CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 70
OCR NO. 0408/62
16 March 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
State Dept., OSD, & DIA review(s) completed.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko's arrival in Geneva on
10 March coincided with increased
Soviet efforts to generate
pressure on the Western powers
through stepped-up activity in
the Berlin air corridors,
through renewed warnings of a
separate treaty with East Ger-
many, and through continuation
of the propaganda campaign aimed
at discrediting a US resumption
of atmospheric testing. Khru-
shchev told the Japanese minis-
ter in Moscow on 10 March that
he had a "dim view" of pros-
pects for success at the 17-
nation disarmament conference
because of the US attitude.
On 12 March Moscow re-
leased Gromyko's favorable re-
plies to UN Acting Secretary
General Thant's queries on the
Soviet attitude toward signing
a convention banning the use
of nuclear weapons and toward
Sweden's "nonnuclear club" pro-
posal. This move was designed
to bring prohibition of both
the use and the dissemination
of nuclear weapons to the fore-
front as two paramount issues
facing the conference.
Berlin and Germany
On 8 March, two days
before ,Gromyko's arrival in
Geneva, the Soviet representa-
tive to the Berlin Air Safety
Center (BASC) announced plans
for 24 Soviet flights on 9
March extending over a six-
hour period--the greatest
number of such flight: plans
filed for one day thus far.
All these flights were carried
out.
On 12 March, the USSR
again modified its tactics by
conducting four flights at
times and altitudes which con-
flicted with established West-
ern commercial schedules. All
previous Soviet corridor flights
had been below 7,500 feet, but
those on 12, 13, and 15 March
were at altitudes normally
used by Western commercial
transports--7,000-10,000 feet.
On the grounds that the ten-
minute interval between Soviet
and Western flights was insuf-
ficient, the Soviet controller
in the BASC refused to accept
Western flight plans which
"conflicted" with Soviet flights.
Moscow apparently hopes
that such tactics will preclude
all Western commercial flights
at altitudes and times of Soviet
operations and will demonstrate
that existing quadripartite ar-
rangements are inadequate to
guarantee air safety in the
corridors. In either event,
the USSR could then argue that
the West must submit to greater
Communist control over the cor-
ridors than now is implicit in
the BASC setup and procedures.
The matter of a separate
German peace treaty has been
given new emphasis following
Mikoyan's renewal of this threat
in his 5 March speech at Leipzig.:
A Pravda article on 9 March reit-
erate ikoyan's warning that
negotiations could not be used
to delay endlessly a treaty which
would grant complete authority
to the East Germans over ?i'
communications to Berlin. An
Izvestia article of 11 March
similarly argued that it is a
"gross miscalculation" to hope
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that the Soviet Union will agree
to postpone a peaceful settle-
ment with Germany indefinitely
or will take some decision in-
fringing dn,Communist Germany's
"sovereign" rights "even to
the sligr cest extent.".
Concurrent with stepped-
up activities in the air corri-
dors, the USSR began applying
pressure to US army convoys
moving along the autobahn be-
tween Berlin and West Germany.
On 7 and 8 March, Soviet author-
ities at the autobahn check-
points attempted to enforce
new regulations on US convoys,
including a requirement that
the number of guards on smaller
vehicles be reduced from two
to one. After one eastbound
convoy had been delayed at
Marienborn--on the West German
border--with such a demand
and then was confronted with
a similar demand at Babelsberg
--outside West Berlin--the US
commander in Berlin ordered
the convoy commander to refuse
the Soviet request. After a
15-minute delay the convoy was
permitted to move on. A Soviet
jeep tailed it as far as Babels-
berg, where another Soviet ve-
hicle followed it to the Andrews
Barracks in West Berlin. This
was a new procedure: hitherto,
Soviet jeeps have followed con-
voys through East Germany, but
surveillance has halted at the
checkpoint. After a two-day
lapse, Soviet authorities re-
sumed their harassments on 12
March, when Soviet soldiers at
Babelsberg and Marienborn, con-
trary to custom and agreements,
attempted to climb aboard the US
vehicles to carry out inspections.
The East Germans report-
edly are initiating a further
move to support their conten-
tion that West Berlin should
be a "free city" without politi-
cal ties with Bonn. A West Ger-
man newspaper on 13 March noted
that West Berliners traveling to
foreign countries via West Ger-
many on the East German rail-
road in three cases have been
required to pay for a "transit
visa" at the Marienborn check-
point. In the past, demands
for visas have been imposed only
on West Berliners traveling to
bloc countries. As of September
1960, East Germany and other
bloc countries formally refused
to accept the use of West German
passports by West Berliners, al-
though they continue to recog-
nize identity documents issued
by West Berlin municipal authori-
ties.
Disarmament and Test Ban
Moscow has continued its
propaganda campaign against
the US decision to resume tests.
The Soviet press has argued
that the decision "casts a
sinister shadow" over the 17-
nation conference. A 13 March
Pravda article referred to the
viet joint statement on
disarmament principles last
fall and said that while there
were "serious" differences, "no
international meeting in the
past enjoyed the same basis
as a starting point in its
work." An Izvestia article
asserted that an ever-in-
creasing number of commentators
now are inclined to believe
that the national system of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
detecting nuclear explosions
is quite adequate."
In letters replying to
U Thant's queries on the So-
viet attitude toward signing
a convention banning the use
of nuclear weapons, Gromyko
reiterated Soviet willingness
to sign such an agreement.
Gromyko also restated Soviet
endorsement of Sweden's non-
nuclear club proposal and said
the USSR would assume an obli-
gation not to turn over nuclear
weapons or information relating
to their production to other
countries, "provided the US,
Britain, and France assume
identical obligations." The
Soviet letters also inject the
question of establishing nuclea
free zones in various regions
of the world. Nothing is said
about controls.
U Thant in early January
had sent two letters to each UN
member, in compliance with UN
resolutions last fall, request-
ing their attitude toward
signing a convention banning
the use of nuclear weapons
and toward Sweden's nonnuclear
club proposal. Replies on the
Swedish proposal were requested
by 15 March in order to permit
him to submit a report to the
UN Disarmament Commission by
1 April. The letters express-
ing views on signing a conven-
tion banning the use of nuclear
weapons were requested by 1
July in order to give Thant
time to prepare a report to
the 17th UN General Assembly.
The content and timing
of Gromyko's letters, dated
10 March and released by Mos-
cow two days before the sched-
uled opening of the conference,
suggested that one of Moscow's
ST
ERLIN
ell -% aiiIi Guten uerst
pe
oe t
Boundaries are not necessarily those
recognized by the U.S. Government.
Railroad Autobahn
Canal Air Corridor
Control Points for Allied Traffic:
A Soviet ,&. Allied
Interzonal Border Crossing Points:
East West
primary tactics during the in-
itial phase of the conference
would be to press for "partial"
disarmament measures which the
Soviets claim will strengthen
confidence between states and
promote agreement on general
and complete disarmament.
At the 15 March session, Gro-
myko did present a draft treaty
providing for general and com-
plete disarmament in three
stages in four years along the
lines of the USSR's September
1960 proposals. He also for-
mally expressed Soviet willing-
ness to discuss partial measures
to'strengthen confidence be-
(Concurred in by OSI)
tween states."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET PARTY MEETING ON AGRICULTURE
The Soviet party central I The amount of investment
committee ended its five-day
plenary session (5-9 March)
without paying apparent atten-
tion to bloc problems or foreign
policy issues. Agricultural
problems were the order of the
day; any discussion of other
matters was presumably informal
and carried on outside the
meeting hall.
