

Instituting Devil's Advocacy in IC Analysis after the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973

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This article explores efforts to institutionalize the role of devil's advocacy in the IC during the mid-1970s. It fills an important gap in the literature surrounding the development of alternative analysis and structured analytic techniques (SATs) within the IC.

The apparent failure by Israeli intelligence to anticipate the massive and deadly attack by Hamas fighters in the Gaza Strip in October 2023 recalled the US Intelligence Community's largely unknown efforts to create a devil's advocacy program in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War 50 years before. The position popularly known as the devil's advocate (from the Latin *advocatus diaboli*) was created by Pope Sixtus V in the late sixteenth century in what today we might think of as part of a nominee-vetting process.^a Although not exactly the function IC proponents envisioned for a devil's advocate, many—including past directors of central intelligence (DCIs)—saw value in creating a formal challenge mechanism to ensure divergent points of view were properly expressed in finished products.

Very little has been written on the development of alternative analysis within the IC, particularly during the 1970s. Larger studies focused on the actions of DCIs Richard Helms and William Colby either do not address the issue or only do so in passing. For example, Harold Ford's declassified study, *William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence, 1973–1976*, goes no further than to acknowledge

that he “encouraged more competitive analysis and encouraged the airing of unorthodox interpretations and devil's advocate evaluations.” Other works that address alternative analyses more broadly fail to address challenge mechanisms or efforts to institutionalize a devil's advocate position in the IC during the mid-1970s. Instead, they focus on the 1976 Team A/B “experiment.”¹

This article explores efforts to formalize the role of devil's advocacy in the IC during the mid-1970s. It fills an important gap in the literature surrounding the development of alternative analysis and structured analytic techniques (SATs) within the IC. Proposed by Colby in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973, the initiative to create a challenge mechanism failed to produce a decision to implement the idea concretely (i.e., by creation of an entity charged with that function or of a directive establishing a procedure to be followed in certain circumstances). Nonetheless, the lessons learned from this failed attempt helped engender IC efforts to institutionalize challenge mechanisms, such as the DCI Red Cell, created after 9/11, and encouraged alternative analysis and the use of SATs in the years that followed.

a. Formally the Promoter of the Faith, or *Promotor Fidei*, the devil's advocate role was to document all possible arguments against a candidate for beatification and canonization. In the 20th century the role has faded in importance within the Roman Catholic Church.

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

Excerpts from Intelligence Documents Preceding the Outbreak of Hostilities on October 6, 1973.*

The CIA Draft on Israeli Thinking on a Peace Settlement with the Arabs, December 4, 1972. “The CIA draft...is a competent but unexciting piece of work.... Having just read the paper, I cannot now think of anything I learned in it, and I am far from being an expert on Israel.... Perhaps it is asking too much of an analyst, but I would like to see a bit more speculation and construction of some alternative courses of action that the Israelis might take.”

Judgment (Redaction) that Syrian Military Preparations are Defensive in Nature. CIA Intelligence Report, October 3, 1973. “In his opinion, recently reported Syrian preparation on their front lines with Israel are defensive as opposed to offensive in nature.... The Syrian officer expressed serious fears of an Israeli attack into Syria.... But because of Syrian fears of an Israeli attack, this year the Syrians are sending their units to the front line, secretly if possible, and to tactically appropriate defensive positions. In other words, the Syrian officer stated, we are “massing” because of our fears.”

Combined Watch Report of the United States Intelligence Board, October 4, 1973. “We continue to believe that an outbreak of major Arab-Israeli hostilities remains unlikely for the immediate future, although the risk of localized fighting has increased slightly as the result of the buildup of Syrian forces in the vicinity of the Golan Heights. Egyptian exercise activity under way since late September may also contribute to the possibility of incidents.”

Israel-Egypt-Syria, Central Intelligence Bulletin, October 6, 1973. “Both the Israelis and the Arabs are becoming increasingly concerned about the military activities of the other, although neither side appears to be bent on initiating hostilities.... Exercise and alert activities in Egypt are continuing, but elements of the air force and navy appear to be conducting normal training activity... A build-up of tanks and artillery along the Suez Canal, this cannot be confirmed.... For Egypt, a military initiative makes little sense at this critical juncture of President Sadat’s reorientation of domestic and foreign policies.... For the normally cautious Syrian President, a military adventure now would be suicidal.”

Initiation of Middle East Hostilities, Memorandum from CIA Middle East Task Force, October 6, 1973, 1000 EDT. “The earliest confirmed military activity (redacted) so far was a high-speed Israeli serial reconnaissance mission at 0654Z (0254 EDT, 0854 Cairo time) along the Suez Canal. The flight terminated at 0732Z.... The Egyptian naval command center at Alexandria ordered a ‘first state of readiness’ at 1351 (1151Z).”

Arab-Israeli Hostilities and their Implications, Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 35/36-73, October 6, 1973. “Heavy fighting is almost certain to be short in duration—no more than a week. Neither side is logistically prepared for lengthy hostilities. The Israelis have the strength to blunt the Syrian offensive capability within a few days and, as quickly, to push the Egyptians back across the canal. Fighting on lesser scale, say an artillery duel across the canal, however, could be more prolonged.”

Soviet Policies in the Event of Imminent Egyptian Collapse, Intelligence Memorandum, October 6, 1973. “For purposes of this paper, it is assumed that Egyptian forces face imminent and perhaps catastrophic defeat and that the ability of the Egyptian state to survive the defeat (and further Israeli military actions) is questionable. Soviet military options in the circumstances described are severely limited. Neither time nor resources will allow Moscow to influence decisively the course of the battle now being waged on both sides of the Suez....”

Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, Subject: Middle East. Summary of Conclusions. 7:22 p.m.–8:27 p.m. October 6, 1973. “Mr. Kissinger: ‘Yes, but Israel won’t accept it until the Egyptians and Syrians are thrown out. We’ll have the situation where a Security Council resolution will be used against the victim. This will teach aggressors that they can launch an attack, then call for a Security Council resolution for a cease-fire and, if it is not accepted, call for its use against the victim. This makes the UN a completely cynical exercise. The Israelis will go to an all-out attack, get a cease-fire resolution drafted, grab as much territory as they can, then accept the cease-fire. If the Arabs were not demented, they will realize that in the long term, and I mean by Wednesday—If we can go in with a cease-fire resolution which Israel can accept, then we could use it against Israel if necessary. And the Soviets won’t get the credit for stopping the fighting.’”

