

Studies in Intelligence

Vol. 51, No. 2

BOOK REVIEWS


Early Cold War Spies

Spymistress: The Life of Vera Atkins

Special Agent Vietnam

The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

- What is Strategic Counterintelligence, and What Should We Do About It?
- The Intelligence Community's Neglect of Strategic Intelligence
- CIA's First Center for Analysis
- Strategic Deception During the Suez Crisis of 1956
- The Tay Ninh Provincial Reconnaissance Unit in the Phoenix Program, 1969–70



This quarterly publication is prepared primarily for the use of US government officials. The format, coverage, and content are designed to meet their requirements. To that end, some issues of *Studies in Intelligence* each year remain classified and are not circulated to the public, resulting in numbering gaps in scholarly collections.

Studies in Intelligence is available on the Internet at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence>. Some of the material in this publication is copyrighted, and noted as such. Those items should not be reproduced or disseminated without permission.

Printed copies of the journal are available to requesters outside the US government from:

Government Printing Office (GPO)
Superintendent of Documents
P.O. Box 391954
Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954
Phone: (202) 512-1800
E-mail: orders@gpo.gov

Requests for subscriptions should be sent to:

Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

ISSN 1527-0874

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in *Studies in Intelligence* are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements, interpretations, or recommendations.

CSI's Mission

The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was founded in 1974 in response to Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger's desire to create within CIA an organization that could "think through the functions of intelligence and bring the best intellects available to bear on intelligence problems." The center, comprising professional historians and experienced practitioners, attempts to document lessons learned from past activities, to explore the needs and expectations of intelligence consumers, and to stimulate serious debate about current and future intelligence challenges.

To carry out this mission, CSI publishes *Studies in Intelligence*, as well as numerous books and monographs addressing historical, operational, doctrinal and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession. It also administers the CIA Museum and maintains the Agency's Historical Intelligence Collection.

Contributions

Studies in Intelligence welcomes articles, book reviews, and other communications from authors within and outside the government on any historical, operational, doctrinal, or theoretical aspect of intelligence. Submissions should be sent to:

Studies Editor
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Awards

The Sherman Kent Award of \$2,500 is offered annually for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in *Studies*. The prize may be divided if two or more articles are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. An additional \$5,000 is available for other prizes, including the Walter L. Pforzheimer Award. The Pforzheimer Award is given to the graduate or undergraduate student who has written the best article on an intelligence-related subject.

Unless otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of *Studies'* purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the awards. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the *Studies* Editorial Board are excluded from the competition.

The Editorial Board welcomes readers' nominations for awards.



Center for the Study of Intelligence
Washington, D C 20505

EDITORIAL POLICY

Articles for *Studies in Intelligence* may be written on any historical, operational, doctrinal, or theoretical aspect of intelligence.

The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Editorial Board.

The criterion for publication is whether, in the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Carmen A. Medina, Chairperson
Frans Bax
A. Denis Clift
Nicholas Dujmovic
Dawn R. Eilenberger
William C. Liles
William Nolte
Maj. Gen. Richard J. O'Lear,
USAF (Ret.)
John W. Perkins
Dwight Pinkley
Barry G. Royden
Jon A. Wiant

Members of the Board are drawn from the Central Intelligence Agency and other Intelligence Community components.

EDITORIAL STAFF

Andres Vaart, Editor

C O N T E N T S

INTELLIGENCE TODAY AND TOMORROW

- The Question of Strategic Counterintelligence
What Is It, and What Should We Do About It?* 1
Michelle Van Cleave
- The State of Strategic Intelligence
The Intelligence Community's Neglect
of Strategic Intelligence* 15
John G. Heidenrich

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

- The Beginning of Intelligence Analysis in CIA
The Office of Reports and Estimates:
CIA's First Center for Analysis* 27
Woodrow Kuhns
- The Art of Strategic Counterintelligence
The Musketeer's Cloak: Strategic Deception
During The Suez Crisis of 1956* 47
Ricky-Dale Calhoun
- A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations
The Tay Ninh Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
and Its Role in the Phoenix Program, 1969–70* 59
Colonel Andrew R. Finlayson, USMC (Ret.)

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

- Early Cold War Spies: The Espionage
Trials That Shaped American Politics* 71
Reviewed by John Ehrman
- Spymistress: The Life of Vera Atkins:
The Greatest Female Agent in World War II* 77
Reviewed by Thomas F. Troy

<i>Special Agent, Vietnam: A Naval Intelligence Memoir</i> Reviewed by Michael J. Sulick	81
The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake	85

Contributors

Ricky-Dale Calhoun holds an MA in History from Murray State University and is now a PhD candidate at Kansas State University. He is focusing on foreign affairs and the role of intelligence in decisionmaking.

John Ehrman serves in the Directorate of Intelligence. He is a frequent contributor and a winner of a *Studies in Intelligence* annual award.

Andrew Finlayson retired as a Colonel in the US Marine Corps. He has since held senior positions with the Northrup Grumman Corporation.

John Heidenrich is a consultant to the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense. He has served as an analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency. He is author of *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars and the Concerned Citizen* and numerous published articles.

Woodrow Kuhns is deputy director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. He has served as an analyst in the Directorate of Intelligence, was a CIA historian, and has taught at the US Naval War College.

Hayden B. Peake is the curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection. He served in the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Operations. He is a frequent contributor to this and other intelligence journals.

Michael J. Sulick was associate deputy director of operations in CIA before he retired in 2004. He was a member of the *Studies in Intelligence* Editorial Board.

Thomas F. Troy is a retired CIA officer who has authored *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* and *Wild Bill and Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson, and the Origin of the CIA*.

The Honorable **Michelle Van Cleave** is Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University. She was National Counterintelligence Executive of the United States during 2003–2006.

Strategic Counterintelligence: What Is It, and What Should We Do About It?

Michelle Van Cleave

“
‘Strategic counterintelligence’ remains a relatively undeveloped concept, in theory or in implementation.
”

Ever since Sherman Kent’s signature work was published, strategic intelligence has been the subject of literature, study, and practice, and, although an author in the pages of this issue of *Studies* will disagree, the subject has come to occupy a well-established place as a core intelligence product line and mission.¹

CIA historian Don Steury has written:

*In thinking about intelligence, Sherman Kent began with an understanding of national power that was well within the mainstream of contemporary American strategic thought. Kent’s contribution was to apply thinking about strategy and national power to an ordered conception of intelligence analysis as an intellectual discipline.*²

By contrast, “strategic counterintelligence” remains a relatively undeveloped concept, in theory or implementation. Isn’t this curious? For if strategic intelligence takes as its touchstone the whole of state interests and the sources of state power, then understanding the purpose and manner in which other states use their intelligence resources to gain advantage and *mastering the capability to counter them* would seem to be the other side of the strategic intelligence coin.

Yet to the extent strategic counterintelligence (CI) is addressed within CI or intelligence circles, it is controversial, poorly understood, and even more poorly executed because it does not fit comfortably within the existing architecture and approach to counterintelligence as it has developed within the United States.

Even though it has been six years since the office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) was created to lead and integrate the US counterintelligence enterprise, at present we have neither the ability to perform the mission of strategic counterintelligence nor a common understanding of what it means, much less an appreciation of its value to national security.^a Indeed, it is one thing to have a national-level office to bring strategic coherence to wide-ranging CI activities, as the law provides; it is quite another matter (to para-

^a The Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 and Presidential Decision Directive 75 (PDD-75, January, 2001), establishing the NCIX, were prompted by deep concerns over CI’s failure to keep pace with growing foreign intelligence activities that were exploiting seams between the several CI agencies of the US government and targeting not only national security secrets but commercial proprietary information as well.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.

Counterintelligence embraces both “information gathered” and “activities conducted” to counter foreign intelligence threats.

phrase Henry Kissinger) to answer the question, “What is strategic counterintelligence and what do you do with it?”

I would like to offer some thoughts on the subject, not to quiet controversy but in the hope of provoking more debate. In my view, the US CI community is at a crossroads. Either strategic counterintelligence is a theoretical construct with little to no place in the real world of US intelligence, in which case we really do not need a national level effort to direct it; or it is a compelling national security mission. If it is the latter, we are losing precious time and advantage and should get on with the job.

The meaning of “strategic counterintelligence”

Counterintelligence has its own distinct logic as an intellectual discipline. As defined at law, counterintelligence embraces both “information gathered” and “activities conducted” to counter foreign intelligence threats.^b More specifically, it is the job of US counterintelligence to identify, assess, neutralize and exploit the intelligence activities

^b The definition of counterintelligence found in the National Security Act of 1947 still stands: “information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.”

of foreign powers, terrorist groups, and other entities that seek to harm us. Sound security measures are unquestionably vital, but they can only carry protection so far. One can pile on so much security that no one can move, and still there will be a purposeful adversary looking for ways to get what he wants.³ The signature purpose of counterintelligence is to confront and engage the adversary.

The tradecraft of counterintelligence and its several tactical functions, which are properly within the separate cognizance and competence of units within the FBI, CIA, and the Department of Defense, have well established objectives and processes that are not at issue here. What is at issue, what the very concept of “strategic counterintelligence” implies, is the potential for engaging CI collection and operations as tools to advance national security policy objectives, and, at the strategic level, to go on the offense to degrade hostile external foreign intelligence services and their ability to work against us.

There are three predicates upon which a strategic CI mission would rest. First, *the foreign intelligence threat is strategic*, meaning that states use their intelligence resources purposefully to gain advantage over the United States and to advance their interests. Second, strategic intelligence threats cannot be defeated through ad hoc measures alone. *The threats must be*

countered by a strategic response. And third, there must be a national level system that integrates and coordinates diverse programs, resources, and activities to achieve common strategic objectives.

The Threat Is Strategic

Foreign intelligence operations against the United States are now more diffuse, more aggressive, more technologically sophisticated, and potentially more successful than ever before. In recent years, we have seen a growing number of intelligence operations within our borders, facilitated by an extensive foreign presence that provides cover for intelligence services and their agents.

Traditional foes, building on past successes, are continuing efforts to penetrate the US government, while waves of computer intrusions into sensitive US government information systems have confounded efforts to identify their sources. We have also seen apparent attempts by foreign partners to exploit cooperative endeavors against terrorist groups to obtain essential secrets about US intelligence and military operations. In addition, a market in US national security secrets has emerged that, among other things, enables foreign practices of deception and denial to impair US intelligence collection. And perhaps most troubling, growing foreign capabilities to conduct influence and other covert operations threaten to undermine US allies and national security interests.

The proliferation of clandestine intelligence services is a striking feature of the modern international security environment. At the start of the 20th century, no state had a standing external intelligence service; today there is scarcely a government that does not have one. And we are only just beginning to understand their modern potential as an extension of state power.^c

The use of human intelligence operations by weaker powers to achieve advantage is a classic “asymmetric strategy,” a fashionable term but hardly a new concept. As one student of the concept put it:

Combatants throughout the ages have continually sought to negate or avoid the strength of the other, while applying one's own strength against another's weakness.⁴

In the eyes of our potential adversaries, the relative weakness of the United States and its democratic allies clearly is the openness of our societies and people. The opportunity for intelligence officers and their agents to move about freely, develop contacts, and operate unnoticed is no more lost

^c The first external service was the British SIS, which originated in 1909. Other great powers, notably Russia and Germany had intelligence services in the 19th century but they were principally domestic security services. One can think of many examples that straddle both functions, but the essential difference is that a security service deals with threats to the security of the state while the external service conducts collection and other operations abroad to advance and protect the government's defense and foreign policy interests.

Growing foreign capabilities to conduct influence and other covert operations threaten to undermine US allies and national security interests

on foreign intelligence adversaries than it was on the 19 hijackers that September morning.

From the standpoint of foreign intelligence interest, there are many potentially valuable targets outside our borders. These would include US government personnel and the far-reaching activities of American commerce and industry. But the real intelligence treasure trove for adversaries is here in the United States.

The central targets of foreign intelligence interest are principally within the borders of the United States:

- The institutions and people responsible for the formulation and implementation of American plans, intentions, and capabilities.
- Intelligence production and weapons design, the secrets of our nuclear labs, and the key R&D activities of our premier industrial enterprises, such as Bell Labs, Boeing, Dupont, and others.
- Thousands of facilities engaged in classified national security work and hundreds of thousands of workers with security clearances dispersed around the country and in most every congressional district.

The CI problem is not only one of sheer numbers of potential targets or foreign intelligence personnel. The larger and more

compelling issue is the scope of these activities.

Historically, embassies and other diplomatic establishments in the United States have served as hubs for foreign intelligence activity because of the operational security they afford. Accordingly, the 20,000-member diplomatic community has commanded the lion's share of US CI's attention. Our CI resources, especially those of the FBI, have been scoped against this threat population and its geographic concentrations in Washington and New York and consular offices in such cities as San Francisco, Chicago, Atlanta, and Houston.

Now, however, foreign powers increasingly are running intelligence operations with unprecedented independence from their diplomatic establishments. The number of formal and informal ports of entry to the country, the ease with which people can travel internally, and the relatively benign operational environment of the United States are tailor made for embedded clandestine collection activities. Thousands of foreign owned commercial establishments in the United States, the routine interactions of trade and transnational business and finance, and the exchange of hundreds of thousands of students and academicians, all potentially extend the reach of foreign intelligence into the core structures of our nation's security.

US counterintelligence could seize the strategic initiative and begin by working the foreign intelligence target abroad.

To cite just one example of the growth in numbers, Russia, reversing a sharp decline that took place during the late Boris Yeltsin's presidency, now has an intelligence presence in the United States equal to its Cold War level, a sizing decision presumably indicative of the return on investment. One need not read too much history to know how successful past intelligence operations against the United States have been. There is hardly an area of national security endeavor that has not been compromised—repeatedly and deeply—by successful espionage.

Strategic threats require a strategically coherent response. Instead of looking at the broader implications of these foreign intelligence operations, we have for the most part adopted a case-by-case approach to dealing with the threat they represented. And by concentrating our CI resources overwhelmingly inside the United States, rather than engaging the foreign intelligence service abroad, we have ceded advantage to adversaries.^d

Foreign powers have seized the initiative, and moved their operations to US soil, where our institutions are not constituted to

^d Three-quarters of the US CI budget since World War II has been devoted to activities within the United States carried out by the FBI; most of the remainder, allocated to CIA, the Defense Department, and to small pockets elsewhere in the government, has gone to programs and personnel based wholly or in part within US borders.

work against growing foreign intelligence networks embedded within American society. Here, CI investigations may result in prosecutions for espionage or related offenses, demarches, or the expulsion of diplomatic personnel for activities inconsistent with their status. But with rare exception, their disposition is decided on the merits of each case at hand and not as part of a larger effort to counter the foreign intelligence service as a strategic target.^e As a result, I fear we have neither an adequate understanding of the foreign presence and intelligence operations in the United States nor an appreciation of their broader effects on US national security.

Former deputy defense secretary John Hamre described the challenge succinctly:

The goal should not be to catch the spy after he's gotten into the country; we've got to stop him from entering in the first place.⁵

Perhaps we have been coming at the problem from the wrong end.

^e One relatively recent example is the espionage case against suspected Chinese agent Katrina Leung, which resulted in a plea bargain in 2005 with no jail time, a \$10,000 fine, and 10 debriefing sessions with Leung about her interactions with the Chinese. The US attorney in Los Angeles entered into the agreement because the government's case was not going well in the courtroom, but it effectively forestalled CI efforts to engage Leung's future cooperation.

Why wait until foreign intelligence activities show up on US soil, with all the operational advantages of proximity and cover that our rich society provides?

There is another way. US counterintelligence could seize the strategic initiative and begin by working the target abroad, with the purpose of selectively degrading the hostile foreign intelligence service and its ability to work against us. This is the central objective of strategic counterintelligence.

By working the foreign intelligence service as a strategic target globally, US counterintelligence should be able to leverage insights into adversary activities and vulnerabilities to direct CI operations to maximum effect. At home, this means that the operational and analytic focus of US counterintelligence would need to be transformed from its case-driven approach to one that includes strategic assessments of adversary presence, capabilities, and intentions. This in turn would drive operations to neutralize the inevitable penetrations of our government and protect national security secrets and other valuable information.

The National Security Strategy of the United States, and in particular the strategy behind the Global War on Terrorism, embodies just such a national offensive orientation.⁶ In times past, the most pressing terrorism-related intelligence question was most often, "who did this?" in turn leading to manhunts, apprehension and rendition for trial. Today the strategic imperative is

to stop the terrorists before they strike, with derivative requirements for operational intelligence support.

Network analyses to map terrorist supply chains, support infrastructures, financial transactions, communications channels, recruitment and training activities, and other footprints serve to focus collection, identify vulnerabilities and inform strategic operational planning to attack, disrupt, and neutralize terrorist operations. While forensic analyses of terrorist acts remain vital, the US counterterrorism enterprise (including its Intelligence Community foundations) is strategically oriented proactively to identify, assess, and defeat terrorist operations.

There is a parallel for thinking about counterintelligence as a strategic mission. Just as US intelligence is mapping the essential features and activities of terrorist groups, so CI analysts could determine how foreign intelligence services are built and operate—call it CI order-of-battle preparation. Key questions would include:

- What is the capability of an adversary intelligence service to target the United States? (Adversary services have cadre trained to go after American targets; US counterintelligence needs to understand who these people are and how they operate.)
- What is the service's deployment doctrine?

The emphasis other states place on human collectors over other means of collection is the single most distinctive asymmetry in modern intelligence structures.

- How and by whom is it tasked?
- What is its structure, organization and budget?
- How and where are its people recruited and trained, and personnel records kept?
- What is its leadership structure?
- What are its liaison relationships, resources and targets?
- What are the critical nodes of foreign collection against us?

This analytic work in turn should lead to refined collection requirements to help identify adversary intelligence service vulnerabilities and support strategic operational planning to exploit them—and some thought-provoking new possibilities for advancing US objectives.

The emphasis other states place on human collectors over other means of collection is the single most distinctive asymmetry in modern intelligence structures. This asymmetric reliance on HUMINT has profound implications for US counterintelligence and our national security leadership. If, as part of a broader national strategic plan, we were to have the ability to shape the human source reports our adversaries receive, we may be able to influence their behavior. The ultimate goal of offensive CI

is to penetrate the opposition's own secret operations apparatus: to become, obviously without the opposition's knowledge, an integral and functioning part of their calculations and operations... [A successful CI penetration] puts you at the very heart of his actions and intentions towards you... Most importantly, you are in a position to control his actions, since you can, by tailoring intelligence for him to your purposes, by influencing his evaluation, mislead him as to his decisions and consequent actions.⁷

To be sure, this describes an ideal CI operation. But even short of such perfection, by exploiting insights into foreign intelligence activities, counterintelligence can provide new avenues to degrading emerging threats.

Strategic assessments of foreign intelligence capabilities can help inform policy deliberations and frame options for actions. Narrowly, as part of a warning template, the activities of foreign intelligence services may number among the most useful early indicators of changes in threat conditions. More broadly, there is scarcely an area of national security concern—from Iranian or North Korean WMD activities to Chinese military space activities to fielding effective ballistic missile defenses—that does not have a critical foreign intelligence dimension. When integrated with other foreign policy tools, the

The strategic CI mission requires a supporting infrastructure to orchestrate the resources of the CI community.

insights and operations of strategic counterintelligence operations could make the difference between favorable and unfavorable outcomes in world events.

Let me be clear: Operations to identify, assess, neutralize and exploit foreign intelligence services as a strategic target are not an entirely new concept for US counterintelligence. Over the course of 70 years, US and British intelligence acquired just such specialized insights into the GRU and the KGB, to inform CI operations against the Soviet Union.⁸ While not presently configured to work as a strategic whole, US counterintelligence, nevertheless, unquestionably could produce and execute collection strategies to characterize other foreign intelligence services of concern, exploit those sources for their positive intelligence value, and develop options to degrade those services as national security objectives may dictate.

The national CI enterprise must be configured to execute the strategic CI mission.

The strategic CI mission requires a supporting infrastructure to orchestrate the resources of the many parts of the CI community to focus collection and analysis of the foreign intelligence service, perform strategic operational planning to address collection gaps, develop options to degrade the foreign intelligence service, and enable coordinated execution to achieve defensive and offensive CI goals.

This is not CI as it has grown up in the United States. Historically, US counterintelligence has divided responsibilities in order to address foreign intelligence threats pragmatically, rather than strategically. Instead of integration under central guidance at the national level, CI programs have served inherently agency-specific mission objectives.^f The office of the National Counterintelligence Executive was created to unify the CI enterprise, but these legacy practices remain deeply ingrained.

Counterintelligence is hardwired into CIA tradecraft in order to protect CIA's own clandestine collection and for the purpose of watchfulness against the insider threat (counterespionage). But apart from select activities during the Cold War, CIA has never seen it as part of its standing mission proactively to degrade foreign intelligence capabilities directed against US interests.

The simple fact is that CIA has never been assigned that peace-

^f By contrast, the need for integration and central direction of US intelligence was obvious from the outset; even so, the decades of experience since the National Security Act of 1947 have shown the difficulty of reaching that goal. Imposing a head on an assortment of heretofore autonomous and vastly different CI agencies is a far greater hurdle. As with many national level programs, the good government principle is to know where to draw the line to establish necessary centralization while preserving the freedom of action (including the responsibility, accountability, and authority that come with that freedom) essential to success.

time mission, and neither has any other operational CI agency. While any CIA officer will tell you that foreign intelligence personnel are already at or near the top of the National Clandestine Service targeting list, it is one thing to check the box for recruitment opportunities, and quite another to have a top down strategically orchestrated effort to disrupt and degrade the operations of a foreign intelligence service.

The FBI is generally responsible for countering foreign intelligence activities within the United States; but despite recent changes the FBI remains first and foremost a law enforcement agency, deriving much of its proven CI expertise from the techniques and training required for criminal investigations. It does not have the people, the organization, training, or equipment to collect and analyze intelligence on the foreign intelligence presence in the United States beyond those personnel here under official or journalistic cover. Neither does it have the capability to develop and execute offensive operations to mislead, deny or otherwise exploit foreign intelligence activities against us. And, in all likelihood, it does not have the public support to venture into the complex grounds of analyzing the vast foreign presence in the United States.

Even the Department of Defense, with its long wartime experience in counterintelligence operations and its highly developed deliberate planning process, has been late to incorporate strategic CI campaign plans as part of standing theater operations plans.⁹ In

the six months leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, an interagency CI strategic planning team came together under DoD leadership to develop a common operating picture of Iraqi intelligence operations worldwide. In response to Command Authority direction, the team was chartered to develop operations to render Iraqi intelligence ineffective.

While this effort, dubbed “Imminent Horizon,” resulted in some important successes, the CI community learned its lessons the hard way. Strategic operational planning to degrade foreign intelligence capabilities has long lead times. Beginning at D minus 6 months—as was the case with Iraq—is too late. Even though Coalition Forces had technically been at war with Iraq for 10 years, flying daily combat missions, the CI community could identify and contain an unacceptably low percentage of Iraqi intelligence personnel. Defense Department efforts to build on the lessons of this experience have met with halting success to date as a consequence of competing demands on resources within DoD and competing priorities across the CI community.

As a result of this decentralization, CI has evolved into a collection of threat-driven activities, each measured on its own terms rather than for its contributions to a larger whole. Did we catch the spy? Did we find the microphones embedded in the embassy walls? Did we discover the true owners of the front company engaged in technology diversion? These are hard-won CI accomplishments; yet it is far more rare

The law is clear on how the new CI architecture is to work under the leadership of the NCIX.

when the operational possibilities of ongoing investigations, or the access of a given penetration, or a double agent tasking, have been fitted against a larger tapestry of the adversary’s strategic purpose to inform a CI plan for dealing with the whole. The system is not designed to work that way.

In short, the US CI enterprise has not been structured to serve a strategic purpose, nor is it postured globally to disrupt a foreign intelligence service. There is no standard approach to targeting across the CI enterprise; interagency information sharing is poor, and infrastructure support even worse. Even the modest national mechanisms developed to deconflict offensive CI activities stop at the water’s edge, a legacy of the old divide between foreign and domestic operational realms. And apart from wartime, we have not routinely addressed foreign intelligence capabilities as part of a national security threat calculus informing national strategy and planning—with unknown opportunity and other costs.

What Stands in the Way?

In contrast to the circumstances I have just described, the advantages of having a strategic CI capability would seem straightforward, and the law is clear on how the new CI architecture is to work under the leadership of the NCIX. So what are the argu-

ments against moving apace in that direction?

Maybe we are overstating the threat. In a conversation with me about the concept of strategic CI, an old hand in the British Secret Intelligence Service dismissed it summarily: “You’re scaring yourself. The bad guys are nowhere near so formidable as to warrant such a broad undertaking. It’s enough to deal with them prudentially; you don’t have to go looking for new dragons to slay.”

He may be right; but given the changes in the world I noted above, I wonder if it is wise to be so sanguine. What’s more, with our nation engaged in a global war on terrorism the threat from adversary intelligence collection has become even more immediate. The need to identify and counter hostile intelligence operations in active theaters of combat is so self-evident that it hardly needs mention. Who would question the strategic value to coalition objectives in Iraq to have a clear understanding and the ability to counter Iranian (and Syrian, al Qa’ida, and other) intelligence activities in that struggling would-be democracy?

And it may well be the case that the best sources on those intelligence operations are to be found not in Iraq but in other parts of the world, another reason why coordinated strategic planning for global CI operations and exploitation to advance theater objectives

In time, strategic CI operations should yield insights into foreign intelligence threats, insights that inform US CI activities globally and diminish the adversary's ability to work against us.

has been deemed essential (if not yet fully realized).

Even so, espionage as a generic national security concern has been dismissed more than once with the ready pronouncement, "there will always be spies." This view might not seem unreasonable, until one reads the file drawers full of damage assessments cataloging the enormous loss in lives, treasure, and pivotal secrets occasioned by spies and other foreign intelligence coups against us. Their content is a cold awakening to what is at stake.

Indeed, the history of counterintelligence reform efforts has been one of decrying the harm caused by espionage and episodically insisting that US counterintelligence needs to do a better job of protecting against foreign penetrations into our government. How is it that spies within the very heart of US intelligence and the national security community have been able to operate undetected for such unacceptably long periods of time (for example, Aldrich Ames, 9 years; Robert Hansen, 21 years; Ana Belen Montes, 17 years; Katrina Leung 20, years) to the profound detriment of US national security?

Interagency damage assessment teams are quick to key on exploitable security vulnerabilities and to recommend new security measures (e.g., more uniform polygraph practices, more rigorous background checks, more comprehensive inspection regimes,

more sophisticated information system audit trails). But smarter security alone will never be enough so long as the foreign intelligence adversary retains, as he does now, the strategic advantage. The US government may elect to accept the status quo and continue to work against these penetrations one case at a time, but at what cost?

Maybe we are overestimating the value of the target, for its positive intelligence value or operational opportunity or both. After all, the foreign intelligence service is among the hardest of the hard targets. Positive intelligence insights into foreign plans, intentions and capabilities that US decision makers require may more readily be found in the foreign ministries and military war rooms and leadership councils than among their clandestine intelligence officers. And operations to degrade foreign intelligence services may be very difficult and very high risk. At a minimum, adopting strategic counterintelligence is not without costs:

- *Resource constraints.* As a national priority, funding for counterintelligence is pitifully low relative to the penalty foreign intelligence successes can exact. While funding for counterintelligence has increased substantially over the past decade, it started that climb from an historic nadir occasioned by the so-called "peace

dividend" at the end of the Cold War. The Global War on Terror has diverted funds and national attention that would otherwise have gone to other counterintelligence priorities. Asking the CI components to take on the additional responsibilities inherent in the strategic CI mission would at first blush appear to be fiscally challenging if not impossible. But more money is not the cure, nor is lack of money the problem, so long as the resulting business model of US counterintelligence remains optimized for a defensive posture of working individual cases at home.

- In time, strategic CI operations should yield insights into foreign intelligence threats that inform US CI activities globally and diminish the adversary's ability to work against us. The FBI should realize the most immediate gains from strategic CI operations as collection against foreign intelligence services abroad begins to fill in the (now largely empty) file folders on intelligence personnel arriving on our shores. In other words, the return on investment in the strategic CI mission should more than offset the cost of redirecting current CI resources and effort; conversely if US counterintelligence does not adopt a strategic approach the marginal return on additional CI dollars is likely to be disappointing.
- *The acute problems of "information sharing."* CIA, the FBI and the military services are working in their separate channels to address different

aspects of the foreign intelligence threat, with some important linkages between them; but bureaucratic resistance to ceding access to sensitive CI information—even the limited, sanitized information necessary to inform strategic direction—remains understandably fierce, if not always wise.

- It may be argued that the sorry history of successful, long-standing espionage carried out by trusted insiders is an indictment of the “each is responsible for its own house” approach to counterintelligence. Nevertheless, counterintelligence (and especially counterespionage) breeds an imperative to hold close to information and to stay in control of these extremely sensitive operations and investigations. These ingrained obstacles to information sharing, along with uneven abilities among department and agency representatives to present much less task “blue” side CI resources, make the urgent job of strategic operational planning still one of the great undeveloped interagency arts.
- Fortunately, such reflexive protectiveness commonly is overcome in the field, where people with a shared duty station and purpose are clear that they are working on the same team. Without some way of instilling that spirit and incentive structure in Washington interagency planning groups, strategic operational planning for CI will remain an elusive goal.
- *Operational Risks.* The risks associated with strategic CI are

Fortunately, reflexive protectiveness commonly is overcome in the field, where people with a shared duty station and purpose are clear that they are working on the same team.

of particular concern to those responsible for clandestine HUMINT. There is an inherent tension between the work of HUMINT collectors and the work of counterintelligence operations. Intelligence collection values above all the information, but CI insists on acting on that information, which is a very different operational dynamic. For example, if a penetration within a foreign government were used as a CI agent (for example, serving as a channel for deception), that CI operation would introduce a new risk of compromising the asset, to the detriment of the collection effort. Yet the very same organizations that are responsible for HUMINT are also being asked to take on expanded CI operational responsibilities, which means they must weigh the costs and benefits of the strategic CI mission against their other standing responsibilities.

- Moreover, offensive counterintelligence in particular can be extremely difficult business—what the classic monograph *A Short Course in the Secret War* deems “an intellectual exercise of almost mathematical complexity.”¹⁰ This is graduate level work, and few are trained or intellectually prepared for the task. Consider, for example, the practice of deception, an ever-present feature in intelligence work:

Alertness to deception presumably prompts a more careful and systematic review of the evidence. But anticipation of deception also leads the analyst to be more skeptical of all of the evidence, and to the extent that evidence is deemed unreliable, the analyst's preconceptions must play a greater role in determining which evidence to believe. This leads to a paradox: The more alert we are to deception, the more likely we are to be deceived.¹¹

- Scripting a successful deception effort must exploit the psychological implications of the opposing intelligence service's awareness of the practice. Deception planners must understand its paradoxical nature, as well as the many other intricate aspects that make up the psychology of deception, to master the demanding nuances of the craft (as must deception analysts, whose job it is to protect US intelligence from foreign manipulation). Little wonder that a community already stretched thin on training and education and other resources and under a microscope for past shortcomings and mistakes faces the prospect of a renewed emphasis on high risk offensive CI operations with general wariness.
- There is no question that exploiting a foreign intelligence service as a channel for deception or perception management is a challenging task,

The national security leadership has every reason to expect that the CI community is hard at work to deliver this new strategic CI capability.

demanding creativity, imagination, excruciatingly detailed planning and tight execution control. There is, of course, precedent for ambitious operations such as that recounted by the late Gus Weiss in "Operation Farewell."¹²

- It was just this kind of high-risk-high-value ingenuity and accomplishment that characterized US intelligence at its inception, pierced the Iron Curtain, and brought us through the Cold War to the position of intelligence dominance we have come to regard as commonplace. Developing the ability to execute the strategic CI mission would at least open the door to these intriguing possibilities.

US CI professionals have made tremendous contributions to the security of our nation. Thanks to their dedicated work there is no reason to doubt that we are deriving about as much value as is possible from the current business model of US counterintelligence. The question is whether our national security leadership thinks that is good enough, because the sum of what our CI agencies do will not bring us a strategic offensive gain against foreign intelligence threats unless orchestrated to a common purpose. That is the mission of strategic CI.

A Status Report

In the final analysis, the decision whether or not to pursue a strategic CI capability is ultimately a

policy call. President Bush made the initial call in approving the first National Counterintelligence Strategy in 2005.¹³ While broadly a vision statement for the many ways in which counterintelligence should support national security, the strategy's central feature is reorientation of the CI enterprise to enable proactive strategic operations against foreign intelligence threats as national security priorities dictate. The national security leadership has every reason to expect that the CI community is hard at work to deliver this new strategic CI capability.