Khrushchev clearly dominated
the scene. He gave both the
keynote address and a rather
long concluding speech. His
proposal for reorganizing the
system of management and con-
trol in the agricultural sector
was a policy innovation com-
parable to his reorganization
of industrial management in
1957 and the Machine-Tractor
Station reform in 1958. There
was no sign of dissent or res-
e._vation about his basic pro-
posals in the remarks of the
plenum's 51 speakers--republic
and provincial party bosses,
agricultural specialists, and
heads of governmental agri-
cultural agencies. Although
Khrushchev attributed the new
organizational scheme to the
party presidium as a whole,
Soviet citizens will credit the
first secretary with it and see
its adoption as another demon-
stration of his leadership.
Unanimity on the basic
proposals, however, did not
mean slavish acceptance of all
details. In his main speech
Khrushchev noted, for example,
that the "majority" of comrades
were in favor of his proposal
for interdistrict rather than
district agricultural production
boards. Estonian party First
Secretary Kebin went on record
as one of the minority. In
his closing remarks Khrushchev
emphasized the need for flex-
ibility in meeting local needs
and accepted Kebin's view as
valid for Estonia and for some
other areas with similar prob-
lems.
to be made in the agricultural
sector, however, was not so
easily settled. Reflecting
behind-the-scenes apprehension
about the implications of his
emphasis on the need for greater
material support of agriculture,
Khrushchev hastened to give as-
surances that this support would
not mean a reallocation of
resources "to the detriment..'
of the development of industry
or the strengthening of the
country's defenses." Clearly,
increases in production will
have to depend more on ef-
ficient use of present resources
than on large increases in capi-
tal investment. Khrushchev is
counting on the new systemrof
management under strict patty
control to accomplish the task.
The addition of some new
resources, however, is being
planned. The Seven-Year Plan
production target for mineral
fertilizers has apparently al-
ready been increased from 35 mil-
lion to 37.7 million metric tons,
and Khrushchev, noting in his
concluding speech the need for
increasing the production of
fertilizer, suggested that a
central committee plenum or a
conference might be held to dis-
cuss development of the chemical
industry.
The proceedings of the plenum
gave added indications that Belo-
russian party First Secretary Ma-
zurov, a candidate member of the
party presidium, and agricultural
procurements chief Ignatov, who
was dropped from the presidium at
the congress in October, may be
held responsible forsonie of ` last
year4`.s agricultural failures. Neither
spoke at the plenum, despite the
fact that all other republic first
secretaries and headsof'Soviet agri-
cultural agencies did. Khrushchev
was particularly critical of Belo-
russian agriculture both at the
plenum and earlier at an agricul-
tural conference in Minsk,and he has
been extremely dissatisfied with the
work of the procurements agency for
many months.________________________
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A last-minute deadlock on
14 March over the disposition
of rebel troops in Algeria held
up the expected agreement be-
tween the French and the rebel
provisional Algerian govern-
ment (PAG) on a cease-fire
announcement. Although-Paris
expresses confidence that the
army will remain loyal and
ultimately put down the violence
that the Secret Army Organiza-
tion (OAS) is expected to pro-
voke following announcement of
a cease-fire, the government
probably realizes it cannot
expect full compliance with
orders to attack the OAS. If
violence is prolonged, and
particularly if a general clash
between Europeans and Moslems
develops, the army may step in
as arbiter and demand modifica-
tions in De Gaulle's policies.
French Delegate General
grin told the US consul general
in Algiers on 12 March that the
remaining problem in the nego-
tiations was the actual draft-
ing of a cease-fire announce-
ment. The PAG, he said, had
originally reacted favorably to
a French suggestion that, once
the announcement was made,
French troops would maintain or-
der in the cities, while certain
areas of the countryside would
be controlled by rebel army
units. Now, however, the PAG
fears that under this arrange-
ment rebel troops would not
remain on a war footing, and
in certain areas would simply
return to their families. It
wants French and rebel troops
regrouped in specified areas
where they would remain under
arms.
There may also be disagree-
ment as to who will sign a
cease-fire. The rebels report-
edly want a French minister to
sign for Paris, but the French
are said to consider that the
agreement would be a military
matter and that the signature
of a high-ranking army officer
would be more appropriate.
French officials in Algiers,
who have reportedly launched a
propaganda campaign to underline
OAS weaknesses cite the locali-
zation of OAS activity in Al-
giers and Oran and the fact that
the accords with the PAG appear
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to safeguard the interests of
the settlers, as reasons for in-
creased confidence that the
post-cease-fire situation can
ultimately be controlled. These
officials, however, all expect
serious disturbances before civil
peace can be imposed.
The consensus of several
high-ranking and responsible
French armed forces officers
as reported on 10-11 March is
that the services will remain
reluctantly loyal to De Gaulle
following announcement of a
cease-fire in Algeria unless
prolonged disorders there or
an unexpected event, such as
De Gaulle's assassination,
opens the way to a military as-
sumption of power.
The officers whose views 25X1
were reported differed in their
predictions of the OAS and
settler reactions to a cease-
fire announcement, but most
agreed that if the security
situation in Algeria becomes
chaotic, the army will inter-
vene and attempt to impose
"conditions" on Paris which
could involve a change of re-
gime.
Meanwhile, the government
reportedly expects the OAS to
attempt "spectacular" terroris-
tic action in France. The Amer-
ican Embassy in Paris, reporting
the numerous recent government
deployments of security forces
to try to limit terrorism
after a cease-fire, observed
that the Secret Army Organi-
zation has not had too much
difficulty in bypassing these
forces to get at its targets.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The meeting in Leopoldville
between Tshombe and Adoula--
originally scheduled to begin
on 15 March--does not seem
likely to bring agreement on
Katanga's reintegration into
the Congo. Tshombe's position
in relation to Leopoldville has
not significantly weakened: his
forces, still including a con-
siderable number of mercenar-
ies, are largely intact, and
he has not been deprived of
his financial resources. His
position in Elisabethville, more-
over, might be endangered if he
should go too far in accommo-
dating Adoula.
Although the meeting may
be delayed as a result of
Adoula's sudden and unexplained
trip to Coquilhatville on 15
March, there may be some prog-
ress when it is held, if for no
other reason than that Tshomb6
wants to prevent a build-up of
pressure among the UN military
for a "third round" in Katanga.
Government leaders in Leopold-
ville nevertheless are not op-
timistic. President Kasavubu's
recent remarks to Ambassador
Guillion that "time will take
care of Tshomb6" and that "it
is imprudent to count on
Tshomb6's good faith" suggest
that Leopoldville has almost
written off the Adoula-Tshomb6
meeting before it begins.
Consul Hoffacker in Elisa-
bethville reports an atmosphere
of continuing tension between
UN and Katangan forces in which
serious incidents could occur
at any time. He believes Ka-
tangan Minister of Interior
Munongo and Foreign Minister
Kimba are "clearly up to mis-
chief" and probably determined
to prevent Tshomb6 from any
reconciliation: with Leopoldville.
The Belgian Union Miniere
still hesitates to put any real
pressure on Tshomb6 to come to
an agreement with Adoula on the
division of dividends and tax
revenues. Only reluctantly,
and after considerable prodding.
from Ambassador MacArthur and
Foreign Minister Spaak, company
officials in Brussels agreed to
send a letter urging Tshomb6
to make such an agreement. They
remain reluctant, however, to
make public either the letter
to Tshomb6 or any reference to
the escrow plan to withhold taxes
and dividends in a special fund.
UN sources have indicated
they are considering moving
three battalions to northern
Katanga, presumably to guide
and control--but not to support
--any attempts by Leopoldville
to reassert control there.
