George C. Marshall as Special Envoy to China, December 1945 to January 1947

David Robarge

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Editor's note: *David Robarge is CIA's chief historian. This article is an adaptation of a chapter drawn from his* The Soldier-Statesman in the Secret World: George C. Marshall and Intelligence in War and Peace *(Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2023, which is available at https://cia.gov/resources/csi/books-monographs/the-soldier-statesman-in-the-secret-world-george-c-marshall-and-intelligence-in-war-and-peace/). This chapter describes Marshall's continuing service to the United States after he retired more than 40 years, including two world wars, after first pinning on his second lieutenant's bars in 1902.*

The challenge Marshall accepted just months after the war against Japan ended in September 1945 was to attempt to negotiate an end to the civil war that had been raging between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the ruling Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (KMT), since the early 1920s. During his 13 months of effort, he would be frustrated by both sides and, although he was aware that the CCP had planted agents in KMT organizations, he could not have known how his efforts were damaged by at least one secret CCP operative, a stenographer in the KMT's Executive Secretariat.

The Call to Serve Again—in China

On November 18, 1945, Gen. George C. Marshall retired from active service in the US Army. The next day, President Truman appointed him as a special envoy to China, partly to mitigate a political flap that the intemperate resignation of the blustery US ambassador, Patrick Hurley, had caused. President Roosevelt had sent Hurley to China in 1944 to stop the feuding between Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party) and Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Hurley angrily resigned on November 6, 1945, after his negotiations failed; he blamed "communist sympathizers" in the State Department.

Marshall, hoping for a respite at his home in Leesburg, Virginia, from the strains of running the Army in the just-won war, instead reluctantly embarked on an unsuccessful, 13-month–long mission to parley a rapprochement between Chiang and Mao. President Harry S. Truman recalled his brief telephone conversation with Marshall: "Without any preparation, I told him: 'General, I want you to go to China for me.' Marshall said only, 'Yes, Mr. President,' and hung up abruptly."[1]

Marshall with Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer in China, December 1945. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

Marshall left on December 14, one day after finishing his lengthy testimony before the Congressional Pearl Harbor Committee, for a multistop, five-day airplane journey across the Pacific. Notwithstanding the administration's overt assertions, he was not charged with being a neutral arbiter. Recounting a private conversation with Truman, Marshall

> *stated that my understanding of one phase of my directive was not in writing but I thought I had a clear understanding of his desires in the matter, which was that in the event that I was unable to secure the necessary action by the Generalissimo, which I thought reasonable and desirable, it would still be necessary for the U.S. Government, through me, to continue to back the National Government of the Republic of China—through the Generalissimo within the terms of the announced policy of the U.S. Government. The President stated that the foregoing was a correct summation of his direction regarding that possible development of the situation."*[2]

Marshall brought with him some experience in the complexities of China's domestic scene gained while he was stationed there during 1924–27. Just over two years into his tour, he wrote to Pershing:

> *How the Powers should deal with China is a question almost impossible to answer. There has been so much wrongdoing on both sides, so much of shady transaction between a single power and a single party; there is so much of bitter hatred in the hearts of these people and so much of important business interests involved that a normal solution can never be found. It will be some form of an evolution, and we can only hope that sufficient tact and wisdom will be displayed by foreigners to avoid violent phases during the trying period that is approaching.*[3]

Marshall was determined to employ that tact and wisdom in his attempt to secure an accord between the KMT and the CCP. Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, who had replaced Gen. Joseph Stillwell as commander of the China Theater, greeted Marshall with a dismal assessment:

> *He would never be able to effect a working arrangement between the Communists and the Nationalists since the Nationalists, who still had most of the power, were determined not to relinquish one iota of it, while the Communists for their part were equally determined to seize all power, with the aid of the Soviet Union. General Marshall reacted angrily and said: "I am going to accomplish my mission, and you are going to help me."*[4]

At the time, the United States found itself, in the words of influential commentator Walter Lippmann, in "a horrible dilemma—to become entangled by intervention in China's civil war, or to get out of China in such a way as to leave China hopelessly divided, and dangerously weak."[5] Operating, as Marshall put it, "between the rock and the whirlpool," and with only a small support staff, he participated in 300 meetings with leaders of the rival forces in an immensely frustrating attempt to end a civil war, eliminate the CCP army, and prod both sides to build a coalition government.[6]

Despite exceptional effort and after some early, sporadic successes—most notably, arranging a cease-fire after only a few weeks—Marshall failed to achieve what he had set out to do. Chiang and Mao were both obdurate negotiators, but Mao, at least superficially, showed more flexibility, and Chiang knew that Washington would support him against the Maoists in the end, so he had little reason to make needed compromises and reforms.

