

P A R T I

PRELUDE TO
CRISIS

Sudden surge in supply of Soviet materiel and personnel to Cuba . . . McCone warns high administration officials, including the President, that the Soviets may be placing medium-range ballistic missiles there . . . CIA U-2 overflights discover surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba . . . McCone warns that SAMs may serve to protect a later emplacement of medium-range missiles . . . Efforts continue to win release of Bay of Pigs prisoners . . . Discovery of medium-range ballistic missile sites in Cuba . . .

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
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
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
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
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


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CUBA U-2 OVERFLIGHT BY SAC
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2. Timetable of Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba, July-October 1962

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TAB A
SECTION II

TIMETABLE OF SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP IN CUBA

(July - October 1962)
(All dates approximate)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Western Cuba</u>	<u>Central Cuba</u>	<u>Eastern Cuba</u>
25-31 July	Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in western Cuban ports.		
1-5 August	Construction begins on SAM sites at Matanzas, Havana, Mariel, Bahia Honda, Santa Lucia, San Julian, & La Coloma.		
5-10 August			
10-15 August			
15-20 August	Soviet armored groups arrive at Santiago de las Vegas and Artemisa.	Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in central Cuban ports.	
20-25 August		Construction begins on SAM site at Cienfuegos.	
25-31 August			
1-5 September	Construction begins on Guanajay IRBM sites.	Construction begins on SAM sites at Sagua la Grande, Caibarien, & Sancti Spiritus.	

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Western Cuba</u>	<u>Central Cuba</u>	<u>Eastern Cuba</u>
5-10 September		Soviet armored group arrives at Remedios.	
10-15 September			
15-20 September	Construction begins at San Cristobal MRBM sites.	Construction begins at Remedios IRBM site.	Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in eastern Cuban ports. Soviet armored group arrives at Holguin.
20-25 September			Construction begins on SAM sites at Los Angeles, Chaparra and Jiguani.
25-30 September		Construction begins at Sagua la Grande MRBM sites.	Construction begins on SAM sites at Manati, Senado, and Manzanillo.

NOTE: Construction of the remaining SAM sites, which apparently were considered less vital than those listed above to the protection of offensive missile bases in Cuba, began in late September or early October. Work probably began on the SAM site at Sigüanea on the Isle of Pines in the last week of September and on the sites at Esmeralda, Chambas, Maldonado, Santiago de Cuba, Ciego de Avila, and Deleite during the first half of October.

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3. *National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," 1 August 1962 (Excerpt)*

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 85-2-62

The Situation and Prospects in Cuba

1 August 1962

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THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA¹

THE PROBLEM

To analyze the situation in Cuba and to estimate the prospects over the next year or so, with particular reference to Castro's relations with the Communists and to the potential for resistance to his regime.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Fidel Castro has asserted his primacy in Cuban communism; the "old" Communists have had to accommodate themselves to this fact, as has the USSR. Further strains may develop in these relationships, but they are unlikely to break the ties of mutual interest between Castro and the "old" Communists and between Cuba and the USSR. (Paras. 1-10)

B. By force of circumstances, the USSR is becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Castro regime. The USSR, however, has avoided any formal commitment to protect and defend the regime in all contingencies. (Para. 11)

C. The Cuban armed forces are loyal to the personal leadership of the Castro brothers. Their capabilities have been and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc's provision of military equipment and instruction. Cuban military capabilities, however, are essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military operations

¹This estimate is designed to bring up-to-date NIE 85-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," dated 21 March 1962. The background information contained in that document remains generally valid.

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overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate. (Paras. 12-29)

D. The Cuban armed forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popular insurrection likely to develop in present circumstances. They are probably capable of containing and controlling any threat to the regime through guerrilla action and of repelling any invasion short of a direct US military intervention in strength. (Paras. 22-23)

E. The Cuban economy is in deep trouble, in part because of the US embargo and a consequent shortage of convertible foreign exchange, in part because of agricultural and industrial mismanagement. Despite remedial measures, it is unlikely that agricultural and industrial production can be significantly increased within the next year or so. The expected increase in capital imports from the Bloc is unlikely to produce a net growth of the economy before the end of 1963. (Paras. 30-35)

F. The Castro regime retains the positive support of about 20 percent of the population, but disaffection is increasing. This trend is manifested in growing passive resistance and in occasional open demonstrations of resentment. Few, however, dare to accept the risks of organized active resistance in present circumstances, for fear of the regime's massive apparatus for surveillance and repression. (Paras. 36-41)

G. If arms and supplies became available and if confidence were created in the likelihood of outside support for a major Cuban uprising, resistance activity and potential would increase. Even so it is unlikely that the regime could be overthrown unless events had already shaken the regime and brought into doubt its capacity for survival, and unless substantial outside support for the insurgents were forthcoming. (Paras. 42-51)

H. The Castro regime still seeks to lead the "inevitable" revolution throughout Latin America, but its preoccupation with domestic problems tends to limit its activity in this

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respect. In Latin America there is widespread disillusionment regarding the Cuban revolution. Nevertheless, militant pro-Castro groups exist in several countries, and Cuban subversive activity could prove effective in certain unstable situations: e.g., in Guatemala or Venezuela. The appeal of the Cuban example will increase in Latin America if reform lags there and hopes and promises remain unfulfilled. (Paras. 52-59)

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31 October 1962

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Soviet MRBMs in Cuba

1. On August 10th at a meeting in Secretary Rusk's Conference Room attended by Rusk, Johnson, McNamara, Gilpatric, Bundy, Gen. Taylor and a number of others for the purpose of discussing General Lansdale's Phase II activities, McCone reported on the sudden importation of materiel -- at that time the characteristic of which was unidentified -- and Soviet personnel, and at that meeting speculated that this could be electronic equipment for use against Canaveral and/or military equipment including medium range ballistic missiles.
2. On August 21st at a meeting in Secretary Rusk's office attended by the same group, McCone again reviewed the situation as it developed since August 10th, reported definite information on surface to air missiles and again speculated on the probability of medium range ballistic missiles.
3. On August 22nd McCone gave the same information to the President, adding certain details concerning the number of Soviet and Chinese personnel who had recently entered Cuba as reported by [REDACTED] who had just returned from Havana.
4. On August 23rd in a meeting with the President, Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, General Taylor, Bundy and others, McCone again reviewed the situation and questioned the need for the extensive SAM installations unless they were to make possible the concealment of MRBMs.
5. The same reasoning was applied in discussions with Senator Russell's Subcommittees, Chairman Vinson's Subcommittee and in private talk with Chairman Cannon prior to McCone's departure on August 23rd.
6. On Saturday, August 25th, McCone urged General Carter, Acting DCI, to propose low level R 101 flights over certain Soviet-Cuban installations in order to obtain detailed technical information.

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7. On September 7th, McCone wired General Carter as follows:

"Question very much if C-package will be helpful Cuba and urge frequent repeat missions of recent reconnaissance operations which Gilpatric advises informative. Also I support use of R-101 if necessary. My hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable type in Cuba which could command important targets of southeast United States and possibly Latin American Caribbean areas. You might suggest to Rusk that we develop joint policies for action in Cuba with selected Caribbean, South-American states as an alternative to seeking unanimous OAS action which most certainly will be an ineffective compromise solution if past history is any indicator."

8. On September 10th McCone wired Carter [REDACTED] as follows:

"Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses being established in Cuba as such extreme costly measures to accomplish security and secrecy not consistent with other policies such as refugees, legal travel, etc. Appears to me quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of insuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMs to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from overflights. Suggest BNE study motives behind these defensive measures which even seem to exceed those provided most satellites."

9. On September 13th McCone received communication from Carter stating that the BNE continued to feel that the installation of SA 2a is most reasonably explained by other than a desire to hide MRBM build-up. To this McCone responded on September 13th as follows:

"Also I continue to be concerned that the establishment of defensive equipment and installations is merely a prelude to the location of an offensive weapon capability and once this is done the implementation of

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our policy as reported in the press might be extremely difficult and involve unacceptable dangers. I would like to talk with you on [REDACTED] from Norstad's headquarters to the White House or Pentagon situation room tonight (13 Sept.) between 1700 and 1800 your time. Unless I hear to the contrary from you by twelve noon today your time I will proceed Paris this evening and make arrangements for this call."

10. On September 16th McCone cabled Carter as follows:

"Also believe we must carefully study the prospect of secret importation and placement of several Soviet MRBMs which could not be detected by us if Cuban defenses deny overflight. In reflecting on my observations of Thor installation in Britain and Jupiters in Italy I can envisage a Soviet plan to package missile, control and operating equipment in such a way that a unit could be made operational a few hours after a site cleared and a modest concrete pad poured. Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter but believe CIA and community must keep government informed of danger of a surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps possibly beyond our capability once Cuban defense system operative. Thrust of press reports reaching me is that there exists a clear demarcation between defensive and offensive preparations and I question if we can be sure of this. I recognize Cuban policy decisions most delicate and beyond Agency or my competence. However believe we must give those making decision our best estimate of possible developments and alternative situations which might evolve and unexpectedly confront us.

11. On 19 September Carter communicated the summary of the conclusions of Cuban SNIE of that date, paragraph D stating that in the opinion of the BNE, establishment of MRBMs in Cuba would be

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incompatible with Soviet policy -- and indicate a greater willingness to increase risk in US/Soviet relations than the Soviet Union has displayed so far--.

12. On September 20th McCone responded as follows:

"Ref DIR 37228: Suggest most careful consideration to conclusion last sentence paragraph d. As an alternative I can see that an offensive Soviet Cuban base will provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take an unexpected risk in order to establish such a position."

13. It is reported that during McCone's absence, Acting DCI, at a meeting held in Mr. Bundy's office on 10 September, proposed an overflight which would cover the entire north and south perimeter of Cuba east of Havana and out to the eastern tip of Oriente Province except for an area in the immediate vicinity of Santa Clara where four SAM sites were known to exist and had been photographed. The purpose of this flight was to make a final determination as to how many SAM sites existed or were under construction. It is reported that because of Rusk's concern for the safety of the U-2 in view of the Sakolin violation on 7 September and the ChiNat loss on 10 September, the sense of the meeting (particularly that of Secretary Rusk) that CIA be permitted to make 4 flights against Cuba, two peripheral and two overflights of limited penetration, including the Isle of Pines. These flights were executed between 26 September and 7 October. On the 14th of September the meeting of the Special Group, JCS representative outlined capabilities for low level coverage. Secretary of Defense indicated he did not wish this operation considered until the results were obtained from CIA reconnaissance as approved on September 11th.

14. On October 4th McCone noted to the Special Group that there had been no coverage of the center of Cuba and more particularly the entire western end of the Island for over a month, and all flights since 5 September had been either peripheral or limited and therefore CIA did not know, nor could advise, whether an offensive capability was being created. DCI objected strenuously to the limitations which had been placed on overflights and there arose a considerable discussion (with some heat) as to whether limitations had or had not been placed on CIA by the Special Group. [REDACTED] were requested

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to prepare a comprehensive plan for aerial survey of Cuba and to submit the plan at a meeting scheduled for Tuesday, October 9th.

15. On 9 October Special Group (Augmented) met. Reviewed [REDACTED] JCS proposals and it was agreed that a U-2 flight flying from south to north across the western part of Cuba where at least two SAM sites were known to exist should be undertaken promptly and that a number of similar sorties might be mounted if this flight did not activate ground-air fire. (Higher authority approved this one mission and left consideration of further missions until the results of the approved mission were determined.)

16. This mission was flown on October 14th. It was successful and encountered no resistance. On October 15th at a Special Meeting (and prior to receipt of the results of the October 14th flight), two additional U-2 missions to cover all of Cuba were approved and this was concurred in by higher authority.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

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August 20, 1962

MEMORANDUM ON CUBA

The Soviet -- and probably bloc -- support of Cuba was stepped up in July and August. 21 ships docked in July and 17 have docked, or are en route, in August, 5 of which are passenger ships.

CIA has received approximately 60 reports on this increased activity; 40 out of Opa Locka, and the balance from controlled sources considered dependable.

It appears that between 4000 and 6000 Soviet/Bloc personnel have arrived in Cuba since 1 July. Many are known to be technicians, some are suspected to be military personnel; there is no evidence of organized Soviet military units, as such, being included. A great many of the arriving Soviet/Bloc personnel are isolated from the Cuban population.

The unloading of most ships takes place under maximum security, with the Cuban population excluded from the port areas. Large equipment is noticeable; large crates have been observed which could contain airplane fuselages or missile components.

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Sophisticated electronic and radar gear has been identified. In some instances trucks or trailers have been lowered into ships holds, loaded, covered with tarpaulins and removed bodily.

The implications are:

- (a) Increased technical assistance to Cuban industry and agriculture and/or the Cuban Armed Forces.
- (b) Possible establishment of surface to air (SAM) missile sites.
- (c) Possible establishment of Soviet COMINT-ELINT facilities targetted against Canaveral and other important U. S. installations.

The timing of this buildup coincides with Raoul Castro's trip to Moscow and this may in itself be significant.

JAM/at:ji

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6. McCone, Memorandum for the File, "Discussion in Secretary Rusk's Office at 12 o'clock, 21 August 1962"

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21 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

Discussion in Secretary Rusk's office at 12 o'clock, 21 August 1962

In attendance: Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Alexis Johnson, the Attorney General, DCI, General Taylor, General Lemnitzer and McGeorge Bundy

Subject: Cuba

McCone stated that the purpose of the meeting was to again review the situation in Cuba in light of the most recent intelligence findings.

DCI recalled that in the August 10th Meeting he had reported such information as was then available on the accelerated Soviet supply of personnel and materiel to Cuba. However, information available to the Agency since August 10th indicated that the extent of the Soviet supply operations was much greater than had been reported on August 10th; furthermore, there were indications that construction work was undertaken by Soviet personnel, technicians with newly delivered Soviet equipment and while the nature of the construction was not known, it was probably either highly sophisticated electronic installations or COMINT and ELINT and possible electro-counter measure efforts or missile sites, probably ground-to-air.

DCI then stated that on August 10th in discussing the arguments for and against the so-called stepped up Plan B, or alternatively the modified Plan B, he had stated that if it was decided to accept the modified Plan B and such a course is pursued, it is the opinion of the DCI that continuing Soviet aid and technical assistance will present the United States with a more formidable problem in the future than it now confronts or has confronted in the past. McCone then stated that conclusive evidence indicated such a stepped-up Soviet effort.

DCI then read 21 August paper entitled, "Recent Soviet Military Aid to Cuba" as prepared by DD/L. He then referred to 21 August paper of the office of National Estimates, subject, "Soviet View of the Cuban Economy" emphasizing the conclusion that under energetic Soviet direction, the potential of the Cuban agricultural, industrial and natural resources could be so developed that the economy would be reasonably viable and over a decade might even earn sufficiently from export surpluses to repay credits and advances already made to Cuba by the Soviet Union. Therefore, the CIA's conclusion that Soviet economists in analyzing Cuba

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would conclude that in supporting Cuba the Soviets were not involving themselves with a permanent liability; furthermore, there was an opportunity of creating a viable and reasonably prosperous economy which, while not a showcase, would always be an annoyance to the United States and a model for all dissident groups in Latin America.

DCI then referred to the 15th August paper of the Board of National Estimates, subject, "The Soviet Stake in Cuba" and read the summary of this paper which is in numbered paragraph 7, page 3.

In support of the above DCI then briefly reviewed a chronology of unevaluated reports on recent Soviet military aid to Cuba, 21 August, and noted my reference to maps; location of the reported activities.

There was general agreement that the situation was critical and that the most dynamic action was indicated.

