

# The Past and Present State of Chinese Intelligence Historiography

*Dr. David Ian Chambers*

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***There is a much neglected orphan in the western scholarly backyard: the evolution of China’s intelligence and security services and the role they played in enabling the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to win and secure national power in the 20th century.***  
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## ***Introduction***

During the past three decades, great progress has been made in mapping and exploring the role of intelligence in international statecraft and war. The contribution of security services to the maintenance of state power has also attracted a great deal of productive scholarly attention.

As far as western intelligence and security services are concerned, the scale of the “missing dimension” identified by Christopher Andrew and David Dilks in 1984 has shrunk significantly.<sup>1</sup> Benefiting from various “open government” and freedom of information initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s, professional historians have produced a plethora of studies about individual agencies and their senior personnel, specific operations, and the interface between intelligence and states in times of war and peace.

Traditional official reticence or silence about past operations has been replaced by the production of official and authorized histories; in several countries, former intelligence officers are free to publish memoirs provided they do not prejudice current intelligence sources and methods.<sup>2</sup>

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe has spawned an upsurge in studies of the security

agencies that once underpinned dictatorship, while a selective opening of intelligence archives in the former Soviet Union has led to the production of official and semiofficial studies of past KGB and GRU operations by Russian writers, as well as high-grade analyses by foreign historians of the use of intelligence and counterintelligence in the USSR’s war against Nazi Germany.<sup>3</sup>

Where once undergraduate and postgraduate courses in intelligence history were rare on the university campus and their reading lists were short, there is now no shortage of courses or material on which to base teaching and research.

Despite these advances, there is a much neglected orphan in the western scholarly backyard: the evolution of China’s intelligence and security services and the role they played in enabling the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to win and secure national power in the 20th century. Though there is no shortage of publications focusing on the current threat China’s intelligence services present to western interests, non-Chinese studies of the history of those services and its reflection in current operational norms and practice are rare indeed. The very few that do exist were written mainly by journalists 20 to 30 years ago and have been criti-

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cized for their defective methodologies and uncritical reliance on a handful of seemingly sensational but deeply flawed sources emanating from both sides of the Taiwan Strait.<sup>4</sup> This is hardly surprising given the enduring power of the near total blackout on public discussion of intelligence issues that the CCP imposed after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949; an adequate platform for western scholarly studies of Chinese intelligence history simply did not exist.

However, just as more relaxed official attitudes towards intelligence research and publication have fueled the growth in historical studies of western services, and as China has pursued a path of radical economic "reform and opening up" over the past three decades, a parallel but largely unnoticed relaxation has provided a rich data stream for scholars seeking to develop insights into the CCP's pre-1949 intelligence wars and the subsequent intelligence operations it directed against perceived internal and external enemies. Based on interviews with PRC intelligence historians and veterans, as well as documentary research, this article's aim is to account for the underdevelopment of public intelligence history in China during and immediately beyond the Mao Zedong era, to examine the reasons for the relaxation that began in the 1980s, and to introduce the types of intelligence history now being produced, as well as the constraints that affect their use as a scholarly resource.

### ***From "Liberation" to Destruction***

Within weeks of the establishment of the PRC in October 1949, the CCP Politburo formally approved a Central Committee *Resolution on Intelligence Work*, which stated that intelligence had played a major role in the Party's achievement of national victory in its extended war with the Kuomintang.<sup>5</sup> However, just as the secrets of ULTRA and the Double-Cross Operation in World War II remained highly classified in the United Kingdom until the 1970s, the successes of the CCP's wartime intelligence operations were withheld from public view and the scrutiny of historians in China.

Nowhere was there scholarly discussion of the role of intelligence in preserving the CCP from near extinction in the late 1920s and early 1930s; the major contribution intelligence made to the Red Army's successful breakout from the Jiangxi Soviet that began the Long March in 1934; the acquisition of predictive intelligence in 1941 about Nazi Germany's invasion of the USSR and Japan's thrust into the Pacific; the paranoid counter-espionage campaign in communist base areas in 1943 for which CCP Chairman Mao Zedong was later obliged to apologize before his peers; or the comprehensive intelligence penetration of the Kuomintang's political and military establishment between 1945 and 1949.

The Chinese press of the early 1950s did carry countless emotive reports about the neutralization of dastardly espionage and subversion

plots by the CIA, SIS, and others, but there was no public discussion of the resource constraints under which the Chinese intelligence services labored when setting operational priorities during and beyond the Korean War. Nor was there any overt indication of a protracted and divisive debate within the Chinese intelligence community about optimum counterintelligence strategy and tactics to be employed against the CCP's old and new enemies.

In this, the behavior of Chinese policymakers was no different from that of their western counterparts. The judgment of the leaders of the intelligence services and their political masters was that secrecy was an absolute value and that there should be no disclosures about past operations lest they prejudice wartime sources and methods—which were still valued and in play—or the commitment of those fighting on the "hidden front" to defend the new regime. Equally, open discussion of security and intelligence dilemmas was considered likely only to provide comfort to China's perceived enemies.

Thus although intelligence chief Li Kenong encouraged the gathering of archival material and preparation of intelligence case histories in the 1950s, such material was for in-house use only.<sup>6</sup> In society at large, trained and politically correct historians were in short supply, their primary duty being to compile macrohistories of the Chinese revolution for use in universities, schools, work units, and CCP branches as part of a nationwide political resocialization program.

The aim of such history was less to establish and explore facts than to inculcate and reinforce loyalty to the

CCP by presenting an idealized past dominated by the infallible wisdom of Mao, the heroic role of the Red Army and “the masses” in the Chinese revolution, and the sagacious leadership of the CCP throughout the civil and Sino-Japanese wars.<sup>7</sup> Provision of detailed public intelligence history was not a priority.

Concepts of necessary secrecy and the need to concentrate scarce scholarly resources on “big picture” history aside, a further reason for the nondevelopment of public intelligence history was the willful distortion of China’s intelligence past by the Chinese communist purge process. This tendency first emerged during cadre screening and counter-espionage campaigns, launched by the CCP in 1943 to neutralize hostile spies within the Party and the base areas it controlled. During the campaigns, virtually every cadre who had operated underground in Kuomintang- or Japanese-held areas became vulnerable to suspicions they might have been recruited by the enemy to penetrate the CCP. Intelligence cadres who had oper-

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ated as case officers or deep penetrations of Kuomintang and Japanese establishments were particularly exposed: to support their operations, many had publicly adopted at best neutral and at worst stridently pro-Kuomintang or pro-Japanese cover identities. Operating separately from local underground CCP branches, they had worked for a single superior cadre fully aware of their circumstances and intelligence product, but the use of aliases and the shifting fortunes of war (deaths, reassignments, enemy successes against CCP networks, and policies requiring the destruction of sensitive documents) often broke those connections and thus the ability of those under suspicion to defend themselves.<sup>8</sup>


With war in progress, it was hardly surprising that few resources were allocated for the preparation of non-didactic histories of past operations or the maintenance of archives that might provide objective answers to

questions about the loyalty of individual intelligence cadres. As anecdotally-based accusations and counteraccusations about past case-work flew back and forth at the height of the 1943 campaigns, hundreds of intelligence and security cadres were targeted for interrogation in Yan’an and other CCP base area headquarters about their possibly dubious links with the Kuomintang and Japanese.