Marshall returned to the United States in January 1947 with very little to immediately show for the stressful time he had spent in China—"a tale of earnest perseverance and ultimate disillusionment," wrote one historian.[7] The lack of proximate accomplishments notwithstanding, another

historian called Marshall's mission "one of his greatest services to the American people." In part because of the firm stand Marshall took with Chiang and his resistance to pressure from certain conservative politicians, media outlets, and business and religious leaders in the United States, the Truman administration did not intervene to aid Chiang's KMT, which, despite its apparent military superiority over the CCP, was "busily digging their own graves and trying to pull us in with them."[8]

The American Intelligence Muddle

While in China, along with the rigors and vexations of mediating with the warring adversaries, Marshall also had to deal with some serious matters concerning US intelligence services' activities and their clashing authorities. He assumed his position soon after Truman had dissolved OSS on October 1, and its espionage and counterintelligence elements were placed in the War Department in a new component called the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). The China branch of OSS had established itself in Shanghai in Wedemeyer's headquarters since late October 1944. Soon after Wedemeyer took charge, he advised Marshall that "One outstanding weakness in [the] Allied war effort in China is the fact that there are so many different [intelligence] agencies operating independently and uncoordinated, running at cross purposes, competing for limited Hump tonnage and altogether confusing the situation."

Those organizations included OSS (which had developed a relationship with the communists), various separate Army and Navy elements, the service attaches, the Joint (Army-Navy) Intelligence Collection Agency, and US diplomats. That chaotic arrangement had improved somewhat by the time Marshall arrived, but with China an important target for US intelligence after the war, confusion persisted in some areas of operation, causing difficulties with intelligence support to Marshall during his early negotiations and in his relations with the Chinese Communists later on.[9]

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The intelligence situation in China, Marshall told his successor as Army Chief of Staff, Dwight Eisenhower, in January 1946 was "unsatisfactory." He was receiving a surfeit of hard-to-reconcile reporting from the intelligence components of the Army, Navy, State Department, and SSU; "there have been too many separate agencies reporting on China which is bound to create confusion, may easily lead to unfortunate leaks and requires too much of my time to examine to see if erroneous impressions may be given." To partially address the situation, he asked Eisenhower to put G-2's China activities under the supervision of the military attache, which the new Chief of Staff did. More serious was the disarray and lack of coordination among US intelligence elements in Mukden, the largest city in Manchuria, the most fought-over region in the Communist–Nationalist conflict.

> *The military attaché was antagonistic to the SSU senior, his side was accused of being pro-Soviet while the SSU was accused of being pro-Kuomintang. Both were criticizing each other and declining to pool or cooperate. . . . The American Consul General, a very fine fellow, was sitting in the middle of this unfortunate American muddle in the center of the most delicate region in the world, possibly, at this moment.*

Marshall employed his familiar management approach of consolidating control in one place.

> *I therefore directed that all United States intelligence agencies in Manchuria be coordinated by the Consul General. I anticipate that there may be objection from* [Army General and Director of Central Intelligence Hoyt] *Vandenberg's new agency* [the Central Intelligence Group]*, but while I recognize its independency [sic] from one point of view, I cannot accept its independence unless it goes completely under cover, which will take time and the introduction of new personnel. I also anticipate some disagreement from your G-2, but again I cannot accept the responsibility for action out here with such fumbling and almost public muddling as inevitably goes on under divided control.*[10]

Marshall further complained that the intelligence he was receiving was poor in quality and arrived too late to aid him in the negotiations. He told Eisenhower that "I need immediate radio Top Secret code reports if I am to be benefited in my work in this

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manner." To G-2 Chief Bissell he wrote: "What I would appreciate are frequent evaluations of world matters as they effect [sic] China, Manchuria in particular."[11]