There was discussion of various courses of action open to us in case the Soviets place MRBM missiles on Cuban territory. There was also discussion of blockades of Soviet and Bloc shipping into Cuba or alternatively a total blockade of Cuba.

Throughout these discussions, it was abundantly clear that in the minds of State, and Mr. Bundy, speaking for the White House, there is a very definite inter-relationship between Cuba and other trouble spots, such as Berlin. It was felt that a blockade of Cuba would automatically bring about a blockade of Berlin; that drastic action on a missile site or other military installation of the Soviets in Cuba would bring about similar action by the Soviets with respect to our bases and numerous missile sites, particularly Turkey and southern Italy. Also, there is a reluctance, as previously, to the commitment of military forces because of the task involved and also because of retaliatory actions of the Soviets elsewhere throughout the world.

McNamara expressed strong feelings that we should take every possible aggressive action in the fields of intelligence, sabotage and guerrilla warfare, utilizing Cubans and do such other things as might be indicated to divide the Castro regime. McCone pointed out that all of these things could be done. Efforts to date with agent teams had been disappointing. Sabotage activities were planned on a priority basis and in all probability, we would witness more failures than successes. To date we had experienced a very tight internal security situation and probably this would become more so in the future.

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6. (Continued)

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The Attorney General queried the meeting as to what other aggressive steps could be taken, questioning the feasibility of provoking an action against Guantanamo which would permit us to retaliate, or involving a third country in some way.

It was Mr. Bundy's opinion that all overt actions would involve serious consequences throughout the world and therefore our operations must be covert at this time, although we should expect a high degree of attribution.

The meeting was inconclusive with respect to any particular course of action. It was felt that the President should be informed on the evolving situation and the DCI agreed to brief him at the Meeting on Wednesday, August 22nd at 6 o'clock.

We further agreed that the entire matter should be reviewed with the President by Rusk, McNamara, Bundy and McCone. Mr. Bundy undertook to arrange for this meeting following the Special Meeting scheduled for ten o'clock on Thursday, August 23rd.

Following this discussion, there was a brief discussion of the Donovan matter as covered in DCI's memorandum to Rusk and the Attorney General, copy of which is attached. It was agreed that Mr. Hurwitz would meet with Mr. Donovan on Thursday, together with the Attorney General, and determine the extent of the commitment we would make for the government which would permit Mr. Donovan to engage in the prisoner release negotiations. DCI made it abundantly clear that the existing commitments to Committees of the Congress prevented CIA from using covert resources for this purpose.

McCone stated that in view of these commitments to the Congress he did not feel that he should meet with Mr. Donovan. Furthermore, that McCone stated that he felt that if a reasonable deal could be made for the release of the prisoners, the Committees of Congress would change the view expressed a year ago at the time of the tractor negotiation.


John A. McCone
Director

JAM:ji

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7. McCone, "Memorandum of the Meeting with the President at
6:00 p.m., on August 22, 1962"

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
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22 August 1962

MEMORANDUM OF THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
at 6:00 p. m. , on August 22, 1962


Attendance: General Taylor

The following points were covered:



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3. DCI briefly reviewed the briefing on the Cuban situation. The President obviously was quite familiar with the situation. McCone reviewed all of the substance of the August 21st briefing of the Secretary of State, Defense and others as reported and recorded and in addition, explained in considerable detail the personal report [redacted] concerning his personal observations and the observations of his confidantes during a recent trip to Cuba as recorded in the attached memorandum. The President expressed concern, but agreed with General Taylor and DCI that any policy matters would be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the Principals to be held at the White House on August 23rd.

4. The President acknowledged receipt of McCone's personal letter concerning his personal plans, indicated approval thereof and stated that he had responded in writing to the letter.



John A. McCone
Director

JAM/mfb:ji

~~SECRET, EYES ONLY~~

*Third
Warning on Missiles
in Cuba*

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

0-34
23 August 1962

Memorandum of Meeting with the President

Attended by Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, General Taylor,
Mr. Bundy, McCone

Subject: Cuba

1. McCone advised that President had been briefed on the Cuban
situation but added the information given [REDACTED]

Rusk advocated informing Canadians and all NATO allies of
growing seriousness of situation; also advocated removal of restrictions
on use of Guantanamo by the Lansdale group.

ACTION: This point not cleared and should be pursued
as strongly opposed by Chiefs.

2. The President requested a continuing analysis of the number and
type of Soviet and Oriental personnel imported into Cuba; quantity and
type of equipment and its probable use; all construction - particularly
anxious to know whether construction involved SAM sites might differ
from the ground sites. McCone stated we probably could not differentiate
between surface-to-air and 350 mile ground-to-ground offensive
missile. McNamara observed portable ground missiles could not be
located under any circumstances.

ACTION: DDCI should have Board of National Estimates
working continuously on this analysis.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

3. President requested analysis of the danger to the United States and the effect on Latin America of missile installations.

ACTION: DDCI should arrange for preparation of such estimates.

4. President raised the question of whether we should make a statement in advance of our position, should the Soviets install missiles and the alternative actions open to us in such event. In the course of the discussion, apparent many in the room related action in Cuba to Soviet actions in Turkey, Greece, Berlin, Far East and elsewhere. McCone questioned value of Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy. McNamara agreed they were useless but difficult politically to remove them.

5. ACTION: He agreed to study this possibility.

President raised question of what we could do against Soviet missile sites in Cuba. Could we take them out by air or would a ground offensive be necessary or alternatively could they be destroyed by a substantial guerrilla effort.

6. President raised question of what we should do in Cuba if Soviets precipitated a Berlin crisis. This is the alternative to the proposition of what Soviets would do in Berlin if we moved in Cuba.

7. During the conversation I raised substance of my plan of action as outlined in the attached paper. There was no disagreement that we must solve the ^{Cuba}~~Berlin~~ problem. However, we should not start the political action and propaganda effort now until we had decided on the policy of following through to the complete solution of the Cuban problem.

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

8. (Continued)

~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

8. After the meeting in a private conversation with Robert Kennedy, I stated that I felt Cuba was our most serious problem;



I also added, in my opinion, Cuba was the key to all of Latin America; if Cuba succeeds, we can expect ^{most} all of Latin America to fall.

John A. McCone
Director

JAM:ji

Attachment: Aug 21, 62 paper - Memorandum, Proposed plan of action for Cuba in the light of:

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

August 21, 1962

MEMORANDUM:

Proposed plan of action for Cuba in the light of:

(a) The arrival of four to five thousand Soviet/Bloc technicians and possibly military personnel during July-August.

(b) Arrival of many ship loads of equipment and materiel during July and August.

(c) The conclusion that stepped up plan (b) will not, in the opinion of the National Board of Estimates, accomplish the stated purpose of overthrowing Castro from within, and moreover will be attributable to the United States and cause loss of face by the United States, and

(d) Modified plan (b) will contribute importantly to our intelligence gathering and will impede Castro regime's economic progress but will not be sufficient to frustrate the regime's progress in view of the evidences of substantial Soviet technical assistance.

The above all lead to the conclusion that with the passage of time, it is possible there will evolve in Cuba a stronger rather than a weaker Castro dominated communist state, fully oriented to Moscow, to serve on the one hand as a model for similar actions by disciplined groups throughout Latin America, and on the other as a bridgehead for Soviet subversive activities in Central and South America. Being dominated by Moscow, such a Cuba would also serve as a possible location for MRBMs, for COMINT and ELINT facilities targetted against United States activities, most particularly Canaveral, and finally as an ECM station which might adversely affect our space and missile work.

Therefore it seems to me a more aggressive action is indicated than any heretofore considered, and should be patterned along the following lines:

SECRET-EYES ONLY

(1) An immediate continuing aggressive political action designed to awaken and alarm all of Latin America and all of the free world as to the extreme dangers inherent in the present Cuban situation.

Appropriate actions should be taken through domestic and foreign press media to inform and alarm the people, through the United Nations, through the Organization of American States and its subcommittees, by contact with each free world country at the level of head of state, foreign minister and ambassador, and through semi-public or private organizations such as labor, church, farm cooperatives, youth groups, et cetera.

(2)



(3) The instantaneous commitment of sufficient armed forces to occupy the country, destroy the regime, free the people, and establish in Cuba a peaceful country which will be a member of the community of American states.

It is possible, though in my opinion improbable, that actions taken under (1) above would in themselves be sufficient to cause destruction of the Castro regime from dissension and disaffections within the regime itself which would obviate steps (2) or (3).

Alternatively, actions under (1) above might cause internal strife of sufficient proportion to prompt the action outlined under (3) above with no further provocation.

Concurrently with this plan, we should go forward with all possible activities called for under plan (b).

J. A. M.

JAM:at


10. William A. Tidwell, Memorandum for the Record, "Instructions Concerning the Handling of Certain Information Concerning Cuba," 1 September 1962

1 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Instructions Concerning the Handling of Certain Information Concerning Cuba

General Carter called Mr. Cline to say that he had just completed a telephone conversation with the President and that according to the President's instructions the clamps were to remain on the release of certain information concerning Cuba except for the barest minimum access on a need-to-know basis for the purpose of preparing a comprehensive briefing for the President Tuesday morning, 4 September. This instruction was interpreted to permit the release of a single copy of the report concerning Cuba [redacted] to OCI for them to use in preparing the briefing with a deadline of 7:30 a.m. 4 September, and a single copy to State, Army, Navy, Air and DIA. All recipients of these copies to be advised that there is to be no further dissemination except on a minimum need-to-know basis to those people who might need to become involved in the preparation of the briefing for the President. They were also to be advised that no actions were to be taken on the basis of the information.


WILLIAM A. TIDWELL
Assistant to DD/I (Planning)

~~SECRET~~

11. Ray S. Cline, Memorandum for Acting Director of Central Intelligence, "Recent Soviet Military Activities in Cuba," 3 September 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

SC-08458-62
3 September 1962

Copy 2 of 3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Recent Soviet Military Activities in Cuba

1. U-2 photography of 29 August confirms extensive Soviet military deliveries to Cuba in recent weeks. Surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, guided missile boats, and additional land armaments were observed.

2. The photography shows eight SAM sites being set up. One probable assembly area has been identified and SAM equipment has been located at one additional site.

- A. The small amount of permanent construction at these sites and the speed of the work indicate the program is proceeding on a crash basis.
- B. Some of these sites could be operational within a week or two.
- C. A minimum of 125 technically trained personnel will be required to operate each site.
 - 1. This figure excludes security and support personnel.
 - 2. No indications that Cubans are trained for SAMs. Soviet personnel doubtless will man the sites for at least the 9 to 12 months while Cubans are being trained.
- 3. Additional SAM sites probably will be set up in the near future.
 - A. All sites now confirmed are in the Western one-third of the island.
 - 1. The one area of SAM activity in Oriente province probably will be followed by several others in the vicinity.
 - 2. Defector and clandestine reports from Las Villas province indicate that at least two sites will be located there, but no confirmation or definite locations thus far.

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

SC-084-58-62
Page 2

- B. The pattern now emerging suggests as many as 24 sites may eventually be set up -- enough to blanket the entire island.
- 4. At least 8 Komar-class missile boats have been delivered to Cuba in recent weeks.
 - A. These PT-like boats carry two missile launchers each, with the radar guided missile effective against surface targets to ranges of between 15 and 17 miles. The missile carries a 2,000 lb. HE warhead.
 - B. Some Cuban naval personnel have received training in the USSR, but it is not known if this included Komar training.
 - C. These boats are in addition to 13 or more torpedo boats and 6 submarine chasers delivered by the USSR earlier this year.
- 5. The photography shows that current deliveries to Cuba also contain land armaments, including tanks and possibly self-propelled guns.
 - A. Reports indicate other shipments have contained artillery, tanks, and possibly combat aircraft, but these are not confirmed.
 - B. The photography of 29 August turned up the highest number of MIG aircraft yet noted, some 37.
 - 1. We believe Cuba's aircraft inventory includes approximately 60 MIG jet fighters, including at least a dozen MIG-19s.
 - 2. No MIG-21s or any type of bomber have been noted.
- 6. Soviet shipments of military equipment and personnel to Cuba show no sign of letting up.
 - A. About 16 Soviet dry-cargo ships are now en route to Cuba, of which at least 10 probably are carrying military equipment.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SC-08458-62
Page 3

1. Total number of military or military-related shipments to Cuba since the current deliveries began in mid-July may be as high as 65.
2. Routine Soviet deliveries of economic aid and trade goods are being made largely on Western ships.
- B. At least 1,700 Soviet military technicians arrived in Cuba in late July and early August in connection with these military activities.
 1. Most of these Soviets appear to be involved in setting up SAM facilities but thus far we cannot conclude that this is their only objective.
- C. At least 1,300 more Soviets are arriving unannounced this week; no reports on their activities so far.
 1. Still additional bloc personnel probably have arrived on some of the cargo ships.

RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Annex A Surface-to-Air Missile Deployment in Cuba
Annex B Description of Komar-Class Missile Boat
Annex C Cuba's Air Defense Capabilities
Annex D Sigint Collection
Annex E USSR-Cuban Communique of 2 September

~~TOP SECRET~~

12. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Director, "Action Generated by DCI Cables Concerning Cuban Low-Level Photography and Offensive Weapons" (n. d.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Action Generated by DCI Cables [REDACTED] Concerning Cuban Low-Level Photography and Offensive Weapons

1. Based upon your proposal of Saturday, 25 August, that RF-101's be used over Cuba, General Carter asked General Lemnitzer on 27 August about the possibility of low-level photography using RF-101 or F8U aircraft. At that time General Lemnitzer indicated that something probably could be dug up. General Carter informed USIB at the 29 August meeting of his conversation with General Lemnitzer. At the Special Group Meeting the following day, General Lemnitzer raised the issue and said that use of RF -101 or F8U aircraft flown by US pilots would be feasible from the military point of view. General Carter pressed the point by indicating that other types of photography did not give sufficient detail and precise identification of certain types of equipment. After some discussion, the Group agreed to take cognizance of this matter and requested it be reopened at an appropriate time when specific targets and information needs could be identified.

2. On 31 August, after General Carter informed Mr. McGeorge Bundy and General Lemnitzer of the readout of U-2 flights showing SA-2 sites, the President called General Carter at 1300, asked how many people had this information, and told General Carter that he wished it put back in the box and nailed tight. This freeze continued until Saturday, 1 September, when the information was extended slightly further to the working analysts. General Carter informed Secretary Gilpatric on 1 September that the General and Karl Kaysen agreed a full readout was necessary and that some low-altitude flights were needed to pinpoint the sites.

3. Not until Tuesday, 4 September, did the President announce the presence of a missile defense system in Cuba. That day General Carter approved COMOR recommendations: in view of SAM sites on the western end of the island, it was particularly important that the next authorized mission should cover those areas of the island which were not photographed because weather or range did not permit, and that the complex eastern end of the island should be photographed again.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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4. General Carter asked DD/R on 5 September to initiate steps for fixing [REDACTED] to cover Cuba.

5. The President and Secretaries of State and Defense were briefed by General Carter late 6 September of a more detailed readout of the 29 August mission which led our analysts to suspect the presence of another kind of missile site--possibly surface-to-surface--at Banes. The White House put a complete freeze on this information; however, Bundy gave an OK to put the analysts to work on providing information to the policymakers on a need-to-know basis but without normal distribution.

6. USIB was brought up to date in executive session at its 7 September meeting on information concerning the SA-2 sites, the new unknown site at Banes, and also the freezing atmosphere of the White House. General Carter requested all members to advise their principals and asked also to be alerted immediately if NSA came up with further information.