The application of relay interrogation, sleep deprivation, physical torture, and peer pressure techniques produced countless false confessions, including, bizarrely, some from schoolchildren who admitted that they were enemy secret agents. Fortunately for the CCP, these excesses were recognized relatively quickly, and the vast majority of those accused of treachery were officially cleared by the time the Seventh CCP Congress met in spring 1945.<sup>9</sup>

Nonetheless, although intelligence operations in the field continued—it would have been impractical to withdraw cadres operating under deep cover in denied areas for questioning at headquarters—the suspicions of some accusers and the vulnerability of the accused to absent or distorted history lingered and led to a series of high-profile purges of the intelligence and security apparatus in the first five years of the PRC.

- Chen Bo (a.k.a. Bo Lu), once lionized by Mao as the “Sherlock Holmes of Yan’an” for his able counterespionage investigation work, was dismissed from his post



Li Kenong, the People's Republic of China's most senior intelligence official from 1949 until his death in 1962.

Li's intelligence career began in the late 1920s, when he penetrated the Kuomintang Investigation Section in Shanghai, working as a wireless operator dealing with classified traffic. In 1946 he was appointed head of the CCP's Social Department (Shehui Bu), the Party's combined intelligence and counterespionage organ. (Above right: The Social Department office in Beijing in 1949.)

as director of the Guangdong Public Security Department in 1950, accused of having been an SIS and Kuomintang agent, and imprisoned for more than 20 years.<sup>10</sup>

- Yang Fan, who had collated the intelligence reporting that did much to facilitate the relatively peaceful takeover of Shanghai in May 1949 and who later ran the city's counterintelligence operations with considerable flair, was removed as director of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau (PSB) in 1951 and imprisoned in 1955 for being a Kuomintang agent. He was not released from custody until 1978.<sup>11</sup>
- Pan Hannian, a former deputy chief of the CCP's intelligence service who had run operations against the Kuomintang in the dark days of the early 1930s and later against the Japanese in World War II, was arrested in 1955. He was charged with having been a spy for the Kuomintang and Japan, and he died in custody in 1977. He was the headline victim of an intelligence purge in which 800–1,000 cadres received compulsory job transfers, demotions, or lengthy prison sentences, some committing suicide to avoid interrogation.<sup>12</sup>

These purges had all been triggered by professional disagreements about counterintelligence policy and fundamental differences of approach between those with solid, hands-on experience with wartime intelligence in denied areas, and others who had either sat out most of the

civil and Sino-Japanese wars at intelligence headquarters in Yan'an or concentrated on security rather than intelligence gathering. As the disagreements escalated into purges, the grave reservations of senior judicial officials about the evidential basis of the cases against Chen, Yang, Pan, and their colleagues were suppressed, and Li Kenong found there was little he could do to protect the intelligence apparatus from the damage the purges were causing to reputations and operations.<sup>13</sup>

The essential problem was that the purges had been initiated or endorsed by Mao and executed slavishly by a minister of public security with limited pre-1949 experience with intelligence work. Mao's formal position, quasi-god-like status, and constructed reputation for infallibility were such that no one was willing or able to challenge his assessments, either directly on the basis of limited archival records, or indirectly by the writing of accurate formal intelligence history. The task of those mining archives was less to produce objective history or to fairly assess the merits of accusations against individual purge targets than to extract material that supported the Chairman's views or perceptions of them. In short, by the mid-1950s, intelligence archives and history—still out of the public gaze—had become weapons and mediums of purges rather than vehicles of truth and scholarly resources.

The political abuse of intelligence history reached unprecedented

heights during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). Virtually every senior cadre who fell was accused of being a “renegade and traitor,” particularly if their pre-1949 careers had involved contact with Kuomintang, Japanese, or collaborationist officials. Intelligence and security cadres were particularly vulnerable to charges that they consorted with the enemy when acting as case officers, penetrations, or runners of double-agent cases that had involved passing genuine intelligence to the other side.

Chaos mounted, and in March 1967, the Investigation Department of the CCP Central Committee (ID/CCP, then China's civilian intelligence service) was placed under military control. It was absorbed by the military intelligence service two years later. ID/CCP secretary-general and de facto chief, Zou Dapeng committed suicide with his wife (herself a senior intelligence cadre) in April 1967 rather than face the kind of interrogation he had endured during the 1943 counterespionage campaign about his participation in operations in northeast China.<sup>14</sup>

Ironically, the history-based assault against the ID/CCP's leadership was led by Kang Sheng, who had headed the Party's intelligence and security apparatus between 1939 and 1946, only to be relieved of that command and stripped of other key posts once Mao and his senior colleagues realized the damage Kang had done to party unity with his overzealous direction of the 1943 campaigns.<sup>15</sup>

In Shanghai—a key center of the CCP's wartime intelligence offensive against the Kuomintang and Japanese and a major attack base for operations against western targets after 1949—over 1,000 PSB cadres

were placed in custody and 147 murdered during investigations of their past conduct. The principal allegations against them were that they had conspired to conceal key issues and protect the guilty during the earlier Yang Fan and Pan Hannian purges or that they had abused their access to pre-1949 police archives to assemble a “black intelligence dossier” on the conduct of Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, during her time in Kuomintang custody in 1934. Perhaps most bizarrely, it was claimed that history proved the PSB cadres were guilty of subverting Shanghai’s post-1949 counterespionage defenses in the interests of the so-called “Japanese Special Service Clique,” the “Collaborationist Police Bureau Underground Party,” the “Soviet Revisionist Special Service Group,” and/or the “Shielding the Hidden US-Chiang Kai-shek Organization Group.”

Once again, distortion of the slim historical record and the retrospective imposition of current political values onto past intelligence conduct was the order of the day. Intelligence archives and the few in-house histories that had been researched and written after 1949 were ransacked for evidence to “prove” ahistorical allegations of past treachery against those already condemned and to identify their former associates. Politically embarrassing material about the leaders of the Cultural Revolution was destroyed.<sup>16</sup>

### ***Hesitation, Rehabilitation, Hesitation Again***

Between Mao’s death in September 1976 and a critical meeting of

the CCP elite in late 1978, Chinese intelligence history remained in limbo, a reflection of the fact that there were much greater issues on the CCP Politburo agenda. Contrary to tabloid histories of Chinese politics in this period, there was no life and death struggle for the future of China between neo-Maoists led by Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng, and pragmatic reformers led by Deng Xiaoping. It was agreed that the Cultural Revolution had been a bad thing, originating from Mao’s misperceptions of his colleagues’ intentions and developing into an all-out civil war with dire political, economic, and social consequences.

However, the fact that the bulk of the CCP membership had joined the party or risen in it by demonstrating fealty to Cultural Revolution policies argued against its immediate official negation. Instead, during 1976–78, the CCP leadership developed an uncomfortable rationale whereby some principles of the Cultural Revolution were defended and said to be of continuing relevance, while its negative features were attributed exclusively to the “Gang of Four” and their followers.<sup>a</sup>

Mao’s infallibility was left publicly unquestioned for the time being for fear that to do otherwise might delegitimize the CCP; his position was protected by the claim that he had recognized the errors of the Cultural Revolution, criticized the “Gang of Four,” and would have

completed his moves against them had illness and death not intervened.<sup>17</sup> Thus Mao’s involvement in the intelligence purges of the 1950s and the consequent attacks on senior intelligence cadres during the Cultural Revolution were left uncriticized, at least for the time being. Not surprisingly, the rehabilitation of intelligence purge victims proceeded at an extremely slow pace.