There have been some important steps forward, and a few back. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, constituted to examine US intelligence in the wake of major failures in the lead up to the war with Iraq, also devoted substantial attention to the problems of US counterintelligence.¹⁴ Finding that "the United States has not sufficiently responded to the scope and scale of the foreign intelligence threat," the judgment of the commission was unequivocally in support of building a strong strategic CI capability and going on the offense. Of particular note, the commission called on CIA to establish "a new capability" to

mount counterintelligence activities outside the United States aimed at recruiting foreign sources and conducting activities to deny, deceive, and exploit foreign intelligence targeting of US interests. In short, the goal would be for the counterintelli-

gence element to track foreign intelligence officers before they land on US soil or begin targeting US interests abroad. In doing so, the new capability would complement the Agency's existing defensive operations, and would provide the Intelligence Community with a complete overseas counterintelligence capability.¹⁵

The starting blocks for the strategic CI mission are in place. In line with the commission's recommendation, the National clandestine Service, under CIA, is ideally situated to deliver, for the first time, a genuine CI capability abroad to complement the FBI's responsibilities at home.

The consolidation and enhanced professionalization of all of the FBI's national security functions under a new National Security Branch should enable a more systematic and strategically-driven approach to the Bureau's intelligence mission, including its CI work. The Defense Department's strategic CI orientation has been institutionalized in the mission of Counterintelligence Field Activity and the ongoing work on CI campaign plans now incorporated within the department's deliberate planning process. And with the issuance of the 2005 National Counterintelligence Strategy, the office of the NCIX engaged the CI community to build central data bases on select foreign intelligence services to support strategic analyses and to identify collection needs, and it established a pilot project for a CI community integration center to conduct strategic operational planning to degrade foreign adversaries intelligence capabilities.

Despite accomplishments, the ability to execute strategic CI operations remains a far-off goal.

Despite these accomplishments, the ability to execute strategic CI operations remains a far-off goal. It is uncertain whether plans for the new external CI cadre at CIA will survive in the face of competing demands on the agency's HUMINT collection and other clandestine resources.

The FBI's performance in shouldering the national security responsibilities it has been assigned is the linchpin to executing the strategic CI mission. But as both the WMD Commission and the 9/11 Commission cautioned, the FBI's past record in effecting institutional and cultural reform to address transnational security threats is not encouraging.¹⁶

CIFA has seen its budget sharply curtailed, and as of this writing its charter and mission are under critical review. Authorities and lines of responsibility over counterintelligence within the office of the DNI are blurred, while the unity of effort and priority requirements of strategic CI have yet to find expression in ordering the plans, programs, budgets or operations of the component CI agencies.¹⁷

Overall, the most formidable obstacle to progress has been the lack of understanding or consensus behind the purpose and value of the strategic CI mission. Even the end goal behind the creation of the NCIX remains a matter of some dispute. Is the objective to establish a new national capability to execute the strategic CI mission or simply to become more efficient at performing the standing missions of the several CI agencies?

The Bottom Line

Which brings us back to the central question with which this paper began. If the strategic CI mission is a bridge too far as measured against other intelligence priorities, then the DNI and the NCIX need to bring that determination back to the president and the Congress and get on with more promising work. The Office of the NCIX, as the national level CI mission manager, can confine itself to reviewing budgets, plans, and programs against individual measures of effectiveness as put forward by the several CI agencies, look to the training and professionalization of the CI cadre (a very important job), perfect its product line of damage assessments (a solid business area), and continue to turn out annual catalogues of foreign intelligence threats and generic strategy documents that illustrate goals but do not bear responsibility for meeting them. These duties may be quite enough to justify the existence of the office and to validate its value-added as a component within the office of the DNI.

In my view, however, larger national security considerations argue for a purposeful ability to deny, degrade, or manipulate the intelligence capabilities of America's adversaries. If our national security leadership judges that the United States requires such a strategic CI capability, then the DNI, the NCIX, and the whole of the community must step up to that task. That is a much higher bar. But it is not beyond our reach.

Sherman Kent's thinking about strategic intelligence emerged from the historical setting in which he worked, a period which Dean Acheson described in his book *Present at the Creation*, when the national security demands were seen as just a little less daunting than the task in Genesis. There, the challenge was to create a new world out of chaos; "ours," Acheson wrote, "to create half a world, a free half, out of the same material without blowing the whole to pieces in the process."¹⁸ And, as he concluded, it's a wonder how much was accomplished—advanced by the intellectual rigor of the era's great strategic thinkers.

Perhaps with the advantage of hindsight, many modern observers have described today's national security challenges as even more complex than those of the Cold War. Among today's new realities of strategy and national power are the effective workings of foreign intelligence services in service to our adversaries. At a minimum, we need a clear-eyed evaluation of their meaning for US national security—both the threats they pose and the opportunities they may present—to enable our national security leadership to judge whether the prevailing more-of-the-same response is good enough. This is the intellectual rigor demanded of US counterintelligence today and where the strategic counterintelligence mission begins.

❖ ❖ ❖

Endnotes

-
1. Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949). Examples of the literature published since Kent's work include: Roger Hilsman, *Strategic Intelligence And National Decisions*. (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956); Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, *Strategic Intelligence for American National Security*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Richard K. Betts, and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds., *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael J. Handel* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, eds., *Strategic Intelligence: Windows Into A Secret World—An Anthology*. (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2004); and Loch K. Johnson, ed., *Strategic Intelligence* (London: Praeger Security International, 2007).
 2. Donald P. Steury, ed., *Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994)
 3. The practical objectives of CI and security are not always in concert – which Christopher Felix (TN James McCargar) called “one of the classic conflicts of secret operations.” Counterintelligence “operations are offensive operations which depend for their existence as well as success on constant, if controlled, contact with the enemy. Security, on the other hand, is a defensive operation which seeks to destroy the enemy's operations and to cut off all contact with him as dangerous.” Christopher Felix, *A Short Course in the Secret War*, 4th edition (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 2001), 126. But the interdependency between CI and the security disciplines has led to some long-playing theoretical discussions about which—if either—may be said to encompass the other; in practice, at a minimum, the two must be closely linked.
 4. David L. Grange, “Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern” *National Strategy Forum Review* (Winter 2000).
 5. Christopher Roache, ed., “Hamre: CI Needs to Accelerate Transformation to Avert Crisis,” *The CIFA Track* (DoD: Counterintelligence Field Activity) 20 May 2003: 1.
 6. George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, issued in 2002 and updated in 2006. The strategy's emphasis on preemption and preventive measures has made it both distinctive and controversial, but well within the mainstream of traditional American strategic thought. See John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
 7. Felix, 121.
 8. For example: “By consolidating information derived from a number of different Soviet sources, it has been possible to reconstruct the process Soviet intelligence uses to spot, screen, train, and assign case officers.” Richard Framingham, “Career Trainee Program, GRU Style” *Studies in Intelligence* 10 (Fall 1966): 45. See also Wayne Lambridge “A Note on KGB Style: Methods, Habits and Consequences” *Studies in Intelligence* 11 (Summer 1967): 65–75.
 9. See for example James L. Gilbert, John P. Finnegan and Ann Bray, *In the Shadow of the Sphinx: A History of Counterintelligence* (Fort Belvoir: Department of the Army, 2005); reviewed by Michael J. Sulick, *Studies in Intelligence* 50, no. 4 (2006).
 10. Felix, 123.
 11. Michael I. Handel, “Intelligence and Deception” in Roger Z. George and Robert D. Kline, eds., *Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004), 379, quoting Richards Heuer, “Strategic Deception: A Psychological Perspective” a paper presented at the 21st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, California, March 1980, 17, 28.
 12. Gus W. Weiss, “The Farewell Dossier,” *Studies in Intelligence* 39, no 5: 121–26.
 13. Office of the NCIX, *The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States* (2005); online at http://www.ncix.gov/publications/law_policy/policy/FinalCIstrategyforWebMarch21.pdf The NCIX is obligated to produce an annual strategy document. According to NCIX Joel Brenner, the 2007 National CI Strategy, recently approved by the president, is intended to build on the earlier effort.
 14. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission), Laurence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb (Cochairmen) *Report to the President of the United States*, March 31, 2005; see especially Chapter 11.
 15. *Ibid.*, 493.

16. *Ibid.* See Chapter 10 citing the 9/11 Commission's findings. The chorus of skeptics is growing louder. See e.g., Richard Posner, "Time to Rethink the FBI" *Wall Street Journal* March 19, 2007, A13—the latest in a continuing critique by Judge Posner. For a reply, see Louis Freeh's letter to the editor, "Former FBI Director Says U.S. Doesn't Need a National Police Force," *Wall Street Journal* March 31, 2007, A9.

17. A serious problem underscored by the WMD Commission is that the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act assigned specific duties to the NCIX, but it did not give it directive authority over the CI elements; nor did it impose a corresponding duty on the parts of the CI community to support the NCIX. To fix this, the DNI could simply delegate his directive authority over CI budget, analysis, collection and other operations to the NCIX. This would go a long way toward giving NCIX the authorities and resources it needs to succeed. Instead, the DNI established substantive deputies to oversee budgeting, analysis and collection community-wide, with authorities and responsibilities assigned by broad directives within which CI is treated as a lesser included whole. As a result, the CI community is answerable to several entities in the office of the DNI, while to date the DNI has delegated none of his authorities over counterintelligence to the NCIX. The title of "mission manager" for counterintelligence belatedly conferred on the NCIX, while a step in the right direction, unfortunately does not solve the problem because by DNI directive a "mission manager's" authorities are subordinate to the authorities of the several deputies.

18. Dean Acheson, *Present At the Creation* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), 28.



The Intelligence Community's Neglect of Strategic Intelligence

John G. Heidenrich

Commonly misunderstood, we neglect it at our peril.

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the National Security Act of 1947. So many of our most prominent government institutions were created by this act—the National Security Council (NSC), the Armed Forces as a joint establishment, the US Air Force, and, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). As a “living” document, the act has outlasted the Cold War, for which it was devised, and much more.

By the 1980s the act's architects had passed away. Their thoroughness was such, however, that amendments have not radically altered what they essentially put in place. One relatively recent change, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, in addition to its impact on the interrelationships of the service arms, notably also mandated the creation of an annual *National Security Strategy*, a document produced by the president and reported annually to the Congress.

The original architects, with World War II in recent memory, knew very well the importance of giving commanders enough authority, and they likewise knew the importance of strategy. By 1947 George Kennan had wired his now famous Long Telegram. In March 1947, President

Harry Truman announced what we now call the Truman Doctrine, and so initiated America's national (grand) strategy of Communist Containment. Today, decades later, a national strategy is not only advisable for the republic but legally required. One can almost hear the original architects asking themselves, *Why didn't we think of that?*

But as much as the security act's architects would have approved of a published national strategy, they would, I believe, be greatly surprised, perhaps even incensed, by today's neglect of strategic intelligence in the Intelligence Community. Strategic intelligence collection and analysis is a capability they took pains to preserve; we are perilously close to losing it. The reasons are complicated, but they deserve our examination and discussion in this anniversary year.

Does Anyone Know What Strategic Intelligence Is?

Readers can easily get a sense of the problem by conducting a small, admittedly unscientific, survey. Hand someone a report on a foreign-related topic and describe it as “strategic intelligence.” Then ask the recipient to explain the term “strategic intelligence” and how the report qualifies. In my own surveys, a

“
The architects of the National Security Act of 1947 would be greatly surprised by today's neglect of strategic intelligence in the Intelligence Community.
”

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

In official circles and beyond, too many people attribute meanings to “strategic” and “strategic intelligence” that no dictionary supports.

typical reply, after an awkward pause, has been that strategic intelligence is information about countries, or about strategic nuclear forces, or perhaps a long-range forecast. Another common reply, commendable in its honesty, has been “I don’t know.”

Substantively, none of these answers is adequate—and they are downright odd when compared to the straightforward answers many of us would give when asked to define tactical intelligence. These might include something like “intelligence information for the tactical battlefield.” Logically enough, the official definition the Pentagon uses is equally straightforward: “Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations.”¹

This is the Pentagon’s official definition of strategic intelligence:

*Intelligence that is required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels.*²

Or, in fewer words, strategic intelligence is that intelligence necessary to create and implement a strategy, typically a grand strategy, what officialdom calls a national strategy. A strategy is not really a plan but the logic driving a plan.

A strategy furthers one’s advance towards goals by suggesting ways to accommodate and/or orches-

trate a variety of variables—sometimes too many for the strategist alone to anticipate and understand. When foreign areas are involved, in-depth expertise is required, which is what strategic intelligence provides. Without the insights of deep expertise—insights based on detailed knowledge of obstacles and opportunities and enemies and friends in a foreign area—a strategy is not much more than an abstract theory, potentially even a flight of fancy. The better the strategic intelligence, the better the strategy, which is why the definition of strategic intelligence should not be so mysterious.

Nevertheless, in official circles and beyond, too many people attribute meanings to “strategic” and “strategic intelligence” that no dictionary supports. Ignorance of the meaning of these words has bred ignorance of the strategic product, with, in my view, enormous consequences. During the past decade and a half, since the Cold War, the production and use of strategic intelligence by the United States government has plunged to egregiously low levels. This decline is badly out of sync with the broader needs of the republic, fails to meet the nation’s foreign policy requirements, ill-serves the country’s many national security officials, and retards the developing prowess of its intelligence analysts.

This neglect is not only perilous, it is tragic. American ingenuity has made great contributions to the ancient craft of intelligence, contributions worthy of national pride. The most famous is the American spy satellite, a Cold War invention. Less famous but just as ingenious is multi-departmental strategic intelligence, invented during World War II by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

Yet, within the government that created it and that was once its master artisan, this analytical invention is now largely neglected. As my informal surveys suggest, very few employees of the Intelligence Community would say they are working to advance the implementation of the official *National Security Strategy*—or indeed, any strategy. Instead, much of today’s intelligence is tactical, tangential, or tied to national strategy only by formal references to high-level strategic planning or guidance documents in forewords, prefaces, or other such administrative front-matter.

Who’s Thinking About Tomorrow?

From my perspective, it’s not clear anyone is, or will be—at least not as long as the analyst’s primary product is current intelligence, which in essence is only the daily news compiled with secret information. This type of intelligence must be desirable since so many consumers do consume it, but, like journalism without investigative reporting, it is not strategic intelligence and

cannot replace it. As a percentage of the community's workload, however, it nearly has. In a survey of hundreds of community analysts performed by a fellow at CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) about two years ago, these complaints were heard:

Our products have become so specific, so tactical even, that our thinking has become tactical. We're losing our strategic edge because we're so focused on today's issues.

About 15 years ago, I used to have 60 percent of my time available for long-term products. Now, it's between 20 and 25 percent.

[V]elocity isn't a substitute for quality. We've gotten rid of the real analytic products that we use to make, and now we just report on current events.³

Many of the community's elders likewise lament the consequences of a national intelligence effort now so focused upon the immediate:

The Intelligence Community really [is] focused on current intelligence, on policy support. It does very little research. It has very little understanding below the level of the policymaker and, in my view, on many issues. I think that, in some ways, these two groups are reinforcing each other's worst habits.⁴

A lot of strategic intelligence is not secret. It's out there. You'd better have some people who understand history. Instead, they've gotten sucked into the

But like journalism without investigative reporting, current intelligence is not strategic intelligence and cannot replace it.

current intelligence business, which is death. It's death to knowing what's going on.⁵

Is American...strategic intelligence up to the demands of the global environment and our national policies and strategies? I think there is a prima facie case that the answer is no.⁶

Summarizing their concern is this excerpt from the CSI-published conference report from which the preceding comment was drawn:

A major [community] weakness...is its difficulty in providing strategic intelligence—the comprehensive overviews that put disparate events and the fragmentary snapshots provided by different intelligence sources into a contextual framework that makes it meaningful for the intelligence consumer. This criticism applies to intelligence prepared both for a national policy audience and for more specialized audiences, such as battlefield commanders.⁷

Some supervisors argue that the community is doing more strategic intelligence work than is generally reported. Perhaps. But the excerpt above hints at a deeper, more insidious problem: It describes strategic intelligence as the provision of context. Context is nice, sometimes even helpful, but it does not compellingly excite the average consumer, especially the military one, because it is not strategic sup-

port. Yet "context" is what most analysts and consumers assume strategic intelligence is.

Another common assumption is that strategic intelligence is merely a longer range perspective. Officialdom even promotes this, if unwittingly. For example, in the National Defense Intelligence College, a component of the Defense Intelligence Agency, is the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research (CSIR). The center describes itself as "the Intelligence Community's research and publication center devoted to an impartial exploration of medium- and long-range issues of concern to intelligence directors...." Where in that description, however, is there any allusion to *national strategy*? Or does strategic intelligence exist in a realm without strategy? Should it?

At the risk of waxing nostalgic about the Cold War, in that era many policymakers were voracious consumers of strategic intelligence because it did provide strategic support. Used to tailor the grand strategy of communist containment, it deeply assessed the threats the United States and its allies faced, articulated their strengths and weaknesses, and noted exploitable opportunities. It was "current" in that it was timely, but it was also strategic. Directly applicable to the national strategy, it was, in today's terminology, "actionable" intelligence. (See the accompanying article in this issue on the

During the Cold War, many policymakers consumed strategic intelligence voraciously because it did provide strategic support.

Office of Research and Estimates.)

At present, about one half of the community's analysts possess less than five years of experience.⁸ Strategic intelligence is not their forte; few would have learned it in college and most have not had enough practice to gain sufficient understanding and expertise to produce strategic intelligence. As intelligence agencies swell their ranks with more and more new analysts, this situation is unlikely to improve anytime soon.⁹

At CIA in particular, General Michael Hayden told Congress last year that for every 10 CIA analysts with less than four years of experience, only one analyst has more than 10 years of experience. "This is the least experienced analytic workforce in the history of the Central Intelligence Agency," he said.¹⁰ One result, warned Carl W. Ford Jr., a former assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research, is that "we haven't done strategic intelligence for so long that most of our analysts don't know how to do it anymore."¹¹

Another reason strategic intelligence "isn't done" is that among today's intelligence consumers, urgency is pushing tactical thinking. *To stop terrorists, I need this specific piece of tactical intelligence—right now.* Consequently, by default, those analytical topics that feel somehow too grand, or too distant in time and place

to matter immediately, tend to get ignored.

In fairness to intelligence analysts and their managers, they are merely following standard procedure, performing compartmentalized, narrowly focused routines. But reality is not entirely amenable to compartmentalization. Reality is interrelated and messy, involving deadly diseases from AIDS to avian flu; politically disruptive environmental changes; demographic dislocation; endemic corruption; trafficking in everything from people to weapons of mass destruction (WMD); intolerant belief-systems; genocide; shifting centers of economic power; global energy competition; and engineering breakthroughs from bio-manipulation to nano technology. These challenges are so profoundly complex, they cannot be well explained only in current or tactical intelligence.

Even if analysts are doing the reporting, reporting the facts de jour is not analysis. At the other extreme, analysis should not exist for its own sake, as though any interpretation of facts is better than none at all. Producing token interpretations, day after day, may keep an analyst employed, but as analytical practice this is only "make work" activity. More often than not it just dulls an analyst's proficiency while the consumer gets a flow of pseudo-analytic drivel. Effective analysis ought to enhance a product until it empowers a consumer with the maximum advantage an expert's

insight can provide. That is actionable intelligence.

At the Creation

Many a reader of *Studies in Intelligence* knows the contributions of Sherman Kent, including his book *Strategic Intelligence and American World Policy*, published in 1949. But to understand from whence modern strategic intelligence originated and where we stand today, we need to look back to World War II, to the work of the Research and Analysis (R&A) branch of the OSS.

At the time, the R&A products that most impressed the US military were infrastructure studies. In 1942, as American forces prepared to invade North Africa, a young Kent at R&A supervised the creation of several studies of that region's ports and railways. Showing vast detail, those studies amazed their military consumers. R&A found most of the raw information quite openly in books, trade journals, statistical abstracts and almanacs, even in the archived project files of cooperative private companies. Kent and his colleagues—all practiced scholars supported by the full resources of the Library of Congress—knew where to find good information.¹²

Today, by contrast, the typical intelligence analyst rarely exploits open sources as well. Working in environments dominated by secrecy and security concerns, most analysts work in relative seclusion. As a result, compared to an experienced professor or a seasoned business researcher—both proficient at

exploiting open sources deeply—most entry-level analysts are novices.

Accurate, detailed information is not necessarily available via the Internet, nor is it always free. Far more exists off the Internet, but the daily deadlines of current intelligence discourage its deep exploitation. So, for reasons of ease, speed, and perhaps a little arrogance, most community analysts confine their raw material to secret information. Secret information may be very good, but information need not be secret to be accurate. And, as we know from the experience of Iraqi WMD, secret information is not necessarily always accurate.

Back to R&A. In 1943, it subjected its famed infrastructure studies to military-economic analysis and, in so doing, invented multi-departmental strategic intelligence. This excerpt from a CIA-published history of the OSS summarizes that phenomenal achievement:

Analyses by the Enemy Objectives Unit (EOU), a team of R&A economists posted to the U.S. Embassy in London, sent Allied bombers toward German fighter aircraft factories in 1943 and early 1944. After the Luftwaffe's interceptor force was weakened, Allied bombers could strike German oil production, which EOU identified as the choke-point in the Nazi war effort. The idea was not original with [the] OSS, but R&A's well-documented support gave it credibility and helped convince Allied commanders to try it.... The resulting scarcity of aviation fuel all but grounded Hitler's

The OSS Research and Analysis Branch products that most impressed the US military were infrastructure studies.

Luftwaffe and, by the end of [1944], diesel and gasoline production had also plummeted, immobilizing thousands of German tanks and trucks.¹³

A great success. Imagine if R&A's infrastructure studies had not existed or were produced in haste by amateurs ignorant of the best sources, the results either inaccurate or incomplete. The actual studies were good, of course, but they might have remained strictly tactical intelligence tools, as tactical as a sergeant's field map, nothing strategic. Imagine if nobody had bothered to think any harder, too cautious or too busy to consider, let alone attempt, a thoroughly multi-disciplinary analysis in the hope of creating a decisive advantage. Good information abounded, but information on paper is not necessarily knowledge in an analyst's mind, and therefore not necessarily incorporated into that analyst's impressions and analyses.

Which brings us to the EOU's economists. Quite young, they could have been derided as "a bunch of silly economists ignorant of real war." They did have advanced university degrees and did represent the OSS, but what made them insightful, persuasive, and ultimately successful is what they knew as individuals. They knew what they were talking about, and it showed. Their thorough study of the multi-disciplinary material they accumulated made them true subject-

matter experts. In the process, they created a new intelligence discipline whose tradecraft transforms vast amounts of scattered information into an individual's comprehensive knowledge and, ultimately, into exceptional insight. The respect they received, they earned.

The OSS did not survive the postwar demobilization of late 1945, but R&A did. Initially transferred to the State Department, it went to CIA because the strategic intelligence capability it embodied was understood to be essential to the national security, whether in war or peace.

Preserving that capability was one of the objectives the architects of the National Security Act of 1947 had in mind. Although the term "strategic intelligence" does not appear, for that term was not yet commonly used among civilians, the act did call for the continuous production of "national intelligence," a category the act treats as distinctly different from tactical intelligence.

National intelligence, according to the act, was to be produced by the Intelligence Community under the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), now the DNI. Tactical intelligence was to be the job of the military services, perhaps not without Intelligence Community help, but that help was not to be the community's main effort. The original architects of the act knew the mission

Kent himself rated the risk that analysts would be contaminated by consumers as a greater danger than the one posed by self-imposed isolation.

of producing national (strategic) intelligence would be daunting, which is why they created a central agency, CIA, to not only receive and coordinate the government's intelligence information but, crucially, undertake multi-disciplinary analysis (an endeavor more comprehensive than "all-source analysis") to achieve the great successes R&A had achieved in World War II.

Little wonder, then, that so many veterans of the old R&A, like Sherman Kent, were recruited into the new CIA.

Informative or Ivory Tower?

"Let things be such," Kent advised during the Cold War, "that if our policymaking master is to disregard our knowledge and wisdom, he will never do so because our work was inaccurate, incomplete, or patently biased."¹⁴ Every good analyst knows the importance of objectivity. By following evidence-based logic, an objective analysis holds the potential to debunk a policymaker's preconceptions, even reveal how his preferred policy actually fails. What keeps the policymaker receptive to such analysis, despite the bad news it may contain, is its claim to objectivity.

The analyst's need to be objective and his need to know which topics most interest a policymaker (or other consumer) have posed a dilemma that has been

much discussed in these pages and in the literature of intelligence in general. Kent himself rated the risk that analysts would be contaminated by consumers a greater danger than the risk posed by self-imposed isolation.

As a result, the CIA's analytical components tended to be isolated and at times seemed out of touch with their consumers. Because so much intelligence work is secretive anyway, the isolation would have felt normal. The Cold War itself reinforced the isolation by requiring little daily interaction between analysts and consumers, the Cuban Missile Crisis being a rare exception.

More typically, the president and other senior officials received daily intelligence briefings, delivered by a briefer (not an analyst) or as a document. Thereafter, those officials would seldom see or speak with an intelligence officer until the next morning's briefing.

That arrangement worked throughout the Cold War because most policymakers knew which countries mattered and knew a lot about them. Every US president from Kennedy to George H. W. Bush witnessed the opening of the Cold War as adults and learned the dynamics of the containment strategy and the key countries in the game. The Cold War dominated current events, university discussions, and, of course, military planning. With

decades of experience, each president would find the Intelligence Community effort to be additional to their own efforts and thus only supplemental, albeit crucially so.

In the military as well, limited interaction prevailed. Behind their salutes and outward camaraderie, many intelligence and operations personnel were actually a little suspicious of each other, mutually afraid of security leaks. Contingency war planning was considered so sensitive that intelligence people, ostensibly supporting the operators, were told remarkably few specifics by those very operators devising the plans.

This left many analysts with time to hone their craft. Consider what they had to learn: In strategic intelligence especially, though not exclusively, every issue involves multiple disciplines: politics, economics, organizational behavior, infrastructure studies (terrain, transportation, telecommunications), engineering, and military science (ground, naval, air, space, nuclear, unconventional). Cultural awareness is imperative, which means knowing more than just some stereotypes. Every ethnicity, religion, and organization has a culture, usually several, their diversity and dynamics revealed only through study. Another analytical skill is to see events in true proportion, using historical experience to investigate across time and distance. An obscure event may possess more lasting significance than today's headline story—the former brew-

ing as a future crisis, the latter likely to be forgotten within days.

Intertwined with analysis is communicating it. This can be remarkably difficult because many habits of conversation tend to be remarkably sloppy. *Well, everybody knows what I really mean!* Little better are many habits of writing. In 1953, decades before instant e-mail rendered a quick spurt of typing preferable to a carefully crafted essay, Kent expressed his “sense of outrage at the infantile imprecision of the language” being used even then.¹⁵

To craft language which is literal, concise, and not misleading requires editing, editing, and more editing. Analysts are thus encouraged, though less so these days, to write strategic studies on their own initiative: typically a few pages long, including an executive summary. The luckiest studies somehow avoid a consumer’s immediate toss into a burn bag of classified trash, instead gaining a temporary but honored place on his desk, ready for a spare moment’s reading because the content remains relevant for at least six months, in some cases for years. Yet, even if the only readers are the analyst’s colleagues, every study results from practice.

What’s in a name? Sometimes some misunderstanding.

The efforts of Kent and his fellows to promote semantic precision could not, alas, counteract decades of Cold War routine. Misconceptions were spread, now

Intertwined with analysis is communicating it. This can be remarkably difficult because many habits of conversation tend to be remarkably sloppy.

all too common, of what “strategic” means and hence what strategic intelligence supposedly is.

One misconception is that strategic intelligence must pertain to a long period of time. In truth, strategic intelligence pertains to strategy, whereas the particular strategy of containment lasted a long period of time. Containment emphasized patience: hold back the Communist bloc states until their internal troubles compel either their reform or their implosion. Since a long wait was expected, many strategic intelligence studies produced then were trend analyses, forecasts, and multiyear estimates. If the time-frame of a strategic issue is short, however, as several are, the strategic intelligence should mirror that.

If that seems obvious now, it was not so obvious then. Even less obvious was a Cold War routine which encouraged the idea that “strategic” means long range. In 1947, the new US Air Force saw in nuclear weapons a means to inflict so-called strategic bombing—defeat an enemy by bombing his national assets, particularly his industrial cities. The US Army wanted nuclear weapons, too, for so-called battlefield use—to destroy Soviet Army formations in eastern Germany if they tried to invade the West. Two nuclear roles, strategic bombing and battlefield use, thus created two categories of nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical. Hence the assumption, still prev-

alent throughout the military today, that strategic means long range while tactical means short.

That assumption is false. Would a thermonuclear blast on a “tactical” battlefield have strategic ramifications? Of course. Consequently, today’s experts in nuclear arms control cannot easily define, in precise legalistic treaty language, what makes a nuclear warhead exclusively “tactical” or “strategic.” Not even the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), some 800 pages long, attempts to define the word “strategic.” START defines delivery systems, such as heavy bombers and inter-continental ballistic missiles. Its negotiators could have defined “strategic” as merely some agreed number of kilometers. Yet they did not, indeed quite sensibly.

Beware of what you wish for...

By the time Bill Clinton assumed the presidency in 1993, the Cold War was over and the world had changed. Subsequent globalization has not homogenized it. What globalization has done is link more localities than ever before—via television, e-mail, phone calls, postal packages, and airplane flights. Usually the results are beneficial, a worthy trade in goods, services, and ideas. But whenever the “locals” somewhere grow restless, the response time left to “outsiders” (actually distant participants) is now acutely short.

Today should be a golden age for strategic intelligence. Instead, what began as a needed intelligence reform—an attempt to reduce the analyst’s isolation from the policymaker—has overcompensated.

Since a Soviet affairs expert is no longer “qualified” to speak intelligently about Africa, the Far East, Latin America, or even about today’s Russia, specialized expertise in that foreign area is now indispensable. Since terrorist networks can thrive in even the most anarchic and impoverished places, every country, indeed every province, now merits at least some intelligence attention.

In other words, today should be a golden age for strategic intelligence. Instead, what began in the 1990s as a needed intelligence reform—an attempt to reduce the analyst’s isolation from the policymaker—has overcompensated, the bureaucratic pendulum pushed from one extreme to another.

Some critics accuse the reform itself of having “politicized” intelligence, for it encourages more analyst-consumer interaction than was preferred during the Cold War. More interaction does raise some risks, of course, but there were risks, too, when the analysts were isolated. Kent himself realized this late in his career. Though he remained concerned about the potential for “group think,” he taught that analysts and consumers must communicate well enough that when an analyst warns of a coming international crisis, the consumer breaks away from his busy schedule and does respond, quickly—for he trusts in that analyst’s competence. Otherwise,

without that trust and easy access, without that professional bond, warnings are ignored too often. “Warning is like love,” Kent quipped. “It takes two to make it.”¹⁶

The reform was initiated by Robert Gates when he was the DCI (1991–93). Drawing upon his experience as an analyst and an NSC consumer, he observed and proclaimed:

*Unless intelligence officers are down in the trenches with the policymakers—understand the issues and know what US objectives are, how the process works, and who the people are—they cannot possibly provide either relevant or timely intelligence that will contribute to better-informed decisions.*¹⁷

Others agreed, including an important advisory body in 1996, the Clinton administration’s Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Among its recommendations was this advice:

Intelligence must be closer to those it serves.... The Commission believes [that the objectivity] problem is real but manageable. The need to present the “unvarnished truth” to policymakers is at the core of every analyst’s training and ethos.... [At the same time, as one expert testified,] “if an intelligence analyst is not in some danger of being politi-

*cized, he is probably not doing his job.” The Commission agrees.*¹⁸

Hence the phenomenal change, one which the “Long War” on terrorism has since intensified. Whatever consumers ask, analysts now endeavor to answer with unprecedented single-mindedness. Likewise in the military, operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq have encouraged a much closer interaction between intelligence and operations personnel. Close intelligence support has enabled successes as spectacular as the capture of Saddam Hussein. And it tracks down terrorists.

... You may get your wish—but nothing else.

Unfortunately, when the consumers’ obvious preference is for current and tactical intelligence, strategic intelligence faces neglect. Those analysts who grew up in the period when attention to strategic intelligence permitted them to deepen their skills and become genuine subject-matter experts have been dwindling away. Many have retired from government service for private sector jobs or left the field entirely.

Meanwhile, a decade’s worth of younger (albeit very bright) analysts are being promoted with much less experience in that past crucible of analytical development. It is lacking because the skills necessary for strategic intelligence do not thrive in the equivalent of a crisis center, rushing from task to task, fact-

sheet to fact-sheet, and blurb to blurb. "It's like cramming for finals, except we do it every day."¹⁹ If current trends continue, the high analytical standards of the past will go from standard procedure to "old school" to possibly a dead art.

