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## Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf—September 2023\*

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\*Unless otherwise noted, reviews are by Hayden Peake.

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## Current Issues

***Intelligence for Homeland Security: An Introduction***, by Jeffrey Douglas Dailey and James Robert Phelps (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2021) 275 pages, end of chapter notes, bibliography, index.

The Department of Homeland Security was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in response to the 9/11 attacks. The nine separate operating agencies and offices were formed from some 20 preexisting organizations subordinated to various government departments. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is the only organizational component of DHS with an intelligence and counterintelligence mission. (87)

In *Intelligence for Homeland Security*, authors Dailey and Phelps present a primer on DHS intelligence missions and functions that includes basic definitions and historical background on the need for domestic security. The focus is on the intelligence elements that contribute to the homeland security mission, especially with respect to terrorist threats and the interaction with related agencies

like the FBI and CIA. They also mention peripheral organizations within the department, such as the Border Patrol, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Transportation Security Agency, that sometimes affect its intelligence mission. Unfortunately, the authors do not provide an organizational chart naming all existing agencies in DHS, although they are named in the text.

The authors include topics on which intelligence is collected, for example, border violations but do not provide actions proposed or taken.

*Intelligence for Homeland Security* is a good start but for a more complete picture it should be read in conjunction with the Wikipedia entry for DHS.

***Lessons from the COVID War: An Investigative Report***, by the COVID Crisis Group (PublicAffairs an imprint of Hachette Book Group, 2023), 347 pages, illustrations, sources, notes, index.

Published shortly before the US government and the World Health Organization declared in May that the national and global public-health emergencies, respectively, had expired, *Lessons from the COVID War: An Investigative Report* aims to reignite public interest in the US response to the global pandemic and call attention to the need to continue investing in public health infrastructure, response, and organizational capacity to prepare for “the next one.” Billed as the most comprehensive look at the pandemic response, *COVID War* traces the causes of what the authors assess is America’s dysfunctional response to the COVID-19 pandemic and compares it to various other country’s responses and historical examples, such as the 1918 influenza pandemic and cholera in the 1800s.

The COVID Crisis Group comprises 34 health experts and practitioners, scholars, and government workers who addressed various aspects of the COVID-19 response. Assembled two years ago by University of Virginia professor Philip Zelickow (who was executive director of the 9/11 Commission), the group was created in anticipation

of a congressional or presidential 9/11-like commission. When the prospect of such a commission faded, the authors turned to Hachette Book Group for publication.

Unlike the 9/11 Commission that interviewed more than 1,200 people, including key government officials under oath, the COVID Crisis Group had no legal authority to order individuals to testify under oath, and instead held “listening sessions” with 300 people, but did not interview most Trump and Biden administration officials leading the response they assessed.

*COVID War* is critical of the US government and takes especially harsh, repeated aim at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, blaming its organizational structure for what they assess was America’s inability to put together an effective response. At times, though, *COVID War* reads like a partial retelling of the US response based on others’ reporting and memories, with no notable revelations. It also fails to acknowledge the experience of many Americans, especially front-line workers.

The authors describe the COVID war in five key parts. Firstly, as a story of advances in scientific knowledge that outpaced human ability to practically apply that knowledge. They often cite the US response as “a 21st century pandemic addressed with structures mainly built for 19th century problems,” which resulted in the US suffering more casualties than any other affluent country, despite having the best access to vaccines. Secondly, that partisan divisions were the result of policy failure and not its cause. Thirdly, there is not enough evidence from China to identify the origin of COVID-19. Fourthly, containment failed. Lastly, systemic problems that existed before 2020 continue to exist today.

Despite this morbid outlook, *COVID War* offers recommendations to address future pandemic threats, including installing a new HHS undersecretary for health security

who would oversee the CDC and other relevant organizations, developing better data systems, and accelerating vaccine manufacturing.

This book presents itself as an investigative report, but fails to dive deep into the key players and instead gains its insights from tertiary figures who many times offer partisan opinions. Interviews with key administration officials, those involved in the vaccine development or rapid deployment, or front-line workers may have helped to offer more unique or new insights. If globally, or even within the United States, governments aim to avoid a repetition of what the authors describe as a “catastrophe of national incompetence in governance,” focusing on refuting long-resolved arguments or harping on personality-based conflicts fails to offer a nonpartisan strategy or playbook for the future.

*The reviewer:* Radhika M. is a CIA analyst focused on health security.

***The Real Special Relationship: The True Story of How MI6 and the CIA Work Together***, by Michael Smith. (Arcade Publishing, 2023) 558, endnotes, photos, index.

