Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf—December 2021

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake*

CURRENT ISSUES

The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia**,** by Ian Easton

GENERAL

Spy Sites of Philadelphia: A Guide to the Region's Secret History**,** Second Edition, by H. Keith Melton, Robert Wallace with Henry R. Schlesinger

HISTORICAL

The Anatomy of a Spy: A History of Espionage and Betrayal**,** by Michael Smith

Double Crossed: The Missionaries Who Spied for the United States During the Second World War**,** by Matthew Avery Sutton

Ian Fleming's Inspiration: The Truth Behind the Books, by Edward Abel Smith

Nixon's FBI: Hoover, Watergate, and a Bureau in Crisis**,** by Melissa Graves

No Moon As Witness: Missions of the SOE and OSS in World War II**,** by James Stejskal

The Secret History of STASI Spy Cameras 1950–1990**,** by H. Keith Melton, Detlev Vreisleben, and Michael Hasco

Spy Swap: The Humiliation of Russia's Intelligence Services**,** by Nigel West

The Spy Who Was Left Out in the Cold***: The Secret History of Agent Goleniewski,*** by Tim Tate and *The Spy Who Would Be Tsar: The Mystery of Michal Goleniewski and the Far-Right Underground*, by Kevin Coogan

FICTION

Geiger**,** by Gustaf Skördeman

❖ ❖ ❖

* Unless otherwise noted at the end of a review, all have been written by Hayden Peake.

Current Issues

The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia by Ian Easton, (Eastbridge Books, 2019), 383 pages, map, bibliography.

The author, who has extensive background in Asian defense matters, has produced a remarkably cogent, richly researched, and highly readable study of potential invasion of Taiwan by the People's Republic of China. Using largely open-source materials from the PRC and Taiwan, he has graphically outlined the planning, preparation, and execution scenarios of both protagonists.

For the practitioners of the arcane, complex, and often overlooked science of operational war planning, this book is essential reading since it lays out in detail the myriad considerations needed to formulate both offensive and defensive war plans in regard to Taiwan. Easton provides everything—from seasonal and maritime weather conditions and potential landing areas to key inland terrain features and timelines for unit embarkation locations and transit times. The author even identifies the likely PLA units for the invasion and how and where they might be employed, as well as the forces on Taiwan that would respond. The book examines how the PLA might conduct an invasion, the various and significant problems it would have to overcome to have a reasonable chance for success, and how a land campaign might be fought once the PLA had successfully landed its forces ashore.

Of significant importance to the United States, the book provides information on the key indicators for an invasion and how these indicators would provide both the United States and Taiwan with at least 30 days, and more likely 60 days, of warning, which means the PLA could not achieve strategic surprise. The book also clearly shows that Taiwan has a detailed understanding of how the PLA might attempt an amphibious invasion and the most likely targets for PLA forces both before and after a landing is attempted. This clarity facilitates Taiwan's defense.

In the final chapter, the author provides a rather low-cost solution to Taiwan's defense, one that would provide a menu of options that might preclude the need for US active engagement in Taiwan's defense. Most of these actions involve US intelligence and surveillance, as well as the sale of critical US military equipment. Many readers will probably disagree with some of Easton's solutions, but they will find ample food for thought on how best to deter a PRC invasion of Taiwan.

The reviewer: Col. Andrew R. Finlayson, USMC (Ret.). As a Marine officer he led a Provincial Reconnaissance Unit as part of the Phoenix Program in Vietnam during 1969–70. See *Studies in Intelligence* 51, no. 2 (June 2007).

General

Spy Sites of Philadelphia: A Guide to the Region's Secret History, Second Edition, by H. Keith Melton, Robert Wallace with Henry R. Schlesinger. (Georgetown University Press, 2021) 259 pages, bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

With 118 additional pages, more photos, new material in many entries, and a different publisher, this edition of *Spy Sites of Philadelphia* is a great improvement over its predecessor published in 2013 by the mysterious Foreign Excellent Trenchcoat Society.

