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## Contemporary Issues

***The Black Banners Declassified: How Torture Derailed the War on Terror after 9/11***, by Ali H. Soufan with Daniel Freedman. (W.W. Norton and Company, 2020) 594 pages, photos, index.

The term "black banners" is attributed to the prophet Muhammad who said that the black banners will come out of the Khurasan region of northeastern Iran and will not be defeated. Osama bin Ladin signed his declaration of jihad against the West and decreed that the flag of al-Qa'ida be black.[a] Author and former FBI special agent Ali Soufan adopted the term for the first edition of his book *The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda* published in 2011.

Mr. Soufan began the book with a compelling expression of displeasure at the often lengthy redactions—some entire pages—insisted on by CIA for security reasons.[b] The addition of "Declassified" to the primary title of the second edition signals that Mr. Soufan's objections have been overcome, and indeed that is the case. Aside from adding some updates (unspecified), an index, photos, and a foreword (it thanks CIA for changing its position)—these additions account for the pagination difference. The new subtitle better reflects Mr. Soufan's central argument: enhanced interrogation techniques—he calls them torture—don't work and damage operations. The desired results, he argues forcefully, more often follow from the nuanced interrogation techniques he developed and applied successfully and to which the majority of the book is devoted.

Do the unredacted portions of the second edition strengthen his assertion that enhanced interrogation produced no useful results and were they justified on security grounds? The answer to both questions is no. Both editions of *The Black Banners* discuss Mr. Soufan's FBI career from his work in Jordan, his extensive involvement in the investigation of the USS *Cole* bombing, and his contributions to post-9/11 interrogations of terrorist suspects. Although he provides many examples of his approach to interrogations, while insisting those employed by the CIA were ineffective despite claims to the contrary by various CIA officers, the redacted portions do not influence these contentions. Because there are no source notes or other means of verification, the final judgment is left to the reader.

The inherent controversy aside, *The Black Banners Declassified* gives an interesting and valuable perspective on the terrorist interrogation issue.

***The Fourth Man: The Hunt for a KGB Spy at the Top of the CIA and the Rise of Putin's Russia***, by Robert Baer. (Hachette Books, 2022) 295, endnotes, index.

In his first book, *See No Evil*, former CIA case officer Robert Baer wrote about his career spent mainly in the Middle East working against terrorist networks. In the mid-1990s, during a tour in CIA Headquarters, he was chief of the Caucasus and Central Asia Branch of the Central Eurasia (CE) Division, in the Directorate of Operations, under division chief Bill Lofgren. One day in March 1996, while they were returning to CIA from a White House briefing, Lofgren announced he was retiring and that he felt bad about some unfinished business. Then as they were parking, he said, "We've got another one. . . . The KGB's running an asset in that building," pointing to the Original Headquarters Building in front of them. (19) Baer knew that he wasn't talking about Aldrich Ames, he was in prison; or Edward Howard, he had escaped to Moscow; or the third suspect who had not been identified and turned out to be Robert Hanssen. Baer concluded Lofgren must have been alluding to some unexplained compromised operations. But Lofgren said no more.

a. Cited in: Kira Zalan: "Dissecting the Threat," *U. S. News Weekly,* September 23, 2011: 14.

b. Ali H. Soufan with Daniel Freedman, *Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda* (W.W. Norton & Company, 2011) 574, key documents and articles cited, no index.

Twenty-three years later, by then both retired, Lofgren told Baer, "I think I know who the KGB mole is." (21) And after naming the suspect, he suggested Baer—who knew most of those involved—look into the matter. Baer did, and *The Fourth Man* tells what he found.

Out of the government, Baer could not conduct a formal inquiry. But he could try to contact key players and try to determine what kind of an investigation had been conducted, what was concluded, and what action resulted.

Baer found several cases that the KGB appeared to know about before Ames or Howard revealed them. For example, KGB Col. Oleg Gordievsky was recalled from London and interrogated before Ames gave the KGB his name, at least according to Ames. If not Ames, who? Then there were instances of very sensitive documents in KGB possession that could not be explained. Acquiring all the facts was not easy. Many of those involved, some retired and some still active, refused to discuss the matter. Even the fact that there was a hunt for the fourth man had been restricted. (Ironically, at one point two of the CI analysts involved had been assigned to Baer, but he was not told what they were doing.) But Baer was able to enlist the support of the lead CI analyst, Laine Bannerman, and she explained the methodology applied to attempt to identify suspects, a methodology that had been developed by former CI chief David Blee. (106–109)

In short, four CI analysts—three from CIA and one from FBI—designated the Special Investigative Unit (SIU), conducted the investigation working in a secure vault. They examined all compromised operations that could not be explained and determined which CIA personnel, CIA agents (Baer erroneously calls them "double agents"), and defectors had known or could have known about them. Foremost among the CIA KGB agents was Alekander Zaporozhsky (called "Max"), who told his handlers—Baer doesn't say when—that he had heard of two penetrations, "one in the CIA and the other in the FBI," and he was "absolutely certain that both were still in place." (11) Then in 1993, he revealed the clue that led directly to Ames. (16) That revelation made it easier to believe Max's subsequent, more sensational, claim: "There was another KGB double agent in the CIA, one more senior and better placed than Ames." (17) Based on all these factors the SIU built a timeline and a matrix that related personnel travel details, bank accounts and deposits, and any unexplained or extraordinary behavior that might correlate with a compromise. *The Fourth Man* describes these complex efforts in detail.

Unfortunately, the SIU never found a smoking gun though it did present evidence that pointed to a very senior staff officer, who did not take the suggestion well. His retaliatory measures, writes Baer, gradually and effectively shut down the investigation. A final point concerns the fourth man's ability to survive. Baer suggests it may have been because he was controlled by the KGB's Second Chief Directorate (now the FSB), since it was and is more secure and powerful, especially under Putin. The SIU, on the other hand, focused on the less secure KGB First Chief Directorate (now SVR). (229)

In his epilogue, after conceding that he doesn't know who the fourth man is, Baer provides a good summary of the many unanswered questions and equivocal issues that leave a firm conclusion in doubt. And after mentioning what happened to the careers of the principal players, he ends by expressing the certainty that without agents in Russian intelligence, the CIA doesn't "stand a chance of understanding the forces and mechanics behind Putin's KGB-backed takeover." (228)

*The Fourth Man* is very well written and leaves readers with a good idea of the work of counterintelligence analysts. A thought-provoking contribution to the literature.

***Getting To Know The President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates and Presidents-Elect, 1952–2016,*** Fourth Edition, by John L. Helgerson. (Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2021) 310 pages, footnotes, photos, index.

Since 1952, presidential candidates and presidents-elect have received intelligence briefings during their campaigns and the presidential transition periods from the CIA and later the Intelligence Community. The first of four editions of *Getting To Know The President*, each written by John Helgerson, was published in 1996, and it described the contacts made with the candidates through the first Clinton administration. A new edition was

published after each change in administration with the addition of a chapter that covered the previous incumbent and providing insights into how he viewed intelligence.