After service in the British Intelligence Corps, the BBC, and the *Daily Telegraph*, Michael Smith turned his attention to writing books about intelligence operations, both British and American. His most recent work, *The Real Special Relationship*, combines those topics and is very positively recommended in the foreword by Gen. Michael Hayden, former director of NSA and CIA, and in an introduction by Sir John Scarlett, former chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service.

Smith dates the origins of the “special relationship” to a secret meeting on February 8, 1941, at Bletchley Park, the British codebreaking facility, 10 months before Pearl Harbor. In attendance were the wartime head of Bletchley Park, Cdr. Alastair Denniston, his key staff, and four US cryptographers. (33) In the days that followed, the British and Americans, in a move approved by their political leaders, shared their most important cryptographic secrets.

As Smith views it, the special relationship that began at Bletchley gradually broadened to include British-American contacts generally and to matters of intelligence involving the Five Eyes nations. But as this book

emphasizes, the key to the special relationship is the cooperation of the British and US intelligence and security services that informs their leaders.

In support of his position, Smith presents a chronological account of robust collaboration. An example, in addition to cryptography, was the combined Anglo-American intelligence unit that was set up in the immediate aftermath of the US atomic bomb attacks on the Japan to focus on possible Soviet atomic efforts—a futile endeavor since unbeknownst to the Allies, Soviet agents had already passed the secrets to Moscow. (162)

In other areas, cooperation included the risky air reconnaissance of East Europe, Soviet agent operations in East Germany and Vienna, the Berlin Tunnel, the overthrow of Mossaddeq in Iran in 1953, support of the mujahideen in Afghanistan, and relations with Gaddafi in Libya.

The handling and impact of defectors and penetrations among the competing services—CIA, MI6, KGB, GRU—is also covered with emphasis on Penkovsky, Mitrokhin, Gordievsky, Kuklinski, and Ames.

There were, of course, organizational tensions. One resulted from US intelligence failures concerning the 1950 Chinese military intervention in Korea. But in this case, Smith makes clear, there was also impressive intelligence reporting on the Chinese buildup before the intervention. The key misjudgments, he argues, were at the top political and military levels.

Political tensions also arose, as in the Suez Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. In each case Smith shows how intelligence cooperation nevertheless continued throughout. The same was true in Vietnam, where Britain's head of station in Hanoi, Daphne (later Baroness) Park, developed good relations with her counterpart in Saigon, William Colby. She had,

in fact, trained Colby in communications security during World War II when he was in the OSS. (415)

The links between Britain's signals intelligence (SIGINT) agency, GCHQ, and NSA are also a vital component of the relationship, though some have wondered whether NSA should go it alone. Smith dashes the thought by telling of the time in January 2000 when "the main signals intelligence processing computer" at NSA crashed and for "seventy-two hours, with the NSA unable to send out any intelligence, GCHQ stepped in to keep the intelligence flowing to the NSA's US customers." (553)

In Smith's view, the history of how MI6, CIA, GCHQ, and NSA work together is "The Real Special Relationship." (603) Well documented, well told, a fine contribution to the intelligence literature.

## Memoir

*Never Give an Inch: Fighting for the America I Love*, by Mike Pompeo (Broadside Books, 2023) 435 pages, photos, index.

From high school in California, life has taken Michael Pompeo down many paths: to West Point and service as a tank commander in Cold War West Germany, Harvard Law School, the aviation business in Kansas and to the US Congress as a representative of the state, CIA director, and secretary of state. Adopting an unpretentious tone, *Never Give An Inch* adds personal and professional details to Pompeo's impressive record.

Pompeo addresses his strongly held religious beliefs and political preferences, but his experience with intelligence, gained since his election to Congress in 2010 and his appointment to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is reflected throughout the book. It was as a member of HPSCI that Pompeo learned a valuable political lesson after publicly and unjustifiably attacking Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) for her views on a report on enhanced interrogation. He explains his error and how he apologized to the senator. (381)

Pompeo also tells how honored he was to be nominated to be CIA director in 2017 and how, before his confirmation, he recommended to President-elect Trump that he visit CIA Headquarters on Inauguration Day. He explains

the bureaucratic reasons that made such a visit not possible. (21)

Throughout the book, Pompeo expresses candid opinions. For example, he characterizes his predecessor at CIA as too risk-averse and too concerned with reorganizing to solve operational problems. He goes on to tell how he supported a risk-taking approach to the core mission and problems within CIA and how this resulted in his selection of Gina Haspel as his deputy. (24)

*Never Give an Inch* also includes discussion of Pompeo's relationship with the president and his contacts with agency overseas elements, friendly-nation counterparts, and foreign adversaries—Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia. With respect to Russia, he tells how CIA cooperated with Russian intelligence services to alert them to an imminent attack by ISIS terrorists on Kazan Cathedral in St. Petersburg. (120–21)

Within CIA itself, Pompeo describes an infuriating moment when it was discovered that "a set of CIA cybertools that assisted with surveillance and [disruption of] adversaries' plans" had been compromised by Julian Assange.