Some of the new entries are significant for multiple reasons. For example, Quartermaster General (there was no G-2 in those days) Thomas Mifflin, was appointed by George Washington to oversee the creation of stay-behind networks of agents when the Yanks had to evacuate Philadelphia. He would go on to sign the Constitution and become the first governor of Pennsylvania.

The case of sculptress Patricia Wright is of interest for different reasons. She had contacts with Hercules Mulligan the New York City tailor and Continental Army agent recommended by Alexander Hamilton. With the

help of Benjamin Franklin, she left her Philadelphia home and moved to London where she spied for Washington.

Turning to the Civil War era, *Spy Sites of Philadelphia* documents the 1860 test-flight from Philadelphia of balloonist Thaddeus Lowe. He would go on to observe and telegraph Civil War battlefields from the air for the Union army.

Another example concerns Philadelphia bar owner, distiller, and supporter of Irish independence, Joseph McGarrity. The Germans tried to recruit him during WWI to sabotage British shipping, among other targets. *Spy Sites of Philadelphia* tells how it turned out.

More recently, Philadelphia was the boyhood home of Samuel Cummings, who the authors call "the cheerful merchant of death." Cummings joined CIA in 1950 and later became a successful arms dealer with a warehouse in Alexandria, Virginia, which was only recently demolished.

The appendices provide maps of Philadelphia that indicate where the sites discussed are located.

For those interested in Philadelphia espionage history, *Spy Sites of Philadelphia* is a real treasure.

Historical

The Anatomy of a Spy: A History of Espionage and Betrayal, by Michael Smith. (Arcade Publishing, 2020) 326 pages, chapter endnotes, glossary, index.

The primary title of this book is suggestive of a biological investigation of a particular spy. But that is not what the book is about, as the first chapter quickly makes clear by its attention to motivations for spying. Although intelligence services have staff psychologists to help deal with that topic, *The Anatomy of a Spy* takes a more practical, intuitive approach.

Author Michael Smith has written several books on intelligence, including a history of MI6. *Anatomy of a Spy* draws on his writings, his service in British military intelligence, and interviews with intelligence officers in various services. He begins by raising some fundamental questions that influence all agent–case officer relationships: Why are agents prepared to put their lives and their loved ones at risk in order to collect intelligence, often for a country to which they have no natural allegiance? How do intelligence services induce ordinary men and women to spy for them? How do they ensure agents will do what is asked and not betray their handlers? (8) Then he identifies motivations that experience has shown can help answer these questions: sexual relationships, money, patriotism, adventurers (fantasists and psychopaths), revenge, the right thing to do, and the unwitting agent. *Anatomy of a Spy* devotes a chapter to each topic.

While many of the examples given in each chapter are well known, Smith does include some that are not mentioned frequently. For example Paul Fidrmuc (Ostro), the WWII Double Cross agent, whom he places in the adventurer-fantasist category. Unlike the respected Garbo, who created fantasy agents for a good purpose, Fidrmuc, according to Smith, "was completely unscrupulous." (145) His case is one of many that support Smith's contention that more that one motivation can be involved in a case, successively or simultaneously. The Ames and Hanssen cases are given as examples of the latter.

The lack of source notes is a bit of a problem. While a list of sources is provided at the end of each chapter, they are not cross-referenced to the text, making if unclear which statement or statements they support. For example, Smith quotes Ames as telling the BBC that he "discovered" that Oleg Gordievsky was the KGB source of material provided by MI6 to the CIA. The presumption is that he is the one who also alerted the KGB, which then recalled Gordievsky to Moscow. A specific source in these instances would have been helpful.

Smith places Edward Snowden in the "unwitting agents" category because it remains unclear, at least to some, that he knew the SVR and the Chinese would acquire his stolen secrets. Kim Philby also plays a role in the category because he sent unwitting agents to their deaths from Turkey.