*These documents can be found in *President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, A Conference Report and Document Release*, January 30, 2013, at the Nixon Presidential Library in Yorba Linda, CA.

Alternative Analysis Roots in the 1970s

One of the earliest mentions of the use of alternative analysis in the IC as part of the analytic process occurred during the Vietnam War era. At the request of Defense Secretary McNamara, CIA analysts produced a report, *The Vietnamese Communists' Will to Persist*, that employed a red-team approach. Analysts during this period used "solid alternative analysis techniques (red team, devil's advocate, and competing hypotheses)." (*The Directorate of Intelligence: Fifty Years of Informing Policy, 1952–2002*, [CIA, 2002], 40–45.)

The Nixon administration's dissatisfaction with the quality of IC analysis spurred other early efforts at producing alternative analyses. DCI Helms, for example, sent Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor, "a new kind of paper" on Soviet strategic weapons programs in February 1970 intended for the president. However, Kissinger never forwarded the assessment, telling Helms that while he thought the memorandum was "an interesting change of pace," the format was "probably too much of a general essay to be a regular publication." Kissinger advised Helms that "the trick ... is striking the right balance between facts and judgments" and that "occasionally, I think it would be productive to play the devil's advocate and offer alternative hypotheses before choosing, or maybe not choosing." (Memo for Henry A. Kissinger, "CIA Memo to the President on Soviet Strategic Programs," March 6, 1970, LOC-HAK-4-5-2-9.)

Similarly, meeting with DCI-designate William Colby in June 1973, Kissinger urged Colby to ensure "analysts clearly bring out alternative interpretations and possible developments," requesting that "he not be subjected to any consensus language." (Memo for the Record, "Breakfast with Dr. Henry A. Kissinger on 15 June 73," June 18, 1973, CIA-RDP-80M01048A000800050023-6.)

These and most of the documents cited in this article can be found via the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST). CREST is available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/search_archive.asp. Documents located in the CREST database are referenced in the endnotes by their subject, date, and Agency Action Identifier, followed by the box, folder, and document number.

I use the term *alternative analysis* in this article to encompass a range of analytic methods and approaches to include competitive analysis, devil's advocacy, red cell/red team, other SATs, and simply the systematic evaluation of differing hypotheses to explain events or phenomena.

Origin of the Initiative

Although there are a few instances of the IC providing consumers with alternative analysis in its early decades, the trigger spurring the development of an IC challenge mechanism was the failure to foresee the outbreak of war in October 1973, which began just one month into Colby's time as DCI. The lack of warning was widely perceived as a major intelligence failure, spurring multiple actions and recommendations to improve strategic warning and prevent future surprises.² Colby surfaced some of these in a memo to Kissinger on October 27, 1973, titled

"Critique of Middle East Crisis."³ Colby wrote that the Intelligence Community Staff (1972–92, a forerunner of the Community Management Staff) had concluded there was "an initial analytical failure in the sense that the intelligence community did not issue a clear warning of impending Arab-Israeli hostilities," acknowledging Kissinger's observation that this was "not so much a question of turning up 'facts,' but one of interpretation and analysis." Colby concluded, "Somehow we must build into our analytical process an automatic challenge or advocacy of variations to the consensus."⁴

Much of the DCI's October memo to Kissinger drew on interim findings his staff had provided him. Colby used these findings to task the IC Staff to "develop regular systems to ensure that serious divergent points of view and conflicting elements of information not be submerged by managerial fiat or the mechanism of reinforcing consensus." The guidance

specified that "such systems will also be charged with ensuring the establishment of means to provide the views of devil's advocates, adversary procedures, and use of gaming techniques as appropriate."⁵

These recommendations as well as others were presented to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) in December 1973 as "Interim Recommendations." Two of these recommendations addressed the nature of the problems the challenge mechanism was designed to address and what form it might take. One recommendation was to establish "a community-wide intelligence forum for the purpose of combating the 'mind set syndrome.'" The other was to "create a challenge mechanism external to the IC to combat the dual problems of analyst desensitization resulting from long-term exposure to confrontation situations and the problem of reinforcing consensus." Presciently, the memo forwarding the recommendations noted in

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parentheses: "Everyone wants a challenge mechanism. Quarrel will be how the details will be worked out."⁶

Developing a Challenge Mechanism

The IC Staff responded quickly to Colby's direction. The Product Review Division (PRD) was tasked in January 1974 to produce a "study of challenge procedures which could enhance the Community's analytical prowess and which (through the Community's publications) help to answer some of the demands of the consumer for a better product."⁷ The IC Staff also immediately began experimenting with the use of a devil's advocate (DA). Gen. Daniel Graham, then deputy director of central intelligence for the IC (DDCI/IC), notified Colby in January 1974 that he had one of his staff serve as DA during a IC-wide gathering of China analysts, noting "this is in line with the notion of establishing more effective challenge mechanisms in the production of intelligence." Graham detailed the DA's actions during the session and ended his memo asking, "The question now is: how can DA roles be institutionalized?"⁸

Graham went on to suggest several ways forward. One approach would have the national intelligence officer (NIO) responsible for drafting an estimate designate a DA "who would review previous papers on the subject in order to find loopholes

... and highlight these weaknesses with a view toward forcing a fresh examination of the major judgments." Another method, especially in cases where there were analytic disagreements, was to have dissenting agencies, in effect, perform the DA function. However, Graham qualified this comment by observing, "Particularly for those NIEs which have passed unanimously year after year, it might be helpful to create the DA's 'artificial' dissent. This might be put at annex to the paper, clearly labeled as an artificial position." Graham concluded by advising the DCI that his staff was working up "a more detailed set of proposals on a challenge mechanism," but meanwhile he believed "the DA concept is worth further experimentation."⁹

