


LESSONS LEARNED

Insights from experience...best practices for the future

JANUARY 2014



INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND POLICYMAKER INTEGRATION:

A Studies in Intelligence Anthology

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Foreword

This compendium of previously published articles from Studies in Intelligence spans some fifty years and focuses on key aspects of the Intelligence Community (IC) relationship with US policymakers. It could not be more timely. These essays touch upon fundamental issues that perpetually test intelligence producers and consumers alike—issues at the heart of current day controversies swirling around the US intelligence community, including:

Can analysis be fixed? Or, how can the IC avoid intelligence failures? In the wake of 9/11, the 2002 Iraq WMD estimate, and the 2007 Iran Nuclear NIE, two major commissions and outside experts and pundits have offered prescriptions for fixing the analysis business. Similar calls occurred following the fall of the Shah during the 1979 Iranian revolution and India's May 1998 nuclear tests.

Congress and Intelligence Community oversight. The Edward Snowden disclosure of NSA collection activities and a current SSCI study of CIA's post 9/11 rendition, detention and interrogation (RDI) program draw clear parallels with controversies that engulfed the CIA in the mid-1970s. Current calls from Congress—and the international community-- for an accounting of NSA's wide-ranging collection as well as greater disclosure of CIA's RDI program echo calls for CIA to divulge and curtail programs following the 1974 revelations of the Agency's foreign covert action and domestic surveillance activities, known collectively as "the family jewels.") Those calls spawned two Congressional investigations and led to the creation of the SSCI and HPSCI oversight committees in 1976 and 1977, respectively.

Is the Intelligence Community too close to policymakers? An underlying theme in the above topics is the charge that the IC has gotten too close to policymakers, as evidenced by charges of IC politicization of the Iraq WMD NIE, or, more recently, the executive branch's perceived efforts to limit disclosure of NSA collection programs.

In short, this compendium offers valuable insight and wisdom at a time when the United States is again wrestling with such core issues as the acceptable scope and reach of US intelligence gathering activities and how that information can or should be used in informing the US national security decision-making process. In broader terms, the underlying issue is the role of intelligence agencies in a democratic society—more specifically, how NSA's technical collec-

tion capabilities in the digital age and CIA's past RDI program square with stated US values. These essays shed light on "lessons learned" that ideally should help inform the thinking of those involved in examining these fundamental issues.

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Introduction

A review of interview transcripts and past studies on the relationship between the intelligence and policy communities conducted by the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) identified consistent themes related to the types of information policymakers need to orient them to the Intelligence Community (IC) when they arrive in Washington. Most common among them are the intelligence and warning cycles; the agencies of the IC and their collection and operational capabilities; the analytic and coordination process; the products available and who produces them; tasking and feedback mechanisms; how to leverage and ask smart questions of the IC; classification restrictions; counterintelligence realities; and lessons learned or best practices on working most effectively with the IC. The review also found that a range of IC orientation materials already have been developed and are available to cover these themes for policymakers.

Since 2009, the office of Partnership Engagement (PE) in the ODNI has produced both classified and unclassified orientation materials for new policy consumers, to include: [US National Intelligence: An Overview, 2013](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/USNI%202013%20Overview_web.pdf) (http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/USNI%202013%20Overview_web.pdf), Federal Intelligence Coordination Office Phonebook 2013, and the IC orientation briefing, *Unlocking the Secrets: How to Use the Intelligence Community*. These orientation products are available in both hardcopy and softcopy, and in classifications ranging from Unclassified to Top Secret. The ODNI and the organizations that comprise the IC also offer policymakers orientation briefings on a range of other topics.

While a broad array of classified articles on the complex relationship between intelligence and policy are available to government officials, this compilation of unclassified articles can be read outside the confines of government offices and may be more convenient for incoming policy and intelligence officials. This compilation is drawn from unclassified and declassified articles and monographs, most of them published in the IC journal of intelligence tradecraft, *Studies in Intelligence*, which began publication in 1955. The articles selected are derived almost exclusively from the perspective of former policymakers and the analytic side of the intelligence profession. These essays bring together the most significant unclassified holdings of the CSI on the relationship between intelligence professionals and their policymaking consumers, and they cover a broad range of topics related to roles, responsibilities, and processes, as well as culture, bias, and appropriate levels of support and interaction.

