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*Unless otherwise noted, reviews are by Hayden Peake.

Current Issues

The Future of National Intelligence: How Emerging Technologies Reshape Intelligence Communities, by Shay Hershkovitz (Rowman and Littlefield, 2022), 165 pages, endnotes, index.

Now a senior research fellow at the Intelligence Methodology Research Center in Israel, Shay Hershkovitz acquired his basic knowledge in intelligence while serving 15 years in the Israeli Defense Force. His post-military service included consulting in the Israeli intelligence community, the private sector, and academia. Gradually he experienced a growing interest in cutting-edge emerging technologies and their potential impact on the intelligence profession.

The Future of National Intelligence discusses eight technologies that, Hershkovitz argues, are needed to radically transform contemporary intelligence organizations:

- the internet of things (IoT);
- 5G;
- big data;
- cloud computing and storage;
- AI;
- blockchain;
- quantum computing; and
- crowd sourcing, which he admits is not really a technology (xiii–xv).

While most of these technologies are not new to today's intelligence communities, Hershkovitz cautions that government, academic, and private-sector enterprises must be considered in their development. But then, instead of an orderly assessment of how each technology can improve the profession, he takes a functional approach. For example, he challenges the use of the intelligence cycle as an organizing principle and then recommends its replacement by activity-based intelligence (ABI) and object-based production (OBP)—techniques for organizing large amounts of data from multiple sources—or temporal intelligence (TEMPINT). The concept, he writes, has "produced impressive successes in exposing terrorist networks in those countries." Unfortunately, he provides no examples, and even adds that he didn't intend "to provide a fully detailed description of these approaches." (95) He takes a similar tactic to another "INT" he creates, CROWDINT, for crowd-source intelligence that allows groups of people to collaborate with agencies.

The one technology mentioned that is less familiar to the intelligence profession is blockchain, a concept often associated with cryptocurrency and considered to be hacker-proof. The blockchain technology has many potential uses but, above all, for transmitting and sharing data, verifying the authors of that data, and guaranteeing the data has not been tampered with. Hershkovitz argues that blockchain will be of great advantage to intelligence but, once more, provides no specific examples.

The Future of National Intelligence concludes by reiterating the central claim of the book: "The present age necessitates a broad-scale revolution in the intelligence world. . . . . Without such a revolution, intelligence organizations will struggle to maintain relevance in decision making at the national level." (113) Hershkovitz then proposes five principles that form a framework that will transform intelligence: collaboration, critique, creativity, content, and expertise. (113ff.)

While thought provoking, these concepts, like the others discussed in this book, lack any exemplary corroboration. Readers are left wondering whether the profession really needs more INTs, and if so, how they will help.

Russian Information Warfare: Assault on Democracies in the Cyber Wild West, by Bilyana Lilly (US Naval Institute Press, 2022) 384 pages, illustrations, endnotes, bibliography, index.

Cyber threat intelligence, AI, disinformation, ransomware, and information warfare are a few of the topics in which Bilyana Lilly acquired foundational knowledge while earning master's degrees at the Geneva Graduate Institute in Switzerland and Oxford University, and her Ph.D. from Pardee RAND Graduate School. With a focus on Russian cyber capabilities, she gained practical experience at the RAND, Deloitte, and now with the Krebs

Stamos Group, a cyber security firm. *Russian Information Warfare* analyzes why and how the Russian government uses cyber operations as a weapon to attack democracies from within and suggests what the United States and NATO countries can do to defend themselves.

To achieve this goal Lilly employs the case-study technique and applies it to seven countries that have experienced Russian cyberwarfare attacks as a tool of statecraft. After setting out the criteria for each case study, she reviews the methodology, the data collection employed, and the graphical techniques applied. Where possible she identifies the main Russian agencies conducting the operations—the SVR (Foreign Intelligence) and GRU (Military Intelligence) and elements of the FSB (domestic security agency). In that discussion, Lilly names some of the cyber programs or APTs (advanced persistent threats) as she calls them, used by Russian hackers: Cozy Bear or Cozy Duke, Fancy Bear or Sofacy, and Sandworm. While she describes the type of technical and psychological damage each program produces, she does not get into details of the programming.

