
fective campaigning of the Com-
munist front, appear unable to
cooperate effectively among
themselves or to maintain dis-
cipline among their followers.
There is evidence of personal
distrust among these leaders
and each appears to be back-
ing his own list among the 83
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUA['AR!
17 April 1958
conservatives in the field. The
leftists, on the other hand,
early agreed to a single slate
of 21.
Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma, who should logically be
the rallying point of the con-
servative forces, has avoided
strenuous campaigning and is ad-
vocating the election of four
or five NLHZ candidates to the
assembly. He fears that a sweep-
ing conservative.,wictory would
drive the NLHZ back to the jungles
and lead to a renewal of civil
war. The most effective spokes-
man for the conservatives ap-
pears to be Katay, leader of the
National party, whose activities
are still limited by his recent
stroke.
The conservatives are ap-
parently relying for victory on
their control of the election
machinery and on the influence
of the Laotian Army. If the gov-
ernment attempts to count out
the NLHZ after the balloting,
however, or if the evidence of
fraud, corruption, or voter in-
timidation is too gross, a seri-
ous reaction may be expected
from the NLHZ leaders.
-
-
timate
that
NLHZ will
th
e
win
be-
tween
five
and ten seats
and
pos-
sibly more. Such a success for
the newly organized leftist
party would constitute a serious
setback for the government and
might well undermine the gov-
ernment's basically pro-Western
foreign policies.
25X1
25X1
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 April 1958
The prolonged dispute over
Malta's future status appears
stalemated. After advocating
integration with Britain as a
solution to,the colony's chronic
economic weakness, Prime Minis-
ter Mintoff now threatens to
campaign for independence be-
cause of his dissatisfaction
with the amount of aid London
is offering.
Because of his increasing-
ly erratic moves--last December
he pushed through the Malta
legislature a resolution to
sever ties with Britain--Min-
toff's integration plan has lost
support in British political
circles. The colonial secretary
recently suggested a five-year
trial period before admitting
three Maltese members to the
.House of Commons.
Mintoff, however, rejected
the interim period aid offer of
over $2,800,000 annually in so-
cial services, unemployment as-
sistance, plus $70,000,000 in
BALEARIC
ISLANDS
MALTESE ISLANDS
Valletta
MALTA -.-
MILES
24967
Tunis _
capital assistance, and a budg-
etary grant this year of $14,-
000,000. Mintoff demanded an
additional $5,000,000 and is
proceeding to spend government
funds as if the sum had been
granted. He anticipates that
local funds will soon be exhaust-
ed, which would probably bring
his. resignation and force Brit-
ain to call new elections for
June or July, and perhaps govern
under emergency powers in the
interval.. London appears pre-
pared to reconsider its whole
Malta policy if negotiations
with Mintoff on the basis of
the five-year interim plan fail.
There is comparatively lit-
tle independence sentiment on
the island, where the Royal
Navy's dockyard is the chief
industry, but Mintoff's dicta-
torial control of Malta's power-
ful Labor party gives him ample
maneuverability in threatening
Britain. He has a popular is-
sue in his vigorous defense of
the dockworkers' right to
SICILY
`-GRVA
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ST1 ARY
17 April 1958
alternative employment in face
of Britain's plan for gradually
cutting down on dockyard opera-
tions.
The Nationalist opposition
leader and former prime minis-
ter, Dr. Borg Olivier,
has previ-
ously advocated independence.
The Colonial Office believes
that the powerful archbishop of
Malta--who has often opposed
Mintoff--could probably ensure
his electoral defeat. Mintoff
possesses, however, a high nuis-
ance value with his election
plans and his capability of
harassing Britain's large naval
and air facilities on the is-
land.
IMPROVED POSITION OF PERU'S NON-COMMUNIST LEFT
The position of Peru's
leftist but non-Communist APRA
party, the largest political
group in the country, has prob-
ably improved in recent weeks.