Work on developing a challenge mechanism continued. On April 1, 1974, a letter of instruction from Graham to the PRD's leadership specifically charged them to "formulate and gain acceptance of ways to introduce a systematic challenge mechanism into the workings of the finished intelligence community."¹⁰ In support of this effort, a study on potential challenge mechanisms was launched with completion scheduled for June, although it was nearly six months later before an actual draft proposal appeared.¹¹

In November 1974, the PRD completed its work by publishing *A Proposal for a "Challenge Mechanism" for the Intelligence*

Community. The PRD proposal, which had been nearly a year in the making, began with an introductory note describing its scope and purpose:

This paper looks at the feasibility of institutionalizing a "challenge mechanism," or "Devil's Advocate," ... in the Intelligence Community.^a The paper does not proceed with a full discussion of the pros and cons of formally institutionalizing challenges. Rather, it seeks to explore the working milieu in which an institutionalized challenge mechanism would have to function. This should enable interested parties to come to some conclusions about the feasibility of the concept.¹²

The proposal was based primarily on interviews with "individuals who formerly held, or hold now, key managerial positions in substantive intelligence producing organizations, and NIOs." This approach was employed because of the study's focus on the "feasibility of the challenge in practice, and these folks are critical to the success or failure of the process."

PRD started by identifying the perceived problems the mechanism was designed to address. It noted an unstated but clear implication of the proposal "was that in the preparation of major substantive papers, such as NIEs [National Intelligence Estimates] and Interagency Memoranda, at least some key minority views were not being ventilated to the fullest extent, that other views were or could be overlooked, or that important contingencies might not receive full attention." The study pointed out NIEs no longer had

a. Here and throughout this article, emphases are as shown in the original documents.

the benefit of the former Office of National Estimate's (ONE's) process of multiple levels of review, including a final level conducted by the Board of National Estimates where "there were a variety of views ... with one or more Board members acting in fact as a Devil's Advocate. Indeed, the role of the Board was to probe and question the entire paper."

Also, in the absence of that office's dedicated drafting staff, "the bulk of all papers prepared under NIO auspices must be produced by substantive organizations geared, in the main, toward producing current intelligence." "There may be a weakness in a system that relies heavily on current intelligence analysts to also prepare estimative and longer-range judgments," the proposal asserted, "at least in the sense of reducing the opportunities for other views to impact current wisdom."

The proposal went on to identify the concerns and questions many had regarding the form a challenge mechanism might take and particularly how it would be implemented. Intelligence officials questioned whether the mechanism was the best way to accommodate dissent and encourage alternative analysis. Many were in agreement with a former CIA deputy director for intelligence who argued, "Dissenting views can most effectively be dealt with at the working level of review, indeed as early as possible in the production process." Another officer endorsed this opinion: "A kind of Devil's Advocate should be part of the process in working up a paper through the working substantive levels. It is all part of the 'tightening process' in producing any paper."

The PRD proposal identified additional issues involving the creation of a challenge mechanism, ranging from its applicability to many intelligence products to its reception by policymakers.

In sum, the proposal concluded,

The strong inclination is to insist that differing views and judgments can best be threshed out by the analysts and producing offices, rather than by another entity or group organized and tasked specifically to prepare opposing views. This means that at each step along the way, drafters, branch and division chiefs, other offices and colleagues in other agencies should continually question judgments.

The PRD proposal identified additional issues involving the creation of a challenge mechanism, ranging from its applicability to many intelligence products to its reception by policymakers. Those interviewed pointed out that not all papers "lend themselves to Devil's Advocating," in part due to their nature and in part because "papers must be prepared for the NSC on very tight deadlines."

Besides short deadlines, the timing of when to introduce a challenge mechanism for best results was raised, with some arguing a DA could be useful before a paper is written, while some contended it would be of most value once a draft was prepared. Others criticized the DA concept on grounds of artificiality, arguing the "DA role drives an individual to take increasingly extreme positions, partly because he and everyone else knows that he is role-playing and this contributes to an essentially artificial situation."

Equally significant were objections voiced over how consumers might react to a DA's end product. As one NIO asked, "What can you do after the Devil's Advocate cites another position—simply ask the policymakers to worry about it?, even though we have no basis for conceding the DA assessment is indeed the correct one." Echoing these sentiments, George Carver, the deputy to the director of central intelligence for NIOs (D/DCI/NIO), saw advancing such an assessment as "confusing policymakers."

Grudging Acceptance

Practitioners, however, acknowledged that a DA approach might be appropriate in certain instances. For example, a former head of CIA analysis opined that if the concept of a challenge mechanism has any merit, "it is probably in those cases where the minority view occurrence, should it take place, would have very serious consequences for the U.S." His sentiments were seconded by a former ONE official who asserted: "An estimate or substantive paper should come down hard, as hard as the evidence permits, on a judgment, and it should be as pointed and precise as possible. But in those instances where the outcome on the other side of the majority position would be very serious to US interests, then a 'worst case analysis' should be undertaken."

The PRD proposal concluded by recognizing that "although sentiment of those reached runs rather heavily against institutionalizing challenge,

“Majorities are sometimes wrong, but it is rash to make the assumption that they are invariably wrong and such an assumption indicates a rather disquieting lack of confidence in the professionalism (including objectivity) or knowledge of the Community’s analysts.”

a large number of possible ways to do just that are set out for possible consideration.” The study also acknowledged that “in the spectrum of possibilities, the ones least likely to have a real impact on the substantive community are generally the ones most acceptable to the producing managers, that is, they are disposed to accept them and work with them.” The study then addressed the questions of who might exercise this challenge function and how large the entity needed to be.

The range of options stretched from appointing an ad hoc challenger or consultants to establishing a new office that would need to be equal in size to the NIO structure to have the necessary personnel and resources to succeed in its mission. In between were multiple possibilities, including a panel consisting of “three or four very impressive and knowledgeable figures.”

Other options focused on tasking existing organizations to take on this work, such as the NIOs, the IC’s PRD, or CIA’s Office of Political Research, a unit formed when ONE was abolished that welcomed some of ONE’s former staffers into its ranks. Yet ultimately the study concluded by citing one of the DA’s proponents: “The institution of a DA is not so important as the philosophy in producing substantive intelligence,” a point shared by DA opponents as well.