Each of the seven case studies—Estonia, Bulgaria, the US presidential elections of 2016 and 2020, Norway, Montenegro, France, and Germany—are treated in separate chapters. Lilly describes the cyber methods employed, why a particular Russian agency was involved, if known, and comments on the effectiveness of the operation. For example, the cyber-attack on Estonia employed denial-of-service techniques against particular targets that shut down the network by overloading it with traffic. Although Russia was strongly suspected, neither Estonian nor NATO IT experts were able to prove a link. (49)

The example of the hack on the US Democratic National Committee is somewhat different. It involved what is called a phishing attack, in which an innocent-looking email containing a bug is opened that gives the hacker access to the user's system. Lilly concentrates on the 2016 penetration and its possible consequences and ramifications. While she does not identify the US agency that discovered the hack, she does attribute the attack in part to the GRU (85) and what she terms the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA), but she provides no further affiliation. As to impact, she concludes "it is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the effect Russia's release of illegally obtained information had on the outcome of the 2016 presidential election." (93)

Russian Information Warfare concludes by presenting recommendations for improving data collection and analysis followed by Lilly's suggestion to discuss policies and techniques to improve cyber operations and their psychological consequences. In neither case does she present anything new. A useful orientation and background book.

See It/Shoot It: The Secret History of the CIA's Lethal Drone Program, by Christopher J. Fuller (Yale University Press, 2017) 352 pages, endnotes, index.

The principal title of this book is taken from a comment by former White House adviser Richard Clark. While catchy, it is also inaccurate. The sequence of events in a drone attack is not that arbitrary. Author Christopher Fuller, a lecturer on American history at the University of South Hampton, makes that clear in this study of the US drone program.

Fuller's account is based on open sources that claim the US government operates three unmanned remotely operated aerial vehicle or drone programs. Two are conducted by the Defense Department. The controversial third program, often attributed to CIA alone, is run jointly by several US government components, is not officially acknowledged, and is the primary focus of this book. (9)

Fuller describes the criticisms emanating from academia and investigative journalists that challenge the legality of what they term targeted killings that amount to assassinations. It is, they contend, an unwarranted escalation of the counterterrorism program introduced after 9/11. In particular, they debunk the notion that civilian staff at CIA can give US Air Force personnel orders to undertake lethal drone strikes. To illustrate this point, Fuller presents a scenario that describes each agency's step-by-step contribution to the mission. (1–7)

More generally, Fuller challenges the assumption that CIA has become militarized as a result of the war on terror, claiming that its drone program began during the Reagan administration. Fuller also refutes the notion that

the program lacks congressional oversight and a domestic legal basis.

In this dispassionate balanced account, Fuller describes the various drone types in use, their capabilities, and their implementation strategy built upon two decades of innovations, which have "transformed the way in which the United States conducts its counterterrorism operations." (247)

Despite frequent noisy objections in the media, drones have become a weapon of choice for many countries because of their relatively low cost and minimum risk to operators. *See It/Shoot It* gives a commonsense account of why that makes sense. An informative contribution.

Striking Back: Overt and Covert Options to Combat Russian Disinformation, by Thomas Kent (Jamestown Foundation, 2020) 289 pages, footnotes, bibliography.

Former president of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Thomas Kent, is a senior fellow of the Jamestown Foundation and teaches Russian disinformation affairs at Columbia University. In *Striking Back*, he argues that contemporary Russia, robbed of communism's inspirational ideology, has adopted many of Stalin's means of control while adding a new method of state image creation through technologically sophisticated and aggressive disinformation operations.

Striking Back doesn't define "disinformation" and uses the term "misinformation" only a few times. But the context of the latter is unintended error whereas the former concerns calculated damaging inaccuracies. Kent also uses the term "information operations (IO)" when discussing "undermining national cohesion and public order within democratic societies." (1)

It is the IOs that form the focus of the book. Kent discusses their gradual development after the Soviet Union collapsed and points out that not everyone takes them seriously, holding that a little common sense and fact-checking will neutralize their impact. But others take a different view and Kent considers various countermeasures. He also stresses that in the Western responses the governments should not be the sole actor. Disinformation and misinformation both rely on private entities and friendly states to accomplish their objectives. He mentions several suggestions for countering Russian disinformation operations and explains why most won't work.