3uch a move would suggest the
UN is not expecting any military
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
action around Elisabethville
and that it has no immediate
plans to try to station UN
forces at mining centers out-
side the city.
In the absence of UN lo-
gistic support, Adoula's moves
to recapture Kongolo in north-
ern Katanga have come to a
halt. A US army attache source
who visited Kabalo, south of
Kongolo, said the 2,000-2,500
Congolese Army troops there
are immobilized by swamps, in-
creasingly hostile Baluba tribes-
men, and lack of discipline.
Frustrated by his and the
UN's failure to bring Tshombe
to heel, by the unwillingness
of the Belgian mining interests
to get tough with Tshombe, and
by the UN's refusal to give him
logistic support, Adoula ap-
pears to be thinking more
seriously of seeking help-out-
side the UN framework. He
reportedly plans to dispatch
missions to African and Asian
countries to try to arrange for
bilateral aid. The form of
help he seeks is not clear,
but one idea apparently is to
try to get foreign troops in
the Congo now assigned to the
UN placed under Leopoldville's
control.` The chances of favor-
able reaction to such a request
would appear slim at this time.
The Congolese missions report-
edly will not visit the Commu-
nist bloc, but Moscow has of-
fered direct assistance in the
formlof economic aid and mil-
itary equipment.
Another indication of Adou-
la's desire to escape from the
UN framework is his renewal
of attempts to establish a
Congolese air force. If the
talks with Tshombe fail to show
LAOS
Souvanna, discouraged by
the inability of the contending
factions to agree on a coalition
government, has threatened to
withdraw to Paris if an early
settlement is not achieved.
The British ambassador met with
Souvanna and Souphannouvong at
Khang Khay on 10 March for an
"exploratory" exchange of views.
good progress, this trend may
gain momentum.
Gizenga, the "heir of
Lumumba," continues in deten-
tion. He is said to be some-
what repentant and to be read-
ing "uplifting" literature.
Adoula's dismissal of
the radical Christophe Gbenye
from the Ministry of Interior
raised new frictions between
radicals and moderates in
the government coalition. For
the moment Adoula has appar-
ently stymied the formation
of a leftist parliamentary
coalition against him. Gbenye,
after having indicated he
would leave the government,
has accepted the vice premier-
ship under pressure--possibly
only in order to forestall
'a move against him.
However, Adoula's actions
toward Gbenye have raised the
threat of a new dissident re-
gime in Stanleyville. Stan-
leyville and surrounding Orien-
tale Province, although in al-
most complete administrative
and economic chaos, are polit-
ically controlled by Gbenye's
supporters. A US Embassy offi-
cial who visited Stanleyville
in late February reported
that they felt "betrayed" by
Adoula, whose close alignment
with the US and UN was con-
trary to Lumumba's policy.
General Lundula, who maintains
his headquarters in Stanley-
ville, ostensibly remains loyal
to Leopoldville, but UN officials
doubt that he would be able to
control his troops in any real
test.
He termed the talks "not dis-
couraging," but no substantive
accord was reached. He expects
further conversations at an
early date.
Even if there is an agree-
ment between the Khang Khay
factions and the West, however,
it is unlikely that Phoumi will
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support any such coalition.
He continues to insist on get-
ting the ministries of defense
and interior for his Vientiane
faction.
There are indications that
a power struggle is taking place
within Souvanna's neutralist
following at Khang Khay and
that left-wing elements are
gaining the ascendancy.
Muorfg
Sai"
ou
Netia
?HON
Muon
eko~i
Luang'
Prgbang
N a
\.
Sam Neua
-rtt SAM NEUA
i
lPlaine des r Ban
-
Thanh
Hoa
Is YtNong Khai
i
soul ,
a?. Pa Xieng ouan
Maflaxay
SAVANNAK$tiET
Tchep
Muan
Ubon
uong
hive
~- Kong Le-Pathet Lao forces
Kong Le-Pathet Lao areas
Trail
Route number
Road under
construction
If Pathet Lao
elements should achieve domi-
nance in Souvanna's neutralist
group, it is doubtful that
Souvanna could resist Pathet
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SECREZ
Lao pressures after a political
settlement.
The military situation has
been marked by limited probes
by both sides.
There has as yet been no
indication of a new Soviet ef-
fort to influence the political
talks between the rival Laotian
factions. Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minister Pushkin, who has been
the USSR's top negotiator in
the Geneva talks on Laos, did
not accompany Gromyko to Geneva,
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and Soviet Ambassador Abramov
has not yet returned to Laos.
Soviet propaganda commentary
on Laos has been minimal.
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Embassy
official on
the need
for the
cochairmen
of the 1954
Geneva
conference--Britain and
The recent increase in
Viet Cong activity is in line
with the gradual intensifica-
tion of the Communist drive in
South Vietnam for the past two
and a half years, It has been
marked by the reappearance of
larger forces, numbering from
300 to 500, for the first time
since early fall. Their prime
targets remain outposts of the
Civil Guard and Self-Defense
Corps in areas where the Viet
Cong may be trying to consoli-
date or link up their bases;
increased aggressiveness is
evident in several attacks on
regular army units and in the
heavy casualties suffered on
both sides.
For the week ending 5
March, 552 incidents were
reported. The locus of action
is the southern part of the
country. Since late February
there have been several attacks
at the extreme tip of South
Vietnam, in the provinces at
the mouth of the Mekong delta,
in the jungle regions north of
Saigon, and in the rubber
plantation areas near the Cam-
bodian border. Government
counteroperations in these and
other areas have scored some
successes with airlifts, air-
strikes, and artillery, but
they have had little effect on
total Viet Cong capability.
The step-up by the Viet
Cong may also be intended to
counter the impact of increased
US military aid to South Vietnam
while underscoring the charges
of Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow
that such aid imperils peace.
A further indication that
the bloc may be maneuvering
toward an international con-
ference on Vietnam has been
reported by the British consul
general in Hanoi. He was re-
cently pressed by a Soviet
the USSR--to call such a con-
ference. A recent Chinese
Communist Foreign Ministry
statement called for consul-
tation among the powers which
participated in the 1954 con-
ference. A North Vietnamese
memorandum of 28 February ad-
vocated reunification elections
as outlined in the Geneva agree-
ments, possibly in the hope
of drawing neutral support for
another conference.
In Saigon, the government
is investigating opposition
elements possibly associated
with the two pilots who bombed
the presidential palace on 27
Fehrv.ary. Despite conflicting
Isle do Phu Quo..
Ruch Cia*
sa" v am
Communist Guerrilla Activity
Quan Long, !r`Bac Lieu
cCa Mau)
SELECTED VIET LONG ATTACKS
Ma auy region boundary 25X1
(s th Vietnamese)
Major areas of Vlet Cong concentration
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stories and persistent reports
that some army officers have
been arrested, the actual num-
ber of detentions appears small
and no new repressive measures
have been taken.
Another anti-American
press;-campaign, such as that
instigated in late November
by Diem's brother and political
adviser Ngo Dinh Nhu, may be
foreshadowed by recent public
remarks of Nhu's wife. In a
speech on 11 March, obviously
directed at the US, Madame Nhu
attacked "pseudo-liberals" in
the West who, like the Commu-
nists, claim the security prob-
lem in South Vietnam is due to
the government's lack of popular
support; instead, she claimed,
it is due solely to "irresponsible"
denial in the past of Diem's
requests for Western aid to
South Vietnam's paramilitary
forces. Her remarks suggest
that she believes the bombing
of the palace was in part pro-
voked by US criticism of the
Diem regime,
The prolonged economic
crisis has seriously affected
public morale in Communist
China. Revolutionary zeal has
subsided, even in the lower
ranks of the party. Apathy and
grumbling against the authorities
are common. The food situation
is better than a year ago, but is
still bad and could worsen be-
fore the early harvests in June.