Both the 9/11 Commission and the WMD Commission have noted this strategic intelligence deficiency, the latter's report adding:

*Managers and analysts throughout the Intelligence Community have repeatedly expressed frustration with their inability to carve out time for long-term research and thinking. This problem is reinforced by the current system of incentives for analysts, in which analysts are often rewarded for the number of pieces they produce, rather than the substantive depth or quality of their production.*²⁰

Under the tutelage of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) there is now a unit of analysts, on rotation, officially devoted to strategic intelligence work. As beneficial as their work can be, however, the NIC itself has only 18 members. How many of the community's thousands of analysts can they mentor personally? Not the mediocre, presumably. A former chairman of the NIC, Robert Hutchings, has even expressed concern that the NIC staff, the chosen few, has gotten too involved in doing current intelligence work in order to help produce the DNI's daily morning briefings for the president.²¹

Unfortunately, when the consumers' obvious preference is for current and tactical intelligence, strategic intelligence faces neglect.

Simply ordering the community's analysts to produce more strategic intelligence may seem the obvious solution, but decrees alone cannot change an analyst's opinion of which product types would best advance his career. As long as any "strategic intelligence" products provide only "context" and not actionable strategic support, how can the trade-craft not actually languish? Whenever a crisis grabs the headlines, a bellicose Iran or North Korea for example, analyses are published of the "strategic ramifications." But if those reports fall within the domain of strategic intelligence, they hardly fill it.

Garnering less attention are the less interesting issues and countries, presumably resulting in less expertise. There is some renewed interest in doing longer forecasts, but those particular analysts are generally separated from the rest, their experience confined mostly to themselves. Rotational assignments might help, but many years will pass before that specialized experience pervades the larger community. Furthermore, strategic intelligence work is something a young analyst should begin with, develop with, not "graduate" into after years of ignorance of it.

Who says nobody wants it?

The need for strategic intelligence products actually does exist in today's environment. To

conduct counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, for example, the Army's elite Special Forces have long used socio-cultural assessments of foreign peoples, the detail almost anthropological. Such strategic support is now needed by civilian and military agencies to contend with foreign corruption, terrorism, and civil affairs challenges. Consider these words from the Army's journal *Military Review*, addressed to every American company commander in Iraq and Afghanistan:

*Counterinsurgency is a competition with the insurgent for the right to win the hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population... Know your turf. Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion, and culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district... Neglect this knowledge and it will kill you.*²²

Also needed are multidisciplinary studies of the inner dynamics of countries and groups, their politics, economies, socio-cultural factors and so forth. Such studies are called Operational Net Assessments (ONAs) and produced (tellingly) largely by private companies fulfilling military contracts, not by the Intelligence Community directly. A study by the Pentagon's Defense Science Board (DSB) has warned that "US military expeditions to Afghanistan

Extraordinary in scope and detail is the intelligence stabilization and reconstruction operations require.

and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such excursions.”²³ Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo—since the end of the Cold War the United States has initiated what are now called stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18 to 24 months, the average operation lasting five to eight years.²⁴

Extraordinary in scope and detail is the intelligence such operations require. Likewise the military’s most advanced theories and operating concepts, called network-centric warfare and effects-based operations, emphasize individual initiative, situational awareness at every level, and “self-synchronization” by everyone from a theater-level combatant commander to the lowly “strategic corporal.” That support, whether labeled an Operational Net Assessment or mislabeled as “tactical intelligence” to garner it more attention, Kent and his R&A colleagues would have recognized as strategic intelligence. Most of the raw information required is even openly available, as the DSB study notes:

*Open source information can be used to develop a broad range of products needed for stabilization and reconstruction operations—such as genealogical trees, electricity generation and grids, cultural materials in support of strategic communication plans, and background information for noncombatant evacuation operations.*²⁵

The most vocal proponents of open source information assert that it could support as much as 80 percent of our intelligence needs, albeit as raw information.²⁶ But being openly available does not mean that it is entirely free, entirely on the Internet, entirely in English, or of impeccable quality. To effectively find, process, and analyze it requires the skill associated with dedicated strategic intelligence work.

Strategic intelligence must also support today’s grand strategy of global democratization and its corollary, strategic communications, used in the global war of ideas. *Where throughout the world might transnational terrorists draw recruits and hide out? Where might illicit WMD be smuggled?* Among the possibilities are at least 50 countries so institutionally deficient in political freedom, managerial competence, and economic development that they teeter at the brink of state failure, their precarious situation too complex to judge with current and tactical intelligence alone. Whatever one’s opinion of global democratization as a grand strategy, whatever the institutional capacity and transparency it either creates or fails to create, strategic intelligence is the means to identify its obstacles, opportunities, progress, and pitfalls.

Private companies and think-tanks can help, but only help. They do offer many fine products, but using those to fill every

strategic intelligence gap will not end our neglect. For the quality of the Intelligence Community lies ultimately in its employees. Innately competent, their proficiency with high-technology is undoubtedly unprecedented. Yet, in comparison to generations past, have today’s intelligence analysts achieved the highest intellectual breadth, depth, and rigor needed in these dangerous times? Are their consumers supported by analyses made as meaningful as possible? And as prudently strategic?

If these are deficient, the solution is in the performance of deeper research and greater practice performed inside the community’s agencies themselves. Only through research that is thorough and multidisciplinary, honed by perseverance and humbling in its lessons, can the ostensibly “expert” knowledge of those analysts be enhanced to the level of truly superior insight.

Even then, strategic intelligence cannot render an analyst, or an agency, infallible. Sometimes even the smartest analyst will get it wrong. “It is when the other man zigs violently out of the track of ‘normal’ behavior that you are likely to lose him,” complained Kent, speaking of Nikita Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis.²⁷ Saddam Hussein was another behavioral challenge. Good strategic intelligence can improve our odds of getting our analysis right, but only by demanding of us a lot more practice.²⁸

Leaders must lead

Certainly the consumers deserve to be supported. We ought to remember, however, that the average consumer of intelligence was never asked, nor did he ever ask, to be made, in effect, responsible for how the Intelligence Community runs itself, its priorities limited to his priorities, its only objective his daily whims. Hardly a prophet of future intelligence needs, many a consumer is just trying to survive the day, filled as it is with busy routine and deadlines so close that his own “long term” is usually measured in only months, weeks, or days.

With a schedule so tight, the intelligence support he wants is not for some nebulous “context” but for very specific information to help him avoid unpleasant surprises. Even then, he may not utilize that support until he finds the time, only to then complain that his intelligence needs are not satisfied. Yet, for all his complaints and demands, the average consumer does trust that the community knows its craft better than he. Someday, if not already, he will require more strategic intelligence than the community now offers, and he will expect those needs to be anticipated without his having to ask.

So what would improve the community’s production of strategic

Consumers may not always call for strategic intelligence, but they will always need it. We must never neglect it.

intelligence? Putting analysts back into isolation would not be a solution. The interaction of analysts and consumers has had tangible benefits in today’s complex era.

Another wrong approach would be to e-mail some directives, categorize the latest reports and studies, tally up what is produced in each category, especially the “strategic intelligence” category, and then report the supposed progress. That bureaucratic model would fail because for too many analysts the very definition of strategic intelligence remains mysterious. The community could multiply its official production of the things it is now doing and remain unchanged. Even if every analyst were ordered to attend a class of instruction, its lessons might soon be forgotten amid the “real work” of current intelligence production back at the office.

Still, a community-wide class on the fundamentals of strategic intelligence is needed. The class should be part of a campaign, with intelligence analysts gathered into auditoriums and given this message:

Strategic intelligence is essential, both for its products and in the experience of its production, for it constitutes nothing

less than the integral intelligence support of a strategy, very often the national strategy.

At the forefront of this campaign should be office chiefs, directorate chiefs, agency directors, even the DNI himself. When analysts see their senior chain-of-command taking this matter seriously, including a discussion of what strategic intelligence really is, they, too, will take it seriously. Of course many consumers will continue to want current and tactical intelligence, but they will no longer be treated as the only authority concerning what types of intelligence ought to be produced.

Once informed by strategic intelligence, a consumer who begins neither globally attuned nor strategically savvy can become both. Otherwise, going without it is like crossing a misty marshland without a guide. Even if every step forward is landed cautiously—a purely tactical consideration—the ignorant can still wander into quagmires where no informed traveler would venture unprepared. Consumers may not always call for strategic intelligence, but they will always need it. We must never neglect it.



Endnotes

1. "Tactical Intelligence," Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington: Department of Defense, 12 April 2001), 526. Available online at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
2. "Strategic Intelligence," JP 1-02, 509.
3. Rob Johnston, *Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2005), 13–16.
4. Quoted in Jeffrey R. Cooper, *Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, December 2005), 32.
5. Quote by Henry S. Rosen, a member of the WMD Commission cited in Tim Weiner, "Fading Fast: Langley, We Have a Problem," *New York Times*, 14 May 2006.
6. *Conference Report: Intelligence for a New Era in American Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2004), 3–4.
7. Ibid.
8. Mark M. Lowenthal, former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, quoted in David Bjerklie and Coco Masters, "How the CIA can be fixed," *Time*, 22 May 2006. Also quoted in "Porter Goss Resigns as Head of CIA," *Online Newshour*, from a PBS broadcast of 5 May 2006. Transcript online at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/government_programs/jan-june06/goss_05-05.html. See also David Ignatius, "Avoiding Another 'Slam Dunk'," *Washington Post*, 24 May 2006: A23.
9. Ibid.
10. Quoted in Mark Mazzetti, "CIA Choice Says He's Independent of the Pentagon," *New York Times*, 19 May 2006.
11. Quoted in Weiner.
12. Harold P. Ford, "A Tribute to Sherman Kent," *Studies in Intelligence*, Fall 1980.
13. Michael Warner, "Research & Analysis," *The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2000).
14. Quoted in Ford.
15. Ibid
16. Quoted in Jack Davis, "Sherman Kent's Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations," Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis *Occasional Papers*, Vol. 2, No.3 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2003)
17. Quoted in Jack Davis, "Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process," Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis *Occasional Papers*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002).
18. Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, "Executive Summary" and "Improving Intelligence Analysis," *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996).
19. Johnston.
20. *Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), Chapter Eight: Analysis.
21. Spencer Ackerman, "Our Myopic Spooks, Under Analysis," *The New Republic*, 29 May 2006.
22. David Kilcullen, "'Twenty-Eight Articles': Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* (May-June 2006), 103–8.
23. Defense Science Board, "Executive Summary," in *Transition to and from Hostilities* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2004), iii.
24. Ibid., iv.
25. Ibid, xv. See also pages 147–52.
26. Ibid. See also www.oss.net, the Web site of the private firm Open Source Solutions (OSS), Inc.
27. Sherman Kent, "A Crucial Estimate Relived," *Studies in Intelligence* (Spring 1964).
28. Davis, "Sherman Kent's Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations."



The Office of Reports and Estimates: CIA's First Center for Analysis

Woodrow Kuhns

“
During World War II, the United States made one of its few original contributions to the craft of intelligence: the invention of multisource, nondepartmental analysis.
”

During World War II, the United States made one of its few original contributions to the craft of intelligence: the invention of multisource, nondepartmental analysis. The Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) assembled a talented cadre of analysts and experts to comb through publications and intelligence reports for clues to the capabilities and intentions of the Axis powers. R&A's contributions to the war effort impressed even the harshest critics of the soon-to-be dismantled OSS. President Truman paid implicit tribute to R&A in late 1945 when he directed that it be transplanted into the State Department at a time when most of OSS was being demobilized. The transplant failed, however, and the independent analytical capability patiently constructed during the war had all but vanished when Truman moved to reorganize the nation's peacetime intelligence establishment at the beginning of 1946.^a

^a This article first appeared as the preface to Woodrow Kuhns, ed., *Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997)

“Current” Intelligence Versus “National” Intelligence

The Central Reports Staff, home to the analysts in the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), was born under a cloud of confusion in January 1946.¹ Specifically, no consensus existed on what its mission was to be, although the president's concerns in creating CIG were clear enough. In the uncertain aftermath of the war, he wanted to be sure that all relevant information available to the US government on any given issue of national security would be correlated and evaluated centrally so that the country would never again have to suffer a devastating surprise attack as it had at Pearl Harbor.²

How this was to be accomplished, however, was less clear. The president himself wanted a daily summary that would relieve him of the chore of reading the mounds of cables, reports, and other papers that constantly cascaded onto his desk. Some of these were important, but many were duplicative and even contradictory.³ In the jargon of intelligence analysis, Truman wanted CIG to produce a “current intelligence” daily publication that would contain all information of immediate interest to him.⁴

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

The presidential directive did not mention current intelligence. It ordered CIG to “accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence.”

Truman’s aides and advisers, however, either did not understand this or disagreed with him, for the presidential directive of 22 January 1946 authorizing the creation of CIG did not mention current intelligence. The directive ordered CIG to “accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence.”⁵ Moreover, at the first meeting of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) on 5 February, Secretary of State Byrnes objected to the president’s idea of a current intelligence summary from CIG, claiming that it was his responsibility as secretary of state to furnish the president with information on foreign affairs.⁶

Byrnes apparently then went to Truman and asked him to reconsider. Admiral Sidney Souers, the first director of central intelligence (DCI), told a CIA historian that Byrnes’ argument

ran along the line that such information was not intelligence within the jurisdiction of the Central Intelligence Group and the Director [of Central Intelligence]. President Truman conceded that it might not be generally considered intelligence, but it was information which he needed and therefore it was intelligence to him. The

result was agreement that the daily summaries should be “actual statements.” The Department of State prepared its own digest, and so the President had two summaries on his desk.⁷

This uneasy compromise was reflected in the NIA directives that outlined CIG’s duties. Directive No. 1, issued on 8 February 1946, ordered CIG to “furnish strategic and national policy intelligence to the President and the State, War, and Navy Departments....”⁸ National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 2, issued the same day, ordered the DCI to give “first priority” to the “production of daily summaries containing factual statements of the significant developments in the field of intelligence and operations related to the national security and to foreign events for the use of the President....”⁹

In practice, this approach proved unworkable. Without any commentary to place a report in context, or to make a judgment on its likely veracity, the early *Daily Summaries* probably did little but confuse the president. An alarming report one day on Soviet troop movements in Eastern Europe, for example, would be contradicted the next day by a report from another source. Everyone involved eventually realized the folly of this situation, and analytical commentar-

ies began to appear in the *Daily Summaries* in December 1946—episodically at first, and then regularly during 1947. The *Weekly Summary*, first published in June 1946 on the initiative of the Central Reports Staff itself, was also supposed to avoid interpretative commentary, but its format made such a stricture difficult to enforce. From its inception, the *Weekly Summary* proved to be more analytical than its *Daily Summary* counterpart.

The Confusion Surrounding “National” Intelligence

Similar disarray surrounded CIG’s responsibilities in the production of “strategic and national policy intelligence.” The members of the Intelligence Community simply could not agree on the policies and procedures that governed the production of this type of intelligence. Most of those involved seemed to believe that national intelligence should be coordinated among all the members of the Intelligence Community, that it should be based on all available information, that it should try to estimate the intentions and capabilities of other countries toward the United States, and that it should be of value to the highest policymaking bodies.

The devil was in the details. High-ranking members of the intelligence and policy communities debated, without coming to a consensus, most aspects of the estimate production process, including who should write them, how other agencies should participate in the process if at all, and

how dissents should be handled. Some of this reflected genuine disagreement over the best way to organize and run the Intelligence Community, but it also involved concerns about bureaucratic power and prerogatives, especially those of the director of central intelligence, the new-comer to the Intelligence Community. Even the definition of “strategic and national intelligence” had implications for the authority of the DCI and thus was carefully argued over by others in the community.¹⁰

DCI Vandenberg eventually got the NIA to agree to a definition in February 1947, but it was so general that it did little to solve the problems that abounded at the working level.¹¹ Ray Cline, a participant in the process of producing the early estimates, wrote in his memoirs that

It cannot honestly be said that it [ORE] coordinated either intelligence activities or intelligence judgments; these were guarded closely by Army, Navy, Air Force, State, and the FBI. When attempts were made to prepare agreed national estimates on the basis of intelligence available to all, the coordination process was interminable, dissents were the rule rather than the exception, and every policymaking official took his own agency's intelligence appreciations along to the White House to argue his case. The prewar chaos was largely recreated with only a little more lip service to central coordination.¹²

In practice, much of the intelligence produced by ORE was not coordinated with the other agen-

Even the definition of “strategic and national intelligence” had implications for the authority of the DCI and thus was carefully argued over by others in the community.

cies; nor was it based on all information available to the US Government. The *Daily* and *Weekly Summaries* were not coordinated products, and, like the other publications produced by ORE, they did not contain information derived from communications intelligence.¹³ The *Review of the World Situation*, which was distributed each month at meetings of the National Security Council, became a unilateral publication of ORE after the first two issues.¹⁴ The office's ad hoc publications, such as the Special Evaluations and Intelligence Memorandums, were rarely coordinated with the other agencies. By contrast, the “ORE” series of Special Estimates were coordinated, but critics nonetheless condemned many of them for containing trivial subjects that fell outside the realm of “strategic and national policy intelligence.”¹⁵

Whatever CIG's written orders, in practice the president's interest in the *Daily Summaries*, coupled with the limited resources of the Central Reports Staff, meant that the production of current intelligence came to dominate the staff and its culture. National estimative intelligence was reduced to also-ran status. An internal CIG memo stated frankly that “ORE Special Estimates are produced on specific subjects as the occasion arises and within the limits of ORE capabilities after current intelligence requirements are met.” It

went on to note, “Many significant developments worthy of ORE Special Estimates have not been covered...because of priority production of current intelligence, insufficient personnel, or inadequate information.¹⁶ This remained true even after the Central Reports Staff evolved into the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) in CIA.¹⁷

If the analysts in CIG, and then CIA, had only to balance the competing demands of current and national intelligence, their performance might have benefited. As it happened, however, NIA Directive No. 5 soon gave the analysts the additional responsibility of performing “such research and analysis activities” as might “be more efficiently or effectively accomplished centrally.”¹⁸ In practice, this meant that the analysts became responsible for performing basic research as well as wide-ranging political and economic analysis. To accommodate this enhanced mission, functional analysis branches for economics, science, transportation, and map intelligence were established alongside the existing regional branches.¹⁹

A high-ranking ORE officer of the period, Ludwell Montague, wrote that

this was a deliberate, but covert, attempt to transform ORE (or CRS, a staff designed expressly for the production of coordinated national intelligence) into an omniscient

NIA Directive No. 5 opened the door to proliferation of various kinds of publications and, consequently, to a dilution of analysts' efforts in the fields of current and national intelligence.

...central research agency. This attempt failed, leaving ORE neither the one thing nor the other. Since then, much ORE production has proceeded, not from any clear concept of mission, but from the mere existence of a nondescript contrivance for the production of nondescript intelligence. All our efforts to secure a clear definition of our mission have been in vain.²⁰

Another veteran of the period, George S. Jackson, agreed with Montague's assessment: "It would not be correct...to say that the Office...had failed utterly to do what it was designed to do; a more accurate statement would be that it had done not only what was planned for it but much that was not planned and need not have been done. In consequence, the Office had unnecessarily dissipated its energies to the detriment of its main function."²¹ He noted that

Requests [for studies] came frequently from many sources, not all of them of equal importance, but there seemed not to be anyone in authority [in ORE] who would probe beneath any of them to make sure that they merited a reply. Nor was there anyone who took it upon himself to decline requests--no matter from what source--when they were clearly for a type of material not called for under the responsibilities of the Office of Reports and Estimates.²²

A Mixed Reception

NIA Directive No. 5 opened the door to proliferation of various kinds of publications and, consequently, to a dilution of analysts' efforts in the fields of current and national intelligence.²³ Perhaps as a consequence of the confusion over the analytical mission, these products received mixed reviews. The president was happy with his *Daily Summary*, and that fact alone made it sacrosanct. Rear Admiral James H. Foskett, the president's naval aide, told ORE in 1947 that, "the President considers that he personally originated the *Daily*, that it is prepared in accordance with his own specifications, that it is well done, and that in its present form it satisfies his requirements."²⁴ President Truman's views on the *Weekly Summary* were less clear, but ORE construed lack of criticism as approval: "It appears that the *Weekly* in its present form is acceptable at the White House and is used to an undetermined extent without exciting comment indicative of a desire for any particular change."²⁵

Other policymakers were less impressed with the current intelligence publications. Secretary of State George Marshall stopped reading the *Daily Summary* after two weeks, and thereafter he had his aide flag only the most important items for him to read. The aide did this only two or three times a week, telling a CIG interviewer that "most of the informa-

tion in the *Dailies* is taken from State Department sources and is furnished the Secretary through State Department channels."²⁶ Marshall also stopped reading the *Weekly* after the first issue.²⁷ Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal considered both *Summaries* "valuable but not... indispensable," according to one of his advisers.²⁸ By contrast, an aide to Secretary of War Robert Patterson reported that the secretary read both the *Daily* and *Weekly Summaries* "avidly and regularly."²⁹

The analytical office's work came in for the most severe criticism in the so-called Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report of January 1949, which assessed both the performance of CIA and its role in the Intelligence Community.³⁰ This report, commissioned by the National Security Council in early 1948, was prepared by a trio of prominent intelligence veterans who had left government service after the war: Allen Dulles, William Jackson, and Mathias Correa.

Their report candidly admitted that "There is confusion as to the proper role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of intelligence reports and estimates" and that "The principle of the authoritative national intelligence estimate does not yet have established acceptance in the government."³¹ They nevertheless took ORE to task for failing to perform better in the production of national intelligence, noting that, although ORE had been given responsibility for production of national estimates, "It has...been concerned with a wide variety of activities and with the production of miscellaneous

reports and summaries which by no stretch of the imagination could be considered national estimates.”³²

The trio found unacceptable ORE’s practice of drafting the estimates “on the basis of its own research and analysis” and then circulating them among the other intelligence agencies to obtain notes of dissent or concurrence.³³ “Under this procedure, none of the agencies regards itself as a full participant contributing to a truly national estimate and accepting a share in the responsibility for it.”³⁴ They recommended that a “small group of specialists” be used “in lieu of the present Office of Reports and Estimates” to “review the intelligence products of other intelligence agencies and of the Central Intelligence Agency” and to “prepare drafts of national intelligence estimates for consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.”³⁵

The three also were not impressed with ORE’s efforts in field of current intelligence: “Approximately ninety per cent [sic] of the contents of the *Daily Summary* is derived from State Department sources.... There are occasional comments by the Central Intelligence Agency on portions of the *Summary*, but these, for the most part, appear gratuitous and lend little weight to the material itself.”³⁶ They concluded, “As both *Summaries* consume an inordinate amount of time and effort and appear to be outside of the domain of the Central Intelligence Agency, we believe that the *Daily*, and possibly the *Weekly Summary* should

The trio found unacceptable ORE’s practice of drafting the estimates “on the basis of its own research and analysis” and then circulating them among the other intelligence agencies to obtain notes of dissent or concurrence.

be discontinued in their present form.”³⁷

The trio concluded disapprovingly that “the Central Intelligence Agency has tended to become just one more intelligence agency producing intelligence in competition with older established agencies of the government departments.”³⁸

The Analysts

The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report was extremely, perhaps unfairly, critical of ORE’s production record. Intelligence analysis is not an easy job in the best of times—the available information on any given analytical problem is invariably incomplete or contradictory or flawed in some other important way—and these clearly were not the best of times. Signals intelligence, which had proved devastatingly effective against the Axis powers in the war, was less effective against the security-conscious Soviets, and, as noted above, in any event could not yet be cited directly in CIA publications, even in those sent to the president.³⁹ The sophisticated aircraft and satellites that would one day open the whole interior of the USSR to surveillance were not yet on the drawing board, and the intelligence collection arm of the new CIA was finding it impossibly difficult to penetrate Stalin’s paranoid police state with agents. In

the end, the analysts had little to rely on but diplomatic and military attaché reporting, media accounts, and their own judgment.

The paucity of hard intelligence about the Soviet Union placed a premium on the recruitment of top-notch analysts. Unfortunately, CIG and CIA had trouble landing the best and the brightest. CIG was in a particularly difficult situation; it had little authority to hire its own staff employees and thus depended on the Departments of State, War, and Navy for both its funding and personnel.⁴⁰ Ludwell Montague complained to DCI Vandenberg in September 1946 that these departments were not cooperating: “From the beginning the crucial problem...has been the procurement of key personnel qualified by aptitude and experience to anticipate intelligence needs, to exercise critical judgment regarding the material at hand, and to discern emergent trends. Such persons are rare indeed and hard to come by, [and] the recruitment of them is necessarily slow.”⁴¹ Montague was particularly bitter about Army intelligence’s (G-2) efforts to fob off on CIG what he termed “low-grade personnel.”⁴²

The establishment of CIA in September 1947 ended the Office’s dependence on other departments for personnel and funds. It permitted the rapid expansion of

The New York Times in 1948 noted that “personnel weaknesses undoubtedly are the clue to the history of frustration and disappointment, of friction and fiasco, which have been, too largely, the story of our intelligence services since the war.

ORE from 60 employees in June 1946 to 709 staff employees by the end of 1950, 332 of whom were either analysts or managers of analysts.⁴³ Although this solved the quantity problem, quality remained an issue.

Hanson W. Baldwin of *The New York Times* in 1948 noted that “personnel weaknesses undoubtedly are the clue to the history of frustration and disappointment, of friction and fiasco, which have been, too largely, the story of our intelligence services since the war. Present personnel, including many of those in the office of research and estimates [sic] of the Central Intelligence Agency, suffer from inexperience and inadequacy of background. Some of them do not possess the ‘global’ objective mind needed to evaluate intelligence, coldly, logically, and definitively.”⁴⁴

A senior ORE officer, R. Jack Smith, shared Baldwin’s view, noting that

We felt obliged to give the White House the best judgment we could command, and we continued to try as the years passed by. Eventually...the cumulative experience of this persistent effort, combined with the recruitment of some genuine specialists and scholars, produced a level of expertise that had no counterpart elsewhere in the government. But this was a decade or more away.⁴⁵

Ray Cline agreed with Smith’s views. Cline wrote that “the expansion under [DCI] Vandenberg made the Agency a little bigger than before but not much better. It was filled largely with military men who did not want to leave the service at the end of the war but were not in great demand in the military services. The quality was mediocre.”⁴⁶

During the critical year of 1948—which saw, among other crises, the Berlin Blockade—38 analysts worked in the Soviet and East European branch: 26 men and 12 women. As a group, their strength was previous exposure to the Soviet Union: nine had lived there, and 12 spoke Russian—both high figures for an era when knowledge about the USSR was limited, even in academia. Their backgrounds, however, were less impressive in other respects. Only one had a Ph.D., while six had no college degree at all. One had a law degree. Of those with college experience, a surprising number majored in fields far removed from their work with CIG/CIA: civil engineering, agriculture, and library science, for example. Far from being stereotypical well-heeled graduates of the Ivy League, many had attended colleges that, at least in that period, were undistinguished. Although military experience was widespread, only one had served in the OSS.⁴⁷

To be fair, the analysts faced a number of impediments that made it difficult for their work to match expectations. The information at their disposal was, for the most part, shared by others in the policy and intelligence communities. Moreover, the pace of the working day was hectic, and the analysts were under constant pressure. The pressure came from outside—from government officials who demanded immediate support—and within, from individuals who realized that career advancement rested on quantity of production. Consequently, analysts had precious little time for reflection. In perhaps the best known example, Ludwell Montague in July 1946 was given only three days in which to research, write, and coordinate with the other agencies ORE-1, “Soviet Foreign and Military Policy,” the first estimate produced by CIG.⁴⁸

Nowhere was the pressure greater than in the production of the *Daily Summaries*. Each morning, at nine o’clock, couriers would arrive at CIA headquarters with the previous day’s cable traffic from State and the Pentagon. Between nine and 10, an editor would read the cables, write comments on those he thought worthy of using in the *Daily Summary*, and sort them according to ORE’s branch organization. The analysts had on average only one hour, between 10 and 11, to draft their articles. Between 11 and noon the articles were edited, and at noon the branch chiefs, editors, and office leadership met to decide which articles should be published. “By one o’clock, the *Daily* was usu-

ally dittoed, assembled, enclosed in blue folders, packaged, receipted for, and on its way by couriers to its approximately 15 official recipients.”⁴⁹

Because there were few contacts between the analysts and editors on the one hand and senior policymakers on the other, choosing which stories to include in the *Daily* was a shot in the dark. As R. Jack Smith, then editor of the *Daily* recalled, “The comic backdrop to this daily turmoil was that in actuality *nobody* knew what President Truman wanted to see or not see.... How were we supposed to judge, sitting in a rundown temporary building on the edge of the Potomac, what was fit for the President's eyes?” After gaining experience on the job, Smith decided that

*Intelligence of immediate value to the president falls essentially into two categories: developments impinging directly on the security of the United States; and developments bearing on major U.S. policy concerns. These cover possible military attacks, fluctuations in relationships among potential adversaries, or anything likely to threaten or enhance the success of major U.S. policy programs worldwide.*⁵⁰

The combination of uncertainty over what the president needed to see and the analysts' need to publish as much as possible brought editors, analysts, and branch chiefs into frequent conflict. The analysts and their branch chiefs believed that they, as the substantive experts, should have the final say on the

The analysts and their branch chiefs believed that they, as the substantive experts, should have the final say on the content of the Summaries, while the editors felt that the experts were too parochial in outlook to make such decisions.

content of the *Summaries*, while the editors felt that the experts were too parochial in outlook to make such decisions.⁵¹ Neither side held command authority, so the disputes had to be settled through argument and compromise. The most intractable cases would be bucked up to the office leadership to decide. This situation remained a source of tension within the office throughout ORE's existence.

The Analytical Record

The Threat of War in Europe... From the beginning, the current intelligence sent to the White House contained numerous alarming reports about Soviet behavior from nearly all corners of the globe: the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and Korea in particular. A policymaker reading the *Summaries*, or the original reports on which the *Summaries* were based, could easily have concluded that Soviet military aggression was an imminent possibility.

The most consistent—and perhaps most important—theme of CIG/CIA analysis during this period, however, was that Soviet moves, no matter how menacing they might appear in isolation, were unlikely to lead to an attack against the West. This judgment looks even bolder in light of President Truman's evident intention that ORE was to warn the

US government of another Pearl Harbor—that is, a sudden surprise attack on American forces or Allies. Denied the ability to make comments in the *Summaries* for most of 1946, CIG's first opportunity to put these reports into perspective was ORE-1, “Soviet Foreign and Military Policy,” published on 23 July 1946. It noted that, although “the Soviet Government anticipates an inevitable conflict with the capitalist world,” Moscow “needs to avoid such a conflict for an indefinite period.”⁵²

Similarly, a Special Study published a month later and sent to the president noted that “during the past two weeks there has been a series of developments which suggest that some consideration should be given to the possibility of near-term Soviet military action.”⁵³ The authors judged, however, that

*The most plausible conclusion would appear to be that, until there is some specific evidence that the Soviets are making the necessary military preparations and dispositions for offensive operations, the recent disturbing developments can be interpreted as constituting no more than an intensive war of nerves. The purpose may be to test US determination to support its objectives at the [Paris] peace conference and to sustain its commitments in European affairs.*⁵⁴

ORE initially deemed the possibility of aggression by the Soviet client regime in North Korea as more likely.

Subsequent crises did not shake this assessment. During the March 1948 “war scare,” touched off when General Lucius Clay, the US military governor in Germany, sent a message to the Pentagon warning of the likelihood of a sudden Soviet attack, CIA analysts bluntly rejected the notion.⁵⁵ During the scare, the State Department reported, in separate cables, that senior members of the Czechoslovak and Turkish governments also feared the Soviet Union was prepared to risk an attack. In comments on these reports made in the *Daily Summary* on 16 March 1948, analysts said “CIA does not believe that the USSR is presently prepared to risk war in the pursuit of its aims in Europe.” On the following day, they added that “CIA does not believe that the USSR plans a military venture in the immediate future in either Europe or the Middle East.”⁵⁶

During the Berlin blockade, CIA’s position remained the same. “The Soviet action...has two possible objectives: either to force the Western powers to negotiate on Soviet terms regarding Germany or, failing that, to force a Western power withdrawal from Berlin. The USSR does not seem ready to force a definite showdown.”⁵⁷ The explosion of the Soviet Union’s first atomic bomb, on 29 August 1949, similarly failed to change the analysts’ judgment: “No immediate change in Soviet policy or tactics is expected” was the verdict in the *Weekly Summary*.⁵⁸

...and in the Far East
ORE initially deemed the possibility of aggression by the Soviet client regime in North Korea as more likely.