There is one weakness in *Striking Back* that limits understanding of the problem: Kent provides qualitative comments about IO types but no details or case studies. For example, he states that Russia "worked to destabilize formerly Soviet countries that had joined the European Union and NATO . . . and in Africa, it tried to revive Cold War relationships based on anti-colonialist solidarity and arms-dealing," but doesn't say how. (2) And later, on the same point, he notes, "There are plenty of examples in history where evil information operations overcame the truth." He just doesn't give any. (95)

What Kent does do is provide specific recommendations and options—ethical and operational—in the information sphere, including social networks, cyberoperations, covert action by Western countries and local NGAs, to counter IOs by Russia and its allies.

Striking Back is well documented, leaves no doubt there is a problem, suggests where to look for answers, and implies that some may be coming in a future book.

General

Intelligence Power In Practice, by Michael Herman with David Schaefer (Edinburgh University Press, 2022) 418 pages, end of chapter notes, index.

The late Michael Herman (1929–2021) read history at Oxford University, served in the Army Intelligence Corps (Egypt), and in 1952 joined GCHQ, retiring in 1987. During his GCHQ career, he served on the Defense Intelligence Staff and was seconded to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) as its secretary from 1972 to 1975. After retiring from GCHQ, Herman joined Oxford's Nuffield College as a research fellow and began his first book on intelligence, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War,* which addressed the roles and effects of intelligence organizations.[a] In addition to writing and teaching, Herman founded and directed the Oxford Intelligence Group, a forum for practitioners and academics to discuss intelligence issues. In 2005, he was made an honorary doctor of letters by the University of Nottingham.

David Schaefer, currently a researcher in the department of War Studies at Kings College, London, was asked by Herman to assist him with a new book he was contemplating to update some of his previous work. The result is *Intelligence Power In Practice*, a four-part collection of papers, some new, others republished.

Part one begins with an interview by Mark Phythian that discusses Herman's life and writings. Among those not previously published, "The Rush To Transparency" is of contemporary interest. The article on intelligence ethics notes that "CIA-bashing remains a world industry" but takes issue with judgment that the United States is "becoming the rogue superpower." (102)

Part two focuses on aspects of the Cold War such as the nature of national threats, did intelligence make a difference, and the origins of the SIGINT collection site in Berlin. The third part deals with organizational and reform issues in British intelligence, a topic Herman was concerned about throughout his career. Herman appeared before the Parliament's Butler Committee on these topics, and his testimony is published here for the first time.

The fourth section explores the neglected role of personalities in intelligence history and the Joint Intelligence Committee, among other topics

Intelligence Power In Practice is decidedly a book on the "British school" of intelligence studies—although CIA is mentioned in passing from time to time—but the topics discussed have applicability to all those interested in the profession. A valuable contribution to the literature.

a. Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Memoir

An Excellent Idea: Leading CIA Surrogate Warfare in Southeast Asia, 1951-1970, A Personal Account, by James W. "Bill" Lair as told to Thomas L. Ahern, Jr. (Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2022) 195 pages, photos.

A typical career for a CIA operations officer includes periodic assignments overseas and headquarters. Bill Lair did not quite meet those benchmarks. His first assignment sent him to Thailand in 1951, and with the exception of one two-year stint at headquarters, he spent his entire career there. In *An Excellent Idea,* Lair, with the help of his friend and collaborator Thomas Ahern, explains these unusual circumstances.

Born in Oklahoma on July 4, 1924, Lair overcame family instability and poverty and entered Texas A&M University in 1942 to study geology. But the dominant subject of the day was the war and Lair didn't want to be drafted, so he enlisted to gain some say in his assignment. He chose infantry; he got the 3rd Armored Division where he landed at Omaha Beach and ended up at the Elbe River at war's end.

Demobilized, Lair returned to Texas A&M and joined ROTC before graduating in June 1950 as a second lieutenant in the army. Having had enough combat, Lair wished to avoid the Korean War and responded to an ambiguous notice on a bulletin board inviting applications for intelligence work. To his surprise he was interviewed and accepted by the CIA and became a member of the first-ever class of junior officer trainees (JOTs), which convened in 1950. Given three choices for his first assignment, Lair listed Asia last. He arrived in Bangkok in March 1951.

For bureaucratic reasons Lair reported to the Southeast Asia Supply Company, or SEA Supply, a CIA proprietary officially a private contractor to the Royal Thai Government and dissolved in the mid-1950s. His assignment was to provide logistic support and training to teams of the Thai National Police chosen to resist communist expansion.