7. This was the climate in the Community in early September when a U-2 had just violated the Soviet Far East; when another U-2 was lost on 8 September over the Chinese mainland; and when your first cable of 7 September arrived:

"Question very much if C-package will be helpful Cuba and urge frequent repeat missions of recent reconnaissance operations which Gilpatric advises informative. Also I support use of RF-101's if necessary. My hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable types in Cuba which could command important targets in Southeast U. S. and possibly Latin America and the Caribbean areas."

8. General Carter, as related above and follows, had already urged use of RF-101's relative to your "hunch" about missiles. General Carter recollects showing your cable to Mr. Bundy the following day, Saturday afternoon. There is no evidence that the information was passed outside of the Agency, presumably because it was a reaffirmation of a position you had already taken before Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Taylor and Messrs. Johnson, Gilpatric and Bundy on 10, 21 and 23 August.

-2-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9. On 8 September, upon learning COMOR made Cuba targets available to JRC for possible RF-101 coverage, General Carter instructed Mr. Reber to check with Colonel Steakley to determine when JRC would seek Special Group approval.

10. On 10 September you cabled following [REDACTED]

"Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses being established in Cuba as such extreme costly measures to accomplish security and secrecy not consistent with other policies such as refugees, legal travel, etc. Appears to me quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBM's to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from over-flights. Suggest BNE study motives behind these defensive measures which even seem to exceed those provided most satellites."

General Carter sent an action memorandum on 10 September to the DD/I quoting this passage and asked the BNE to undertake the necessary analysis. BNE's response was sent to you in an 11 September cable. The response said that BNE "still persuaded that costly crash operation to install SA -2's is reasonably explained by other than desire to hide later build-up and the Soviets likely to regard advantage of major offensive build-up not equal to dangers of U. S. intervention."

11. The events of 10 September have already been chronicled in my separate memorandum. However, it was also this date that General Carter sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense calling further need to conduct tactical reconnaissance of Cuba, particularly the facility near Banes, indicating that the site would require in the near future photography of a larger scale than acquired by a U-2, and recommending that SecDef initiate necessary action to provide for employment of this tactical-type reconnaissance.

-3-

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12. On 13 September you cabled [REDACTED] your views of the importance of going ahead with securing release of Cuban prisoners. Included in this cable was the following:

"Also I continue to be concerned that the establishment of defensive equipment and installations is merely a prelude to the location of an offensive weapons capability and once this is done, the implementation of our policy as reported in the press might be extremely difficult and involve unacceptable dangers."

13. The following day (14 September), at the Special Group (Augmented) meeting, Colonel Steakley outlined capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the same area were available. Further conclusion was thus deferred until the next week's meeting, although Elder's memorandum for the record reveals that General Carter pushed hard to keep the Group disposed toward a favorable consideration later.

14. On 16 September you again cabled extensive comments on the Cuban situation making the point that we must carefully study the prospect of MRBM's in Cuba. General Carter directed that a copy of this cable be given to the DD/I and assigned action responsibility to the DD/I. The DD/I's response, contained in a cable to you on 18 September, stated that an introduction of MRBM's was unlikely because of the risk of U. S. intervention.

15. At the USIB meeting of 19 September, General Carter, in discussing terms of what would be necessary if a complete SA-2 defense would make use of the U-2 extremely hazardous if not impossible, again stated a desire to use RF-101's over Cuba. He also said that he thought use of a [REDACTED] drone over Cuba could be justified to the Special Group, adding: "We cannot put a stop to collection; otherwise, the President would never know when the point of decision was reached." At this meeting, USIB also approved NIE 85-3.

-4-

~~SECRET~~

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16. At the Special Group Meeting on 20 September, [REDACTED] was discussed. After its use over Kamchatka was disapproved, General Carter urged its possible use against Cuba and State appeared enthusiastic. Based upon this, General Carter dispatched an action memorandum to the DD/R assigning them responsibility "within CIA [REDACTED] also CIA responsibility for planning other aerial reconnaissance operations against Cuban targets and for presentation of these CIA operations to the Special Group (Augmented) after appropriate Agency and Community coordination."

17. During this period, poor weather resulted in no exploitable take from U-2 operations. The Agency had made an operational determination that none of the four flights which evolved from the 10 September meeting would be made unless weather along the flight routes was less than 25% overcast. The first of the four flights was made on 26 September; the last on 7 October. The peripheral flights turned up additional SAM sites and coastal defense cruise-missile sites, but that is about all.

18. Conclusions of the Cuban SNIE, approved by USIB on 19 September, were cabled to you that day. While the SNIE stated that the Soviets might be tempted to establish other weapons of a more "offensive" character, such as additional types of short-range surface-to-surface missiles, and that the Soviet Union could derive considerable advantage from the establishment of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, the estimate concluded:

" . . . It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the Soviet Union has displayed thus far, and consequently would have important policy implications with respect to other areas and other problems in East-West relations."

-5-

~~SECRET~~

12. (Continued)

~~SECRET~~

19. The following day, 20 September, you cabled [REDACTED] suggesting a most careful consideration of the conclusion that introduction of offensive missiles was unlikely. This paragraph, paragraph one of your cable, was immediately passed to the DD/I. However, no change was made to the estimate. It had already been endorsed by the Intelligence Community and released.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

-6-

~~SECRET~~

13. Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter to McCone, Cable,
4 September 1962 (Excerpt)

ORIG: E. H. KNOCHE TS-874
UNIT: O/DCI
EXT: 7805
DATE: 4 SEPTEMBER 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOP SECRET

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PAGE 1 OF 4

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TO: [REDACTED]
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: ECI 1-2
INFO: S/C 3-4

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SIT GEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
OUT 72756
PRIORITY

TO: [REDACTED]
PRIORITY

INFO

CITE DIR

33894

EYES ONLY ^{McCONE} FROM ^{CARTER} [REDACTED]

1. CUBAN READOUT CONFIRMS EIGHT AND PROBABLY NINE SAM RPT SAM SITES UNDER CRASH CONSTRUCTION. EIGHT OF NINE SITES NOTED WILL BLANKET ENTIRE WESTERN HALF OF ISLAND. NINTH IS ON EAST COAST AND WE EXPECT OTHERS WILL BE BUILT TO COVER ENTIRE COUNTRY. CONSTRUCTION PROCEEDING SO QUICKLY WE LOOK FOR SOME TO BE OPERATIONAL WITHIN NEXT WEEK OR TEN DAYS. READOUT ALSO SHOWED EIGHT TORPEDO BOATS WITH DUAL, RADAR-GUIDED, MISSILE LAUNCHERS. SUCH MISSILES HAVE ESTIMATED RANGE OF ABOUT 15 MILES FOR A 2,000-POUND HI-EXPLOSIVE PAYLOAD WITH GOOD ACCURACY. PRESUME YOU KNOW OF WEEKEND COMMUNIQUE IN WHICH MOSCOW CLAIMS RIGHT TO EXTEND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CUBA WHILE DANGER OF INVASION PERSISTS. ALL THIS CREATES NEW ATMOSPHERE. PRINCIPALS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TODAY TO DISCUSS WHITHER NOW, AND WITH HILL LEADERSHIP AT WHITE HOUSE THIS AFTERNOON.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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OUT 72756											
TO	INFO -2-	CITE DIR 33894									
2. DONOVAN IS BACK FROM HAVANA WITH NEW PRICE LIST FROM FIDEL. LATTER WILL SETTLE FOR THREE MILLION CASH AND 25 MILLION IN FOOD AND MEDICINE. DONOVAN TO CONFER WITH HURWITZ AND ATTY GEN BEFORE RETURNING TO HAVANA LATER THIS WEEK. WORD WE HAVE IS THAT FIDEL WANTS TO COMPLETE ALL ARRANGEMENTS QUICKEST, WITHIN TEN DAYS. OUTLOOK IS FOR AGENCY TO BE ASKED TO HELP OUT. WE WILL INSURE CLEARANCE ON THE HILL PRIOR TO ANY INVOLVEMENT.											
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ORIG: E. H. KNOCHE
UNIT: O/DCI
EXT: 7805
DATE: 5 SEPTEMBER 1962

TS-889

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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INFO: S/C 3-4

500-... 252

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CITE DIR

34210

PRITY:

EYES ONLY [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED]

Mc CONE

CARTER

1. IN INITIAL REACTION TO OFFICIAL US STATEMENT 4 SEPT RE SAM SITES AND PT BOATS, CUBAN SPOKESMEN EMPHASIZING CLAIM THAT ARMS BUILDUP IS EXERCISE OF RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE. MOSCOW IS SILENT SO FAR. CUBAN MILITARY FORCES FOR PAST WEEK OR SO IN HIGH STATE OF ALERT. IT MAY BE THAT REGIME DELIBERATELY ALARMING POPULACE TO JUSTIFY MASSIVE SOVIET ASSISTANCE AND TO DIVERT MINDS FROM ECONOMIC FLIGHT.

2. PETE SCOVILLE IS FIXING THE C-PACKAGE TO PERMIT COVERAGE OF CUBA. THIS WILL TAKE ABOUT THREE WEEKS. IN BACKS OF OUR MINDS IS GROWING DANGER TO THE BIRDS.

3. [REDACTED]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PAGE 1 OF 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS 910
DATE : 7 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM :

ACTION: DCI 1

INFO : S/C 2-3

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SEP 7 1259Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 18314

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FROM


NO DISSEMINATION

CARTER

McCONE

1. APPRECIATE YOUR MESSAGES. WILL REMAIN HERE AS SCHEDULED. RETURNING PARIS 21 SEPTEMBER. WILL SPEND 14 SEPT IN PARIS AND WILL MEET GENERAL JACQUIER ON THAT DAY.

2.



3.

4. QUESTION VERY MUCH IF C-PACKAGE WILL BE HELPFUL CUBA AND URGE FREQUENT REPEAT MISSIONS OF RECENT RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS WHICH GILPATRICK ADVISES INFORMATIVE. ALSO I SUPPORT USE OF R-101 IF NECESSARY. MY HUNCH IS WE MIGHT FACE PROSPECT OF SOVIET SHORT-RANGE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES OF PORTABLE TYPE IN CUBA

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

ROUTING

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2	5
3	6

PAGE 2 OF 2

IN 18314

WHICH COULD COMMAND IMPORTANT TARGETS OF SOUTHEAST UNITED STATES AND POSSIBLY LATIN AMERICAN CARIBBEAN AREAS.

5. YOU MIGHT SUGGEST TO RUSK THAT WE DEVELOP JOINT POLICIES FOR ACTION IN CUBA WITH SELECTED CARIBBEAN, SOUTH-AMERICAN STATES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO SEEKING UNANIMOUS OAS ACTION WHICH MOST CERTAINLY WILL BE AN INEFFECTIVE COMPROMISE SOLUTION IF PAST HISTORY IS ANY INDICATOR.

END OF MESSAGE

*I did this
He was most
appreciative -
[Signature]
8 Sept 6:*

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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Copy No.

17. Carter to McCone, Cable, 7 September 1962 (Excerpt)

FROM: E. H. KNOCHE

UNIT: O/DCI

EXT: 7805

DATE: 7 SEPTEMBER 1962

TS-921

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~ - E T

PAGE 1 OF 4

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: [REDACTED]

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DCI 1-2

INFO: S/C 3-4

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
OUT 74272 PRIORITY

TO: [REDACTED]

INFO

CITE DIR

3039

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY

McCONE

FROM

CARTER

I HAVE REPORT FROM GOOD SOURCE QUOTING CUBAN AMB IN PRAGUE (WHO IS SON OF FORMER RAUL ROA) THAT CUBA HAS "ROCKETS OF SAME KIND THAT SHOT DOWN U-2" AND THAT PREPARATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR "COMPLETE DESTRUCTION" OF GUANTANAMO BASE IN EVENT OF ATTACK ON CUBA.

ASSUME YOU NOTING PRESS REPORTS SHOWING HOW CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS PRESSING FOR A FORMOSA-TYPE RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING PRESIDENT TO USE TROOPS IF NECESSARY IN CUBA.



E.

RELEASING OFFICER


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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOP SECRET	PAGE 4 OF 4	ROUTING
TO : UNIT : EXT : DATE :	1 2 3	4 5 6
TO : FROM: DIRECTOR CONF: INFO :	DEFERRED ROUTINE OUT 74272	
TO	INFO	CITE DIR 34829



7. WE HAVE YOUR MESSAGE AND ARE LOOKING INTO ALL MATTERS YOU RAISE. WILL ADVISE. TERRY LEE TAKING NECESSARY ACTION RE YOUR HOUSE PLANS.

8. WE HAVE THE MESSAGE ASKING FOR DAILY BULLETIN TO BE SENT TO YOU EVERY DAY. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT ALL SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING THOSE COVERED IN BULLETIN, ARE INCLUDED IN THIS DAILY CABLE SERIES.

END OF MESSAGE

LT. GEN. MARSHALL S. CARTER
 A/DCI

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~TOP SECRET~~

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

TS-930
ORIG: E. H. KNOCHE
UNIT: O/DCI
EXT: 7805
DATE: 8 SEPTEMBER 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1 OF 5

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: [REDACTED]
FROM: DIRECTOR
CCNF: DCI 1-2
INFO: S/C 3-4

EYES ONLY

0000 01 202
SIGN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
OUT 74587
PRIORITY


TO: PRIORITY [REDACTED] INFO
EYES ONLY [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED]

McCONE CARICR

CITE DIR OUT 74587
35013

1. READOUT OF LATEST (5 SEPTEMBER) TAKE SHOWS THREE MORE SAMS, THESE IN LAS VILLAS PROVINCE IN CENTRAL CUBA. TOTAL SAMS NOW TWELVE, PROBABLY THIRTEEN. TO BLANKET ISLAND, WE LOOK FOR EVENTUAL TOTAL OF ABOUT 25. ALSO SPOTTED ONE MIG-21 AT SANTA CLARA AIRFIELD. NINETEEN CRATES SEEN PROBABLY HOUSE MIG-21 WHICH WOULD TOTAL 20. (TOTAL NUMBER MIG-15, 17 AND 19 IS CARRIED AT ABOUT 60.) MIG-21 IS 1,000 MPH JET, WITH ALTITUDE CAPABILITY 60,000 FEET, EQUIPPED WITH TWO AIR-AIR INFRARED MISSILES AS WELL AS STANDARD ROCKETS AND CANNONS.

I HAVE TALKED WITH RUSK WHO WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE FOR YOUR SUGGESTION RE JOINT ACTION PLANNING WITH SELECTED LATINO STATES.



2.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~TOP SECRET~~

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER 2

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18. (Continued)

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EXT:			PRIORITY	INITIALS
DATE:			OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS
TO:			DIR 35013 OUT 74587	
FROM: DIRECTOR				
CONF:				
INFO:				
TO:	INFO	PAGE -3- OF 5	CITE DIR	
5. [REDACTED]				
6. AS RESULT OF U-2 VIOLATION OF SAKHALIN AND PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC PROMISE TO "REVIEW PROCEDURES," SPECIAL GROUP HAS APPROVED AIR FORCE PROPOSAL TO STAND DOWN AIR FORCE U-2 OPERATIONS FOR "TIME BEING."				
7. [REDACTED]				
RELEASING OFFICER:	TOP SECRET	AUTHENTICATING OFFICER		
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ORIG: E. H. KNOCHE
UNIT: O/DCI TS 948
EXT: 7805
DATE: 10 SEPTEMBER 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PAGE ONE OF FOUR PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTING	
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TO: [REDACTED]
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: DCI 1-2
INFO: S/C 3-4

1030 21 55z
OUT 74930

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
OUT 74830
PRIORITY


TO: PRITY [REDACTED] INFO
EYES ONLY [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED]

CARTER

CITE DIR 35116
35116

1. STILL UNABLE TO CONCLUDE ON FATE OF LOST U-2.
CONFIRM.
THERE IS NOTHING TO ~~INDICATE~~ MECHANICAL MALFUNCTION AND
GRADUAL OR SUDDEN LOSS OF ALTITUDE. THERE WERE CHICOM
MIGS IN THE AREA BUT NOT AT U-2 ALTITUDE SO FAR AS WE CAN
TELL. NO KNOWLEDGE RE FATE OF PILOT.