However, that situation changed significantly after unforeseen developments at a CCP leadership conference convened in late 1978 to address pressing economic policy issues. In the present context, the most significant intervention at the conference was that of Chen Yun, head of the CCP’s intelligence and security service from 1931 to 1933. A senior CCP Politburo member prior to the Cultural Revolution, Chen had earlier been discreetly exploiting his unquestionably high revolutionary status to improve the living conditions of former intelligence comrades and their dependents who had suffered during the Cultural Revolution.

Following the lead of others who had intervened to set aside the conference’s economic agenda in favor of discussing political issues, Chen dramatically called for the ashes of former Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai to be reinterred with honor in Beijing’s hallowed Babaoshan Revolutionaries’ Cemetery. Chen also demanded that the “extremely

<sup>a</sup> Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, and the Shanghai CCP officials Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, and Zhang Chunqiao.

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grave” errors of Kang Sheng during the Cultural Revolution be criticized.

Chen’s intervention was highly significant on two counts. First, it amounted to a criticism of Mao’s behavior preceding the Cultural Revolution (the Chairman had ordered Peng Dehuai dismissed in 1959), and second, it was Kang who had launched the Cultural Revolution attack on the operational records and loyalty of the ID/CCP leadership. It followed from Chen’s remarks that official intelligence history was no longer to be set in Maoist stone: if the Chairman had made a grave error in his treatment of Peng, he and his acolytes might have been equally wrong in their assessments of senior intelligence and security cadres purged before the Cultural Revolution, as Peng had been. Similarly, if Kang Sheng’s Cultural Revolution critique of ID/CCP’s leaders such as Zou Dapeng was incorrect, it followed that the official narrative of pre- and post-1949 intelligence history generated during the Cultural Revolution was in urgent need of revision.<sup>18</sup>

Chinese intelligence historiography thus became inextricably bound up with the complex process of rehabilitating cadres who had been purged in earlier years. In some instances, the initiative for rehabilitation came from above, as individual senior CCP leaders placed cases for fallen intelligence heroes onto official agendas. Chen Yun, after a careful personal examination of the historical basis for Pan Hannian’s purge in 1955, submitted a written request to the Politburo Standing


Committee in 1981 to have the case reviewed.<sup>19</sup>

In other instances, relatives of the fallen submitted petitions to individual CCP leaders and Central Committee organs. Many of these petitions were for individuals who were either dead or languishing in labor camps; the extended personal lobbying and petitioning of senior Party officials by Yang Fan’s wife to enlist support for his release from a Hubei labor camp is a classic example.<sup>20</sup>

Former intelligence cadres who had been rusticated to the provinces after enduring imprisonment in jails or labor camps journeyed to Beijing to seek the support of colleagues who had survived the Cultural Revolution and attained high office. Thus, Hua Kezhi, a key operative in the

CCP’s wartime South China intelligence station, petitioned former ID/CCP deputy chief Lian Guan and Liao Chengzhi (a Central Committee member soon to join the CCP Politburo), both of whom had been aware of his role in operations based in Hong Kong and Shanghai during the 1940s. Similarly, Yun Yiqun, a journalist who had spied for the CCP inside the Japanese and collaborationist establishment in wartime Shanghai, used old press connections to win an audience with Politburo member Hu Yaobang to present his case for rehabilitation.<sup>21</sup>

Decisions to rehabilitate fallen intelligence cadres were not made simply on the basis of high-level recommendations or party fiat. Instead, each appeal was subject to a “cold-case” review, involving extensive trawling through archival material and interviews with surviving colleagues to establish whether or not the original purge was supported by the available historical evidence. The findings were then



Babaoshan Revolutionaries’ Cemetery in Beijing.

considered at a senior level by the intelligence and security agencies, and by the CCP Central Committee Organization (i.e., personnel) Department and its provincial branches before recommendations for rehabilitation were submitted to the relevant superior CCP body.<sup>22</sup>

Some rehabilitations took place relatively quickly—Yan Baohang, a major wartime penetration agent who died in prison in 1968, was formally rehabilitated in January 1978, and the deceased Zou Dapeng was cleared of all charges in February 1979. However, for the majority of purged intelligence cadres, the rehabilitation process was long and occasionally contentious.

The first to benefit from rehabilitation were those who had survived the Chinese gulag after their purges in the Cultural Revolution; the cases of those who had been purged earlier or were dead were assigned a lower priority since scarce investigative resources were as much in demand to investigate those responsible for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution as the brutal treatment of its victims. The cases of those whose purges had been based on a specific directive from Mao or interpretation of his indirect musings (e.g., Pan Hannian and Yang Fan) could not be addressed properly (or safely) until the CCP Central Committee passed a resolution in June 1981 publicly acknowledging that the Chairman had made several profound errors of judgment in the years after 1949. Turf battles between different components of the CCP machine complicated access to historic archives for the case reviewers.

As rehabilitations began to gather momentum in the early 1980s, they

culminated in the reappearance of once-purged intelligence cadres in their former units or alternative pre-retirement comfort posts. Countless solemn memorial meetings honored the dead. Herein lay the roots of the emergence of public intelligence history in the PRC. The intermediate products of the rehabilitation process for the living and the dead alike were nonpublic circular documents rescinding earlier Party and court verdicts. For the dead, formal memorial ceremony eulogies delivered by senior Party or state cadres were duly reported in the press. Circulars and eulogies were closely based on the historical record as established during the case review process, and it was these, together with memoirs by past associates of the deceased, which constituted the initial raw material for public intelligence history in the 1980s.

In parallel, intelligence history was beginning to acquire a solid research and vetting infrastructure. A Party History Research Office (*Dangshi Yanjiu Shi*) directly subordinate to the CCP Central Committee was established to set priorities for scholarly research in universities, the Academy of Social Science, and the elite Party School system, working through the Party History Research Society (*Dangshi Yanjiu Hui*) which held its inaugural meeting in mid-1980. Discussions began about improving researchers' access to archives held by the intelligence and security services, leading to some case files being transferred to relatively open-access civilian provincial-level archives.

In 1983, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) was established and assumed the functions of the ID/CCP—as well as the counterespionage functions of the Ministry of Public Security. The MSS set up a small headquarters group to stimulate the production of public and classified intelligence histories. This group eventually became the MSS's Intelligence History Research Division (*Qingbao Shi Yanjiu Chu*), publishing material under its own name and playing a custodial and prepublication vetting role comparable with that of CIA's Historical Collections Division and the Publications Review Board.

Intelligence history publications in the 1980s were mainly cradle-to-crematorium biographical studies of deceased intelligence cadres. Dominant themes in the prefaces of such works were China's moral obligation to honor the contribution of fallen intelligence heroes to the success of the communist revolution; the country's need to atone for their physical suffering during the Cultural Revolution; and/or the detailing of their experience as an inspiration to those following in their professional footsteps.