An Excellent Idea reveals how he succeeded under unusual circumstances. Lair so impressed his Thai superior that he was made an official member of the Thai police. With CIA approval he wore a Thai uniform; the agency kept his Thai salary. With only two years in the country, Lair went on to propose—in a private meeting with the director general of the National Police, Thailand's second most powerful figure at the time—a major new capability: an elite unit capable of rapid, airborne mobilization into at-risk border areas. "An excellent idea," the director general responded; he gave Lair license to work with Thai officers to create the unit, first known as the Airborne Royal Guard and later the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU). Under these conditions he became "the working partner of the Thai who managed their country's participation in the war in Laos," providing aerial, intelligence and security support. "Finally, I would wind up as the field manager of the largest paramilitary operation ever undertaken by CIA," Lair recounted. "In that capacity, I would support and guide the Hmong tribesmen in their courageous but ultimately doomed resistance to the North Vietnamese army." (42) The authors cover these operations in considerable detail.

While he never "went native," he learned the language, married a Thai, and, most important, developed a way of dealing with the Thai at all levels that did not seem pushy or overbearing, a major strong suit. He would consult rather than instruct, suggest rather than order. The Thai came to rely on his judgment in matters of training, logistical support, personnel selection, and paramilitary operations.

Besides several strong-willed CIA chiefs of station, Lair dealt with senior US and Thai dignitaries during his long tour. William Donovan, the ambassador to Thailand, discussed the OSS role in Thai independence. Allen Dulles "had heard of the innovative Airborne Royal Guard and asked for a look at [the] operation." (95) And on several occasions, he dealt with the king and members of the royal family. But it was recruitment of Maj. Vang Pao he long remembered. Vang Pao, leader of the Hmong tribesmen through the Vietnam War, would stay the course until the end when he was evacuated to the United States with fellow Hmong emigres. When Lair retired in 1977, he had the satisfaction of knowing his contribution had helped the Thai keep the war in Laos from spreading communism to northeast Thailand.

This is the story of a unique and precedent-setting career, not just for its singularity but for exemplary execution. It provides performance measures that those who succeed Bill Lair would be wise to adopt. A most worthy contribution to the intelligence literature.

History

The Birth of the Soviet Secret Police: Lenin and History's Greatest Heist, 1917–1927, by Boris Volodarsky (Frontline, 2023), 393 pages, notes, index.

A new history of the Soviet intelligence services is always welcome, especially if it takes advantage of fresh archival material to add details or correct errors in previous books as it updates the story. Former Russian intelligence officer Boris Volodarsky's *The Birth of the Soviet Secret Police*, an account of the first decade of Soviet intelligence, claims to do just that and so it was that I took it up with high expectations. Alas, it soon became clear that I was to be disappointed.

Volodarsky certainly has done his homework. His account of the establishment of the Cheka and the early years of Soviet intelligence, using the latest releases, is filled with detailed descriptions of plans, operations, and capsule biographies of the people who carried them out (or tried to thwart them). Some of these are well known, but others will be unfamiliar to all but the most dedicated students of Soviet intelligence. Volodarsky also takes a great deal of pleasure in pointing out and correcting the errors of previous authors—Wikipedia is a frequent, if easy, target and he seems to enjoy poking Christopher Andrew—as well as noting how many of the Chekists whose operations he chronicles were executed in the 1930s.

What all this adds up to is unclear, however. The mass of detail lands with a thud, overwhelming the reader with quantity but not providing any clear theme or conclusion. It must be said, too, that Volodarsky is not a master of prose. Even allowing for the fact that he is not a native English speaker, the text is repetitive, filled with stylistic quirks, and needs a good edit. All but the most determined readers, one expects, will give up and put the book on the shelf.

That might not be so bad, however. *The Birth of the Soviet Secret Police* is one of those books that serves best as a reference, where you can go to look up a case, check a name, or compare different accounts of an operation. But anyone looking for a readable history of the Cheka will have to go elsewhere.

The reviewer: John Ehrman is a retired CIA officer.

Crown, Cloak, and Dagger: The British Monarchy and Secret Intelligence from Victoria to Elizabeth the Second, by Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac (Georgetown University Press, 2023) 319 pages, endnotes, bibliography, appendix, photos, index.

Crown, Cloak, and Dagger is the US edition of *The Secret Royals: Spying and the Crown, from Victoria to Diana*, a review of which appeared in "The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf" in September 2022. Although the book is some 300 pages shorter, mostly because it uses a smaller font, the narrative is, with notable exceptions, much the same. Both begin with an anecdote about James Bond and Queen Elizabeth II and end with the Diana conspiracy, followed by some thoughtful conclusions.