The new foreign minister, Raul
Porras, is close to APRA. More-
over, the party's support of
conservative President Prado
appears to have been very effec-
tive in ending the serious Com-
munist-inspired labor unrest on
12 April.
APRA provided the mass sup-
port for Prado's election to
the presidency in 1956, but it
is so bitterly disliked by the
military that its followers have
been given no high-level govern-
ment appointments except abroad.
The military may be able to
accept Porras' appointment, how-
ever, since the same cabinet re-
shuffle of 5 April resulted in
dropping the minister of interi-
or, thought to be pro-Communist
by the military.
The cabinet reshuffle,
which in part reflected popular
dissatisfaction over Peru's
growing economic difficulties,
was followed by a week-long wave
of Communist-led labor unrest
and violence, particularly in
the mountain city of Cuzco,
where the commanding general
was held captive by rioters for
several hours and the army dur-
ing the week had to move in 500
troops with full battle equip-
ment. In response, members of
Prado's own political party
joined with APRA and the small
National Union party in Congress
on 11 April to introduce a bill
to give the President plenary
powers to deal with Communists
summarily without court action.
At APRA insistence, Prado had
also agreed by 11 April to round
up Communist leaders and deport
them.
The ending of all the
strikes on 12 April--possibly
because the Communists learned
of Prado's intentions--may in-
cline Prado to return to his
former policy of vacillation.
APRA's position in Peruvian
politics has probably improved,
nevertheless, because of the
apparent effectiveness of its
support of Prado in the face
of serious Communist-inspired
unrest, and APRA seems likely
to continue its emphasis on
anti-Communist action, and may
thereby conciliate the military.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT "REVISIONISM"
Since the meeting of f6r,,
eign Communist leaders in Mos-
cow ih November, Soviet spokes-,
men have waged an intensified
campaign against "revisionism"
.--liberal and`nationalisttc de-
viations from dogma and policies
established by Moscow. Khru-
shchev-,and others have condemned
as "revisionist" a wide variety
of ideas which have gained cur-
rency in the Communist world
during the past two years, chal-
lenge the supremacy of the USSR,
.question the validity of Commu-
nist dogma, and repudiate basic
features in the Soviet system.
The presently mounting
propaganda barrage against "re-
visionism"--labeled the "main
danger" within the Communist
movement--reflects the increased
sensitivity of the Soviet lead-
ers since the Hungarian revolt
to even the slightest manifes-
tations of nonconformity and
criticism by Communists at home
or abroad. While directed main-
ly at departures from orthodoxy
outside the USSR, notabl in
Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Com-
munist parties in the West, the
campaign is addressed also at
defiant Soviet intellectuals.
Rise of "Revisionism"
One of the principal re-
percussions of de-Stalinization
and the Polish and Hungarian .
upheavals was the emergence:,
within the Communist world of
a current independent and criti-
cal thought which Moscow has
indiscriminately branded "re-
visionism." While the scope
of ferment has differed from
country to country, the evolu-
tion of thought has developed
along similar lines. From at-
tacks on the cult of Stalin,
the criticism spread to a gen-
eral reappraisal of fundamental
Soviet theory and practice. The
most outspoken criticism has
~IA
Cp~'E ODE- ~ ---
"ff
alwo
come from a small but articulate
group-','of Communist intellectuals,
but the vigor of the Soviet re-
action suggests that reserva-
tions about the Soviet,.` system.,
however, concealed: and,uncrys-
talli zed, have affected. aide
circles of Communists in all.
countries.
The protest against Soviet
domination of the Communist
world is the form of "revision-
ism" most often denounced by
Moscow. The protagonists of
this school of thought, notably
the Yugoslavs and to a lesser
extent the Poles, contend that
relations within the Communist
world should be based on equali-
ty and independence. Tito and
Gomulka have advanced the con-
cept of."different roads to so-
cialism" well beyond the limits
intended by Moscow. "Revision-
ist" writers in Yugoslavia and
Poland have.urged that the So-
viet-sponsored "proletarian in.-
ternationalism"--i.e., hegemony
of-the Soviet party--be replaced
by "peaceful coexistence" among
commun st'parties'. The Chinese
Communists also speak of the
need for equality and independ-
ence, but have denounced those
Communist parties which use
their freedom to advance along
"different roads."