Leadership Reactions

Senior IC officials were forthcoming with additional comments on the study over the next three months. Some saw no need to create a new entity to execute a challenge mechanism, suggesting that it would not address the real problems and might in fact make things worse.

Richard Shryock, the PRD chief who led multiple IC postmortem studies, including the assessment done in the aftermath of the October 1973 surprise, was one such voice. In a memo appearing ten days after the draft proposal, Shryock argued that “the development of a viable challenge mechanism would be more manageable and realistic if the term ‘institutionalizing’ were taken less literally and if the purpose of the challenge mechanism were more clearly defined.”¹³ He argued the primary purpose of a challenge mechanism was not to present dissenting views to the customer but rather to “assist production analysts to overcome three occupational hazards to which, according to our post mortems they are generally, and sometimes seriously, subject.”

Shryock identified these as *preconceptions, reinforcing consensus, and the current intelligence syndrome*. Thus he saw the challenge mechanism as a means of “reminding, nudging, alerting the analyst—telling him, in fact, that in spite of his widely acknowledged expertise he may have overlooked or unconsciously suppressed something

important.” Shryock also had strong views of who should perform this role, asserting what was needed was “an individual or group that does not have preconceptions (at least not the same ones as the pros), is not burdened by the consensus of colleagues, and does not read every scrap of current intelligence.”

Moreover, “the validity of [the DA’s] challenge,” he insisted, “would rest not primarily on the scope of his knowledge but rather on the different perspective he would bring to the problem at issue, a perspective untrammelled by the occupational hazards of the professional analyst.”¹⁴

George Carver was harsher in his criticism of the proposal and warned that it might create new problems. In a memo titled “Devilish Advocacy,” Carver wrote, “Institutionalizing the process also raises another potential difficulty . . . Majorities are sometimes wrong, but it is rash to make the assumption that they are invariably wrong and such an assumption indicates a rather disquieting lack of confidence in the professionalism (including objectivity) or knowledge of the Community’s analysts.”¹⁵ At the same time he acknowledged, “I do agree, as do my colleagues, that we have to be particularly careful in papers where there is almost unanimous consensus or ones whose judgments have a direct bearing on vital U.S. interests along the lines indicated above—i.e., ones in which judgmental errors could be disastrous.”¹⁶

What form the challenge mechanism might take and who should exercise the function drew even more attention from senior IC officials. Instead of a new entity, one argued in favor of something smaller in scale

in nature, much along the lines of an “alert memo,” a new product being developed by the strategic-warning community at Colby’s direction.¹⁷ Most, however, were in agreement with Shryock’s view that “there already is, in being, Community machinery, the NIO system, which could accommodate—effectively, if not easily—the establishment of challenge procedures.”¹⁸

Not surprisingly, Carver reinforced this point even more strongly: “What is required here is simply that the NIO responsible for such a paper ensure that the chairman allow full scope to the interplay of debate. The whole NIO structure was deliberately set up to facilitate this and encourage it.”¹⁹ The chief of the IC Coordination Staff likewise believed that if a challenge mechanism was to be instituted, it should be limited to papers handled within the NIO system and urged that “the D/DCI/NIO should be charged with recommending to the DCI which specific estimates or other key documents involve matters of such evidential uncertainty that a challenge procedure could be used to advantage.”²⁰

In sum, Carver spoke for many when he offered General Graham’s successor as the D/DCI/IC, Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, the following advice:

The problem which led to General Graham’s original suggestion and has stimulated the DCI’s concerns is a real one. My colleagues and I are aware of and bothered by it as anyone else in the Community. It needs to be addressed and we are endeavoring to address it. An elaborate, formal devil’s

The proposal General Wilson forwarded to the DCI in February 1975 reflected many of the concerns and suggestions contained in the November study and discussed by Shryock, Carver, and others.

*advocate mechanism, however, does not seem to us to be the optimum way to tackle it.*²¹

D/DCI/IC Wilson’s Recommendation for Colby

The proposal General Wilson forwarded to the DCI in February 1975 reflected many of the concerns and suggestions contained in the November study and discussed by Shryock, Carver, and others.²² Wilson began the memo by acknowledging Colby’s earlier tasking, noting the DCI’s interest in “establishing within the community a regular system for the presentation of the views of devil’s advocates, i.e., some sort of system which would ensure that majority views and the conventional wisdom concerning major intelligence judgments would be subject to effective challenge procedures.”

Wilson, who had come to the IC job from a position leading DIA’s estimative process, conceded that “though few would quarrel with the objectives of the proposal, several have, in fact, questioned the practicality of institutionalizing challenge procedures and have expressed the fear that the system’s (non-monetary) costs might outweigh its benefits.”²³ He admitted his own mixed feelings on the subject stating, “I very much favor the concept of regular challenge procedures, particularly as part of the normal production process, but recognize that there will be pitfalls attending their establishment as a separate institution.”²⁴

Accordingly, what Wilson recommended reflected a compromise. It envisioned key roles for the NIOs and the D/DCI/NIO. In producing assessments NIOs would ensure “minority points of view and dissents [were] adequately represented and discussed” and they would report to the USIB or DCI “principal issues in dispute, if any, and the extent to which he and his committee pondered contrary opinions and judgments.”

The D/DCI/NIO, when appropriate, would appoint a devil’s advocate to represent dissenting views. Such an appointment would normally occur only when “an interagency paper 1) is considered to be of unusual significance to US interests and policies; 2) contains judgments which are clearly controversial; or 3) makes estimates which, if wrong, would likely have very important (and adverse) effects on US attitudes and policies.”

Wilson continued, saying the DA would be “a senior and experienced officer in the community” whose role would be to formulate and represent dissenting views throughout the life of the assessment under consideration as well as solicit the views of other dissenters within the IC. Finally, the NIO and DA would provide the DCI or USIB with a written report “in those instances when mistaken estimates might result in very serious damage to US interests.”²⁵

I have found no record indicating Colby made any decision or took action in response to the Wilson’s memorandum regarding possible IC

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challenge procedures or that further formal discussion of the topic was undertaken by the USIB or any other IC forum. The available documentation and scholarship certainly suggest Colby was receptive to and encouraged alternative analysis.²⁶ Conceivably, Colby may have posed no objection to NIOs considering alternatives along the lines recommended in the memorandum, but I did not discover any document indicating formal initiation of an institutionalized system supporting one or more types of alternative analysis.