In between is a historical account of how the royals dealt with intelligence matters. *The Secret Royals* has six parts, the US edition five. The deleted part—three chapters—concerns royal diplomacy. Chapters titled "Nuclear Secrets" and "Bugs & Bugging" also don't appear in *Crown, Cloak, and Dagger* but the material is covered in other chapters. Like many books about British intelligence, CIA enters at some point, and *Crown, Cloak, and Dagger* earned that distinction several times. If you haven't read *Secret Royals,* then *Crown, Cloak, and Dagger* is a worthwhile endeavor.

The Forever Prisoner: The Full and Searing Account of the CIA's Most Controversial Program, by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2022), 452 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

The forever prisoner is Abu Zubaydah. A Palestinian born in Saudi Arabia, he had lived in the United States and had a Swedish wife when captured by the FBI and CIA in Pakistan in 2002. When interrogated at a so-called black site, he identified Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and was waterboarded because it was thought he knew details about future terrorist operations. He was later sent to the US prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he remains. Journalists Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy tell the ominous story of his life during this time.

The central issues of the book are a consequence of the contention that what some called "enhanced interrogation" was in fact torture and that the techniques employed, whatever they were called, produced no actionable high-value intelligence. (2)

The well-known story is told chronologically with a few new names added. The authors struggle to be objective, interviewing many of the key players on both sides of the issues. Of particular interest are the responses of two civilian psychologists hired to conduct the interrogations and the circumstances surrounding the handling of the interrogation tapes. The authors also cite CIA interviews, CIA documentation, participant books, and the report of the Senate committee that investigated the interrogation program. They even imply they received some input from Abu Zubaydah, although they acknowledge they couldn't interview him.

But the authors' position is clear. Despite claims to the contrary, they argue Zubaydah wasn't hiding intelligence about an imagined coming "second wave" of al-Qa'ida attacks, which his interrogators could not possibly have known. (221) More generally, they state that CIA committed, if not condoned, torture and those involved were promoted.

The Forever Prisoner recapitulates a familiar story without noting that all the essential details may not be known.

Guarding the Caesars: Roman Internal Security under the Flavian Dynasty, by Rose Mary Sheldon (Rowman and Littlefield, 2023), 413 pages, endnotes, bibliography, index.

On the topic of intelligence in the ancient world, Rose Mary Sheldon, history professor emeritus at the Virginia Miliary Institute, is the preeminent authority. She has written more than 30 articles and eight books on the topic, two of which focused on Roman internal security. *Kill Caesar!* (published in 2018) was the first; *Guarding the Caesars* is the second.

Roman internal security, as defined by Sheldon, is akin to modern national security. Various components of government were responsible for maintaining a stable regime by protecting the emperor, preventing invasions, collecting intelligence, and monitoring the loyalty of the army, senators, and regional governments. The major difference, as she points out, is that reliance on imperial control of these functions was not always successful: three of the five rulers discussed were "murdered," while rumors of foul play "swirled around the deaths of the other two." (xi)

Guarding The Caesars deals with the internal security of the Flavian dynasty (69–96 AD) founded by Titus Flavius Vespasianus and the sons who followed him, Titus and Domitian.

Sheldon explains the historical circumstances that brought Vespasian to power and describes his nearly 10-year reign. She discusses his accomplishments—Rome's Colosseum was begun during his regime (63)—and the way he trained his son Titus to deal with threats to his rule. Although apparently not the target of political conspiracies he died under mysterious circumstances. Still, Sheldon gives him good marks. The situation changed when Titus's brother, Domitian became emperor—and Sheldon devotes more than five chapters to his troubled reign. While his principal duty was to hold the empire together and protect it from Rome's enemies as his father and brother had done, he did not share their reputation. As Sheldon points out, he had strong opposition. Some thought he had a personality disorder, and the Senate never accepted him. Tacitus, among others, considered him a monstrous tyrant; a recent work concluded he was "Rome's most productive, loathed, and forgotten emperor." (105)

Sheldon portrays a less harsh view and refers to Domitian as a competent and dedicated emperor. But in matters of internal security Domitian ultimately failed, and his assassination in a coup led to a new dynasty.

