CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2005
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• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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tONFIDEa i if11.
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
7
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
Q DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
CENTRAL
14 MAY 1980
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
h702
'Vq r
State Department review completed
COPY NO. fig
OCR NO. 4900/60
20 October 1960
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
20 October 1960
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
BLOC COMMENTARIES ON KHRUSHCHEV'S UN PERFORMANCE
In his public speech in
Moscow on 20 October, reporting
on the results of his UN mission,
Khrushchev elaborated on his
proposals to reorganize the Se-
curity Council, the executive
organs, and the office of the
secretary general. He justified
his activities in New York as
not only worthwhile but neces-
sary in order to raise the "fun-
damental" proposition that the
UN is obsolete and must be re-
constructed to reflect the ac-
tual balance of forces in the
world. He implied that both
India and Indonesia deserved
permanent seats on the Security
Council, and repeated his previ-
ous warnings that decisions
taken by the UN would not be re-
spected until a reorganization
was effected. The Soviet view,
he claimed, had gained sympathy
and understanding among a number
of important states.
Khrushchev used the disarm=
ament issue as the basis for a
vigorous reaffirmation of his
position on points at issue with
the Chinese Communists. He em-
phasized that Marxist-Leninists
must adopt a realistic view of
the world and realize that in
the present balance of power it
is necessary to seek solutions
to the main international prob-
lems on the basis of peaceful
coexistence. He described a
nuclear war as causing unprece-
dented destruction and the death
of "hundreds and hundreds of
millions," and said,"Only adven-
turers can think that a change
in the social order can be a-
chieved by unleashing wars."
Khrushchev also justified his
position on disarmament as being
based on "realistic political,
economic, and moral factors,"in
contrast to a position--by im-
plication China's--of "fatalism
and passivity" on the question
of war and peace.
Khrushchev claimed a great
victory on the question of the
Soviet proposal for eliminating
all colonies. He reiterated
his statement concerning de
facto recognition of the Alge-
rian rebel government, and de-
clared that there could be no
"unity" with colonialism. In
a reference to voting results
he described as a "temporary
thing" the fact the neutralist
countries sometimes;:echo the
colonial powers.
As to the future, Khrushchev
cautioned against optimism on
new disarmament talks. He de-
scribed Western proposals as an
"ill omen" which indicated that
the West still refused to ap-
proach the question seriously.
He again called for a special
session of the UN General As-
sembly in March or April for
heads of government to consider
an agreement on disarmament
principles, which would be sub-
mitted to a new 15-nation com-
mittee. As to a new summit
meeting, he repeated his claim
that agreement had been reached
at Paris to convene another
meeting.
In its propaganda Moscow
has endeavored to create the im-
pression that the Soviet premier
set in motion forces which will
open the way for future Soviet
victories in the UN, closer co-
operation between the bloc and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the Afro-Asian states, and the
ultimate destruction of the "US
voting machine."
As Radio Moscow summed up
the session, "The socialist
states launched a far-flung and
irresistible offensive, forcing
the supporters of imperialism
and colonialism to take up a
defensive position." Soviet
propaganda claimed that Khru-
shchev scored victories on
several key issues. He was
credited with an initial triumph
in defeating Western attempts to
prevent the meeting from becoming
an "unprecedented top-level
forum," Second, Moscow asserted
that the discussion by the
world's leading statesmen re-
vealed that the West came to
the meeting with nothing new or
constructive to offer on press-
ing international problems.
Khrushchev was also pictured
as gaining a "big victory" in
focusing the debate on the issue
of complete and general disarma-
ment and immediate abolition of
the colonial regimes. On both
issues, Moscow claimed success
in exposing Western opposition
to disarmament discussions and
in forcing the West to retreat
on resisting a full-scale as-
sembly debate on colonialism.
A principal, theme which
emerges from bloc propaganda is
that the UN debates should not
be appraised only in terms of
initial successes, but viewed
as a long-range effort begun by
Khrushchev. Bloc media have
picked up and featured Khru-
shchev's remarks that the USSR
"sowed good seeds" which will
inevitably bear fruit. The bloc
has adopted this approach in
dealing with the adverse reaction
to Khrushchev's proposals to re-
vamp the UN executive machinery.