*An armed invasion of South Korea by the North Korean Peoples’ Army is not likely until US troops have been withdrawn from the area or before the Communists have attempted to “unify” Korea by some sort of coup. Eventual armed conflict between the North and South Korean Governments appears probable, however, in the light of such recent events as Soviet withdrawal from North Korea, intensified improvement of North Korean roads leading south, Peoples’ Army troop movements to areas nearer the 38th parallel and from Manchuria to North Korea, and combined maneuvers.*⁵⁹

ORE earlier had predicted that Soviet withdrawal from North Korea would be followed by “renewed pressure for the withdrawal of all occupation forces. The Soviet aim will be to deprive the US of an opportunity to establish a native security force in South Korea adequate to deal with aggression from the North Korean People’s Army.”⁶⁰

Unfortunately for ORE and the policymakers who read its analysis, this line was revised in early 1950. “The continuing southward movement of the expanding Korean People’s Army toward the 38th parallel probably constitutes a defensive measure to offset the growing strength of the

offensively minded South Korean Army,” read the *Weekly Summary* of 13 January. ORE further stated that “an invasion of South Korea is unlikely unless North Korean forces can develop a clear-cut superiority over the increasingly efficient South Korean Army.”⁶¹ Although this assessment appears naive in retrospect, it actually fit in well with the views held by senior American military officers, who believed the South Korean Army was sufficiently strong and no longer required US military aid. South Korean strongman Syngman Rhee, moreover, had begun making noises to American officials about reunifying Korea under his control; the possibility of South Korean provocation thus was not as remote at the time as it seems now.⁶²

The day after the North Korean attack on 25 June 1950, the *Daily Summary* counseled that “successful aggression in Korea will encourage the USSR to launch similar ventures elsewhere in the Far East. In sponsoring the aggression in Korea, the Kremlin probably calculated that no firm or effective countermeasures would be taken by the West. However, the Kremlin is not willing to undertake a global war at this time.”⁶³

After initially suggesting that “firm and effective countermeasures by the West would probably lead the Kremlin to permit a settlement to be negotiated between the North and South Koreans,” the analysts within days concluded that “It is probable...that a concerted attempt will be made to make the US

effort in Korea as difficult and costly as possible.”⁶⁴ A week later, the analysts amplified this theme:

*All evidence available leads to the conclusion that the USSR is not ready for war. Nevertheless, the USSR has substantial capabilities, without directly involving Soviet troops, for prolonging the fighting in Korea, as well as for initiating hostilities elsewhere. Thus, although the USSR would prefer to confine the conflict to Korea, a reversal there might impel the USSR to take greater risks of starting a global war either by committing substantial Chinese Communist forces in Korea or by sanctioning aggressive actions by Satellite forces in other areas of the world.*⁶⁵

ORE analysts quickly concluded, however, that Chinese intervention was not likely. They reasoned that, although a North Korean defeat would “have obvious disadvantages” for the Soviet Union, “the commitment of Chinese Communist forces would not necessarily prevent such a defeat and a defeat under these circumstances would be far more disastrous, not only because it would be a greater blow to Soviet prestige throughout the world, but because it would seriously threaten Soviet control over the Chinese Communist regime.” Moreover, if the Chinese were to emerge victorious, “the presence of Chinese Communist troops in Korea would complicate if not jeopardize Soviet direction of Korean affairs; Chinese Communist prestige, as opposed to that of the USSR, would be enhanced; and Peiping might be tempted as

The Weekly Summary of 15 September 1950 briefly described the evidence that suggested Chinese intervention was likely but still concluded that Beijing would not risk war with the United States.

a result of success in Korea to challenge Soviet leadership in Asia.” Finally, the analysts believed that Chinese intervention was unlikely because “the use of Chinese Communist forces in Korea would increase the risk of global war, not only because of possible UN or US reaction but because the USSR itself would be under greater compulsion to assure a victory in Korea, possibly by committing Soviet troops.”⁶⁶

The *Weekly Summary* of 15 September 1950 briefly described the evidence that suggested Chinese intervention was likely but still concluded that Beijing would not risk war with the United States:

Numerous reports of Chinese Communist troop movements in Manchuria, coupled with Peiping's recent charges of US aggression and violations of Chinese territory, have increased speculation concerning both Chinese Communist intervention in Korea and disagreement between the USSR and China on matters of military policy. It is being argued that victory in Korea can only be achieved by using Chinese Communist (or Soviet) forces, that the USSR desires to weaken the US by involving it in a protracted struggle with China, and that the Chinese Communists are blaming the USSR for initiating the Korean venture and thus postponing the invasion of Taiwan. Despite the apparent logic of this reason-

*ing, there is no evidence indicating a Chinese-Soviet disagreement, and cogent political and military considerations make it unlikely that Chinese Communist forces will be directly and openly committed in Korea.*⁶⁷

The first Chinese warnings of intervention in the war if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel were published in the *Daily Summary* on 30 September without comment, perhaps because they were downplayed by the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, to whom others in the Moscow diplomatic corps had passed the warnings.⁶⁸ On 3 October the analysts drew on a similar report from the US Embassy in London to state that “CIA estimates...that the Chinese Communists would not consider it in their interests to intervene openly in Korea if, as now seems likely, they anticipate that war with the UN nations [sic] would result.”⁶⁹ In the same article the analysts warned, as they had before and would again, that “The Chinese Communists have long had the capability for military intervention in Korea on a scale sufficient to materially affect the course of events.”⁷⁰ Nevertheless, in eight subsequent *Daily Summaries*, CIA analysts restated their belief that China would, first, not intervene, and then—as the intervention got under way—that it would not develop into a large-scale attack. The last *Summary*

ORE analysts were far more concerned about Soviet use of local communist parties to subvert pro-Western governments than they were about the possibility of armed aggression by the USSR.

containing this judgment came on 17 November, three weeks after the first Chinese troops, wearing Korean uniforms, entered combat in far northern Korea.⁷¹

The Danger of Subversion in Europe

Throughout this period, ORE analysts were far more concerned about Soviet use of local communist parties to subvert pro-Western governments than they were about the possibility of armed aggression by the USSR or one of its communist allies. As ORE expressed it in September 1947, "The USSR is unlikely to resort to open military aggression in present circumstances. Its policy is to avoid war, to build up its war potential, and to extend its influence and control by political, economic, and psychological methods."⁷²

CIG had reached a very similar conclusion about the first serious postwar confrontation with the Soviet Union—its refusal to withdraw its forces from northern Iran and its subsequent support for the breakaway Iranian provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.⁷³ After the worst of the Iran crisis had passed, the first *Weekly Summary* warned that the Soviets, having recognized that their policy toward Iran was "heavy-handed and over-hasty" would rely on "gradual penetration." It declared that "the Soviets clearly feel that

'time is on their side' in Iran and that the general economic backwardness of the country and the unpopular labor policy of the British oil companies will forward their cause."⁷⁴ "Their cause" was identified as "gaining control over Iranian oil and blocking closer military ties between Iran and the West."⁷⁵

ORE tracked the gradual but inexorable consolidation of communist power across Eastern Europe, as brought about through a combination of political manipulation by local communists and pressure from the Soviet occupation forces. The political and economic undermining of the prospects for democracy in Eastern Europe reinforced the analysts' conclusion that this type of subversion was the greatest danger from the Soviet Union. The analysts observed that Moscow's objective in the region was to "establish permanent safeguards for their strategic, political, and economic interests, including...stable and subservient, or at least friendly, regime[s]."⁷⁶

The analysts were most troubled by the consolidation of Communist power in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, judging that it would diminish

the possibility of a compromise in Europe between the ideologies of the Kremlin and the principles of Western democracy and individual freedom. Such a compromise had appar-

*ently been achieved in Czechoslovakia.... The coup...reflects the refusal of the Communists to settle for anything less than complete control and their conviction that such dominance could never have been achieved under a freely operating parliamentary form of government.*⁷⁷

On Germany, ORE anticipated that Stalin would use subversive tactics to try to create a unified German state from the occupied ruins of the Third Reich: "A German administration strongly centralized in Berlin will be much more susceptible than a loose federation to Soviet pressures.... Posing thus as the champions of German nationalism and rehabilitation, the Soviets can attempt to discredit the policy of the Western powers and to facilitate the Communist penetration of their zones."⁷⁸ The analysts warned that the removal of zonal barriers would place the Soviets in a "position to launch a vigorous campaign to communize the Western zone."⁷⁹

After the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) conference in Moscow in the spring of 1947 failed to reach agreement on Germany's future, ORE analysts advised that the Soviets may be trying to (1) "prolong the unsettled conditions in Europe conducive to Communism; and (2) to encourage the US to expend its patience and energy in a vain quest for agreement until forced by its internal economic and political conditions to curtail its foreign commitments and to leave Europe to the USSR by default."⁸⁰

ORE noted that Soviet efforts to penetrate the western zones of Germany focused on attempts to “extend the SED [Socialist Unity Party, the Communist’s stalking horse in the eastern zone] political structure to the west, while, simultaneously, efforts are made to establish Communist front organizations, such as the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ), and to penetrate Western Zone labor unions.”⁸¹ ORE warned that if “Soviet efforts at the [November 1947] CFM fail to achieve a united Germany on Soviet terms, the USSR will attempt to blame the Western powers for failure of the conference. At the same time, the Kremlin may announce the recognition of a ‘German Republic’ east of the Elbe and attempt to secure the removal of the Western Allies from Berlin.”⁸²

Once the first signs of the Berlin blockade emerged in April 1948, ORE analysts advised that Stalin wanted “a negotiated settlement...on terms which would permit ultimate Soviet control of Berlin and Communist penetration of western Germany.”⁸³ After the blockade was lifted in the spring of 1949, CIA assessed that Soviet objectives in Germany remained unchanged: “Soviet agreement to lift the Berlin blockade and enter into four-power discussions on Germany does not represent any change in the Soviet objective to establish a Germany which will eventually fall under Soviet domination.”⁸⁴

The analysts also highlighted the communist threat in France and Italy. Both countries had emerged from the war with widespread devastation and strong

The analysts also highlighted the communist threat in France and Italy.

communist parties sharing power in coalition governments. After the French and Italian prime ministers expelled the communist ministers from their governments in the spring of 1947, ORE predicted that

*The Kremlin apparently proposes for countries such as France and Italy: (1) intensive agitation against their present governments and against non-Communist liberals; and (2) the development of highly-disciplined Communist cores which, at the proper moment, could assume control. Such a program is well-adapted to the current situation in France where, [now] relieved of governmental responsibility, the Communists are in a position to threaten (by propaganda, subversion, and trade-union agitation) the stability of the present Government. Where Communism is less powerful, the Kremlin desires to concentrate on gaining control of trade unions and other liberal organizations.*⁸⁵

ORE warned in September 1947 that “the sudden overthrow of the De Gasperi government [in Italy] by Communist-sponsored armed force, following [the December 1947] withdrawal of Allied troops,” was “within the realm of possibility” because of the Italian Army’s weakness. But the analysts thought that outcome was unlikely. They wrote that “the USSR is unwilling to support directly such a step because it might involve war with the US” and because the potential failure of the much anticipated

European Recovery Program (better known today as the Marshall Plan) could deliver Italy into the hands of the communists in the April 1948 elections. ORE worried more that a communist-inspired general strike could paralyze the important north Italian industrial area; such an event could “defeat the operation of the European recovery program and eventually throw not only Italy into the Soviet orbit, but possibly France as well.”⁸⁶

A Special Evaluation published on 13 October 1947 concluded that Moscow’s establishment of the Communist Information Bureau in September 1947

*suggests strongly that the USSR recognizes that it has reached a point of diminishing returns in the attempts of the Communist parties of Western Europe to rise to power through parliamentary means and that, consequently, it intends to revert to subversive activities, such as strikes and sabotage, in an effort to undermine the stability of Western European governments. This move likewise tends to substantiate the contention that the USSR considers international subversive and revolutionary action, rather than military aggression, as the primary instrument for obtaining its worldwide objectives.*⁸⁷

ORE concluded that, “In its efforts to sabotage the European recovery program, which is the USSR’s immediate and primary target, the Kremlin will be will-

The civil war in Greece, which had begun in 1946, received relatively little attention in the current intelligence publications until early 1947.

ing even to risk the sacrifice of the French and Italian Communist Parties” by ordering them to use sabotage and violence against the Marshall Plan. “If these Parties are defeated and driven underground, the USSR will have lost no more than it would lose by the success of the European recovery program. CIA believes that the unexpectedly rapid progress of the [proposed] Marshall program has upset the timetable of the Kremlin and forced this desperate action as the last available counter-measures.”⁸⁸

The unexpectedly severe defeat of the Italian communists in the April 1948 national election considerably eased the concerns of ORE’s analysts. Noting that the election results had “vastly improved the morale and confidence of the anti-Communists in both Italy and France,” the analysts predicted that “for the immediate future, Communist activities in Western Europe are likely to be directed toward rebuilding the popular front rather than an early or determined bid for power.” Nevertheless, “the Communists are not expected to relax their efforts to prevent recovery in Europe.... Strikes and industrial sabotage...therefore can be expected.”⁸⁹

The civil war in Greece, which had begun in 1946, received relatively little attention in the current intelligence publications until the British Government

announced in early 1947 that it would have to withdraw its forces from the country and significantly reduce its assistance to Greece’s non-communist government. The *Weekly Summary* of 28 February, published seven days after the British announcement, summarized the dire situation facing Greece:

*Alone, Greece cannot save itself. Militarily, the country needs aid in the form of equipment and training. Politically, Greece’s diehard politicians need to be convinced of the necessity of a housecleaning, and the prostrate Center . . . requires bolstering. Economically, it needs gifts or loans of commodities, food, foreign exchange, and gold to check inflation. Of these needs, the economic are the most vital.... Without immediate economic aid...there would appear to be imminent danger that the Soviet-dominated Left will seize control of the country, which would result in the loss of Greece as a democracy.*⁹⁰

ORE analysts believed the chain of command for the communist forces in Greece started in Moscow and ran through Yugoslav leader Josip Broz-Tito to Bulgaria and Albania before reaching the Greek Communists.⁹¹ Nevertheless, they rejected the possibility that armies of those countries would assist the Greek guerrillas, despite numerous rumors to the contrary:

*CIG considers direct participation by the Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian armies unlikely. Such action would obviously have far-reaching international repercussions and might even involve the USSR in a world war for which it is unprepared. The likelihood of direct participation by Soviet troops in Greece or Turkey at this time is so remote that it need not seriously be considered.*⁹²

In July 1948, ORE advised the President that Tito’s rift with Stalin, which appeared in March, would considerably lessen the pressure against Greece.⁹³ It soon followed with a report of slackening Bulgarian support for the guerrillas, although ORE was unable to specify the cause of the change.⁹⁴

The Threat From Revolution in the Far East

In their coverage of the Chinese civil war in the late 1940s, ORE analysts noted that “the Soviet Union has scrupulously avoided identifying the Chinese Communist Party with Moscow, and it is highly improbable that the Soviet leaders would at this time jeopardize the Chinese Communist Party by acknowledging its connection with the world Communist movement.”⁹⁵ They later affirmed that the USSR had “given renewed indications that it is not ready to abandon its ‘correct’ attitude toward the Nanking government in favor of open aid to the Communists in China’s civil war.”⁹⁶ Moreover, “Because of the intensely nationalistic spirit of the Chinese people...the [Chinese] Communists are most anxious to protect themselves

from the charge of Soviet dominance.”⁹⁷

Not until the end of 1948 did ORE analysts begin to worry about what a communist victory in China might mean for the global balance of power: “A tremendously increased Soviet war potential in the Far East may result eventually from Communist control of Manchuria and north China.”⁹⁸ At the same time, the analysts began warning that “Recent statements from authoritative Chinese Communist sources emphasize the strong ideological affinity existing between the USSR and the Chinese Communist party...and indicate that Soviet leadership, especially in foreign affairs, will probably be faithfully followed by any Communist-dominated government in China.”⁹⁹

After the communists’ final victory over Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime in the autumn of 1949, the analysts doubted that Mao’s protracted stay in Moscow, which began in December 1949 and lasted for nine weeks, was a sign of potential trouble in the alliance: “Although the length of Mao’s visit may be the result of difficulties in reaching agreement on a revised Sino-Soviet treaty...it is unlikely that Mao is proving dangerously intractable. Mao is a genuine and orthodox Stalinist, [and] is in firm control of the Chinese Communist Party.”¹⁰⁰ The analysts believed that “The USSR can be expected to gradually strengthen its grip on the Chinese Communist Party apparatus, on the armed forces, on the secret police, and on communica-

Not until the end of 1948 did ORE analysts begin to worry about what a communist victory in China might mean for the global balance of power.

tions and informational media.”¹⁰¹

ORE initially devoted little attention to the French struggle in Indochina against the Viet Minh independence movement led by Ho Chi Minh—in fact, the office devoted much more coverage to the problems the Dutch were having in their colony in Indonesia. Although most of ORE’s information came from French officials, the analysts were skeptical that Paris would be able to put down the rebellion.¹⁰² They concluded that “Any Vietnam government which does not include Ho Chi Minh or his more moderate followers will...be limited in scope of authority by the perimeters of French military control and will be open to widespread popular opposition and sabotage.”¹⁰³

Ho was not at first portrayed by ORE as either a communist or a Soviet ally. The analysts referred to him as “President Ho.”¹⁰⁴ The first mention of a tie to Moscow, made in May 1948, was a grudging one: “Ho Chi Minh...is supported by 80 percent of the population and...is allegedly loyal to Soviet foreign policy.”¹⁰⁵ As late as September 1949, analysts wrote that “Ho’s relationship with the Kremlin and the Chinese Communists remains obscure.... Ho has stated his willingness to accept military equipment from the Chinese Communists. On the other hand, Ho still maintains that neutrality between the US and the

USSR is both possible and desirable.”¹⁰⁶

Moscow’s recognition of Ho’s government on 31 January 1950 prompted the analysts to change their stance dramatically, however.¹⁰⁷ They saw the likelihood of a series of regional governments falling in turn under Soviet influence:

If France is driven from Indochina, the resulting emergence of an indigenous Communist-dominated regime in Vietnam, together with pressures exerted by Peiping and Moscow, would probably bring about the orientation of adjacent Thailand and Burma toward the Communist orbit. Under these circumstances, other Asian states—Malaya and Indonesia, particularly—would become highly vulnerable to the extension of Communist influence.... Meanwhile, by recognizing the Ho regime, the USSR has revealed its determination to force France completely out of Indochina and to install a Communist government. Alone, France is incapable of preventing such a development.”¹⁰⁸

The analysts concluded that, although only the United States could help France avoid defeat, the “Asian nations...would tend to interpret such US action as support of continued Western colonialism.”¹⁰⁹

Soviet Aims in Israel

Like many in the State Department and elsewhere in the US government, ORE, worried by

ORE's repeated, correct assurances that a Soviet attack in Europe was unlikely must have had a steadying influence when tensions were high and some feared a Soviet onslaught.

reports that the Soviets were funneling arms and money to Zionist guerrillas, suggested that the creation of Israel could give the USSR a client state in the Middle East.¹¹⁰

Formation of a Jewish state in Palestine will enable the USSR to intensify its efforts to expand Soviet influence in the Near East and to perpetuate a chaotic condition there.... In any event, the flow of men and munitions to Palestine from the Soviet Bloc can be expected to increase substantially. The USSR will undoubtedly take advantage of the removal of immigration restrictions to increase the influx of trained Soviet agents from eastern and central Europe into Palestine where they have already had considerable success penetrating the Stern Gang, Irgun, and, to a lesser extent, Haganah.¹¹¹

Not until November 1948, six months after Israel declared its independence and defeated a coalition of Arab opponents, did ORE suggest that events might turn out otherwise: "There is some evidence that Soviet...enthusiasm for the support of Israel is diminishing."¹¹² ORE later suggested that the change in attitude stemmed from a Soviet estimate "that the establishment of Israel as a disruptive force in the Arab world has now been accomplished and that fur-

ther military aid to a country of basically pro-Western sympathies would ultimately prove prejudicial to Soviet interests in the Near East."¹¹³

Conclusion

ORE met its end shortly after Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith and William H. Jackson, of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa survey team, arrived in late 1950 as Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Director, respectively. They abolished ORE that November and replaced it with three new units: the Office of National Estimates, the Office of Research and Reports, and the Office of Current Intelligence. These steps finally ended the confusion over the analytical mission, primarily by splitting the competing functions of national, current, and basic intelligence into three offices.

Much maligned by insiders and outsiders alike, ORE's record is perhaps not as bad as its reputation. Its analysis holds up well when compared to both the views held by other agencies at the time and our current understanding of events in that period. Of course, ORE, like all intelligence organizations in all eras, had its failures. Dramatic, sweeping events, such as wars

and revolutions, are far too complex to predict or analyze perfectly. Even with the benefit of unprecedented access to Russian and Chinese sources, for example, contemporary historians are unable to conclusively pinpoint when and why Mao decided to intervene in Korea.¹¹⁴

Gaps also exist in our knowledge about what intelligence President Truman saw, understood, believed, and used. Judging the impact of intelligence on policy is difficult always, and especially so from a distance of 50 years. On many issues, such as the communist threat to Italy, ORE's work tended to reinforce what many policymakers in the administration and officials in the field already believed.

It does seem fair to conclude that ORE's repeated, correct assurances that a Soviet attack in Europe was unlikely must have had a steadying influence when tensions were high and some feared a Soviet onslaught. In this, the analysts of ORE served President Truman well, and their accurate assessment ultimately must be considered ORE's most important contribution in those early, fearful years of the Cold War.



Endnotes

1. The name of the Central Reports Staff was changed in July 1946 to the Office of Research and Evaluations, and again in October 1946 to the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), by which name it was known until it was abolished in November 1950. CIA veterans typically use "ORE" as the shorthand name for the analytical office for the whole period 1946–50.
2. Truman wrote in his memoirs that he had "often thought that if there had been something like co-ordination of information in the government it would have been more difficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor." Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), 56.
3. See Arthur B. Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), 81.
4. Current intelligence was defined in National Security Council Directive No. 3, "Coordination of Intelligence Production," 13 January 1948, as "that spot information or intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs, which is used by them usually without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation." See United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 1,110. Hereafter cited as *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*.
5. "Presidential Directive on Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities," United States Department of State, *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, 178, 179. Also reproduced in Michael Warner, ed., *The CIA Under Harry Truman* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), 29–32.
6. "Minutes of the First Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority," *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, 328. The National Intelligence Authority was composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and a representative of the President, Flt. Adm. William Leahy.
7. Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency*, 81, 82.
8. National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 1, "Policies and Procedures Governing the Central Intelligence Group," 8 February 1946, *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, 329–31. After CIA was established, National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1, "Duties and Responsibilities," issued on 12 December 1947, again ordered the DCI to produce national intelligence, which the Directive stated should be "officially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial dissent." National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3, 13 January 1948, gave CIA the authority to produce current intelligence: "The CIA and the several agencies shall produce and disseminate such current intelligence as may be necessary to meet their own internal requirements or external responsibilities." See *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, 1,119–22; 1,109–12.
9. National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 2, "Organization and Functions of the Central Intelligence Group," 8 February 1946, *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, 331–33. Interestingly, Souers, who drafted both NIA Directive 1 and Directive 2, continued to believe that CIG's principal responsibility was the production of strategic and national policy intelligence. In a memorandum to the NIA on 7 June 1946, Souers wrote that the "primary function of C.I.G. in the production of intelligence...will be the preparation and dissemination of definitive estimates of the capabilities and intentions of foreign countries as they affect the national security of the United States." "Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence to the National Intelligence Authority," 7 June 1946, *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, 361.
10. *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, 367.
11. The NIA agreed that "strategic and national policy intelligence is that composite intelligence, interdepartmental in character, which is required by the President and other high officers and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security.... It is in that political-economic-military area of concern to more than one agency, must be objective, and must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department." "Minutes of the 9th Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority," 12 February 1947, *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, 492. After the establishment of CIA, National Security Council Directive No. 3, 13

January 1948, similarly defined national intelligence as “integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one Department...and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department.” See *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, 1,111.

12. Ray S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA* (Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1976), 91, 92. Cline rose to become Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) between 1962 and 1966. Another veteran of the period, R. Jack Smith, who edited the *Daily Summary*, made the same point in his memoirs, *The Unknown CIA* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), 42: “We were not fulfilling our primary task of combining Pentagon, State Department, and CIA judgments into national intelligence estimates.... To say it succinctly, CIA lacked clout. The military and diplomatic people ignored our statutory authority in these matters, and the CIA leadership lacked the power to compel compliance.” Smith also served as DDI, from 1966 to 1971.

13. Smith, *The Unknown CIA*, 34, 35. ORE began receiving signals intelligence in 1946 and was able to use it as a check against the articles it included in the *Summaries*. Security concerns prevented its broader use. Signals intelligence was sent to the White House by the Army Security Agency (from 1949 on, the Armed Forces Security Agency) during this period. CIA did not begin including communications intelligence in the successor to the *Daily* until 1951.

14. The delays involved in interagency coordination made it difficult to meet the publication deadline while still including the most recent events in its contents. George S. Jackson, *Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946-1951*, Miscellaneous Studies, HS MS-3, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1954), 279-87. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 263, History Staff Source Collection, NN3-263-95-003.

15. See the discussion of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report on page 10.

16. Memo from Chief, Projects Division to Assistant Director, R&E, “Proposed Concept for Future CIG Production of Staff Intelligence,” 1 July 1947. CIA History Staff Job 67-00059A, Box 2, Confidential. Nevertheless, during its existence ORE did produce over 125 estimates, 97 of which were declassified in 1993 and 1994 and deposited in the National Archives.

17. This point is made repeatedly throughout George S. Jackson, *Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946-1951*. Jackson himself served in the office during the period of this study.

18. National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 5, “Functions of the Director of Central Intelligence,” 8 July 1946, *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, 392.

19. The Scientific Intelligence Branch of ORE was established in January 1947 and shortly thereafter incorporated the Nuclear Energy Group, which had been in charge of atomic energy intelligence in the Manhattan Project, within its ranks. At the end of 1948, the branch was separated from ORE and elevated to office status, becoming the Office of Scientific Intelligence.

20. Montague to Babbitt, “Comment on the Dulles-Jackson Report,” 11 February 1949. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 263, History Staff Source Collection, HS/HC 450, NN3-263-94-010, Box 14. Montague's reference to a “deliberate but covert” attempt to increase the responsibility of ORE refers to the efforts of DCI General Hoyt Vandenberg to boost himself, and CIG as a whole, into a dominant position in the Intelligence Community. Opposition from the other departments largely scuttled his attempts in this direction. See *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, 366.

21. Jackson, *Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946-1951*, vol. 1, 95.

22. *Ibid.*, 98.

23. In addition to the publications mentioned above, ORE produced *Situation Reports* (exhaustive studies of individual countries and areas) and a variety of branch-level publications (daily summaries, weekly summaries, monthly summaries, branch “estimates,” and reports of various types).

24. Montague to J. Klahr Huddle, Assistant Director, R&E, “Conversation with Admiral Foskett regarding the C.I.G. *Daily* and *Weekly Summaries*,” 26 February 1947, in Warner, ed., *The CIA Under Harry Truman*, 123.

25. *Ibid.*

26. Memo from Assistant Director, Office of Collection and Dissemination to Huddle, “Adequacy Survey of the CIG *Daily* and *Weekly Summaries*,” 7 May 1947, History Staff Job 67-00059A, Box 2.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 5.

30. Allen W. Dulles, William H. Jackson, and Mathias F. Correa, "The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence: A Report to the National Security Council," 1 January 1949. The summary of the report is reprinted in *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, 903–11. The entire report is available at the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Box 1555.

31. Ibid., 65, 69.

32. Ibid., 6.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., 6, 7.

36. Ibid., 84, 85.

37. Ibid., 85, 86.

38. Ibid., 11.

39. From unsecured Soviet communications, signals intelligence provided reliable information on such things as foreign trade, consumer goods policies, gold production, petroleum shipments, shipbuilding, aircraft production, and civil defense. A weekly all-source publication that did contain COMINT, the *Situation Summary*, was created in July 1950 and sent to the White House. The *Situation Summary's* purpose was to warn, in the wake of the North Korean invasion of South Korea, of other potential acts of aggression by Communist forces. See George S. Jackson and Martin P. Claussen, *Organizational History of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1950-1953*, Chapter VIII, *Current Intelligence and Hostility Indications*, The DCI Historical Series (Washington, DC: The Central Intelligence Agency, 1957), p. 21. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 263, History Staff Source Collection, NN3-263-92-004.

40. When the Central Reports Staff began operations, it consisted of 17 people—five assigned to it by State, eight by War, and four by Navy—all of whom immediately became preoccupied with preparing the *Daily Summaries* for President Truman, the first of which they published on 15 February 1946. The Staff published its first piece of national intelligence, ORE 1, "Soviet Foreign and Military Policy," at the end of July. See Document 4.

41. Montague to Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, "Procurement of Key Personnel for ORE," 24 September 1946, in Warner, ed., *The CIA Under Harry Truman*, p. 85.

42. Ibid.

43. "Table of Organization," 20 December 1950, Job 78-01617A, Box 55.

44. Baldwin, "Intelligence—IV, Competent Personnel Held Key to Success—Reforms Suggested," *The New York Times*, July 24, 1948.

45. Smith, *The Unknown CIA*, 36.

46. Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars*, 92.

47. Author's survey of CIA personnel files. Another veteran of the period, James Hanrahan, recalls that pockets of greater academic expertise existed in other branches of ORE, such as the West European branch. Interview with James Hanrahan, 16 July 1997.

48. Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency*, 130.

49. Jackson, *Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946-1951*, vol. 5, 583.

50. Smith, *The Unknown CIA*, 34.

51. Ibid., 31–33.

52. ORE 1, 23 July 1946, "Soviet Foreign and Military Policy," Document 4.

53. On 9 February 1946, Stalin had given a harsh speech that convinced many leading Americans, including Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, that war with the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly likely. See Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), 134, 135. Other incidents of this period that caused particular concern were Soviet diplomatic pressure on Turkey over joint Soviet-Turkish control of the straits, Yugoslavia's destruction of two US aircraft, and a vicious Soviet propaganda campaign and internal crackdown (the *Zhdanovshchina*) against Western influences. On the *Zhdanovshchina*, see Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 123–25.
54. *Special Study No. 3*, 24 August 1946, "Current Soviet Intentions," Document 8.
55. Clay's message, sent on 5 March 1948, stated that "For many months...I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least 10 years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness." Quoted in Frank Kofsky, *Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 104.
56. *Daily Summary*, 16 March 1948, Document 64; *Daily Summary*, 17 March 1948, Document 67.
57. *Weekly Summary*, 2 July 1948, Document 85.
58. *Weekly Summary*, 30 September 1949, Document 145.
59. *Weekly Summary*, 29 October 1948, Document 103.
60. *Weekly Summary*, 16 July 1948, Document 87. ORE 3-49, "Consequences of US Troop Withdrawal from Korea in Spring, 1949," published 28 February 1949, similarly predicted that the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea "would probably in time be followed by an invasion." Reprinted in Warner, ed., *The CIA Under Harry Truman*, 265.
61. *Weekly Summary*, 13 January 1950, Document 155.
62. Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1992), 365.
63. *Daily Summary*, 26 June 1950, Document 173.
64. *Ibid.*; *Weekly Summary*, 30 June 1950, Document 176.
65. *Weekly Summary*, 7 July 1950, Document 180. Three days after the war began, ORE analysts assured President Truman that "No evidence is available indicating Soviet preparations for military operations in the West European theater." Nevertheless, the analysts cautioned, "Soviet military capabilities in Europe make it possible for the USSR to take aggressive action with a minimum of preparation or advance notice." *Daily Summary*, 28 June 1950, Document 175.
66. *Weekly Summary*, 14 July 1950, Document 184.
67. *Weekly Summary*, 15 September 1950, Document 191. For the contemporary research on this issue, see, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 77–82.
68. *Daily Summary*, 30 September 1950, Document 193.
69. *Daily Summary*, 3 October 1950, Document 194.
70. *Ibid.*
71. *Daily Summaries*, 9 October 1950, Document 196; 16 October 1950, Document 200; 20 October 1950, Document 201; 28 October 1950, Document 202; 30 October 1950, Document 203; 31 October 1950, Document 204; 2 November 1950, Document 205; 17 November 1950, Document 208.
72. *Review of the World Situation*, 26 September 1947, Document 37.
73. In December 1945, Iranian rebels under the protection of Soviet forces proclaimed an independent Azerbaijan and an independent Kurdish People's Republic. The Government of Iran protested this Soviet interference in its internal affairs before the UN Security Council in January 1946.
74. *Weekly Summary*, 14 June 1946, Document 1.
75. *Weekly Summary*, 18 March 1949, Document 127.

76. *Weekly Summary*, 5 July 1946, Document 2. The quotation refers specifically to Bulgaria, but the same point was repeated about other East European countries as well. *Weekly Summary*, 19 July 1946, Document 3, for example, contains a piece on Hungary that notes the “Soviet desire to establish the control of the minority Communist Party in anticipation of the peace settlement and the ultimate withdrawal of Soviet troops.”

77. *Weekly Summary*, 27 February 1948, Document 62.

78. *Weekly Summary*, 19 July 1946, Document 3.

79. *Weekly Summary*, 2 August 1946, Document 5.

80. *Weekly Summary*, 2 May 1947, Document 23.

81. *Weekly Summary*, 5 September 1947, Document 34.

82. *Ibid.*

83. *Weekly Summary*, 5 November 1948, Document 105.