The new chapter, "Donald J. Trump: A Unique Challenge," is worthy of consideration. After he was inaugurated, President Trump's briefers came to be convinced that "he doubted the competence of the intelligence professionals and felt no need for intelligence support." And, Helgerson notes, he criticized the "outgoing directors of national intelligence and the CIA, and disparaged the work and integrity of the intelligence agencies." (231)

But those were not the impressions Trump conveyed as a candidate or during the transition period, when briefings were presented about twice a week. Trump's reaction to the President's Daily Briefing (PDB), according to the principal briefer, was that "He touched it. He doesn't really read anything." (243) In another departure from his predecessors, Trump was not briefed by the CIA on any covert action programs, although some on his team were.

Tensions between the IC and Trump increased following charges that Russia had interfered in the election, the leaking of the Steele dossier alleging improper conduct by Trump in Moscow, and the allegations that the Trump team had had improper contacts with the Russians. Helgerson deals with each of these matters in turn before discussing how Trump's support during the 2016 Republican primary campaign for enhanced interrogation techniques created another point of tension with CIA Director John Brennan (254–55) and Trump's irritation following the whistle-blower complaint in August 2019 about his efforts to enlist Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's support for investigating then-candidate Joseph Biden. (266)

The fourth edition also comments on briefings to Trump's staff, his first cabinet appointments, and his visit to CIA Headquarters on his first full day in office, when his "largely extemporaneous remarks backfired." (262)

Overall, Helgerson concludes that "the IC achieved only limited success" with the Trump transition. (269) The final chapter of the 4th edition, however, presents Helgerson's views on the briefing program and the assessments of former presidents that leave no doubt of its unique value to the principals and those concerned about national security in our government.

## Memoir

***Free: A Child and a Country at the End of History*** (US edition), by Lea Ypi. (W.W. Norton & Co., 2021), 288 pages.

Lea Ypi's account of coming of age in an Albania that was coming apart is extraordinary. Ypi reminds us, in prose that is at once quiet and suddenly revelatory, that Albania is composed of fellow human beings with stories to tell, not a punchline to a joke or an abstract intelligence problem. Those stories reveal themselves elliptically, as Ypi discovers hidden, sometimes intimate, truths about herself, her family, and their friends and enemies. We learn of the small triumphs, daily compromises, and subtle acts of resistance of life under Albania's cloistered, xenophobic brand of socialism espoused by longtime dictator Enver Hoxha, who ruled from 1944 until his death in 1985.

Isolated by geography and politics, ruled in ancient times by a succession of empires and invaders (Romans, Byzantines, Visigoths, Bulgars, Huns, Ottoman Turks), divided and battered by the great powers during the world wars, and estranged in succession from Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and China during the Cold War, Albania existed in a kind of political gloaming. Like North Korea under the Kim family dynasty, perhaps the closest parallel in the 20th century, Albania under Hoxha collectivized agricultural production, nationalized industries, and insti-tuted highly centralized economic planning.

Like every communist "socialist paradise," Albania ensured compliance through complex webs of surveillance, repression, informants, self-censorship, and as Ypi details, state files on every individual. These "biographies" sorted Albanians into categories of privilege that depended on a family's revolutionary credentials and political reliability. "Biographies were carefully separated into good or bad, relevant or irrelevant, transparent or confusing, suspicious or trustworthy." (27) For Ypi, coming to age meant learning about her own family's

biography, which had channeled her grandparents, parents, and ultimately herself into lives bounded by unseen but omnipresent fences.

When change came fitfully in 1990, and talk of "civil society" replaced "the Party," (184) Albanians tried to regain their footing on a changed social landscape. Like others behind the crumbling Iron Curtain, many of Ypi's family and neighbors reinvented themselves in the blink of an eye. Apparatchiks became entrepreneurs, fervent Stalinists become respectable socialists, and stolid bureaucrats became parliamentarians.

For a time, people seemed to be Albania's chief export. But as Ypi observes, when Albania was closed, the Europeans wanted to help them leave; when the walls came down, Europe slammed the doors shut, herded refugees into camps, and pushed them back into the sea. Freedom, it turns out, does not mean the freedom to move, a bitter lesson repeated any times since.

In 1997, Albania descended into civil war; that June, when Ypi graduated from high school, her final exam was interrupted by a bomb threat. Ypi, now a professor of Marxism at the London School of Economics, observes in her epilogue that "if there is one lesson to take away from the history of my family, and of my country, it was that people never make history under the circumstances they choose." (261) This is a lesson intelligence officers would do well to remember.

*Free* was awarded prizes by the *New York Times*, *Guardian*, *Financial Times*, *New Yorker*, and shortlisted for more. Ypi deserves every plaudit.

*The reviewer*: Joseph Gartin is managing editor of *Studies*.

***UNCLASSIFIED: My Life Before, During, and After the CIA***, by Richard James Kerr. (Rand-Smith Publishing, 2020) 215, photos, no index.

After a somewhat chaotic childhood, he joined the Army, married, and later obtained a history degree from the University of Oregon. In 1960, he joined CIA as an analyst, grade GS-7, retiring 33 years later after serving as acting director of central intelligence. Dick Kerr's career at CIA was unique and in many ways exemplary though his memoir doesn't use those terms. *UNCLASSIFIED* is a straightforward account of how he became an intelligence professional and the skills he developed working with Congress and the executive branch. He participated in important world events from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the first Iraq war, often briefing world leaders and gaining their respect even when they were not pleased with the message. At CIA, he was admired for his abilities and impish demeanor. He once attended Director William Webster's staff meeting wearing a gorilla costume; the director only asked him if he had anything to report. (107) On Halloween he wore it all day. Reaction to the appearance of a six-foot three-inch gorilla in the halls was not recorded, though readers of this review recall with delight Kerr dressed as Sesame Street's Big Bird or wearing bow ties with blinking lights on select occasions.

In this memoir Kerr treats the details his career chronologically. He served under 10 directors beginning with Allen Dulles. However, it was under John McCone that he first participated in congressional briefings "as a bag carrier." (29) The experience served him well. He would go on to brief many presidents and foreign leaders, events that required extensive travel, much of which he describes.

As Kerr advanced up the organizational ladder, he served in various directorates, gaining experience in such functions as imagery collection and exploitation programs and the *Glomar Explorer* operation. Director William Casey made Kerr the deputy director for administration and subsequently the deputy director for intelligence (today's Directorate of Analysis). It was also under Casey that Kerr became involved in the Iran-Contra affair, although he was prescient enough to express his doubts in writing to Casey.