Although there were some in-
stances of dissident activity
last year, resistance to the
Chinese Communists has been
largely passive and there are
no present signs of organized
antiregime action.
The Peasantry
Peiping is especially con-
cerned about peasant attitudes,
which have a direct bearing on
farm production. Over the
past months the peasants have
been accorded a number of con-
cessions aimed at increasing
their incentive to produce,
but they seem to regard these
with skepticism and cynicism.
One concession, termed the
system of "guaranteed produc-
tion," permits the peasants to
keep whatever they produce over
a certain quota; the rub, of
course, is how high the quota
is set. Also, the regime re-
laxed controls over private
plots--a concession which
resulted in a meaningful addi-
tion to this winter's food
stocks but has led the peasants
to neglect "collective produc-
tion." There are fragmentary
indications that winter wheat
acreage this year may be down.
despite favorable weather
conditions,
The peasants seem to be
testing how far the regime will
go, and Peiping may feel that
it has almost exhausted the
concessions it can make. Ar-
ticles attacking "laissez-faire"
attitudes and appealing to the
peasants to support the collec-
tive approach to agriculture
have appeared regularly in the
local press since the first of
the year. Travelers testify
that crop stealing remains a
common offense.
Conditions in the cities
are probably somewhat better,
but worker apathy has been
evident and industrial produc-
tion has failed to rally from
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
last year's doldrums. The
urban intelligentsia has bene-
fited from an atmosphere of
relaxation and the current
emphasis on production rather
than on political reliability.
The intellectuals, like their
country cousins, are skeptical
of the regime's purported new
tolerance of the unorthodox.
The Party
Peiping's biggest prob-
lem may be the declining morale
and increasing corruption
among the 17,000,000 party
members. Over 80 percent joined
subsequent to the Communist
take-over of the mainland and
consequently have not been--in
the words of Liu Shao-chi--
"steeled in revolutionary
struggle." Most of the late-
comers enrolled with great
expectations, only to encounter
hardships and to be blamed re-
peatedly for policy failures.
Recent resignations from member-
ship suggest that to be among
the party cadre may no longer be
regarded by all as a mark of
distinction; Peiping has felt
the need to point out in its
propaganda that "it is not a
shameful thing to be a cadre."
The party has been plagued
with corruption to an increasing
degree since economic conditions
began to deteriorate in 1960,
and now is once again engaged
in an intensive campaign to
reassert discipline and close
the gulf between those at lower
levels who implement party
policy and those at the top
who proclaim it. Since early
this year the Peiping press
has called attention to "inde-
pendent kingdoms"--a euphemism
for the separation of territori-
al units from the party center
and a reference to the Kao Kang
purge of 1953-54 which will not
be missed by the party faithful.
The Army and Security Forces
25X1
25X1
Eat
1961 when malnutrition
spread to the army a.id of-
ficials were discussing "the
big hurdle of the first half
of the year" before the har-
vest--the same situation
Peiping now faces--the military
affairs committee issued in-
struction after instruction
on how to improve morale. A
campaign to recount the hard-
ships of the revolutionary
past was launched in order
by contrast to minimize the
sufferings of the present.
25X1
this campaign was relatively suc-
cessful and questioning of
regime policy diminished, at
least temporarily.
The problem apparently
persists, however, since
Peiping is continuing its
intensive political indoc-
trination of the troops.
In mid-1961 Peiping changed
its military recruitment
policy and for the first
time conscripted urban
rather than rural youths
into the army, possibly
in the belief that the
political reliability of
city dwellers might prove
better than that of the
peasants. Contacts between
the armed forces personnel
and the civilian population
are being kept to a mini-
mum to avoid unnecessary
friction and resentment.
Although morale has cer-
tainly declined, there is
no indication of disloyal-
ty. (Con- 25X1
curred in by ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET AND CHINESE AID TO NEPAL
Although Soviet and Chi-
nese Communist aid programs
in Nepal made progress in the
past year, they continue to
encounter difficulties because
of the rudimentary conditions
of the country. Both Peiping
and Moscow have granted conces-
sions to cope with Nepal's
weakness, but the ways in which
each has handled this problem
reveal the differences between
Chinese and Soviet interests
in the region.
The Chinese are just get-
ting started on the implementa-
tion of a program initiated in
1956, and they will probably
move more rapidly now as part
of an overall effort to strength-
en China's ties with Nepal in
competition with India and the
US--Katmandu's two main sources
of foreign assistance. The So-
viet Union, restrained by its
ties with India, appears reluc-
tant to become involved in any
major undertaking in Nepal but
has extended some aid in order
not to leave the bloc's effort
there entirely to the Chinese.
Even though almost all
Communist aid has been in the
form of outright grants cover-
ing the foreign-exchange costs
of equipment and technical aid,
Nepal must still find funds
for the local costs of the
projects involved. Katmandu's
inability and unwillingness to
raise the required revenue led
to requests to both the USSR
and China for cash or commodi-
ties to generate the necessary
local currency. The Chinese
promptly complied, doubtless
viewing this as a simple way
to stimulate trade by marketing
their goods in cooperation with
the Nepali Government.
The USSR, always reluctant
to depart from its normal forms
of economic aid and with no
prospects for trade with Nepal,
bargained for nearly a year be-
fore grudgingly agreeing to
supply a small amount of cur-
rency and goods on a loan basis,
as well as some goods as a gift,
all of which will be used for
local financing.
Under a $7,500,000 aid
grant of 1959, the USSR is build-
ing a small hospital in Katmandu,
has started a hydroelectric plant,
and has plans for a sugar mill
and a cigarette factory. Soviet
engineers in 1959-60 carried out
a preliminary survey for a major
East-`Vest road extending across
the entire length of Nepal. A
detailed survey on the eastern
half of the road was finished
in May 1961, but a team of Soviet
technicians scheduled to complete
the survey has never arrived.
Recently jhe NepaliGovernment
announced that it will complete
the survey itself and is seeking
foreign and domestic funds for
eventual construction of the
road. Persistent reports that
the Soviet Union was offering
to build, as well as survey,
the road apparently were false,
as Moscow seems unwilling to
become involved in such an ex-
tensive operation.
According to an agreement
signed last September intended
to implement two aid grants of
1956 and 1960 totaling $33,600,-
000, the Chinese are to build
a cement factory, a paper mill,
and a leather tanning and shoe
factory, and to install a small
electric power plant in Nepal
during the next five years.
All of these projects are in
the initial stages; the first
two have been under considera-
tion since 1956.
Far more important for its
strategic implications is the
agreement signed during King
Mahendra's visit to China last
October which provides for the
Chinese to supply some $9,800,000
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
worth of equipment, materials, and
technical assistance for a road
linking the Tibetan. border with
Katmandu. The arrii al of Chinese
technicians to begin studying the
project has been expected for
several weeks, but so far there
is no indication of their pres-
ence. Disagreement over the: pro-
posed route may account for at
least part of the delay.
Although Nepali Foreign
Minister Giri has hinted in the
context of requestccfor Western
materiel that the bloc has
offered military aid, chere is
almost no Soviet or Chinese
activity in this field. The
USSR recently agreed to supply
two MI-4 helicopters on credit,
however, and the Chinese have
promised three small AN-2
utility transport aircraft.
China also recently supplied
the Nepali Army with several
field radio sets.
(Prepared by ORR)
London is planning a formal
investigation of the riots of
16 February, and British Guiana's
independence is almost certain
to be delayed at least until
early 1963. In agreeing to the
investigation, Premier Jagan
evidently understood that this
would probably delay the consti-
tutional conference planned for
May which was to have scheduled
the independence date. Recent
colonial conferences have set
such dates at least six months
after the conference.