A major point of contention arose around that time when Zhou Enlai, Mao's lead representative in the talks, complained to Marshall about SSU's spying on the Chinese Communists in northern China and Manchuria.[a] Initially uncertain whether he should accede to CCP demands that the SSU withdraw, Marshall sought advice from the principal US officials involved with intelligence in China. John King Fairbank, a former OSS analyst who was then chief of the US Information Service in China, was critical of the SSU. Conversely, Col. Ivan Yeaton, head of the US Army Observer Group (the Dixie Mission) in Mao's stronghold of Yenan and an expert on Chinese Communism, supported continued SSU operations in northern and eastern China.[b,12]

Presumably hoping to move the talks along, Marshall deferred to Chou and encouraged Wedemeyer to stop SSU activities in those areas. Wedemeyer, who wanted the SSU to remain operational, did not respond immediately but then grudgingly recommended deactivating it. During his trip to Washington, DC, during March–April 1946 for consultations, Marshall got into a back-and-forth with the JCS, which at first opposed Wedemeyer's recommendation but reversed itself after Marshall met with them. The War Department's Operations Division then weighed in on the SSU's side after SSU leadership told it that the organization "was furnishing practically all the intelligence emanating from the China Theater and also the intra-China radio net of SSU was a valuable asset."

At this point, Marshall backed off, saying that "he was not familiar enough with the situation and desired to leave the decision on the continuance of SSU to General Wedemeyer," who changed his mind and allowed the SSU to remain.[13]

Marshall now evidently saw value in having the SSU as an intelligence provider supporting his negotiations and rethought his earlier position about closing it down. After the War Department deactivated the China Theater effective on May 1, 1946, the SSU's headquarters office in China continued operating until the beginning of July. After that, the SSU's China personnel reported to its headquarters in Washington and got logistical and liaison support from the Army, but they preferred that the Navy's Seventh Fleet take over command of their organization. Marshall agreed and sent this message to Wedemeyer in early July:

> *Some form of China SSU organization after 30 September is desirable for essential intelligence coverage, and its continuation under limited control and full logistic support of Seventh Fleet may be necessary. However, realistic steps should be taken to reconstitute it as an undercover agency if possible, particularly if we are to avoid Chinese Government's right to press for a similar unit in United States or avoid Soviet right to establish similar unit in China. At present, SSU in China lacks cover as counter espionage agency and is of definite value only as an intelligence unit.*[14]

a. Shortly before arriving in China, Marshall had to deal with a similar flap involving Soviet complaints about OSS operations in Manchuria. In August 1945, an OSS team codenamed Cardinal was dropped into Mukden to learn about Soviet activities in the region and to track down POWs. The Soviets ordered the OSS unit out of its occupation zone. Marshall initially wanted to file a formal protest, but after receiving further information about the situation, he relented and instructed US commanders in China and the Soviet Union to "take no actions . . . concerning this matter," thus ending OSS's collection efforts in Soviet-occupied Manchuria. Yu, 242–47.

b. As Chief of Staff, Marshall had encouraged President Roosevelt to dispatch the Dixie Mission, hoping that it would acquire useful intelligence and help American pilots who had crashed behind Japanese lines evade capture. Roosevelt's message to Chiang read: "Thank you for the steps you have initiated as stated in your message of February 22 to facilitate our plan for sending American observers into North China to gain more accurate information regarding large Japanese concentrations there and in Manchuria. The area of North and Northeast China should be a particularly fruitful source of important military intelligence of the Japanese. We shall therefore plan the dispatch of the observer mission in the near future." Marshall stayed at the unit's spartan outpost in Yenan when he met with Mao in March 1946. One of the mission's original members, S. Herbert Hitch, was on Marshall's staff during the negotiations. Yeaton advised Chou about Marshall's personality and encouraged him to set up a "war room" so Marshall would take him and the Communists seriously (the Americans helped build it). Yeaton also instructed Marshall about the Communists' ideology and goals and accompanied him to the meeting with Mao.(For sources see endnote 12.)

However, Marshall did not want to have any direct tie to the SSU to avoid displeasing the KMT, the CCP, or the Soviets. Chiang and the KMT were concerned that the continued operation of a US intelligence service in China violated its sovereignty; the CCP had already protested to Marshall about SSU activities in north China and Manchuria; and the Soviets had demonstrated their hostility to US intelligence operations in the north since the end of the war. The SSU chief in China reported that "Marshall and [Henry] Byroade [head of Marshall's executive headquarters in Peking] have stated that they want nothing to do with SSU directly, although all admit [the] value of our work."