In an address after return-
ing from New York, Czech Presi-
dent Novotny acknowledged that
"for the time being" the neutral
states did not want to go quite
so far on the issue of revising
the secretariat, "even though
they are in general agreement
and want a change...." Novotny
also attempted to convey the im-
pression that the voting record
of the neutralists was in the
process of shifting in favor of
bloc positions. He stressed
that "one must know and under-
stand" that the reason for neu-
tral opposition on certain is-
sues was that they still have
"illusions about the work of
some UN committees" and fail to
see through "US machinations."
Novotny also cautioned
against accepting the participa-
tion of these countries in in-
ternational politics "uncriti-
cally" or "overestimating it,"
He explained that the voting on
the China issue revealed that
many African countries "appar-
ently do not yet have their
bearings and are in many cases
linked with the former colonial
powers."
In his arrival speech in
Budapest, party leader Kadar
took a similar line in differ-
entiating between the general
debate and voting records. He
portrayed the bloc and neutralist
countries as firmly united in
discussion on the issues, but
claimed that "for the time being,
the influence of the imperial-
ists is decisive in voting,"
since votes are not yet determined
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
by "arguments or convictions.
Both Pravda and Izvestia also
claim that the USSR was "let
down" by inexperienced repre-
sentatives of newly independent
states and by other countries,
such as Yugoslavia, which re-
fused to raise their voices in
support of Soviet proposals.
Sino-Soviet Dispute
Overtones of the dispute
between Moscow and Peiping also
figure in the Soviet public
assessment of Khrushchev's UN
activities and in bloc inter-
pretations. Pravda on 15 Octo-
ber connected the Soviet views
on foreign policy with the en-
tire Communist bloc by claiming
that Khrushchev "defended the
Communist world outlook" in the
international arena. As a re-
sult of this, Pravda asserts,
the "leading role" of the So-
viet Union in international af-
fairs became "even more percep-
tible and obvious to every in-
habitant of the earth...."
Speeches by three satellite
leaders on their return to their
own countries also stressed the
importance of Soviet leadership
and Khrushchev's paramount role,
and made it clear that they were
standing behind the Soviet pre-
mier's views of the correct
course to be pursued in inter-
national relations.
Novotny devoted considerable
attention to personal praise for
Khrushchev and expressions of
strong support for the "Leninist
principle of peaceful coexist-
ence,.''- which he characterized
as the basis for bloc policy
during the UN session. Novotny
also emphasized that the his-
toric significance of the General
Assembly debate was due to the
untiring initiative reflected in
policies of the Soviet Union and
that Khrushchev's appearance
and Soviet proposals were the
main contributions of the ses-
sion.
Polish party First Secre-
tary Gomuitca also stressed that
the Soviet proposals made in the
UN constitute a platform for a
world-wide struggle for peace-
ful coexistence. Kadar may
have had the forthcoming world
Communist meeting in mind when
he ended his speech by calling
for "loyalty to the alliance
that ties us to the Soviet
Union and the socialist camp."
In contrast to other bloc
propaganda, Peiping has not
lauded Khrushchev for his ac-
tions at the United Nations.
Furthermore, unlike Moscow's
summation of the session as a
"far-flung and irresistible
offensive" by the USSR a Pei-
ping People's Daily editorial
on 19 October concluded that
"the socialist camp headed by
the Soviet Union was pushed
around in a most outrageous way.
The editorial intimated that the
Soviet Union should draw from
the session the lesson that the
only hope for peace lies in
resolute struggle against Ameri-
can imperialism, a struggle de-
void of illusions about the
United States or the UN, which
is under its control.
Since the debate on the
Chinese representation issue,
the Chinese have devoted con-
siderably more attention to the
General Assembly proceedings
and to Khrushchev personally.
Peiping had previously been
virtually silent on his activi-
ties. The contrast between
Peiping's initial reticence and
later attention indicates that
the Chinese adopted a wait-and-
see attitude toward Khru-
shchev and underscores the
freedom of action they are
taking toward Soviet moves.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The UN's refusal to ac-
quiesce in the arrest of Lu-
mumba by Mobutu has continued
the political stalemate in
Leopoldville. Although Mobutu
continues to take sporadic
actions against Lumumba ad-
herents, the protection af-
forded the deposed premier,by the
UN and the prestige which stems
from occupying the premier's
residence may enable Lumumba
to wait out his opposition.
In contrast to Lumumba's
protection from the UN,
Mobutu remains dependent on
the Congo's student bureaucracy
and the poorly disciplined army.