Team A/Team B Experiment

The IC's 1976 Team A/Team B "experiment," as it was known, in competitive analysis is certainly better known than the IC's efforts to institutionalize a challenge mechanism.²⁷ The experiment during DCI George H. W. Bush's tenure resulted not from an intelligence failure, but from growing political pressures against détente and concerns over the perceived Soviet strategic threat. The impetus came from outside the IC, and it was not seen in the same light as the exploration the IC Staff had undertaken to ensure appropriate substantive challenges to mainline analytic judgments. In addition, the historical record indicates no linkage between the 1975 challenge proposal and the Team A/Team B experiment a year later. General Graham, a key participant in the experiment and in the IC's efforts to institutionalize a challenge mechanism, included no discussion of it in his memoir, which details the experiment and his role in it.²⁸

Cold War Concerns

The origins of the Team A/B experiment can be traced to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board's (PFIAB's) August 1975 request that a competitive analysis be conducted on Soviet strategic weapons systems. This request was initially deflected by Colby, with the DCI promising that the 1976 update of NIE 11-3/8-75, *Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through 1985*, would address its concerns. The PFIAB renewed its request for a competitive analysis to the Ford administration in the spring of 1976, and Bush and Deputy Secretary of Defense for intelligence Robert Ellsworth agreed to the proposal.

There were actually three A/B Team exercises, each addressing one of three issues, air defense, missile accuracy, and Soviet strategic objectives. The A Teams had IC analysts who were already working on updating NIE 11-3/8. DCI Bush and a PFIAB committee selected the B Team members. The B Teams that focused on Soviet missile accuracy and air defenses did their work collaboratively, constructively, and without fanfare or publicity. The third B Team—led by Harvard professor of history Richard Pipes—unfortunately dealt not with the military issue as initially proposed but with the broad topic of Soviet objectives. It produced a lengthy polemic intent on discrediting Team A analysts. This report was promptly leaked and became another anti-détente, the-Soviets-are-coming diatribe that angered the DCI.²⁹

Although Team A/Team B is one of four contrarian techniques

discussed in a March 2009 trade-craft primer devoted to "Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis," the 1976 experiment is not remembered in a positive light but rather as a classic example of the politicization of intelligence. Richards Heuer probably spoke for many when he wrote: "The Intelligence Community teaches a couple types of structured debate, which are useful, but they call these by the unfortunate name Team A/Team B. I say this is unfortunate because I'm old enough to remember the original Team A/Team B experiment, and what that brings to mind for me is predictable failure and entrenched warfare between long-term adversaries. I suggest this is not a good model to follow."³⁰

Continuing Efforts

The failure to institutionalize a challenge mechanism in February 1975 did not end the push to increase alternative analyses within the IC. In fact, occurring concurrently with the DCI's initiative were efforts to restructure and revitalize the US warning community.³¹ This push envisioned an important role for the that community in challenging IC analysis, a theme reiterated multiple times in the ensuing years. A memo in October 1974 from the DCI to the Ad Hoc Committee on Watch Mechanism observed "that the Watch mechanism's real value lies in its ability to challenge the conventional wisdom of the rest of the community, particularly as expressed in current intelligence production."³²

Discussions sparked by the proposal to institutionalize a challenge mechanism reverberated throughout

the IC during the next four years. A memo to CIA's deputy director for intelligence in March 1977 noted the correspondence "relates to our discussion on February 16 about alternative approaches in intelligence analysis. Four of these—alternative hypothesis analysis, competitive analysis, devil's advocacy, and alternate conclusions to a best judgment—are discussed in the attached memorandum."³³ A Center for the Study of Intelligence monograph in 1977 on NIEs noted that while critics may have overstated the roles of group think, of reinforcing consensus, and of mind set in preventing "the adequate exploration of analytical alternatives and the formulation and presentation of alternative estimates," many consumers "nevertheless made it clear they wanted and expected all the informed views they could get."³⁴

The CSI study cited an example of the use of devil's advocacy in the production of an NIE and found it to be "very useful." Several of those interviewed added the qualifier that "it would appear important, however, to confine use of the technique to important areas of estimates where there is substantial uncertainty and debate." "In all this," it concluded, "the problem is to encourage alternative analysis without artificiality and without a drop in the quality and coherence of the product, in a way that stimulates thinking rather than emotion, and within the constraints of available time and resources."³⁵

Efforts to institutionalize a challenge mechanism—albeit on a smaller scale and focused on certain areas—did not cease either. One such initiative involved the warning community and its ongoing efforts to avoid another warning

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failure. Documents discussing the role and requirements of an IC warning system throughout 1978 highlighted the need for a challenge mechanism. A still largely classified paper, "The Role of the DCI in Warning and Crisis Management," for example, contained a section identified as "Warning and Current Intelligence: The Need for Challenge Mechanisms."³⁶

Similarly, a paper discussing the requirements for a national warning system emphasized, "It must incorporate mechanisms to challenge conventional thinking and bring out alternative hypotheses."³⁷ Finally, a response prepared to answer the question "What would be the impact of the elimination of the Strategic Warning Staff?" stated: "It serves as a devil's advocate in challenging conventional (analytic) wisdom. As such, it represents the DCI's 'insurance' against another Pearl Harbor."³⁸

Senior Review Panel

In 1977, a unit outside the warning community—the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC)—was given a role in alternative analysis. NFAC had been formed by a merger of CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and the NIO structure, retitled the National Intelligence Council (NIC). Within the NIC a Senior Review Panel (SRP) was created to provide NFAC's director "an independent review of major intelligence products, especially those focusing on problems that have serious policy implications."³⁹

The SRP was expected to:

serve not only as a Devil's Advocate—reviewing and critiquing selected intelligence production—but [to] surface alternative conclusions to best judgments (many of what have been described as 'intelligence failures' stem from analysts not giving sufficient weight to worst-case hypotheses), assist in identifying critical intelligence questions that merit formal alternative hypothesis analysis or competitive analysis and taking part in, managing or monitoring such products."⁴⁰