Sheldon's assertion that the book is aimed at the generalist is a little off target. Too many terms and names are left undefined. For example, she acknowledges that quellenkritik is the very heart of classical scholarship," (xvi) but she doesn't explain that the term means: critical analysis of sources. Likewise, she leaves it to the reader to search out who Augustus was and to determine the meaning of frumentarii or agentes in rebus from her earlier writings.

Guarding the Caesars is the first account of the internal security problems of the Flavian dynasty. For those interested in Roman security issues it will be very informative. For those considering the broader historical view,

it documents that heads of state have long had difficulty retaining power when they cannot maintain internal security. A valuable contribution to the literature.

Three Ordinary Girls: The Remarkable Story of Three Dutch Teenagers Who Became Spies, Saboteurs, Nazi Assassins—And WWII Heroes, by Tim Brady (Citadel Press, 2021) 298 pages, footnotes, photos, index.

Once a medieval northern Holland town, by the late 1930s Haarlem had become a modern city. Jewish teenage sisters, Truus and Freddie Oversteegen lived in one part. Non-Jewish, red-headed Johanna (Hannie) Schaft, a law student nearing 20, in another. All three shared the socialist views of their respective parents.

When World War II began, the Dutch government tried to remain neutral as it had during World War I. Toward that end, it had maintained relations with Germany during the interwar period and had not modernized its army beyond adding "two regiments of bicycles." (14) Shocked by the reality of the Nazi occupation and its increasingly oppressive treatment of Jews and other citizens, the Dutch slowly began to form resistance groups. The sisters joined one, Hannie another. They would eventually join forces. *Three Ordinary Girls* tells their story.

For the Oversteegen sisters, resistance began with the distribution of anti-Nazi pamphlets and leftist newspapers. It soon progressed to providing courier services and hiding and escorting Jews trying to avoid the Nazis. They did these things initially with their mother's support because the Nazis didn't find teenage girls suspicious. Hannie, on her own initiative, stole identification cards and gave them to a friend who knew how to make counterfeits for her Jewish friends. Out of necessity and applying common sense, all three developed effective tradecraft on the job to avoid capture. Their recruitment for more organized resistance work began when they were introduced to Frans van der Wiel.

Drawing on memoirs and interviews with survivors, author Tim Brady tells how Wiel recruited Truus and Freddie, tested their loyalty, trained them, and assigned them ever more risky tasks that eventually included sabotage and assassination. (85) Brady also explains how, late in the war, Wiel teamed Hannie up with the Oversteegens. (120) In addition to her work with the sisters, Hannie also bicycled past Nazi missile launch sites and reported their coordinates.

Three Ordinary Girls discloses a little-known story of wartime resistance that only two of the heroes survived. Their recognition was a long time coming, but well deserved. An interesting and valuable account.

Intelligence Abroad

A Faithful Spy: The Life and Times of An MI6 and MI5 Officer, by Jimmy Burns (Chiselbury, 2023) 384 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

Walter Bell was a career intelligence officer who served in both MI6 and MI5 in the UK, the United Sates, and several other countries. British journalist Jimmy Burns knew Bell and his wife Katharine ("Tattie") Spaatz, daughter of General Carl Spaatz, who commanded the Strategic Air Forces in Europe in WWII and would become the first chief of staff of the US Air Force in 1947. After Bell died in 2004, his wife gave his papers to Burns to use in his biography that otherwise would have "remained untold." (8)

The title of the book hints at its two intertwined but separate themes, one obvious—his intelligence career—the other less so—his loyalty. In the end, Burns concludes Bell was loyal, but throughout the book he hints at reasons others—even Kim Philby—were aware and sometimes concerned by the left-wing views he developed at the London School of Economics (LSE)—a contemporary of Richard Bissell, later director of CIA's operational directorate, the Directorate of Plans)—where he once sold copies of *The Daily Worker*. Even in retirement, Bell

would write of the "serene voices" of Harold Laski, John Strachey, and other Marxists. (327)

After a summary of Bell's family origins and his early life in Europe, Burns covers the second theme, Bell's professional career. Burns provides a chronological account of Bell's assignments, beginning with his recruitment by MI6 in the mid 1930s. His first posting was to New York City, officially as vice consul but actually as deputy head of station to the consul or passport control officer.

After the war began in Europe, Bell was assigned to a new intelligence unit in New York called British Security Coordination (BSC), which was headed by Canadian William ("Bill") Stephenson. Bell's duties, Burns tells us, involved developing US support for Britain and the war effort.