The Anatomy Of A Spy concludes there is no single motivation that answers the question, why do spies spy, and

"no single reason for betrayal." (245) The narrative supports this view while providing some interesting reading. Overall, a positive contribution.[a]

Double Crossed: The Missionaries Who Spied for the United States During the Second World War, by Matthew Avery Sutton. (Basic Books, 2019) 401 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

Washington State University history professor Matthew Sutton begins *Double Crossed* with a story about William Eddy, a multilingual World War I Marine veteran who "became a missionary" after the war. (1) When a new world war appeared imminent, he rejoined the Marines as a lieutenant colonel and was sent to Cairo as the naval attaché. After Pearl Harbor, William Donovan, an "Irishman who had gone from marine, to lawyer . . . to spymaster," (1) recruited Eddy into the OSS. He was, Sutton asserts, "exactly the kind of person Donovan needed . . . not to share the love of Christ, but to orchestrate assassination plots, and foment uprisings." (59)

Putting aside the fact that Donovan was in the Army, not the Marines, Sutton's claims that Eddy "became a missionary" or "thought of himself as a missionary" (61) will surprise those familiar with OSS history since those assertions are not made elsewhere. Not in Eddy's *New York Times* obituary, or in descriptions of his career in other books—not even in Thomas Lippman's biography of Eddy. Now it is true, as Lippman points out, that Eddy's parents were missionaries in what is now Syria-Lebanon. It is also true that Eddy had a PhD in English literature from Princeton, was fluent in Arabic, studied the Koran, and taught in the English Department of the American University in Cairo from 1923 to 1928. Returning to the United States the same year he accepted a position at Dartmouth teaching English before becoming president of Hobart and William Smith Colleges.

Sutton's assessment of Eddy is important because the central theme of *Double Crossed* is that "dozens of missionaries, missionary executives, priests, religious activists, and at least one rabbi, worked for the OSS," a fact that Donovan "intentionally hid." (3–4) He goes on to amplify the point saying, "OSS holy spooks fought to implement FDR's religious ideals." In particular he states that dozens of missionaries worked "in the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS." (8) It is a doubtful proposition as they go unnamed. More broadly, in a fit of conjecture typical of Sutton throughout the book, he writes that the "OSS religious activists believed that expanding American power and influence would enhance their efforts to build the kingdom of God around the globe." (10) Since no sources are provided for these avowals, one must look to the rest of the book for substantiation. That exercise was not fruitful.

In fact, *Double Crossed* deals primarily with four officers who served mainly in the field, though he adds some detail on their postwar careers. In addition to Eddy, there is John Birch a missionary in China, fluent in Mandarin. Birch volunteered for duty in the US Army, aided the downed air crews after the Doolittle Raid, and served on General Chennault's intelligence staff until 1944, when he was unwillingly transferred to OSS, where he performed well. He was later captured by the Chinese communists and executed.

Steven Penrose, recommended to OSS by Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, was a missionary executive who recruited missionaries, among others, for OSS. While rising to senior managerial positions he retained his interest in Middle East issues.

Stewart Herman, a prewar pastor in Berlin, repatriated with George Kennan, was recommended to OSS by John Foster Dulles. He would be involved with plans for the invasion, but he later resigned because he felt OSS was not handling the "German angle" well. (218)

The *Double Crossed* narrative views the OSS intelligence operations through a religious lens. Moreover, it strives hard to make the case that religion was a driving factor in OSS personnel recruiting and operations as opposed to operational necessity. But the facts presented support an equally plausible theory: that men who spoke foreign languages, had proficiency overseas, were patriotic and coincidentally had religious experience made good intelligence officer candidates.

a. Readers with an interest in motivations for spying may visit CIA psychologist Dr. Ursula Wilder's unclassified treatment of this topic in "Why Spy? The Psychology of Espionage and Leaking in the Digital Age," in *Studies in Intelligence* 61, no. 2 (June 2017).