In 1989, as Webster's deputy, Kerr was briefed on what later became the Aldrich Ames case, "a real disaster for the CIA and the nation." In retrospect, he regrets not pushing "to get answers about what was going on." He had "never worked on a major counterintelligence problem or paid much attention to that area of intelligence." (109)

Kerr was also deputy director when he was sent to meet Senator Orin Hatch, who wanted the CIA to hire a friend

to fill a senior position. Kerr explains how Hatch made his request, initially in the senator's offices and later by phone. The pressure was intense, but the candidate did not have the necessary prerequisites; Kerr refused and explains his rationale.

In an unusual twist for a memoir, Kerr asked four former colleagues to write some comments about their relationships. They are included in chapter 7 and add colorful perspective. Then Kerr adds his own views of the "CIA in Decline," seen from retirement and resulting in part from consequences of the creation of the ODNI. (111)

Life in retirement was not cocktails, tennis, and golf, though there may have been some of that. Kerr tells of his first trip to Russia, his work with the media, consulting with CIA[a] and corporate boards, and his membership on a four-member commission in Northern Ireland monitoring the Good Friday Agreement. Then there was the meeting in Dubrovnik, Croatia with retired intelligence officers, including Markus Wolf, former head of the East German foreign intelligence service—the HVA, not the Stasi—Dick Stolz (former deputy director for operations) and others from various countries. A book of their papers was published.[b]

At several points in the book Kerr mentions his wife, Jan, and her skillful home management during his frequent absences. All the more impressive because she also had CIA duties and helped raise their four children.

Dick Kerr ends his story with some thoughts on the state of world affairs and the CIA. (148) He is concerned about the future of democracies and the threat of authoritarianism, problems he urges the CIA to address. (149)

*UNCLASSIFIED,* not by declaration but by example, refutes a time-worn wisdom that says success at the CIA goes to the Ivy Leaguers or graduates of a handful of top universities. A really worthwhile contribution to the intelligence literature.

## History

***All Blood Runs Red: The Legendary Life of Eugene Bullard—Boxer, Pilot, Soldier; Spy***, by Phil Keith with Tom Clavin. (Hanover Square Press, 2020) 350 pages, footnotes, photos, index.

On December 16, 1959, as *Today Show* host Dave Garroway entered the elevator in Rockefeller Center in New York City, he greeted Gene Bullard, the friendly operator who regularly wore several medals on his uniform. But on that day Garroway noticed an impressive new medal and asked what it was. "The Legion of Merit," Bullard replied, "France's highest decoration." (312) Eugene James Bullard, whose grandparents had been enslaved, explained it had been awarded for service in World War I, but it was only recently presented. A stunned Garroway then asked about the other medals and Bullard said it was a long story. Within a week Bullard summarized his story on the *Today Show*. (314) *All Blood Runs Red* by history writer and US Navy veteran Phil Keith (who died in 2021) and Tom Clavin fills in the details.

Eugene Bullard was born on October 9, 1895, in Columbus, Georgia, the seventh of 10 children. After two years of schooling and faced with virulent racism, he ran away, intending eventually to go to France where, his father told him, Blacks were treated the same as Whites. After a series of odd jobs and training as a jockey, he stowed away on a German ship bound for Scotland. Unable to understand the Scots, he went on to London where he performed slapstick comedy learned on the job with a touring African-American troupe. He also trained with a boxer who helped him get to Paris, where he found success as a boxer and worked in a dance hall until World War I broke out in August 1914.

Because foreigners were not allowed to join the French Army, Bullard joined the French Foreign Legion and became a machinegunner. Later the situation changed and

a. CIA engaged Kerr's consulting group to review the analytic performance of the IC on the approach to and beginning of the war against Iraq during 2003–04. The unclassified part of that report, "Collection and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the US Intelligence Community," appeared in *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 3 (2005): 47–54.

b. General Todor Boyadjiev (ed.), *The Intelligence: Men of Dignity in the Game With No Rules* (Libra Scorp, 2006).

he was assigned to the 170th Infantry Regiment serving at Verdun. After his second severe wound, he was awarded the Croix de Guerre. While recuperating, a colleague suggested he transfer to the French air service and become an aerial gunner. Then he decided to become a pilot, though other friends bet he could not do it. He was accepted and received his pilot's wings in May 1917. He flew more than 20 combat missions. "All Blood Runs Red" was painted, in French, on the side of his plane.

Bullard stayed in France after the war working as a drummer in a jazz band. He later started an athletic club and eventually opened a nightclub of his own called, L'Escadrille. Josephine Baker, Langston Hughes, Louis Armstrong, and Ernest Hemmingway were frequent patrons. They were entertained by performers like Dooley Wilson, who played Sam in the film *Casablaca*.

By the time World War II started, Bullard had married, divorced, and had custody of two daughters. It was then that he was contacted by the Deuxième Bureau, French military counterintelligence, and asked to report what the many German officers said while they dined and drank in his club. (205ff) Unfortunately, *All Blood Runs Red* does not dwell on the intelligence or the details of its acquisition. It does say that Bullard was convincing enough to fool the Germans and a local partisan who shot him for being too friendly with the hated enemy. He survived.

When the Germans invaded France, Bullard volunteered for the infantry. He was wounded for the last time at Orléans and forced to escape to Spain. Then with help of friends at the US embassy, he returned to the United States where he would remain until his death in 1961.

*All Blood Runs Red* tells an extraordinary story of a pathbreaking American who was posthumously recognized by the National Museum of the US Air Force.

***Break in the Chain—Intelligence Ignored: Military Intelligence in Vietnam and Why the Easter Offensive Should Have Turned Out Differently***, by W.R. (Bob) Baker. (Casemate: 2021) 251 pages, endnotes, bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

Bob Baker was an army brat. By the time he graduated high school in 1970, he had lived all over the United States and in Germany, and his father was completing a second tour in Vietnam. The draft was still in effect when he received a draft board notice to report for a physical. He enlisted so that he could pursue the military specialty of his choice, intelligence. After basic training he was assigned to the first class at the new intelligence center at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, and graduated first in his class. He was sent directly to Vietnam. *Break in the Chain* tells the story of his tour as an analyst in the 571st Military Intelligence (MI) Detachment and the events surrounding the Easter Offensive of 1972 in I Corps (comprising the three provinces just below the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam).

The central argument of Baker's book is that the Easter Offensive should not have been the surprise that it was and that lives were lost unnecessarily because the warnings supplied by the 571st were ignored. In developing this position, Baker presents a broad view of the military operations in Vietnam in the early 1970s. He includes events preceding the Easter Offensive that influenced it and the intelligence briefed to the military leaders at all levels of command from Washington to Saigon headquarters (MACV), and various field elements. Writing some 50 years after the events allowed Baker to draw on archival material to provide a broad perspective and include details he did not know when they occurred.