In late 1940 Bell was posted on a short-term assignment to Mexico City for BSC. There he worked with FBI Special Agents and elements of the US Navy to track German ships trying to run the blockade.

Back in Washington in 1942, Bell was unexpectedly reassigned to London as the MI6 liaison officer to the OSS station. He returned to Washington in 1946 as private secretary to the Ambassador Lord Inverchapel. It was during that assignment that Director-General (D-G) of MI5 Sir Percy Sillitoe asked Bell to join MI5, which he subsequently did. (182)

Burns records Bell's MI5 service in Kenya—Head of Station, Nairobi—and India. Then in 1957, he returned to London as private secretary to MI5 D-G Roger Hollis. After one year, he moved on to the Caribbean and then back to Kenya in 1961, his final posting.

In the late 1960s, Bell retired from government service with high awards from the US and British governments. In retirement, he wrote articles advocating for more transparency on intelligence matters and on related national security issues. He also worked for The International Documentation and Information Centre, a private organization that supplied reports to selected journalists and think-tanks about Soviet ideological subversion and Soviet strategy.

Regrettably, Burns doesn't comment on the details of Bell's intelligence work, presumably because they were not included in his private papers. He compensates to some extent by discussing espionage cases that Bell "keenly followed" during his service, while noting Bell was not involved. For example, Burns gives lengthy attention to Cedric Belfridge's role as a Soviet agent assigned to the BSC and to Dusko Popov's (TRICYCLE) interaction with the FBI. Likewise, Burns mentions Bell's social contacts with Kim Philby and Donald Maclean, while acknowledging he was unaware of their treachery. Burns also names several high level friends, for example, Dick White, who headed MI5 and MI6, but nothing about their intelligence relationship.

There are some inaccuracies, such as Burns's reference to Philip Agee, as "the CIA officer turned whistle-blower," adding that "Angleton would never forgive him." Of course, Agee was defector not a whistle-blower and Burns never knew Angleton. Burns also called Maclean a double agent, while noting Hollis lacked the qualifications to be one.

A Faithful Spy tells an interesting personal story but doesn't satisfy this reader's desire to know more about his professional one.

Estimative Intelligence in European Foreign Policymaking: Learning Lessons from an Era of Surprise (Intelligence, Surveillance and Secret Warfare), edited by Christopher Meyer, Eva Michaels, Nikki Ikani, Aviva Guttmann, and Michael S. Goodman (Edinburgh University Press, 2022), 351 pages, end-of-chapter notes, references, index.

Predicting the future is easy; anyone can do it. Estimating the circumstances of international crises in time to allow decisionmakers to take appropriate action is more difficult, as this volume demonstrates. Each of the nine academic contributors have experience writing and teaching strategic intelligence. One is a former UK senior defense intelligence officer. Another headed the German foreign intelligence service (BND) and is a former director of the little-known European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre, an organization seldom encountered in the literature. The study also has the benefit of consultation and draft-review by several intelligence professionals,

as for example, Sir David Oman, former head of GCHQ (the UK's equivalent of NSA) and author of his own important books on intelligence.

Seven of the eight articles in this volume take a lessons-learned approach to the way three major European polities—the UK, Germany, and the EU—dealt with estimative intelligence relating to three crises: the Arab Spring uprisings, ISIS's rise to power in Syria and Iraq, and the Russian annexation of parts of Ukraine. In particular, they examine the extent to which surprise was a factor in each event. (18)

The contributors' analysis is based on government and open-source—presumably corroborated—material. Another interesting feature is the focus on European intelligence operating conditions in both intelligence production and decision making while consciously avoiding the vastly different US approach, which they outline briefly.

Rather than employ a single-case analysis where each player is compared with a given instance of surprise, the core premise of this study takes a dual-comparison approach that analyzes the performance of the three intelligence entities with each other and with the three cases of surprise. This, the editors argue, allows for a "very thorough and comprehensive analysis" (14) while increasing the potential for learning more about estimative intelligence. (248) While this may be true, the details of implementation are not well demonstrated.