So far, so predictable, but an additional motive behind the MSS's initial support for intelligence publications was the hope that intelligence history would help the new ministry establish its reputation with post-Mao leaders who had relatively little direct personal experience with intelligence work, thus improving the chances of the MSS gaining access to diplomatic cover slots

abroad and enjoying decent treatment in annual and quinquennial manpower-allocation and budget-setting exercises. More broadly, it was anticipated that public intelligence history and associated discussion of intelligence and security issues would help raise awareness of espionage and subversion threats to the PRC and provide a sympathetic operational environment for those professionally responsible for countering them.<sup>a</sup>

However, public intelligence history was almost stillborn. In July 1980, veteran journalist Mu Xin published a short book about the activities of Chen Geng during his time as director of CCP Special Service Section (SSS) intelligence and counterintelligence operations in Shanghai between 1928 and 1931. Based on interviews with Chen (who had died in 1961) and his surviving colleagues, the book was classified for “internal circulation” (*neibu faxing*), i.e., for PRC readers only. Over 73,000 copies of the book were printed (a relatively large print-run for the times). Readers were provided a sober and detail-rich account of the operations Chen had led against hostile security agencies and of the SSS’s bloody reprisals against CCP defectors and key Kuomintang security personnel, all brought to a shuddering halt when SSS chief Gu Shunzhang defected to the Kuomintang in April 1931.<sup>23</sup>

Though Mu Xin’s book proved to be hugely popular with its readership, reactions in the upper levels of the CCP and intelligence services were mixed. For some, public intelligence history was an indispensable moral and political component of the rehabilitation process, which honored the deceased and fallen and served the interests of the services. Others took a contrary view, arguing as their predecessors had in the early 1950s, that public intelligence history should not be encouraged lest it expose sources and methods still in use.

In the short term, this contradiction was resolved by classified circulars issued by the Central Committee General Office and Propaganda Department in 1982. These stated that although intelligence work had been an integral component of the Chinese revolution and was a worthy subject for historical research, all publications about it were to be subject to strict Party leadership (i.e., censorship) to prevent unauthorized disclosure of details regarding organization, personnel, sources, and methods. “Inappropriate” leaks in the past had produced “unhealthy” consequences at home and abroad.<sup>24</sup>

As a result, later publications rich in detail were given a higher classification or were edited to remove any discussion of sources and methods deemed to have contemporary operational relevance. Access to intelligence archives was to be controlled

as before: possible if researchers were past or serving members of the intelligence community, but difficult to negotiate for academics who were not. Soon afterwards, Chinese People’s University Professor Hu Hua, the then doyen of CCP academic historians, commented in a major Party history journal that:

*Some secret Party incidents cannot be written about for the time being...we can avoid these issues and not write about them [but] pushing them to one side certainly doesn’t mean that the facts do not exist—it just means that they can’t be written down for the time being. For example, at present we can only refer in vague terms to the individuals who took part in the struggles of the SSS and to the secrets of the underground struggle—but we can’t serve it up on a plate or write it all down. Perhaps some of these affairs can be written about by the next generation.*<sup>25</sup>

### **Creating Public Intelligence History: the Example of Pan Hannian**

The production of intelligence history thus proceeded to edge in from the cold, subject to the limits set out in the Central Committee circulars. The posthumous, post-rehabilitation reconstruction of Pan Hannian’s reputation provides a classic example of the process. After an 18-month investigation of the case, a classified CCP Central Committee Notice

<sup>a</sup> The latter factor was the explicit *raison d’être* for launching the MSS’s monthly house-journal *Guojia Anquan Tongxun* [State Security Bulletin].



was issued in August 1982 that set out and reassessed the three major charges on which Pan had been found guilty at a secret trial in 1963, eight years after Mao had ordered his detention.

Examination of contemporary documents and telegrams had proved that rather than being recruited by the Kuomintang and subsequently betraying the CCP during secret united front negotiations in Moscow and Nanjing in 1936, he had adhered throughout to the CCP's negotiating position. Second, during the Sino-Japanese War, he had met frequently with a senior Japanese intelligence officer and collaborationist officials, but these meetings had been approved in advance by CCP headquarters, had been reported fully by Pan and had produced well-received, strategically important intelligence.

Thirdly, Pan had overseen postwar counterintelligence operations in Shanghai that had deployed pre-1949 defectors from the Kuomintang as double agents, and he had directed deception operations with



Pan Hannian, ca. 1950s.

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captured Kuomintang agent radios to identify enemy intelligence requirements, incoming personnel, and modus operandi. These operations had required the provision of genuine intelligence to the enemy, but none of it had directly assisted the Kuomintang's damaging aerial bombing raids against Shanghai in the early 1950s, and many hostile espionage and subversion circuits had been broken.

Pan had erred by waiting until 1955 to report an unscheduled 1943 meeting with collaborationist government chief Wang Jingwei, but that had been a mistake rather than an act of treason. It followed that Pan's detention in 1955, his trial on espionage charges in 1963, and the barbaric treatment he had suffered in prison and labor camp had been completely unjustified: Pan had been a hero of the underground intelligence war of the Chinese revolution, not one of its biggest traitors.<sup>26</sup>

Like similar rehabilitation documents, the notice was classified for distribution exclusively within the CCP down to the level of county Party branches. For those intent on ensuring Pan's place in CCP intelligence history, the next step was to convert the classified text into public history. The first move was made by Politburo member Chen Yun, who directed one of Pan's former intelligence colleagues to write a memorial article that was published in November 1982 in the national Party organ *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily]. In the next month, a restricted Shanghai journal published a Pan photo-feature and no fewer than 17 articles by his former

colleagues. Such was the demand for copies that a second print-run was commissioned in January 1983. Even that proved inadequate to meet public demand, prompting the publication of two unrestricted collections of articles about Pan in 1984 and 1985.<sup>27</sup>

By the end of the 1980s, Pan had been the subject of two unrestricted book-length biographies: one written by a veteran associate from the pre-1949 Shanghai underground,<sup>28</sup> the other the product of four years of research by a young postgraduate whose interest had been piqued by the August 1982 Central Committee Notice. As a junior civilian cadre, he had been unable to access official intelligence archives, but—backed by senior members of a Shanghai CCP Committee group working on the post-rehabilitation welfare of those once jailed for being members of the alleged “Pan Hannian Counter-Revolutionary Clique”—he was able to interview several of Pan's relatives and former intelligence colleagues.<sup>29</sup>

In the final shot of the opening salvo of intelligence history publications about Pan, in 1991 the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) published a qualitatively superior biography by an MPS cadre with formal access to intelligence archives. For the first time, accounts of past operations were presented in fine detail. No attempt was made to conceal the fact that intelligence-led assassination operations were as much a feature of the CCP intelligence service's early years as the gathering of secret information about Kuomintang political and mil-

itary intentions. The targeting, recruitment, and running of human sources was presented not in simplistic terms but as a complex process often involving necessary contact with those whose profiles were anything but pro-CCP.

Fair regard was given to the difficulties of intelligence cadres operating alone in the field, and descriptions of operations were linked explicitly to the CCP's intelligence requirements and to the product that had flowed from them. Most significantly, the book addressed, albeit obliquely, the role of senior CCP officials from Mao downwards who had criticized Pan's leadership of intelligence operations and his occasionally undisciplined responses to political issues of the day.<sup>30</sup>

Nonetheless, the door to public intelligence history was only partly open: rather than being available for open sale to Chinese and foreign readers alike, the book was classified for distribution to political-legal cadres only and printed in limited numbers. After four years of serial plagiarism, edited, unrestricted versions of the book and its intelligence chapters were published separately in 1996, and, by the time the centenary of Pan's birth was commemorated in 2006, he had been the subject of almost 20 book-length studies, countless articles, and a TV serial dramatization of his life.