In late July, Marshall indicated his preference that the Navy's Seventh Fleet "assume control and support of SSU China as soon as practicable in order to disassociate officers in the military advisory and executive groups from connection with an intelligence agency." That occurred on September 30, and SSU/China was renamed External Survey Group 44 and then External Survey Detachment 44, or ESD 44. The Washington-based Central Intelligence Group, created on January 1, 1946, as OSS's successor, took charge of ESD 44's finances. All elements of the SSU were eventually integrated into CIA, which was established in September 1947.[15]

Three-Sided Intelligence Intrigues

As the negotiations with the KMT and the CCP dragged on, Marshall grew increasingly frustrated as he learned from various sources, including the SSU and the Dixie Mission, that Soviet collusion with the CCP was growing. In May 1946, the Dixie Mission delivered this analysis:

> *Direct positive proof based upon personal observations together with much circumstantial evidence definitely establishes the fact that the Soviet Union is guiding the destinies of one of its strongest allies, the Chinese Communist Party, as it has in the past and will in the future.*

Other intelligence reporting concluded that Moscow was supplying Mao's troops with rifles, mortars, machine guns, and tanks.[16]

Marshall was not able to get definitive evidence of a CCP-Soviet nexus through COMINT—"intercommunication back and forth I never was able to pick up exactly," he later said—because Chou appeared to rely on one-time pads to encrypt his messages. In contrast, Marshall often knew what Chiang's supporters were up to ahead of time because American cryptanalysts had much less trouble reading their communications.[17] He also was aware that the CCP had planted agents inside the KMT, including its espionage and counterintelligence apparatus—they even got hold of Chiang's codebook—but he did not know that the Soviets had penetrated his own side.

An economic adviser in the Nanjing embassy, Solomon Adler—whom Marshall called "indispensable"—had passed information to KGB handlers during the war when he worked at the Treasury Department, and now he was informing the Soviets about Chiang and the KMT from his current post.[18] Adler was designated in KGB traffic with the codename "Sax." Presumably the Soviets passed on some of his information to the Chinese Communists, but how or whether that espionage complicated Marshall's mission is not apparent from the record.

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Notwithstanding his awareness of the expanding Soviet-CCP relationship, Marshall continued trying to avoid alienating Mao and his confederates. Beyond Marshall's conduct of the negotiations, he demonstrated that attitude in two intelligence episodes. In mid-May 1946, he learned that ONI planned to present a posthumous citation to Dai Li, the KMT's brutal spymaster who ran what at the time was the world's largest espionage organization, with around 500,000 case officers, assets, and informers as of 1945. Dai Li had died in a weather-related plane crash two months earlier that many local observers regarded as suspicious.

The US Navy had decided to help Chiang build a modern surface fleet, and senior US officials, including Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and Admiral King, had promoted Dai Li to be commander of the new KMT navy—a prospect the Maoists abhorred. In a message sent to Forrestal on May 19, Marshall warned that presenting the citation

> *will seriously prejudice my efforts by virtually egging on the Communist propaganda against American support of National Government in present conflict.*

Marshall's mediation efforts never regained any momentum after he returned to China from Washington in mid-April 1946.

> *Importance of naval recognition of Dai Li's assistance . . . I think is of negligible importance compared with settlement of present crisis. Cannot this matter be delayed?*

Emphasizing the urgency with which Marshall viewed this development, the message's routing instructions to his aide Col. Marshall Carter stated: "Please see Secretary Navy personally immediately and give him the following orally. Repeat orally." According to Cmdr. Milton Miles, a professional friend of Dai Li's who headed the US Naval Group China, Marshall prevented both him and Adm. Charles Cooke, the commander of the US Seventh Fleet who had a Legion of Merit for Dai Li, from attending his funeral. (Miles did so unofficially wearing civilian clothes.)[a, 19]