SOVIETS PLAYING INCIDENT IN LOW KEY THUS FAR. CHICOMS
ACCUSING UNITED STATES OF BEING INSTIGATOR AND LINKING
MAXWELL TAYLOR PRESENCE IN TAIPEI WITH DISPATCH OF SPY PLANE.



2.

RELEASING OFFICER [REDACTED] COORDINATING OFFICERS [REDACTED] AUTHENTICATING OFFICER [REDACTED]
~~TOP SECRET~~
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PAGE TWO OF FOUR PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTING	
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OC:G
UNIT
EXT
DATE

TO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
OUT 74830

TO INFO -2- CITE DIR 35116

3. OUR EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY HAS RELIABLE INFO THAT MEXICO AND BRAZIL (WHO HAVE BEEN IN VANGUARD OF THOSE OPPOSING TOUGH POLICY RE CASTRO) NOW JOINTLY DISCUSSING POSSIBILITY OF MAKING DIPLOMATIC BREAK WITH CUBA. REASON IS NOT RPT NOT NEW SOVIET INROADS BUT THAT MEXICAN AND BRAZILIAN GOVTS NOW THINK WE WILL INVADE AND ERASE CASTRO AND WANT TO BE SPARED DOMESTIC EMBARRASSMENT BY BREAKING BEFOREHAND.

4. THANKS FOR YOUR THOUGHTS RE CUBA. BNE HAS THEM AND IS CONSIDERING. ENVY THE "BEAUTIFUL ENVIRONMENT" YOU DESCRIBE. HAVEN'T SEEN ANY HERE FOR A WHILE. SPECIAL PROJECT SHOULD BE READY IN APRIL. EVEN WITH CRASH PROGRAM, IT COULD NOT BE READY BEFORE JANUARY OR FEBRUARY.

5.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~TOP SECRET~~

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DATE	TS 940 10 SEP 62		ROUTING
TO	DIRECTOR		1 4
FROM	[REDACTED]		2 5
ACTION	DCI 1 (COPY ISSUED TO DCI 0725 10 SEP 62)		3 6
INFO	S/C 23		SEP 10 1104Z 62
			PRIORITY
			IN 19372

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No Change in Class.

Class. Changed to: TO (3) C

Next Review Date: _____

DIR CITE [REDACTED] Ha 70-3
 3-18-91. BY: 233768

EYES ONLY [REDACTED] AND ELDER FROM [REDACTED]

- CARTER* *McCONE*
1. VERY APPRECIATIVE YOUR DETAILED DAILY REPORTS. CHINA INCIDENT MOST DISTRESSING BUT NOT SURPRISING AND RECALL THAT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS I POINTED OUT TO SPECIAL GROUP PACFI AND HIGHER AUTHORITY THAT AN INCIDENT WAS INEVITABLE.
 2. DIFFICULT FOR ME TO RATIONALIZE EXTENSIVE COSTLY DEFENSES BEING ESTABLISHED IN CUBA AS SUCH EXTREME COSTLY MEASURES TO ACCOMPLISH SECURITY AND SECRECY NOT CONSISTENT WITH OTHER POLICIES SUCH AS REFUGEES, LEGAL TRAVEL, ETC. APPEARS TO ME QUITE POSSIBLE MEASURES NOW BEING TAKEN ARE FOR PURPOSE OF INSURING SECURITY OF SOME OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY SUCH AS MRBM'S TO BE INSTALLED BY SOVIETS AFTER PRESENT PHASE COMPLETED AND COUNTRY SECURED FROM OVERFLIGHTS. SUGGEST BNE STUDY MOTIVES BEHIND THESE DEFENSIVE MEASURES WHICH EVEN SEEM TO EXCEED THOSE PROVIDED MOST SATELLITES.
 3. SUGGEST YOU REVIEW STATUS KELLY JOHNSON PROJECT AND

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declassification

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DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

PAGE 2

IN 19372

POSSIBLY INITIATE CRASH PROGRAM TO GIVE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CAPABILITY AS THIS MIGHT BE MOST USEFUL IN DETERMINING CUBAN ACTIVITIES.

4. THE ABOVE BITS OF WISDOM RESULT FROM COMPLETE RELAXATION IN THIS INCREDIBLY BEAUTIFUL ENVIRONMENT. REGARDS.

END OF MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1
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declassification

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21. Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Director, "White House Meeting on 10 September 1962 on Cuban Overflights," 1 March 1963

~~SECRET~~

1 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: White House Meeting on 10 September 1962
on Cuban Overflights

1. The following is a reconstruction of the reasons for the meeting at the White House in Mr. McGeorge Bundy's office on 10 September 1962 at approximately 5:45 p.m., and a report on what transpired at that meeting. This memorandum is based upon discussions with Mr. Parrott of the White House, General Carter, Dr. Herbert Scoville, and Messrs. [REDACTED] and Reber of Dr. Scoville's office who also attended the meeting.

2. A memorandum for the record prepared by Mr. McMahon [REDACTED] records that at approximately 10:00 on the morning of 10 September he received a telephone call from Mr. Parrott passing on a request made by Mr. Bundy on behalf of the Secretary of State. According to Mr. Parrott, the Secretary of State had expressed the hope that there wouldn't be any incidents this week, and Mr. Bundy asked that the following questions posed by the Secretary of State be answered.

a. How important is it to our intelligence objectives that we overfly Cuban soil?

b. How much would our intelligence suffer if we limited our reconnaissance to peripheral activities utilizing oblique photography?

c. Is there anyone in the planning of these missions who might wish to provoke an incident?

3. Mr. Parrott indicated that Mr. Bundy desired an answer within a half hour. Mr. McMahon immediately contacted the Chairman of COMOR which was in session at that moment, and they agreed to provide a response as quickly as possible. Mr. Parrott called a second time to advise Mr. McMahon that Mr. Roger Hilsman had advised that he

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

would accept the responsibility for providing the answers to the Secretary of State, and that he had scheduled a meeting that afternoon with Mr. James Reber, the Chairman of COMOR, in order to obtain the answers.

4. With the above background to the meeting, it is apparent that the primary concern was to insure that there would be no incidents involving a U-2 in the overhead reconnaissance of Cuba. (You will recall that it was at this time that there had been two U-2 incidents--one over China and one over Sakhalin--which had caused considerable noise level.) The meeting opened with an analysis of the risk of incidents involved in the Agency's proposal for two extended overflights covering the remainder of Cuba which had not been covered in the 29 August and 5 September missions. Mr. Rusk asserted that although the information was needed, everything should be done to minimize the risk element and avoid a third incident. He urged that the routes be so designed as to have the U-2's over the Island the minimum possible time, and there was general discussion on the desirability of avoiding the SAM sites. The Secretary of State also made the point that he did not wish to have overflights mixed with peripheral flights, as he wished to maintain the right to fly over international waters with peripheral flights. He raised the question as to whether some of the needed coverage couldn't be obtained from peripheral flights with oblique photography.

5. The CIA representatives showed the members of the group a map of Cuba and the planned routes. The SAM sites which had already been identified were pointed out and it was noted that the routes planned would avoid these sites. It was noted, however, that there could be new sites which had not yet been identified along the planned routes. The CIA representatives also stressed the importance of the intelligence requirements. Messrs. Bundy and Rusk indicated that the group would not object to the overflights provided there were no incidents and that the routes taken over the land mass of Cuba were the shortest possible and avoided the surface-to-air missile sites.

6. The minutes of this meeting were prepared on the next day by Mr. Tom Parrott who did not attend the meeting.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

~~SECRET~~

ORIG: E. H. KNOCHE
 UNIT: O/DCI TS 964
 EXT: 7805
 DATE: 11 SEPTEMBER 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE ONE OF FOUR PAGES

ROUTING	
1	4
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TO: [REDACTED]
 FROM: DIRECTOR
 CONF: DCI 1-2
 INFO: S/c 3-4

DEFERRED
 ROUTINE
 OUT 75341
 PRIORITY

OUT75341

TO: PRITY [REDACTED] INFO

CITE DIR

35429
 35429

EYES ONLY *Mc Conf* FROM *CARTER* [REDACTED]

1. HAVANA RADIO CHARGES THAT TWO CARGO SHIPS, OUTWARD BOUND FROM CUBA, ONE CUBAN AND THE OTHER BRITISH, WERE ATTACKED 11 SEPT OFF NORTHERN COAST OF CUBA. WE HAVE INFO THAT AN EXILE GROUP CALLED ALPHA-66 (BASED IN PUERTO RICO) PROBABLY DID THE JOB. STUDENT EXILE GROUP IN MIAMI LAST WEEKEND PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO ATTACK BLOC SHIPS MOVING IN AND OUT OF CUBA. THERE IS GROWING MOOD OF FRUSTRATION AMONG REFUGEES AND DANGER OF UNILATERAL OPERATIONS AND INCIDENTS IS LIKEWISE GROWING.

ASSUME YOU NOTING IN PRESS THE SOVIET STATEMENT ISSUED 11 SEPT MAKING SWEEPING CHARGES THAT US PREPARING CUBA INVASION AND WARNING THAT "IF THIS ATTACK IS MADE, THIS WILL BE BEGINNING OF UNLEASHING OF WAR." IMPLICATIONS OF THE 4,000-WORD STATEMENT UNDER STUDY. WILL ADVISE YOU FURTHER.

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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PAGE TWO OF FOUR PAGE

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TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 75341 DIR 35425

TO INFO -2- CITE DIR

2. REF YOUR REQUEST THAT BNE EXAMINE IMPLICATIONS OF DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT. FOLLOWING IS PRELIM BNE STATEMENT:

"WHOLE QUESTION SOV MOTIVATIONS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE REASONS WHY SOVS MIGHT CONSIDER INSTALLATION MRBMS, BEING EXAMINED IN SNIE BEING DRAFTED FOR USIB NEXT WEEK. BNE STILL PERSUADED THAT COSTLY CRASH OPERATION TO INSTALL SA-25 IS MORE REASONABLY EXPLAINED BY OTHER THAN DESIRE TO HIDE LATER BUILDUP AND THAT SOVS LIKELY TO REGARD ADVANTAGES OF MAJOR OFFENSIVE BUILDUP NOT EQUAL TO DANGERS OF US INTERVENTION CUBA LEAKING LIKE SIEVE FROM GROUND OBSERVATION ALONE. THUS SUDDEN CRACKDOWN ON REFUGEE FLOW AND LEGAL TRAFFIC WOULD BE STRONG INDICATOR OF POSSIBLE DESIRE TO UNDERTAKE FURTHER MILITARY BUILDUP IN SECRET."



3.

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ORIG: E. H. KNOCHE
 UNIT: O/DCI 1668
 EXT: 7805
 DATE: 12 SEPTEMBER 1962

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TOP SECRET

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ROUTING	
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	ROUTINE
	PRIORITY
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

20 SEP 20 092

SIG GEN

OUT 75805

TO: [REDACTED]
 FROM: DIRECTOR
 CONF: DCI 1-2
 INFO: S/C 3-4

TO PRITY [REDACTED] INFO CITE DIR 35713
 EYES ONLY ^{McCONE} FROM ^{CARTER} [REDACTED]

1. CASTRO HAS LAID DOWN STRICT CENSORSHIP FROM CUBA. WESTERN PRESS AND RADIO SERVICES HAVE BEEN OUT OF TOUCH WITH CORRESPONDENTS SINCE ABOUT MID-DAY 11 SEPTEMBER. REUTERS MAN ARRESTED. OTHERS MISSING AND MAY BE IN CUSTODY.

2. HERewith EXTRACTS FROM AGENCY ASSESSMENT OF MOSCOW STATEMENT 11 SEPTEMBER RE CUBA:

STATEMENT DESIGNED TO FURTHER VARIETY OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES, FOREMOST BEING TO DETER US FROM ACTIVE INTERVENTION. STATEMENT DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER NATURE OF SOVIET COMMITMENT TO DEFEND CASTRO. MOSCOW HAS ONCE AGAIN USED VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE TO AVOID CLEAR-CUT OBLIGATION OF MILITARY SUPPORT IN EVENT OF ATTACK.

STATEMENT ALSO CALCULATED TO ENABLE MOSCOW TO CLAIM FULL CREDIT FOR PROTECTING CUBA IF NO INVASION OCCURS.

RELEASING OFFICER: [REDACTED] AUTHENTICATING OFFICER: [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

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2 Copy No

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~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE TWO OF FOUR PAGES

ORIG :
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EXT :
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ROUTING	
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TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
OUT 75805 DIR 35713 OUT 75805

TO INFO -2-

CITE DIR 35713

IN ADDITION TO DETERRENT EFFECT, STATEMENT SEEMS INTENDED TO CHECK GROWING ALARM RE SOVIET INTENTIONS. IT STRESSES DEFENSIVE NATURE OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND DENIES INTENTION TO ESTABLISH SOVIET BASE IN CUBA. AT SAME TIME MOSCOW EMPHASIZES RIGHT TO PROVIDE HELP TO CUBA, CITING EXISTENCE OF US ALLIANCES AND BASES ALL ALONG PERIPHERY OF SINO-SOVIET BLOC.

STATEMENT BRUSQUE AND STRONG RE CUBA, BUT MODERATE ON BERLIN. IT NOTES "PAUSE NOW HAS BEEN REACHED" IN BERLIN TALKS AND SAYS IT IS "DIFFICULT" FOR THE US TO NEGOTIATE DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.

3.



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COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~TOP SECRET~~

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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TS-003

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE PAGE 1 OF 2

DATE : 13 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : [REDACTED]

ACTION: DCI 1-2 (Tempo copy issued DCI at 0855 13 Sept.)

INFO : S/C 3-4

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Next Review Date	IN 2 493
HR 77-3	

OPIM DIR CITE [REDACTED] 235768

EYES ONLY [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED]

REF DIR 35650 (OUT 75733) * (CARTER) (MC CONE)

1. I BELIEVE SECURING PRISONER RELEASE A SERIOUS OBLIGATION OF UNITED STATES, IMPORTANT FROM A HUMANITARIAN STANDPOINT AND AN ESSENTIAL STEP IN OUR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES FOR CUBA. THEREFORE PERFECTLY AGREEABLE TO ALTER MY PLANS TO ASSIST WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP AND COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN. DO NOT BELIEVE MY IDENTIFICATION AS REPUBLICAN PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BUT RECOGNIZE A BI-PARTISAN APPROACH BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT ON THIS DELICATE MATTER IMPORTANT, AS ARE MY PERSONAL CONNECTIONS ON THE HILL.

2. DO NOT UNDERSTAND APPARENT READINESS TO APPROVE MEDICINE AND DRUGS TO THE EXTENT INDICATED BUT NO FOOD, AS I BELIEVE BOTH HAVE THEIR HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS AND PERSONALLY SUPPORT BOTH. ALSO I CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT AND INSTALLATIONS IS MERELY A PRELUDE TO THE LOCATION OF AN OFFENSIVE WEAPON CAPABILITY AND ONCE THIS IS DONE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR POLICY AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS MIGHT BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND INVOLVE

~~TOP SECRET~~

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PAGE 2 OF 2

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE:

TO:

FROM:

ACTION:

INFO:

IN 21493

UNACCEPTABLE DANGERS.