As statues in Pan's honor were unveiled in Shanghai and his home county, and schools were renamed in his memory, all that was lacking was

the production of a Felix Dzerzhinsky/Richard Sorge-style postage stamp to celebrate his contribution to CCP intelligence. And as Pan's rehabilitation and record became public, so the rehabilitation of his former intelligence colleagues and the agents he had run followed, sparking a secondary wave of public historical studies of their careers and those of other intelligence giants who had fought on the "hidden front."<sup>31</sup>

### ***Intelligence Histories, 21st Century-Style***

Intelligence history sells well in China. Most weekly TV schedules include at least one documentary or racy drama on the subject, and popular interest has sparked a deluge of "noodle-stall" accounts comparable to the wave of ill-sourced "airport-bookstall" versions of US and UK intelligence history—written by journalists and parahistorians—that emerged in the 1970s and shows no signs of abating.<sup>32</sup>

These and the often sensationalist blogs of Chinese cyberspace offer little to serious scholars (Chinese or western), who can turn more confidently and easily to a wide range of scholarly books, journals, and institutional websites for biographies, memoirs, operational case studies, reference aids, and reproductions of archival documents that have emerged over the last 30 years. Recent suggestions that China has never contributed to the literature of intelligence and that "there is no tradition of retirees publishing their memoirs, of senior officers recalling

their triumphs...or of government agencies declassifying documents and making archival material available to historians" are patently incorrect.<sup>33</sup>

As indicated above, the products of rigorous research and the recording of oral intelligence history are protected by a formal system intended to ensure that sources and methods are shielded and that publications conform with official assessments of past and current political norms. At the lowest level, publications are classified for open sale to all or for sale only to PRC nationals. Above that level, publications are restricted for circulation only to those working in the political-legal occupational sector (*xitong*), a low-level classification very roughly equivalent to those held by people working inside the Beltway or the Westminster Village.

At the next highest level, publications are available only to employees of the agency concerned and to favored historians. In this category, books and periodicals sometimes appear without colophons and are over stamped with markings indicating that they must be kept in safe custody at all times and not be copied, passed to others, or cited in unrestricted publications. Fortunately, open distribution publications far outnumber the other varieties.<sup>34</sup>

Most obviously, there is much in current PRC intelligence history for students of the dynamics of the Chinese revolution, the early years of the PRC, and the ways in which intelligence practice reflected and contributed to the differences within the CCP leadership about how to

achieve regime goals. In addition, Chinese intelligence historians have thrown much fresh light on hitherto vague or unknown aspects of international intelligence history. Examples abound.

- It is now possible to chart Richard Sorge's recruitment and deployment of Chinese nationals during his Shanghai posting, thanks to a memoir by his principal Chinese assistant.
- The obscure circumstances of the arrest of the GRU's Maxim Rivosh (a.k.a. Joseph Walden) in 1935 and the damage that resulted are now explained.
- A significant addition to the history of World War II has emerged in biographical studies of Pan Hannian and Yan Baohang, a Chongqing-based penetration agent, who together obtained predictive human intelligence about BARBAROSSA and Japan's Pacific intentions; the information was passed to the Kremlin, prompting a letter of thanks at the time and posthumous awards to Yan and members of his network by Russia's ambassador to China in 1995.
- Histories of the so-called US "intelligence failure" that preceded the attack on Pearl Harbor must now incorporate findings that the Kuomintang SIGINT effort had decrypted enciphered Japanese messages indicating the likelihood of the attack and that those details were passed to the United States by the Nationalist defense attaché in Washington on Chiang Kai-shek's direct orders. Furthermore, it seems possible that a CCP penetration in the Kuomintang

SIGINT unit passed the Japanese take onward for transmission via CCP headquarters to the Kremlin.<sup>35</sup>

- Histories of CCP underground and intelligence activities in the postwar years suggest that the US Military Advisory Group was penetrated by no less than seven locally-engaged staff who were secret CCP members (a profile reminiscent of that of the infamous Larry Wu-tai Chin).
- The liaison between US Ambassador John Leighton Stuart and the CCP during the abortive postwar CCP-Kuomintang mediation effort was not merely one of his former Yanjing University students—he was also a CCP intelligence cadre who had worked for the GRU in China for 15 years.
- A biography of a former Shanghai PSB deputy bureau chief provides much collateral for overt contemporary reporting about the Hugh Redmond case and the neutralization of External Survey Detachment 44, CIA, SIS, and Kuomintang intelligence case-work in early 1950s China, providing names of hostile agents and case officers, and describing how they were detected and the product of their interrogations.

Nonetheless, there are problems for producers and readers alike in current PRC intelligence history practice. PRC intelligence historians of any worth find themselves plagiarized in print or their findings

extracted without attribution on Internet sites. Sometimes, as indicated above, they are unable to cite the source documents for their findings, and when the product of their research is pirated and represented as original, it can easily be misread as substantiation by readers new to the field. The Chinese legal system offers little protection against plagiarism, and intelligence historians who challenge official Party verdicts have been threatened with legal action for defamation by the descendants of their subjects.

Another problem arises from the operational codes of wartime intelligence work and the oral origins of much recently published intelligence history. The reporting delivered by intelligence cadres working in the wartime field often existed only in oral form until it was relatively high up the communications chain to headquarters. Clandestine radio facilities destroyed tasking documents and intelligence reports once they had been received or transmitted. As discussed above, the collection of archival material and, especially, oral history was disrupted severely by the intelligence purges of the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution.

Consequently, much of the raw material of CCP intelligence history generated in the last three decades is in the form of transcripts of oral reminiscences by veteran intelligence cadres. Inescapably, they are elderly men and women, sometimes with faded or distorted memories. Some were held in solitary confine-

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ment, especially during the Cultural Revolution, for so long that they lost the power of speech. Others could not recognize even their immediate families or had developed various psychoses from which recovery was incomplete.

The pride of some intelligence veterans in recounting their experiences and at last receiving recognition is manifest in many memoirs, but others have refused to confide anything about their past work to historians or even close family members on the grounds that what was once secret should always remain so. Some have declined to meet MSS or MPS researchers because they want nothing more to do with a system that treated them so badly. And it goes without saying that some have an agenda of self-justification or aggrandizement. Thus, as Philip Davies argued in 2000, no single source, orally-based or not, should be considered definitive: triangulation is as necessary a component of intelligence research and reading in the Chinese context as in any other.<sup>36</sup>

An additional problem, familiar to historians of western or Warsaw Pact intelligence and security services, is the difficulty of gaining access to official intelligence archives. Compared to the sheer volume of archival material now available in the United States, PRC intelligence archives are relatively small, for the historical reasons considered above. Recent works demonstrate that established professors and postgraduate students working in academia

have more difficulty gaining archival access than do cadre historians employed by “the relevant departments” (*youguan bumen*), i.e., the intelligence services themselves.<sup>37</sup>

Like their western counterparts, the Chinese intelligence services are able to invoke legislation to defend nondisclosure—specifically, the 2010 PRC Protection of State Secrets Law and the State Archives Law of 1996. The latter provides that archives involving “security or vital interests” or other “unsuitable” topics are exempt from a general provision that makes PRC archives accessible after 30 years. In this way, historic “sources and methods” still considered to be relevant are protected in the same way as in the West.<sup>38</sup>