In some respects, Baker's narrative reads like an intelligence analyst's report. He gives order of battle (OB) details for all sides, with dates and estimates of anticipated actions, and source reliability, all in considerable detail. And while acknowledging the often conflicting reports from other military and civilian sources, he concludes, "Our reports would become the lynchpin of future efforts for 1972." (145) To illustrate this point, he quotes the 571st report of February 28, 1972, that stated the "general offensive plan of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam would go into effect on March 10, 1972" [it began in April] and consist of "four main fronts." This was contrary to the current thinking and when Baker noted it was based on four reliable human agents, it only increased official doubt. This was because, he claims, human sources were considered unreliable by most commanders. To strengthen his point, he adds, "Virtually all detailed collateral information leading up to (and for the next couple of weeks after) the Easter

Offensive of 1972 in I Corps came from the 571st MI Detachment's agent reports…and our analysis contained in these INTSUMS" [intelligence summaries]. (146.)

While Baker makes a strong argument that the 571st got it right, he does not present any hard evidence that headquarters intentionally ignored the intelligence because even he acknowledges conflicting positions existed. There could have been other factors causing the delayed response. In the end, South Vietnam, supported by US airpower, won the Easter Offensive, so the details Baker raises are not the subject of most histories.

*Break In The Chain* is a well-documented account that sheds light on an important intelligence contribution to the Vietnam War and the role of intelligence at the tactical level.

***Capital of Spies: Intelligence Agencies in Berlin During the Cold War***, by Sven Felix Kellerhoff & Bernd Von Kostka. (Casemate, 2021) 230 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

German historians Sven Kellerhoff and Bernd Von Kostka begin their book with the assertions that Berlin was the capital of spies during the Cold War and may still be so today. To bolster the latter position they cite Hans-Georg Maaßen, the head of the BfV—the German counterespionage agency from 2012 to 2018: "In no other city are there more spies." (9) But nothing more is said about post–Cold War Berlin espionage. And while this English edition of *Capital of Spies* is a revised version of the original German edition published in 2008, the focus remains the Cold War. Kellerhoff and Kostka offer this account as an updated "introduction to the history of espionage in Berlin." (11)

Examples of the new material include the discussion of the case of Stasi agent and West German policeman Karl-Heinz Kurras based on the release of more than 30 volumes of Stasi files in 2009. Then there is the surprising discovery of the previously unknown portions of the Berlin Tunnel in 2012, segments of which are in the Washington International Spy Museum. (11)

Most of the other topics in the book are well known. These include Jeffery Carney, the US soldier who monitored East European communications and volunteered his services to the Stasi, and James Hall, who worked at the Anglo-American listening post on Teufelsberg—the highest point in West Berlin—and who offered his services to both the East Germans and the KGB. (59) Then there is the Berlin Tunnel operation, the Allies' military liaison missions working out of Potsdam, and the use of female agents in special operations. (129–32) Finally, they include the origins of the Stasi and its takeover by Erich Mielke and some discussion of HVA (the foreign intelligence division) under Markus Wolf.

The final chapter is devoted to an operation in which the CIA acquired a "list of at least several hundred thousand" HVA secret agents, designated the Rosenholz files. (352) The authors admit the details of acquisition remain in question, and they summarize the various alternatives that have surfaced, all unofficial. Understandably, the German intelligence services wanted copies of the Rosenholz files and the authors include a photo of a CD—with "Rosenholz" misspelled on the label as "Rosnholtz"—claiming copies were returned. They also indicate some agents were identified and arrested but are uncertain as to the overall counterintelligence benefits achieved.

*Capital of Spies* is an interesting, well-documented overview of Cold War espionage in Berlin.[a]

***The Cold War Wilderness of Mirrors: Counterintelligence and the US and Soviet Military Liaison Missions, 1947–1990****, by* Aden C. Magee. (Casemate, 2021) 322 pages, illustrations, maps, bibliography, and index.

For more than 40 years, the United States and Soviet Union maintained Military Liaison Missions (MLMs) in Germany, which—despite their anodyne name and origins—served as important intelligence collection

a. US Army historian Thomas Boghardt has written a history that focuses on the work of Army intelligence in Germany at the beginning of the Cold War. See, *Covert Legions: U.S. Army Intelligence in Germany, 1944–1949* (US Army Center for Military History, 2022).

platforms for each side in the Cold War. In *The Cold War Wilderness of Mirrors*, former intelligence officer Aden C. Magee tells the story of this little-known area of intelligence history. Unfortunately, his account is not as valuable as one would hope.

Magee starts promisingly enough, with a straight forward account of the formal establishment of the MLMs in 1947. Originally intended as a means through which US and Soviet military forces in occupied Germany could communicate. Because the agreement provided headquarters facilities and virtually unlimited travel rights in each other's zones, MLMs quickly assumed intelligence roles. (The British and French had MLMs of their own, but Magee's focus is on the US and Soviet missions.) Magee then provides an overview of the MLMs' operations, collection methods, and the cat-and-mouse games in which US Mission members engaged with the Soviets and East Germans as they sought to collect on the two states' military forces. This makes the first hundred pages of *The Cold War Wilderness of Mirrors* an interesting and informative history of an area of operations that most people have never heard of.

After that, however, the book becomes a subpar effort at counterintelligence history. Magee's point is that the Soviets outwitted the Americans at every turn, deploying a centralized effort that penetrated the US military in Germany to such an extent that, however successful MLM collection might have been, its efforts were neutralized—the Soviets knew all NATO plans and capabilities, he concludes. Much of the blame, Magee believes, lies with the military's complacency and ineptitude, but he heaps blame as well on CIA and its condescension toward military intelligence. Only late in the game, in the mid-1980s, did the US military realize how badly it had been defeated and began to reform its counterintelligence efforts. By then, of course, it hardly mattered, as the Soviet Union was on its last legs.

Magee, alas, needs almost 200 pages to make these points, and his writing is convoluted, repetitive, and dull to the point where all but the most dedicated readers will give up. Magee provides no footnotes or source attributions but instead gives a brief listing of the (largely secondary) sources he has consulted. This forces the reader to take his statements on faith, which is curious for a history that claims to use declassified documents and interviews as its primary sources. Magee may be correct in his statements, but the lack of citations makes it impossible to verify the accuracy of his accounts.

Beyond telling the story of the MLMs, the value of *The Cold War Wilderness of Mirrors* is Magee's point that the United States paid a heavy price for its poor counterintelligence practices. It's a shame, however, that it is surrounded by poor writing and inadequate documentation.

*The reviewer*: J.E. Leonardson.

***Fugitives: A History of Nazi Mercenaries during the Cold War,*** by Danny Orbach. (Pegasus Books, Ltd., 2022) 288 pages, notes, bibliography, photographs, index.