3. I WOULD LIKE TO TALK WITH YOU [REDACTED] FROM NORSTAD'S HEADQUARTERS TO THE WHITE HOUSE OR PENTAGON SITUATION ROOM TONIGHT (13 SEPT) BETWEEN 1700 AND 1800 YOUR TIME. UNLESS I HEAR TO THE CONTRARY FROM YOU BY TWELVE NOON TODAY YOUR TIME, I WILL PROCEED PARIS THIS EVENING AND MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS CALL.

END OF MESSAGE

CARTER'S

MC LONE

C/S Comment: [REDACTED] message to [REDACTED] re procedures to effect release of the Cuban prisoners.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

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downgrading and
declassification

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Copy No.

CRG W. ELDER
 UNIT O/DCI
 EXT 7805
 DATE 13 SEPT 1962

Handwritten: TS 0131/1/11

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~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE ONE OF TWO PAGES

ROUTING	
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TO [REDACTED]
 FROM DIRECTOR
 CONF DCI 1-2
 INFO S/C 3-4

13 SEP 62 23 23 Z


SIG DEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

OUT 76318

TO PRITY [REDACTED] INFO [REDACTED] CITE-DIR [REDACTED]
 EYES ONLY *McCONE* FROM *CARTER* [REDACTED]

36026

1. AT LEAST TWENTY SIX MORE SOVIET SHIPS CURRENTLY EN ROUTE TO CUBA. REFUGEE SOURCE REPORTS EQUIPMENT FOR SAM SITE PROBABLY MOVED TO ISLE OF PINES IN LATE AUGUST. ANOTHER SOURCE WITH CUBAN NAVY CONTACTS REPORTS MORE TORPEDO BOATS AND TWO TYPES ANTI-SUB SHIPS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN CUBA FROM SOVIET UNION LATE 1962 AND EARLY 1963.



RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
~~TOP SECRET~~

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
13 September 1962

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Analysis of the Suspect Missile Site at
Banes, Cuba

1. A review of all available evidence leads us to conclude it is highly likely that the suspect missile site near Banes, Cuba is a facility for launching cruise missiles against ship targets at fairly close ranges.

2. The site, which is located about 300 feet above sea level and 3.5 nm from the sea is oriented in a general easterly (seaward) direction. It consists of two 30 foot rail launchers in revetments, each connected by cable to a Soviet Whiff tracking radar. Ground support equipment consists of eight canvas-covered, missile-type trailers, two probable generators and electronic vans, and other general purpose vehicles. The area is being fenced, and the personnel are housed in tents. The site configuration and the equipment observed are compatible with a cruise missile system and not compatible with surface-to-air or ballistic systems.

3. Although our knowledge of Soviet cruise missiles is incomplete, we know of three systems which could fit those facilities observed at Banes. We have eliminated other operational Soviet cruise missile systems, with ranges from 1000 to 4000 nm, because their missiles probably would be too large for the Banes facility. A 600 nm cruise missile has had a test range firing in the USSR, but it too would be too large for the Banes site.

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TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~
1.57



4. The three remaining possibilities are:

- a. SS-N-1-- a destroyer-launched cruise anti-ship homing missile launched from 30 foot inclined rails. With destroyer radar, the effective system range is 20 to 30 nm. With the assistance of an air controller, the system range can be extended to 130 nm. This system could be installed at a shore site.
- b. SS-N-2-- a Komar class patrol craft-launched cruise anti-ship homing missile, launched from inclined rails 25 to 30 feet long. With the Komar radar, the effective system range is 10 to 15 nm. This system could also be installed at a shore site. Eight KOMARS have been transferred to Cuba.
- c. SS-C-1-- the "missile-in-a-bottle", first shown in the 1961 Moscow 7 November parade. This missile is launched from an inclined ramp within a tube mounted on a large four axle truck. We know nothing of its guidance system. The missile probably has a range of about 150 nm, but possibly it could be as much as 300 nm. This system could be installed at a fixed site.

5. Although none of the known Soviet cruise missile systems precisely fit the facility at Banes, we believe it is more likely that the site is for a short range 25-30 NM missile system. The Whiff radar seen at the site has not been noted with known cruise missile systems but could be used for target acquisition in this installation. If the missile has an inertial guidance system and a means of target acquisition, the range of the missile at the Banes site could be extended to a range of about 130 nm.

~~TOP SECRET~~



6. There are several items of circumstantial evidence which tend to support the conclusion that the Banes site is for relatively short range coastal defense cruise missiles. The fact that the site is near the coast suggests that the range of its missile is short; otherwise it could be located inland in a less vulnerable area. It is located where short-range missiles could defend against seaborne assault on deep water ports in Nipe Bay south of Banes.* Thus far, the Soviets apparently have not given Cuba any weapons which provide them a long range striking capability, suggesting that their policy is to provide for Cuba's defense only. Because neither the SS-N-1 nor the SS-C-1 has sufficient range to hit any target in the United States, such missiles would fit this policy pattern.

7. If the analysis that the Banes missile site is a coastal defense installation is correct, it would follow that similar facilities may be set up at a number of other locations favorable for protecting beaches against amphibious attack.

8. We doubt that Cubans have been given sufficient training in the use of such missiles to allow them to have operational control over the sites. It seems likely that Soviet technical training personnel would be needed for some time to come and would be available for operating the installation in time of crisis.

* Cuba's two nickel plants are in this general area. Their output is being sent to the Soviet Bloc and is equivalent to 20 percent of Soviet production. The more important of these two plants is on the bay protected by the Banes site.

ORIG: W. ELDER
UNIT: O/DCI
EXT: 7805
DATE: 14 SEPTEMBER 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1 OF 4

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: [REDACTED]
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: DCI 1-2
INFO: S/C 3-4

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OUT 76847

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ROUTINE
PRIORITY
OUT 76847

TO: PRITY [REDACTED] INFO

CITE DIR

EYES ONLY [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED]

McCONE CARTER

36344

1. FIRST SOVIET COMMENT ON 13 SEPTEMBER PRESIDENTIAL CONFERENCE FEATURES ALLEGATION THAT KENNEDY QUOTE ACTUALLY ADMITTED PREPARATIONS ARE UNDERWAY IN THE UNITED STATES FOR OVERTHROWING CUBAN GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE. THIS ALLEGATION HINGES ON PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH EXILES. SOVIET DOMESTIC MEDIA GIVING HEAVY PLAY TO QUOTE CONTRAST UNQUOTE BETWEEN DEFENSIVE AID TO CUBA AND US MILITARY BASES SURROUNDING BLOC.

2. [REDACTED]

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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Copy No.


28. McCone to Carter, Cable, with attached note from MSC
[Carter], 16 September 1962

75 592
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
16 Sept 62

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Get a copy to
Cline + Kent and
Helms and have
~~them~~ Cline advise as to
action —

DONE
17 Sep 62


17 Sep 62

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TS 042
E : 16 SEP 62

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SEP 16 1551Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 23209

OPIN DIR CITE

EYES ONLY

FROM

CARTER Mc LONE

1. FOLLOWING AUGUST MEETING PRINCIPALS WHEN WE FIRST REPORTED SOVIET CUBAN BUILDUP I SUGGESTED BNE STUDY ECONOMIC PROSPECTS OF CUBA ASSUMING SOVIET TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND GUIDANCE COULD CORRECT PRESENT MISMANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE BY CASTRO ORGANIZATION. I THEN FELT AND STATED THAT SOVIETS WOULD REASON THAT PROPER MANAGEMENT COULD BUILD CUBA INTO A VIABLE ECONOMY WITH SUFFICIENT EXPORT OF AGRICULTURAL AND MANUFACTURED PRODUCT AND OTHER NATURAL RESOURCES TO COVER NEEDS FOR IMPORT AND PROVIDE SOME EXCESS FOR SOCIAL BETTERMENT. IN VIEW OF VERY EXTENSIVE PRESS COMMENT ON DETERIORATION OF CUBAN ECONOMY LEAVING IMPRESSION SITUATION CAN NEVER BE REVERSED AND POSSIBILITY OF SUCH REASONING INFLUENCING U. S. POLICY IMPORTANTLY I BELIEVE THE STUDY PROPOSED WILL BE REVEALING AND USEFUL.
2. ALSO BELIEVE WE MUST CAREFULLY STUDY THE PROSPECT OF SECRET IMPORTATION AND PLACEMENT OF SEVERAL SOVIET MRBMS WHICH COULD NOT BE DETECTED BY US IF CUBAN DEFENSES DENY OVERFLIGHT. IN REFLECTING ON MY OBSERVATIONS OF THOR INSTALLATION IN BRITAIN AND JUPITERS

~~TOP SECRET~~

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES		IN 23209 [REDACTED] 0019													
<p>IN ITALY I CAN ENVISAGE A SOVIET PLAN TO PACKAGE MISSILE, CONTROL AND OPERATING EQUIPMENT IN SUCH A WAY THAT A UNIT COULD BE MADE OPERATIONAL A FEW HOURS AFTER A SITE CLEARED AND A MODEST CONCRETE PAD POURED. DO NOT WISH TO BE OVERLY ALARMING THIS MATTER BUT BELIEVE CIA AND COMMUNITY MUST KEEP GOVERNMENT INFORMED OF DANGER OF A SURPRISE AND ALSO THAT DETECTION OF PREPARATORY STEPS POSSIBLY BEYOND OUR CAPABILITY ONCE CUBAN DEFENSE SYSTEM OPERATIVE.</p> <p>3. THRUST OF PRESS REPORTS REACHING ME IS THAT THERE EXISTS A CLEAR DEMARCATION BETWEEN DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE PREPARATIONS AND I QUESTION IF WE CAN BE SURE OF THIS. I RECOGNIZE CUBAN POLICY DECISIONS MOST DELICATE AND BEYOND AGENCY OR MY COMPETENCE. HOWEVER BELIEVE WE MUST GIVE THOSE MAKING DECISION OUR BEST ESTIMATE OF POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS AND ALTERNATIVE SITUATIONS WHICH MIGHT EVOLVE AND UNEXPECTEDLY CONFRONT US.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">END OF MESSAGE</p>															

29. Carter to McCone, Cable, 17 September 1962 (Excerpt)

ORIG E. H. KNOCHE
 UNIT O/DCI TS 056
 EXT :7805
 DATE 17 SEPT 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
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C. E. ... @ ...
 PAGE ONE OF FIVE PAGES

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TO [REDACTED]
 FROM: DIRECTOR
 CONF: DCI 1-2
 INFO: S/C 3-4

17 SEP 22 22 33z

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OUT77481

TO PRITY [REDACTED]
 EYES ONLY [REDACTED]

CITE DIR 36649

FROM *McCONE* [REDACTED] *CARTER* [REDACTED]

1. SOVIET PASSENGER SHIPS HAVE MADE NINE UNPUBLICIZED TRIPS TO CUBA SINCE LATE JULY; TWO MORE BELIEVED EN ROUTE NOW. THE TWO WILL BRING ESTIMATED TOTAL MILITARY TECHNICIANS ARRIVING SINCE MID-JULY TO ABOUT FORTY-TWO HUNDRED.

UNDER AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED RECENTLY BY BRITISH GUIANA TRADE MINISTER ON VISIT TO HAVANA, BRITISH GUIANA WILL SEND UP TO ONE THOUSAND EXPERIENCED CANE CUTTERS TO HELP WITH NEXT YEARS HARVEST.

2. CHICOMS HAVE ASKED FOR EMERGENCY MEETING OF WANG AND CABOT IN WARSAW. DATE SET IS 21 SEPT. NO HINT OF SUBJECT, BUT WE SUSPECT IT WILL BE CHICOM CHARGE OF "AGGRESSIVE INTENT" IN WAKE OF U-2 INCIDENT. CHICOM PRESS BENDING EVERY EFFORT TO TAG US WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE U-2 OPERATIONS OVER MAINLAND, AND WE ARE ALSO GETTING COMPLAINTS FROM PEIPING ABOUT US

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COORDINATING OFFICERS
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[Signature]
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8 SEP 62 21 04z

TO: [REDACTED]

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DD/1

INFO: DCI 2, DDP, AD/NE, S/C 2*

Document No. _____

No Change in Class.

Declassified

Class. Changed to: TS - S C

Next Review Date: _____

Auth: HR 70-3

Date: _____ *EY/ST only*

SIG GEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 77871

TO: CPIM [REDACTED] INFO CITE DIR 36854

FROM: [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED]

RE: [REDACTED] *McCone* *CARTER*
*IN 23209)***

1. NO DOUBT THAT CUBAN ECONOMIC RESOURCES CAPABLE OF SUBSTANTIAL DEVELOPMENT GIVEN BETTER MANAGEMENT AND SUFFICIENT CAPITAL INVESTMENT. SIEE 85-3, BEFORE USIB TOMORROW, RECOGNIZES THIS AS A PROBABLE SOVIET INTENTION AND THAT THE OBJECTIVE IS TO STIMULATE COMMUNIST POLITICAL ACTION ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA. AS NOTED IN 85-2 (1 AUG), HOWEVER, PRESENT STATE OF CUBAN ECONOMY IS VERY BAD AND SUBSTANTIAL UPTURN WILL BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER 1963.

2. SIEE 85-3 DISCUSSES IN DETAIL POSSIBILITY OF INTRODUCTION OF MRMs INTO CUBA, BUT JUDGES THIS TO BE UNLIKELY BECAUSE OF RISK OF U.S. INTERVENTION INVOLVED UNLESS THERE IS A RADICAL CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY NOT PRESENTLY INDICATED. SUCH A CHANGE WOULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS EXTENDING FAR BEYOND CUBA. WE KNOW FROM OUR BRIEFINGS THAT GOVERNMENT TOP LEVEL REALIZES POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPMENTS SHIELDED FROM OUR DETECTION ONCE SA-2'S OPERATIVE. SIEE 85-3 STRESSES THAT THERE IS A MIDDLE GROUND IN WHICH DEFENSIVE OR OFFENSIVE CHARACTER OF BUILDUP IS A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION. VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES

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TO

INFO

CITE DIR

36854

EXPLORED. AGAIN WE KNOW AMBIGUITIES OF OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE DISTINCTION
BROUGHT TO TOP LEVEL ATTENTION BEFORE PUBLIC STATEMENTS FORMULATED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION SAME AS REFERENCED CABLE.

McCONE GARTER

**Cable from [redacted] to [redacted] concerning the
Soviet buildup of Cuba.



MARSHALL S. CARTER, A/DCI

RELEASING OFFICER

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RAY S. CLINE, DDI

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H. KNOCHE
O/DCI TS-078
7805
18 SEPTEMBER 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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- 2. S/C 3-4

18 SEP 29 122

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
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PRITY [REDACTED] INFO

CITE DIR 36974

EYES ONLY ^{McCONE} [REDACTED] FROM ^{CARTER} [REDACTED]



3. WE STILL HAVE NO WORD OF ANY WHITE HOUSE DECISION ON DONOVANS MISSION AND CAN ONLY ADVISE YOU AT THIS POINT TO HOLD TO YOUR

PLANNED ITINERARY.
RELEASING OFFICER

~~TOP SECRET~~
COOPERATING OFFICERS
~~TOP SECRET~~

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ORIG W. ELDER
 UNIT O/DCI
 EXT 7805
 DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1962

TS-097

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PAGE 1 OF 7

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TO [REDACTED]
 FROM: DIRECTOR
 CONF: DCI 1-2
 INFO: S/C 3-4

19 SEP 62 23 15z

SIG GEN
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 OUT 78480
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OUT 78430

TO PRITY [REDACTED] INFO
 EYES ONLY [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED]

CITE DIR

37228

McCONE CARTER

I. HERewith CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE APPROVED BY USIB ON 19 SEPTEMBER.

A. WE BELIEVE THAT SOVIET UNION VALUES ITS POSITION IN CUBA PRIMARILY FOR THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES TO BE DERIVED FROM IT, AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA IS TO STRENGTHEN THE COMMUNIST REGIME THERE AGAINST WHAT THE CUBANS AND THE SOVIETS CONCEIVE TO BE A DANGER THAT THE US MAY ATTEMPT BY ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER TO OVERTHROW IT. THE SOVIETS EVIDENTLY HOPE TO DETER ANY SUCH ATTEMPT BY ENHANCING CASTRO'S DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES AND BY THREATENING SOVIET MILITARY RETALIATION. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY EVIDENTLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN OFFENSIVE MILITARY BASE IN CUBA MIGHT PROVOKE US MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THUS DEFEAT THEIR PRESENT PURPOSE.