Several of the student "com-
missioners" have openly crit-
icized Mobutu for failing to
carry out his threat to ar-
rest Lumumba. The almost
total lack of discipline with-
in the army was reflected in
the recent departure from
Leopoldville of one 120-man
contingent despite a plea by
Mobutu to stay.
UN Under Secretary Bunche
on 17 October expressed to
American officials his hope
that "in a matter of weeks"
the Congo Parliament sight be
reconvened and a government
created "which the UN could
support." In Leopoldville,
however, neither Mobutu nor
Lumumba appears anxious to
reconvene Parliament. Mobutu
adherents, while claiming the
support of a majority of
deputies, no longer propose
the convening of Parliament for
the purpose of stripping
Lumumba of his legislative im-
munity. On 17 October, Mobutu
announced that he would con-
tinue to exercise government
power through the army and
the student commissioners until
the end of the year.
Mobutu's arrest of 16
pro-Lumumba politicians on
19 October appears to have
been designed as a warning
to demonstrators in Leo-
poldville, whose activities
on behalf of Lumumba have
taken a particularly violent
turn in the past week. Most
of those arrested were re-
leased the same day, probably
after a search for incrimi-
nating documents such as
those found among Lumumba's
possessions in late Sep-
tember.
Press reports indicate that
the leftist Antoine Gizenga,
Lumumba's erstwhile vice pre-
mier, has proceeded to Stan-
leyville, possibly to scout
the prospects for setting up
a Lumumba "exile" government
there. Although Orientale
Province has been considered
a Lumumba stronghold, its po-
litical leanings have been
obscure since early October,
when Mobutu's soldiers success-
fully arrested several. pro-
Lumumba leaders there, includ-
ing Lumumba's brother.
In Katanga Province, Pres-
ident Tshombd's irritation with
what he considers the limited
extent of Belgian support, to-
gether with his apprehension
over continuing tribal violence,
has led him to improve his
relations with the UN Command.
In a joint communiqud issued
on 17 October, Tshombd and the
UN agreed on two areas in northern
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
20 October 1960
Katanga in which UN forces would
be responsible for security a-
gainst the depredations of anti-
Tshombd Baluba tribesmen. Earli-
er, Tshomb6 had been extremely
critical of UN efforts to main-
tain security. Tshombd has al-
so indicated a disposition to
have all aid to Katanga chan-
neled through the UN, despite
the fact that such a move might
reduce Belgian aid, as well as
make Katanga dependent on the
UN.
SITUATION IN LAOS
Premier Souvanna Phouma has
made several moves apparently
designed to put his regime in a
more favorable light as an ef-
fective vehicle for combating
Communism in 1~aos . At his in-
stigation, the National Assembly
passed a resolution condemning
Communism as incompatible with
Laos' aspirations and claiming
that Pathet Lao functionaries
will in the future be integrated
into the bureaucracy only if
they forswear their allegiance
to a "foreign ideology." The
premier also canceled at the
last minute another rally spon-
sored by the leftist Youth par-
ty and succeeded in having the
party's headquarters moved from
downtown Vientiane to an out-
lying area. Souvanna's rebuke
of Captain Kong Le by placing
him under technical house ar-
rest was publicly attributed to
Kong Le's unauthorized red-car-
pet reception for Soviet Ambas-
sador-designate Abramov on his
arrival in Vientiane on 13 Octo-
ber. A strong attack on the
USSR by the Laotian UN delegate
in a UN General Assembly commit-
tee on 18 October may also have
been stimulated by Souvanna.
The Communist Pathet Lao
has agreed to restore Sam Neua
Province to the Souvanna govern-
ment and to stop attacks on
Laotian Army elements loyal to
the Souvanna government. The
Pathet Lao negotiators insisted
on the right, however, to deter-
mine for themselves which areas
were loyal to Souvanna. Sou-
vanna had previously made these
demands as preconditions for
continuation of the negotiations,
which began in Vientiane on 13
October. Although government
control in Sam Neua will prob-
ably only be nominal and the
Pathet promise to stop attacks
was somewhat less than categor-
ical, the premier will probably
choose to consider the Pathet
Lao concessions sufficient to
permit the talks to move on to
discussion of substantive points
at issue.
The Pathet Lao radio on
17 October broadcast a new ver-
sion of Pathet terms for a set-
tlement with the government, in-
cluding unification of "all
patriotic armed forces" and par-
ticipation of the Pathet Lao's
legal front--the Neo Lao Hak
Sat party (NLHS)--in a coali-
tion government. These demands
probably represent a maximum
bargaining position. The Pathet
Lao may be willing to defer
entry into a coalition govern-
ment if Souvanna offers as-
surances of early elections.