In the aftermath of the
riots, sentiment for post-
ponement of independence is
growing among many people in
British Guiana who fear the
establishment of. an East Indian
police state along Communist
lines. Chief opposition leader
Forbes Burnham, while still on
record as demanding independence
this year, is said to favor a
delay in order to strengthen
his own party. Moreover, he
fears further violence between
East Indian and Negro elements--
violence from which his party,
based on the less numerous
Negroes, could only suffer in
the long run.
The US consul general in
Gerogetown believes that both
Burnham's People's National
Congress and Jagan's People's
Progressive party have lost much
prestige. The riots revealed
Jagan's dependence on British
military support to control the
country in a crisis, and Burnham
failed to press the demonstrations
in a sufficiently determined
and coherent manner to oust
Jagan, whose four-seat legis-
lative majority has held firm.
With politics now on an
openly racial basis, the small,
conservative third party, the
multiracial United Force, is
even more isolated than before.
No effective challenger to
either Jagan's or Burnham's
leadership has yet appeared,
however, and the consul general
believes the only chance for
stable government in the colony
lies in the ultimate replace-
ment of Jagan by a new grouping
of moderate political elements
from all three parties.
With the country's economy
set back for years by the de
struction in Georgetown,Jagan is
renewing efforts to seek Soviet
trade and aid. He has received
the Czech commercial counselor
from Brazil, sent missions to
the Soviet bloc, and announced
that projects have been discussed
with several Communist countries
and that construction of fac-
tories is likely to be arranged
soon. London presumably would
not object to trade arrangements
but has indicated it would pre-
vent acceptance of any bloc
loan.
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COMMUNIST PLANS FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE IN VENEZUELA
The Venezuelan Commu-
nists have apparently de-
cided to resort to guer-
rilla tactics to undermine
President Betancourt's coal-
ition regime, having failed
to oust him through an ex-
tensive campaign of urban
violence last January. Their
plans are timed to take ad-
vantage of the government's
recent loss of its majority
in the lower house of Con-
gress following the defec-
tion in January of a left-
ist group in Betancourt's
Democratic Action party,
and the collaboration of this
group--which now styles it-
self the New Democratic Ac-
tion--with other opposition
parties in Congress.
The Venezuelan Commu-
nist party (PCV) has long
been. training a small para-
military organization of
some 200 to 300, and has
received Cuban support for
guerrilla activity.
a it er s month the press
reported the government's
capture of a large number
of leftist guerrillas, along
with sizable quantities of
arms and Cuban propaganda
advocating the overthrow of
Betancourt by guerrilla action.
Apart from Cuban aid,
the Communists have several
advantages for guerrilla ac-
tivity. They can count on
favorable terrain in a num-
ber of mountainous regions,
on the fact that many Com-
munist-leftist groups possess
small arms, and on poor
transportation and communi-
cations to obstruct govern-
ment countermeasures. They
may also get some coopera-
tion from leftist guerrillas
in neighboring Colombia,
Even sporadic guerrilla
operations, combined with
legislative obstruction by
the opposition in Congress,
could partly disrupt agrar-
ian reform--the keystone of
Betancourt's socio-economic
program. The government's
concern is indicated by re-
cent extensive arrests of
leftists and Communists, by
a systematic effort by secu-
rity forces to uncover arms
illegally held by civilians,
and by measures to halt al-
leged contraband arms ship-
ments into Venezuela.
Betancourt has wide-
spread support among the
peasants, whose cooperation
would be needed by the
Communists for successful
conduct of guerrilla war-
fare on any sizable scale.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Political tensions are in-
creasing with the approach of
the 10 June presidential elec-
tion. The leading candidate
at present is Victor Raul Haya
de la Torre, founder of the
leftist but anti-Communist APRA.
non-APRA candidates
such as ex-dictator Manuel Odria
and able but unpopular former
prime minister Pedro Beltran,
have been conducting a whispering
campaign to publicize the armed
forces' anti-APRA attitude and
play on the fears of many con-
servative Peruvians that an
APRA victory would lead to ex-
tensive expropriation.
The Communists have taken
advantage of the present ad-
ministration's desire to re-
duce antigovernment sentiment
during the campaign period.
The government has made in-
creasingly conciliatory re-
sponses to demands of several
irresponsible labor unions,
particularly in controversies
involving US-owned companies.
Communist agitators incited
the usually docile highland
Indians to attack troops
sent to drive them off
private property--Peru-
vian-owned haciendas--
and several Indians were
shot.
The Communists in
Lima, claiming that the
Indians had been driven
from land owned by the
Cerro de Pasco Corpora-
tion, a US-owned mining
company, organized a
The APRA party (Alianna Popular Reoolucio-
naria Anericana) was founded in 1924 by Victor
Raul Huya de la Torre. Intended to be interna-
tional in scope, with a thorough radical socio-
economic reform progroee for all "Indo-Onerica"
(Raja's term for Latin Anertca), it survived as
a political entity only in Peru. Revolutionary
and leftist but never CWMMtst, APRA is in-
volved in ray bloody clashes with the Peruvian
Amy during the 1920s and 1930s, and senior of-
ficers retain a deep hatred of the party. APRA
gained respectability by supporting the con-
servattue fda zzel Prado's successful presiden-
tial campaign in 1956, and has been his tacit
congressional ally for the past Sts years.
"demonstration of protest"
which degenerated into an
anti-US riot. The rioters,
predominantly members of the
Communist-dominated Federa-
tion of Bank Employees (FEB),
were subdued with tear gas and
clubs. Subsequently when an
FEB organizer was forcibly
ejected from a restricted
area of the Lima branch of
the National City Bank of
New York, where he had gone
to harangue the non-FEB em-
ployees, the Communists agi- 25X1
tated for the deportation of
the three US citizens who
ejected him.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Prime Minister Diefenbaker
is expected to call a general
election some time in the next
six months. He evidently hopes
to cap.talize on Canada's con-
tinuing economic upturn--marked
by a seasonally adjusted un-
employment rate of only 5.9
percent, compared with last
year's recession high of 7.8
percent. Polls and recent by-
elections, however, suggest
that the opposition Liberals
have at least an even chance
of ousting him. His Progres-
sive Conservative government,
which holds 204 of 265 seats
in the House of Commons, is
clearly on the defensive and
is trying to smooth over sharp
intracabinet differences.
Elections are not mandatory
until March 1963, but a pre-
election atmosphere is evident.
Diefenbaker is going out of
his way to demonstrate his gov-
ernment's independent approach
on foreign policy and defense
questions. Displeased by the
proceedings against Cuba at
Punte del Este, Ottawa appears
further than ever from joining
the OAS. Diefenbaker is re-
"iterating his unwillingness to
vurb trade with Cuba further,
maintaining that no strategic
goods have been shipped. Never-
theless, there is growing uneasi-
ness in some press and high
opposition circles over the ad-
visability of continuing such
trade, by which Havana obtains
badly needed spare parts. Its
imports from Canada totaled
about $32,000,000 last year.
Large grain sales to Commu-
nist China--some $220,000,000
worth since January 1961--have
won the government support from
the prairie states, and current
reluctance to continue sales at
the same level is based only
on an anticipated shortage of
supply, not on any ideological
considerations.