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B. IN TERMS OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, THE CURRENT SOVIET DELIVERIES ARE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVING AIR DEFENSE AND COASTAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES IN CUBA. THEIR POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SOVIET STATEMENT OF 11 SEPTEMBER, THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE REGARDED AS ENSURING THE CONTINUATION OF THE CASTRO REGIME IN POWER, WITH CONSEQUENT DISCOURAGEMENT TO THE OPPOSITION AT HOME AND IN EXILE. THE THREAT INHERENT IN THESE DEVELOPMENTS IS THAT, TO THE EXTENT THAT THE CASTRO REGIME THEREBY GAINS A SENSE OF SECURITY AT HOME, IT WILL BE EMBOLDENED TO BECOME MORE AGGRESSIVE IN FOMENTING REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA.

C. AS THE BUILDUP CONTINUES, THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE TEMPTED TO ESTABLISH IN CUBA, OTHER WEAPONS REPRESENTED TO BE DEFENSIVE IN PURPOSE, BUT OF A MORE "OFFENSIVE" CHARACTER: E. G., LIGHT BOMBERS, SUBMARINES, AND ADDITIONAL TYPES OF SHORT-RANGE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES. A DECISION TO PROVIDE SUCH WEAPONS

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ROUTINE
CJT 78480

TO INFO -3- CITE DIR 37228

WILL CONTINUE TO DEPEND HEAVILY ON THE SOVIET ESTIMATE AS TO WHETHER THEY COULD BE INTRODUCED WITHOUT PROVOKING A US MILITARY REACTION.

D. THE SOVIET UNION COULD DERIVE CONSIDERABLE MILITARY ADVANTAGE FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES IN CUBA, OR FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVIET SUBMARINE BASE THERE. AS BETWEEN THESE TWO, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUB BASE COULD BE MORE LIKELY. EITHER DEVELOPMENT, HOWEVER, WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH SOVIET PRACTICE TO DATE AND WITH SOVIET POLICY AS WE PRESENTLY ESTIMATE IT. IT WOULD INDICATE A FAR GREATER WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF RISK IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS THAN THE SOVIET UNION HAS DISPLAYED THUS FAR, AND CONSEQUENTLY WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT POLICY IMPLICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO OTHER AREAS AND OTHER PROBLEMS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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E. THE LATIN AMERICAN REACTION WILL BE TO THE EVIDENCE OF AN INCREASED SOVIET COMMITMENT TO CUBA, RATHER THAN TO THE TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARY BUILDUP. MANY LATIN AMERICANS WILL FEAR AND RESENT A SOVIET MILITARY INTRUSION INTO THE HEMISPHERE, BUT WILL REGARD THE PROBLEM AS ONE TO BE MET BY THE US AND NOT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY. WE ESTIMATE THE CHANCES ARE BETTER NOW THAN THEY WERE AT PUNTA DEL ESTE TO OBTAIN 2/3 OAS MAJORITY FOR SANCTIONS AND OTHER STEPS SHORT OF MILITARY ACTION AIMED AT CUBA. IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ESTABLISHING AN "OFFENSIVE" BASE IN CUBA, MOST LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD EXPECT THE US TO ELIMINATE IT, BY WHATEVER MEANS WERE NECESSARY, BUT MANY OF THEM WOULD STILL SEEK TO AVOID DIRECT INVOLVEMENT.

2.

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33. *Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62 "The Military Buildup in Cuba," 19 September 1962 (Excerpt)*

~~SECRET~~

SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 85-3-62

The Military Buildup in Cuba

19 September 1962

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THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

THE PROBLEM

To assess the strategic and political significance of the recent military buildup in Cuba and of the possible future development of additional military capabilities there.

CONCLUSIONS

A. We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it, and consequently that the main purpose of the present military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose. (*Paras. 1-11*)

B. In terms of military significance, the current Soviet deliveries are substantially improving air defense and coastal defense capabilities in Cuba. Their political significance is that, in conjunction with the Soviet statement of 11 September, they are likely to be regarded as ensuring the continuation of the Castro regime in power, with consequent discouragement to the opposition at home and in exile. The threat inherent in these developments is that, to the extent that the Castro regime thereby gains a sense of security at home,

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it will be emboldened to become more aggressive in fomenting revolutionary activity in Latin America. (Paras. 18-21)

C. As the buildup continues, the USSR may be tempted to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive in purpose, but of a more "offensive" character: e.g., light bombers, submarines, and additional types of short-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). A decision to provide such weapons will continue to depend heavily on the Soviet estimate as to whether they could be introduced without provoking a US military reaction. (Paras. 22-28)

D. The USSR could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the establishment of a Soviet submarine base there. As between these two, the establishment of a submarine base would be the more likely. Either development, however, would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far, and consequently would have important policy implications with respect to other areas and other problems in East-West relations. (Paras. 29-33)

E. The Latin American reaction will be to the evidence of an increased Soviet commitment to Cuba, rather than to the technical implications of the military buildup. Many Latin Americans will fear and resent a Soviet military intrusion into the Hemisphere, but will regard the problem as one to be met by the US and not their responsibility. We estimate the chances are better now than they were at Punta del Este to obtain the necessary two-thirds OAS majority for sanctions and other steps short of direct military action aimed at Cuba. If it became clear that the USSR was establishing an "offensive" base in Cuba, most Latin American governments would expect the US to eliminate it, by whatever means were necessary, but many of them would still seek to avoid direct involvement. (Paras. 34-37)

2

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DATE: 20 SEP 62

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: DCI 1-2

INFO: S/C 3-4

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OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN: 25591

CO IN DIR SITE [REDACTED]

EYES ONLY [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED]

CARTER (OUT 78480) * McCONE

1. REF DIR 37228: SUGGEST MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO CONCLUSION

LAST SENTENCE PARAGRAPH D. AS AN ALTERNATIVE I CAN SEE THAT

AN OFFENSIVE SOVIET CUBAN BASE WILL PROVIDE SOVIETS WITH MOST

IMPORTANT AND EFFECTIVE TRADING POSITION IN CONNECTION WITH

ALL OTHER CRITICAL AREAS AND HENCE THEY MIGHT TAKE AN UNEXPECTED

RISK IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH SUCH A POSITION.

DDI

2. [REDACTED]

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downgrading and
declassification

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INFO : _____

PAGE 2

IN 25591

3. FOR BUNDY: WILL LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN PARIS AND HOPE YOUR SCHEDULE WILL PERMIT A VISIT THIS COMING WEEKEND.

4. FOR ELDER: IF YOU FEEL IMPORTANT TO DO SO POUCH SELECTED DOCUMENTS INCLUDING RECENT CUBAN NIE'S, MEMORANDA OF INTER-DEPARTMENTAL MEETINGS, [REDACTED] FOR STUDY EN ROUTE. HOWEVER DO NOT REPEAT NOT DO THIS IF SPECIAL COURIER IS INVOLVED.

5. [REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE

C/S Comments : * The possible establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or the establishment of a Soviet submarine base there would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in U.S. -Soviet relations than the Soviet Union has displayed thus far, and consequently would have important policy implications with respect to other areas and other problems in East-West relations.

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Copy No. _____

TO: E. H. KNOCHE
 FROM: O/D&I
 INFO: 7805
 DATE: 21 SEPT 1962

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ROUTINE

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INITIALS

TO: [REDACTED]
 FROM: DIRECTOR
 INFO: DCI 1-2
 S/C 3-4

(Eyes Only)

OUT 79452

PRITY [REDACTED] INFO [REDACTED] CITE DIR 37809
 EYES ONLY [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED] *HALL* *CARTER*

1. ONE OF OUR BEST SOURCES (A DIPLOMAT IN HAVANA) REPORTS A RESURGENCE SINCE MID-AUGUST OF OLD-LINE COMMUNISTS, ESPECIALLY BLAS ROCA. CASTRO SAID TO BE UNHAPPY OVER DOMINANT ROLE, WITH SOVIET BACKING, THE OLD COMMUNISTS PLAYING ONCE AGAIN. SOURCE REPORTS:

A. IN ECON FIELD (THIS IS THE PRIMARY PRESERVE OF THE CZECHS), BLOC TECHNICIANS WORKING CLOSELY WITH CUBANS AT PLANT AND PRODUCTION LEVELS.

B. AT MINISTRY, POLIT, AND POLICY LEVELS, SOVIETS EXERTING INFLUENCE THRU OLD AND TRUSTED COMRADES (ROCA, RODRIGUEZ, AND PENA).

C. IN MILITARY FIELD, SOVIETS PROVIDING ADVISERS AND CONVENTIONAL EQUIPMENT TO CUBAN ARMY BUT ARE KEEPING

COORDINATING OFFICERS
 RELEASING OFFICERS [REDACTED] AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS [REDACTED]
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K. The Targeting of San Cristobal

40. Although the sites themselves were closed to ground observation; the movement of equipment to them from the ports was in fact seen by CIA agents and by a number of individuals who later fled to the US. The agents reported this information as soon as they were able, but in most cases had to depend on secret writing for communication. Hence, there was a lag of several days at least before their information became available. Refugee reports were delayed considerably longer for other, and uncontrollable, reasons--the time of the individual's decision to leave Cuba, his discovery of means for doing so, and his delivery to an interrogation center. Many of the reports so received dealt with unidentifiable construction activity. Many of them, because of the time-lags noted above, did not arrive in Washington until after 14 October, and some are still coming in.

41. Nevertheless, by about 1 October, the San Cristobal area had been pinpointed as a suspect MRBM site and photographic confirmation had been requested. This represents a considerable technical achievement. To understand why, it is again necessary to back-track in time. Since the moment of Castro's triumphal march into Havana, the Intelligence Community had been flooded with reports of Soviet weapons shipments and missile installations in Cuba. There were several hundred such reports, claiming the presence of everything from small arms to ICBMs, before August 1960, i.e., before the USSR had supplied Cuba with any weapons at all. More specifically, CIA's files contain 211 intelligence reports (this does not include press items) on missile and missile-associated activity in Cuba before 1 Jan 1962. All of these were either totally false or misinterpretations by the observer of other kinds of activity. CIA analysts had naturally come to view all such reports with a high degree of suspicion.

42. On 15 February 1962 an interagency interrogation center was established by CIA at Opa Locka, near Miami, to handle Cuban refugees and improve the quality of intelligence collected from them. It was manned by trained bilingual interrogators from the armed services and CIA. The establishment of Opa Locka coincided with a sharp drop in reports of missile activity received in Washington. When the defensive phase of the Soviet buildup began, the volume of Opa Locka reporting rose very rapidly, and provided good information on the types of equipment coming in, on the use of Soviet personnel and on the security precautions imposed by the Soviets on this operation. (Such reports were the basis for the Checklist item cited in para 9).

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43. For the better part of two years, CIA had been checking information obtained from refugee, defector, and agent sources with NPIC whenever it was apparent that the information was of a kind that could be verified or negated by aerial reconnaissance. In May 1962, NPIC began publishing a series of formal listings (Photographic Evaluation of Information on Cuba) in which these reports were evaluated in the light of photographic coverage. In the 7 issues of this publication between 31 May and 5 October NPIC examined 138 raw reports referred to it for comment. Of this total, only three cited missile activity which could not be linked directly to the SA-2 and cruise missile deployments. NPIC's evidence negated those three.

44. When the first indications of build-up began to come in in August, these procedures were further tightened. CIA current intelligence was ordered orally by the DD/I's office on about 14 August not to publish any information on the construction of missile bases in Cuba until they had been checked out with NPIC. (This instruction was in the field of intelligence technique rather than of policy; it had no relation to later restrictions; (see para 50). Between 14 August and mid-October this office sent NPIC 13 memoranda asking for a check on 25 separate reports containing information which was thought to raise the possibility of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. A great many more such reports were checked with NPIC informally by telephone. In all cases, NPIC either lacked the necessary coverage or made a negative finding.

45. On 20 August, the COMOR Targeting Working Group (chaired and staffed largely by CIA) set up the first comprehensive card file system for Cuban targets. An example of its procedures is the handling of targets in the Sagua La Grande area. Based on refugee reporting, the COMOR Targeting Working Group on 27 August pinpointed four farms in this area as suspect missile sites. Readout of the 29 August coverage showed an SA-2 site near Sagua La Grande which apparently was the basis for the reported activity there, and the target card was changed to show a confirmed SA-2 site. It should be noted that knowledge that this site was in the area could have led analysts to misinterpret any subsequent reports of MRBM activity as part of the SAM development, but in fact no such reports were received.

46. By September, the volume of agent and refugee reporting had become very large indeed. During the month 882 reports on internal activities in Cuba were disseminated, exclusive of telegraphic dissemination. (The CIA clandestine collectors report that their output represented only the small publishable fraction of the raw material collected.) A substantial

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proportion of these dealt with the deployment of defensive missiles and related activities. Knowledge on the part of the analysts that such a deployment was in fact going on, plus the normal difficulties encountered by untrained observers in telling an offensive missile from a defensive one, tended to throw a sort of smoke-screen around the Soviet offensive deployment when it finally began. The CIA analytic apparatus, however, recognized and correlated the first authentic reports of MRBM equipment ever to be received in Washington, and took action upon them. It targeted the San Cristobal area, not as another location where alleged missile activity should be negated by photography, but as a suspect SS-4 site.

47. This process took about three weeks, from the date when the first observation was made on the ground in Cuba to the preparation of the target card. The two reports from Opa Locka which triggered it were:

a. An observation in Havana on 12 September of a convoy carrying long canvas-covered objects which the source identified under interrogation as resembling SS-4s. This report, which was disseminated by CIA on 21 September, contained sufficient accurate detail to alert intelligence analysts.

b. An observation on 17 September of a convoy moving toward the San Cristobal area. This information, received on 27 September, dovetailed in many respects with the earlier report.

48. The arrival of the second report led CIA analysts to a tentative conclusion that the two observers had in fact seen the same convoy, and that there was a possibility of the SS-4 identification being genuine. A day or so earlier, a target card on San Cristobal had been prepared on the basis of a vague report of "Russians building a rocket base." Now this card was removed and, with the two reports cited above and other less specific information on activity in this area which was beginning to trickle in, a new card was prepared between 1 and 3 October which was in effect a priority requirement for photographic coverage. This card was used in the targeting of the 14 October flight (see para 63). It read as follows: "Collateral reports indicate the existence of a restricted area in Pinar del Rio Province which is suspected of including an SSM site under construction, particularly SS-4 Shyster. The area is bounded by a line connecting the following four town: Consolacion del Norte (8332N/2244W); San Diego del Los Banos (8325N/2235W); San Cristobal (8301N/2243W); and Las Pozos (8317N/2250W). Requirement: Search the area delineated for possible surface missile construction, with particular attention to SS-4 Shyster."