. A large body of "revision-
ist" opinion has questioned the
validity-of Communist dogma in
the light of changes in the cap-.
italist world. The Marxist
theory of.the pauperization of
the working class undercapi-
talism--the doctrinal justifi-
cation for socialist revolution
--has been heavily criticized
by Communists in Poland, Yugo-
slavia-, and the West. This
school holds that: economic and
political gains of the working
class in capitalist countries
have introduced "elements of
social sm" which -,ensure the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
ultimate victory of socialism
by evolutionary means and in-
validate Soviet theories of
class struggle and revolution.
These ideas were- most recently
expressed in the draft program
of t 42V. Yugoslav Communist par-
ty published on 13 March.
Many Communista, shocked
by Khrushchev's disclosures
about Stalin and by the Soviet
intervention in Hungary, have
repudiated the Soviet system
as despotism. In their view,
Stalinism was the direct out-
growth of. the Soviet totalitar-
ian system and should be suc-
ceeded by some form of "human-
itarian socialism. it
Moral revulsion against
Stalinism has been common among
Communist intellectuals, but
the forms of protest have varied.
Communists in the West have
criticized mainly the authori-
tarian features of the Soviet
system and have advocated demo-
cratic organizational principles,
greater freedom of expression,
and renunciation of violence as
a.means to,a political end.
Within the Communist bloc, where
the'avenues of protest have been
severely limited, literature
has been the main vehicle for
expression of "revisionist
ideas. Soviet bloc intellec-
tuals, particularly in Poland,
have protested against official
regimentation of creative ac-
tivity and the perversion of
human values under Communism.
Soviet Reaction
The Soviet reaction to
"revisionism" has been a vigor-
ous reassertion of Soviet pri-
macy in the Communist world and
a militant revival of doctri=r-
naire Marxism directed against
all the ideas disapproved by
Moscow. Through ideological
intimidation and organizational
pressure, Moscow has attempted
to restore discipline. The cam-
paign against "revisionism;"
initiated in the summer of 1956
to counter the unsettling ef -
fects of de-Stalinization, has
become increasingly aggressive,
particularly since last Novem-
ber. Previously treated only
as an ideological deviation,
"revisionism"-is now identified
with political treason.
Within the .USSR the attack
has centered primarily on the
intellectual and literary fields.
Following-,.the Hungarian and Pol-
ish revolts in the fall.of 1956,
the regime decisively reversed
the trend toward relaxation of
restrictive policies toward in--
tellectuals,, though without re-
course to Stalinist terror.
With Khrushchev's intervention
in the arts in the -epringl"of
1957, the official principles
of party direction and "social-
ist realism" were authoritative-
ly reaffirmed, ...and - . deviant
writers and intellectuals were
exposed to mounting official
pressure for conformity. "Gloomy"
descriptions of Soviet life
like Dudintsev's novel Not By
Bread Alone were singleU"'ouT
as examples of "revisionism"
and-calls. were sounded at the
republic party congresses in
January and February to weed
out "revisionists" from the par-
ty ranks..
As a result of these meas-
ures, . a. large .degree. of con-
formity has been restored in
Soviet domestic life. ghru-
shphev himself recently implied
that "revisionist manifestations'"
now area thing of the past in
the USSR. At.a.Kremlin recep-
tion on 8 February honoring
leading members. of the Soviet
intelligentsia, Khrushchev ex-
pressed great satisfaction with
the loyalty of Soviet intellec-
tuals,' in contrast to his threat-
ening attitude in the ;spring
and summer of 1957. As a pre-
cautionary measure against re-
newed outbreaks, however, the
regime has stepped up- its cam-
paign against "revisionism."
Khrushchev set the tone
for the present propaganda cam-
paign in his October Revolution
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
anniversary address on. 7 Novem-
ber.' He castigated "revision-
ism " at greater length and with
more vitriol than he or any,
other top leader had before.