For decades, career IC professionals have explored issues that influence the intelligence-policy relationship and have sought to better understand how to

serve US policymakers. One truism that comes to light in the articles that follow is that it is the responsibility of intelligence officers to take the lead in orienting busy policymakers to the capabilities and services the IC can provide. The IC has long recognized that it can't expect policymakers—many of whom serve limited terms and have little or no background in intelligence—to know how to engage or best use its resources. A second truism is that policymakers are busy (especially when they start their jobs) and operate primarily in an unclassified environment, and it is difficult to find the right time or mechanism to orient them. It is the hope of CSI that this unclassified compilation will assist new policy and intelligence professionals to understand the intricacies of the intelligence-policy relationship and the value that can result from a strong partnership.

The IC and its relationship with policymakers have evolved in the years since many of these articles were written. Presenting these articles together provides the reader with a unique opportunity to see how the relationship and the roles and responsibilities on both sides have evolved. It is important to be cognizant of the period in which these articles were written and the conditions that prevailed at the time, although many of the underlying themes are as relevant today as they were at the time they were published. Readers should also keep in mind that the articles published in *Studies in Intelligence* represent the opinions and perspectives of the authors. While they are deemed to be valuable contributions to the profession of intelligence and worthy of thought and reflection, the views expressed are not endorsed by the IC.

The Relationship in Theory and Practice

The ten essays in this section encapsulate the ongoing, decades-long debate over the differences in approach and perspective between intelligence professionals and policymakers. These articles reflect extensive debate over the appropriate level of engagement between the two parties, and articulate their roles, capabilities, needs, and biases. A constant concern of the analytic community is finding ways to be relevant, timely and objective in meeting policymaker needs. A key tenet of CIA analysis explored in several of these articles is how to do this without crossing the often hazy and subjective line of policy advocacy. While many similar themes emerge across the papers, each focuses on a unique aspect of the relationship.

[Intelligence and Policy—the On-Going Debate](#), by Deborah Brammer and Arthur S. Hulnick [*Studies in Intelligence* (1980)]—looks at the traditionalist and activist schools of thought and the debate that resurfaced in the 1960s and following the Murphy Commission in 1975; discusses the trend toward briefings and shorter articles as well as the challenges of using oral communications as the preferred medium; and closes by highlighting opportunities that exist for both sides to improve their relevance to one another.

[Tribal Tongues: Intelligence Consumers, Intelligence Producers](#), by Mark Lowenthal [*Studies in Intelligence* 35 (Summer 1992)]—looks at the differences that shape the perspectives of policymakers and intelligence professionals; explores what matters most to both sides; examines what each is looking to get out of the relationship.

[The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949](#), by Jack Davis [*Studies in Intelligence* 35, no. 2 (1992)]—exemplifies the debate in the IC between those who believe intelligence must be divorced from policy and those who assert that involvement in the policy process is required to provide timely and relevant support, and articulates—without prejudice—the points of view of the historic thought leaders on each side.

[Bridging the Intelligence-Policy Divide](#), by James A. Barry, Jack Davis, David D. Gries, and Joseph Sullivan [*Studies in Intelligence* 37, no. 3 (1993)]—conveys the findings derived from interviews and roundtable discussions held with intelligence and policy officials on the relationship between the two groups; highlights the products designed to orient consumers to the IC; and examines the many practical measures taken by policymakers and intelligence officials to improve

communication.

[The Intelligence-Policy Relationship](#), by Hans Heymann, Jr. [*Studies in Intelligence* (Winter 1984)]—looks at the factors that shape policymakers' negative views of intelligence and argues that there isn't much the IC can do to change these views but attempts to identify some of the drivers behind the tension that exists between the two sides.

[The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage](#), by Arthur S. Hulnick [*Studies in Intelligence* (Winter 1985)]—examines traditional and activist views regarding how close intelligence should be to policy; discusses philosophical and stylistic differences between the two sides; describes the intelligence cycle and intelligence products; and closes by outlining some conditions that must exist if the IC is to better serve customers.