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49. Another report, too general to be used in the process described above, is nevertheless of interest as the first good information distributed on the Soviet offensive build-up. On 20 September, CIA disseminated a [REDACTED] report that Castro's personal pilot, Claudio Morinas, had said on 9 September "We have 40-mile range guided missiles, both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air, and we have a radar system which covers, sector by sector, all of the Cuban air space and (beyond) as far as Florida. There are also many mobile ramps for intermediate range rockets!"

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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COUNTRY	CUBA	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/522,702
SUBJECT	RESTRICTED MILITARY AREA IN PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE AND POSSIBLE MISSILE INSTALLATION AT LA GUIRA	DATE DISTR.	18 SEPTEMBER 1962
DATE OF INFO.	7 SEPTEMBER 1962	PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	CUBA (15 SEPTEMBER 1962)	REFERENCES	IN 23874 RD-ACQ-01258
APPRAISAL	PAPA 1: 4; PAPA 2: 3.	FIELD REPORT NO.	
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.			
SOURCE	RESIDENT OF HABANA		

1. A LARGE ZONE IN PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE WITHIN A PERIMETER BOUNDED BY THE CITIES OF SAN CRISTOBAL, SAN DIEGO (DE LOS BANCOS), CONSOLACION DEL NORTE, AND LAS POZAS IS HEAVILY GUARDED BY SOVIETS WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF PERUVIAN AND COLOMBIAN NATIONALS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT GROUND FORCES COULD EFFECTIVELY CONTROL AS ONE COMPLETE AREA A ZONE AS LARGE AS THE ONE CITED ABOVE. THE GRIDS FOR THE ABOVE AREAS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. SAN CRISTOBAL (N 22-43.00, W 83-02.50; AMS E 723, SHEET 3584 II, UTM GRID 17QKR85134).

B. SAN DIEGO / LOS BANCOS (N 22-38.45, W 83-22.15; AMS E 723, SHEET 3583 IV, UTM GRID 17QKR563061).

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STATE/DIR	REPORT/INSTR FOR THIS														

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		PAGE 2

G. CONSOLACION DEL NORTE (N 22-44.55, W 83-33.15; AMS E 723, SHEET 3484 II, UTM 17QKR377177).

D. LAS POZAS (N 22-52.02, W 83-17.58; AMS E 723, SHEET 3584 IV, UTM GRID 17QKR642305).

2. SECURITY IS ENFORCED TO PREVENT ACCESS TO THE FINCA OF DR. CORTINA, AT LA GUIRA, WHERE VERY SECRET AND IMPORTANT WORK IS IN PROGRESS, BELIEVED TO BE CONCERNED WITH MISSILES. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE FINCA BELONGING TO DR. CORTINA AT LA GUIRA IS PROBABLY THE CORTINA FINCA AT N 22-37.05, W 83-24.20; AMS E 723, SHEET 3583 IV, UTM GRID 17QKR527049. LA GUIRA IS AT N 22-37.56, W 83-24.00; AMS E 723, SHEET 3583 IV, UTM GRID 17QKR533046.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	Possible Missile Site in Havana	DATE DISTR.	27 Sep 62
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	[REDACTED]

DATE OF INFO. To 12 Sep 62
 PLACE & DATE ACQ. Havana/12 Sep 62

HED
 9:20 (SE)
 1 PM

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, [REDACTED]

1. After dark on 12 Sep 62, I was driving east on Avenida 23, Marianao, Havana, when I observed and counted 20 Soviet trucks towing 20 long trailers going west on Avenida 23. The truck convoy was preceded by a jeep containing militiamen. The trucks were driven by Soviets in civilian clothes -- short-sleeved shirts in various colors.
2. As the truck convoy neared its destination at Campo Libertad, the militia jeep was waved off, and the Soviet trucks and trailers proceeded into Campo Libertad.
3. The trucks appeared to be the 6x6, ZIL-157, canvas-covered. [Source described these and later identified them from photographs [REDACTED] In the banks of the trucks could be seen sealed black boxes or cases of various sizes. I do not know what these boxes contained.
4. The trailers, the longest I have ever seen in Cuba, were two-axle, four-wheeled. They were about 65 to 70 feet in length and about eight feet in width.
5. I believe the transport trailers were carrying large missiles, so long that the tail end extended over the end of the trailer. I would guess that the missiles were a few feet longer than the trailers. The missiles were covered with wool and canvas. From the tail end of the missile it looked as if the bottom and two sides of the missile had a wooden frame, and the entire missile was canvas-covered. It looked as if the tail end of the canvas silhouetted the two top fins of the four fins of the missile. The top of the canvas-covered missile was taller than the top of the truck towing it. I am not positive that the trailer was carrying

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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-2-

a missile, but it surely looked that way. [Source described, then drew rough sketches of, the missile silhouette and tail fin silhouette; later, from photographs, he identified Guided Missile, Surface-to-Surface, SS-4 "Soyuz," ~~_____~~]

6/ I do not know where the truck convoy originated. ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ told me that Soviet cargo ships, names unknown, had docked at the Flota Blanca piers around 10 or 11 Sep 62. He told me that all Cuban dock-workers and other Cubans who worked in that area were forbidden to be in the area during the unloading of the ships and that the unloading was handled only by Sovbloc personnel. He said the cargo unloaded at the Flota Blanca docks consisted of missiles. I do not know where he got his information, but he is usually pretty reliable. ~~_____~~

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INFORMATION REPORT		INFORMATION REPORT	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY			
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CONFIDENTIAL			
COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	Soviet and Rebel Army Convoy	DATE DISTR.	1 Oct 62
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	[REDACTED]
DATE OF INFO.	17 Sep 62		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	[REDACTED]		[REDACTED] <i>9/21/62</i> <i>1:00</i>
THIS IS UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION			
SOURCE	Cuban national, A 12 853 974, 47 years old.		
	[REDACTED] traveled on business throughout the island a great deal. Four years of schooling, average intelligence.		
	[REDACTED]		
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. On 17 Sep 62, about 2100 hours, while traveling by automobile from Havana toward my home in [REDACTED] Pinar del Rio, I observed a convoy of 10 motorcycles, 16 trucks, and eight trailers proceeding southwest on the Central Highway toward Pinar del Rio. Since I was traveling in the same direction as the convoy, I passed what were the last units of the convoy at the entrance to Guanajay, Havana [Grid coord 270360, Sheet 3500 I, Series BT23], and then passed the leading element of the convoy immediately after Artanico, Pinar del Rio [Grid coord 192235, Sheet 3500 III, Series BT23]. Although the vehicles were scattered over a distance, in my opinion they were all part of the same convoy. 2. The leading element of the convoy was five motorcycles driven by unarmed Rebel Army soldiers whose function appeared to be clearing the civilian traffic ahead. The motorcycles were followed by six M2-502 trucks, each carrying about 30 Rebel Army soldiers armed with 9 mm submachine guns M-25 and rifles. Since it was dark, I could not see who the drivers of the trucks were. 3. The trucks were followed by eight Soviet-built flatbed-type trailers approximately 32 feet long, seven of which were carrying what looked like huge tubes extending over the entire length of the flatbed and completely covered with canvas. I could not distinguish what the eighth trailer was carrying since it was completely covered with canvas. However, I did notice what looked like large metal prongs sticking out from under the canvas at the rear of the trailer. Although I don't know too much about it, it looked like a piece of radar equipment. 4. The trailers were followed by six M2-502 trucks, each carrying about 30 Rebel Army soldiers, also armed with rifles and 9 mm submachine guns M-25. The trucks were in turn followed by five motorcycles driven by unarmed Rebel Army soldiers. Because of darkness and rain I could not distinguish who the drivers of any of the vehicles in the convoy were. 		
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	Collector's Note:	[REDACTED]	
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<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block; font-size: x-small;"> GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification </div>			
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INFORMATION REPORT		INFORMATION REPORT	

41. McCone, "Memorandum of MONGOOSE Meeting Held on Thursday, October 4, 1962"

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won't know what Ref. 5.

October 4, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF MONGOOSE MEETING HELD ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1962.

Chaired by the Attorney General.

Attended by: Gilpatric, Johnson, General Taylor, General Carter, McCone, Scoville, General Lansdale and Colonel Steakley (part of the time).

The Attorney General reported on discussions with the President on Cuba; dissatisfied with lack of action in the sabotage field, went on to stress that nothing was moving forward, commented that one effort attempted had failed, expressed general concern over developing situation.

General Lansdale reviewed operations, pointing out that no sabotage had been attempted and gave general impression that things were all right.

McCone then stated that phase one was principally intelligence gathering, organizing and training, that no sabotage was authorized, that one operation against a powerhouse had been contemplated but was discouraged by group, that he had called a meeting to review matters this morning and that he had observed a lack of forward motion due principally to "hesitancy" in government circles to engage in any activities which would involve attribution to the United States.

AG took sharp exception stating the Special Group had not withheld approval on any specified actions to his knowledge, but to the contrary had urged and insisted upon action by the Lansdale operating organization.

There followed a sharp exchange which finally was clarifying inasmuch as it resulted in a reaffirmation of a determination to move forward. In effect it seemed to be the consensus that phase two

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~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

as approved on September 6, was now outmoded, that more dynamic action was indicated, that hesitancy about overflights must be re-considered (this to be commented on later in this memorandum), that actions which could be attributed to indigenous Cubans would not be important or very effective, and that a very considerable amount of attribution and "noise" must be expected.

As a result, General Lansdale was instructed to give consideration to new and more dynamic approaches, the specific items of sabotage should be brought forward immediately and new ones conceived, that a plan for mining harbors should be developed and presented, and the possibility of capturing Castro forces for interrogation should be studied.

With respect to overflights, [REDACTED] were instructed to prepare and present to the Special Group on next Tuesday at a special meeting alternate recommendations for overflights. These to include the use of U-2s on complete sweeps (as contrasted with peripheral or limited missions), the use of firefly drones, the use of 101s or other reconnaissance planes on x low level, intermediate level, and high level missions, and other possible reconnaissance operations.

Consideration was given to stating publicly that we propose to overfly Cuba in the interest of our own security and the security of the Western Hemisphere, and then to proceed even though doing so involved risk.

It was the consensus that we could not accept restrictions which would foreclose gaining all reasonable knowledge of military installations in Cuba.

During the meeting McCone reviewed the earlier meeting with General Lansdale, and pointed out to the group that this meeting clarified General Lansdale's authority over the entire MONGOOSE operation and that the CIA organization was responsive to his policy and operational guidance, and this was thoroughly understood.

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~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

41. (Continued)

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

Consideration was given to the existing guidelines and it was the consensus that the August 1st guidelines for phase two were inadequate and new guidelines must be considered.

John A. McCone
Director

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132 #97

Memorandum of Discussion with Mr. McGeorge Bundy Friday, October 5, 1962, 5:15 p.m.

1. McCone reviewed details of the Donovan negotiations, discussions with the President, Attorney General, Eisenhower, the decisions not to approach Congressional leadership, the discussion with Senator Javits, and the final report from Donovan. Bundy expressed general agreement.

2. At the October 4th meeting of the Special Group Mongoose was discussed in some detail as was the meeting with Carter, Lansdale, et al in DCI's office on that day. McCone stated there was a feeling in CIA and Defense that the "activist policy" which founded the Mongoose operation was gone and that while no specific operational activities had been (refused) the amount of "noise" from minor incidents such as the sugar, the students firing on the Havana Hotel and other matters and the extreme caution expressed by State had led to this conclusion. More importantly, however, the decisions to restrict U-2 flights had placed the United States Intelligence Community in a position where it could not report with assurance the development of offensive capabilities in Cuba. McCone stated he felt it most probable that Soviet-Castro operations would end up with an established offensive capability in Cuba including MRBMs. McCone stated he thought this a probability rather than a mere possibility. Bundy took issue stating that he felt the Soviets would not go that far, that he was satisfied that no offensive capability would be installed in Cuba because of its world-wide effects and therefore seemed relaxed over the fact that the Intelligence Community cannot produce hard information on this important subject. McCone said that Bundy's viewpoint was reflected by many in the Intelligence Community, perhaps a majority, but he just did not agree and furthermore did not think the United States could afford to take such a risk.

3. Bundy then philosophized on Cuba stating that he felt that our policy was not clear, our objectives not determined and therefore our efforts were not productive. He discussed both the Mongoose operations and the Rostow "Track Two". Bundy was not critical of either or of the Lansdale operations. It was obvious that he was not in sympathy with a more active role such as those discussed at 5412 on Thursday as he felt none of them would bring Castro down nor would they particularly enhance U. S. position of world leadership. Bundy seemed inclined to support the Track Two idea and also inclined (though he was not specific) to play down the more active Lansdale

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operation. Bundy had not talked to Lansdale but obviously had received some of the "static" that is being passed around in Washington. (Before) McCone in reporting on the discussions at Thursday's 5412 meeting repeated the views of the President and expressed by the Attorney General it was agreed that the whole Government policy with reference to Cuba must be resolved promptly as basic to further actions on our part. In general, Bundy's views were that we should either make a judgment that we would have to go in militarily (which seemed to him intolerable) or alternatively we would have to learn to live with Castro, and his Cuba and adjust our policies accordingly.

4. McCone then elaborated on his views of the evolution of Soviet-Castro military capability stating he felt defense was just phase one, phase two would be followed by various offensive capabilities and indeed the existing defensive capabilities such as the (MIG) 21s a very definite offensive capability against nearby American cities and installations. McCone stated that he thought that the establishment of a very expensive^o offensive mechanism could not be the ultimate objective of the Soviets or Castro and therefore the objective was (a) to establish an offensive base or (b) to insert sufficient Soviet specialists and military leaders to take Cuba away from Castro and establish it as a true Soviet controlled satellite. McCone stated that he felt there were only two courses open -- one was to take military action at the appropriate time or secondly to pursue an effort to split Castro off from the Communists and for this reason he, McCone, had vigorously supported the Donovan mission as it is the only link that we have to the Castro hierarchy at the present time. Note in this connection it might be well to study the evolution of the Toure experience in Guinea when the Communists moved in and captured all elements of the Government and economy and forced Toure to expel the Ambassador and try to rectify the situation. There may be a parallel here.

5. McCone reviewed the Eisenhower discussions. Bundy read the memorandum covering these discussions. Bundy stated that Adenauer did not express the concern of the U. S. policy reflected by Eisenhower and reported in the memorandum.

6. Bundy rejected the idea of regular NSC meetings stating that every President has to organize his Government as he desires and that the Eisenhower pattern was not necessarily adaptable to the Kennedy type of administration. McCone stated that if this is the case he intended to request

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occasional NSC meetings to review specific estimates or other intelligence situations and the next one would be a report and discussion of the estimate of Soviet air defense capabilities. Bundy agreed.

7. Bundy rejected the idea (calling) the several Special Groups 5412, CIA, Mongoose, and North Vietnam together feeling it was better to keep them separated. He also rejected the idea that the visiting commissions such as the Byroade Team and the Draper Team should report back to the Special Group (CI) feeling it was appropriate that they report to the President, (through) the Secretary of State, with consultation with the Special Group (CI). It was agreed that we would have a further discussion over the weekend.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

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43. Sherman Kent, Memorandum for the Director, "Implications of an Announcement by the President that the US would Conduct Overhead Reconnaissance of Cuba . . ." 8 October 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Deutchman

8 October 1962

SECRET

Daly
BY DCI

Executive Registry
80,62-2056

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Implications of an Announcement by the President that the US would Conduct Overhead Reconnaissance of Cuba, and of the Actual Reconnaissance Thereafter

NOTE: The following are the conclusions reached by a panel of members of the Board of National Estimates and of the ONE Staff

1. The President's announcement would be vigorously condemned by the Soviets and the Cubans as evincing an intention to commit acts of international aggression.
2. The weight of publicly expressed opinion in the free world would probably condemn the announcement as threatening a marked increase in international tensions. Many Latin Americans would probably look upon it as incompatible with the principle of non-intervention. On the other hand,

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those few which desire the US to take decisive action against Cuba would probably consider the announcement as a disappointingly weak manifestation.