84. *Weekly Summary*, 6 May 1949, Document 134.

85. *Weekly Summary*, 9 May 1947, Document 24.

86. *Weekly Summary*, 12 September 1947, Document 35.

87. *Special Evaluation 21*, 13 October 1947, “Implications of the New Communist Information Bureau,” Document 40.

88. *Daily Summary*, 4 December 1947, Document 48.

89. *Weekly Summary*, 23 April 1948, Document 72.

90. *Weekly Summary*, 28 February 1947, Document 19.

91. *Weekly Summary*, 15 August 1947, Document 31.

92. *Daily Summary*, 5 September 1947, Document 33.

93. *Weekly Summary*, 9 July 1948, Document 86.

94. *Weekly Summary*, 23 July 1948, Document 90.

95. *Weekly Summary*, 19 December 1947, Document 52.

96. *Weekly Summary*, 9 January 1948, Document 55.

97. *Weekly Summary*, 27 February 1948, Document 62.

98. *Weekly Summary*, 12 November 1948, Document 106.

99. *Weekly Summary*, 3 December 1948, Document 111.

100. *Weekly Summary*, 13 January 1950, Document 155.

101. *Weekly Summary*, 17 February 1950, Document 160.

102. *Weekly Summary*, 10 January 1947, Document 17.

103. *Weekly Summary*, 14 March 1947, Document 21.

104. *Weekly Summary*, 24 October 1947, Document 41.

105. *Weekly Summary*, 14 May 1948, Document 77.

106. *Weekly Summary*, 9 September 1949, Document 143.

107. Communist China had recognized Ho's government on 18 January 1950.

108. *Daily Summary*, 1 February 1950, Document 156.

109. *Ibid.*

110. *Daily Summary*, 25 June 1948, Document 82.

111. *Weekly Summary*, 14 May 1948, Document 77.

112. *Weekly Summary*, 12 November 1948, Document 106.

113. *Weekly Summary*, 17 December 1948, Document 112.

114. The two sets of sources appear to be at least partially contradictory. See the discussion in Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 65–69, and in John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 77–80.



The Musketeer's Cloak: Strategic Deception During the Suez Crisis of 1956

Ricky-Dale Calhoun

“
The strategic deception operation that enabled the British, French, and Israelis to surprise the United States in 1956 was multi-faceted and complex.

”

In order to perform illusions greater than a sleight of hand, the magician often uses a cloak. The creation of illusions is not magical, or mystical, but is a hint of suggestion, an understanding of human nature, relatively simple technical manipulations, and the fulfillment of carefully planted expectations. Despite this fundamental awareness, one is awed by the magician's illusions of objects disappearing and appearing.¹

Military operations on the scale of Operation Musketeer, the 1956 British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, require extensive advance planning and logistical preparation. When the large numbers, wide variety, and multi-national character of the forces involved in the Suez operation, the narrow geographical confines within which it took place, and the sheer amount of intelligence gathering and analysis capability available to the United States at the time are considered, the attack upon Egypt should have been impossible to conceal. Yet, President Eisenhower and other American leaders were caught by surprise—especially so by the role that the Israelis played.

The question must be asked—why? As is the case with all complex questions, there is no single, simple answer, but the best generalization is that the Brit-

ish, French, and Israelis hid their preparations in plain sight by allowing the Americans to see what they expected to see and thus led them to a false conclusion, then acted in an unexpected way. The strategic deception operation that enabled them to do so was multi-faceted and complex. The erroneous perceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict that the deception planted in the American mindset in 1956 are still operative today.

It is often forgotten today that the United States had virtually no tradition of collecting foreign intelligence in a systematic manner prior to World War II. Throughout most of American history, intelligence operations had been organized and conducted on an ad hoc basis in response to a particular need. Not until 1947 did the United States establish a permanent dedicated intelligence service, the Central Intelligence Agency.

Thus in 1956, the CIA was less than 10 years old, and its capabilities were neither as extensive nor as developed as they are today. On the other hand, Great Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) was the world's preeminent strategic intelligence organization. The SIS's antecedents extended back to at least the 16th century, and its experience and sophistication far exceeded

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

Strategic deception was an alien concept that was little understood in US intelligence and diplomatic communities.

that of the CIA. In particular, the British had a marked advantage in the area of strategic counter-intelligence. In the United States, counterintelligence generally meant catching enemy spies, not manipulating the perceptions of another power's intelligence services.

Strategic deception was an alien concept that was little understood in US intelligence and diplomatic communities. The British, however, had a long tradition of conducting such operations and considerable recent experience in their successful "XX" or "Double Cross" operations against Nazi Germany.

Although Americans had played a large role in its implementation, the spectacularly successful strategic deception plan for the D-Day invasion of Normandy had been the product of British minds. In the complex relationship between the CIA and SIS that had grown out of wartime British-American cooperation, the British were definitely the senior and most experienced partner.²

CIA's Estimative Challenge

In the months leading up to the founding of the state of Israel, the CIA, in its first report dealing with the Palestine situation had warned that the formation of a Zionist state would most likely harm US relations with the Arabs.³ At the time, the CIA worried that the Zionists were a

cat's-paw for the Soviet Union, and were concerned that formation of a Jewish state in Palestine would provide a precedent for the Soviets to demand that an independent Kurdistan be established and that Turkey's Kars Province be ceded to Soviet Armenia.

CIA analysts responsible for the region did not believe the Jews would be able to win the vicious, protracted guerrilla war that was certain to erupt upon British withdrawal and worried that public pressure would force the United States to come to their rescue. This, the CIA warned, would damage US-Arab relations and push the Arabs into the arms of the Soviet Union even though the Muslim Arabs had very little sympathy for communism because of its avowed atheism. Alternatively, it was feared that the USSR might assume the role of rescuer of the Jews and send troops into the region.

The first scenario presented a situation in which the United States would come to be seen as pro-Zionist and cost it recently won oil concessions in the Arab states and loss of access to petroleum resources; the second situation would put Soviet military forces in position to assert physical control over those resources.

Either outcome would have badly weakened future Western economic development in relation to that of the Soviet Union. The basic American strategic goal was to prevent any situation

from developing that would give the Soviet Union the leverage it needed to gain influence in the Middle East. As the Arab-Zionist conflict developed, the CIA never wavered from this initial theme.

Formulating an American policy that achieved that goal would prove difficult, the CIA's intelligence officers warned. They recognized that American policy toward Israel was driven by politics, not by the studied intelligence that they provided.

Politics, in turn, was driven by American public opinion, not by calculation. Public opinion, in its turn, was driven by a complex interrelationship of emotional sympathy for the Jews growing out of the Holocaust, preconceptions based upon history and religion, and oftentimes flawed or outmoded understandings of the real situation in the Middle East.

The CIA's analysts also recognized that the policies pursued by Great Britain and France in the region were driven by lingering imperial concerns that did not necessarily coincide with the long-term interests of the United States. Similarly, they recognized that the Arab-Zionist conflict, although intertwined with the American-Soviet Cold War confrontation, was driven by causes that were separate from it. The result, the CIA's officers realized, was ambiguity in US policy in the region. That element of ambiguity made the CIA's task of providing information to decisionmakers much more difficult.

The Egyptian Perspective

Gamal Abd al-Nasser's rise to power in Egypt and the policies that he pursued enormously complicated the already difficult American strategic situation in the Middle East. Many of Nasser's domestic policies, such as land redistribution with compensation to the former landlords, though unpopular with Egypt's old ruling classes, seemed to be designed to undercut potential communist support among the rural poor and was viewed favorably in the West.

Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles took a particularly favorable view of Nasser, even after it became known that Nasser had agreed to purchase arms from the Soviet Bloc on very attractive barter terms. The CIA station chief in Cairo, Miles Copeland, was on even more cordial terms with Nasser—and he shared Nasser's distrust of the British. It was in fact Copeland and CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt who suggested to Nasser that he announce that the new armaments were coming from Czechoslovakia, not from the Soviet Union. Copeland and Roosevelt were obviously concerned that the arms deal would give a false impression that Nasser was moving Egypt into the Soviet orbit. Nasser most certainly was not, and CIA documents reflect that American intelligence officers clearly understood that he was not.⁴

For his part, Nasser tried to woo the United States with a three-pronged approach, laying out his program in a well-written article

The element of ambiguity in US policy in the Middle East made the CIA's task of providing information to decisionmakers much more difficult.

that appeared in the January 1955 issue *Foreign Affairs*. First, he sought cordial relations with the United States in order to obtain financing for major development projects, notably the Aswan High Dam. He also sought to capitalize on the historic Wilsonian policy of anti-colonialism in order to use the United States as a counter weight to Britain and France, whose imperial designs he distrusted.

Nasser's was the classic diplomatic strategy of a weak nation playing off strong nations against one another. Lastly, he sought to allay American fears of Soviet penetration into Egypt. When Nasser decided to accept the Soviet arms offer he did not view it as a departure from neutrality. Export subsidies on American cotton had severely depressed the world market price of that commodity, upon which Egypt depended for 85 percent of its foreign trade income. Thus when the Soviets offered to barter modern arms for cotton, Nasser simply took advantage of what to him was a very good business offer.⁵

US Preconceptions

US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles took a contrary view, however. To him, Nasser's Soviet bloc arms deal provided corroboration of an already held view that the Egyptian leader was the main local spoiler of US Cold War strategy in the Middle East.

Although he was strongly anti-colonialist when it came to dealings with Britain and France, Dulles viewed Nasser's willingness to do business with the Soviet Union through the Cold War prism. This made him susceptible to the British strategy of manipulating US foreign policy in ways beneficial to Britain's imperial interests by holding up the communist bogey.⁶

Miles Copeland, Kermit Roosevelt, Allen Dulles, and others at CIA recognized another critical factor that Nasser himself probably did not: apart from the potential damage to Egyptian relations with the United States, the increased danger that the "Czechoslovakian" arms deal invited to Egypt's security were disproportionate to the increase in military strength the arms bestowed.

True, the packing list was impressive: 200 MiG jet fighters and Ilyushin light bombers, 100 tanks, 6 torpedo boats, and even 2 destroyers—plus munitions and spare parts. The arms deal's weakness lay in its insufficient provision for training and technical support: the agreement called for East bloc technicians to provide only 90 days' instruction in maintenance and operation of the equipment to the Egyptians. With that little training, the new armaments would not give the Egyptians anywhere near the fighting power that its quantity seemed to indicate.

In October 1955, the CIA warned that many in the Israeli leadership were committed to territorial expansion.

Nonetheless, the infusion of so much new military hardware into Egypt's arsenal would be alarming to the Israelis. The CIA further predicted that as the Egyptians' perceptions of their own military strength relative to that of the Israelis increased, so would their militancy. Premature Arab combativeness would in turn give the Israelis pretexts to launch a preemptive war before the arms deliveries were completed.⁷

In October 1955, the CIA warned that many in the Israeli leadership were committed to territorial expansion and would welcome a war that brought it about. In the same report, it concluded that a new Arab-Israeli war would result in a devastating defeat for the Arabs. The Israelis would likely overrun Gaza and at least part of the Sinai, all the Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River and some east of the river, and the Syrian and Lebanese territory adjoining Israel's borders unless some outside power intervened—and CIA saw little likelihood of that happening. Only the British, who had a treaty obligation to defend Jordan, seemed likely to interfere with the Israelis militarily. Should circumstances come into favorable alignment the Israelis would probably not let the opportunity to expand Israel's borders pass, the CIA warned.⁸

Nationalization of the Canal

Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956 set in motion the Egyptian showdown with Britain and France that had been building steam for some time and brought about the favorable alignment of circumstances the Israeli's awaited. Just five days later, on 31 July, the CIA led the preparation of a 33 page Special National Intelligence Estimate on the situation and probable developments for President Eisenhower.

- CIA correctly predicted that the Egyptians would be able to operate the canal—contrary to the belief expressed by the British and French.
- It also warned that if the Egyptians succeeded with the takeover of the Suez Canal it would likely prompt a wave of anti-Western, anti-colonial, and nationalist sentiment in the Arab world that would encourage other nationalizations of foreign-owned oil concessions, pipe lines, and other oil related facilities.

At that point, the Intelligence Community was already concerned that Nasser's action and the British-French reaction likely to grow out of it would be damaging to the West and beneficial to the Soviet Union. The estimate stated:

The courses of action open to the West in this situation range from acquiescence with as good

grace as possible, through recourse to diplomatic representations, legal action in international or other tribunals, appeals to the United Nations, and economic sanctions, to military operations against Egypt. The UK has already adopted drastic economic measures.... The courses of action open to Nasser in countering Western measures short of military action include seizure of British and other Western assets in Egypt, harassment of shipping in the canal by delays and hindrances, or full closure of the canal to Western shipping.... Both the UK and France on the one hand, and Nasser on the other, have already taken positions from which they are unlikely to retreat in the near future.... The recent developments are markedly to the Soviet interest, opening as they do a wider gulf between Egypt and the West, between the Arab world and the West, and possibly among Western nations themselves.⁹

The preparers of the estimate were careful to note that although Nasser would welcome the Soviet Union's support in the confrontation with Britain and France, they reiterated their previously stated belief that he did not intend to permanently align himself with the USSR. Nasser's primary motivation was Egyptian nationalism and anti-imperialism, and the estimate predicted that he would not exchange British domination for Soviet domination. In this they were proven correct. In their next paragraph, however, the analysts seriously misjudged another element in the situation:

Israel will view with satisfaction the widened rift between its principal Arab antagonist and the major Western Powers.... We do not believe, however, that Israel will attack Egypt, at least during the early phases of this crisis. Nasser will probably feel it necessary to avoid conflict with Israel while he is engaged in his contest with greater powers. However, if Nasser emerges as the victor in the present crisis, he is likely to take an increasingly stiff attitude toward Israel.¹⁰

Neither Israel's self restraint nor Nasser's discretion proved to be as great as the Middle East experts thought. They may also have thought Nasser had more control over events along the Egyptian-Israeli frontier than he actually possessed. The estimators almost certainly underestimated the ability—indeed the likelihood—that Israeli intelligence would reach the same conclusion about Nasser's future attitude that they had.



Egyptian Prime Minister Nasser cheered in Cairo after announcing takeover of the Suez Canal Company, 1 August 1956. (© Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBIS)

Neither Israel's self restraint nor Nasser's discretion proved to be as great as the Middle East experts thought.

The CIA had serious concerns that should Nasser's gamble with the Suez Canal succeed, the temptation to use control of the vital waterway as a political weapon would become overpowering. Should the dispute over the canal end in a way that made it appear that Nasser had humiliated the British, his political position and anti-Westernism would be strengthened, and he would eventually embark on a campaign against other Western interests in the region.

The most important and vulnerable target would be Western oil concessions. Unless Nasser received a setback at Western hands, the report said, other Arab states would be encouraged to follow his example. Arab reactions to that setback might be equally damaging to Western interests, however. Reactions to Western military action against Egypt might be especially severe.¹¹

In assessing the possibility of Israeli military action, the report stated:

In general, Israel may be expected to pursue the line that the more trouble the Western Powers have with the Arab states, the greater should be their support to Israel.... Israel would probably welcome Western military action in response to Nasser's seizure of the canal.... We believe that the chances are against Israel itself deliberately initiating war with Egypt.... The danger of such action might materially increase if the Western powers undertook military action—in which case Israel might seek to join them; or if Western relations with Egypt deteriorated so drastically that Israel could feel reasonably confident of avoiding severe Western punitive measures as a result of attacking Egypt—presumably with the aim of destroying the Egyptian forces and toppling Nasser.¹²

Although couched in the language of probability and uncertainty—as all forecasts are—the CIA clearly understood that the chances of the Israelis taking advantage of any British-French attack upon Egypt were great. It is also clear from this paragraph that the CIA's intelligence analysts understood that a set of circumstances could develop that would lead to a convergence of British-French and Israeli interests to the point that the Western nations would tacitly condone an Israeli attack upon Egypt.¹³

The situation was further clouded by what amounted to a full-scale disinformation campaign underway in the US press aimed at turning American public opinion against Nasser.

The Disinformation Campaign

American intelligence officers continued to follow the Middle East situation as pressure increased throughout the late summer and fall. British radio propaganda against Nasser increased sharply, both from the transmitters of the BBC and from Sharq al-Adna, the powerful SIS-owned Arabic language radio station in Cyprus. On 19 October, the CIA expressed the belief that Britain and France would not resort to military action unless there was some “new and violent provocation.” In the next paragraph, the CIA restated its belief that Nasser was most likely aware of that fact and would be especially careful to avoid any violent provocation.¹⁴

Throughout the lead up to the Suez Crisis the situation was further clouded by what amounted to a full-scale disinformation campaign underway in the US press aimed at turning American public opinion against Nasser. In the wake of the East Bloc arms deal, the State Department sent Assistant Secretary of State George V. Allen to Cairo to attempt to patch up relations with Nasser and, if possible, get him to cancel the arms deal with the Soviets. Allen was carrying a formal diplomatic note from John Foster Dulles that warned Nasser of the dangers inherent in too close relations with the Soviets. The note’s tone, though it expressed serious concern, was

not especially harsh, but someone at the State Department tipped the press that it was an “ultimatum” and it was so reported in the mass media even before Allen landed in Cairo.

Kermit Roosevelt intercepted Allen at the airport and advised him not to present the note to Nasser. Allen agreed, but the damage had already been done. Nasser’s mindset had been formed by the press reports and he reacted to Allen’s proposals based upon what he thought the undelivered note said. As a result, Allen’s reconciliation mission failed. More importantly, it failed in such a way that John Foster Dulles and the press blamed Nasser.¹⁵

As hostility toward Egypt increased in France and Britain, Nasser’s vilification in the British press continued. Most of the American news media relied on British sources for information about the Middle East—and the British were well aware that many American journalists were predisposed to pro-Zionist sentiments. Although the specifics of the secret British disinformation effort remain hidden, there is circumstantial evidence that suggests that the British were carefully controlling the information from official sources available to American correspondents in order to capitalize upon the American media’s preexisting pro-Zionist bias to transform it into an anti-Nasser bias.

Three leading British newspapers, *The Express*, *The Mail*, and the influential *Times* of London, whose lead the American press often followed, repeatedly compared Nasser to Hitler. The fact that Nasser, at the suggestion of US military intelligence officers, had invited famed German commando leader Otto Skorzeny to visit Egypt and had hired about 100 German military advisers recommended by him provided the factual foundation beneath fictive reports that a cadre of “unrepentant Nazis” was controlling Nasser from behind the scenes.¹⁶

Simultaneously, Israel was waging its own independent disinformation campaign. Forty percent of all the American reporters in the Middle East-North Africa region were based in Israel, while the remainder were scattered throughout the Arab world from Morocco to the Persian Gulf. There were 10 American correspondents in Israel; the most in any one Arab nation (Egypt) was five.

This concentration of reporters afforded the Israelis an excellent opportunity to manipulate American news coverage in their favor. Casualties inflicted upon the Israelis by *fedayeen* guerrillas operating from Egyptian and Jordanian territory were consistently played up so that the American public would view Israel’s own aggressive actions as justified responses to attack. The separate British and Israeli disinformation campaigns meshed in the US news media. As a result, the interpretations that US policymakers read in

the popular media (and that shaped US public opinion) and the CIA's classified intelligence reports often ran directly counter to one another.¹⁷

On 24 October, the US ambassador in London reported to Washington that British Minister of Defence Walter Monckton had secretly resigned from the Cabinet—and that Monckton had quit to protest the Eden government's decision to attack Egypt. Suspicion that something was about to happen increased, but Washington evidently had no inkling that French Premier Guy Mollet, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had already met secretly at Sèvres during 22–24 October and agreed upon a devious plan of action against Nasser.¹⁸

The Attack Plan

The plan called for the Israelis to begin the operation by a surprise air attack and parachute drop to secure the eastern entrance to the Mitla Pass, about 35 miles east-northeast of the southern end of the Suez Canal. Israeli armor and motorized infantry would then drive across the Sinai along three main routes of advance: one column would attack along the Mediterranean coast toward Port Said, another through the northern part of the peninsula via Bir Gafgafa toward the mid-point of the Canal, and a third across the center of the peninsula through the Mitla Pass toward the southern end of the Canal. This would present a “threat” to the Suez Canal and

Washington evidently had no inkling that French, British, and Israeli leaders had already met secretly and agreed upon a devious plan of action against Nasser.

activate Britain's rights to defend it under the 1888 Convention and the 1954 withdrawal agreement.

The British and French would followup with an ultimatum demanding that both sides withdraw from a zone ten miles wide on either side of the waterway, a demand that they expected Nasser to reject. At that point the British and French would intervene militarily to “separate” the combatants. David Ben-Gurion was understandably worried because the plan cast Israel in the role of aggressor, but prior publicity given to the *fedayeen* raids and the continuing Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping com-

bined with selective reporting of Nasser's bellicose rhetoric provided Israel with a plausible *casus belli*.¹⁹

US efforts to monitor developments in the eastern Mediterranean area increased sharply after the report of Monckton's resignation. On 27 October, a U-2 flying from Wiesbaden, Germany, photographed the British bases in Cyprus. Its high resolution photographs revealed large numbers of British and French bombers and transport planes parked beside the runways. Concentrations of troops and equipment were also revealed. Another U-2 flying from Incirlik airbase in Turkey detected a squadron of French fighter-bombers parked



The history of suspicion and animosity between the Zionists and Great Britain was simply too great for it to seem possible that a scheme could be hatched between them.

at an Israeli airfield, but their presence did not raise alarms because French military aircraft had made unannounced visits to Israel before.²⁰

The SNIE of 19 September 1956 indicates that IC analysts had at least an inkling of the possibility of a situation developing between the Israelis and Egyptians that would give Britain and France a pretext to act. It stated:

Finally, it is possible, but we believe unlikely during the period of this estimate, that other situations of friction in the area—the Arab-Israeli conflict, or Iraqi-Syrian relations for example—might develop in such a way as to furnish an occasion for UK-French military action against Nasser.²¹

However, there is no hint in the record that analysts even considered the possibility that the British, French, and Israelis would conspire to manufacture a facsimile of that situation to furnish a pretext for Britain and France to move against Nasser.

The history of suspicion and animosity between the Zionists and Great Britain was simply too great for that to seem possible. Personalities also militated against such an alignment. Eden was anti-Zionist if not outright anti-Semitic; it was known that Ben-Gurion detested him. Nor did the Americans recognize the intent behind military moves they

observed once the plan to attack Egypt was set in motion. The long buildup to the crisis had allowed the Royal Navy and Marine Nationale to move warships into position without arousing overly much suspicion. A long-planned NATO exercise off Greece involving two US Navy aircraft carrier battle groups and ships from several allied navies was scheduled for the same time. British and French ships that deployed to the eastern Mediterranean to participate in that exercise could easily be diverted to the Suez operation.²²

The Jordan Piece

Jordan was an ally of Great Britain, and the fact that the British were obligated by treaty to come to Jordan's defense if that country was invaded provided the crucial raw material for another key part of the Suez deception plan. Guerrilla attacks launched out of Jordan had prompted the Israelis to contemplate an invasion of the West Bank while the Suez Crisis was unfolding.

Thus in the late summer of 1956, the British were confronted with the very real possibility of having to fight a politically unpalatable war to repel an Israeli invasion of Jordan. Troops and aircraft for such a contingency would have to be assembled on Cyprus. This provided an ideal cover for the buildup for the



A planned NATO exercise, involving US Navy aircraft carrier battle groups shown here, allowed British and French warships to enter the region without drawing undue attention. (© Bettman/CORBIS)

attack on Egypt. Likewise, when the French approached Ben-Gurion with the proposal that Israel attack not Jordan, but Egypt, the Jordanian situation furnished a ready made cloak behind which the Israelis could hide the real intent of their military preparations.

When Israeli mobilization began, the information the Americans received about it matched their preconceived expectations—and they naturally assumed that the Israeli mechanized forces assembling in the Negev south of Beer-sheba were preparing to strike eastward at guerrilla bases in Jordan. Hand in hand with that erroneous supposition went one that the British troops on Cyprus were there to meet a Jordanian contingency.²³

In making their assumption about Israeli intentions based on what they thought they knew and what they saw happening on the ground, the Americans overlooked one critical fact: the theater of operations was simply too small for an interpretation of Israeli troop dispositions to be meaningful. The Israelis could just as easily strike at Egypt as at Jordan from the same starting points.

To complicate the CIA's problem even more, the small size of Israel's population allowed close personal relationships to exist between its top political leaders, senior military commanders, and their subordinates down to quite low levels. This permitted face-to-face transmission of plans and orders to the Israeli armed forces, removing the need to use

When Israeli mobilization began, the information the Americans received about it matched their preconceived expectations.

communications systems that might have been vulnerable to US eavesdropping.

Convergence of a series of unrelated events also contributed to the Suez deception plan's success. In the United States, the presidential election was only days away and the demands of the campaign required most of President Eisenhower's immediate attention. In Hungary, meanwhile, the situation was nearing the crisis point (the Soviets invaded Hungary on 4 November) and drew the Department of State and the CIA's attention in that direction.

In the midst of the two crises, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles fell gravely ill, leaving the State Department leaderless. Dulles's illness may have been a mixed blessing to the British, French, and Israelis, however, as it opened the way for Herbert

Hoover Jr. to become acting secretary of state on 3 November. Hoover had come to the Department of State from the oil industry and was both an expert on Middle East affairs and knowledgeable in international finance. Hoover did not share Dulles's negative view of Nasser and played a key role in persuading Eisenhower to instruct the Federal Reserve to dump sterling on the world currency markets at a steep discount, thus threatening the British with severe devaluation of their currency to force them to agree to withdraw from Suez.²⁴

In the Rearview Mirror

With hindsight, it is possible to say that CIA and Intelligence Community analysts should have suspected collusion between the British, French, and Israelis. Many within the US intelligence establishment, particularly the CIA personnel who had been

British Prime Minister Anthony Eden (left) and US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (right). Both leaders were in poor health during the period, a factor that affected the course of events. (©Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBIS)



Those running the British-French-Israeli counter intelligence effort understood that humans tend to perceive what they expect to perceive.

involved in the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953, had learned to be wary of manipulation by the SIS—but that wariness did not extend upward to the higher echelons of CIA, the State Department, or the Eisenhower administration. It was at that level of US leadership that the strategic deception in the Suez Crisis was aimed. It was also at the top that the British-French-Israeli deception worked best.

For a time, ailing Prime Minister Eden was in a genuine quandary. Just as the CIA believed, Eden was willing to use force against Nasser, but was unwilling to accept the severe diplomatic censure that an invasion of Egypt would generate. That supposition became an integral element of American thinking that clouded it such that when military preparations were detected they caused no special alarm.

David Ben-Gurion's repeated assurances to Eisenhower that Israel would not take part in the British-French quarrel with Nasser and the real friction with Britain because of Jordan obscured the new British-French-Israeli alignment. Additionally, Eisenhower's reputation for integrity and honesty was well known. Eden and Ben-Gurion may have capitalized on that personal trait, knowing that since Eisenhower would not lie to them, he would be unlikely to suspect them of lying to him. In

any event, the Americans were thoroughly misled.²⁵

Worse, US intelligence officers, diplomats, and political leaders had not only been wrong in what they thought, they had been deliberately misled into thinking what the British, French, and Israelis wanted them to think. In that respect the British-French-Israeli deception perpetrated on the United States during the Suez Crisis was one of the most successful operations of its kind ever undertaken.

Those running the British-French-Israeli counter intelligence effort understood that humans tend to perceive what they expect to perceive. They correctly identified what the Americans were predisposed to think, and then exploited existing circumstances in such a way that the Americans saw so many *expected* things happening in an anticipated pattern that they did not perceive the *unexpected* intent cloaked by that pattern.²⁶

Furious that Eden, Mollet, and Ben-Gurion had deceived him and alarmed that CIA had failed to see through the subterfuge, President Eisenhower commissioned the head of his recently created Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, Dr. James R. Killian to conduct a thorough investigation. Killian concluded that although the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, whose cabinet-level office as established in the

National Security Act of 1947 was titled "Director of Central Intelligence" and was supposed to be in charge of coordinating all US intelligence activities, the structural constraints imposed by the American intelligence system precluded the DCI from fulfilling that intended role. Eisenhower proposed to Allen Dulles that he assume the coordinating function embodied in the office of Director of Central Intelligence, and leave operational control of the Central Intelligence Agency to a subordinate. Legal and political constraints prevented this, however, and no major structural revamping of the US Intelligence Community occurred.²⁷

US-British relations had changed fundamentally, however. The Cold War and increased Soviet influence in the Third World (a development greatly boosted by the Suez fiasco) made a permanent breach impossible, and Eisenhower and Eden's successor, Harold Macmillan, moved quickly to repair the damage, but many in the United Kingdom's leadership never wholly forgave the U.S. for the severe pressure Eisenhower had exerted on them. Relations between the SIS and the CIA would never again be as cordial nor as open as they had been before Suez. By using their intimate knowledge of the methods and mindset of the US Intelligence Community gained during more than two decades of cooperation to deceive Eisenhower, the SIS sowed seeds of long-lasting suspicion and distrust between the British and American intelligence services.

The Israelis won a strategic advantage during the crisis, one many argue it holds to this day.

Although President Eisenhower threatened to discontinue all US assistance to Israel and to join the Soviet Union in supporting imposition of United Nations sanctions up to and including Israel's expulsion from the UN to force its withdrawal from the Sinai, the Israelis emerged from the Suez debacle remarkably unscathed.

One reason may have been popular disbelief that there had been premeditated collusion before the invasion. For many years after 1956, the British, French, and Israeli governments vehemently denied that they had collaborated in planning the invasion. The Israelis steadfastly claimed that they had launched their attack to preempt an imminent and overwhelming attack from Egypt. The fact that there had been a great deal of tension between Britain and the Israelis while the Suez invasion was in progress made these denials plausible.

For his part, Nasser, although he privately gave Eisenhower credit for forcing the British, French, and Israelis to withdraw, failed to capitalize on the potential US public relations windfall that the situation had given him. Worse, his silence allowed Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to claim credit for Eisenhower's accomplishment, in the process creating an impression that the USSR had a much closer relationship with Nasser than it really had.

In the absence of effective communication from Nasser, Israel's supporters in the United States were able to use the circumstances to frame a convincing pro-Israel/anti-Arab information warfare campaign in the US press, a campaign that became self-propagating. Once that was achieved, the Israelis had won a decisive strategic advantage, one many argue Israel continues to hold to this day.



Endnotes

1. Richard N. Armstrong, *Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 1.

2. Ibid; Philip H.J. Davis, "Organizational Politics and the Development of Britain's Intelligence Producer/Consumer Interface," in *Intelligence Analysis and Assessment*, edited by David A. Charters, Stuart Farson, and Glenn P. Hastedt (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1996), 113-132; Ladislav Farago, *The Game of the Foxes* (London: David McKay Co., Inc., 1971), passim; John Keegan, *Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), passim.

3. All references to CIA and other intelligence documents are taken from declassified materials of the period available in the CIA's Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room at www.foia.cia.gov: "The Current Situation in Palestine," Office of Research and Estimate (ORE)-

49, 20 Oct. 1947; "The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine," ORE-55, 28 Nov. 1947; "Conditions and Trends in the Middle East Affecting US Security," National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)-73, 15 January 1953.

4. William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 295–307; Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (New York: Overlook Press, 2002), 477–78; Daniel F. Calhoun, *Hungary and Suez, 1956: An Explanation of Who Makes History* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1991), 13–19.

5. Gamal Abdel Nasser, "The Egyptian Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1955 (Reprint by the Egyptian Embassy, Washington, DC); Muhammad Abd el-Wahab Sayed-Ahmed, *Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1956–1956* (London: LAAM Ltd., 1989), 109–51.

6. Ibid.

7. "Probable Consequences of the Egyptian Arms Deal With the Soviet Bloc," Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 30-3-55, 12 October 1955.

8. Ibid.

9. "Nasser and the Middle East Situation," SNIE 30-3-56, 31 July 1956.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. "The Likelihood of a British-French Resort to Military Action Against Egypt in the Suez Crisis," SNIE 30-5-56, 19 October 1956.

15. Calhoun, 32.

16. Michael W. Suleiman, *The Arabs in the Mind of America* (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1988), 15–35; Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001* (New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 2001), 290–301; Aldrich, 480–93; Ralph Negrine, "The Press and the Suez Crisis: A Myth Re-Examined," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 25, No. 4. (December, 1982): 975–83; Jean Owen, "The Polls and Newspaper Appraisal of the Suez Crisis," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 3. (Autumn, 1957): 350–54; Miles Copeland, *The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), 105.

17. Ibid.

18. Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 480–88.

19. Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 290-293; Terence Robertson, *Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy* (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1965), 146–47; Selwyn Lloyd, *Suez 1956: A Personal Account* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1978), *passim*.

20. Ibid.; "Probable Repercussions of British-French Military Action in the Suez Crisis," SNIE 30-4-56, 5 September 1956; Central Intelligence Agency, "Memorandum for the Record, "Briefing of Mr. Stevenson, September 10, 1956," 12 September 1956.