[Intelligence Rams and Policy Lions](#), by G. Murphy Donovan [*Studies in Intelligence* (Fall 1986)]—discusses the differences between the roles and functions of intelligence officers and policymakers, and how they coexist in a symbiotic relationship; provides an overview of the intelligence cycle; and examines how each side perceives intelligence products, how products are disseminated, and how those products influence policy.

[The CIA and American Foreign Policy](#), by Robert Gates [*Studies in Intelligence* (1987)]—identifies the CIA's role in supporting the policy process and how the Agency accomplishes that task; outlines some policymaker grievances and the biases that exist on both sides; discusses policymakers' focus on current issues (as opposed to long-term intelligence priorities); and examines the interaction between Congress, the executive branch, and the IC.

[Intelligence and Bureaucratic Politics](#), by Colonel John Macartney [*Studies in Intelligence* 33 (Spring 1989)]—provides an overview of the members of the IC and their unique roles, customers, and subcultures.

[Dealing with Intelligence-Policy Disconnects](#), by L. Keith Gardiner [*Studies in Intelligence* 33, no. 2, (1989)]—Focuses on some of the cognitive differences between policymakers and intelligence officers and concludes by discussing measures that can bridge that gap—most notably, better tailoring engagement to meet the policymakers' preference for how they receive information.

Policymaker Perspectives

The views expressed by policymakers concerning the relationship between intelligence and policy primarily revolve around their individual self-interests and their desire to make intelligence work for them. Many policymakers report that in their view, good support boils down to regular contact and the IC having a clear understanding of their specific needs and deadlines. The more general and routine the production, the less well it serves individual policymakers' needs for information to support their decisions. Consistent themes among consumers profiled in this section include the need for keeping close contact, exchanging regular feedback, accommodating busy policymaker schedules, and filling specific information gaps. Dozens of interviews with former policymakers conducted in recent years—as part of a continuing effort by the CSI to examine the relationship between intelligence and policy—only reinforce the perspectives captured in these articles.¹

[A Policymaker's Perspective on Intelligence Analysis](#), by Jack Davis [*Studies in Intelligence* 38, no. 5 (1995)]—based on interviews with Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill conducted between 1991 and 1993; highlights Blackwill's view of what intelligence provides busy customers, what is helpful, and what is not; and offers recommendations for policymakers and the IC to improve their relationship.

[Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations](#), by Jack Davis [*Studies in Intelligence* 39, no. 5 (1996)]—expresses the views of former Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who argues for closer relationships between analysts and policymakers and outlines practices that he believes help (or hinder) the policymaking process.

[The Views of Ambassador Herman J. Cohen](#), by Jack Davis [*Studies in Intelligence* (1995)]—provides Cohen's views when he was Assistant Secretary of State for Africa in 1994; describes how he structured his day and obtained intelligence to support his needs; highlights his views of the importance of feedback and the mechanisms he used to inform analysts of his needs.

¹ For additional information on the interaction between intelligence briefers and different presidential administrations, see [Getting to Know the President](#), by former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence John Helgerson. Published under the auspices of CSI, this book is available online at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/getting-to-know-the-president/pdfs/U-%20Book-Getting%20to%20Know%20the%20President.pdf>.

[Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers: Congress as a User of Intelligence](#), by L. Britt Snider [CSI monograph (1996)]—outlines the history of information sharing with Congress; identifies differences in how Congress and the executive branch receive and use information provided by the IC; and examines how these differences affect relationships among the three groups.

[The Brown Commission and the Future of Intelligence](#) [*Studies in Intelligence* (1996)]—provides the transcript of a roundtable discussion held with the members of the Brown Commission in 1996 and reveals their views on a variety of topics ranging from the politicization of intelligence and the proximity of analysts and policymakers, to the structure of the IC and the need to better educate consumers about the capabilities of the community.

[Increasing CIA's Value Added to the Senior Policymaker](#), by Tom Bjorkman [*Studies in Intelligence* 42, no. 2 (1998)]—written by a CIA officer who spent two years on rotation at the Department of State; articulates the opportunities that exist for analysis to be more relevant to consumers and the benefits of close and continual contact; and identifies differences between support to principal consumers and to those at the senior working level who help them shape policy.