Presumably for the same reason that he opposed the Dai Li citation, and perhaps out of personal respect for CCP lead negotiator Zhou Enlai, Marshall did not take advantage of an amazingly serendipitous intelligence windfall that came his way—a notebook that Chou had dropped when he dozed off on a Marshall's airplane on a flight from Manchuria—where there had been a negotiation—to Nanjing in June 1946. It contained many valuable secrets, including the name and address of one of the top CCP spies in the KMT. On June 9, Marshall sent an aide to Chou's estate to deliver a thickly wrapped packet. Chou was astonished to find his notebook inside. He was sure that Marshall had had its contents copied and prepared to have the spy in the KMT activate his escape plan. Nothing indicates Marshall had the notebook copied, but if he did, he did not disclose any of the information to the KMT, and the spy continued to operate in place under CCP control.[20] Critics of Marshall's handling of the China mission would later use this incident to demonstrate that he was too willing to defer to Mao to secure an accord with him.

Frustration and Disheartenment

Marshall's mediation efforts never regained any momentum after he returned to China from Washington in mid-April 1946. Chiang's nationalists and Mao's communists had staked out irreconcilable positions, violated earlier agreements, and tried to take advantage of Marshall's attempts to find grounds for compromise. As historian Ernest May succinctly observed, "The Nationalists would make no real concessions, and the Communists only pretended to do so."[21] More expansively, then Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated in 1949:

Marshall with Zhou Enlai. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

> [O]*ur policy at that time* [of the Marshall mission] *was inspired by the two objectives of bringing peace to China under conditions which would permit stable government and progress along democratic lines, and of assisting the National*[ist] *Government to establish its authority over as wide areas of China as possible. As the event proved, the first objective was unrealizable because neither side desired it to succeed: the Communists because they refused to accept conditions which would*

a. In late 1942, Dai Li had tried to control US intelligence operations in China—particularly OSS's—by proposing an agreement to create a Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization (SACO) that he would lead. The JCS took up the proposal in February 1943. King supported it, but Marshall strongly disapproved of the portions of the draft charter that had the US officer in charge of US equities report to Dai Li and not to the commander of US forces in China, Gen. Joseph Stillwell. Stillwell, however, agreed to relinquish control of intelligence to SACO, thereby disarming Marshall's opposition. The agreement establishing SACO was signed in China on July 4, 1943, but neither OSS nor Army intelligence were ever completely subordinated to it. To circumvent SACO, William Donovan collaborated with the commander of the 14th Air Force, Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault, to set up the 5329th Air and Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff (with the infelicitous acronym AGFRTS) and enable OSS to run operations inside Japanese territory under Air Force cover. No documentation indicates that Marshall got involved in that maneuver in any fashion. After OSS was disbanded on October 1, 1945, SACO's dissolution followed 10 days later.

> *weaken their freedom to proceed with what remained consistently their aim, the communization of all China; the Nationalists because they cherished the illusion, in spite of repeated advice to the contrary from our military representatives, that they could destroy the Communists by force of arms.*[22]

By the fall of 1946, Marshall concluded that his mission was futile. He later lamented that "I tried to please everyone. The result was that by the time I left, nobody trusted me."[23] As early as October, he proposed to President Truman that it be terminated, and in November he ended mediation efforts. In late December, he told the president that "It is quite clear to me that my usefulness will soon be at an end for a variety of reasons," as he had become "persona non grata." "It is now going to be necessary for the Chinese, themselves, to do the things I endeavored to lead them into."[24] Truman announced Marshall's recall to Washington on January 6, 1947, and his appointment as secretary of state the next day. In a personal statement issued on January 7, Marshall complained that

> *The greatest obstacle to peace in China was the almost overwhelming suspicion between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang. . . . They each seemed only to take counsel of their own fears. They both, therefore, to that extent took a rather lopsided view of each situation and were susceptible to every evil suggestion or possibility. . . . Sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been*

1946 photo of Marshall seated between top KMT and CCP negotiators, Chang Ch'un and Zhou Enlai (left and right, respectively). Photo courtesy of the Marshall Foundation.