The first seven chapters are guided by these essential questions: What surprised the knowledge producers and/or decisionmakers? Were they "black swan" (unique unexpected) moments? How did those responsible perform? What were the underlying causes of any performance problems? And which are the lessons that individuals, organizations, governments and foreign policy communities should learn for the future so as to be less frequently and less completely surprised about major foreign threats and opportunities? (2)

The final chapter raises many questions associated with the dual-comparison approach but does not address them in order, thus creating a cloud of confusion. One interesting conclusion is that the better resourced and more experienced of three intelligence services considered did not produce better estimates of surprise. A second and more valuable result confirms that "fundamentally, it is doubtful whether the right lessons have been learned in a lasting way by European governments, ministries and agencies, foreign policy communities, and societies" may be correct, but the precise reasons remain obscure. (2) A challenging contribution.

I Was Never Here: My True Canadian Spy Story of Coffees, Code Names and Covert Operations in the Age of Terrorism, by Andrew Kirsch (pagetwo.com: Page Two, 2022) 230 pages.

After working as a financial analyst in the UK, Canadian Andrew Kirsch responded to the 2005 terrorist attack in London by asking Google, "How do I become a Canadian spy?" He got a response! After a few months processing, he joined the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) as an intelligence analyst and later served as a field investigator. After a decade on the job, he grew tired of the bureaucracy and "the grueling reality of being a spy" and left CSIS to form a private security-threat firm and to write a memoir. (4) The book's title comes from Kirsch's service on a covert operations squad that occasionally had to gain access to an activity legally but without leaving signs.

I Was Never Here address two audiences: one consists of potential intelligence officers and the other is the broader reading public. With respect to the first, Kirsch describes his own experiences, including his application, training, tradecraft, and working conditions, especially those of a field investigator. He then describes Canada's national security program and components—CSIS and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police—in particular, as well as the modern threats—terrorism, cyber warfare—with which it must deal. He compares CSIS to the British and Israeli intelligence services. Toward general readers, he issues an appeal for increased public alertness to cyber threats.

Kirsch provides a good introduction to a Five Eyes intelligence service.

Shadows Within Shadows: Spies and Intelligence in Historical China, by Ralph D. Sawyer (Independently published, 2023), 286 pages, footnotes, no index.

The study of Chinese military and intelligence history has been part of Ralph Sawyer's scholarly pursuits for more than five decades. His first book, *The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China* (Basic Books, 2007), included a translation of Sun-tsu's *Art of War.* He has also written numerous papers on related topics and, to satisfy the many requests for copies, has published nine of the most popular in *Shadows Within Shadows*. Each was presented at a professional conference and several have been published in professional journals, one in *Studies in Intelligence*. When given estimates of unit conventional publishing costs approaching $100 per book, Sawyer decided on self-publishing at about $12 a copy to increase accessibility.

While there is much to learn about Chinese intelligence history in *Shadows Within Shadows,* Sawyer's selection of the title, a line from an extended treatment of misinformation by a Ming Dynasty military thinker, is in and of itself difficult to understand, as most classical Chinese language expressions are. It is explained more fully in Sawyer's article, "Wisdom of the Ancients: Traditional Chinese Conceptions and Approaches to Secrecy, Denial, and Obfuscation (*Studies in Intelligence* 64, no. 1, March 2020).

Of the nine substantive chapters in the book, the first six deal with aspects of the intelligence profession—defectors, human agents, double agents, deception, Chinese disinformation theory—as developed during China's long history. In his discussions of them, Sawyer is strong on principles but light on detailed implementation examples. His sources are most often *The Art of War* though sometimes he includes frequently incomplete Chinese references. And, of concern to those not well acquainted with Chinese intelligence history, each of the chapters contain unfamiliar terms and references to Chinese historical personalities and events that are presented without context.

Should readers desire more detail and background on the topics mentioned here, two of Sawyer's books may be of help. *The Tao of Spycraft* (Hachette Books, 1998) presents an expanded treatment of the first six chapters (*Tao* is a Chinese term synonymous with "method" or "the way"). The second choice is Sawyer's *Book of Spies* (Independently published, 2020), his translation of *Jianshu* by Zhu Fengjia, which deals with premodern Chinese spycraft. For additional perspective on Sawyer's translation of this work it is recommended that readers consult the review article by Michael Schoenhals, "A Chinese Spy Manual From the Quing Dynasty" (*Intelligence and National Security* 36, no. 7 [2021]: 1076–80).

The final three chapters turn away from intelligence to focus on Chinese military thought and strategic warfare policy, including contemporary political developments in China. According to Sawyer, the "inexorable dominance of Xi Jinping's thought in every realm" in the current period "has mooted the relevance of traditional martial contemplations." Some examples are provided in the footnotes. (6)

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