On the question of nuclear
weapons, Diefenbaker so far has
felt obliged to defer publicly
to Foreign Minister Green's
obsession with disarmament and
unwillingness for Canada to
take any action which might
hinder progress toward an inter-
national agreement. Neverthe-
less, growing public dissatis-
faction with the government's
long-standing indecision on
the acquisition of nuclear weap-
ons is being exploited by the
Liberals in aggressive parlia-
mentary questioning.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
CUBA'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
The imposition of Commu-
nist political institutions
in Cuba was very rapid during
the second half of 1961, and
the structure'of the state for
all practical purposes now is
patterned after Soviet bloc
party and governmental organ-
ization. A single political
machine professing Marxist-
Leninist principles and having
functions and leadership inter-
locked with those of state
organs, has assumed the lead-
ing role in the formulation of
;overnment policy. Government
at the provincial and local
levels was completely reorgan-
ized last year.
has been announced for the
emergence of the PURS from the
ORI.
Membership in the ORI is
limited to the revolutionary
elite, who are to be the "van-
guard of the dictatorship of
the proletariat." Membership
is to be a requisite for any
positions of economic or politi-
cal importance. Che Guevara
has described the ORI as "the
political motor of the entire
country." One of the ORI's first
major activities has been ti,.,
training of a cadre through a
network of Basic Schools for
Revolutionary Training through-
out the country.
Party Structure
On 26 July 1961, Fidel
Castro announced that the United
Party of the Socialist Revolu-
tion (PURS) would be formed as
the single party of revolution-
ary Cuba. Pending official
formation of the PURS}Castro
explained, the Integrated Revo-
lutionary Organizations (ORI)
would develop the bases on
which the new party would be
built. The ORI resulted from
a merger of the Popular Social-
ist party (PSP), which was the
Cuban Communists' old, disci-
plined, and fairly large party,
and two amorphous and nearly
defunct "revolutionary" organ-
izations--Castro's 26th of
July Movement (M26J) and the
Revolutionary Directorate (DR),
a student organization. This
"unification of revolutionary
forces" had been urged at the
PSP's eighth national congress
in August 1960 and became a
reality a year later. No date
The ORI National Directo-
rate is the supreme policy-mak-
ing body in Cuba. Of its 25
members--announced on 9 March
--ten are veteran leaders of
the PSP, ten were prominent in
the M26J, and one was a leader
of the DR. The remaining four
members are not known to have
been affiliated with any par-
ticular group, but all have
long been close to the PSP and
to Fidel Castro. They, as well
as the ten M26J leaders, in-
clude some individuals believed
for some years to be crypto-
Communists.
The directorate's leader,
at least nominally, is Fidel
Castro, but veteran Communist
Blas Roca has become the most
authoritative spokesman on ORI
matters. President Dorticos
has an important role, as does
long-time Communist leader
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. The
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF CUBA'S
INTEGRATED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS
te,ra 1 ar_, r
izatrcrrs t .~s) _s ltel a
.e Concrr:ntis tsr l-opu.la 7oc al ist
(gas), Fidel Castro'a 2 500. o f , 0 c _ -
'rorot (126J), art i'cltt ono , .
torate (3i ,i, a ~ rnt o ;;anizatiot.
leaa.,s o,f tt s' r^~an .ens aye m~n~
MEMBERS OF ORI
NATIONAL DIRECTORATE
Fidel CASTRO Rue
Raul CASTRO Ruz
Ernesto "Che" GUEVARA
-as 4 -v zncipa.l o, :tears of the
att0aol lnstttote of Aprartan cPone:
'l'(-A), 000] ate onarp Lisbon :/orrcersr
:;antral ( -~), an] 3entral Plan-
ni~.-r t top-leeel cou-
erYer,reta Pol ~o 001_', co0rdtraates the ac-
t0ntttes f - outnctal a.] ",:znietpal
?00.10 for Ccor_tnatton, otoee:than, aal
GOVERNMENT AND PRIOR POLITICAL
OTHER POSITIONS PARTY POSITIONS
Prime minister, presidonf of Titular head of M26J
JUCEFLAN, a med forces
commander in chief
Minister of armed forces, M26J leader
vice-president of JUCEPLAN,
chief of the Oriente JUCEi
President of INRA, director
of the PSP doily Hoy
Faure CHOMON
Ramiro VALDES Menenaez
Severn AGL.IRRE Cristo
Flovio BRAVO Farco
Cesar ESCALANTE Dellunde
Joaquin ORDOQUI M-
-- FENA Gonzalez
Ambassador to the USSR
Minister of interior
Froduction chief of INRA
Director of commission on
political control of the
nilitio
Secretary general of CTC-R
and a Vic - -scent of the
Major Juan ALMEIDA
Armando HART Davalos
Major Sergio DEL VALLE
Army chief of staff
NJ ni star of education
Army General Sta]F officer
Major Geillormo GARCIA
Fria,
M26J leader
Uncertain
Secretary general of the FSP
since 1935
M26J national coordinator
Memher, PSP executive committee
Member, PSP executive
mittee; PSP secretary
for organization
Leader of the DR
M26J leader
Member, PSP executive committee
Member, PSP central committee
Member, FSP executive committee
Member, FSP executive committee
N"Member, FSP executive committee
PSF youth leader and expert on
foreign affairs
N.26J leader
M26J leader
M26J leader
Uncertain
uncertain
M26J leader
principle of "collective leader-
ship" has been evoked by Castro,
but in even stronger terms by
Blas Roca.
Provincial ORI units have
been formed in each of the
six provinces and in most if
not all of the country's 126
municipios (local units similar
to counties or townships).
Provincial and national assemblies
are apparently envisaged as--
theoretically--the highest party
organs on those levels. The
only provincial ORI assembly
held so far was in December
1961 in Oriente Province.
Executive and legislative
authority is formally vested in
the Council of Ministers, or
cabinet. With the assumption
by ORI of the policy-making
function, the Council of Ministers
is to a considerable extent
reduced to the role of a body
of technicians. The Central
Planning Board (JUCEPLAN) is
the top-level governmental
body, with greater power than
the Council of Ministers. The
JUCEPLAN was formed in late
1960 in order, according to
government announcement, to
formulate and implement basic
policies for the development
of the national economy. It
has since also assumed politico-
administrative functions and
is the central coordinating
agency for the newly established
provincial and municipal Boards
for Coordination, Execution,
and Inspection (JUCEI), which
have supplanted the former
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
provincial and local govern-
ments.
JUCEPLAN'S president is
Fidel Castro, and its vice
president is Raul Castro. Blas
Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez
are key members. Ex officio
members include nine cabinet
ministers and a delegate of
the National Institute of
Agrarian Reform (INRA).
Provincial and Local Government
Local JUCEI, formed or in
the process of formation in all
126 municipios, are subject
to and represented in the ap-
propriate provincial JUCEI,
which in turn are subordinate
to the JUCEPLAN. Blas Roca
described the JUCEI in August
1961 as "a new form of state
power"--a step forward in the
"direct establishment of the
power of the, people over the
entire country." Raul Castro,
a month earlier, said they are
"state bodies, politico-admin-
istrative instruments of revo-
lutionary power.. .the life-
nerve of the revolution and of
the new revolutionary state."
The provincial JUCEI con-
sist of a "congress," which is
apparently to convene peri-
odically; a "plenum" of per-
haps 30 representatives of
various political and economic
groups in the province and
delegates from the ministries of
the national government;a perma-
nent committee; and a secretariat.
The permanent committee is,
in practice, the dominant
organ on the provincial level.
The chairmen of the JUCEI pro-
vincial permanent committees
are, generally, individuals,
not specifically identified as
Communists and are frequently
military men with some local
popularity as rebel leaders
who fought with Castro against
the Batista dictatorship. Actual
power, however, appears to be
exerted by the secretaries
general of the permanent com-
mittees, who are ORI provincial
leaders and veteran Communists.