[Supporting US Foreign Policy in the Post 9/11 World](#), by Richard Haass [*Studies in Intelligence* 46, no. 3 (2002)]—highlights Ambassador Haass' view that successful intelligence requires a mutual understanding between policymakers and the IC that is all too often lacking; outlines an array of challenges the IC must monitor to keep pace with the rapidly changing world; describes the current focus of policymakers and the role intelligence plays in looking over the horizon and providing timely information that can be translated into smart policy actions.

[Lessons for Intelligence Support to Policymaking during Crises](#), by Paul D. Miller [*Studies in Intelligence* 54, no. 2 (June 2010)]—written by a former NSC director; outlines the role of the NSC and support provided by the IC; and highlights areas where IC support to policymakers could be improved.

Intelligence Officer Perspectives

The articles in this section were written by intelligence professionals for intelligence professionals. Some of their discussions echo the debate over how close analysts should be to policy consumers—covered extensively in the first section of this compilation—but the primary issues in this section revolve around the realities of the analytic profession and maintaining or improving the IC’s relevance to customers. The authors deal with issues that include analytic objectivity, efforts to strengthen analysis, and politicization of intelligence. Several of the articles are forward looking and examine current and future challenges for the IC, as well as measures that could improve the support it provides to policymakers.

[The Future Market for Finished Intelligence](#), by Ross Cowey [*Studies in Intelligence* 20, no. 4 (1976)]—initially intended to forecast the markets that would influence intelligence production and support five to ten years into the future; provides an interesting perspective on where the IC was at that time and the challenges it foresaw; although not intended to project much beyond 1980, provided a remarkably accurate forecast of what was to come; and highlights the challenges that would shape the IC over the next 30 years—many of which remain valid today.

[The Evaluation of Intelligence](#), by Helene L. Boatner [*Studies in Intelligence* (Summer 1984)]—looks at how successful the IC has been and how successful it can reasonably expect to be; explores consumer expectations and reactions and the challenges of the intelligence profession; and examines several historical examples to evaluate performance and put expectations, successes, and shortcomings into context.

[New Links Between Intelligence and Policy](#), by David D. Gries [*Studies in Intelligence* 34, no. 2 (Summer 1990)]—highlights consumers’ preference for oral rather than written assessments and the need for the IC to adjust accordingly; discusses the products used by the IC and how intelligence is used to support policy decisions; and examines the challenge of maintaining a strong linkage with consumers as their preferences change and resources tighten.

[Guarding Against Politicization](#), by Robert M. Gates [*Studies in Intelligence* 36, no. 1 (1992)]—derived from remarks made by Gates when he was Director of Central Intelligence; discusses the politicization of intelligence and how analysts can remain objective and safeguard against it; and reminds members of the analytic profession to understand their role in the process, and the difference

between real and perceived politicization.

[Facts, Findings, Forecasts, and Fortune-telling](#) by Jack Davis [*Studies in Intelligence* (1995)]—defines the role of intelligence as adding value to policy deliberation and formulation, and discusses how analysts can avoid politicization and improve their relevance by providing facts, findings, and forecasts and avoiding fortune-telling, which the author defines as inadequately explained judgments.

[Ways To Make Analysis Relevant But Not Prescriptive](#), by Fulton T. Armstrong [*Studies in Intelligence* 46, no. 3 (2002)]—describes the difference between national interests, administration priorities, and bureaucratic equities; states that national interests are not absolute and points out that the dynamics that influence priority preferences are part of the world we live in; and proposes techniques that can help analysts remain objective and relevant to consumers.

[Synthesizing with Clients, Not Analyzing for Customers](#), by Josh Kerbel and Anthony Olcott [*Studies in Intelligence* 54, no. 4 (December 2010)]—highlights policymakers' calls for a closer relationship with intelligence analysis; explores what that relationship—with the IC as a knowledge service provider—could look like; and examines the risks and rewards for both sides in moving to this model.

[A Cultural Evolution](#), by Robert Cardillo [*Studies in Intelligence* 54, no. 3 (September 2010)]—written by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration; discusses the culture of the IC and its common goals and values that can only be achieved through better integration; highlights some of the challenges that stand in the way and envisions a future in which the IC is fully integrated and better positioned to fulfill its mission.