Sutton's final chapter summarizes the strict current executive policies that limit CIA recruitment of religious personnel as agents, a practice he wishes were otherwise, perhaps for religious reasons. Were the religious portions of the narrative removed from *Double Crossed* nothing new would be left.

Ian Fleming's Inspiration: The Truth Behind the Books, by Edward Abel Smith. (Pen & Sword, 2020) 205 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Ian Fleming was dismissed from Eton for a sexual encounter, then from Sandhurst when he caught gonorrhea. When he failed the Foreign Office exam, scoring 20 percent on his English test, his mother arranged employment with the Reuters News Agency for a starting salary of £150 a year. An assignment to Moscow earned him good marks as he polished his writing skills, which served him well as a naval officer during World War II. His James Bond books and films have generated more than $7 billion to date. (ix)

Author Edward Abel Smith became a James Bond fan watching the films. But only after reading the Bond books, short stories, and Fleming biographies did he appreciate that many of Bond's eccentricities and penchants were possessed by Fleming himself. These features are examined in *Ian Fleming's Inspiration*.

Each chapter of the book is named after a Bond novel or short story. But while chapter 1 is titled "Casino Royal" after Fleming's first novel, succeeding chapters are arranged chronologically according to Fleming's life, not the publication date of the book whose titles appear as chapter titles.

Common to many of them, Bond mirrors Fleming's passion for fast cars, fine food and drink, travel, gambling, and glamorous women. In the telling, Smith also explains the source of names associated with Bond. For example, Goldeneye (the name of his Jamaican home and a wartime operation), M (the head of the British Secret Service), Bond's codename 007 (18), and Octopussy. (120)

Although not a full biography, Smith does comment on Fleming's family connections, famous people he encountered, and his secret trip to Moscow for *The Times*. (10) Of equal interest is how Fleming joined naval intelligence as an officer without prior service, (16) the nature of his wartime postings, and when he first thought of writing a novel. Smith usually includes a comment on the origins of the novel discussed. For example, *From Russia With Love*, the book that made SMERSH popular, is linked to Fleming's wartime experience with Enigma and code-breaking. (40)

For James Bond lovers, *Ian Fleming's Inspiration* is informative, documented, and a reading pleasure.

Nixon's FBI: Hoover, Watergate, and a Bureau in Crisis, by Melissa Graves. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2020) 246 pages, end of chapter notes, bibliography, index.

In *Nixon's FBI*, lawyer/historian Melissa Graves, an assistant professor of intelligence and security studies at The Citadel, analyzes two principal issues. The first challenges the conventional wisdom that *Washington Post* reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein were, with Deep Throat's help, responsible for the demise of the Nixon presidency. The second concerns the nature of the proper relationship between the Bureau and Nixon.

Professor Graves does not spend a great deal of time with Woodward and Bernstein's role, which she grants did keep an interested public informed. She does discuss Mark Felt's contributions as Deep Throat before asking the perceptive question: Where did Felt get the details that he leaked? He didn't do any investigative fieldwork. He, and thus Woodward and Bernstein and any other Bureau sources they had, were dependent on the case agent reports. The case agent for the Watergate investigation was Special Agent Angelo Lano, and Graves documents his determined successful contribution.

The relationship between the Bureau and Nixon is more political and more complicated. In 1970, Hoover was still FBI director and he shared Nixon's concerns with the turmoil—bombings, hijackings, sit-ins—conducted with "malign influence" by the "New Left," as it was called,

and that it was most likely infiltrated by communists. (12) Hoover attacked the problem with an open letter to university students. (17) Nixon took a more rigorous approach. He tasked a White House staff lawyer, Tom Huston, to draft a plan of action to deal with the unrest, using burglary, illegal electronic surveillance, and opening the mail of domestic radicals, to name a few tactics. The 43-page report was called the Huston Plan.