In 1982, the chairman of the NIC—by then answering directly to the DCI after abolition of NFAC the year before—solicited the SRP's views on more systematic use of devil's advocacy in the estimative process. The panel's response concluded that despite a mixed record,

*the technique may have substantial values. Among the most important of the latter are: (a) encouragement of more thorough scrutiny of available evidence and all-source intelligence; (b) heightened analyst sensitivity to alternative hypotheses and inertial mind-sets; (c) increased consumer awareness of probability ranges, indicator ambiguity, and policy sequels.*⁴¹

Not unlike the earlier effort to explore institutionalization of a challenge mechanism, the SRP assessment anticipated problems impeding its adoption, including "community

The 1980s and particularly the 1990s witnessed a push within the IC to improve the analytic tradecraft and the methods it employed.

participation, analyst comprehension, and format and distribution of end products.” Consequently the panel recommended that the DA technique be introduced into the estimative system. It further recommended its use be governed by two principles. First, that it be tried experimentally on one or two subjects; second, that the effort be mounted by the analytical production community—defined in this memo as the NIC’s Analytic Group and “those who work the daily materials and the information flow.”⁴² “The aim of the initial exercise,” the panel concluded, “should be not only to test the alternative line, array its consequences, and devise sets of early indicators but also to develop methodology and approaches for a possibly wider application of the technique.”⁴³

Ensuing Decades and New Efforts

IC interest in devil’s advocacy and other means to elicit alternative analysis was evident intermittently over the next two decades. For example, an article discussing Israel’s “devil’s advocate shop,” which was originally published in Israel’s *Defense Forces Journal*, was reprinted in the 1985 winter edition of *Studies in Intelligence*. The article reviewed why the office had been established, how it operated and what were considered key factors in its success.⁴⁴ The next year an “interesting and provocative” alternative analysis piece was forwarded from the director for Near Eastern and South Asian analysis to the DCI. Noting that

while “most observers believe that an Iranian victory over Iraq would threaten US interests in the Middle East by emboldening Tehran to export its revolution to other Arab states,” this assessment presented a credible case for how an Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq War “would reduce the threat of additional Iranian military exploits, foster political moderation in Tehran and Baghdad and enhance US security ties to Saudi Arabia and the smaller Persian Gulf states.”⁴⁵

The 1980s and particularly the 1990s witnessed a push within the IC to improve analytic tradecraft and the methods it employed. This push—driven by a small group of senior leaders who recognized the need for rigorous analytic tradecraft and strongly supported initiatives and programs designed to strengthen it—produced new tradecraft manuals, training courses, and ultimately the creation of the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis in 2000.⁴⁶ These efforts were accompanied by the exploration and use of new analytic methods—later called Structured Analytic Techniques—that had begun in the 1970s as part of the IC’s response to President Nixon’s demand that the community explore new methods and improve the quality of analysis delivered to the nation’s senior leaders.⁴⁷

9/11 and Iraq WMD

The push for better tradecraft and methods was spurred further by world events and shortcomings in the IC’s performance. Although the IC had been criticized in the past for

failing to provide timely warning and accurate assessments—including of the testing of a Soviet atomic bomb in 1949, Soviet intentions before the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the outbreak of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and India’s 1998 nuclear detonations—none matched the combined effects of the 9/11 attacks and the failure to find WMD programs in Iraq the IC had purported existed.

Two days after 9/11, DCI George Tenet commissioned the deputy director for intelligence to “create a ‘red cell’ that would think unconventionally about the full range of relevant analytic issues,” an action accomplished within days. The DCI Red Cell was “charged with taking a pronounced ‘out of the box’ approach” and “periodically produce memoranda and reports intended to provoke thought rather than to provide authoritative assessment.”⁴⁸ In addition, the Defense Intelligence Agency created a devil’s advocate position to perform a similar function.

Congressional investigations into both 9/11 and flawed assessments of Iraq’s WMD programs reinforced the need for the IC to expand and improve its use of alternative analysis. The 9/11 Commission concluded, for example, that it was “crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination.”⁴⁹ Going further, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 specified that the newly created position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was to “encourage sound analytic methods and tradecraft” and “conduct alternative analysis (commonly referred to as ‘red team analysis’) of information and conclusions in intelligence products.”⁵⁰

This language was captured and expanded on in IC Directive 203, “Analytic Standards,” in 2007. Under analytic standard four—“Incorporates alternative analysis where appropriate”—the policy directed that “to the extent possible, analysis should incorporate insights from the application of structured analytic technique(s) appropriate to the topic being analyzed.”⁵¹ In its 2005 report, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction echoed the same message contained in the IRTPA but was even more explicit in its call for alternative analysis and especially contrarian analysis, singling out the need for competitive analysis and use of red teams and devil’s advocates:⁵²

The Community should institute a formal system for competitive—and even explicitly contrarian—analysis. Such groups must be licensed to be troublesome. Further, they must take contrarian positions, not just ones that take a harder line (a flaw with the Team B exercise of the 1970s).⁵³

Insights

Colby’s push in 1973 to institutionalize a challenge mechanism in the IC was a minor initiative that failed to take hold, but it was the most significant effort up to then to ensure that the IC allowed “serious divergent points of view [to be] properly expressed in finished products.”⁵⁴

Moreover, his attempt to institutionalize a challenge mechanism is still relevant for today’s IC. The insights gained from Colby’s tasking, subsequent studies and pilots, and the

pushback they engendered shaped IC efforts to institutionalize challenge mechanisms—such as the DCI Red Cell—and to provide consumers with alternative analyses in the decades that followed. Preconceptions, reinforcing consensus, and the never-ending demand for current intelligence, for example, have changed little in 50 years; neither have their negative effects on the IC’s ability to identify and warn of major strategic developments, as witnessed by the Arab Spring in 2011, Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, and HAMAS’s surprise attack on Israel in October 2023.

The objections voiced over institutionalizing a challenge mechanism ultimately contributed to the initiative’s abandonment in 1975. This same resistance reinforced the need for the IC to find other methods to incorporate challenge mechanisms and facilitate alternative analyses. One such path was through the processes employed by NIOs and later the NIC in regularly encouraging dissent and alternative viewpoints. The imperative to find other ways to address the real analytic problems the challenge mechanism was designed to mitigate also proved beneficial for concurrent efforts, begun in the 1970s, to develop and use advanced analytic methods, many of which would become SATs.