The Mass Organizations
The numerous organizations
established or reorganized dur-
ing the past year, usually iden-
tified as mass organizations,
constitute a primary instrument
of the government in mobilizing
and indoctrinating the popula-
tion and in attempting to trans-
mit a sense of dedication and
identification with the regime.
Most Cubans now are probably
directly or indirectly associa-
ted with one or more such
organizations.
The Revolutionary Cuban
Workers' Central (CTC-R) is
based on the 23-year-old Con-
federation of Cuban Workers
but was completely reorganized
under Communist leadership last
November and converted into a
vertical organization with com-
ponents based on industry or
place of work rather than on
craft or trade. Its claimed
1,300,000 members are being
subjected to a concerted cam-
paign for "socialist emulation,"
and many are being asked to
"volunteer" for wage reductions,
extra hours of work, and cane-
cutting details.
The Association of Rebel
Youth (AJR) was formed in Oc-
tober 1960 with the absorption
by the youth sector of the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Communist party of four other
youth groups. Its estimated
100,000 members have been ex-
ceptionally useful to the re-
gime, participating in great
numbers in the militia, the
voluntary labor battalions,
and the "literacy brigades"
which went out to the country-
side last year as part of the
regime's effort to eradicate
illiteracy. The Union of Rebel
Pioneers is the junior version
of the AJR for children between
6 and 13. The Federation of
Cuban Women, with a claimed
membership of 166,000, has
played a leading role under
Raul Castro's wife, Vilma Espin,
in the establishment of day
nurseries to release mothers
for work in the fields and
factories, in the establishment
of sewing and tailoring schools,
and in the literacy campaign.
In addition to its role
as an active military force,
the militia has been one of
the most pervasive mass or-
ganizations in the mobiliza-
tion and indoctrination of the
population. There are about
200,000 militia members--both
men and women--in the ready
reserve and home guard, includ-
ing many who otherwise would
have been unemployed.
Much of the rural popula-
tion has been organized through
the new economic entities--the
cooperatives and state farms--
as well as through the militia
and other mass organizations.
Even the remaining small land-
owners are being forced into
an organization which makes
their independence only nominal.
Castro's Position and Role
Fidel Castro has never
been an effective administrator,
and only during brief periods
has he played an active role in
the day-to-day business of govern-
ment. His power has been based
on his personality, particularly
his extraordinary ability to
engender enthusiasm in the masses.
Early in his regime he came to
depend on others as adminis-
trators and organizers. His
progressive personal identifica-
tion with Marxism-Leninism led
him to rely increasingly on the
Communists.
Although Castro's personality
and temperament are such that he
will not easily adapt himself
to the principle of collective
leadership, the requirements of
governmental unity will probably
dictate an accommodation when and
if disputes arise between Castro
and the Communist leadership.
There is no confirmation of
rumors that their relationship
has seriously deteriorated or
that a disruptive struggle for
power is underway. It is un-
likely that the Communists
have any intention or desire
to remove Castro as the valuable
popular rallying point for the
regime.
An attempt to explain
Castro's replacement on 14 Feb-
ruary as president of the Na-
tional Institute for Agrarian
Reform by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez
was made in an editorial in the
Communist daily newspaper Hoy,
which is directed by Rodriguez.
The editorial described Castro
as "the great captain of our
victories" and said the job
change was to "free Comrade
Fidel from some of the administra-
tive obligations" in order to
give him more time "to devote
to the general battle, of con-
tinental as well as national
importance, for the full and
final triumph of socialism in
our country."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
OPPOSITION FORCES IN IRAQ
The Qasim regime in Iraq
is the target of a number of
opposition forces--ethnic,
religious, and ideological. In
many instances these groupings
overlap each other and their
objectives vary. So fart Qasim
has remained in power by play-
ing off one group against
another and by instituting tight
security precautions backed by
the army--the only group which,
for the most part, has remained
loyal.
Opposition of Ethnic
Or Religious Groups
The heterogeneous make-up
of Iraq's population itself en-
courages opposition to the gov-
ernment. The country's esti-
mated 800,000 Kurds have long
regarded the central government
as an alien force which has
thwarted their aspirations for
a Kurdish state. Since last
summer an important segment of
the Kurds has been in open
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revolt. Despite a punitive
force sent against them last
summer and conti:4ued aerial
bombing throughout the winter,
Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani's re-
bellious tribesmen remain unde-
feated. They control a consid-
erable area in mountainous
northeastern Iraq and are a
potential nucleus for an exten-
sive Kurdish rebellion. Tribal
rivalries so far have prevented
the formation of a united Kurd-
ish opposition. However, there
is much latent sympathy among
Kurds for the Mullah's cause.
The great majority of
Iraqi Arabs are Moslems, but
they are divided along sectarian
lines into Shias and Sunnis. The
1,250,000 Sunni Arabs, polit-
ically dominant since the days
of the Ottoman Empire, regard
themselves as superior to their
Sunni Kurdish and Shia Arab
coreligionists. The Shias,
numbering about 3,800,'000
and concentrated in southeastern
Iraq, are mostly farmers. Shia
resentment of the Sunnis is
strong, and the influence of
conservative religious leaders
is much deeper than among the
Sunnis. These leaders, called
mujtahids, have consistently
opposed what they regard as
Qasim's pro-Soviet and pro-
Communist leanings.
In addition, Shia religious
conservatism has tended to
create sympathy for Jordan's
King Husayn because of his
direct descent from the Prophet
Mohammed. This sympathy has
been utilized by Husayn in his
anti-Qasim efforts among certain
tribal leaders of the lower
Euphrates Valley, although
Husayn's marriage to an English
girl is said to have diminished
his, popularity there. Much of
the plotting among bedouin
sheiks can be categorized as
an endemic pastime, but those
in Iraq have lost much influence
and land since the 1958 coup
because of their support of the
former royal regime.
The success of a tribal
uprising in the Euphrates
Valley, unless accompanied by
disorders in the remainder of
the country, is extremely dubious.
Lightly armed tribesmen have
been no match against Iraq's
army and air force in the past,
although tribal revolt might
spark a coup effort by other
disgruntled elements.
Qasim's Political Opponents
There is opposition to
Qasim in every political group-
ing in the country. His failure
to carry out his promise of a
return to constitutional govern-
ment and to hold parliamentary
elections has dismayed all
politically conscious elements.
Ideological differences have
also cost him support.
Opposition to Qasim among
the Communists is centered in
the Ittihad al-Shab faction, which
was outlawed after Qasim gave his
blessing to a splinter group led
by an acquaintance. The outlawed
faction has wavered between sup-
port for and opposition to the
regime since it was founded. At
present it is bitterly criticiz-
ing Qasim for alleged favoritism
to Arab nationalist elements.
Rigged elections in the teachers'
association early this year gave
the victory to these elements,
and the Ittihad al-Shab group
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
in reaction has increased its
attacks on the Iraqi prime
minister personally. Inasmuch
as the Communists probably
are fearful that the prime
minister's overthrow would
eventually redound to their
own disadvantage, however,
it seems unlikely that they
would move decisively against
him unless he were to perse-
cute the party actively. How-
ever, they will continue their
attacks.
Among Qasim's most vehement
opponents are the pan-Arabist
and socialist Baathists. It
was the Baath that carried out
the nearly successful assas-
sination attempt against Qasim
in October 1959.
Reports from Baghdad
during the past several months
another conspiracy led
by retired Col. Tahir Yahya,
the first chief of securit
under Qasim.
The Army
Information regarding
the extent of anti-Qasim
plotting in the army is meager.