21. "The Likelihood of a British-French Resort to Military Action Against Egypt in the Suez Crisis," SNIE 30-5-56, 19 September 1956.

22. Aldrich, 485–87.

23. Ibid, 482; Morris, 288–89.

24. Aldrich, 488.

25. Donald N. Wilber, *Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran* (CIA Clandestine Service History, CS Historical Paper No. 208, 1954); Aldrich, 480–81.

26. Richards J. Heuer, Jr. *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), Ch. II/1–7.

27. Aldrich, 521–22.



The Tay Ninh Provincial Reconnaissance Unit and Its Role in the Phoenix Program, 1969–70

Colonel Andrew R. Finlayson, USMC (Ret.)

“
Phoenix is still looked upon with a great deal of suspicion and misunderstanding.
”

The Phoenix program is arguably the most misunderstood and controversial program undertaken by the governments of the United States and South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. It was, quite simply, a set of programs that sought to attack and destroy the political infrastructure of the Lao Dong Party (hereafter referred to as the Viet Cong infrastructure or VCI) in South Vietnam.¹

Phoenix was misunderstood because it was classified, and the information obtained by the press and others was often anecdotal, unsubstantiated, or false. The program was controversial because the antiwar movement and critical scholars in the

United States and elsewhere portrayed it as an unlawful and immoral assassination program targeting civilians.

Unfortunately, there have been few objective analyses of Phoenix, and it still is looked upon with a great deal of suspicion and misunderstanding by many who study the Vietnam War.

Following the below overview is a set of first-hand observations of one part of the Phoenix program in one province of South Vietnam, Tay Ninh. It is a snapshot in time and place, but it represents a picture of the way one important and highly effective aspect of Phoenix worked in the years immediately after the 1968 Tet offensive. It is the story of a single operational unit that was part of the larger, country-wide action element of the Phoenix program—the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs).

The Anatomy of Phoenix

Phoenix was one of several pacification and rural security programs that CIA ran in South Vietnam during the 1960s. The premise of pacification was that if peasants were persuaded that

¹ This article is an adaptation of a paper Col. Finlayson gave at a CSI/Texas Tech University Joint Conference on Intelligence and the Vietnam War. Introductory material is drawn mainly from the most reliable accounts of the Phoenix program that include: Thomas L. Ahern Jr., *CIA and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam* (Washington, DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001; declassified 2006), chapters 10 and 11; Dale Andradé, *Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1990); and Mark Moyar, *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997).

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

Although Phoenix was run and ostensibly controlled by the Saigon government, CIA funded and administered it.

the government of South Vietnam and the United States were sincerely interested in protecting them from the Viet Cong and trained them to defend themselves, then large areas of the South Vietnamese countryside could be secured or won back from the enemy without direct engagement by the US military.

By 1967, the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), had succeeded in consolidating all military and civilian pacification efforts into one entity, called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).

CIA and MACV were intensely involved in CORDS, which was run in conjunction with the Saigon government. CIA-veteran Robert H. Komer initially headed CORDS, but it was most active and successful under William E. Colby, who replaced Komer in 1968.

Colby had served as chief of station in Saigon from 1959 to 1962 and as chief of the Far Eastern Division since then. Colby believed the United States must rid the south of the existing communist parallel government in the villages and eradicate the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) in the countryside. Thus CORDS, while working on village defense and civic action programs—the latter included land reform, infrastructure building, and economic development—also devoted considerable resources to rooting out the VCI.

Another component of CORDS was the Phoenix Program.² Although Phoenix was run and ostensibly controlled by the Saigon government, CIA funded and administered it. Phoenix built on the work of the CIA-created network of over 100 provincial and district intelligence operation committees in South Vietnam that collected and disseminated information on the VCI to field police and paramilitary units.

Essentially, these committees created lists of known VCI operatives. Once the name, rank, and location of each individual VCI member became known, CIA paramilitary or South Vietnamese police or military forces interrogated these individuals for further intelligence on the communist structure and its operations.

The lists were sent to various Phoenix field forces, which included the Vietnamese national police, US Navy Seal teams and US Army special operations groups, and Provincial Reconnaissance Units such as the one in Tay Ninh.

² In late 1967, the prime minister of South Vietnam decreed that all of his government's anti-VCI activities be integrated into a program he dubbed *Phung Hoang*, after a mythical bird endowed with extraordinary powers. Komer promptly renamed the American advisory effort after the nearest Western equivalent, the phoenix.

These forces went to the villages and hamlets and attempted to identify the named individuals and “neutralize” them. Those on a list were arrested or captured for interrogation, or if they resisted, they were killed. Initially, CIA, with Vietnamese assistance, handled interrogations at the provincial or district levels.

Later, when the program was turned over to the Saigon government, the Agency alone handled information-gathering. Eventually, about 600 Americans were directly involved in the interrogation of VCI suspects, including both CIA and US military personnel.

The PRUs became probably the most controversial element of Phoenix. They were special para-



William Colby pictured on a poster attacking the Phoenix program. CIA History Staff file photo. Date unknown.

military forces that were originally developed in 1964 by the government of South Vietnam and CIA. Initially, they were known as Counter-Terror Teams.

Eventually numbering over 4,000 and operating in all of South Vietnam's 44 provinces, the PRUs were commanded by US military officers and senior NCOs until November 1969, after which they were transitioned to CIA advisers.

Critics of US involvement in Vietnam claimed that the PRUs were nothing more than assassination teams, yet only 14 percent of the VCI killed under Phoenix were killed by PRUs. Most of the rest died in skirmishes and raids involving South Vietnamese soldiers and police and the US military.

In 1972 CORDS reported that since the 1968 Tet Offensive, Phoenix had removed over 5,000 VCI from action, and that conventional military actions and desertions—some prompted by Phoenix—accounted for over 20,000 more. MACV claimed that Phoenix and the US military's response to the Tet Offensive, along with other rural security, and militia programs, had eliminated upwards of 80,000 VCI through defection, detention, or death.

That figure lies on the high end of estimates, all of which were dependent on statistics of varying reliability. By most accounts, however—including those of Vietnamese communists—Phoenix (which ended in 1971) and other pacification programs drove the

I accepted his offer with literally no knowledge of what I was signing up for.

VCI so far underground that it was unable to operate effectively. In the 1972 Easter offensive, and again in 1975, there was no sign of the VCI or the Viet Cong military because Phoenix and its allied activities had dealt them a very serious blow.

July 1969—Initiation to Phoenix

Of course, I was clueless about all of the above in July 1969, when, as a Marine infantry officer in command of G Company of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines in South Vietnam, I first came in contact with the PRU program. I was then half way through my second tour in the country. We were operating in the "Arizona Territory" west of the An Hoa Combat Base in Northern I Corps, South Vietnam. My company had just returned to Hill 65, a fire support base southwest of Da Nang, when I was informed by the battalion operations officer that my infantry company was to provide security for a special unit of Vietnamese police that was to enter a village in the Arizona Area looking for suspected Viet Cong political cadre.

When the police unit arrived, I greeted its commander, a US military officer dressed in black pajamas and armed with an assortment of unusual weapons, including a Chinese AK-47 assault rifle and a Browning 9-mm automatic pistol. I immediately recognized this officer as a

fellow Marine who had graduated a year ahead of me from the US Naval Academy and who had served with me in 1967 with the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company near Da Nang.

I spent three days with this officer and his team of 16 Vietnamese while they searched a village for VC political cadre. At the end of the operation, he suggested that I extend my tour of duty in Vietnam and apply for a position with the PRU program, to which he was then assigned.

When I asked the normal questions anyone would ask about a new assignment—one he felt was so interesting and challenging that I would gladly extend my tour for a chance to join its ranks—he would say only that the program was classified and I would be told more about it if I agreed to add six months to my scheduled 13-month tour.

I admired this officer and respected his judgment, so I accepted his offer with literally no knowledge of what I was signing up for. He said I should continue to serve as a company commander until III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) headquarters in Da Nang told me I had been invited to travel to Saigon for an interview.

In late August 1969, the invitation came, and I was ordered to Saigon to report to MACV's Marine Liaison Office for instructions. My orders included a provision that I take an Air America

I was handed Douglas Pike's Viet Cong and told to read it that night and to be prepared to discuss it in detail the next day.

flight from Da Nang, something few Marines ever did. After landing at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon and reporting to the liaison office, I was told to go to the Duc Hotel, register, and await instructions.

After a few hours, a Vietnamese officer wearing dark sunglasses, a tiger-striped camouflage uniform, and a grim smile met me in the hotel lobby. He introduced himself and told me he would be taking me to his headquarters. I tried to small-talk the officer, but he remained silent or cut me off with a curt, "You will see soon."

After a short ride in his jeep, we arrived at a stately but nondescript villa not far from the Presidential Palace. Inside, I was escorted to an office on the second floor and told to wait. Soon, I was introduced to a man dressed in civilian clothes, who told me he was a captain in the US Army, but he did not tell me his name. He told me he wanted to interview me for "an important job fighting the Viet Cong." If I "passed" the interview, I would be accepted into an organization responsible for eliminating the VCI and assigned to one of its operational units, which could be anywhere in South Vietnam's 44 provinces.

The captain then began a nearly two-hour long interview. For the most part he questioned me about my knowledge of Vietnamese history, culture, and language. He spent a lot of time

trying to ascertain my true feelings for the Vietnamese people and how I thought my military experience as a long-range patrol leader and infantry company commander would benefit the PRU program.

At the end of the interview, he handed me Douglas Pike's, *Viet Cong*. He told me to read it that night and be prepared to discuss it in detail the following morning at 0800.³ I then was driven back to the Duc Hotel where I immediately began reading. I finished *Viet Cong* at 0200.

Early the next morning, I was picked up at the hotel once more and driven to the PRU headquarters and again ushered up to the second floor office. After a few minutes of waiting alone in the office, the nameless captain and two other Americans in civilian clothes came in. They took me to another office, where I was formally introduced to the two, who turned out to be the top US leadership of the PRU. One was the senior PRU adviser in South Vietnam, a Marine Corps colonel; the other was his deputy, also a Marine Corps officer. The colonel told me I had been chosen to join the PRU program and would be assigned immediately to Tay Ninh Province to replace an officer who had been relieved

³ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966).

of his duties because of financial and personal misconduct.

The colonel told me forcefully that whatever I might think about working for a classified program like Phoenix, I was to conduct myself with the utmost discretion and do nothing that would violate the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In short, he told me I was never to do anything illegal or immoral while assigned to the PRU, and if I did, he promised to personally see to it that I was cashiered from the Marine Corps and imprisoned. I had no doubt about his orders or his ability to make good his threat.

Surprisingly, we did not talk about Pike's book, which was an eye-opener to me. Until then, my perceptions of the Viet Cong had been shaped by the broad strokes and generalities of the Western press. *Viet Cong* gave me fresh insight into the connections between the VCI and Communist Party of North Vietnam and their organizational and operational procedures. Though reading did not help me through my interview, the knowledge would help me in the months to follow in Tay Ninh.

In the Shadow of Nui Ba Den

The next day, I was on one of Air America's Pilatus Porter planes to Tay Ninh City, the capital of Tay Ninh Province. After a 30-minute flight north from Tan Son Nhut Air Base, I saw the famous Nui Ba Den (Black Virgin Mountain) rising out of the flat surrounding plain that constituted

most of the province. After landing and leaving the plane, I found myself alone on the rough corrugated steel runway that was the little Tay Ninh East Air Base. I wondered if anyone had told them I was coming.

I stood in the sweltering heat for a few minutes, becoming the subject of the the curiosity of several Vietnamese irregular soldiers from the US Special Forces Camp B-32, who stared at me from behind their barbed wire encampment. I had begun to think I had been dropped off at the wrong airfield when I spotted a green Toyota Land Cruiser with US Embassy tags approaching me from the far end of the airfield. On reaching me, the driver, a Filipino named Bernie, said he would take me to my new "home," a small villa next to the MACV compound in the city. And so began my 10-month tour of duty with the Tay Ninh PRU.

On arrival I met the US team in Tay Ninh, led by the the provincial officer in charge (POIC)—the senior CIA officer in the province who was, in effect, my day-to-day supervisor. I learned quickly from them that I would be working for two "bosses" in this assignment: in addition to the POIC, I would answer to the province chief who was responsible for all operational activities in Tay Ninh province.

I met the province chief, the next day. A Lt. Colonel in the Vietnamese Army, he spoke good English and proved to be a capable, confident, and well-respected leader. I would come to regard him as a model leader, one who

The next day, I found myself alone on the runway of Tay Ninh East Air Base.

bore none of the characteristic corrupt qualities that were ascribed to many South Vietnamese provincial figures.

Who Were the Tay Ninh PRU?

On my second day, in a relatively informal gathering, I would meet many of the members of the 92-man Tay Ninh PRU that I would command and advise. I would find them to be brave and experienced troops. Some had military experience with the Cao Dai Army (a local militia that fought the Viet Minh), the South Vietnamese Airborne Division, or the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), which had been commanded by US Special Forces. Most of the PRU's troops were members of the Cao Dai religion, but a few were Roman Catholic, and even two or three ethnic Cambodians were assigned. All of them had a deep hatred for the Viet Cong, primarily because of atrocities committed against them and their families. Religion and family played large parts in their lives.

The Tay Ninh PRU was divided into five 18-man teams (each team was broken further into three squads), one for each of the four districts in Tay Ninh Province and one for Tay Ninh City. The headquarters of the Tay Ninh PRU, which was collocated with the Tay Ninh City team, consisted of just two individuals, the commander and his operations officer. The commander of


the city team also served as the Tay Ninh PRU's deputy commander.

The PRU was armed with M16 rifles, M60 machine guns, 45-caliber automatic pistols, and M79 grenade launchers; however, individuals also had a variety of other weapons they had acquired from disparate sources. The units also possessed PRC-25 radios, 7-by-50 binoculars, medical kits, 4-by-4 Toyota $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton trucks, and Honda motorcycles. In garrison at their district headquarters, the men wore civilian clothes; in the field they wore tiger-stripe camouflage uniforms or black pajamas. The units' US advisers were similarly outfitted and armed.

In my first assessment of the Tay Ninh PRU's operational capabilities, I found that the teams functioned well in most situations, but they lacked fire discipline. That is, the teams did not maneuver well under fire, and they were not proficient in calling for and adjusting supporting arms, generally artillery fire. Thus, the units did not perform well when they and the enemy met by chance or when the enemy was prepared for them.

In part, this was a product of their training, which was unsystematic and erratic. Most PRU members were highly experienced combat veterans, who had survived many years in elite combat units before coming to the PRU, but a few had received only rudimentary field training or had

The Tay Ninh Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) and Its Role in the Phoenix Program, 1969-70



DI Cartography Center/MPG 774297A1 (G01294) 6-07

served in noncombat units. At the national level, training took place from time to time at a camp near Vung Tau on the shore of the South China Sea; but at the local level, US commanders and advisers led training when operational lulls permitted. As a result, training was uneven and so was performance.

The PRU's strong suits lay in its intimate and complete knowledge of the people and terrain of Tay Ninh Province. This knowledge was central to their success in mounting operations against local VCI cadre and in compensating for training shortcomings. This knowledge of the province led to a great ability to develop accurate intelligence on the VCI and to plan methodically. The members of the PRU also were masters in camouflage, concealment, and night movement. As a result they tended to rely heavily on surprise and ambush to achieve decisive results.

Sources of Intelligence

Thanks to the introduction of systems associated with CORDS, the Tay Ninh PRU *in theory* had a wide array of intelligence sources available to it. Everything from local agent reports to national-level intelligence could *in theory* be funneled to them via the system of District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCCs). US military district advisers could channel operational leads to district PRU units for exploitation. At the provincial level, the same organizational structure existed for coordination; however, at that

The PRU's strong suits lay in its intimate and complete knowledge of the people and terrain.

level, the US PRU adviser filled the role US military advisers played at the district level.

In practice, however, few operational leads were shared with the PRU for a host of reasons. Petty jealousies between the Vietnamese National Police, the Vietnamese Special Branch Police, and district chiefs often prevented the transmission of good operational leads to the PRU.

This same problem existed on the American side, where US military commanders and civilian advisers were reluctant to share intelligence with the Vietnamese for fear of compromise. Sadly, US civilian advisers were reluctant to share intelligence with the PRU even when they were specifically directed to do so by the US Embassy in Saigon—and many of them even refused to share their intelligence with other US agencies for fear of others getting a share of the credit.

In theory, the DIOCC system should have worked well in developing operational leads, and on occasion it did. By and large, however, it did not function properly in Tay Ninh Province because of personal intransigence and bureaucratic in-fighting.

The sources that were uniformly inaccurate were the agent reports developed by US military intelligence units. During the 10 months that I served as the PRU adviser, not a single agent report received by the PRU from the US

military proved to be of value. Most agents were paid for their information in a piecemeal fashion, and this led to the manufacture of a large volume of worthless reports.

Vietnamese National Police agent reports were equally worthless to the Tay Ninh PRU, and in some cases, dangerously inaccurate. National-level intelligence sources were accurate but often did not pertain to VCI activities, so they were of little value to the PRU in rooting out the VCI in the province.

Of moderate importance and value to the PRU were reports from the interrogation of prisoners by the Vietnamese Police Special Branch at the Provincial Interrogation Center (PIC). Many of the prisoners held at the PIC provided accurate and timely information on VCI personalities and activities. When this information was shared with the PRU, which was rare, the results were usually highly successful.

Of particular value were the many VC who rallied to the South Vietnamese government as part of the *Chieu Hoi* ("Open Arms") Program. These *Hoi Chanhs* (returnees) were screened after they surrendered to the South Vietnamese government and then interrogated at the PIC, where they often volunteered to guide PRU teams into highly contested areas to capture VCI. *Hoi Chanhs* were usually far more reliable than other prisoners, although many VC

The intimate knowledge of the VCI led to many highly accurate operational leads.

guerrillas and North Vietnam Army (NVA) soldiers also provided useful information on VCI targets.

Another source of intelligence that was often productive, but time consuming to exploit and difficult to process, was the vast store of data collected by Census Grievance teams during 1963–64. These teams conducted interviews in conjunction with a national census at that time. Their interviews led to the development of maps of the province's districts and villages that were color-coded to illustrate degrees of loyalty to the South Vietnamese government. Green-colored houses were deemed loyal; yellow meant neutral; and red indicated VC sympathy.

In addition, these maps would often contain the names of family members who were VCI members or sympathetic to the communists. This storehouse of data was kept at the CIA villa in Tay Ninh City and reviewed periodically by the US adviser for operational leads. In most cases, the information was dated or difficult to exploit because of the inaccessibility or the death or capture of the communist sympathizer, but in some notable cases important mid-level VCI cadre were arrested or killed as a result of information on the Census Grievance maps. Had these maps been digitized and the information contained in a readily accessible database, the time taken to absorb their information probably would have been

greatly reduced and many more operational leads developed.

By far, the most prolific source of intelligence for the PRU was the PRU's own intelligence system. The Tay Ninh PRU was forced to develop its own source of operational leads because of the aforementioned reluctance of other agencies to share information on VCI targets. As natives of Tay Ninh Province the PRU members had lived and worked in the province for most, if not all, of their lives. They were part of the fabric of the provincial society, and their families engaged in all kinds of commerce throughout the province.

Through family contacts, PRU members developed an extensive intelligence system that successfully gathered accurate information on the VCI at the hamlet and village level to map VCI activities. In many cases, the PRU members knew personally the VCI cadre they were hunting; indeed, many had known them since childhood. They knew the families of the VCI and the details of their personal lives. In some cases, the Tay Ninh PRU was actually successful in infiltrating the VCI.

This intimate knowledge of the VCI led to many highly accurate operational leads and the elimination of several important VCI cadres during my tour there. While I was the US adviser to the Tay Ninh PRU, approximately two-thirds of the VCI the PRU captured or killed were uncov-

ered by the intelligence developed by the PRU's organic system.

Operational Relationships

While the PRU program was a national organization under CORDS on the American side and the Ministry of Interior on the Vietnamese side, it was much more a provincial "action arm." By that I mean the operational direction and authority for any PRU came from the Vietnamese province chief, who was the only official who could sign an arrest order or operational order for the PRU.

Thus, as the US PRU adviser in Tay Ninh, I could coordinate with Vietnamese and American military units and plan operations, but I could not authorize them. To conduct any operation by the Tay Ninh PRU against a VCI target, I had to submit a written request for a signed authorization from the province chief.

Since the province chief and his key subordinates and US advisers met almost daily, this requirement never really was an impediment to successful use of the PRU. Down the line, at the district level, Vietnamese district chiefs could not use the PRU teams located there on missions without the approval of both the US PRU adviser and the province chief. Even so, because the district coordination centers, the DIOCCs, were set up to rapidly process such operational requests, I saw no meaningful delays in approving PRU opera-

tions at the district level while I was there.

The Impact of the Changing Role of American Participation

I arrived at a time of shifting arrangements. Installed as a “commander” of the PRU in September, I became an “advisor” after November 1969. Until then, “command” rested with the US military officers and senior noncommissioned officers assigned to the PRUs. This arrangement changed after November because General Creighton Abrams, the MACV commander, had become concerned about perceived abuses in the Phoenix program and the effect allegations of abuse were having on support of the war in the United States.

That month, he issued an order that changed the status of US military men assigned to the PRU from “commander” to “adviser.” He also stipulated that no American was to accompany PRU teams on operations in the field. This he did to avoid the possibility that US personnel might involve themselves in actions that could be construed as violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

I was not privy to the rationale of Abrams or his staff in formulating these restrictions, but I can say that during my assignment in Tay Ninh, I never witnessed and never even heard of a single operational act by either an American or a Vietnamese

MACV’s policy [of keeping US commanders out of the field] devastated the PRU’s morale and effectiveness.

PRU member that violated the code.

The new policy devastated the morale and effectiveness of the men in Tay Ninh. The PRU relied heavily on the Americans who accompanied them on dangerous missions to provide radio contact with US supporting units, especially medevac helicopters and artillery units. Without the prospect of Americans by them, PRU members became reluctant to carry out missions into contested areas north and west of Tay Ninh City, such as War Zone C and the An Thanh-Cay Me border area with Cambodia. They knew if they got into difficulty, without Americans they would be unable to receive prompt medical evacuation, supporting arms fire, or emergency extraction by US helicopters.

This was no small matter for the Tay Ninh PRU. Its teams operated in areas in which the North Vietnamese Army’s 5th, 7th, and 9th Divisions operated. And, as lightly armed units, the PRU teams needed rapid US fire support if they engaged with NVA or VC main force units.

After November 1969, it took several months and many hours of training before the Tay Ninh PRU members were again will-

ing to venture into contested areas. I admit that in some cases, my loyalty to the PRU and my understanding of leadership caused me to question MACV’s restrictions. I formally requested reconsideration of the policy but the request was denied.

Why Were PRU Teams Successful in Destroying the VCI?

While my experience in Tay Ninh does not necessarily represent the experience of other PRU advisers and their units, I can say confidently that the Tay Ninh PRU was successful during my tour. From September 1969 to June 1970, the Tay Ninh PRU



Formal military formations were rare in Tay Ninh. In this case, four members of the PRU were awarded Bronze Stars for bravery during an operation with the US Army’s 25th Infantry Division. Photo courtesy of the author.

The Tay Ninh PRU was successful because it was a locally recruited outfit.

killed 31 VCI and captured 64—at a cost of only two PRU members killed and two wounded.

As early as December 1968, it was apparent to the Tay Ninh PRU that most of the senior VCI cadre had been either killed or captured in the months after Tet or had been driven into neighboring Cambodia. As a credible political threat, the VC had ceased to function in any meaningful way by the time I left Vietnam in June 1970.⁴

Further proof of the PRU's effectiveness came in 1975, when the communists finally defeated the South Vietnamese. The NVA commander occupying Tay Ninh Province would put in a hurried request to North Vietnam for 200 civilian political cadre. He reported that there were only six local VC cadre left in the province to manage the province's affairs.

The Tay Ninh PRU was successful primarily because it was a locally recruited outfit whose members had an intimate knowledge of their province, its people, and the enemy. They also had discipline, strong leadership, and an intense personal motivation to defeat the VC. They had an accurate and highly effective intelligence system that was difficult for the enemy to infiltrate or

defeat because it was based on strong family loyalties and religious and civic affiliations.

The American commanders and advisers came and went and played important roles. But few served more than a year in any province. And as much as I (or I think any of my fellow PRU advisers) would like to find ways to take credit for the success of the PRU, I (and we) cannot. Long after the Americans left South Vietnam, the Tay Ninh PRU continued to root out the VCI. The concept may have been an American one, but the execution and adaptation were entirely Vietnamese.

After the fall of Saigon in April 1975, the lives of Tay Ninh PRU members changed dramatically for the worse. They were hunted down and arrested or killed. Many served long terms in reeducation camps, where they were tortured and made to work under inhumane conditions. Some escaped the camps and made their way to the United States, where they were settled by the US government and given jobs.

Most, however, were executed or died in squalid camps. A few never surrendered and continued to fight the Vietnamese communists and their southern allies. They organized a "stay behind" unit in Tay Ninh called the "Yellow Dragons," and their activities were still reported on by the communist authorities in the province well into the 1990s.

Lessons Learned

With the Tay Ninh experience behind me, I have often pondered if units similarly organized, equipped, and trained could duplicate the PRU's success in other places and times. Could special police units drawn from local communities to identify and apprehend insurgents be successful and be so in keeping with the fundamental democratic principles we espouse? I believe they can *if* the following conditions are met:

- The units are imbued with both a professional and civic ethical standards that make them accountable to the people for their actions, not only to specific government officials or political leaders.
- They are equipped and trained to a high level of professionalism.
- They are paid well (and regularly) and rewarded for tangible results—a crucial element in preventing corruption and enemy infiltration.
- They are organized into small, tightly knit teams whose ranks are filled by members of the communities they serve. (Out of a population of over 17 million, there were never more than 4,500 PRU members in all of South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. Most of these PRU members were natives of the provinces in which they served.)
- They are subject to effective judicial and political oversight

⁴ I obtained the information about the status of the VCI in Tay Ninh Province after I left Vietnam from an interview with two former Tay Ninh PRU members who resettled in the United States in 1985.

Special police units drawn from local communities to identify and apprehend insurgents can be successful and still be in keeping with the fundamental democratic principles we espouse.

and not free to conduct unauthorized missions, without orders from a competent legal authority.

- The units are not responsible for interrogating or incarcerating captives beyond seeking identifying information and holding them until transfer elsewhere.
- A clear separation is made between PRU-type units and other police units, especially those involved in criminal investigations and arrests.
- The units' members and their families are protected by the state from retribution and given assurances that their

names will not be revealed to the press or any other unauthorized source.

- They are provided with the highest level of professional and ethical leadership
- They receive full access to pertinent targeting intelligence through some form of inter-agency coordinating group, like the South Vietnamese DIOCCs.
- If US advisors are assigned to such a unit, they should receive pre-assignment training concentrating on language proficiency, cultural sensitivity, intelligence management, small unit tactics, and staff planning.



Early Cold War Spies: The Espionage Trials That Shaped American Politics

John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. xii + 251.

Reviewed by John Ehrman

No matter how familiar a spy case may be, a fresh look can usually bring new insights. Very often, however, authors and practitioners limit themselves to drawing narrow lessons—usually they study such cases as those of Aldrich Ames or Robert Hannsen in the hope of learning how to stop future spies before they can wreak comparable havoc. Sometimes, especially when looking at cases that became great causes celebres, like those of Alfred Dreyfus, Alger Hiss, or the Rosenbergs, historians and political scientists try to evaluate a particular case's effects on politics, culture, and society. Seldom, however, do authors attempt to use a comparative approach and present several cases at once. This is unfortunate, for comparative studies of espionage hold great promise for teasing new, broad lessons out of well-worked ground.

In their new book, *Early Cold War Spies*, historians John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr review the major espionage cases of the early Cold War era, beginning with the *Amerasia* affair and ending with the Soblen trial. By looking at how the cases were understood at the time and then adding what has been learned about them since the end of the Cold War, they “hope to better assess the history of American politics and public opinion regarding communism and anticommunism” during the 15 years following World War II (17). While Haynes and Klehr fall somewhat short of this ambitious goal, their book still is very good, both as an introductory text and as an example of the promise that comparative study holds for expanding our understanding of espionage, intelligence, and the political environment in which they are carried out.

Intelligence officers are taught not to be involved in politics. From the day they take their oaths—or earlier, even, in application interviews—their managers and instructors repeatedly tell them that they are to be nonpartisan in their work and never to align themselves with any external political agendas. They are taught that their roles are to collect and report information as accurately as possible, and to analyze it without bias or preconceptions. Indeed, in this belief system the highest achievement is to deliver analysis that a consumer might find unpalatable, for it confirms the integrity of the system and its officers. This is especially true for officers working in counterintelligence and counterespionage, who are trained to follow leads wherever they may go and be

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

prepared to take legal actions, no matter how unpleasant the consequences might be.

Daily life, however, is more complicated. Every intelligence agency is a part of the government, and their activities are subject to the ebb and flow of political processes, as anyone who has ever briefed a high-level Executive Branch customer or member of Congress is well aware. Intelligence products are important to the policymaking process, and various factions—in both the executive and legislative branches, as well as outside of government—seek to exploit them in debates; the Team A-Team B episode in the 1970s is instructive in this regard. Similarly, the leaders of intelligence agencies are shrewd political operators in their own right, skilled at defending their agencies' interests, promoting programs, obtaining resources, and manipulating public perceptions of their work. The result is that the intelligence world is one with complex, constantly shifting political dynamics. Individual officers may seek to live up to their ideal of being outside of politics, but they live in an environment in which politics are part of everyday life.

One of the more striking, although not altogether surprising, aspects of intelligence politics is how the same issues surface again and again. Many of the debates in American foreign policy since 1945, and especially since 1991, have centered on how to maintain the country's dominant position in the world. The result has been recurrent debates about such issues as relative military power, nuclear proliferation, economic competitiveness, and how to deal with nondemocratic ideologies and rogue states. Intelligence plays a large role in each of these questions, and criticisms of the Intelligence Community's performance tend to be repeated in each cycle of debate. On the collection side, complaints about the US over-reliance on technical collection and the urgent need to improve human collection have been heard for decades. Criticisms of analytical biases and procedures, poor understandings of foreign cultures, and demands to increase the use of alternative analyses and new methodologies are perennials—the post-Iraq debates about how to improve analysis are not much different from those that followed the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Iranian revolution in 1979, or the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In each of these cases, public debates have gone over the same ground and resolved little. The result appears to be a firm public perception that US intelligence agencies are extraordinarily proficient at technical collection, abysmal at espionage, and somewhere in between when it comes to analysis.

The same is true in the world of counterintelligence and counterespionage, where major cases have had wide-ranging political effects. The best-known cases of the early Cold War era, those of Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs, helped feed the growth of McCarthyism and then took on long political lives of their own. They still affect how the American right and left view each other, foreign policy, and intelligence. After the 1950s, ideologically-motivated spies almost disappeared from the United States, but their replacement by troubled or mercenary characters like Jonathan Pollard, Ames, and Hanssen did not lead to a separation of espionage and politics. After Ames's arrest, for example, some members of Congress and prominent intellectuals asked if the Ames affair, combined with the

end of the Cold War and what they claimed was the CIA's long record of intelligence failures, showed that espionage and counterintelligence were essentially pointless activities and wondered if the country would be better off abolishing the CIA; others, for their parts, offered countless suggestions for reforming the CIA. Even more politicized, in 1999 and 2000, was the Wen Ho Lee case, which took place at a time when concerns about rising Chinese military power intersected with Republican accusations that the Clinton administration was not tough enough on Beijing. The result was that the investigation and prosecution of the alleged Chinese spy was stoked—and compromised—by a combination of journalists seeking to chase a hot story and government officials willing to leak sensitive information. Such behavior is common in Washington politics, only here it was applied to what was supposed to be a professional, impartial investigation.¹

What this overview suggests is that the politics of counterintelligence should be similar to those of intelligence in general. Despite all the books and articles that have been written on spy cases, however, few have noted this phenomenon or sought to explore its roots or implications. The number of cases that could be used for comparative studies is large, however, making the field of counterintelligence politics ripe for exploration through comparative analyses. John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, therefore, are in the fortunate position of being among the first to carry out such research.



Haynes and Klehr are among the best qualified historians to look at Cold War spy cases. Indeed, much of our understanding of Soviet espionage in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s is a result of their previous collaborations. Both are experts in the history of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) and in two books, *The Secret World of American Communism* (1995) and *The Soviet World of American Communism* (1998), they used material from newly-opened Soviet archives not only to document how Moscow controlled the party, but also how the leadership of the CPUSA willingly allowed the USSR to use it as an espionage apparatus. In a third book, *Venona* (1999), they described in detail the networks and individual Soviet spies whose operations the Venona program uncovered, filling in many of the blank spots in previous histories.