The immediate Pathet aim is
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BURMA
NORTH
en Bien Phu VI ETNAM
.Hanoi
Sam Neua
' :TIANE Pak San
VIENTIANE;
THAILAND
Savannakhet
probably to resume normal po-
litical activity through the
NLHS so as to take advantage
of the present favorable cli-
mate for such activity.
There are fragmentary in-
dications that the forces back-
ing Kong Le in Vientiane may
be beginning to lose their
cohesion. Morale is reported
to be declining in the key
Second Paratroop Battalion, the
main basis of Kong Le's power,
to take action independent of
the Souvanna government. Fac-
tionalism centered on'the is-
sue of Communism is also al-
GULF
OF
TONKI u
OPEW
ttopeu
leged to be developing
in the Youth party, or-
ganized after Kong Le's
coup and previously
active in directing
popular support for
Kong Le. These indi-
cations are tentative
but may become more
pronounced in the ab-
sence of some new ini-
tiative by Kong Le or
his lieutenants.
General Phoumi
and his Savannakhet
Revolutionary Commit-
tee appear to have
consolidated their
control of the Second
Military Region follow-
ing its: break from
Vientiane on 9 October.
Phoumi has sent one
of his top commanders,
Col. Sourith, previously
commander of Laos'
paratroop battalions,
to assume command of
the region. His pur-
view will be restricted
to Xieng Khouang Prov-
ince, however, since
Sam Neua, nominally
loyal to Souvanna, is
probably under the
real control of the Pathet Lao.
Newly designated Soviet
Ambassador Abramov, whose post
of residence is Phnom Penh, has
not yet presented his credentials
to the King. He apparently has
lost no time, however, in in-
dicating to Premier Souvanna
the Soviet Unions': willingness
to-provide aid. He also re-
vived the subject of the Inter-
national Supervisory and Con-
trol Commission (ISCC) for
Laos by recalling in a public
statement that the USSR was a
co-chairman of the Geneva truce
conference that set up the ISCC
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in 1954. Before the ISCC's dis-
bandment in 1958, a move opposed
by the Polish member, the pres-
ence of the group was a limiting
factor in the government's efforts
to suppress the Pathet Lao.
Radio Moscow has emphasized
in its broadcasts the Souvanna
Phouma government's declared
adherence to the Geneva agree-
ment and has also charged that
American representatives in
Laos tried to wreck the talks
between Souvanna and Pathet
representatives. The United
States was accused of "impudent
interference" in Laotian in-
ternal affairs, and propaganda
commentary stresses the legit-
imacy of the Souvanna regime in
contrast with Phoumi's rebel
clique, which is alleged to have
American support.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
CUBAN D13VELOPMENT.S'
The Cuban nationalization
decrees of 14 October and the
urban reform law of 15 October
have the most drastic social
and economic implications of
any measures yet taken by the
Castro regime. They virtu-
ally wipe out sources of in-
come for the upper and upper-
middle classes and give the
state complete control over
urban real estate.
The 382 businesses expro-
priated on 14 October, mostly
Cuban owned, represent the bulk
of large and medium companies
that had remained in private
hands, and they have an estimat-
ed total value of $2 billion.
They range from theaters and
department stores to railways
and the Bacardi rum distiller-
The government is'to pay
the former owners an income
equivalent to what they had
received in rent, but only up
to $600 per month; the excess
goes to the state. Heirs of
former owners get nothing.
National and provincial urban
reform councils are set up to
implement the law, the objec-
tive of which is stated to be
to provide "every family with
a decent home." The law is
likely to have an initial strong
appeal to lower and middle in-
come renters in the cities,
where abusive real estate prac-
tices have long been prevalent.
Active opposition to Cas-
tro continues among scattered
groups inside Cuba despite the
fear instilled by recent exe-
ies. The seizures complete the cutions and the increased gov-
government takeover of the sugar ernment repression. Several
and textile industries. The ,hundred guerrillas are reported
move is frankly explained as a
measure to "liquidate the priv-
ileges of certain economic
classes" standing in the way of
the revolution. Another law
issued the same day nationalized
all Cuban private banks.
The urban reform law
eliminates an -
or ism in Cuban urban areas.