As CIA director and secretary of state, he would pursue Assange's extradition.

In April 2018 came the surprise announcement in a Tweet that he would be nominated to replace Rex Tillerson as secretary of state. (51) Pompeo accepted and secured approval of Gina Haspel as his successor.

Pompeo writes that at State, as at CIA, "There were scores of people focused exclusively on things not directly related to the core mission." He says he worked hard to correct that situation. (92) He mentions many efforts undertaken at State, such as the Abraham Accords (327)

and some joint efforts that he addressed both as secretary of state and CIA director. He cites the bringing home of Americans held captive overseas as "perhaps the most satisfying" of these. (199)

Pompeo asserts that he always put America first and has "the scars to prove it," citing lines from the *New York Times* or *Washington Post* describing him as "a suck up, sycophantic, former-Trump-hating, power-hungry hack." (408) *Never Give An Inch* makes clear why he disagrees and retains hope for America's success.

## **History**

***Agents of Influence: How the KGB Subverted Western Democracies***, by Mark Hollingsworth (Oneworld, 2023) 310 pages, endnotes, bibliography, appendix, photos, index.

British journalist Mark Hollingsworth has chosen a classic espionage topic for his latest book. With frequent Sun Tzu citations supporting several case studies, he argues that some agents are employed not to collect secrets but to influence the actions of others.

The first case tells how Hans-Peter Smolka, an NKVD (Soviet internal security service, 1934–46) agent recruited by Kim Philby, worked for the British Ministry of Information where he covertly influenced and manipulated public opinion. After the war, he was awarded an Order of the British Empire by King George VI. He then went to Vienna and helped Graham Greene write *The Third Man*. Although not a spy movie, at one point in the writing Greene included a scene in which the NKVD kidnapped a woman. Smolka, influenced the film's director to remove the scene from the movie script. As an interesting aside, Hollingsworth claims that Harry Lime—the movie's charismatic, morally squalid central character, played memorably by Orson Welles—was partly based on Smolka himself. (30)

A well-known variant performed by agents of influence involves sexual entrapment. Hollingsworth provides publicly known examples. The case of Conservative Party MP Anthony Courtney is unusual because he refused to cooperate with the KGB even after compromising photos were circulated in Parliament.

A much lesser known example concerns Helen O'Brien, who presided in the 1960s over a "unique den of political, sexual and espionage intrigue" in London—a night club called Eve. Frequented by government ministers, KGB officers, and MI6 agents like Greville Wynne, it was a prominent source of KGB compromising information, or *kompromat*. (168) Fluent in Russian, Romanian, French and English, O'Brien was "in fact a registered MI5 agent and informant, who was determined to discover the KGB's deepest secrets and counter their operations." (169)

Britain was not the only target for agents of influence. Hollingsworth notes that "French intelligence agencies were thoroughly penetrated by Soviet spies," (49) the most celebrated of whom was KGB agent of influence Victor Louis, who operated in Europe and America. (53)

Also mentioned is the book *Who's Who in the CIA*, a joint KGB-Stasi (East Germany's internal security service) operation, published in various languages, including English, and purporting to list names and duties of CIA officers. (92) A more direct attack was authored by Labor MP Bob Edwards and titled *A Study of a Master Spy*. It was exposed as "a vituperative attack" on former CIA Director Allen Dulles written by a KGB officer. (243) And much later, in an example of organizational influencing, the KGB would promulgate the lie that the CIA had spread the AIDS virus.

Hollingsworth concludes that in the modern cyberspace world, Russian influence operations will be enhanced by digital technology, and the West must develop means to deal with the resulting threat.

*Agents of Influence* is an interesting read, but it offers little that is really new.

***Before Bletchley Park: The Codebreakers of the First World War***, by Paul Gannon. (The History Press, 2020) 352 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The original edition of this book was published in 2010 as *Inside Room 40* (Ian Allen). Author Paul Gannon determined there was a need for an update when the British National Archives released materials correcting some of the previously accepted accounts of Room 40's code-breaking operations during WWI.