Hoover chaired the committee of Intelligence Community directors who would carry it out. Then after signing the official version, he withdrew his approval five days later and frustrated the plan's implementation "at every turn," demonstrating he would not "offer up the Bureau to do the President's political bidding." (21) When Nixon failed to get support from the CIA and the Intelligence Community, he assembled "a group of former Intelligence Community officers . . . loyal only to him"—Gordon Liddy (ex-FBI), Howard Bunt (ex-CIA) and James McCord (ex-CIA, not FBI as Graves writes, page 2), and others: the Plumbers were born. (42)

Graves describes the deterioration of the Hoover-Nixon relationship resulting from collapse of the Huston Plan and the reasons Nixon didn't dismiss Hoover outright. At the same time, as she shows, there was constant organizational havoc among domestic intelligence operations within the FBI as well as elements of the Intelligence Community. These events were compounded by criticism following revelations of FBI domestic spying exposed by the burglary of one of its field offices in 1971. Then two events occurred that changed everything. The first was the death of Hoover on May 2, 1972, which set in motion a succession battle. That, coupled with the second event on June 17, 1972, the Watergate break-in, brought down a president.

Graves's account of Nixon's appointment of Patrick Gray as acting FBI director is informative, if not inspiring, as he attempts to deflect the blame for Watergate from Nixon. During that process, Angelo Lano and his team, working to complete its investigation, has sharp encounters with Gray and Woodward and Bernstein.

Nixon's FBI concludes with an assessment of how Watergate led to permanent changes in presidential power. But at the same time, Graves concludes, the investigative special agents remain independent, resistant to cover-ups, threats, lies and intimidation. *Nixon's FBI* makes powerful, well documented arguments. A worthwhile contribution to intelligence literature.

No Moon as Witness: Missions of the SOE and OSS in World War II, by James Stejskal. (Casemate, 2021) 180 pages, bibliography, photos, index.

Before he became an author, James Stejskal (pronounced Stay-skel) served in the Army Special Forces and the CIA as a case officer. In *No Moon as Witness*, he has produced a summary of OSS and SOE operations in Europe and the Far East during WWII. After discussing the key individuals and the history associated with the origins of both organizations, he compares their structures, personnel selection and training methods, and the special equipment they developed and used.

The balance of the book is devoted to operations performed jointly and separately. Many will be familiar. There are for example the contributions of Nancy Wake, William Colby in Norway, Virginia Hall, and the Jedburghs. Others, like the SOE Kriepe Operation in Crete, will be new to some. All are of interest and provide a good sampling of the SOE and OSS roles in WWII provided one qualification is kept in mind: Stejskal does not provide any source notes. This creates problem for readers and the author. Reader must trust the author's judgments or check sources if a statement or a name doesn't seem correct or if further information is desired.

The author's problem is the large number of unforced errors. A few examples make the point. First, Stejskal writes that at "the beginning of WWII," Britain faced an "Axis alliance of Germany, Italy, and later Japan." (xi) But Italy didn't declare war until June 1940, and the inclusion of "later Japan" is grammatically incompatible. Second, it is the "chief" of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), not "director." (9) Third, William Donovan was appointed coordinator of information in July 1941, not coordinator of strategic information. (17) Fourth, after noting a lack of military capability early in the war, Stejskal asserts that Churchill had expectations "the resistance in Europe (and elsewhere) along with naval blockades and strategic bombing would bring about the defeat of the Axis." (167, 168) This was never the case. The SOE and OSS

capabilities were meant to irritate, constrain, and provide intelligence until sufficient military force was assembled.

In his epilogue, Stejskal raises the most pertinent and difficult question concerning SOE and OSS: Was it worth the sacrifice and effort? (167) From the qualitative evidence presented he concludes that "overall their operations contributed greatly" to winning the war and holding the peace. A comprehensive study evaluating specific operations in each theater of war is required before his judgment can be accepted. *No Moon as Witness* can serve as a primer for those interested further study.