Seasoned intelligence professionals know well the aphorism that perception and reality are often part of the same potion. The narratives their organizations work to verify are not necessarily consistent with facts, but chasing them can have significant geopolitical implications antithetical to their state's interests. University of Jerusalem professor Danny Orbach's *Fugitives*: *A History of Nazi Mercenaries during the Cold War* is a useful allegory that underlines the importance of this timeworn lesson. In this case, Orbach's deep-dive research into US, German, and Israeli archives throws welcome light on the activities of lesser-known Nazi fugitives seeking new identities after Germany's collapse at the end of World War II. More importantly, it illustrates how the fever dreams of the spies arrayed against them were ultimately more influential than the less sensational, often painfully prosaic truth.

Whatever its billing, *Fugitives* is less a page-turning nonfiction thriller than a sometimes dizzying catalogue of names and incidents culled from Orbach's research. In just over 200 pages of text, Orbach breezes through a wide spectrum of players and organizations, most of which are unfamiliar even to persons well acquainted with WWII, the Holocaust, and Cold War spy games. Reinhard Gehlen, Adolf Eichmann, Josef Mengele, Heinz Felfe, and Herberts Cukurs all feature in various sections alongside lesser lights like Hermann Baun, Franz Rademacher, Walter Rauff, and Alois Brunner. Indications are that Orbach had more information on all of the lesser-known

individuals and the work would have benefited from deeper examination of their histories, personalities, and postwar activities.

Other minor flaws deserve cursory mention: Orbach sometimes is overreliant on metaphors or clichés that dilute the meaning of key passages. He has a strange fondness for the phrase, "Hitler's rubbish heap," which appears about a half-dozen times. Closer editing might have also helped. Orbach says the literal translation of *Auftragstaktik* is "mission tactics," when the closest English approximation for this hard-to-translate term is more like "assignment delegation tactic." Confusingly for the English-language reader, he refers to Lake Constance—which borders Germany, Austria, and Switzerland—as Lake Bodensee (in German, it is simply Bodensee).

None of these, however, undermines the utility of *Fugitives* as a quick, consequential read useful for even experienced intelligence professionals. Orbach skips across various persons, organizations, and events but still maintains a unifying narrative theme. In particular, he highlights how Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, the West German intelligence service) head Gehlen and Mossad Director Isser Harel both were victims of emotionally slanted, narrative-based thinking divorced from strong factual support. For example, Gehlen's fear of Soviet aggression blinded him to the risks of employing compromised, highly suspect individuals like Felfe, whose betrayal to the Soviets deeply dented the BND's credibility and Gehlen's legacy. Gehlen's willingness to supply arms through ex-Nazis to Algerian revolutionaries even undermined West Germany's careful efforts of rapprochement with France.

Similarly, Harel's obsession with German scientists working in Egypt arose from his fear that Gamal Abdel Nasser wanted to initiate a second Holocaust against the Jewish state with nuclear missiles. This belief was completely inconsistent with the facts that CIA and his own intelligence operatives were reporting. Mossad finally retreated from this narrative but not before kidnappings, letter bombs, and bungled assassination attempts undertaken as part of Operation Damocles threatened bilateral ties with the West German government and cost Harel his job. Both cases show that *Fugitives* is a timely reminder for an evergreen lesson: even experienced professionals do well to keep a clear head and discerning eye despite the heavy undertow of emotional and cognitive biases.

*The reviewer:* Chris K. is a member of the Lessons Learned Program at CSI.

***Honey Trapped: Sex, Betrayal and Weaponized Love**, by Henry R. Schlesinger*. (The History Press, 2021) 352 pages, bibliography, index.

Twenty years after his release from prison in 1972, former KGB agent John Vassall was in need of funds. At a meeting in Claridge's Hotel in London, collector Keith Melton bought the Minox-A camera—now in the International Spy Museum—Vassall had used to photograph British secrets and pass them to the KGB. Vassall, a gay man, was recruited while serving in the British embassy in Moscow as a clerk, although not a code clerk or assistant naval attaché as Schlesinger asserts. *Honey Trapped* describes how Vassall, after being shown photographs of himself in compromising circumstances with other men, agreed to become a KGB agent—a textbook honey trap. (257–61)

Not all the cases included in *Honey Trapped* are as clear cut as Vassall's. Discounting his references to fictional cases, some of them do not qualify at all, like famed Civil War doctor Mary Walker, Confederate scout Frank Stringfellow, or the much-mythologized World War I spymaster Elsbeth Schragmüller, none of whom used sexual entrapment for espionage. (154–57) This ironically supports his assertion "that those outside the intelligence community usually possess only a vague understanding of how honey-trap operations work." (15)

In several instances Schlesinger broadens the classic Vassall definition of a honey-trap operation to include instances of seduction that lack a coercive element. The Civil War cases of Rose Greenhow and Belle Boyd are examples. (80–85) Mata Hari also falls in this category. The NKVD agent who seduced Trotsky's female assistant to gain access to him and thus allow his assassination is another. (164–65) Markus Wolf's East German so-called Romeo spies also qualify. (301ff)

The inclusion of the Bernard Boursicot case stretches the definition even further. (268–69) Boursicot, a French diplomat in China, was seduced by a Chinese-sponsored person with whom he fell in love and claimed to have fathered a child. Confronted by Chinese security officials who threatened to break up the union, Boursicot provided secret documents. The case blew up when it was revealed that Boursicot's lover was a man. His explanation for the charade made no sense, and he served time in a French jail.

Although *Honey Trapped* is a well written collection of interesting stories, there are no source notes and many unforced errors. Caveat lector.

***Nazis on the Potomac: The Top-Secret Intelligence Operation that Helped Win World War II***, by Robert K. Sutton. (Casemate, 2021) 205 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Originally part of George Washington's Mount Vernon estate in Northern Virigina, and named after a Civil War Union general, Ft. Hunt served a unique purpose during WWII. Three secret intelligence operations were conducted there. The first, called Military Intelligence Service-X (MIS-X), specialized in developing escape and evasion methods that could help American POWs escape. The second, Military Intelligence Service-Y (MIS-Y), involved specially trained soldiers who interrogated high-value German prisoners and eavesdropped on POW conversations. The third operation, called the Military Intelligence Research Service (MIRS), translated and analyzed captured German documents. The military participants were all sworn to secrecy for life and could refer to their post only as "PO Box 1142," its mail address in nearby Alexandria, Virginia. When the records of these operations were finally declassified beginning about 20 years ago, Robert Sutton, chief historian of the National Park Service, became interested in the story, interviewed the few survivors, and wrote *Nazis on the Potomac*.