[What I Learned in 40 Years of Doing Intelligence Analysis for US Foreign Policymakers](#), by Martin Petersen [*Studies in Intelligence* 55, no. 1 (March 2011)]—describes what the author defines as the five fundamental truths about consumers and the six things he learned about analysis during his time as an intelligence officer.

[An Educated Consumer Is Our Best Consumer](#), by Dennis C. Wilder [*Studies in Intelligence* 56, no. 2 (June 2011)]—received top honors in the IC's 2010 Galileo Award completion; focuses on the IC's struggle to educate consumers about the capabilities of the IC and improve relationships with customers at all levels; and identifies opportunities and offers recommendations for how to bridge the gap.

Estimates, Warning, and Surprise

Estimates, warning, and surprise are enduring themes for discussion in the intelligence and policy communities. The creation of the CIA is largely the result of the failure to warn of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the creation of the ODNI and expanded intelligence apparatus came out of the perceived failure to warn of the terrorist attacks of September 2001. The premier intelligence product of the IC has long been the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), and much attention is given to getting warning right in estimative products. The past decade has brought with it considerable debate on the issue of warning—whether all the dots were connected, too many dots were connected, or the warning provided was adequate for policy action. The articles in this section discuss the warning and estimative process and attempt to explain the inherent difficulties of anticipating surprise and conveying warnings to customers.

[A Crucial Estimate Relived](#), by Sherman Kent [*Studies in Intelligence* 8, no. 2 (1964)]—discusses the warning and estimative process in the context of the military buildup in Cuba and depicts the variables that go into developing an NIE and the choices that were made in this particular case.

[On Warning](#), by Keith Clark [*Studies in Intelligence* 9, no. 1 (1965)]—submits that the world is so dynamic it is unrealistic to expect to anticipate everything; argues that many actions are driven by reaction or miscalculation rather than rational decisions and careful planning; and contends the analytic community must decide what to monitor and warn about based on importance, likelihood, and imminence of the threat, which involves setting priorities and accepting risk.

[Strategic Warning: The Problem of Timing](#), by Cynthia M. Grabo [*Studies in Intelligence* 16, no. 2 (1972)]—conveys the challenges of strategic and tactical warning and predicting the timing of attack; looks at numerous historical examples; and concludes that warning is not a forecast of imminence but rather the probability of attack.

[National Estimates: An Assessment of the Product and the Process](#), by Louis Marengo, Dean Moor, Richard Ober, and Dick Wood [*Studies in Intelligence* 21 (Spring 1977)]—uses interviews with nearly 100 users and producers of NIEs to examine the products, process, audience, and producer-user relationship.

[Warning Cycles](#), by John F. McCreary [*Studies in Intelligence* 27, no. 3 (Fall

1983)]—discusses the difference between warning of an impending threat to national interests and being surprised by world events; outlines the warning cycle and the outcomes of warning—success, failure, and false alarm; explores the problems associated with issuing repeated warnings, and the ways in which warnings are handled and issued.

[Miscalculation, Surprise and US Intelligence](#), by James J. Wirtz [*Studies in Intelligence* (Summer 1991)]—discusses the challenge of identifying an opponent’s initiatives and miscalculations and warning leaders that an adversary is about to take an irrational or unwise action, and uses historical examples to illustrate miscalculation and surprise.

[Managing the “Reliability Cycle”: An Alternative Approach to Thinking About Intelligence Failure](#), by Scott Hatch [*Studies in Intelligence* 57, no. 2 (June 2013)]—applies the lessons of High Reliability Organizations (HROs) to the discipline of intelligence analysis; explores the importance of self-evaluation and improving organizational performance and customer relevance; and introduces the author’s COPE (Cognitive Failure, Organizational Failure, or Policy-Environmental Failure) model for identifying and evaluating failure.

Oversight, Intelligence Reform, and Secrecy

The IC is subject to oversight and has undergone multiple reforms throughout its history.¹ The following articles discuss the relationship between Congress and the IC, the role of the judiciary and the laws that govern intelligence, and the many reforms that shaped the Community into what it is today. Tensions between the executive branch and Congress, as well as the challenge of maintaining secrecy in the information age are also prevalent themes.

[Oversight or Overlook: Congress and the US Intelligence Agencies](#), by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi [*Studies in Intelligence* (Summer 1974)]—consists of a transcript of a speech the congressman gave to senior intelligence officials, outlining his views of the theory, reality, and challenges of overseeing intelligence.