The Secret History of STASI Spy Cameras 1950–1990, by H. Keith Melton, Detlev Vreisleben, with Michael Hasco. (Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 2020) 240 pages, bibliography, photos, glossary, index.

After the KGB relaxed its control over the East German Ministry of State Security (MfS) in 1957, East Germany and Czechoslovakia gradually became major sources of cameras and optical systems used by Warsaw Pact intelligence services. The KGB did continue to supply specialized items, like surveillance lenses. (129) These were described in an earlier book and also included here. After German unification, coauthor Vreisleben gained access to the Stasi Records Agency and Archives (BStU). Working with the collectors and camera specialists Keith Melton and Michael Hasco, he selected the cameras and optical devices described in this book.

The first two of the book's nine chapters discuss the structure and history of the principal organizations mentioned, with particular emphasis on the photographic elements of the Stasi and the Czech State Security Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service (StB). Some operations are examined and pictures of the equipment and associated artifacts are included—e.g., Putin's Stasi ID card. Most Stasi terms are explained in the glossary. An exception is the frequently mentioned noun "camouflage" used to indicate how a camera is hidden during an operation. For example, a buttonhole can serve as a lens camouflage. (23)

The Cold War ended before smart phones simplified copying secret material, and chapters 3–5 of *STASI Spy Cameras* present a show-and-tell of how it was done in the days of film. Still, motion, and portable document cameras are pictured and their operational uses are described in detail. From microdots to Polaroids—the Stasi would adopt Western techniques when necessary—the authors reveal how they accomplished their missions.

The Stasi was famous for its almost blanket surveillance at home. Its foreign intelligence counterpart, the HVA—under Markus Wolf—conducted foreign operations. The final four chapters present and discuss the methods and equipment used in various situations. The camera types range from hand operated, to remote-controlled-through-wall systems, to brassier camouflaged cameras. (134–37) The concealment devices developed were equally innovative and ranged from household items to musical instruments. Several examples of Stasi, KGB, and Swiss motorized cameras—spring wound and electric—are also shown.

For those interested in how the Warsaw Pact nations accomplished human surveillance in the predigital age, *The Secret History of STASI Spy Cameras* is the book to study.

Spy Swap: The Humiliation of Russia's Intelligence Services, by Nigel West. (Frontline Books, 2021) 202 pages, endnotes, photos, appendices, index.

The *Spy Swap* portion of the title refers mainly to operation Ghost Stories that ended in 2010, when 10 Russian illegals were swapped for three imprisoned Russian intelligence officers— Gennady Vasilenko, Aleksandr Zaporozhsky, Sergei Skripal—and one Russian scientist, Igor Sutyagin. Considering the number of officers returned to each service, one might reasonably ask if the Russians were the ones humiliated, as the title suggests. But it soon becomes clear that Nigel West has a broader context in mind.

In West's view, *Spy Swap* is the story of the counterintelligence foundation laid by James Angleton that led to "a remarkable period of operational activity that resulted in unprecedented success and brought the once mighty Soviet (and then the Russian) intelligence monolith to the point of collapse." Thus, there is no ambiguity here, and

the readers are justified in expecting the book to support his position.

In *Spy Swap*, West first explains how several CIA, FBI, and KGB officers who would become involved in Ghost Stories got to know each other. These accounts are followed by summaries of the Ames and Hanssen cases to establish how the KGB and its successor organizations—the SVR and FSB—operated prior to the Ghost Stories period.

For historical perspective, West then discusses a number of Soviet legacy cases, including Walter Krivitsky, Robert Gordon Switz, and Vladimir Kuzichkin, the Rote Kapelle, and Alexander Foote, to cite a few. None of the legacy cases are directly linked to Ghost Stories but they do show how the Russian services have functioned since the revolution. Likewise, the chapters succeeding the one on Ghost Stories are included to show that intelligence under Putin has changed little.