While Sutton provides historical background on Ft. Hunt and biographical data on those he interviewed, the most interesting parts of the book are examples of what these operations did. For instance, there's the case of Silvio Bedini, "the first cryptographer in the U.S. Army"—a doubtful claim but still of interest. He was assigned to the "Creamery," the building where codes for communicating with POWs were developed. There he created a system that worked well for communicating with POWs. (188)

The interrogation and eavesdropping program, MIS-Y, had mixed results. Sutton estimates the most valuable information came from the monitoring program, the rest from interrogation. But the time delay involved lessened the value of the information in both cases and no examples are provided. The document translation program had similar limitations of time and distance. Sutton gives it high marks for producing the "Red Book" containing the German Army order of battle (OB) used by the Allies. (20) This is a difficult claim to accept since the Allies had more timely OB data in the field. But MIRS was of great historical value and continued long after the war was over.

Sutton adds comments about the staffing of Ft. Hunt. Most men trained at Camp Richie, Maryland; many were German Jews who had escaped to the United States. He also discusses Ft. Hunt's role in Operation Paperclip, which dealt with German scientists brought to the United States after the war. He mentions Werner van Braun as the most famous of the group, but he does not say he spent time at Ft. Hunt, although several of his colleagues were debriefed there.

Two final points are worth remembering. First, although chapter 5 is titled "Name, Rank, and Serial Number," soldiers did not have serial numbers; they had and still have service numbers. Second, *Nazis on the Potomac* is more about German military men, not all of whom were Nazis. In any case, it is an interesting contribution to the military intelligence record.[a]

***The Nine: The True Story of a Band of Women Who Survived the Worst of Nazi Germany***, by Gwen Strauss. (St. Martin's Press 2021) 317, endnotes, bibliography, photos, no index.

Gwen Strauss is a poet. Her great aunt Hèlené Podliasky was an engineering student at the Sorbonne, who spoke five languages and joined the French Resistance in 1943 when she was 23 years old. Captured in Paris by the

a. See also Warren Fishbein's review of *Nazis on the Potomac* on page 47 of this issue.

Gestapo in 1944, she was sent to Ravensbruck concentration camp on the last train to leave the city before the Allies arrived. Hèlené survived the war a decorated officer but did not speak of her experiences until 2002, when Strauss interviewed her. *The Nine* tells her story and those of her fellow prisoners—five French, two Dutch, and one Spaniard.

The first chapter, titled "Hèlené," begins with an account of how the nine escaped the Germans. Only later do we learn how they were caught in the first place, the circumstances of their imprisonment, and how Strauss learned their stories.

While not a traditional chronological accounting, it is not annoying either. Chapters are devoted to one or more of the prisoner/escapees and provide essential background. In Hèlené's case we learn how Strauss came to record her great aunt's work for the Resistance. Besides the coded communications with London, she coordinated agent and equipment drops behind German lines in northern France and held clandestine meetings with resistance leaders. It was one these efforts gone wrong that led to her arrest and the brutal experiences of German waterboarding (9) and having her fingernails pulled out (10) that she had kept hidden for so many years.

Hèlené's interview was not Strauss's only source. Suzanne Maudet (Zaza), whom Hèlené had known in high school and was one of the nine, wrote a book right after the war about her resistance experiences. Although not published until 2004, it supported much of Hèlené's account. In telling Zaza's story, Strauss includes vivid descriptions of life in Ravensbruck and its auxiliary camps, where Hèlené managed to sabotage the manufacture of the weapons she was assigned to produce. (47)

Succeeding chapters are devoted to the other members of the nine with details of their personalities and how they adjusted to concentration camp life. Their strength of character and determination to remain together when sent on a forced march to the east near the end of the war is impressive. It also made possible their successful escape to contact US soldiers in Colditz, Germany.

The final chapter tells how the nine lived after the war. Several had difficulty adjusting, some never did. They did not stay in contact and waited 60 years before having a reunion. *The Nine* tells a remarkable story of brave women serving the Resistance during WWII.

***A Spy in Plain Sight: The Inside Story of the FBI and Robert Hanssen—America's Most Damaging Russian Spy***, by Lis Wiehl. (Pegasus Books, 2022) 316 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Lawyer, federal prosecutor, law professor, journalist, and novelist, Lis Wiehl is also the daughter of an FBI agent. For reasons unstated, Wiehl came to believe "there were secrets yet to be uncovered" about the case of FBI special agent Robert Hanssen, who voluntarily spied for Moscow from 1979 to 2001. Once made public, these secrets would "further a more robust discussion of how we can assure the FBI never again cultivates" another Hanssen. (ix) *A Spy in Plain Sight* attempts that ambitious discussion, minus the secrets. Put another way, although Wiehl's interviews with former FBI and CIA participants discloses some opinions and details not reported in other accounts, nothing classified is included.

In chapter 1, *A Spy in Plain Sight* grabs the reader's attention with the story of Hanssen's first known act of espionage, the betrayal of high-value GRU (Soviet military intelligence) Maj. Gen. Dmitri Polyakov (TOPHAT to the Bureau), an agent jointly run by the FBI and CIA. Wiehl quotes CIA analyst Sandy Grimes to say he was "the best source that any intelligence service has ever had," though no examples of what he provided are included. (4) Wiehl concludes her account by describing Polyakov's demise at the hands of the KGB: "He's lying naked on a metal tabletop, still alive after his torturers have extracted every last secret they can from him. As the video rolls, the tabletop is slowly elevated at one end until TOPHAT slides off the lower end into a roaring fire." (6) As with other accounts of this more than likely apocryphal form of execution, no sources are provided.

Sourcing is a problem throughout the book, though Wiehl often cites the major books and official reports concerning cases. In so doing, she also reveals that most of what she writes has been told elsewhere. This includes her coverage of Hanssen's childhood, education, marriage, and religion, as well as his nerdy, even weird, personality, and his meandering path to the FBI. More importantly, it does not say

anything new about how he managed to make contact with the Soviets and avoid detection for 20 years while betraying their agents and other secrets to the KGB.

There are some incidents where two versions of the circumstances exist and she presents both, leaving final judgment to the reader. For example, Hanssen's wife, Bonnie, tells her brother Mark (an FBI agent) about $5,000 cash she found in Robert's dresser. Mark says he reported the suspicious event to his supervisor. His supervisor tells a different story. (119ff) Nothing is done, and Hanssen continues his espionage for years.

As to new material, some concerns Brian Kelley, the CIA officer suspected by the FBI as the long-sought penetration. In chapter 18, Kelley's wife, lawyer Patricia McCarthy, gives her account of how Brian and his family dealt with the stress of constant FBI surveillance for two years. She also reveals the circumstances of Kelley's untimely death of a heart attack at age 68.

In a chapter titled "The Mind of a Spy," Wiehl speculates on why spies spy. In particular she includes the innovative though unorthodox recommendations of Dr. David Charney, a psychiatrist who interviewed Hanssen at length. These are followed by some practical assessments from former senior CIA officer Michael Sulick who outlines the range of often conflicting ambiguities that molehunters must take into account. Wiehl also reviews comments made by Jack Hoschouer, Hanssen's lifelong friend, but they offer nothing substantive.