All leases are declared void
and mortgages canceled. Rent
still active in the Escambray
Mountains despite government
claims that virtually all guer-
rilla forces have been liquidated.
the 25X1
guerrilla groups are poorly
armed and provisioned; among
their biggest problems is a
lack of unity and popular ef-
fective leaders.
A block-warden informant
system, called for on. 28 Sep-
tember by Castro to control
counterrevolutionary activity
payments are to be made to the !in the cities, has reportedly
state and applied toward purchase already been instituted in San-
of the properties by the former tiago, where the people appear
---- -
t th
+hrou
h l
VP-
i n t i m i d a t e d b
t se
e
g
y
y
government. Purchasers cannot
resell without government per-
mission, and the state is to
have the first option to buy.
cent developments.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BERLIN SITUATION
Khrushchev used his 20
October public speech in Moscow,
reporting on his UN mission,
to clarify the Soviet position
on the Berlin question.
firmed his post-summit commit-
ment to maintain the situation
in Berlin if a new summit con-
ference is agreed on after the
American elections, but provid-
ed there were no "provocations"'
by the West.
In the USSR's first authori-
tative response to Bonn's denun-
ciation of the interzonal trade
agreement, Khrushchev stated
this could lead to a further de-
terioration of the Berlin
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Although reports are still
unconfirmed that Soviet MIG
fighters have arrived in Cuba
they have not yet been. Reports
of construction work by Czech
and Soviet personnel around
Havana and near several air
bases probably involve placement
of antiaircraft guns and fire-
control apparatus. Antiair-
craft artillery, as well as
machine guns and at least 100
jeeps, have been among the equip-
ment in recent Soviet shipmehts.
Cuba appears about to rec-
ognize East Germany and would
thus become the first non - Com-
munist bloc 'state--except. Yugo
slavia--to do so.
will soon be sent to Cuba if
thus far, such planes probably
A Rumanian
commercia a ega ion has ar-
rived in Cuba, probably presag-
ing diplomatic recognition and
a trade agreement with Bue arest.____.
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situation, since East Germany
would be forced to reply with
economic measures. Khrushchev
declared that "if any new pol-
icy is 'thrust on the bloc," the
Western powers will bear, the
main responsibility. He called
for both sides to refrain from
steps which would aggravate the
situation.
The East German regime
has stepped up pressure on Bonn
to open negotiations for a
new interzonal trade pact, fol-
lowing West Germany's denuncia-
tion of the existing instrument
on 30 September. After issuing
a formal statement on 13 Octo-
ber calling for new talks, the
regime now has threatened, al-
though not explicitly, to dis-
rupt traffic between West Berlin
and Bonn if no agreement is
reached.
In a Neues Deutschland ar-
ticle on 16 October, a medium-
level Ministry of Foreign Trade
official claimed that agreements
on traffic would lapse when the
trade pact expired on 31 Decem-
ber. He stressed that while the
East Germans had "generously"
granted official permits for
movement of goods, this situa-
tion could not be expected to
continue without a new contrac-
tual regulation. The threat
was also extended-to include
East German electric power, gas,
and water services to West Ber-
lin, which the East German offi-
cials alleged are covered by an
appendix to the trade agreement.
Although West Berlin obtains
some gas, electricity, and water
from East Berlin and East Ger-
many, the city is not dependent
on the East for them.
In the official statement
on 13 October, the Communist
regime indicated that new talks
should be conducted on a govern-
mental level, but thus far the
East Germans have not rejected
the use of the normal interzonal
25X1
A Soviet Foreign Ministry
official on 5 October raised
the Berlin problem in a conver-
sation with an American Embassy
officer and asked for American
reaction to including all of
Berlin in a free city. He de-
nied that there was no altbr-
native to making only West
Berlin a free city, but ex-
plained that inclusion of
East and West Berlin would
have to be within the
framework of a German
confederation, with each
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sector of the city retaining
a "large measure" of autonomy.
Although the USSR in offi-
cial statements has rejected this
approach on the grounds that
East Berlin is the capital of
East Germany, Moscow would prob-
ably hope to represent any such
Western offer as a retreat from
the fundamental position that
the occupation rights are based
on Germany's unconditional surren-
der and cannot be the subject of
bargaining apart from an agreement
on German unification. The USSR
would also claim that Western ac-
ceptance of the general concept
of a free city constitutes recog-
nition that the city's status is
"abnormal" and should be chap ed.