In *Early Cold War Spies*, Haynes and Klehr present their material in a straightforward, chronological order. They begin with the two episodes that alerted US authorities to the extent of Soviet espionage, the *Amerasia* case and the defection of Soviet code clerk Igor Gouzenko in Canada. They then move briskly through the cases that grew out of Elizabeth Bentley's information, the Hiss

¹ Edward Jay Eptstein, "On the Team," *New Republic*, March 28, 1994; Caleb Carr, "Aldrich Ames and the Conduct of American Intelligence," *World Policy Journal*, Fall 1994; David Ignatius, "Downspying the CIA," *Washington Post*, March 5, 1995; "The Times and Wen Ho Lee," *New York Times*, September 26, 2000.

case, the Rosenbergs and the other atomic espionage cases, the botched prosecution of Judith Coplon, and finish with the little-known Soble-Soblen case. The facts of all these cases now are well settled; Haynes and Klehr present no new research or material but, rather, provide accounts that readers new to the cases or with little background in counterintelligence will find to be clear, concise, and useful for later reference. For those who want more depth, Haynes and Klehr provide an annotated bibliography at the end of each chapter, pointing readers to the major books and materials for each case.

The main theme that Haynes and Klehr follow through their narratives is that the difficulty the government had in establishing investigatory and evidentiary procedures for spy cases meant that the public's understanding of Soviet espionage was significantly distorted. In the late 1940s, the procedures for investigating espionage cases, presenting evidence in court, and protecting classified evidence used in espionage trials still were unclear. (It took more than 30 years, until the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978 and the Classified Information Procedures Act in 1980, to create a clear set of rules.) Until then, Haynes and Klehr point out, the government often chose not to present the full story behind its prosecutions or was forced to let spies go unprosecuted, either because evidence had been gathered illegally or because no standard procedure existed to protect classified information from defense lawyers' threats to expose it in court. Consequently, the government was vulnerable to charges that it was conducting politically-motivated trials based on stories invented by unreliable witnesses. In the *Amerasia* case, Haynes and Klehr write, because the government could not present its evidence collected from warrantless searches, it "was accused of 'red-baiting,' engaging in vendettas against whistleblowers, and trying to muzzle reporters," while Elizabeth Bentley "was pilloried by historians and journalists as a neurotic, alcoholic fantasist who lied, exaggerated, and embellished her story" (34, 82). Thus, until all the evidence was released in the 1990s and the full stories of these spy cases became clear, historians did not know the true nature of Soviet espionage in the 1940s. As a result of this, and their increasing skepticism during the 1960s and 1970s of government accounts, academics writing on the spy cases often accused the FBI of "orchestrating a witch-hunt of innocent people" (233).

Haynes and Klehr conclude with an effort to apply the lessons of early Cold War espionage cases to current government efforts to cope with terrorist threats. Just as in the late 1940s and 1950s, they point out, the government faces the need to update the rules and procedures for investigations, as well as the requirement to decide how much sensitive information to release to the public to bolster its claims of serious threats. The government now faces the "same dilemmas [as] in several of the early cold war spy trials where defense lawyers demanded disclosure of counterintelligence information that the government insists would seriously harm its efforts to protect the public against terrorist attacks." This, they note, is simply a new manifestation of the problem the American form of government has deciding how to deal with serious internal threats while still striking the "proper balance between security and liberty" (p. 240).

Haynes and Klehr make reasonable points but, in keeping with their goals for *Early Cold War Spies*, limited ones. The lesson that incomplete disclosures can

distort the public's understanding of espionage and cast doubt on the accuracy of other intelligence-related information is correct and well worth remembering. More intriguing, however, are the additional observations Haynes and Klehr make in passing. Taken together, these show the promise that comparative studies hold for understanding the links between counterintelligence and politics.

What stands out most clearly from the cases Haynes and Klehr present is how cyclical the patterns of major espionage cases are. In each, numerous actors insert themselves, with each trying to advance their own interests. In the case of Elizabeth Bentley, for example, her information was of little intelligence value when it became public in 1948—the Russians had long before shut down the networks with which she had been associated and withdrawn most of their intelligence officers from the United States, while the FBI and Justice Department had concluded their investigations and decided not to prosecute most of the individuals identified through her leads. Nonetheless, the FBI and House Un-American Activities Committee were happy to have Bentley tell her story in public, as it bolstered their views of the Soviet threat and the need for strong internal security measures. The press, meanwhile, happily played up the charges of the “red spy queen,” as Bentley was dubbed by the tabloids, to sell newspapers. This combination of political manipulation and sensationalism has occurred repeatedly since the 1940s, most recently in the Wen Ho Lee case. Finally, and usually later in a case, intellectuals like to become involved, trying to use it to support their broader cultural, political, and social analyses.²

These are not the only aspects of the politics of counterintelligence that appear repeatedly. Haynes and Klehr describe another behavior that has repeated itself regularly: in their introduction to the atomic espionage cases, they note that while some critics denounced the cases as witch hunts, others used them to call for a “long-overdue focus on a more rigorous counterespionage program” (138). Indeed, when a major case becomes public, it usually is followed by revelations of poor security or personnel practices, Congressional investigations, and plans for reforms. But as publicity wanes and new issues arise to consume public attention, the reforms are put on the back burner; eventually, old habits and practices reassert themselves. This pattern has been displayed most recently at the Department of Energy which, after all the attention focused on its counterintelligence and security practices during the Lee case, was forced to institute extensive polygraph requirements for its employees. The requirement, however, was largely rolled back in the fall of 2006.³

² For good examples of how intellectuals used early Cold War spy cases in their debates, see Leslie Fiedler, “Hiss, Chambers, and the Age of Innocence,” *Commentary*, December 1950, and “Afterthoughts on the Rosenbergs,” *Encounter*, October 1953, both reprinted in Fiedler, *An End to Innocence* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955); and Robert Warshow, “The ‘Idealism’ of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg,” *Commentary*, November 1953, reprinted in Warshow, *The Immediate Experience* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1962). These may be compared usefully with a more recent example, Gabriel Schoenfeld, “How Inept is the FBI?” *Commentary*, May 2002.

³ For the Energy Department and the polygraph, see “Energy Department Polygraph Program Expanded,” *Washington Post*, October 14, 2000; “Polygraphs for Nuclear Weapons Workers,” *New York Times*, October 5, 2006.

Early Cold War Spies is an introductory work and it would be unreasonable to expect it to begin looking too deeply at all of the issues growing out of the cases it describes. Nonetheless, the material it covers hints at some rich possibilities for future research on the politics of counterintelligence. The consistent, repetitive nature of reactions to spy cases points to views and behavior deeply rooted in American political culture. Understanding these, and perhaps comparing them to the ways other political cultures view and react to espionage, might suggest paths to improved investigations and prosecutions, or at least reductions in the damage to intelligence operations that come from the resulting political maneuvering. It would be especially useful given the likelihood that our counterterrorism efforts will lead to a new generation of spy cases and the possibility that we might avoid repeating some of the errors of the Cold War.



Spymistress: The Life of Vera Atkins: The Greatest Female Agent in World War II

William Stevenson. New York: Arcade Publishing, 2007, 354 pages.

Reviewed by Thomas F. Troy

Another book on World War II by William Stevenson, the author of the phenomenally successful but utterly unreliable *A Man Called Intrepid*, will surely make the cognoscenti wonder whether Stevenson learned anything from the slings and arrows so cruelly aimed at his earlier book, himself, and the late Sir William Stephenson. They need not wonder long. This William (“Bill”) Stevenson, journalist, TV producer, and author of 16 books, and someone I know, have lunched with, and like personally, is the same Stevenson who in his *Intrepid* book and in this one persistently gets history and fiction distressingly commingled. Consider three samples.

Vera Steals the Donovan Show. Colonel William J. (“Wild Bill”) Donovan’s historic fact-finding mission to London in July 1940 on behalf of President Franklin D. Roosevelt is well known to historians generally and to Donovan biographers like Anthony Cave Brown, Richard Dunlop, Corey Ford, and me. With the red carpet rolled out for him Donovan met, so reported the US military attaché, “an extraordinary list of well-posted people,” including the king, queen and prime minister. But in *Spymistress*, the hitherto unknown Vera Atkins, a covert operations officer, got the sole role, in fact the starring role, in the grand encounter. She took him over. He was so “impressed” by what she told him, about covert operations and code-breaking, that he personally gave FDR “his strong Impression of her” and that was “a key factor” in convincing FDR of “the Allies ultimate success.” With no trace of evidence, this brand new rewrite of history challenges belief.

Vera Takes Donovan Riding. A Special Operations Executive (SOE) officer working with the French Resistance, Vera allegedly needed Donovan’s support in battling MI-6 opposition to SOE. One day she took him off from London business. They went riding “in a series of cars” older than she (then 32) “from Marble Arch for 47 miles” through “a country side enjoying rare sunny weather...onto Bletchley Road.” There was “an unspoken understanding between them. He liked her steely beauty, her long lustrous black hair...her athletic figure.” With “her smoky eyes,” runs the blurb, “she was overwhelmingly seductive.” Then they “paused for a pub lunch...in Old Bletchley so he could catch the authentic flavor of the country’s largest clandestine operation.” He had “an overview of work...around Enigma.” The stories are difficult

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.

to accept when it is recalled that Atkins joined SOE months after Donovan had returned to the United States. The excerpts also illustrate Stevenson's penchant for dropping Donovan's name in contrived contexts and without footnotes.

Vera Hobnobs with Intrepid. No less often dropped by Stevenson was the name of Sir William Stephenson. One day in 1935 Vera "was...in Stephenson's office" in London when Donovan "called in" on business; she heard Donovan say FDR could do nothing about the Nazi menace unless he stayed in power. In 1936, in New York, she attended one of "the Stepheons' private dinners" where Wallace B. Phillips, an American businessman of no account then or now, decried some Americans' susceptibility to Nazi "con" artists. After the fall of France when Vera described to Stephenson a "silence" in Whitehall that was "sinister," he said "Powerful Whitehall influences" say Churchill's hatred of Hitler "stops...peace with Germany" To counter this, Stephenson moved to New York to form an organization in support of Churchill against the appeasers. Late in 1940 Stephenson told Donovan that "no woman in the history of espionage has exercised such power" as that wielded by Vera. In 1941 "Vera missed Bill Stephenson's presence in London." She "also missed Billy...because he mixed the deadliest martinis." All this, including the startling new reason for Intrepid's establishment of British Security Coordination, again appears without any proof.

Inevitably one asks about Stevenson's sources. In addition to criticizing the traditional British secrecy record, he faults the internecine SOE-SIS hostility for blocking access to records. He laments the destruction of SOE's records in "a mysterious fire" in its Baker Street headquarters in 1946. (Incidentally no such fire is mentioned by M. R. D. Foot in his *SOE In France*.) In France Stevenson "found many records unavailable in London," but his unimpressive 16 pages of endnotes show no trace of them. The Swiss Intelligence Agency "opened" files for him, and "Americans" "gladly allowed" him to examine records of the Office of Strategic Services, but here again his footnotes reveal no trace of his findings. Instead of official documents, there are secondary sources, often skimpy and inadequate, including Begin's, *The Revolt*, Goebbels', *Diaries*, and *Holocaust Encyclopedia*.

Most in evidence are references to interviews, conversations, and letters, which by their nature are clearly beyond the reader's reach. Because there are persons who were tied up in that SOE-SIS struggle, persons he calls "our Mutual Friends," they "need" anonymity. And hence one encounters source notes indicating "Identity not made public." Noticeable are many references to "notes" kept by Intrepid, and the many, yes the many, conversations he had with Intrepid's wife, Lady Mary Stephenson. As one who has specialized in the Stepheons, I can say these "notes" and "conversations" are new gems, if genuine.

Then there is Stevenson's most important informant, Vera herself, who refused throughout her life to talk publicly about her wartime job. She appears early in the book as an obviously bewitching female who befriended our author in 1940 in London when he was "a small, bare-headed, bare-kneed boy," in "a Boy Scout uniform," bicycling between a police station and emergency posts. According to his text, she became his "close friend," who so greatly admired his Intrepid book that she would let no one else write her story, and that he could do so only after

she died, which happened in 2000. Thus, much of this book depends on the testimony of a partisan quartet: Vera, the Stephensons, and author Bill Stevenson.

One like me can only try to explain why Stevenson writes as he does. There is no question of his honesty or suspicion of motives. He has been a man of strong and passionately held convictions about World War II, especially the conflict between Churchill and appeasers and between Intrepid and Donovan on the one hand and Lord Halifax on the other. When confronted by a mass of facts, he finds them, as does any historian, embedded in unknowns and uncertainties, in probabilities and impossibilities. Seeking the whole truth and trying to present it to the public, Stevenson surely lets his obviously creative imagination recreate the missing facts, resolve the doubts, and fill in the blanks. Thus his portrait of Sir William Stephenson, a man and friend I greatly admired, not only made him *A Man Called Intrepid* but also made him larger than life.

What then of Vera Atkins? By the title of this book, Stevenson has also made her larger than life. He has her spending “much of the 1930s running countless espionage missions” for some obscure organization. She never seems to have had any official rank, but Stevenson wants us to know that she reached SOE’s “leadership echelon” and enjoyed a “commanding role” that was never acknowledged because of anti-feminism. Yes, she had a “nominal” boss. She had a finger in every wartime pie. For example, she was on hand to give parachuting Rudolf Hess “something to ensure he didn’t wake up until morning,” and “she selected” Reinhard Heydrich to be assassinated in 1942 and “she found” two young Czechs to do the job.

Again, what then of Vera Atkins? Stevenson would have us believe that she was a remarkable woman, an independent leader in a man’s world. That she worked in an especially dangerous wartime role—recruiting, training, and dispatching to Nazi-occupied France secret agents who had 50-50 chances of escaping capture, torture, and execution—is beyond cavil. While full of admiration for her, Stevenson gives no intelligible personal chronology, little on her job, staff, and functions, and no discernible record of accomplishments. When encountered, she is flitting in and out of major events with little relevance to her work. When not flitting, she is either in deep talk with luminaries or reading their minds and vice versa, without, however, much connection with action. In short there is here too much of the old Stevenson’s mixing of fact and fancy. Whatever her achievements, Stevenson’s account hardly proves her a great agent, much less “the greatest female secret agent in World War II.”

Special Agent, Vietnam: A Naval Intelligence Memoir

Douglass L. Hubbard. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006. 269 pages, photos, index.

Reviewed by Michael J. Sulick

Special Agent, Vietnam, the first published comprehensive account of naval counterintelligence in Vietnam, is a fascinating history of the activities of the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) in Vietnam from 1962 to the fall of Saigon in April 1975. Author Douglas Hubbard, the longest serving NIS agent in Vietnam, chronicles the demanding counterintelligence and criminal investigation missions of the NIS through detailed vignettes of cases drawn from his own experience and interviews with colleagues. In tracking counterintelligence and criminal leads, Hubbard writes, “there was often a strange twist in the Vietnam environment.” Counterintelligence and criminal investigations, inherently complex even in peacetime, presented special challenges in Vietnam, where witnesses died in combat before trials and where even travel to a crime scene involved dodging enemy ambushes and mortar attacks. Hubbard captures the “strange twists” of the Vietnam conflict and examines the murky undercurrents of war, the crime and corruption that were unfortunate byproducts of the American experience in Vietnam.

At its peak the NIS contingent in Vietnam numbered fewer than two dozen agents, all of them volunteers, and the striking breadth of investigations vividly detailed in this book reflect the challenges faced by this small cadre of dedicated professionals. NIS agents were responsible for both counterintelligence and criminal activities, and Hubbard’s account reflects the overwhelming burdens of tackling both missions. Early in the conflict, counterintelligence information was a vital necessity as civil unrest increased and Vietcong infiltration became an overarching concern. As the war escalated, however, more troops and more materiel in theater resulted in more crime, and NIS agents became swamped with investigations running the gamut from bizarre murders to shipping pornography through the mail. Counterintelligence was short-changed in the process, and, as Hubbard notes, even toward the end of the war “counterintelligence remained a low priority.”

Counterintelligence collection, according to NIS information for agents newly assigned to Vietnam, was mostly based on “liaison with other U.S. government agencies, personal observation, and contact with Vietnamese sources or foreigners who are in some manner associated with the U.S. Navy or U.S. Marine Corps.” Hubbard portrays some of the sources in broad brush strokes,

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

and they cover a wide spectrum ranging from Canadians in the International Control Commission, American correspondents, Vietnamese navy informants to domestic employees, office staff and a Chinese tailor who ferreted out information from customers. NIS agents did not pursue classical counterintelligence penetrations of the Viet Cong (VC) or North Vietnamese Army (NVA), but they were often able to shape snippets of information from their diverse sources into insightful analysis. According to Hubbard, domestic employees gathered accurate information on potential coup attempts against the South Vietnamese government during 1964–65. In another instance, Viet Cong “tax collectors” stopped trucks along Route 1, Vietnam’s national highway, to demand bribes, and NIS agents analyzed information from sources about roadmarkers near which these highwaymen operated to identify enemy units and pinpoint their locations.

Special Agent, Vietnam provides more insights into NIS criminal investigations than its counterintelligence operations. Hubbard notes in his preface that his requests for access to NIS Vietnam reports under Freedom of Information Act provisions were denied, which may explain the heavier focus on criminal investigations in the book. A critical aspect of the NIS counterintelligence mission was counterterrorism, though the term was hardly in vogue during the Vietnam conflict. One of the highlights of *Special Agent, Vietnam* is the portrayal of threats from Viet Cong terrorism and sabotage. NIS and other agencies were responsible for providing early warning indicators of potential Viet Cong sabotage against US interests, and Hubbard effectively conveys the urgency and frustration his fellow agents experienced in coping with the increasing terrorist threat. A Viet Cong assassin dubbed the Dragon Lady killed a Navy lieutenant and other victims as she rode past them as a passenger on a motorbike. The Viet Cong put the omnipresent motorbikes on Saigon streets to more destructive use by packing explosives in the frames to target Americans and their hangouts. Car bombs, the preferred terrorist method of a later age, also seriously damaged the US embassy and an officer barracks, resulting in extensive casualties. The parallel to modern day Iraq is unmistakable and serves as a reminder that terrorist attacks against American interests and civilians in war zones have roots well in the past. The reader of *Special Agent, Vietnam* will sense the tension felt by current terrorist hunters in the intense efforts of NIS agents in Vietnam to thwart Viet Cong sabotage.

In presenting these incidents and NIS operations, Hubbard deftly weaves in the political context in which they occurred, both in Vietnam and in the United States. He has a distinct knack for conveying the impact of larger political events on the everyday work of an NIS agent, for example, the increasing unrest resulting from the rotting regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam and the growing disenchantment with the war in the United States. Opposition to the war and inflamed racial tensions in the United States reverberated across the Pacific as a handful of US servicemen vented their own opposition in criminal activities.

One particularly heinous crime in this regard was known as “fragging,” the slang term derived from the M-26 fragmentation grenades that disgruntled troops would roll or pitch into a tent to kill a superior. This lethal practice represented a dark side of the Vietnam experience that has received little in-depth treatment in histories of the conflict. While some incidents were motivated by opposition to the war or racial militancy, most were individual acts of revenge against a particular officer or non-

commissioned officer. NIS had the sad duty to investigate all fragging incidents involving US Navy and Marine Corps personnel, and Hubbard explores a number of these cases in significant depth: a sergeant blown in half by a grenade in his tent, a Marine Corps captain losing his legs to a booby-trapped grenade, a Marine from a militant black group fragging a crowded NCO club during a performance, and even a victim who arranged his own suicide by fragging his tent, carefully placing the grenade so his face and upper body would be uninjured and suitable for viewing at his funeral. As Hubbard sadly notes, “agents were astonished at the futility and often stupidity of killing they were involved with.”

Murder investigations were among the most vexing and challenging for NIS agents in the Vietnam environment. Hubbard notes that old hands in NIS claimed “there are many ways to die in Vietnam,” and *Special Agent, Vietnam* explores in chilling detail some of the more bizarre murders investigated by NIS. Hubbard skillfully portrays the complexity and cultural nuance in investigating indiscriminate murders of innocent Vietnamese civilians by US military personnel, but perhaps the most senseless one presented in the memoir is the murder of a visiting Australian singer, shot to death during a performance by a Marine for no apparent motive.

NIS, of course, investigated crimes other than fragging or murder. *Special Agent, Vietnam* presents over 30 cases covering a staggering array of crimes that had to be investigated by a handful of agents under dangerous combat conditions. Some of the investigations seem incongruous for a combat environment: misuse of the US mail, stolen checks, obscene phone calls to navy nurses, to name a few. Others were endemic to the wartime atmosphere in Vietnam: opium smuggling, black marketeering, desertions, alleged war atrocities, and even a mutiny when a civilian crew seized a US government-chartered vessel to protest the war. Still others had counterintelligence implications. In one incident NIS agents found a Vietnamese merchant wrapping his goods in classified US documents, which, fortunately, turned out not to be a clever method to pass secret information to the enemy but simply shoddy disposition of classified materials.

Special Agent, Vietnam brims with atmospherics that only someone with first-hand experience like Hubbard could provide: conducting an investigation in the torrential rains of monsoon season, the dangers of travel to remote firebases in the “bush” of I Corps, near the Demilitarized Zone of the divided Vietnam, the sights and smells of Saigon’s crowded streets, and the sharp contrast with the colonial elegance of foreign enclaves like the Cercle Sportif club, a throwback to the era of French influence in Vietnam.

Special Agent, Vietnam should appeal to a broad readership, military historians, students of counterintelligence and criminal investigation, and Vietnam veterans like this reviewer, who will recall the seamier side of life in theater that Hubbard captures so well. Despite its treatment of the seamy side, Hubbard’s account is an inspiring story of dedicated professionals struggling against insurmountable odds to bring law and order to the chaos of Vietnam.

The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake

Current

Enemies: How America's Foes Steal Our Vital Secrets-and How We Let It Happen—Bill Gertz

Inside The Jihad: My Life with Al-Qaeda: A Spy's Story—Omar Nasiri

Intelligence in an Insecure World—Peter Gill and Peter Phythian

JIHAD Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the US—Steven Emerson

Safe For Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA—John Prados

Shopping For Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the A. Q. Kahn Network—Gordon Corera

Terrorism and Espionage in the Middle East: Deception, Displacement, and Denial—H.H.A. Cooper and Lawrence J. Redlinger

Triple Cross: How Bin Laden's Master Spy Penetrated the CIA, the Green Berets, and the FBI—and Why Patrick Fitzgerald Failed to Stop Him—Peter Lance

General Intelligence

Anticipating Surprise; Analysis for Strategic Warning—Cynthia M. Grabo

Handbook of Intelligence Studies—Loch Johnson (ed.)

Warning Analysis for the Information Age: Rethinking the Intelligence Process—John W. Bodnar

Historical

Churchill's Man of Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence—Gill Bennett

Flawed Patriot: The Rise and Fall of CIA Legend Bill Harvey—Bayard Stockton

Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence—Nigel West

Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence—Nigel West

The Meinertzhagen Mystery: The Life and Legend of a Colossal Fraud—Brian Garfield

Spying For Empire: The Great Game in Central and South Asia, 1757-1947—Robert Johnson

True Believer: Inside the Investigation and Capture of Ana Montes, Cuba's Master Spy—Scott W. Carmichael

Intelligence Services Abroad

At Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Chiefs of Britain's Intelligence Agency—Nigel West

Current

Bill Gertz, *Enemies: How America's Foes Steal Our Vital Secrets—and How We Let It Happen* (New York: Crown Forum, 2006), appendices, index.

In *Enemies*, Gertz uses case studies and interviews with counterintelligence (CI) experts to make the case that there are critical shortcomings in US CI efforts. Some of the case studies are well known, including Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and STAKEKNIFE—a British penetration of the IRA.¹ Less so are the cases of agents recruited by North Korea, China, Cuba, the Philippines, and Al Qaeda. His interview subjects include former key players Michelle Van Cleave, former director of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) (whose article on strategic counterintelligence appears in this issue), Richard Haver, formerly with the Defense Department and Intelligence Community Management Staff, and David Szady, former special agent with FBI's CI unit.

The chapter on North Korea shows a surprisingly high level of activity and describes its troubling and little-known “rendition” efforts. Chinese espionage cases the book documents include the PARLOR MAID (Katrina Leung) case. Treated in more than a chapter, it is the most detailed treatment of the case to date. The Chinese effort to acquire US technology is described in the chapter devoted to the RED FLOWER operation. Gertz devotes a chapter to Americans who have been caught spying for the Chinese, including three former CIA officers who were caught but for various reasons were never prosecuted. Russia's intense post-Cold War espionage efforts are described in another chapter.

Enemies includes a chapter on DIA officer, Ana Montes, who spied for Cuba, and contains material—albeit unattributed—from Scott W. Carmichael's book *True Believer: The Investigation and Capture of Ana Montes, Cuba's Master Spy*, also reviewed in this issue. To underline weakness in current FBI CI abilities, Gertz devotes a chapter to Brian Kelly, the CIA officer wrongly suspected for three years of committing the espionage eventually traced to Hanssen. Gertz gets the details of the case right, but even he cannot explain how experienced FBI special agents could have been blind to evidence pointing to Hanssen for so long.

¹ Gertz devotes a chapter to STAKEKNIFE as an example of a penetration of a terrorist organization. But he is preaching to the choir and offers nothing new. He digresses in the middle of the chapter to comment on ethical dilemmas in intelligence, citing the long-disproved story about Churchill supposedly declining to warn of an impending attack on Coventry to protect ULTRA. See: F.H. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, Volume 1 (London: HMSO, 1979), 536.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Oddly, it seems, Gertz treats cases in which agents were caught or confessed—presumed successes—yet he argues that “FBI is out of control” (199) and American CI isn’t doing anything right, largely because it takes too long to catch the culprits, a problem he blames on the lack of high-level attention. Like others before him, Gertz argues that more resources, better leadership, and proactive programs are needed.

Omar Nasiri, *Inside The Jihad: My Life with Al-Qaeda: A Spy's Story* (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2006), 337 pp., glossary, maps, index.

Omar Nasiri, a pseudonym, was a multi-lingual walk-in to the offices of DGSE (the French foreign intelligence service) in Belgium in the mid 1990s. A Moroccan member of the Algerian terrorist organization Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), Nasiri was something of a maverick—he drank, smoked, went to night clubs, and enjoyed western women; attributes he never gave up. To maintain his lifestyle—and replace the money he had stolen from his GIA cell—he sold his services to the DGSE. For the next six years he reported on the cell’s operations and membership, which included two of his brothers and his mother. Incredibly, Nasiri claims to have admitted to two cell members that he had contacted the DGSE. He asked for forgiveness and submitted to a test of his allegiance by successfully smuggling guns into Algeria, a feat that surprised his colleagues. When members of the Brussels cell were arrested, Omar “escaped.” The DGSE helped him reach Pakistan and from there Afghanistan. He was trained in weapons and explosives in Al Qa’ida training camps for more than a year.

Nasiri’s first Al Qa’ida assignment was to form a sleeper cell of Islamist recruits in London. He informed the DGSE, which, jointly with MI6 and MI5 in London, controlled his activities. These included attendance at local Mosques that served as sources of recruits. At some point he learned that members of his Belgian cell who knew of his DGSE links were to be released from jail, and, fearing exposure and reprisal, he asked for and was denied French asylum and protection. Instead, he went to Germany to stay with a German girl he had met and whom he eventually married. The Germans were no more helpful than the French, however, and he was denied permanent resident status. Thus forced into menial work cleaning toilets he decided to write *Inside the Jihad* for the money and revenge. Not surprisingly, then, the book is hard on the DGSE, which Nasiri says “hung him out to dry” after faithful service.

Is his story true? The BBC thought it was good enough for a 45 minute documentary in November 2006. His US publisher said the facts they could check, for example the story of the cell members arrests, checked out. They also consulted former CIA terrorist specialist Mike Scheuer, who said the training story rang true.²

² *New York Times*, 17 November 2006.

Nasiri concludes his memoirs by noting that “I am a Muslim. And to this day I would go to war for my faith.... Part of me remains a mujahid. I think the United States and all the others should get off our land, and stay off. I think they should stop interfering in the politics of the Muslim nations. I think they should leave us alone. And when they don’t they should be killed, because that is what happens to invading armies and occupiers.” (318-19) This we can believe.

Peter Gill and Peter Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World* (Malden, MA: 2006), 228 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

The conventional wisdom among academics working on intelligence holds that the British have tended to focus on the history of the profession while their colleagues in the United States write more about intelligence processes. The British authors of this volume have broken that mold. They argue that in the post 9/11 and 7/7 world “a systematic analysis of intelligence structure and processes is long overdue” and it should not be left to insiders to accomplish the task. “It is clear,” they state, “from both the regularity and costs of intelligence failures, that intelligence is too important to be left to the spooks.” (172) The authors would correct that error by outsourcing.

They get off to a weak start by justifying the need for outside help, citing specific intelligence failures, many of which weren’t. They even resort to quoting Aldrich Ames, after his conviction, although others more reputable are also included. They also contend that an intelligence theory must be developed and offer a redefinition of intelligence that demands it. Unfortunately, counterintelligence and covert action are excluded, though the latter is discussed in the text. The theory, based on the conventional intelligence cycle, involves adopting political and social science concepts not often encountered in the study of intelligence-positivism, modernism, postmodernism, critical realism, and surveillance, the latter in a context completely different from how that term is normally used by intelligence officers.

The authors then apply these concepts to each step of the intelligence cycle using familiar examples of failures and problems. But in the end, the reader is left wondering just how their ideas for a “more self-consciously analytical and theoretical” approach to intelligence will help—no examples are given. Ambiguity also follows their conclusion that “citizens have been excluded for too long from any knowledge of intelligence policies and practices.” (172) While the existence of this book and its bibliography suggest otherwise, it is by no means clear the objective is a worthy one. *Intelligence in an Insecure World* may help clarify the nature of the gap between intelligence professionals and elements of academia, but it does not close it.

Steven Emerson, *JIHAD Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the US* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2006), 535 pp., end of chapter notes, photos, index.

In his 2002 book, *American JIHAD*, journalist Steven Emerson, reported on the extensive terrorist networks in 11 American cities.³ He presented unequivocal evidence that “infiltration of radical Islamism into our Society” was an ongoing reality as early as 1992. He concluded that, despite the successful arrests and trials that followed the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, further investigation of the organizations that carried it out might have prevented the 9/11 attack. In the post 9/11 world, Emerson decided to tackle that problem with his own organization, The Investigative Project on Terrorism. In the five years since, despite new laws and organizational changes in the United States, he concludes the problem has not been solved and in many ways has grown worse. *JIHAD Incorporated* reports the current situation and tries to answer the question: “to what extent does radical Islamic activity in the United States today pose a threat to national security at home and abroad?” (21) In searching for an answer, it should be kept in mind that Jihad is an old, well established and uniquely Islamic institution that regulates, with its own rules, the relations of Muslims with non-Muslims to this day.

This book has three parts. The first looks at al Qa’ida in the United States. The second examines other terrorist networks operating here— Hamas, Hizballah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Pakistani Jihadist Network. These he says are well trained and ready to “fight for Jihad.” The third part is the largest, covering networked groups operating in the United States—charities, foundations, and benevolence organizations, each with Web sites and sources of financing. KINDHEARTS, for example, is supposed to provide emergency relief to Muslims, including, sanitation services, medical and health care, vocational training and education to refugees. In fact, Emerson writes, it is a conduit for terrorist financing with connections to Hamas. A related organization known as the SAAR network, whose members are “scholars, businessmen, and scientists from the Middle East,” (383) is a 501(c)(3) foundation incorporated in Herndon, Virginia, with “known ties to radical Islamist groups.” Also discussed are the Mosques in America, which provides recruiting centers and other terrorist support functions. These are just three examples of anti-Western groups supporting the global jihad. Chapter 12, “Jihadi Webmasters,” is particularly disconcerting in describing how terrorists use the Internet to meet their communications needs. Whatever the answer to these problems, Emerson see cyberspace as a major player on both sides.

³ Steven Emerson, *American JIHAD: The Terrorists Living Among Us* (New York: The Free Press, 2002). It was in this book that he reported on the Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA), which issued coloring books instructing its young members on “how to kill the infidel” and preached “extermination of Jews and Christians.”

In covering what is being done by the FBI and intelligence agencies to counter these groups, he barely mentions, for reasons unexplained, the Department of Homeland Security. He lists the arrests that have been made since 9/11, but he concludes the battle is not close to being won because terrorist resources in money and manpower are just too great. This work is an excellent, though dispiriting, survey of radical Islamist activities in America. *JIHAD Incorporated* ends without proposing any solutions, which presumably is a task left to professionals.

John Prados, *Safe For Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), endnotes, note on sources, index.

Safe For Democracy is a revision of a Prados' 1986 book on CIA covert action, *The President's Secret Wars*.⁴ Revision is necessary, he says, because "public opinion polls in many countries [that] portray the United States as the greatest threat to world peace on the globe, worse than terrorism or any other nation." (xiii) The basis for that judgment, he maintains, is in large part CIA covert action, the major policy tool of all presidents since World War II. The CIA, he argues, "attempts to pursue operations beyond the limits of the oversight system," and this demands a critical and comprehensive examination of the "consistently disappointing" covert action results.