3. The Cubans, or some other country, would probably bring the matter before the UN shortly after the announcement. (They would be virtually certain to do so if a reconnaissance vehicle were shot down.) Having international law on their side, they would hope to achieve a UN condemnation of the US for acts threatening peace. The UN situation would be complicated, and it is possible that in one way or another the US could avert a formal resolution. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that the US would find much support among the assembled nations. It might find itself, for the first time, in virtual isolation.

4. The Soviets and the Cubans would probably be impressed by the evident willingness of the US government to raise still further the level of tension over Cuba, and to commit itself to further risks. We do not believe, however,

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that this would lead to any change in Soviet policy toward Cuba. The USSR would not consider that the US announcement created such a dangerous situation as to require it to reduce its support of Castro. Moreover, it would judge that, in political terms, it could ill afford to make any reduction at such a time. On the other hand, we do not believe that the announcement, or succeeding overflights, would cause the USSR to alter its Cuban policy in a direction which increased the provocation offered to the US, e.g., the provision of medium-range missile bases. In reacting publicly, the Soviets would probably reaffirm their commitment to Cuba's defense, though they would probably not make the commitment more specific or binding.

5. We think it unlikely that the Soviets would retaliate directly with any major moves against the Western position in Berlin. In confronting the Allies with local crises which raise the level of risk in Berlin, they generally prefer to choose a time when US opinion is not highly agitated over other East-West issues. While the announcement would


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create new strains in Soviet-American relations, this effect would not be so strong or so long-lasting as to influence basic Soviet choices with respect to Berlin.

6. The Soviets and Cubans would make every effort to shoot down any reconnaissance vehicle that came over Cuba. If they succeeded in doing so, the tensions would be somewhat increased, though the international political effects of the shootdown would not in themselves be as great as if it had occurred without the prior Presidential announcement. The demonstration of military capability which such an incident would provide would almost certainly impress many Latin Americans.



SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
Board of National Estimates

- 4 -

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11/2 #98

October 11, 1962

MEMORANDUM ON DONOVAN PROJECT

Immediately after my discussion with the Cannon Committee (including Taber, Ford and Mahon), I went to the White House and explained to the President and McGeorge Bundy the positions taken by Ford and Mahon, as covered in separate memorandum prepared by Mr. Warner. The President made the judgment that we should proceed with the negotiations, recognizing there would be some political consequences and criticisms, but he, the President, was willing to accept this as a fact.

I then showed the President photographs of the crates which presumably would carry, or were carrying, IL 28s, Soviet medium bombers, and were deck loaded on a ship which had arrived in Havana in the early days of October. The President requested that such information be withheld at least until after elections as if the information got into the press, a new and more violent Cuban issue would be injected into the campaign and this would seriously affect his independence of action.

McCone stated that these particular photographs could not be restricted as they had been disseminated to the Intelligence Community and several joint and specified commands, such as CINCLANT, SAC, NORAD, and others and would be reported in the CIA Bulletin on Thursday morning. The President then requested that the report be worded to indicate a probability rather than an actuality because in the final analysis we only saw crates, not the bombers themselves. DCI agreed. The President further requested that all future information be suppressed. DCI stated that this was extremely dangerous.

It was then agreed that future information would be disseminated to members of USIB, with appropriate instructions that only those responsible for giving the President advice be given the information.

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Furthermore, that within CIA circles a minimum number of experts be informed. McCone stated there was no problem in CIA, that it was secure. It was therefore agreed that the USIB members would be instructed to restrict the information to their personal offices and fully and currently inform the Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman, the Service Secretaries and the Secretary of Defense. Similar restrictive action would be taken in State. Therefore all those involved in "giving advice to the President" would be fully informed. However operational divisions and the joint and specified commands would not be informed at this time, except at the direction of the above people who are receiving the information.

At this point the President mentioned that "we'll have to do something drastic about Cuba" and I am anxiously looking forward to the JCS operational plan which is to be presented to me next week.

McCone effected the above instructions by calling Mr. Cline, who was unavailable, and then Mr. Sheldon who agreed to prepare a procedure for review on Thursday morning.

McCone then called the Attorney General and advised him of his talk with the Cannon Committee. The Attorney General had no particular comment.

At six o'clock McCone received a report from Houston that Donovan had gone into a meeting at five o'clock. At eleven o'clock Houston reported the meeting was still in progress. At seven o'clock on Thursday morning Donovan still had no report.

At 11:15 General Eisenhower called McCone stating he was sorry a meeting could not be arranged, he was leaving very early the following morning for Gettysburg. McCone reported that negotiations were in progress and he also reported objections stated by several members of Congress. Eisenhower advised that the negotiations be pursued, indicating his support of it and furthermore stated that if the negotiations were satisfactorily concluded the complaints and objections would, in his words, disappear.

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McCone told General Eisenhower there were some defensible evidences of shipments of twin-engined light jet bombers. Eisenhower responded the situation must be watched very carefully. Positive action might be indicated and then he said there had been two instances where action was warranted but had not been taken. Eisenhower did not elaborate; however, I know from previous discussions he feels that when Castro embraced Communism publicly and announced publicly his allegiance to Moscow, we had then a reason to act militarily and if we had chosen to so act, such action would have been defensible.

On Thursday morning McCone reported by telephone to Mr. Kennedy, reviewing the Eisenhower discussion and stating that he, McCone, was concerned over Donovan's safety in view of the rash of publicity, most particularly the Herald Tribune article, and that he had instructed that contact be made with Donovan and that if things were not proceeding satisfactorily and a conclusion to the negotiations along the lines agreed in sight, then Donovan should come out. The Attorney General stated that he had no concern over Donovan's personal safety, that "they will not do anything to him". McCone stated he was not so sure and that he therefore concluded to bring Donovan out unless things were going well.

With reference to the political implications, McCone recalled that he had told the President and the AG that he would take all, or his full share of responsibility, that he wished the AG to bear this in mind as the position taken in this respect by Mr. McCone in the first conversation after his return from Europe still stood. AG expressed appreciation for this statement.

John A. McCone
Director

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27 February 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through
14 October 1962

The August 29th flight flew over most of the island and photographed much of it. The photography revealed that eight SAM sites were under construction in the western half of the island. The flight also discovered an installation at Banes in the eastern end of the island that was not familiar to the photo interpreters. Subsequent research by the interpreters, comparing the August 29th photography with that of two similar installations recently noted elsewhere, had by September 14th enabled them to identify the installation as a cruise missile site.

The finding of SA-2's in Cuba on the August 29th flight presented us with a new problem in planning U-2 flights over Cuba.

Today, there is general acceptance of the fact that we are carrying out overhead reconnaissance of Cuba and that we will continue to do so as long as our national security requires it. This almost universal approval of U-2 flights over Cuba is an attitude that has existed only since the middle of last October. Prior to the finding of offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba, quite a different public attitude existed.

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In planning for any U-2 operations over well-defended, denied territory we were always aware of criticism that attended the U-2 incident over the USSR in May of 1960. The two incidents involving the straying of a U-2 over Sakhalin on August 30th and the loss of a Chinese Nationalist U-2 over the China mainland on September 8th served to sharpen the already existing apprehensions.

Within the intelligence community there was always at the backs of our minds the knowledge that in the event of a mishap we would have to be able to explain, convincingly and in detail, the justification--in terms of the highest priority intelligence needs--for having undertaken the mission.

Elsewhere in Government and among persons whose stated views strongly influence public opinion there were serious reservations regarding the use of the U-2. There were expressions of extreme concern from some public leaders over the increase in tension that might result from overflights, and others voiced the opinion that such flights were illegal or immoral. Although many public figures conceded the necessity of the United States securing intelligence by whatever means required, they were quick to caution that the use of the U-2 was quite a different matter from the classical use of spies and agents.

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The vulnerability of the U-2 to Soviet SA-2 systems and the discovery of those systems in Cuba contributed further complicating factors in weighing risks against the need for hard intelligence.

The situation as of September 1962 must be viewed against this background of universal repugnance, or, at the very least, extreme uneasiness regarding overflights.

Because of the widespread apprehension over use of the U-2, we took particular care to ensure that each flight produced the maximum of information of value to the entire intelligence community. Each track was drawn to cover high priority targets agreed upon by an inter-agency group known as the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, a committee of the United States Intelligence Board.

We were also concerned with the conservation of the asset. The U-2 is not a sturdily-built aircraft. It is designed for one purpose--long flights at very high altitudes and at relatively low speeds. We had very few of these planes. Therefore, before we committed one to a mission we wanted to be absolutely certain that the intelligence need was great enough to justify the risk of loss of the pilot and aircraft. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance was the intelligence community's vehicle for making the target studies.

All CIA overflights were programmed through the medium of the CIA Monthly Forecast. At the time the Soviet arms build-up

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began in Cuba, flights over Cuba were being forecast and flown at the rate of two per month.

Because of the need to husband our resources and to ensure that highest quality photography was obtained from each U-2 flight, it was the practice not to launch a mission unless weather over most of the critical targets was predicted to be less than 25 per cent overcast.

After reviewing the result of the August 29th mission, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, in undeniably good judgment, recommended that the next mission should cover those areas of the island which were not photographed on the August 29th flight and that particular attention should be paid to the then unidentified site at Banas. It was important to learn whether the Soviets had made a limited deployment of SA-2's to Cuba or whether an island-wide defense was being built.

The next mission was successfully flown on schedule on September 5th over the eastern and central portions of the island. Three additional SAM sites were detected in the central portion of the island. Unfortunately, the flight encountered heavy cloud cover over eastern Cuba.

Late in August, Mr. McCone suggested to General Carter, who was acting as DCI during Mr. McCone's absence, that low-level

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reconnaissance of Cuba be proposed. General Carter requested the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance to consider the kind of information that could be obtained thus. The Committee met on September first and third and reported its views on what might be accomplished through low-level flights.

As a result of the Committee's deliberations and because of the heavy cloud cover encountered over eastern Cuba on the September 5th mission, General Carter, on September 10th, 1962, addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense recommending that the Secretary initiate the necessary action to provide for employment of tactical-type reconnaissance against Banes, which was still unidentified, or other targets identified by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance as being suitable for low-level reconnaissance. The Secretary of Defense felt it preferable not to mount a low-level reconnaissance of Banes until the results of CIA high-level reconnaissance became available. As noted in the first paragraph, continuing research had by September 14th identified the Banes installation as a cruise missile site.

Now, let us return to the matter of the September U-2 flights. One mission had already been flown on September 5th. One flight remained yet to be flown in September. A special meeting was held on September 10th to consider the specific track for that second flight.

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General Carter presented a CIA proposal for a single high-level flight designed specifically to photograph the Banes area, where earlier photography had not been conclusive, and generally to search for SAM sites in those areas of central and eastern Cuba that had not been covered since the September 5th flight.

This meeting followed closely on the heels of the two U-2 incidents previously mentioned: the straying of a U-2 over Sakhalin on August 30th and the loss of a Chinese Nationalist U-2 over the China mainland on September 8th.

The Secretary of State expressed concern at CIA's planned coverage of Cuba, involving extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space, all in one flight. He said that he had no objection to the peripheral parts and, in fact, thought it useful to continue to establish our right to fly over international waters. On the other hand, he recognized the necessity of obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba. He felt, however, that it was unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flight would draw undue attention to the mission and further that should the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred, this would put the United States in a very poor position for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.

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Taking these views into account the plan was changed and four flights were substituted for the one. Two flights were to be wholly peripheral, involving no land overflight. One was to cover the Isle of Pines, and the other was to overfly the eastern end of the island targeted against Banes and Guantanamo.

There was a three-week period from the 5th to the 26th of September during which only one flight was flown (on September 17th), and it yielded no useable photography. We finally acquired a moderately complete mosaic of the SA-2 defense of Cuba by piece-meal photography search carried out in late September and early October. The delay in completing the photographic coverage was due solely to the unfavorable weather predicted during this period.

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Much of Cuba was under heavy cloud cover throughout most of September, and the cloud patterns were rapidly and continually changing. The few periods of acceptable weather were so fleeting that they had passed before flights could be mounted.

The weather was checked for a possible mission every day beginning on September 6th. There was a one- or two- day period around the middle of the month when the forecasts were moderately favorable. A flight to the northeast was scheduled for the 16th. It went to the final briefing on the 15th, but was delayed for 24 hours because of weather and was cancelled when the weather continued unfavorable. Planning for a flight over the Isle of Pines was under way on September 15th. At the final briefing on the 16th, the forecast remained favorable. The mission was flown on September 17th, but by then the weather had turned sour and no useable photography was acquired.

Another mission was under consideration between September 18th and 21st, but the weather was bad and the mission was cancelled.

The mission to cover the Guantanamo and Banes areas was under consideration beginning 22 September. It went to alert daily, but weather was not acceptable until the 26th. On that date the mission was successfully flown and three SAM sites were discovered. This was the first of the four flights agreed upon on September 10th, and

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it was the first day on which weather permitted a successful flight.

One of the four tracks was originally approved to cover only the Isle of Pines. Mr. McCone called Mr. U. Alexis Johnson on September 28th and got approval to include coverage of the Bay of Pigs area. The flight was successfully flown on September 29th. The SAM and the cruise missile sites at Siguanea on the Isle of Pines were discovered.

Two of the three remaining missions for September were considered during the period September 29th through October 2nd. Both were cancelled because of bad weather.

The next flight under consideration was that along the periphery of the southeastern coast. It was delayed because of weather on October 3rd. It was briefed on October 4th and successfully flew the mission on the 5th. One additional SAM site was discovered.

There was good weather along the northeastern coast on October 6th. A flight was launched but it aborted because of aircraft fuel problems.

The flight along the northeastern coast was successfully flown the next day, October 7th. Four more SAM sites were discovered.

The mission of October 7th completed the September flight program.

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As the September overflight program progressed, identifying additional SAM sites, it became apparent that an island-wide SA-2 defense was being constructed. The next step was to discover how far advanced the earlier SAM sites were. This information could be obtained only by taking the risk of overflying an SA-2 site that might be operational.

At an interdepartmental group meeting on October 4th, the DCI made a strong representation for extensive overflights of Cuba. The group requested [REDACTED] JCS, and CIA to examine all alternative means of conducting aerial reconnaissance and to report back as soon as possible. A meeting was called on October 9th to hear this report, and at this meeting the flight was planned which was actually flown on the 14th of October.

Additionally, from September 18th through October 2nd, agent and refugee reports dovetailed sufficiently to create a suspicion that there was something of unusual importance going on in a definite area west of Havana and that this unusual activity might be concerned with MRBM's. These reports, however, were not of sufficient credibility to warrant their being used in intelligence publications. Accordingly, the track of the flight planned at the October 9th meeting to test the operational readiness of the known SAM sites was drawn to cover the area in which MRBM's were suspected.

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The weather was checked daily on October 10th, 11th and 12th, but the forecasts were unfavorable. On October 12th, operational control of U-2 overflights of Cuba was transferred to the Strategic Air Command of the U.S. Air Force. The weather forecast continued unfavorable on October 13th. The mission was successfully flown by SAC on October 14th over the suspect area west of Havana and near the SAM site thought most likely to be operational. The flight was the first to discover the presence of MRBM's.

As of October 16th, blanket authority was given for unrestricted overflights of Cuba.

Attached at Tab A is a summary of weather forecasts and the status of missions, 5 September through 14 October 1962.

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