The key points in *Spy Swap* have to do with deciding when to arrest the 10 illegals, how to go about it, and the selection of the imprisoned Russians to be exchanged. Not all authors agree with West's views on these points, especially when it comes to the inclusion of Gennady Vasilenko. BBC journalist Gordon Corera links the decision to arrest the 10 illegals with the imminent defection to the West of a KGB officer and CIA agent who has supported the illegals and thus knows them. He says the choice of Vasilenko was because he helped the FBI and CIA in the Ames case.[a]

Gus Russo and Eric Dezenhall take a different position on Vasilenko linking his inclusion in the trade to the influence of his retired CIA friend, Jack Platt. They argue that Vasilenko was not a CIA or FBI agent or asset, just Platt's friend, who was unjustly imprisoned.[b]

West's explanation differs from both. He concludes that Vasilenko was a CIA agent and that the decision to arrest the illegals when they were was in part driven by the desire to get Vasilenko released. While he presents no direct evidence, West does acknowledge interviews with the key players in the CIA and FBI.

Spy Swap leaves to the reader with two mysteries. One must ask whether the narrative supports the assertion that the Russian intelligence services were brought to the point of collapse by the unprecedented success of Western intelligence services. The other concerns the reason Vasilenko was included in the swap. Whatever your conclusion, *Spy Swap* provides a fine review of the espionage cases discussed.

The Spy Who Was Left Out in the Cold: The Secret History of Agent Goleniewski, by Tim Tate (Bantam Press, May 2021) 398 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The Spy Who Would Be Tsar: The Mystery of Michal Goleniewski and the Far-Right Underground, by Kevin Coogan (Routledge, September 2021) 358 pages, end of chapter notes, bibliography, appendices, index.

The late Kevin Coogan was an investigative journalist from Philadelphia. While researching conspiracy theories and far-right secret societies, he found references to a Michal Goleniewski, who claimed to be the son of the last Russian Tsar, Nicholas II. Further inquiries revealed that Goleniewski was a Cold War Polish spy linked to the CIA, the FBI, and the KGB about whom little had been written. Coogan decided to write his story, *The Spy Who Would Be Tsar*. He was unaware that at the same time Tim Tate was writing his own biography of Goleniewski, *The Spy Who Was Left Out in the Cold*, which was published just four months before Coogan's book.

Both authors agree that in 1958, while he was a serving Polish intelligence officer, Goleniewski began sending double-wrapped letters to the US embassy in Bern, Switzerland. The inside letter was addressed to J. Edgar Hoover because Goleniewski thought the KGB had penetrated CIA. Nevertheless, following embassy protocol, each letter was given to CIA officers for action.

a. Gordon Corera, *Russians Among Us: Sleeper Cells, Ghost Stories and the Hunt for Putin's Agents* (HarperCollins, 2020), 224. Reviewed in *Studies in Intelligence* 64, no. 2 (June 2020).

b. Gus Russo & Eric Dezenhall. *Best of Enemies: The Last Great Spy Story of the Cold War* (Twelve, 2018), 224. Reviewed in *Studies in Intelligence* 62, no. 4 (December 2018).

They contained information that, when coupled with data he provided when he defected in January 1961, proved Goleniewski's bona fides and led to the exposures of the Portland Spy Ring; the KGB illegal Gordon Lonsdale; the ensnarement of John Vassall in a KGB honeytrap; Heinz Felfe, who gave the KGB data on CIA operations in Germany; and the KGB penetration of MI6 by George Blake.

The books reveal differences in the authors' interpretation of various events. For example, Tate argues that Goleniewski's deranged contention that he was the Tsarevich was a consequence of CIA's broken promises and bad treatment of him. Coogan, on the other hand, acknowledges some problems in the defector's relationship with CIA, but he points out that the agency provided Goleniewski and his family with an income and apartment for life. He also maintains that Goleniewski's issues with CIA were the result of natural mental illness brought on, in part, by the CIA and British intelligence deciding not to undertake counterintelligence operations he had recommended. It was hard to take Goleniewski seriously after he announced that "Henry Kissinger was a Soviet agent code-named 'Bor'" (xv)[a] Coogan presents a strong case—supported by a timeline of events backed up by solid sources—that Goleniewski's mental deterioration left CIA little choice but to discontinue operational contact and to discourage official contact with congressional committees.