[Intelligence Gathering and the Law](#), by Benjamin R. Civiletti [*Studies in Intelligence* (Summer 1983)]—examines the development of laws governing the collection of domestic and foreign intelligence and highlights some of the constitutional and legal problems that emerge from the tension between intelligence needs and individual rights.

[Intelligence and the Rise of Judicial Intervention](#), by Frederic F. Manget [*Studies in Intelligence* 39, no. 5 (1996)]—discusses the role of the judiciary in national security and provides historical context and a discussion of the role of judicial oversight in the affairs of the IC.

[Congressional Oversight of Intelligence](#), by Bruce D. Berkowitz [*Studies in Intelligence* (Summer 1986)]—explores the debate over oversight and secrecy and discusses the Select Committees, their staffs, and their roles and responsibilities.

[A Review of Congressional Oversight](#), by James S. Van Wagenen [*Studies in Intelligence* (1997)]—provides a historical exploration of intelligence oversight and the roles of Congress and the executive branch from the Revolutionary War to the 1990s.

¹ For a more definitive look at Intelligence Reform Studies and their effectiveness see, [US Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947](#), written by Michael Warner and J. Kenneth McDonald in 2005 under the auspices of the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

[The Consequences of Permissive Neglect](#), by James B. Bruce [*Studies in Intelligence* 47, no. 1 (2003)]—examines the issue of secrecy; discusses threats posed to intelligence sources and methods by the proliferation of leaks and provides examples of how leaks damage US intelligence capabilities; and looks at the challenges related to enforcement.

[The Evolution of Intelligence Reform 2002-2004](#), by Philip Zelikow [*Studies in Intelligence* 56, no. 3 (September 2012)]—walks through the history of US intelligence reform; outlines four models of IC management that have been debated over the years; and provides the author's perspective on how policy and legal changes worked to impose the most recent round of IC reforms.

Intelligence and Policy in Action

The articles in this section describe how intelligence has interacted with policymakers under an array of challenging circumstances and capture the role intelligence played in supporting customers as they negotiated treaties, selected strategic programs, debated intervention, and engaged in wars and conflicts.

[Policy and Intelligence, The Arab-Israeli War](#), by J.L. Freshwater [*Studies in Intelligence* (1969)]—depicts the influence of intelligence on US decisionmaking leading up to the Arab-Israeli war as a success story; addresses some of the factors that led to the timely and insightful intelligence support to the crisis as it unfolded; and examines the conditions that allowed the analytic community to respond definitively to policymaker needs.

[The INF Treaty](#), by William E. Kline [*Studies in Intelligence* (1991)]—uses a Harvard University Kennedy School case study commissioned by the CSI to highlight the role intelligence played in supporting treaty negotiators.

[Intelligence in Small Wars](#), by George W. Allen [*Studies in Intelligence* (1991)]—depicts some of the interactions between intelligence and policy during the Vietnam war; highlights the challenges of providing unbiased intelligence in the midst of political pressure; and outlines many challenges intelligence officers may face when assessing small wars.

[Lebanon and the Intelligence Community](#), by David Kennedy and Leslie Brunetta [*Studies in Intelligence* 37, no. 2 (1994)]—published by scholars at Harvard University's Kennedy School; depicts the less-than-positive outcome resulting from intelligence-policy interactions surrounding US intervention in Lebanon in the early 1980s; and uses interviews with participants to portray the relationships among and perceptions of policymakers and intelligence analysts working the issue at the time.

[Intelligence and US Missile Defense Planning](#), by Thomas G. Ward, Jr. [*Studies in Intelligence* 45 (2001)]—outlines the history of the US missile defense program and discusses the intelligence that supported decisionmakers throughout this costly strategic endeavor, including identifying threats, providing technical specifications, and gauging foreign reactions.

[Intelligence in War: It Can Be Decisive](#), by Gregory Elder [*Studies in Intelligence* 50, no. 2 (2006)]—uses case studies to depict how warnings of enemy intentions and the fusion of national- and tactical- level intelligence can provide policymakers and military commanders with an edge in battle, and concludes that none of the victories described were won by intelligence alone, but rather the appropriate application of force based on the information provided.