The control system is imperfect, however, and some archives, particularly those related to domestic security operations, have been discovered and put to excellent analytical use by foreign scholars.<sup>39</sup> And Chinese scholars do benefit from relatively free access to reproductions by the MSS and MPS of historic archive material, collections of veterans’ memoirs, and draft histories that are judged not yet fit for open circulation or purchase by the man in the street (or by the foreign researcher). Thus, while the MSS’s monthly *Guojia Anquan Tongxun* [State Security Bulletin] carried little historical material prior to its recent closure, both the MPS and MSS have produced solid serial collections and draft histories of great value to researchers, their efforts

replicated at the provincial level by organs of both ministries.<sup>40</sup>

High office provides no exemption from constraints in public intelligence history writing. In a recent example, former Minister of Public Security Liu Fuzhi published a memoir in 2010 containing a great deal of hitherto unknown detail about security/counterespionage operations during the years of revolution prior to 1949, his activities as a senior MPS cadre in subsequent years, and his treatment in custody during the Cultural Revolution. However, Liu’s memoir makes no mention of the purges that rocked the security elite in the 1950s or of his role in drafting policy papers which, once approved by the CCP Politburo, led to the creation of the MSS almost 30 years ago.<sup>41</sup>

Detailed discussions of the CCP’s intelligence failures and the undoubted success of the Kuomintang intelligence and security services in penetrating the CCP are extremely hard to find. Much is made of the treachery of those (such as Gu Shunzhang) who willingly allowed themselves to be debriefed after being captured by the Kuomintang, or who defected to join the Kuomintang. Absent, however, are accounts of defections in-place by CCP intelligence cadres or details of the Kuomintang’s successful counterintelligence operations against the CCP and its intelligence services, even though it beggars belief that the Kuomintang was no less energetic in its efforts than the CCP, if not as successful.

Ultimately, the most intrusive and powerful constraints on public intelligence history in China relate to cur-

rent political sensitivities. Historians may not, under any circumstances, challenge the principle that CCP leadership was a necessary condition for the intelligence successes of the past. Nor may they address the issues about Chinese intelligence methods raised by western studies of the (now relatively dated) Larry Chin and Bernard Boursicot cases, let alone cases that have not yet moved from current affairs to researchable history. Indeed, apart from some limited coverage of PRC intelligence operations in Taiwan and Hong Kong in the 1950s, there is virtually nothing to be found in openly accessible material about PRC intelligence operations outside China since 1949.<sup>a 42</sup>

Some publications are driven explicitly by CCP leadership concerns about the ideological state of China's youth. Thus, a collection of biographies of heroes of the pre-1949 Shanghai underground was published in December 1989, with the hortatory aim of providing "patriotic education" material in the wake of the "counterrevolutionary turmoil" that had taken place in Tiananmen Square earlier in the year. Similarly, a study of Pan Hannian's intelligence career was published in 1996 after a senior CCP leader had decried the tendency of China's consumerist youth to identify more with the gangsters and ruffraff of China's pre-1949 past than with revolutionary intelligence heroes such as Pan.<sup>43</sup>

Firm political ground rules also apply to discussion of former intelligence cadres currently esteemed or excoriated in official CCP historiog-

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raphy. For example, it is perfectly proper (and accurate) to chronicle party saint Zhou Enlai's major role in the foundation of the CCP's intelligence services and his direction of their activity on many occasions during his working life. However, official accounts do not discuss his failures in judgment during the period immediately prior to SSS chief Gu Shunzhang's defection in 1931, or his explicit endorsement of the false charges against Pan Hannian and Yang Fan at a national public security conference in February 1971.

Historiography surrounding Kang Sheng—an SSS section chief from 1931 to 1933 and intelligence/security service director from 1939 to 1946—illustrates the converse case. Expelled posthumously from the CCP in 1980 for his persecution of cadres during the Cultural Revolution, he may currently only be described as something approaching the devil incarnate for his conduct in the Cultural Revolution and the 1943 counterespionage campaign. Though memoir material and histories have added several others to the list of those responsible for past persecutions of intelligence cadres, seldom indeed is there discussion of Kang's close relationship with Mao, analysis of Kang's seemingly exemplary conduct as a co-organizer of assassinations in the early 1930s, or his subsequent role directing the creation and operations of the CCP's intelligence apparatus during the Sino-Japanese War.<sup>44</sup>

Institutional pride and a determination not to besmirch the reputation of deceased heroes also apparently account for the treatment of ex-Minister of Public Security Luo Ruiqing and other senior MPS officials in recently published intelligence histories. In Luo's case, since his 1978 death, he has entered the pantheon of CCP heroes, rightly acknowledged as one of the Cultural Revolution's principal elite victims (a failed suicide attempt in 1966 left him crippled for life). Serving as PLA chief of general staff at the time of his death, Luo is remembered as having supported Deng Xiaoping's return to office in 1977, for backing subsequent proposals for military reforms, and for lending critical PLA media support to the 1978 campaign to establish the principle that CCP policies should be formulated according to facts rather than dogma.

However, neither in a hagiographic MPS-published biography, nor in a substantial work published by one of China's major biographical publishing houses is there any mention of Luo Ruiqing's active role as Minister of Public Security in purging Chen Bo, Yang Fan, and Pan Hannian. They, too, have been rehabilitated and declared heroes of the intelligence wars but are apparently considered of lesser status, their fates an embarrassment to the Luo legacy.<sup>45</sup>

Similar ahistorical airbrushing is evident in the treatment of Xu Jian-

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<sup>a</sup> Note the similarity between PRC and UK practice: the official history of SIS by Keith Jeffery published in 2010 to mark the service's centenary has a cut-off date of 1949.

guo and Huang Chibo, appointed in 1952–53 on Mao's orders to serve as director and deputy director, respectively, of the Shanghai PSB and to eradicate the damage done to the bureau's counterintelligence program by an allegedly malevolent Yang Fan, working on behalf of the Kuomintang. Both Xu and Huang are now honored as intelligence and security heroes who suffered in the Cultural Revolution, and while the contemporary record leaves no doubt that both were vociferous critics of Yang's counterintelligence operations, that record is omitted from their official biographies.<sup>46</sup>

### Conclusion

At present, there is no comprehensive scholarly history of the Chinese communist intelligence services available, either in Chinese or in English. Chinese intelligence historians freely admit that they still have some way to go before they are able to complete microstudies of particular pre-1949 operations and write individual biographies that would allow CCP intelligence history to be incorporated accurately into histories of CCP leadership decision-making. However, work is well underway on building intelligence into the bigger picture of CCP urban underground work (and the military campaigns of the revolutionary years) and setting it into a theoretical framework.<sup>47</sup>



Inevitably, some historic intelligence research material remains classified (particularly that related to post-1949 operations), but current Chinese practice is more congruent with that of western states, following the derestriction of the 1980s and 1990s rather than the "closed doorism" that prevailed in China during and immediately after the Mao era. Certainly, the volume and quality of publications now available to Chinese-reading western researchers demands attention and can no longer be overlooked. There are pitfalls in the recently constructed past, but they are not unavoidable. Perhaps, then, this history is now less of an orphan in the backyard than a colleague, long lost through no fault of his own, ready to join the international intelligence history community?