He charged "revisionists" such
as Diilas in Yugoslavia and,, Nagy
in Hungary with "outright be-
tra.ya'1" of the Communist cause.
Shortly thereafter the confer-
ence of foreign Communist lead-
ers was convened in Moscow in
an effort to gain support for
a joint struggle against ""re-
visionism" based on -rigid prin-
ciples laid down by the USSR.
Despite Yugoslav opposi-
tion and Polish reservations,
the USSR obtained bloc-wide ac-
ceptance at the Moscow confer-
ence of its primacy and of nine
"universal laws" for building
socialism based on Soviet ex-
perience. The Soviet position
was strongly supported by Mao
Tse-tung, who had long agreed
with Moscow on the "universal
laws" and who in June 1957 had
described "revisionism" as the
principal problem of the bloc.
However, although "revisionism"
was declared the "main danger"
within the Communist movement,
each Communist party was granted
the right to determine for it-
self the degree of danger, as
well as to decide how the "uni-
versal laws" would be applied.
Probably in response to
the failure to obtain full ac-
ceptance of the Soviet position
at the Moscow conference, the
Soviet press and radio::ls?ince
November 1957 have carried a
steady barrage of attacks on
"revisionism" by leading party
theoreticians. From late No-
vember to mid-March, 55 full-
length commentaries denouncing
"revisionism" were broadcast
to bloc and Yugoslav audiences,
as against ten in the preceding
six months. While most-of these
broadcasts have been beamed to
Yugoslavia, no charges of "re
visionism" have.been levied di-
rectly at the Yugoslav party,
in line with the ideological
truce achieved by Khrushchev
and Tito in "Rumania last Au-
gust.
"Revisionism" in Poland
has been one o the main targets
of the attack. While Moscow has
publicly cofferred the mark of
orthodoxy on the Gomulka regime,
it has attempted to bring pres-
sure to bear on the Polish Com-
munists'. Polish .philosopher
L. Kolakowski has drawn partic-
ularly heavy fire from Soviet
critics, who have treated him
as one of the chief contemporary
"'revisionists."
In an apparent effort to im-
munize the Soviet population.
against "revisionist" influences,
the regime has pointedly re-
f rai ned from any serious discus-
sion of the merits of arguments
raised by its foreign critics.
The Soviet press has treated
Yugoslav--developments with stud-
ied indifference during the past
six months and has even avoided
comment on the recently published
Yugoslav draft program, although
many concepts in it are "revi-
sionist." The Soviet approach
has been merely to reaffirm cat-
egorically the validity of So-
viet theory and practice and to
label all deviations as revivals
of positions condemned by Lenin.
This line of attack, which re-
cently led to the reissuance of
Lenin's collected writings on
"revisionism," has been but'
tressed by a concerted campaign
to silence criticism of the USSR
by extolling Soviet technologi-
cal and economic achievements.
Prospects
The concerted Soviet drive
indicates that the Soviet lead-
ers regard "revisionism" as a
serious problem. By doubting
the fundamentals of Soviet the-
ory and./ practice, "revisionism"
threatens to vitiate the mili-
tancy of Communist doctrine,
weaken the authority of the USSR,
and undermine the unity of the
Communist world. In meeting
this long-run challenge, the
Soviet regime is banking heavi];y
on ideological indoctrination
and organizational pressure.
Should these fail, the regime
would be faced with the alterna-
tive of force.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
INDIA'S NUCLEAR
India has made a small be-
ginning in the nuclear energy
field with a realistic program
within its capabilities and sup-
ported by an abundance of essen-
tial raw materials. One reactor
is in operation, two others are
near completion, and several
plants for processing raw ma-
terials are in operation or un-
der construction.
nuclear energy program
the largest in Asia
Natural Resources
India has the world's larg-
est thorium reserves--estimated
at about 500,000 tons in mona-
zite sands, principally in Kerala.