The documentation Prados provides is impressive and includes declassified CIA reports covering the 25 nations in which he maintains covert actions have caused untold suffering. The book goes into detail in cases from Iran to Bosnia. He does not question US pursuit of democracy throughout the world, only the methods used to achieve the goal. The Prados solution to the problem lies in greater Congressional oversight, which he acknowledges has increased dramatically since 1976. He does not address the point at which oversight becomes management by committee, however.

This is not an objective study. Prados clearly held negative views of covert action before he set pen to paper, and set out to prove his point. Even the covert support given to resistance to anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan is a negative; the Soviet Union would have collapsed in any event in Prados' view. Still, this is thorough review of covert action, and readers may well reach different conclusions.

Gordon Corera, *Shopping For Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the A. Q. Kahn Network* (London: Hurst & Company, 2006), 288 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

Shortly after India exploded a "peaceful nuclear device" on 18 May 1974, A. Q. Kahn wrote to Pakistan's prime minister suggesting a plan to match India's accomplishment. It was accepted, and by the time Pakistan became a nuclear power on 28 May 1998, Kahn had become a national hero. In between,

⁴ John Prados, *The President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II* (New York: William Morrow, 1986).

Kahn also created what Mohammed El-Baradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, termed the “Wal-Mart of private-sector proliferation,” (xiv) violating any number of national and international laws in the process. Khan’s efforts had not gone unnoticed, however, and thanks mainly to a joint effort by the CIA and MI6, Kahn was placed under house arrest on 31 January 2004. (207) In *Spying for Bombs*, BBC correspondent Corera tells how this came about.

As with many intelligence operations, the breakthrough came, Corera writes, when one of Kahn’s customers defected and contacted MI6 to offer details of the Khan network. Hard evidence was acquired when a ship carrying thousand of components needed for uranium enrichment was intercepted on the way to Libya. After cooperation from Libya was obtained the links to the Khan network were verified. Corera explains how Kahn acquired sources for the equipment on the no-export list from businesses in countries around the world and how he supplied the material to buyers in Iran, China, and North Korea, among others.

Corera's documentation is impressive and he adds to the veracity of his story by including comments from Joseph Nye, the chairman of the National Intelligence Council during the Clinton administration, and from Peter Bergen, an expert on political machinations in the Middle East.

In his Epilogue, Corera raises disturbing questions about material known to have existed in the Kahn network that has yet to be located and which could play a role in the battle to end nuclear proliferation. How much damage Kahn did is a question yet to be answered. Corera’s story is well told and of value to intelligence officers and students of national security.

H.H.A. Cooper and Lawrence J. Redlinger, *Terrorism and Espionage in the Middle East: Deception, Displacement, and Denial* (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd., 2005), 773 pp., end of chapter notes, bibliography, name index, subject index.

Readers hoping to learn more about the relationship of terrorism and espionage from this massive work by professors Cooper and Redlinger will be totally disappointed. Those who read past the title will learn that the authors argue that Israel, not Arab factions or states in the Middle East, is the actual sponsor of terrorism there and elsewhere in the world. Their rationale is simple: *cui bono*; it is in Israel's self-interest to convince the United States that the Arabs are the sources of terrorism even if it means Israel must commit the acts and attribute them to the Arabs. The authors suggest some provocative examples: Israel, it is theorized, “cleverly engineered” the episode in which Nizar Hindawi used his Irish girlfriend to unknowingly smuggle a bomb on to El Al flight LY016 from Heathrow to Tel Aviv. (264ff) Another implies that the blame for the “kidnappings and captivity of Westerners in Lebanon,” (vii) including both Terry Waite and CIA station chief William Buckley, (450) falls on Israel since these acts were to her “advantage...[and

helped] keep the conflict going as long as possible.” (vii) The most outrageous example is that Israel, not Libya or any other Arab nation, was responsible for the bombing of Pan Am 103.

The authors' approach to scholarship is clear from the outset where they state that while “the positions taken are most tenaciously defended....There is little room for true objectivity.” (4) They go on to claim they “have tried to use speculation judiciously,” (xix) but here they are only half right; they speculate extensively throughout the book.

This level of scholarship and application of fuzzy concepts has been achieved in only two other intelligence books—and they wrote those as well.⁵ This might be reason enough to skip this book, but its \$170 price tag makes the decision a no-brainer.

Peter Lance, *Triple Cross: How Bin Laden's Master Spy Penetrated the CIA, the Green Berets, and the FBI—and Why Patrick Fitzgerald Failed to Stop Him* (New York: Regan Books, 2006), 604 pp., endnotes, appendices, photos, index.

In his first book, *1000 Years For Revenge*, Peter Lance presented documentary evidence available to the FBI that he judged might have prevented the 9/11 tragedy had it not been ignored. One item concerned a source recruited by the Bureau as an al Qaeda penetration: an ex-Egyptian army officer and member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad named Ali Mohammed. Lance reported that Ali had become an American citizen, a member of the US Army Special Forces, and a contract agent of the CIA before his dismissal for having unauthorized contacts with Hizballah. He had trained al Qaeda terrorists in Khost, Afghanistan, and served as bin Laden's bodyguard in Sudan. When bin Laden moved to Afghanistan, Al Mohammed helped with the arrangements. In between, he was a weapons trainer for an Al Qaeda cell in New York City headed by Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind Sheikh. His final contribution was to help plan the embassy bombing in Nairobi. He was arrested after the Nairobi bombing and confessed his al Qaeda links. Case closed.

Left unexplained in that first book were the reasons for his arrest and his punishment. At the invitation of the 9/11 Commission Chairman, Thomas Kean, Lance told the Ali story and others to a staff investigator in secret session. When the final report was published, Lance's testimony was not included and Ali Mohammed was not mentioned. *Triple Cross* is Lance's attempt to explain the reasons.

Lance tries to make Ali Mohammad the central thread in *Triple Cross*, but he is only partially successful. It is a complicated book with many new names—a graphic in the center helps sort them out. Lance marshals new data to argue that if only Ali Mohammed had been better handled and debriefed, 9/11 might not have happened and bin Laden would have been caught or neutralized. For

⁵ H.H.A. Cooper and Lawrence J. Redlinger, *Catching Spies* (Paladin Press, 1988); *Making Spies* (Paladin Press, 1986).

example the FBI eventually learned that Ali Mohammed's 1998 confession and detailed debriefings produced only lies—nothing checked out. Indeed, Ali has never been sentenced and remains in witness protection. These facts tends to weaken the argument that he was central to the counterterrorism program.

Lance does present a new analysis of what happened in the ABLE DANGER data mining operation, and he tables indications that the destruction of TWA Flight 800 east of New York City in July 1996 was a terrorist act, not the result of the internal fuel tank explosion the National Transportation Safety Board concluded was the most probable cause.

In the midst of all this Lance tells of an FBI sting against Ramsi Yousef, the 1993 World Trade Center bomber, that involved a mafia inmate who helped the FBI monitor Yousef's telephone calls—calls that he was not supposed to have been making—to his fellow terrorists overseas. Lance leaves the significance of this operation dangling.

In the end, Lance asks if we will “ever know the truth?” (468) Of course, the answer is “maybe.” He is satisfied with knowing more now and *Triple Cross* does provide new dots, but unfortunately it is by no means clear how they connect.

General Intelligence

Cynthia M. Grabo, *Anticipating Surprise; Analysis for Strategic Warning* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 2004), 174 pp., footnotes, index.

John W. Bodnar, *Warning Analysis for the Information Age: Rethinking the Intelligence Process* (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2003), 189 pp., footnotes, illustrations, index.

Anticipating Surprise is a condensed version of a three-volume classified treatment of warning intelligence Cynthia Grabo, an experienced intelligence analyst, prepared between 1972 and 1974. Although its central theme is strategic warning, the concepts apply to intelligence analysis generally; put another way, it is a textbook for a 101 course in analysis. Among the principles it stresses are the importance of research, knowing one's subject, reaching the right conclusions, and informing decisionmakers in a timely fashion.

Grabo provides examples of what she terms intelligence failures and the circumstances that led to them. In addition to Pearl Harbor, the most recognizable example, she includes failure to foresee Chinese military intervention during the Korean War. In this context she raises an interesting variant to the definition of “intelligence failure,” arguing that analysts then did have advance warning, but they were ignored by General MacArthur and President Truman. Failure in this case applies “because no action was taken.” (17) She reiterates the point later in the book. But nowhere does she explain

why analysts should bear a burden for failing to convince superiors to accept their conclusions. One could argue that responsibility belongs to the decisionmaker alone—it should go with the pay grade.

Among other topics covered are: asking the right questions, knowing what methods to apply to collected data, understanding how the adversary thinks, order-of-battle warning issues—the only topic for which she supplies a list of warning indicators—the difficulties of developing and assessing warning indicators involving political issues, and deception. She also emphasizes assessment of probabilities as a technique for improving the quality of judgments. This is not new and others have supported the approach, but Grabo doesn't explain just how guessing or estimating arbitrary numerical values in an iterative process can improve the result. Nor does she offer an example of successful intelligence analysis that used the approach.

Anticipating Surprise is valuable for young analysts wondering where to start and what to do next.

Bodnar's *Warning Analysis for the Information Age* takes a different approach to the same topics Grabo covered. Dr. Bodnar quotes her book frequently in his early chapters to show that he is on the same page with her conceptually, but the differences are important. One observer quoted in the front material of Bodnar's book asserts that "Dr. Bodnar sees the Information Age as signifying a fundamental shift away from a deterministic and linear Newtonian paradigm (the Grabo approach) to a complex adaptive systems perspective grounded in non-linearity and modern, quantum physics." (vii)

The book will help just a little in elaborating that observer's point; it is neither self-explanatory nor 101 course reading. Bodnar's central theme is that in today's complex, multipolar world, we require multidimensional analysis (MDA) applied by data-mining computer programs that, he seems to suggest, have yet to be written. At one point he asks, "how do we replace the missing historians with smart computer programs?" The implication is that the volume of data to be evaluated is so great that it exceeds human capacity to store and process quickly, so we don't need or can't use historians anymore. Dr. Bodnar provides many graphs and charts, but readers will not understand the points they are intended to make just by looking at them. In fact, this book would be best used if a knowing teacher is present to explain. Few will disagree with Dr. Bodnar's premises concerning analysis in the Web-based world, some may even argue that we are not so far from reaching the goal as *Warning Analysis for the Information Age* seems to suggest.

Loch Johnson (ed.), *Handbook of Intelligence Studies* (London: Routledge, 2007), 382 pp., end-of-chapter notes, bibliography, appendices, index.

In the 1970s, despite anti-government student protests, college courses on intelligence gradually gained acceptance for two related reasons. First, the students liked the subject. Second, because the courses were consistently oversubscribed academia tolerated them—they made money. But there were few texts on the subject beyond Professor Harry Howe Ransom's *The Central*

Intelligence Agency (1965) and *The Intelligence Establishment* (1970). To provide current material, professors assembled readers—collections of articles—and brought in guest speakers. The turning point came in the 1980s, when professor Roy Godson of Georgetown University sponsored conferences on intelligence and published the proceedings, with contributions from academics and retired professionals.⁶ By the mid 1980s, a number of texts were available, and the trend has continued.⁷ But none of works provided anything like the broad, authoritative coverage of the subject found in *The Handbook of Intelligence Studies*.

Handbook editor and contributor Loch Johnson has assembled 26 articles from 27 academics and professionals that discuss aspects of the literature, history, and the intelligence cycle. They address how intelligence organizations function, the roles of counterintelligence, covert action, science and technology, the use of open sources, oversight, judicial intervention, and accountability. These are in-depth, up-to-date treatments that provide, with a couple of exceptions, a introductions to the topics they address.

The first exception is the article on open source intelligence, which makes the bizarre assertion that “the US government is still not serious about open source intelligence.”(140) It is true that the profession needs improvements in many areas, but the use of open source material is not one of them. The CIA and its predecessor organizations, with the help of the British, actually set the pace in this field, beginning before World War II, and, with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service—the predecessor to the Director of National Intelligence’s Open Source Center—have had an exemplary track record since then. The second exception is the failure to distinguish between counterintelligence and security. One case in point, a case study of the FBI treatment of scientist Linus Pauling, is not about counterintelligence as claimed, but about security practices “run amok.” There was no espionage suspected in the case.(269) Executive Order 12333 specifically excludes the topics of physical, document, personnel, and SIGINT security from the definition of counterintelligence.

The *Handbook* is by no means an uncritical examination of the profession. Failures and weakness are discussed in every article. Perhaps the most pertinent is Professor Johnson’s chapter “A Shock Theory of Congressional Accountability for Intelligence.” In it he reviews the efforts of Congress to achieve this goal over the past 30 years and makes a strong case for its validity and the need for greater effectiveness, and the risks of failure to achieve it. It is a timely argument.

The book’s hefty, \$170, price tag may limit access to it. I hope a paperback edition will appear so that every student of intelligence can have one as a foundation for further study.

⁶ E.g., Roy Godson (ed.), *Intelligence Requirements For The 1980s: Clandestine Collection* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1982).

⁷ E.g., John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA*; Loch Johnson, *A Season of Inquiry*; and former CIA officer Scott Breckinridge, *The CIA and the U.S. Intelligence System*

Historical

Gill Bennett, *Churchill's Man of Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence* (London: Routledge, 2006), 404 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

For most of the 1930s Winston Churchill, MP, held no cabinet office—his so-called wilderness years—but he still managed to see secret government reports on the situation in Europe. Desmond John Falkiner Morton (1891–1971), then a senior officer in the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Director of the Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC), was one of his sources. Some historians argue Morton provided the service unofficially, acting as Churchill's "mole."⁸ Others suggest Morton had the blessings of three prime ministers to keep Churchill informed.⁹ Gill Bennett, former Foreign Office historian, working with full access to the official record, concludes there is no smoking gun for either position, a situation typical in the life of her inscrutable subject who destroyed his personal papers and wrote no memoirs. (150ff)

Bennett gives the reader glimpses of Morton's personal life from public sources, correspondence, and interviews. An only child and life-long bachelor, Morton attended Eton and the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich before beginning his well-documented government service as an artillery officer in World War I. Wounded in France, he lived the balance of his life with a bullet near his heart. It was in France that Morton met and became friends with Churchill, who would help him enter SIS, and, during World War II, call him to serve as the prime minister's liaison with the intelligence services. Bennett's coverage of each phase of Morton's life, with emphasis on his intelligence service, gradually makes clear why he was considered an abrupt, abrasive, efficient, effective administrator, "driven by impatience," but most of all, a man of mystery.

Bennett portrays Morton's service in SIS as a monument to expediency and rejection of bureaucratic formalities in favor of accomplishing a mission. He often ruffled feathers, but he usually got results. For example, soon after World War I, Britain needed to know what the European powers were doing economically and militarily. Meeting this objective required sources who knew what was happening. Some of these were British citizens. Ignoring the government stipulation that SIS/MI6 limit operations to foreign entities, Morton recruited knowledgeable Brits since no other intelligence agency would do so. Thus it happened that Maxwell Knight, later head of an important MI5 counterespionage section, first served Morton and MI6.

⁸ Roy Jenkins, *Churchill* (London: Macmillan, 2001), 479–80.

⁹ Christopher Andrew, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (London: Sceptre, 1986), 503. Andrew notes that the permission from the PMs to give Churchill sensitive reports was put in writing. Bennett records that Morton had made this claim and that the letter was in his safe deposit box. But she reports that it has never been found and hints that it may never have existed.

The increasing demand for foreign intelligence led to the formation within SIS of the IIC, which Morton headed for six years beginning in 1931, a period in which he learned to deal with horrendous bureaucratic rivalries. It was from this position that he passed material to Churchill and the ministries. In May 1940, after a short tenure as Director of Intelligence in the Ministry of Economic Warfare, Morton's life changed for good when Churchill summoned him to be his assistant in a new government, taking on vaguely defined duties—a kind of gatekeeper for the PM—for which he would be best known to history. Here too he found conflict as he tried to play a role in setting up the Special Operations Executive and served as the PM's liaison to SIS, MI5 and GCHQ. The latter duties brought him into contact with William Donovan the director of OSS. Bennett does a fine job of explaining how Morton got his jobs done in spite of the many obstacles encountered in each.

Morton's influence with Churchill diminished near the end of the war, as other organizations established more direct links to the PM. When Churchill was voted out of power after the war, a somewhat demoralized Morton was left looking for work. He spent seven years with the Treasury working on reparations before retiring in 1953. He remained active in charity and church work during the final years of his life, which ended quietly in 1971.

Despite Desmond Morton's best efforts to remain a very private man, Gill Bennett has produced a fine account that he would probably have admired.

Bayard Stockton, *Flawed Patriot: The Rise and Fall of CIA Legend Bill Harvey* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006), 355 pp, endnotes, bibliography, appendix, photos, index.

The late Bayard Stockton served two years in Berlin under Bill Harvey, the legendary, gun-toting CIA chief of base, before moving on to *Newsweek* magazine and a career in journalism. Several years ago, encouraged by Harvey's widow, he began *Flawed Patriot*, which was published soon after his death.

Stockton's intriguing and complex subject left a sparse paper trail and this biography leaves some basic details unexplained, starting with his subject's real name. Bill Harvey was born "William Walker, son of Drenan R. Walker and Sara J. King," (6) later known as Sara J. Harvey, both of Danville, Indiana. If his mother ever explained the name differences, Harvey never made them public. Harvey's colorful career has been a topic in other books. Stockton draws on them and firsthand accounts from interviews and government documents to separate the Harvey myth from reality.

Stockton used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain Harvey's heavily redacted personnel file for details of his early life. Dissuaded from seeking an appointment to West Point by his maternal grandfather, Harvey worked awhile at the family newspaper before entering, at age 18, Indiana University in 1933. He would marry, earn his BA and a law degree and move to Cincinnati, where he worked in his father-in-law's legal practice before applying to the FBI, which he joined in 1940.

Harvey's years in the FBI began with routine criminal investigation duties in New York City, but he was soon transferred to intelligence-related duties. He handled some of the most important FBI espionage investigations of the time, including the TRAMP case, which ended with the arrest of some 31 German agents. After the World War II, he was an early handler of Elizabeth Bentley, although he left the Bureau before she began testifying in 1948. Harvey's Bureau career had ended abruptly the year before when he earned the life-long displeasure of J. Edgar Hoover for violating FBI rules after a drinking incident. In researching this phase of Harvey's career, Stockton did not find Harvey's name in any files covering Bentley or other cases he worked—probably the result of Hoover's displeasure.

Joining CIA in 1947, Harvey was assigned to Staff C, the counter espionage branch, and soon became acquainted with Kim Philby, the British head of station and liaison to the CIA. When Philby's colleagues and fellow KGB agents Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean defected in 1951, it was Harvey, not James Angleton, as some have reported, who concluded Philby was also complicit. He notified DCI Walter Smith in writing that Philby should be withdrawn, which is what happened. Harvey next went to Berlin Base, where he built a reputation for solid counterintelligence work and managed the Berlin tunnel project. "Harvey's Hole," as it came to be called, proved to be the positive highlight of his career. Stockton devotes several detailed chapters to this portion of what by then had become a successful, though colorful, gun-toting career.

He returned to Headquarters in 1959, having divorced, remarried, and adopted a child while in Berlin. He headed Staff D (covert communications) for two years. During this period he was sent to the White House to meet President Kennedy. Stockton tells a story Harvey told a friend about handing over to a secret service guard two weapons before entering the Oval Office and not bothering to declare a third. (120)

In the run-up to the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, Harvey was assigned to head Task Force W with a mission to get rid of Castro.(121) Stockton devotes the balance of the book to the career-ending problems this assignment created. He describes the various attempts of Task Force W to accomplish its mission, including the convoluted effort to enlist the Mafia. After too many failures, Harvey had a savage run-in with Robert Kennedy, who ordered his dismissal from CIA. Richard Helms managed to save him temporarily by assigning him to Rome, where things continued downhill as Harvey's lifelong drinking problem became unmanageable. Returning to Headquarters, he walked the halls, fought off persistent questions about his Mafia links, and eventually retired in 1968. Called to testify before the Church Committee in 1975, he was again asked about his Mafia connections and his possible links to President Kennedy's assassination. Infuriated at the implications, and with much he found wrong with Agency performance, Harvey made his views clear in simple declarative sentences and left Washington for good. He died a year later.

Richard Helms characterized Bill Harvey as aggressive, demanding, and conscientious, with a good knowledge of operations. *Flawed Patriot* adds meat to these bones while tempering the contrary Angletonian view found in David

Martin's *Wilderness of Mirrors* and the image of Harvey as the "weird eccentric" portrayed by Norman Mailer in his novel *Harlot's Ghost*. The story of Harvey's often controversial career has lessons for all readers interested in intelligence.

In Stockton's view Bill Harvey never received the recognition he thought he deserved, even in death: only two of his former colleagues attended his funeral.

Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2006), 330 pp., bibliography, chronology, index.

———, *Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007), 438 pp., bibliography, appendices, chronology, index.

These volumes are the fifth and sixth in Scarecrow Press's historical dictionary intelligence series. The first, on international intelligence, has the broader scope but fewer entries than the second. In both cases some topics appear in both volumes, though the level of detail differs. Elizabeth Bentley, for example, gets half a page in the first volume and two pages in the second, while Romanian defector Ion Pacepa has a short paragraph in the first and more than a page in the second. The reverse is also true: the Philby entry in the international intelligence dictionary is a page and a half while it gets only half a page in the counterintelligence dictionary. These differences do not appear to be related to any intrinsic definition of the categories used in the dictionaries—Philby is both an international and a counterintelligence case. Similarly, the absence of an expected case or topic does not mean it belongs elsewhere, it is more likely absent because of a space limitations or oversight. Thus, readers should consult other volumes and sources in the bibliographies.

The CI volume has an impressive selection of cases, some little known, and a valuable bibliographic essay covering the evolution of books during the Cold War. Scholars will appreciate the appendices, which list espionage prosecutions in the United States, US defectors to the Soviet Union, plus Soviet and Soviet Bloc defectors to the West. Curiously, similar data for the UK are absent.¹⁰

Both volumes have factual errors worth noting. The international volume states Philip Agee won a court challenge to recover his US passport; he did not. Nor did James Angleton identify Canadian counterintelligence officer James Bennett as a KGB mole; the Canadians did that on their own. And the comment that the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) was originally designated the Third Department is inaccurate; it was the Fourth Department.¹¹ The counterintelligence volume has similar difficulties. Elizabeth Bentley told her story of espionage to the FBI in November of 1945,

¹⁰ Neither do they appear in West's *Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2005). "Appendix D, US Defectors to the Soviet Union" places Michael Peri on that list, but the entry for Peri shows his defection was to East Germany, before he redefected to the West several months later.

not September; Hede Massing did not try to recruit Alger Hiss; Alexander Orlov “emerged from hiding” in 1953, not 1954, and Joseph McCarthy claimed in his West Virginia speech, to have a list of 205 communists in the State Department, not 57.¹² Concerning the KGB, Yuri Nosenko did not seek to defect in 1962; that happened in 1964. And Line X is the designation for a science and technology specialist, not an illegal support officer; that designation in Line N.¹³

While these volumes are useful additions, especially with their indices, to the intelligence dictionary (really encyclopedia) series, the editorial practice of leaving the fact-checking and source determination to the reader diminishes their utility. Corrected paperback editions would greatly increase their value.

Brian Garfield, *The Meinertzhagen Mystery: The Life and Legend of a Colossal Fraud* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2007), 352 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, glossary, index.

While serving in the Sinai during World War I, British Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen was on a scouting mission when he was spotted by Turks. A chase ensued and a wounded Meinertzhagen escaped after dropping his haversack containing documents describing British army plans for advancing on Jerusalem. The Turks recovered the spoil and, accepting their good luck, prepared to defend the point the maps said the British would attack. This realignment of forces weakened the front where the main attack actually occurred and succeeded. The Haversack Ruse, as it became famously known, was conceived and executed by Meinertzhagen. We know this because Meinertzhagen’s diaries tell us so.

After the war Meinertzhagen kept active through his hobby, bird watching, and his practice of collecting rare species throughout the world. Each was catalogued, including place and time and date observed/captured, and eventually he gave over 25,000 specimens (skins as they were called) to the British Museum. He was given awards for sighting several rare species in locations where they had never been seen before; some were even thought to be extinct. Meinertzhagen also hunted in Africa and worked on his wartime diaries for publication.¹⁴

¹¹ The accurate GRU data can be found in Robert Pringle’s *Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence*, which was published before the volumes reviewed here.

¹² The figure 57 was entered into the Congressional Record with the official copy of the speech in reaction to the controversy raised by the higher figure. Neither number was accurate. See Richard Gid Powers, *Not Without Honor: The History of American Anticommunism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 235, 239.

¹³ See Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West* (London: Penguin, 2000), 959.

¹⁴ See: Col. Richard Meinertzhagen, *Army Diary, 1899–1926* (London: Oliver & Boyd, 1960); *Kenya Diary, 1902–1906* (Oliver & Boyd, 1957); and *Middle East Diary, 1917–1956* (London: Cresset Press, 1959). In addition, there are 82 volumes of his unpublished diaries in the Bodleian Library in Oxford.

Then, in September 2005—Meinertzhagen had been dead since 1967—an article in *Nature Magazine* by Rex Dalton accused him of ornithological deceit. A year later John Seabrook's *New Yorker* article, "Ruffled Feathers: Uncovering the Biggest Scandal in the Bird World," stated the accusations more forcefully.¹⁵ The upshot: Meinertzhagen had not observed his birds when and where he stated. Worse yet, he had stolen most of them from museums and friends and forged the critical acquisition details that became part of the official record. Meinertzhagen was so well known and liked that even when caught removing skins from the British museum his response that he was testing security was accepted. His fabrications were not suspected even when his "finds" defied history. When the truth emerged a monumental database correction, still unfinished, was undertaken. Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence, some authors deny his deception in all matters.¹⁶

As the bird controversy got underway, Brain Garfield and some colleagues came across Meinertzhagen's name while studying the War for Kilimanjaro (1914–15) which the British lost, despite superior forces, due to poor intelligence. Captain Meinertzhagen was the British intelligence officer for the campaign. They soon concluded his accounts of the African theater were false. This led to examinations of other adventures described in his diaries and the discovery that many were fake or distorted—including the Haversack Ruse. It was not, as he claimed, his idea, and he didn't drop the haversack. Nor was he wounded, and he was only a captain at the time. The tendency to take credit due others never left him. Garfield's documentation is thorough and well corroborated.¹⁷ The charming, popular Meinertzhagen, roommate of Lawrence of Arabia in Paris, trusted friend of David Ben-Gurion, David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, was a fraud.

The *Meinertzhagen Mystery* gives many more examples of unresolved controversies surrounding this extraordinary character, e.g., did he, as some alleged, really murder his wife? It is a British variation of Catch Me If You Can based on rigorous scholarship.

Robert Johnson, *Spying For Empire: The Great Game in Central and South Asia, 1757–1947* (St Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Co., 2006), 320 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

In June 1842, those in the main square of Bokhara, Uzbekistan, witnessed two British spies lose their heads to an executioner's axe—a Muslim problem solving technique not unknown today. Colonel Charles Stoddart had been detained first. Captain Arthur Connelly went to rescue him; both became victims of the Great Game, a term coined by Connelly years earlier and made popular by Rudyard Kipling in his novel, *Kim*.¹⁸

¹⁵ John Seabrook, "Ruffled Feathers: Uncovering the Biggest Scandal in the Bird World," *The New Yorker*, 29 May 2006: 51–61.

¹⁶ Michael O'Connell, *Dances in Deep Shadows: Britain's Clandestine War In Russia 1917–20* (London: Constable, 2006).

¹⁷ Garfield had problems with documentation in an earlier book, *The Paladin*, a story of a schoolboy spy for Winston Churchill. The tale was a fabrication passed on to Garfield. Nigel West exposed it in *Counterfeit Spies* (London: St. Ermin's Press, 1998).

In *Spying For Empire*, British historian Robert Johnson defines the Great Game as the “struggle to secure and maintain geo-strategic supremacy in Asia in order to protect India.” (21) Britain viewed the Russian empire as the main threat. The British army had to know the possible and probable routes of Russian attack through Central Asia. The presence of hostile tribes in Afghanistan and the Hindu Kush mountain range complicated data collection. Johnson tells of two approaches. One used military officer/explorer/agents to go where they could. The second employed pundits, the term applied to Asian surveyors/agents, who operated clandestinely and were sent to map high risk regions. There was also a political dimension to the Great Game and Johnson deals with this too. These efforts often had short term positive results, but usually ended in fighting. Britain fought two wars with Afghanistan during the 19th century and lost both to determined tribal leaders. In the end, they would keep out the Russians too.

A major objective the book successfully accomplishes is to demonstrate a not often recognized fact: by the end of the 19th century, British military intelligence in India had become a professional service that did more than monitor the northern frontier. It also maintained India’s domestic security through collaboration with the local Indian police. Finally, it was to become the source of experienced officers who would achieve high positions in the War Department and the civilian intelligence services.

The Great Game changed in the 20th century after Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese war. As World War I approached, the threat shifted to Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia. *Spying For Empire* shows how British intelligence met these challenges successfully just in time to be faced with a new and unfamiliar threat—political subversion from the Soviet Union. Johnson concludes that British intelligence eventually learned to work well in the south Central Asian nations at least until 1947. He leaves unasked the question of whether the lessons learned then, became lessons forgotten after 9/11.

Scott W. Carmichael, *True Believer: Inside the Investigation and Capture of Ana Montes, Cuba’s Master Spy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 187 pp., photos, index.

The “Queen of Cuba” was what some of Ana Montes’s fellow DIA analysts called her. Fidel Castro may have agreed. Montes was one of Cuba’s best agents in America during much of her 16-year DIA career. She was arrested on 21 September 2001, sentenced on 16 October 2002, and is serving her 25 years. Author Scott Carmichael, a DIA senior counterintelligence investigator, was instrumental in bringing her to justice. He tells much of the story in this memoir, but many of the details one would like to know—just when and how she was recruited, precisely what was it that made DIA security and the FBI think she was an agent—have been omitted, probably for security reasons.

Still we learn that signs of a mole in the Latin American area of the Intelligence Community had appeared during the late 1980s. What alerted an observant DIA employee to Montes is obscured, but when Carmichael was told, he began

¹⁸ Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: On Service in High Asia* (London: John Murray, 1990), 1–2. Rudyard Kipling, *Kim* (London, Macmillan, 1901).

in April 1996 what turned out to be an on-again off-again investigation—there was an incredible unexplained 4-year lapse of activity. Besides providing a narrative chronology of investigative events, *True Believer* tells us something about Montes's background, her relationship with her colleagues, and the level of classified intelligence to which she had access. Of particular interest is Carmichael's persistence as he sought to convince the FBI and his DIA superiors that Montes was very likely involved in espionage. And then, having done that, he describes the elaborate and clever schemes developed to keep her from suspecting she was under suspicion as her access to sensitive materials was minimized. This became difficult after she was accepted as an analyst in the National Intelligence Council at CIA headquarters, but with the help of a clever, bad-tempered admiral, her assignment was changed.

Throughout all this, perhaps most frustrating to Carmichael were the legal details that had to be observed during the investigation to protect its integrity. In the Epilogue, Carmichael releases a surprising bit of pique over what he perceives as a diminished sense of urgency within "my community about detecting and countering the effects of Cuban penetrations of the US government." (176) He encourages greater efforts to prevent another Montes and concludes with a "well done" to the Cuban service for running her so long. He also warns Havana that he won't give up. There is more to be said about the Montes case, but *True Believer* is a worthwhile start.

Intelligence Services Abroad

Nigel West, *At Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Chiefs of Britain's Intelligence Agency, MI6* (London: Greenhill Books, 2006), 296 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendix, index.

In 1932, British author and former Secret Intelligence Service officer, Compton Mackenzie, decided that the requirement to keep secret the existence of the service itself and the name of its Chief "C" no longer made sense. So when he mentioned both details in his book *Greek Memories*, the government promptly responded to his progressive contribution to the freedom of information by confiscating all copies—well, almost all—the CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection has one.¹⁹ Mackenzie was convicted in court of violating the Officials Secrets Act and fined £200. Despite the exposure, the official existence of "C" and the service remained a secret until 1994. *At Her Majesty's Secret Service* explains why, and then provides short biographical essays on each of the 13 "Cs" since Mansfield Smith-Cumming, who Mackenzie revealed. Each entry offers the officer's personal details, reviews his career, notes controversies he encountered, and summarizes the circumstances that led to his appointment. Some entries include commentaries from peers about their abilities. The appendix lists SIS stations around the world. Compton Mackenzie would be pleased.

¹⁹ Compton Mackenzie, *Greek Memories* (London: Cassell, 1932), 90.