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### Endnotes

1. Christopher Andrew & David Dilks (eds.), *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (London: MacMillan, 1984), 1.
2. See Christopher R Moran, "The Pursuit of Intelligence History: Methods, Sources and Trajectories" in Patrick Major and Christopher R Moran. (eds.), *Spooked: Britain, Empire and Intelligence since 1945* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 1–28. A version appeared in *Studies in Intelligence* 55, No. 2 (June 2011).
3. See Gary Bruce, *The Firm: The Inside Story of the Stasi* (Oxford University Press, 2010); Genrikh Borovik, *The Philby Files: The Secret Life of the Master Spy-KGB Archives Revealed* (London: Little, Brown, 1994); Sheila Kerr, "KGB sources on the Cambridge Network of Soviet Agents: True or False?" *Intelligence and National Security* XI, No. 3 (1996): 561–85; David Murphy, *What Stalin Knew: the Enigma of Barbarossa* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005); Robert W Stephan, *Stalin's Secret War: Soviet Counter-Intelligence Against the Nazis, 1941–1945* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004).
4. See Chalmers Johnson's perceptive review of Richard Deacon, *The Chinese Secret Service* in *The China Quarterly* (CQ) 64 (Dec. 1975): 763–65. Deacon's book also is included in Orville Schell's review article "Dragons and Dungeons" in *CQ* 139 (Sept. 1994): 783–93.
5. "Zhong Gong Zhongyang Guanyu Qingbao Gongzuo De Jueding" [CCP Central Committee Resolution on Intelligence Work], 16 November 1949, a document still classified over 60 years since its promulgation.
6. Li Kenong is the subject of several post-Mao biographies, the best of which are Kai Cheng, *Li Kenong* (Beijing: Zhongguo Youyi Chubanshe, 1996) and Xu Linxiang & Zhu Yu, *Chuanqi Jiangjun Li Kenong* [The legend of General Li Kenong] (Hefei: Anhui Renmin Chubanshe, 1996).
7. See Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, "Party Historiography in the People's Republic of China." *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 17 (Jan. 1987): 77–94.

8. “Guanyu mimi gongzuo de jige jue ding” 12 April 1939 cited in Pu Yuhuo and Xu Shuangmi, *Dang De Bai Qu Douzheng Shihua* [History of the Party’s struggles in the White Areas] (Beijing: Zhong Gong Dangshi Chubanshe, 1991), 163. Introducing the necessity of ciphers to protect sensitive wireless exchanges, no less than Mao Zedong enjoined his senior colleagues in 1936 to “appoint a specific person to decipher [the messages] and then burn and destroy them as soon as you have read them...please keep them to yourselves.” *Wenxian He Yanjiu* 4 (1985): 4.
9. See Peter J Seybolt, “Terror and Conformity: Counterespionage Campaigns, Rectification, and Mass Movements, 1942–1943.” *Modern China* XII, No. 1 (1986): 39–75; and Chen Yung-fa, “Suspect History and the Mass Line: Another ‘Yan’an Way’” in Jeffrey S Wasserstrom (ed.), *Twentieth-Century China: New Approaches* (London: Routledge, 2003), 169–89.
10. See Jiang Wei, *Hongse Fuermosi: Bo Lu yu Gongan Xitong Diyi Qi An* [Red Sherlock Holmes: Bo Lu and the First Strange Case in the Public Security System] (Shanghai: Xuelin Chubanshe, 2003). Chen died in custody in 1972.
11. Yang Fan, *Duan Wei: Mengyuan Ershiwu Nian de Gongan Juzhang* [Broken Mast: The 25-year ordeal of a Director of Public Security] (Beijing: Qunzhong Chubanshe, 2001).
12. Yin Qi. *Pan Hannian Zhuan* [Biography of Pan Hannian] (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Gongan Daxue Chubanshe, 1991).
13. On judicial reservations, see Peng Shuhua, *Pan Hannian An Shenpan Qian Hou* [The Beginning and End of the Trial of the Pan Hannian Case] (Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, 2010); on Li Kenong’s reservations, see Kai Cheng, *Li Kenong*, 426–36.
14. See Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao’s Last Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 97–98; Wang Jun (ID/CCP veteran and former vice minister of state security), “Kang Sheng zai Zhongyang Shehui Bu” *Bainian Chao* 5 (2003): 21–29; and “Zou Dapeng” in Zhong Gong Dongbei Jun Dangshi Zu (ed.), *Zhong Gong Dongbei Jun Dangshi Yigu Renwu Zhuan* [Biographies of Deceased Personalities in the History of the CCP in the North Eastern Army] (Beijing: Zhong Gong Dangshi Chubanshe, 1995), 121–24.
15. Frederick C Teiwes with the assistance of Warren Sun, *The Formation of the Maoist Leadership: From the Return of Wang Ming to the Seventh Party Congress* (London: Contemporary China Institute, 1994), 52–59.
16. Shanghai “Wenge” Shiliao Zhengli Bianzuan Xiaozu (ed.), *Shanghai ‘Wenhua Dageming’ Shihua* [Telling the history of the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’ in Shanghai] (Shanghai: n.p. 1992), 453–74.
17. See Lowell Dittmer, “Learning from Trauma: The Cultural Revolution in Post-Mao politics” in William A. Joseph, Christine P. W. Wong and David Zweig (eds), *New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 21–24. Based on interviews with key participants as well as extensive documentary research, Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, *Between Restoration and Reform: Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping and the Dismantling of Maoism, 1976–1981* (Armonk, NY: M E Sharpe, forthcoming) presents a finely nuanced corrective to simplistic popular views of PRC elite politics in the immediate post-Mao period.
18. Chen Yun, “Jianchi You Cuo Bi Jiu Fangzhen” 12 November 1978 in Zhong Gong Dangshi Wenxian Yanjiu Shi, *Chen Yun Lun Dang De Jianshe* [Chen Yun on Party Building] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1995), 236–40.
19. Liu Renshou, “Chen Yun Wei Pan Hannian Yuanan Pingfan” in Guo Simin (ed.), *Wo Yan Zhong de Chen Yun* [Chen Yun in My Eyes] (Beijing: Zhong Gong Dangshi Chubanshe, 1995), 237–39.
20. Li Qiong, “Pan Yang An’ Zhong de Yang Fan Yi Jia” *Bainian Chao* 12 (2008): 47–53 and Zhang Zhongtian, *Gongheguo Diyi Yuanan* [First Miscarriage of Justice of the Republic] (Beijing: Huayi Chubanshe, 1989), 257ff.
21. Gu Xueyong, *Qi Cai, Qi Wen, Qi An-Yun Yiqun Zhuan* [Rare Talent, Remarkable Tale, Curious Case: a Biography of Yun Yiqun] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1996), 383–86 and Dai Xing, *Hu Yaobang Yu Pingfan Yuan Jia Cuo An* [Hu Yaobang and the Redress of Incorrect, False and Unjust Cases] (Beijing: Zhongguo Gongren Chubanshe, 2004 Rev. Ed.), 59–62.
22. For participants’ accounts of the reviews, see Li Bingjun, “Huifu Lishi de Benlai Mianmu” in Yang Fan, *Duan Wei*, 501–509 and Yang Youzhen, “Yu Wang Heshou Yitong Pingfan ‘Liang An’ de Rizhi” in *Zongheng* October 2010 at <http://www.1921.org.cn/book.php?ac=view&bvid=28479&bid=845> [accessed 19 Oct. 2010].
23. Mu Xin, *Chen Geng Tongzhi Zai Shanghai-Zai Zhongyang Teke de Douzheng Jingshi* [Comrade Chen Geng in Shanghai-Experiences of Struggle in the Central Special Section] (Beijing: Wen Shi Ziliao Chubanshe, 1980).
24. “Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, ‘Guanyu Bianji Chuban Huiyi Dixia Douzheng Duwu Yingdang Zhuyi Wenti De Tongzhi’ Zhong Xuan Fawen [1982] 16 Hao” 29 April 1982 in *Shanghai Dangshi Ziliao Tongxun* 3 (1982): 40–42.
25. Hu Hua, “Guanyu Dangshi Renwu Zhuanji de Yanjiu he Xiezuo Wenti” in *Zhong Gong Dangshi Renwu Zhuan* 25 (1985): 351, emphasis added.
26. *Zhong Gong Zhongyang Guanyu Wei Pan Hannian Tongzhi Pingfan Zhaoxue, Huifu Mingyu De Tongzhi* [CCP Central Committee Notice Rehabilitating And Restoring The Reputation of Comrade Pan Hannian] 23 August 1982.
27. Tang Yu (ed.), *Lingluo Cheng Ni Xiang Ru Gu -Yi Pan Hannian Dong Hui* [Dead flowers Become Dirt but Smell Fragrant As Before - Remembering Pan Hannian and Dong Hui] (Beijing: Sanlian Chubanshe, 1984) and *Huiyi Pan Hannian* [Remembering Pan Hannian] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 1985).
28. Chen Xiuliang, *Pan Hannian Feifande Yisheng* [The Extraordinary Life of Pan Hannian] (Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1989).