CCP Moles in the Kuomintang

According to American China scholar Maochun Yu, the CCP intelligence figure named in the unopened notebook was Xiong Xianghui, who wrote a memoir—*Zhou Enlai and My Twelve Years Underground*—published in China in 1991.[25] Xiong was embedded in the headquarters of a KMT field army from where he revealed KMT military plans, including an attempt to overrun the CCP's headquarters in Northwest China. Zhou ordered Xiong out of China to the United States when Xiong's situation became untenable in 1947. There he studied at Case Western Reserve University before returning after the CCP takeover in late 1949. In Beijing, he would serve in the new government as an intelligence chief and diplomat. In 1962, he was charge d'affairs in China's embassy in London. Xiong played a leading role in negotiations in China in 1971 that paved the way for President Richard Nixon's visit to China the following year. Xiong died in 2005.

Not mentioned in Yu's book was another mole of critical importance to the CCP at the time. That mole was a woman named Shen Anna, who served as Chiang Kai-shek's stenographer. According to her memoir published in 2016, five years after her death, Shen had been serving the Communists for years in lower-level government offices, sending to the CCP via her witting husband and couriers transcripts of secret leadership discussions and planned military operations.

In time, the KMT would promote Shen to the party's Executive Secretariat as the senior notetaker. During the several failed attempts after the war to create a unity government and during KMT/CCP reconciliation negotiations in which Marshall participated, Shen attended the KMT leadership meetings that followed each day's negotiations. In those meetings the leadership discussed the negotiations and formulated strategy for the next session. Shen dutifully and in detail transcribed their discussions, secretly made copies and had them delivered immediately to Zhou Enlai, in time for his reading before the next round of talks.[26]

frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both sides.

One of the few positive passages in Marshall's message was his praise for the intelligence support he received from US elements in China, with due recognition given to the difficult circumstances under which they operated. "It was only through the reports of American officers in the field teams from Executive Headquarters that I could get even a partial idea of what was actually happening and the incidents were too numerous and the distances too great for the American personnel to cover much of the ground."[27]

The following day, Marshall boarded the aircraft that took him and his wife, Lily, to Hawaii for a week of rest before he returned to Washington to start his next assignment. Marshall tried to arrange with the White House for the announcement of his recall and appointment to have a maximum impact in China. He wrote to his aide, Marshall Carter, on January 5:

. . . my decision is to leave here Wednesday a.m. the 8th local calendar, stopping over for rest in Honolulu. Request following White House announcement be made 24 hours earlier:

The President has directed General Marshall to return to Washington to report in person on situation in China. He will probably leave Nanking tomorrow morning.

In case there is a leak from out here, which is quite possible, make the announcement immediately correcting time element accordingly. I decided that the general effect out here would be better, first to have the shock of my immediate departure with its various implications, to be followed a few days later by the added shock of the January 10 announcement.

However, outgoing Secretary Byrnes apparently disclosed news of Marshall's appointment, dissipating that intended effect.[28] Soon after he arrived and took up his new post, Marshall would have to deal with the political and security ramifications of his failed mission in the fevered, espionage-inspired atmosphere of the "Second Red Scare" of the latter 1940s.

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Endnotes

1. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, Volume 2, Years of Trial and Hope* (Doubleday, 1956), 66.
2. "Memorandum of conversation by General Marshall," December 14, 1945, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), *Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Volume VII, Far East, China*, Document 557, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v07/d557.
3. Marshall letter to Pershing, December 26, 1926, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, ed. Larry I. Bland et al., 7 vols. (The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981–2016; hereafter *PGCM*), https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-general-strong-5/. (Citations with URLs refer to the on-line versions of the published Marshall Papers; citations with volume and page numbers refer to the hardcopy editions.), 1:294
4. Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (Henry Holt, 1958), 363.
5. In addition to the coverage in the Marshall biographies, see also Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, *The China Mission: George Marshall's Unfinished War, 1945–1947* (W.W. Norton, 2018; Lippmann quote at page 37); Barry F. Machado, "Undervalued Legacy: Marshall's Mission to China," in *Marshall: Servant of the American Nation*, 117–28; the essays in *George C. Marshall's Mediation Mission to China*, eds. Larry I. Bland, et al. (George C. Marshall Foundation, 1998); Katherine K. Reist, "To Mediate Civil War: Marshall and the Mission to China," in *George C. Marshall and the Early Cold War: Policy, Politics, and Society*, ed. William A. Taylor (University of Oklahoma Press, 2020), 38-59; *The China White Paper, August 1949* (originally issued as *United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949*, Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30, August 1949), 2 vols. (Stanford University Press, 1967), 1:127-220; Marshall, "Memorandum for Harry S. Truman on China," May 18, 1954, *PGCM*, 7:833–40; and *FRUS*, *1946, Volume X, The Far East: China*, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v10, Documents 1–723.
6. Marshall message to Marshall Carter, December 6, 1946, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-colonel-marshall-s-carter-18/.
7. John J. McLaughlin, *General Albert C. Wedemeyer: America's Unsung Strategist in World War II* (Casemate, 2012), 149.
8. John King Fairbank, *Chinabound: A Fifty-Year Memoir* (HarperCollins, 1983), 316, 321.
9. Maochun Yu, *OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War* (Naval Institute Press, 1996), 199.
10. Marshall message to Eisenhower, August 2, 1946, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-general-of-the-army-dwight-d-eisenhower-51/. See also Marshall message to War Department, August 1, 1946, ibid., https://www.marshallfoun-