It ranks third or fourth in
beryl reserves and production
and also has substan-
tial deposits of zir-
conium. New uranium
discoveries in the
Ranchi Plateau area
of Bihar in northeast
India appear promis-
ing, and Prime Minis-
ter Nehru recently
claimed that India
has about 30,000 tons
of uranium reserves,
Personnel
India's nuclear
energy development is
hampered because the
few qualified scien-
tists and technicians
are overburdened with
teaching and adminis-
trative responsibili-
ties. Although Nehru
stated recently that
there were 700 scien-
tists working in the
atomic Oaerg.y field,
this figure probably
;
iefer s .;to{ engineers and
ENERGY PROGRAM
technicians as well-is scien-
tists.
Orgabization?and.'.Facilities
Nuclear energy activity is
directed by the Department of
Atomic Energy (DAE), an inde-
pendent agency responsible to
the prime minister. The present
advisory Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, soon to be given full ex-
ecutive powers, will become re-
sponsible for formulating the
policy and budget of the DAE
and for carrying out the govern-
ment's atomic energy policies.
A processing plafl1 at Alwaye
in Kerala, State, ip ope atioh.
since December 1952, is reported
treating 1,500 tons of monazite
a year and is being remodeled
to double this capacity. A plant
to extract uranium and thorium
salts from the residue of the
Alwaye .process -went: ?. '.into
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
operation near;Bombay.in August
1955. A uranium'-processing
plant to produce uranium metal
suitable for readtor fuel is ex-
pected to.go into operation in
1958. A heavy-water plant now
being built is to produce 10 to
15 togs apaally by about 1960.
Scientific and technologi-
cal research is carried out ex-
clusively by government labora-
t.or and universities, although
onljr a few of the 33 universi-
ties have science departments.
To overcome this handicap, the
government has: launched a sub-
sta.ntial program for construct-
ingand staffing new facilities
during the next 15 years.
Many of the facilities of
the Atomic Energy Establishment
being,built at Trombay--a suburb
of Bombay--are in .operationo and
students from. -Egypt, 'Burma,: and
Thailand are already using them.
The primary equipment is the
Indian-built 1,,000-kilowatt
"swimming-pool'.' research reac-.
tor; fueled with enrichedura
nium supplied-by.Britain.
A second reactor is also
under construction at Trombay'
and is scheduled for completion
in 1959. This 10,000-kilowatt
"NflX-'type":,research reactor is
being jointly constructed and
financed by India and Canada at
a cost of $14,000,000. It will
provide a more advanced training
facility than the first one and
an increased -number; of radioiso-
topes.
A zero-energy reactor being
built at Trombay is scheduled
for completion by mid-1958. it
is to be used for studies in
fuel element arrangement and
spacing, and reactor design.
The Atomic Energy Estab
lishmeist 'at Trombay 1inaugurat d
a. train*ng,:schooi for.:'nuclear
scientists and engineers on 1
August 1957, with an enrollme t
of 170 students. Plans call .or
establishment of research.labora-
tories, a plant for producing
fuel elements, and a,radiochemi-
cal laboratory for plutopium
study.
The Tata Institute of Fun-
damental Research at Bombay has
conducted all the research for
the atomic energy program to
date. Although its major inter-
est is cosmic ray research, the
institute ha's also dealt with
nuclear`physics'instrumentation,
reactor design, meson theory,
and proton-neutron interactions.
The. institute has a 12-inch cy-
clotron, 100- to 200-kev (thous-
and electron volts) Van de Graaff
accelerator, a 1.2-mev (million
electron volts) Cockcroft-Waltan
accelerator, a beta-ray specto-
graph, and a mass spectrometer.
The University of Bombay's
School of Science has done phys-
ics research, chiefly in spec.
troscopy. The Institute of Nu-
clear Physics of the University
of Calcutta has a 400,000-volt
accelerator from which neutron
time-of-flight studies are made;
also in operation are a beta
spectrometer,and an electron mi-
croscope,both of Indian manufac-
ture, and .a 38-inch 4-mev cyclo-
tron. The Physics Department of
the University of Delhi is carry-
ing on research on fundamental
particles and is.studying the
origin of cosmic rays in nova
outbursts.