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29. Tao Baikang, *Cong Chicheng Jiangchang Dao “Shizong”-Mengyuan Ershiqizai de Pan Hannian* [From Galloping on the Battlefield to “Disappearance”-the Twenty-Seven Year Injustice of Pan Hannian] (Beijing: Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi Chubanshe, 1989).
30. Yin Qi, *Pan Hannian Zhuan*.
31. See, for examples, Ding Yanzhao, *Guan Lu Ah Guan Lu* (Beijing: Renmin Wenxue Chubanshe, 2001) and Hu Zhaofeng, Feng Yuehua and Wu Min, *Jiandan Qinxin: Hongse Qingbaoyuan Yuan Shu Chuanqi* [Spirit of the Sword, Heart of the Lute: the Remarkable Life of Red Intelligence Agent Yuan Shu] (Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1999).
32. See Moran, 4.
33. These erroneous suggestions are made in I.C. Smith and Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence* (Lanham MD: Scarecrow Press, 2012), 310.
34. PRC classification practices are discussed in Flemming Christiansen, “The *Neibu* Bibliography: A Review Article” and Liu Changyun, “A Preliminary Analysis of the Characteristics of *Neibu* Materials in the Social Sciences” in *CCP Research Newsletter* No. 4 (Fall-Winter 1989–90): 13–20 and 21–23 and Zhang Dianqing, *Qiemi yu Fanqiemi* [Espionage and Counter-Espionage] (Taipei: Shiyong Chubanshe, 2008), 595–626.
35. See Frederic Wakeman Jr., *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service* (Berkeley: California University Press, 2003) 283 and Wu Yue, *Jiang Jieshi De Wangpai Tegong – Midian Poyi Qicai Chi Buzhou* [Chiang Kai-shek’s Special Agent Trump Card – Code-Breaking Genius Chi Buzhou] (Beijing: Dongfang Chubanshe, 2009) 135–169. Chi’s own account is “Wo Zai Kang Ri Zhanzheng Zhong Zhenpo Riben Midian Huiyi” [My memories of breaking secret Japanese codes during the War of Resistance against Japan] in *Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji* (Beijing) 46 (2000): 38–77. Reliable non-PRC source collateral for this claim has yet to surface.
36. Philip H. J. Davies, “Spies as Informants: Triangulation and Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of Intelligence and Security Services.” *Politics* 21, No. 1 (2001): 73–80.
37. For examples of professorial and post-graduate complaints about access controls, see Zuo Shuangwen and Wang Jie, “Gaike Kaifang Yilai Zhong Gong Yinbi Zhanxian Yanjiu” *Lishi Jiaoxue Wenti* 6 (2009): 78–86, 48; Lao Kaizhun, *Kangri Zhanzheng Shiqi Zhong Gong Shanghai Qingbao Gongzuo Yanjiu* [A Study of the Shanghai CCP’s intelligence work during the War of Resistance against Japan], MA dissertation, Shanghai Normal University May 2011.
38. “Archives Law of the PRC” 5 July 1996 at <http://www.saac.gov.cn> [accessed 8 July 2010]. Section 23(3) of the UK’s Freedom of Information Act (2000) similarly exempts the Security Service and SIS from the mandatory provisions elsewhere in the Act, and Section 24 (1) of the Act permits nondisclosure of information “for the purpose of safeguarding national security.”
39. An impressive example of archive-based research is Michael Schoenhals, *Spying for the People: Mao’s Secret Agents, 1949–1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
40. The principal in-house documentary collections are the MPS’s *Gongan Shi Ziliao* [Public Security History Materials] and the MSS’s *Zhongguo Gongchandang Qingbao Shiliao Huibian* [Collected Historical Materials on CCP Intelligence]. These are supplemented from time to time by classified book-length studies of particular intelligence operations; see, for example, Shanghai Shi Guojia Anquan Ju, Jiangsu Sheng Guojia Anquan Ting, Huadong Qingbao Shi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui Bangongting Qingbao Shi Bianji Zu, *Huadong Qingbao Shi Zhuanti Xuanji* [Special Selection on East China Intelligence History] (n.p. 1995).
41. Liu Fuzhi, *Liu Fuzhi Huiyilu* [Memoirs of Liu Fuzhi] (Beijing: Zhong Gong Wenxian Chubanshe, 2010).
42. Keith Jeffery, *MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949* (London: Bloomsbury, 2010).
43. Editorial preface to *Shanghai Yinglie Zhuan* No. 5 (1989) 1 and Yin Qi, *Pan Hannian de Qingbao Shengya* [The Intelligence Career of Pan Hannian] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1996). See also Yu Debei, *Yan Baohang Chuanqi* [The Legend of Yan Baohang] (Shenyang: Liaoning Shaonian Ertong Chubanshe, 2011), one of a series of books intended to inspire the youth of Northeast China with stirring tales of heroic underground and intelligence patriotism during the Sino-Japanese War.
44. The standard PRC restricted biography of Kang is Zhong Kan, *Kang Sheng Pingzhuan* [A Critical Biography of Kang Sheng] (Beijing: Hong Qi Chubanshe, 1982). See also the article by former MSS Vice Minister Wang Jun, “Kang Sheng yu Zhongyang Shehui Bu.”
45. See Tao Siju, *Xin Zhongguo Diyi Ren Gongan Buzhang Luo Ruiqing* [New China’s First Minister of Public Security: Luo Ruiqing] (Beijing: Qunzhong Chubanshe (the MPS’s dedicated publishing house), 1996) and Huang Yao and Zhang Mingzhe, *Luo Ruiqing Zhuan* [Biography of Luo Ruiqing] (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1996).
46. Ren Yuan and Han Da’nan, “Xu Jianguo” in *Zhong Gong Dangshi Renwu Zhuan* Vol. 49 (1991) 360–375 and Zhu Yuqi, *Jingwei Da Shanghai – Tie Xue Gongan Ju Zhang Huang Chibo Chuanqi* [Guarding Shanghai – The Legend of Iron and Blood PSB Chief Huang Chibo] (Shanghai: Wen Hui Chubanshe, 2006).
47. See, for example, You Guoli, *Zhongguo Gongchandang Yinbi Zhanxian Yanjiu* [A Study of the CCP on the Hidden Front] (Beijing: Zhong Gong Dangshi Chubanshe, 2006).