The development of these techniques allowed for other ways to “challenge” and “explore different hypotheses” at lower levels and in a less confrontational, more bureaucratically palatable manner. The analytic tradecraft cells now found in multiple IC organizations—equipped with savvy analytic methodologists—can be traced in part to the valid

requirements the 1974 challenge mechanism was designed to address and the reservations voiced over its adoption.⁵⁵

The establishment and success of CIA’s Red Cell and DIA’s devil’s advocate, and the greatly expanded use of red teams by military commands within the Department of Defense are likewise partly due to the insights from efforts in the 1970s to institutionalize a challenge mechanism as well as those garnered from Israel’s experience.⁵⁶ In 2001, just as in 1973, it took an intelligence failure and strong support from the DCI to force the IC to consider and accept an organization whose mission was to challenge or go beyond mainline analysis. What emerged—a small unit outside the main producing organization selectively engaged on key issues involving significant US interests—conformed closely to the 1974 proposals deemed most likely to be accepted by the IC and perform its mission adequately.

The analytic challenges have not gotten easier with the passage of time. For one, the IC’s formal strategic warning structure—once identified as the “DCI’s ‘insurance’ against another Pearl Harbor”—was disestablished in 2011.⁵⁷ For another, as technology—particularly the growing use and importance of AI—and threats we face have evolved, so too have the analytic challenges and the tools that must be employed to overcome or mitigate them.

Yet history—and particularly Colby’s effort in the 1970s—suggests the requirement to challenge widely accepted views and analyses certainly will remain in the future. The recently released Durham Report examining

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the FBI's investigation into the Trump campaign's interaction with Russia during the 2016 presidential election recommended that the Department of Justice seriously consider identifying "an official to challenge both a politically sensitive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

Application (FISA) application and other steps of an investigation," essentially acting as a devil's advocate.⁵⁸ History also makes equally clear the importance and continued need to depend on more than a single office or an individual to ensure alternatives are introduced to mainline

conclusions. As noted in 1974, the philosophy of a devil's advocate must be inculcated "in all the producing divisions so that various and differing views are surfaced normally through the regular production mechanism."⁵⁹



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Endnotes

1. Micah Zenko, *Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking like the Enemy* (Basic Books, 2015).
2. Intelligence Community Staff, "The Performance of the Intelligence Community Before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: A Preliminary Post-Mortem Report," December 20, 1973, Approved for release June 2006. See Memorandum for D/DCI/IC on Post Mortem Phase II, December 6, 1973, CIA-RDP83M00171R001800040033-9 and Memo, PRD Post-Mortem Phase II Work Program, May 3, 1974, CIA-RDP83M00171R001800040024-9) for Product Review Group follow-on work from post-mortem.
3. Memo for Secretary Kissinger, "Critique on the Handling of the Middle East Crisis," November 21, 1973, LOC-HAK-187-7-57-5.
4. Ibid. For an overall summary of the 1973 war and an excellent compendium of primary sources, see Richard Kovar, *President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in The 1973 Arab-Israeli War* (January 30, 2013), Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/collection/president-nixon-and-role-intelligence-1973-arab-israeli-war>.
5. "Extract from Section V. (Preliminary Recommendations)," N.D., CIA-RDP83M00171R001800040032-0. These recommendations emerged from a Post-Mortem study done on the Yom Kippur War. See Memorandum for D/DCI/IC on Post Mortem Phase II, December 6, 1973, CIA-RDP83M00171R001800040033-9.
6. "Summary of Interim Recommendations," November 19, 1973, CIA-RDP83M00171R001800040004-1.
7. Memo for the Record, "Middle East Post-Mortem, Phase II," January 17, 1974, CIA-RDP83M00171R001800040031-1.
8. "A Proposal for a 'Challenge Mechanism' for the Intelligence Community," November 19, 1974, CIA-RDP-80M01133A000700150007-9.
9. Ibid. The report noted that an "experimental DA" had already been used on three occasions, including as a DA on a détente paper in May 1974. See Memo for National Intelligence Officer for USSR/EE, "A Devil's Advocate View of Soviet Détente Policy," May 15, 1974, CIA-RDP80M01082A000400090003-0.
10. Memo for Deputy Chief, PRD, "Letter of Instruction," April 1, 1974, CIA-RDP80M00165A002900090102-2.
11. Memo, PRD Post-Mortem Phase II Work Program, May 3, 1974, CIA-RDP83M00171R001800040024-9. Further emphasizing the seriousness with which the challenge mechanism was pursued is the fact that PRD'S proposed charter directed it to "develop regular systems (for implementation by the NIOs) to ensure that serious divergent points of view are properly expressed in finished products, and it should formulate ways to introduce systematic challenge procedures into the Community's deliberations." Charter for the Product Review Division (PRD) of the Intelligence Community Staff, May 15, 1974, CIA-RDP80M01133A000600190011-1.
12. "A Proposal for a 'Challenge Mechanism' for the Intelligence Community," November 19, 1974, CIA-RDP80M01133A000700150007-9.
13. Memorandum, "Challenge Mechanism," November 27, 1974, CIA-RDP80M01082A000800020002-4.
14. Ibid.
15. Memo for Lt. General Wilson, "Devilish Advocacy," February 12, 1975, CIA-RDP91M00696R000500150005-1.
16. Ibid. Although Irving Janis's *Victims of Group Think* (Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1972) was published a year before the 1973 war, I could find no evidence that it played a role in influencing the discussion surrounding institutionalizing a challenge mechanism. One