25X1
Factionalism in the Alba-
nian Communist party, which be-
came evident on 9 September with
the announcement of the ouster
of politburo member Belishova
at a central committee plenum,
apparently was aggravated by
differences regarding Albania's
ADRIATIC
SIA
tSAM Sit.*
res Tirane
support of Peiping in the Sino-
Soviet controversy. Recent
evidence suggests that Beli-
shova, who had been a princi-
pal figure in the formulation
of the party ideological line
and ranked fifth in the hier-
archy, favored a pro-Soviet
position.
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_ USSR
Since her ouster, the regime
has assumed a less equivocal pro-
Chinese position, as shown in
party boss Hoxha's speech on the
eve of the 1 October Chinese lib-
eration anniversary and by the
conduct of Deputy Premier Kellezi
on a trip during the ;past three
weeks in China. Kellezi, in his
tour of rural China since the 1
October celebrations on behalf
of the Albanian-Chinese Friendship
Society, has exchanged pledges of
support with the Chinese and has
drawn attention to the two coun-
tries' joint stand in the defense
of the purity of Marxism-Leninism.
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qw, SECRET
Despite reports over the
years of a rivalry between
party leader Hoxha and Premier
Shehu, the two leaders do not
appear to have any serious dis-
agreements in their views con-
cerning the Sino-Soviet differ-
ences, Premier Shehu, who owes
his rise in power to his control
over the police, has tradition-
ally held "hard-line" views, is
very strongly anti-Yugoslav,
and apparently favors the Chi-
nese stand.
Party leader Hoxha, who
has directed the Albanian party
without interruption since 1943,
has generally assumed a some-
what less extreme position on
issues, although he clearly led
the fight against the pro-Yugo-
slav faction, headed by Koci
Xoxe, which was purged in 1948.
It is unlikely, however, that
Hoxha--through his position as
party first secretary--could
not bring the party solidly in-
to support of the USSR if he
should choose. Because of his
recent pro-Chinese speech, any
such action seems unlikely.
In addition to the personal
and diplomatic snubs tendered to
the Albanian delegation in New
York by bloc personnel, Albanian
Ambassador to Poland Musin Kroi
--now in Albania on leave--was
reportedly told by the Poles
not to return to Warsaw. These
acts reflect the existing dis-
cord between the Albanians on
the one hand and the Russians
and other European satellites on
the other. Nevertheless, the
willingness of the Albanian
leaders to proceed with their
party congress--which was post-
poned from November to December,
presumably to allow them to at-
tend the Moscow meeting of
world Communist leaders--suggests
Hoxha believes he will be
able to restate the party's 25X1
existing ideological and policy
positions without significant
alteration.
DIFFICULTIES IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE
Two Soviet agricultural
programs, heretofore closely
associated with Khrushchev in
Soviet propaganda, face a set-
back this year. Sizable grain
losses, probably'larger than
those of 1959, are expected in
the New Lands, and partly as
a result of this the total 1960
Soviet grain harvest will prob-
ably be mediocre--about the same
as last year. The Soviet press
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
AZERBAIJAN
Zi SSR ?t~ 5
SSR ~-''L. ~1< S 1~ .7
TADZHIK
Stalinabpd' SSR
recently acknowledged that pro-
duction of meat and milk is lag-
ging well behind the planned
goals.
Since the New Lands pro-
gram was begun in 1954, one
third of the total Soviet grain
area has been in Siberia and
Kazakhstan, and these areas have
accounted for 40 percent of the
grain delivered to the state.
By 1 October less than two thirds
of the grain had been gathered
in the New Land areas and de-
liveries of grain to the state
were running behind the average
for previous years. Harvesting
has been later than in 1959,
when large areas were covered
with snow before the grain could
be gathered. There have already
been a few snow flurries in the
New Lands, and strong winds were
reported earlier this month.
The area remaining to be harvest-
ed will yield only a small a-
mount of usable grain--much of
the unharvested grain has already
either been damaged by rain and
wind or has failed to ripen.
It now appears that the
Soviet corn crop, although some-
what larger than average, will
not be large enough to offset
the harvesting losses of wheat
in the New Lands and the grain
losses in the European USSR
from winterkill and spring dust
storms.
The lateness of the harvest
this year has delayed prepara-
tions for next year's crop. By
1 October less than one third
of Siberia's autumn plowing
plan had been completed--a good
indication that the major share
of the field work in the New
Lands must, as last year, be
postponed until spring.
A recent Pravda editorial
admits that per o3` rmance in the
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