In conclusion, after describing the perfunctory FBI apology made to Brian Kelley, *A Spy in Plain Sight* expresses some thoughts on the prospects of another Hanssen—very likely—but only covers the same old ground. If you have not read about the Hanssen case, *A Spy in Plain Sight* provides a thorough review.

## *Intelligence Abroad*

***Head of the Mossad: In Pursuit of a Safe and Secure Israel***, by Shabtai Shavit. (Notre Dame University Press, 2020) 388 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

After service in the Israeli Navy and the special forces of the Israeli Defense Force's (IDF), Shabtai Shavit joined the Mossad. Twenty-five years later he was appointed its director. *Head of the Mossad* is an account of his career and his views on the role intelligence plays in Israel's survival.

Shavit says little about his life before government service. He does mention his wife and children and that his wife had served an operational tour with him in Iran but offers no details. He also reveals he studied at Harvard (1985–86) and was there when Jonathan Pollard was arrested as an Israeli spy. He quickly adds, "I, of course, had no idea who he was and what he had done." (41)

He is equally reticent when it comes to intelligence operations. Although the first three chapters have "intelligence" in the title, their content seldom mentions the subject, and when it does, it is just to describe functions. Only in the final chapter, "Wars," does Shavit discuss the intelligence failure that led to a "Pearl Harbor" surprise and the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, long before he became director. After faulting the IDF/Miltary Intelligence more than the Mossad, he concentrates on the political fallout and the high-level resignations that resulted.

When he mentions more recent Israeli operations, for example, the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear site at Osirak, he says nothing about how it was accomplished. And while including a reference to the cyberattack on Iran's nuclear facilities "through the Stuxnet computer worm," (56) he only hints at Mossad participation. What does *Head of the Mossad* say?

Shavit provides an assessment of the threats facing Israel, the organizations charged with dealing with them, and the professional principles to be applied. When bureaucratic conflicts occur among the three intelligence services—IDF/MI, Mossad, and Shin Bet (internal security)—he discusses the solutions but not much about how they were realized. The issue of who performs analysis and research of information collected is an example. The IDF, as the senior service, retained that responsibility for some years. Shavit explains how the Mossad was authorized to develop its own capability over the objections of the IDF.

Other topics of interest include Mossad's relationship with foreign intelligence services and, in cases like Jordan, establishing contacts before diplomatic recognition. And while Shavit clarifies his views on security, media, censorship, Israel's strategic issues, he asserts intelligence plays a vital role but does not explain how.

Chapter 3, "Intelligence and the International Arena," reviews classical and modern terrorist organizations—including ISIS, al-Qa'ida, and Iran's Revolutionary Guard—and the principal Islamic beliefs driving their behavior. It notes in passing the "individual suicide bomber, assuming that he complies with the basic rules of clandestine activity, can fly under the radar of intelligence and achieve the element of surprise," but Shavit does not discuss the operations undertaken to deal with the problem. (70)

Although Shavit maintains that he comes "from the world of practice and not from the world of thought," (206) his memoir suggests otherwise, taking as it does too much of a political science and historical approach at the expense of practice. Only of general interest.

***Spies and Sparrows: ASIO and the Cold War***, by Phillip Deery. (Melbourne University Press, 2022) 364 pages, endnotes, bibliography, index.

Phillip Deery is emeritus professor of history at Victoria University, Australia, where he specializes in the study of communism, anticommunism, and espionage. *Spies and Sparrows* examines the origins and development of the Australian Security and Intelligence Organization (ASIO) in the Cold War era.

In contrast to the Russian intelligence services, which apply the term "sparrow" to a female officer engaged in a honey trap or seduction for official purposes, ASIO employs the term to refer to its active agents. Operation Sparrow was ASIO's effort to insert an agent into every branch of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA). By 1972, ASIO employed some "five hundred sparrows in 120 branches" of the CPA. (10)

To illustrate how ASIO worked to accomplish its security mission, *Spies andnd Sparrows* presents case studies of eight individuals—some communists, some suspected communists, and some anticommunists. Professor Deery supplements his discussion of each case with organizational and political details that affected ASIO's creation, development, and operational capabilities. A complicating factor was British and US distrust engendered by evidence of NKVD penetration revealed in the VENONA decrypts, which were initially kept from ASIO. Deery describes how ASIO gradually regained their trust.

Some of the cases fell victim to Cold War anticommunism of the early postwar era. For example, the nuclear scientist Tom Kaiser, Dr. Paul Janes, and migrant Jimmy Anastassiou were procommunist but loyal Australians, a distinction ASIO could not grasp. Labeled subversives, their careers were ruined. At the other end of the political spectrum, Anne Neill, a housewife and the third sparrow ASIO ever recruited, became a card-carrying communist and penetrated the CPA for eight years. Initially a highly valued agent, she helped ASIO establish a detailed database of the CPA and its front groups in the region where she worked. But Deery raises some questions about the quality of her later reporting on subversives in the peace movement. (140)

Perhaps the most surprising chapter in *Spies and Sparrows* is the one about Maria Anna Allyson, better known as Evdokia Petrov, wife of Vladimir Petrov. The Petrovs were both KGB officers and they defected to ASIO in 1954, an act that earned the respect of Australia's intelligence service allies. They told their story in the book *Empire of Fear*.[a] Professor Deery summarizes their recruitment, adding the little known fact that Vladimir defected "sixteen days before she did without telling her." (147) This complicated her defection, with ASIO's help, after she was put on a plane to Moscow escorted by KGB officers. Deery makes a strong case that, to ASIO's surprise, Evdokia was the more important of the two, since she had been a cipher clerk for the KGB and had operational experience in the field with both the KGB and GRU.

The remaining years in Australia were stressful for Evdokia. Vladimir became an alcoholic and mistreated her, a situation she discussed with GRU defector Igor

a. Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, *Empire of Fear* (Praeger, 1956).

Gouzenko. She was also worried that the Soviets would penalize her family in Russia for her actions. This did not happen in her case, and her sister was allowed to join her. Deery speculates that the KGB didn't view her as having defected voluntarily. ASIO provided continuing support after Vladimir died in 1991. This included employment and a dinner with KGB defector Anatoli Golitsyn. (162) *Spies & Sparrows* provides a lucid look at ASIO in its formative years while adding new material about the Petrovs and other less-well-known cases.

## Rediscovered

***HHhH,*** by Laurent Binet (translation by Sam Taylor). (Vintage, 2013), 327 pages. Published in French by Editions Grasset et Fasquelle, 2009.

A first-time novelist produces a book of historical fiction that, as much as telling a story, inserts himself into the text to recount his struggles with the literary-philosophical questions of how to balance narrative, accuracy, and interpretation. This is not exactly calculated to attract American readers, but Laurent Binet's *HHhH* turns out to be a captivating book.