However, at least two dissi-
dent groups are believed to
exist, aside from those con-
nected with the Yahya group
and the Baathists. Officers
in the Basra area in southern
Iraq have been reported to
harbor strong anti-Qasim
feelings and at one time were
said to be planning Qasim's
assassination. Their enmity
may, in part, stem from his
campaign against the Kurds,
since many Kurdish units have
been transferred to southern
Iraq out of Kurdish territory.
and inconclusive campaign.
Should Qasim order a major
anti-Kurdish campaign this
spring when the snows melt in
the mountains, and should the
campaign bog down or the army
suffer reverses, army leaders
might decide that Qasim must
be removed in order to wipe out
the loss of face and to avert
what could be a long-drawn-out
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SOVIET BLOC PROBLEMS WITH STUDENTS FROM UNDERDEVELOPED.COUNTRIES
Treatment of students from
the underdeveloped countries by
bloc governments and peoples
gives rise to a multitude of
complaints, and Western diplo-
matic missions in the USSR and
Eastern Europe are frequently
approached by students with re-
quests for assistance in ob-
taining scholarships in the
West. Last December the Czecho-
slovak police seized a Somali
student in Prague, placed him
on a Czechoslovak airliner,
and dumped him penniless and
without luggage in Cairo. This
was the climax of a month and
a half's effort by the student,
once considered by Western ob-
servers a convinced Communist,
and five,of his countrymen to
leave Czechoslovakia for West
Germany and Great Britain in
the hope of securing scholar-
ships to continue their studies
in the West. The Somalis had
been studying in Czechoslovakia
for up to three years and were
thoroughly disheartened by
what they had encountered.
ship is required, feel they have
to accept a proffered bloc
scholarship or risk being re-
fused other scholarship opportu-
nities. Almost all bloc scholar-
ships are offered through cul-
tural exchange agreements, in
which case the underdeveloped
state nominates the recipients,
or through the bloc-sponsored
International Union of Students--
a device for extending aid to
"progressives" unlikely to be
chosen for scholarships by their
own governments.
Upon arrival in a bloc
state, the prospective student
sometimes finds that he is not
permitted to take the course
of study he wishes. A Togolese
student in Hungary, for example,
was pressured into premedical
studies, although he was
interested in engineering.
Some foreign students in the
USSR have been handicapped in
electing subjects of their
choice because these subjects
involved "state secrets."
Although, this dramatic
expulsion is not typical of the
bloc's treatment of students
from abroad, it underlines the
fact that the bloc's program
to win support from the emerging
intelligentsia of the newly
independent states is at best
,a qualified success. There is
no reliable estimate of the
number of these students in
Eastern Europe, but each of
the satellites probably has
250 or more and the USSR ap-
proximately 2,000 in universi-
ties and vocational schools.
Sources of Dissatisfaction
Some of the students in
Eastern Europe on bloc scholar-
ships were sent against their
wishes. For example, students
from Mali, where government
approval for accepting a scholar-
Next, the student must
take an intensive course in
the language of his host coun-
try--a language some feel will
be of no use once they have
completed their studies. In
Rumania, students have also
been compelled to take courses
in Rumanian literature and
history, which they consider
burdensome and useless. A
course on the history of the
Communist party required for
foreign students on scholar-
ships in the USSR proved so
unpopular among Asians and
Africans studying in Kiev that
they have been allowed to cut
class at will. It is still re-
quired in some other educational
institutions,.however, and re-
mains a sore point for many
foreign students.
The scholarship stipends
provided the foreign students
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are large by local standards
and normally considerably in
excess of those granted by the
East.Europeans to native stu-
dents. In Rumania, for in-
stance, the scholarships ex-
ceed'the average daily indus-
trial wage. Nevertheless,
foreign students generally con-
sider these stipends less than
adequate. They can earn out-
side fees for radiobroadcasts
and newspaper articles in sup-
port of regime propaganda,
but some find this distaste-
ful.
Major and Minor Irritants?
Once in residence, the
students encounter a variety of
major and minor irritants. Many
of these students come from
relatively wealthy families and
are appalled at the primitive
living conditions they encounter,
such as having hot water only
two days a week or occupying a
small room with three other
students. Indonesians studying
near Frunze in the USSR ex-
pressed horror over what they
considered the desperate state
of some Soviet citizens belong-
ing to Central Asian minority
groups who were observed living
in caves in the mountainsides
and in dugouts.
Foreign students in Czecho-
slovakia believe the-mail they
send home is censored, and claim
that sometimes it does not ar-
rive at all. In Czechoslovakia,
Rumania, and probably other
satellites, the foreign students
are quartered with trusted
satellite students who, the
visitors feel, keep tabs on
them and attempt to indoctrinate
them. Complaints over police
surveillance have been voiced
by students in most East Euro-
pean states. The Indonesians
in Frunze refer to the USSR
as the land of "Nelzya"--it
is forbidden."
Bloc governments frown on
student contacts with the West.
Visits to Western embassies
are discouraged, even if the
students are only seeking
texts in languages they can
understand. Ghanaian students
in Kiev tried unsuccessfully
for six months to communicate
with the Ghanaian Embassy in
Moscow last spring and were
able to do so only after a
serious incident involving
African students, Also, the
students are involuntarily
rousted out on special occa-
sions, such as the death of
Patrice Lumumba, to demonstrate
in front of Western embassies.
Scholarship students in the
Soviet Union have also com-
plained about being expected
to work in the fields without
pay at harvest time.
Since the foreign students
are given preferential treat-
ment, they are resented by
East European students and
citizens who often shun them.
Generally, the visiting stu-
dents complain-about their
isolation and inability to
meet the people.
Sometimes this resent-
ment has racial overtones. A
Zanzibari student in Poland
was deeply upset when he
found an offensive poster on
his dormitory bulletin board.
In East Germany, students in
the company of white girls have
been offended by the remarks
of passers-by. Some African
students in the USSR, especially
those stinging in Kiev, have
commented that they are re-
luctant to attend social
gatherings, since "it always
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results in an unpleasant in-
Student Reaction
When disillusionment ap-
pears in a given country's
student delegation, factionalism
within the group occasionally
develops between the dyed-in-
the-wool Communists and the
mere fellow-travelers and
nationalists. This situation
arose last year among the 55
Iraqi students in'Rumania.
Twenty-two apparently left
the country in March after
knife fights occurred frequent-
ly enough for them to become
concerned about their personal
safety.
Some students suspect that
the diplomas they receive are
"paper degrees" which will not
be worth much outside the bloc.
In Poland, one student drew
this conclusion because he
felt the students from his
own country were not intellec-
tually capable of grasping the
material the Poles were willing
to teach them. Courses in the
special People's Friendship
University, established in
Moscow for Asians, Africans,
and Latin Americans, are for
four. to five years, as opposed
to the five to six years re-
quired in other Soviet educa-
tional institutions. This
disparity, as well as the low
educational level of some of
the students, has led to doubts
about the value of the univer-
sity's degrees.
Bloc Policy
With the realization of
the program' shortcomings,
the bloc states can be expected
to try to improve them with
such measures as establishing
separate universities--as the
USSR has already done and as
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia
are in the process of doing.
Moscow's People's Friendship
University, which opened in
1960 with an enrollment of
600, now has 1,286 students
and has announced plans for
an eventual 4,000-5,000. Ad-
ditional special centers for
foreign students are being es-
tablished in Kiev and Tashkent.
While reports on educa-
tion in Eastern Europe come
only from students who found
the experience disappointing,
many of the irritants they
encountered appear inherent
to education in the bloc. This
suggests that the presence
of foreign students will con-
ti _nue to be a mixed blessing
to the Communist regimes.
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