Goals of the Program
India's present nuclear
energy program is aimed at fun-
damental.re'Search and applica-
tion of nuclear science to agri-
culture, industry, and medicine.
Production of nuclear power is
of major interest to government
and scientific leaders, however.,
because of the relatively high.
cost of conventional power. The
secretary of the Department of
Atomic Energy recently announced
that India is considering the
purchase of one or two nuclear
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
power plants in the next few
years.
Nehru has pledged that no
Indian government *ill--use
atomic energy for other than
peaceful purposes. The Indian
Army, however;'?'~has held defen-
sive atomic warfare exercises,
and,is likely to expand such
training in the future.
International Relationships
Although India hopes to
rely on don}estic manpower and
resources fqr its nuclear energy
program,'it probably will con-
tinue to need technical and fi-
nancial assistance, primarily
from other Commonwealth coun-
tries. India and Britain signed
an agreement in December 1955
providing for close. cooperation
in the development of the peace-
ful uses of atomic energy. Can-
ada and India signed an agree-
ment on 28 April 1956 to cover
the installation of the NRX re-
The Indian and French Atom-
ic Energy Commissions are carry-
ing on joint research
India has declined the
United States' offer of a bi-
lateral research agreement pro-
viding for financial assistance
totaling $350,000 toward the
purchase of a research reactor,
but Indian students have accppted
the ICA's sponsorship to the
International School of Nuclear
Science and Engineering in the
United States. The 21 tons of
heavy water to be used'in India's
second research reactor have
been purchased from the United
States, and India has sold sur-
plus monazite and thorium nitrate
to the US. India does not sup-
port the US-proposed Asian Re-
gional Nuclear Center in the
Philippines.
New Delhi has not accepted
Moscow's offers of technical as-
sistance despite Nehru's state-
ments that India favors scien-
tific cooperation with all na-
tions. Cooperation with Soviet
bloc countries is limited to
an occasional exchange of stu-
dents and visiting profe
favored financial arrangements
within the sterling bloc, and
membership in the Commonwealth
tend to direct India's bilater-
al-or international activities
into British or Canadian chan-
nels.
A supporter of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency,
New Delhi now may turn more to
the agency than to bilateral
agreements. India is in a good
position to barter its radioac-
tive materials for equipment
and facilities it does not yet
possess.
(Prepared Jointly with OSI)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 April 1958
POSITION-OF PAKISTANI PRESIDENT APPARENTLY WEAKENING
Pakistan's President Mirza
may no longer be able to domi-
nate the political scene in his
country. These signs, which
include. indications that the
pro-Western President no longer
enjoys the full support of the
army, suggest that he may have
a hard time getting re-elected
to office if national elections
are held next November as sched-
uled. He also might be unsuc-
cessful should he attempt to
assume dictatorial
powers in order to
prevent a further
worsening of the do-
mestic political
situation or to re-
verse a trend toward
neutralism in Paki-
stan.
Mirza's efforts
to play. political
parties. against each
other to prevent any
threat to this ;au-.,.7
thority,during the
past two years have
resulted in his woo-
ing and rejecting
nearly every impor-
tant party in the
country. Like the
Shah of Iran, Mirza
has alienated many important
politicians and has prevented
the development of a stable gov-
ernment under a strong prime
minister. His personal ltntip.a-
thy, for former Prime Minister
Suhrawardy, the most recent
strong leader to appear as a
rival, is well known. Under
these circumstances, Mirza will
probably find it difficult to
find a major political party-
or coalition group willing to
champion him in the forthcoming
elections.
On 19 December 1957:, the
Republican party, which Mirza
helped to create, revolted
against his authority. It broke
away from the government coali-
tion, caused the fall,.of Prime
Minister Chundrigar, Mirza's
close personal friend,and.estab-
lished a new coalition under
Prime Minister Noon with the
support of Suhrawardy, who had
been ousted from the premiership
by Mirza some months earlier.