dation.org/library/digital-archive/to-the-war-department-office-of-the-chief-of-staff/, and Marshall message to Lt. Gen. Alvan Gillem, August 1, 1946, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-the-commanding-general-china-service-command-gillem/. Gillem commanded US Army forces in China.

11. Marshall messages to Eisenhower and Bissell, both dated January 22. 1946, ibid., 5:420 n. 1.
12. Carolle J. Carter, *Mission to Yenan: American Liaison with the Chinese Communists, 1944-1947* (University Press of Kentucky, 1997), 19, 180-83, 186; Kurtz-Phelan, 2-3, 132, 137. On the Dixie Mission's initial activities, see Bob Bergin, "The Dixie Mission 1944: The First US Intelligence Encounter with the Chinese Communists," *Studies in Intelligence* 63, no. 3 (September 2019).
13. Yu, 256–7.
14. Marshall message to Wedemeyer, July 7, 1946, *PGCM*, 5:624; Yu, 252–7.
15. Yu, 261–2.
16. Kurtz-Phelan, 197; Marshall message to Col. Henry A. Byroade and Walter S. Robertson, January 14, 1946, *PGCM*, 5:421.
17. Ibid., 5:420, n. 2. Marshall's own communications were secure because they were encrypted by a Sigaba machine, a highly sophisticated device that the United States and Great Britain used during the war to pass messages about ULTRA.
18. Frederick Wakeman Jr., *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service* (University of California Press, 2003), 273, 341; Marshall testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 14, 1947, *PGCM*, 6:38; John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr,. *VENONA: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (Yale University Press, 1999), 144–5; Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—The Stalin Era* (Random House, 1999), 158; Marshall message to Byrnes, February 10, 1946, *PGCM*, 5:451.
19. Wakeman, 355–58, 364; Marshall message to Forrestal, May 19, 1946, *PGCM*, 5:560–61; Yu, 25556. Ibid., 94–100, 153–7, 252; Wakeman, 285–93, 315–8, 377–83; Douglas Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage* (Simon & Schuster, 2011), 205–14.
20. Yu, 254. Marshall later wrote that "In my conversations with Chou, I found him to be one of the ablest negotiators with whom I had come in contact. He was very agreeable, clever and inscrutable in the sense that one could never quite tell what were his objectives or intentions of the moment." Letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, May 18, 1951, *PGCM*, 7:525.
21. Ernest R. May, "1947–48: When Marshall Kept the U.S. Out of War in China," *Journal of Military History*, 66:4 (October 2002), 1005.
22. "Letter of Transmittal," July 30, 1949, in China White Paper, 1:xi.
23. David Roll, *George Marshall: Defender of the Republic* (Dutton Caliber, 2019), 418.
24. Marshall message to Truman, 28 December 1946, quoted in Kurtz-Phelan, 321.
25. Yu, 320, endnote 15.
26. Shen Anna, Hua Kefang, and Li Zhongxiao, *A Heart Full of Loyalty: Chinese Communist Party Intelligence Operative Shen Anna, An Oral Account* (Publishing House of the History of Chinese Communist Party [Zhonggong Dangshi Chuban She], 2016), Foreword
27. *PGCM*, 5:772–76
28. Marshall message to Carter, January 5, 1947, and Carter message to Marshall, January 8, 1947, *FRUS, 1946, Volume X, The Far East: China*, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v10, Documents 366 and 374.

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