Another difference in the accounts concerns Goleniewski's life after his CIA debriefings ended. Tate dwells more on issues surrounding his extensive attempts to convince the world he was the Tsarevich, that most of his siblings had survived, and that he was the rightful heir to the Romanov fortune. Although Coogan also covers these topics, *The Spy Who Would Be Tsar* places greater attention on two other subjects, CIA and MI5 attempts to show that Goleniewski was, at some point, under KGB control and Goleniewski's tenuous links to far-right secret societies. From an intelligence reader's point of view, Coogan spends far to much time on the convoluted behavior of these groups.

For a balanced, unembroidered account of Goleniewski's intelligence contributions and his post-career life, Coogan is the one to read.

❖ ❖ ❖

a. In 1963 during a visit from congressional staffer Herbert Romerstein, Goleniewski asked him, "how would you like to be Duke?" Author conversation with Romerstein, September 29, 2000.

Fiction

Geiger, by Gustaf Skördeman (Zaffre, 2021—Translated from the Swedish/Originally published in Sweden by Bokförlaget Polaris in 2020) 424 pages**.**

Is anyone in Scandinavia happy? Not if the authors of Scandinavian noir novels are to be believed. Just when you thought that Maj Sowall and Per Wahloo, Jo Nesbo, and Stieg Larsson had exposed the entire seamy underside of social democratic paradises, along comes Swedish screenwriter Gustaf Skördeman with his first novel, *Geiger*, which takes the Scandi-noir genre into the world of spy novels.

The plot has something to do with old Stasi agents, a Soviet-era KGB illegal, and terrorists, who have been hanging around since the seventies waiting for their chance and now are about to set off atomic bombs hidden in Germany for all these years. They are, to be sure, an ancient bunch, and their fiftyish pursuer is a Stockholm policewoman named Sara Nowak. Assigned to the prostitution squad, Sara stumbles into the case by accident. At first she has no comprehension of the world of spies and espionage, but gradually catches on. Basically, *Geiger* is the latest iteration of the classic plot of the clueless outsider stumbling across a dastardly plan to devastate the world and then racing to save civilization. Think *The Thirty-Nine Steps* or *North by Northwest*.

Skördeman certainly knows how to tell a story. The chapters are short, the prose is direct and punchy, and the action shifts back and forth among the different characters and locations. Bodies pile up, the plot twists, and the growing suspense will keep readers turning the pages. It's a hard one to put down and, while the ending is ridiculous, you won't care.

How does *Geiger* work as Scandinoir? Alas, not quite as well as one would hope. Corruption certainly abounds, beloved national figures and leaders turn out to be pedophiles and hypocrites of the worst type, and Sara's personal life is a depressing brew of a troubled childhood, marital problems, and a violent temper that is destroying her career. But Skördeman lays it on a bit too thick, with the result that he sometimes seems to be parodying the conventions of Nordic angst and introspection to share a knowing laugh with readers. That's too bad, because with some self-restraint Skördeman might have been able to say something more about the choices Sweden made during the Cold War and the near-universal disappointment with how the world has turned out since the heady days of 1991.

Still, *Geiger* is an enjoyable thriller, one no doubt destined soon for streaming or the big screen. We can only hope the screenwriter will give us a version that draws out the story that lies within.

The reviewer: J. E. Leonardson is the pen name of a CIA Directorate of Analysis officer.

❖ ❖ ❖

Hayden Peake has served in the CIA's Directorates of Operations and Science and Technology. He has been compiling and writing reviews for the "Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf" since December 2002.