Mirza's prestige fell noticeably
after this break, and the Ameri-
can Embassy in Karachi reported
that he was attempting '..to-:-re
gain it. by ; making; ~an unusual-
ly large,. number of public
.ppearances...throughout Paki-
stan:..
In early March
1958, Noon apparent-
ly defied Mirza by
sending a delegation
to London to explore
the purchase of some
Canberra light bomb-
ers. Negotiations
were undertaken in
mid-March, despite
an assurance by Mirza
to the American am-
bassador on 7 March
that he did not know
of the matter and
that the request for
bombers should not
be taken seriously.
On 18 March,
Noon and the Republi-
can party withstood
an attempt by the.,opposition
Moslem League to topple the Re-
publican provincial government
in West Pakistan in the hope of
weakening Noon at the national
level and preparing for his
eventual downfall. Mirza was
reported to have favored the
Moslem League. His subsequent
attempts in,-public speeches to
dissociate himself from politi-
cal intrigues were similar to
his efforts last December.
The opportunistic agreement
reached just prior to 18 March
by the Moslem League with the
leftist National Awami party
assembly members for the purpose
of attacking the West Pakistan
government also left the league
discredited in the public eye.
National Awami party leaders
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY Sy
17 April 1958
are also probably disillusioned
with the Moslem League, which
probably cannot by itself ensure
the election of a presidential
candidate.
On 31 March, Governor
Faziul Huq of East Pakistan ap-
parently attempted on his own
authority to replace the Awami
League provincial government,
one of the mainstays of Noon's
national government in Karachi,
with a local coalition. Huq
was himself dismissed the same
day by Mirza following an emer-
gency meeting on Noon's cabinet.
Nevertheless, the fact that Huq
felt he could get away with his
action without obtaining the
consent of Mirza, at whose pleas-
ure he holds office,;.suggests
that the President is no longer
regarded as having real power.
Parliamentary efforts to
unseat the Awami League govern-
ment of East Pakistan also
failed during late March and
early April, and Suhrawardy's
political viability was again
evident. The Moslem League,
which participated in these ef-
forts, once more found itself
impotent. It was not supported
by the National Awami party,
with whose representatives it
had been allied in West Pakistan
less than a month earlier. The
National Awami party's support
for the East Pakistan.' govern-
ment at this time suggests it
considers the Moslem League
there a spent political force.
President Mirza, in seeking
re-election next November, prob-
ably cannot count on the full
support of a single major.'.tia-
tional party. He has antago-
nized the Awami League by.oust-
ing Suhrawardy from the prime
ministership. The Republican
party is suspicious of him. A
number of Moslem League leaders
dislike him. The leftist Na-
tional Awami party, with some
of whose leaders Mirza maintains
relations, is not strong enough
by itself to re-elect Mirza even
in the unlikely event Mirza
should count on it for strong
support.
These points are of impor-
tance to Mirza, since the presi-
dent is elected indirectly by
members of the national and pro-
vincial assemblies rather than
directly by the people?and Mir-
za's re-election would depend
on the good will of Pakistan's
politicians.
Mirza might consider post-
poning national elections or
ruling dictatorially. Should
he postpone elections, he could
be faced with strong opposition
from political parties and a
populace which has shown grow-
ing signs of desiring no further
delay. Should he attempt to
assume sole governing authority,
he might be even more strongly
opposed.
Under these conditions, 25X6
Mirza's ability to remain a dom- 25X6
inant figure would depend on
the support of the army.
Mirza' .s awareness of the
army's;, dtit?ica1'4tt'itude is.. ap-
parent in his statement to the
American ambassador on 7 March
that he intends to replace Ayub
when the general's term expires
at the end of 1958. Mirza ap-
parently no longer trusts Ayub,
who--with the strength of the
army behind him--for years has
been a strong backer of the rul- 25X1
ing clique in Pakistan.
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