- of the earliest reflections of this work in IC literature is a book review by Fritz Ermarth in *Studies in Intelligence* 18, No. 1, (1974): 61, CIA-RDP84B00890R000800050003-4.
17. Note, "Challenge Procedures," N.D., CIA-RDP80M01133A000700150005-1.
 18. Ibid.
 19. Memo for Lt. General Wilson, "Devilish Advocacy," February 12, 1975, CIA-RDP91M00696R000500150005-1.
 20. Memo for Lt. General Wilson, "Comments on PRD's Challenge Procedures – A Proposal," January 8, 1975, CIA-RDP-80M01133A000700150006-0.
 21. Memorandum for Lt. General Wilson, "Devilish Advocacy." The chief of the Intelligence Community Staff's Coordination Staff echoed this point, writing: "Essentially, I am very skeptical as to the usefulness of any formalized 'devil's advocate' procedure. In my view, it is a responsibility of the head of each production office to ensure that his analysts approach estimative problems with a 'devils advocate' set of mind so that tentative findings and conclusions are subjected to challenge from the onset. It is at an early phase in the development of an estimate that I consider challenges to analyst thinking most important." Memo for General Wilson, "Comments on PRD's Challenge Procedures – A Proposal," January 8, 1975, CIA-RDP80M01133A000700150006-0.
 22. IC Staff Weekly Report, January 23, 1975, CIA-RDP80M01133A001200120030-0 and Memo for DCI, "Challenge Procedures for the Intelligence Community," February 1975, CIA-RDP80M01133A000700150003-3.
 23. Memo for DCI, "Challenge Procedures for the Intelligence Community."
 24. Ibid.
 25. Ibid. It is noteworthy that employing a devil's advocate was recommended as a finding in the Cyprus post-mortem published January 28, 1975. CIA-RDP80M01133A000700160010-4.
 26. Ford, *William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence*, 58; and *President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War*, 23.
 27. For a detailed discussion of the 1976 Team A/Team B "experiment," see Anne H. Cahn, *Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA*, (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998); Zenko, *Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy*, 76–83, and Kevin P. Stack, "Competitive intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security* 13, no. 4 (1998). For the actual IC assessments of the A-Team-B Team experiment, see Memo for Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, "NSC Staff Request for Evaluations of the A Team-B Team Experiment," November 16, 1982, CIA-RDP85B00134R000200090002-8.
 28. Daniel O. Graham, *Confessions of a Cold Warrior* (Preview Press, 1995), 104–106.
 29. Lawrence Friedman, "The CIA and the Soviet Threat: The politicization of estimates, 1966–1977," *Intelligence and National Security* 12, no. 1, 122–42, DOI:10.1080/02684529708432402
 30. Richards Heuer, "Rethinking Challenge Analysis," Paper presented at the Conference on Learning the Lessons of All-Source Intelligence Analysis, July 1, 2008, Washington, DC.
 31. Memo, "Comments on 24 May draft, 'Revitalizing the USIB Watch Mechanism,'" June 6, 1974, CIA-RDP-80M01082A000200020017-4
 32. Memo for Members of the Ad Hoc Committee on Watch Mechanism, October 7, 1974, CIA-RDP80M01082A000200020008-4.
 33. Author redacted, Memo for Sayre Stevens, "Improving Intelligence Analysis," March 7, 1977, CIA-RDP86B00985R000100110011-8.
 34. CSI, Intelligence Monograph, *National Estimates: An Assessment of the Product and Process*, April 1977, CIA-RDP80-00630A000300040001-3.
 35. Ibid.
 36. "The Role of the DCI in Warning and Crisis Management," January 1, 1978, CIA-RDP83B01027R000200080008-0.
 37. Draft, N.D., CIA-RDP83B01027R000200050009-2. Additional support for establishing a challenge mechanism within the IC is found in the 1978 House Select Committee's Subcommittee on Evaluation which recommended "a community-wide effort to provide the 'challenge teams,' training, and methodology support staffs to ensure that analysis is directed at the right questions and the appropriate techniques are used." Memo for Mr. Lehman, August 11, 1978, CIA-RDP83B01027R000200060006-4.
 38. "What Would Be the Impact of the Elimination of the Strategic Warning Staff?" October 1, 1978, CIA-RDP-83B01027R000200130021-9. A similar message was being conveyed four years later. The Director of the Strategic Warning Staff wrote: "Consumers of intelligence and especially of warning intelligence have for some time—about ten years—pleaded for full expression of intelligence to be known as alternative hypotheses. The Strategic Warning Staff was directed to provide 'reasonable hypotheses not covered in other community publications, providing alternate explanations and short-term forecasts for situations of a threatening nature.'" Memo for the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, "Review of the Role of the Strategic Warning Staff," February 6, 1981, CIA-RDP83B01027R000100110011-3.
 39. "Organizational Changes and the Quality of Intelligence," N.D., CIA-RDP86B00985R000100100001-0.
 40. Ibid. This panel originally comprised three experts with "impressive careers in Government, the Military, and Academia." One member was Ambassador William Leonhart; the second a retired US Army general whose name is redacted, and the third a "noted academician," also redacted. Memo for Ambassador Leonhart, "Response to the Senate Select Committee question relating to the Review Panel," March 14, 1979, CIA-RDP98S00099R000400750006-8.
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49. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004, <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm>, 344.
50. US Congress, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 at <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ458/pdf/PLAW-108publ458.pdf>, See 15, 34, and 37.
51. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203: (Analytic Standards), June 2007.
52. *The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States* (March 31, 2005) at Unclassified Version of the Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction - Content Details - (govinfo.gov) Discussion of Red-teams, Devil’s Advocate, alternative and competitive analysis can be found on 25–26, 170–71, 328, 387–88, 406–7, and 415.
53. Ibid., 187, 769.
54. Charter for the Product Review Division (PRD) of the Intelligence Community Staff, May 15, 1974, CIA-RDP-80M01133A000600190011-1
55. In the ensuing years the IC responded with increased training on the use of SATs, complemented by primers on employing them to improve intelligence analysis, and the creation of methodology tradecraft cells within offices and organizations. Scholars and former intelligence practitioners—such as Richards Heuer and Randy Pherson—also contributed to the literature and training available on employing SATs. See US Government, ‘A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Analysis; Randolph Pherson and Richards Heuer, *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*, 3rd ed. (CQ Press, 2021).
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58. US Department of Justice, Special Counsel John H. Durham, Report on Matters Related to Intelligence Activities and Investigations Arising Out of the 2016 Presidential Campaigns (May 12, 2023): 306.
59. “A Proposal for a ‘Challenge Mechanism’ for the Intelligence Community,” November 19, 1974, CIA-RDP-80M01133A000700150007-9.