Binet's subject is Operation Anthropoid, the British-Czech mission in late May 1942 to assassinate Reinhard Heydrich, the Nazi ruler of Bohemia and Moravia.[a] The title refers to Heydrich's nickname in Nazi circles, *Himmler Hirn heist Heydrich*, or "Himmler's brain is called Heydrich." An exhaustive researcher, Binet sticks to the facts of Anthropoid as he creates a richly detailed and compelling story while delving into the minds and motivations of the characters, both Czech and German. His reflections on how to do this, how much license an author has to put words and thoughts into his characters, and the morality of an assassination certain to result in savage reprisals (including the destruction of the entire town of Lidice and the murder of thousands of Czechs) create a parallel narrative that gives intelligence readers a lot to consider for their own work.

Favorably reviewed when it was published in French in 2010 (winning the Prix Goncourt du Premier Roman) and English in 2012, and adapted for the film *The Man With an Iron Heart* in 2019, *HHhH* did not find a large US audience and was not reviewed in *Studies*. But it is not too late to rediscover Binet's book; it is well worth the intelligence practitioner's time.

*The reviewer*: J. E. Leonardson.

***Naples, '44: An Intelligence Officer in the Italian Labyrinth,*** by Norman Lewis. (First edition, Williams Collins, 1978; reprint by Eland Books, 1983, subtitled *A World War II Diary of Occupied Italy*), 187 pages.

In October 1943, when the Allies captured Naples, the densely packed city and vital transportation node on Italy's Mediterranean coast, they entered a city ruined by war. Allied bombers and naval gunners had killed tens of thousands of civilians, destroyed lines of communication, idled the vital fishing fleet, and shattered essential services like electricity and water. What the Allies had not destroyed—Lewis called it Gen. Mark Clark's Guernica—the retreating German Wehrmacht sabotaged, poisoned, and booby-trapped. Into this hellscape arrives Norman Lewis, a British intelligence officer assigned to the British Field Security Service.

In diary form, *Naples '44* opens with a wry tone that seems more akin to Evelyn Waugh's *Men at Arms* than John Hersey's *Hiroshima*. Lewis finds himself attached to the US Fifth Army, which wants little do with him. He tramps ashore with the invasion force at Salerno armed only with a Webley revolver and five rounds of ammunition. Lewis observes that few of his comrades had ever fired a gun, and they spend a few days admiring the Roman temples at Paestum, reading poetry, and dodging the occasional desultory strafing runs by the Luftwaffe.

a. See R.C. Jaggers, "The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich," *Studies in Intelligence* 4, no. 1 (1960). Released in full September 22, 1993.

Such idyll was short lived. When Lewis makes his way to his office, established in a grand palazzo as victors are wont, he sets about trying to sort friend from enemy. It is no small task. Lewis finds a city battered physically and psychologically, first by Mussolini's fascists, then the Germans, and finally the Allied invasion.

As in every theater, the US military arrived flush with riches unfathomable to most Napolitani. A mishmash of partisans, communists, chancers, and criminals jockeyed for largesse with the new masters, who incredibly had appointed the Italian-American gangster Vito Genovese to oversee logistics. Genovese quickly set up a massive blackmarket operation, and corruption fueled every manner of vice. Lewis recounts child beggars shooed away by restaurant patrons wearing coats made from US Army blankets and GIs trading rations for sex with destitute women. Lewis does not linger on such scenes of despair; his quick brushstrokes are more powerful than detailed sketches.

Lewis busies himself sorting out *denùnzie* (complaints) filed by neighbors looking to settle scores or chasing down rumors of spies and saboteurs. After receiving reports of nighttime flashes of lights in one village, Lewis's team swoops in under cover of darkness, only to find a man with a flashlight making his way to the single outhouse in the village. Countless hours are spent in the bureaucratic labyrinth vetting fascist functionaries whose services are needed to run the city; prefiguring the Allies advance across Western Europe after D-Day or conquest of Imperial Japan, dubious alliances are made.[a]

When his tour ends abruptly after a year, Lewis ruefully observes that the weary Napolitani very much just want the Allies to leave. "A year ago we liberated them from the Fascist Monster, and they still sit doing their best to smile politely at us, as hungry as ever, more disease-ridden than ever before, in the ruins of their beautiful city where law and order have ceased to exist." (169)

*Naples '44* was adapted for a documentary in 2016, directed by Francesco Patierno and narrated by Benedict Cumberbatch and Adriano Gianni. Notable for its use of rarely seen archival footage of wartime Naples along with recreations and postwar movie clips, the film is a fine companion to Lewis's portrait of an intelligence officer in wartime Naples.

*The reviewer:* Joseph Gartin.

## Streaming

### *All the Old Knives* (Prime Video, 2022)

The best that can be said about this slickly produced yet ultimately forgettable film is that it plays a good hand poorly. All the right cards are surely there. Henry Pelham (Chris Pine) and Celia Harrison (Thandiwe Newton) are the impossibly photogenic pair of CIA case officers whose love affair was shattered by tragedy. Gloomy spy-filled Vienna, sunny coastal California, generic Islamist hijackers, *Bourne Identity*-style assassins, and predictably villainous CIA spymasters Vick Wallinger and Bill Compton (played with gusto by veteran actors Laurence Fishburne and Jonathan Pryce, respectively) tick the various boxes of the modern spy drama.

The predictable plot devices are not improved by director Janus Metz's lethargic pacing, which makes Tomas Alfredson's glacial adaptation of John LeCarré's *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* (2011) seem positively brisk. The first 15 minutes unfold so slowly you think time is moving backward, an effect amplified by Metz's reliance on flashbacks to explain why everyone seems so tormented. Metz is no stranger to effectively jumping location and time, as he did deftly codirecting the superb narcotrafficking series *ZeroZeroZero* (2019–20), another Prime Video release, but here it grows tiresome. At least *All the Old Knives* is on streaming, so you can make a cup of coffee or take the dog out, then rewind it to see if you missed anything. (Spoiler: you probably didn't.)

As usual, the intelligence practitioner will marvel at Hollywood's portrayal of espionage. This extends from the superficial—those spacious and elegant offices in the station would be unrecognizable to anyone who has worked overseas—to the existential. Wallinger dispatches Pelham to identify, and kill, the mole who leaked

a. See the review of *Fugitives* on page 58.

information that resulted in the deaths of all the hijacking victims eight years prior.

It does not reveal too much to say that Pelham is not alone in this task. In the film's denouement (cue more flashbacks), this operationally dubious and legally fraught solution seems to involve a few dozen conspirators. Did no one suggest turning the investigation over to the FBI, filing a congressional notification, and handing out exceptional performance awards to the counterintelligence team instead? The price of greater verisimilitude might be less time travel and fewer sultry glances, but it would have been nice had the director tried.

*The reviewer*: Joseph Gartin.

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