Gannon first presents a summary of the events leading to World War I and Britain's need to intercept and decode enemy signals traffic. Next, he summarizes the traditional accounts of how Room 40 originated and the successes achieved in cooperation with its military counterpart MI1(b). Then he argues that the "standard account is in good part a cover story to explain leaks of codebreaking stories into the public realm after the war." Thus the acquisition of German naval codebooks was more "than immensely good luck." (20) And the official story that attributed codebreaking to amateurism and luck was "a comforting legend ... part of a cunningly effective British plan to trick its enemies into underestimating its code-breaking capabilities." (86) Gannon even challenges the conventional wisdom that the selection of the first head of Room 40, Alfred Ewing, was the result of a chance

encounter with the director of naval intelligence early in the war. (92)

Perhaps Gannon's most interesting revision concerns the Zimmermann Telegram, sent by German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann, proposing that Germany and Mexico join forces to wage war against the United States. Gannon asserts that William "Blinker" Hall (Ewing's successor) explained the decryption on the capture of a diplomatic codebook in Persia, resulting from "some good luck and some bad luck." In fact, however, it "was actually reconstructed, largely by [Nigel] de Grey" who worked in Room 40. (362) Gannon also charges that Hall gave at least two versions of how the telegram reached the United States and then was passed on to President Wilson the false claim about the way the telegram was discovered and decrypted. (374)

*Before Bletchley Park* draws on many primary sources that correct details in previous accounts of Room 40 operations. But the overall positive contribution of British codebreaking efforts in World War I is not changed.

***Danger Zone: US Clandestine Reconnaissance Operations Along the West Berlin Air Corridors, 1945–1990***, by Kevin Wright. (Helion & Company Limited, 2023) 80 pages, bibliography, photos, no index.

Tempelhof Airport opened for service in Berlin in October 1923. As air traffic increased, the Nazis built the iconic curved canopy terminal in the mid-1930s, and it operated until it was replaced in 2008.

Early during the Cold War, Germany was divided into four occupation zones: British, French, American and Soviet. Berlin was located in the middle of the Soviet zone and by agreement among the victors divided into sectors each controlled by one of the Allies. Auto and train access to Berlin from the Western zones required travel

through East Germany and was allowed over designated routes. Air access was permitted in three air corridors with military and commercial flights coordinated among the occupying powers. Tempelhof served as the terminal for most US military intelligence collection flights discussed by British author Kevin Wright in *Danger Zone*.

Wright has assembled photographs and performance details of the various aircraft used throughout the Cold War beginning with modified B-26, B-17, and B-29 bombers. These are followed by the workhorse C-54 and

C-130 variants. Mission characteristics are supplied by former pilots and SIGINT ground stations are shown, for example the Allied listening station on Teufelsburg, built on Berlin war rubble. (19) Some Allied and Soviet aircraft that monitored operations in the corridors are also shown and described. Not all collection occurred in the corridors

and Wright describes the small fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters used to patrol the Berlin zone.

The enclave of West Berlin contained the headquarters of the Four Power Control Commission, and Wright devotes a section to working with the Soviets on a day-to-day basis.

***Double Agent Balloon: Dickie Metcalfe's Espionage Career for MI5 and the Nazis***, by David Tremain (Pen & Sword Military, 2023) 246 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The MI5 double-agent operations against the Nazis in WWII were first revealed publicly by J. C. Masterman in his 1972 book, *The Double Cross System* (Yale University Press). Masterman described how the system operated and discussed the contributions of the principal agents, for example TRICYCLE, SNOW, GARBO, and TATE. BALLOON (Dickie Metcalfe), a sub-agent of TRICYCLE (Dusko Popov), was mentioned only a few times and then with sparse detail. British author David Tremain attempts to fill the gap with *Double Agent Balloon*.

Although thoroughly documented with primary sources, the result is a disjointed presentation of facts, often in the form of lengthy quotes, that leaves the reader puzzled. For example, one wonders why after Metcalfe was “passed out of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst,” and stayed in the army, where he was “tried by general court martial and convicted of two of the six charges” and, forced to resign, was nevertheless recruited by MI5. (26)

Tremain explains how it happened. After finding work as an air raid precautions officer, Metcalfe wrote to his father's friend Sir Vernon Kell, MI5's first director. He was then interviewed by MI5 officer Thomas Argyll “Tar”

Robertson in April 1939. (31) It is not clear when he was designated BALLOON, though Tremain writes he was formally recruited by MI5 in 1941, after working for them even earlier as an arms dealer. (70) There are references to his working for the Ministry of Supply while an MI5 double agent, but the relationship is not clarified.

At one point BALLOON and GELATINE (Friedl Gartner) were both TRICYCLE's subagents in what Tremain calls “The TRIBARGE Organization” apparently intended to add credence to TRICYCLE's bona fides for the Germans. Although the chapter with that title does not mention the organization, there are long quotes indicating but not explaining, its activity. (253)

Tremain goes on to acknowledge that “BALLOON was, in his own way, a colorful character, but he pales in comparison to TRICYCLE. Together they succeeded in deceiving the Germans in the ‘great game’ of double-cross.” (352)

*Double Agent Balloon* provides some interesting new material while creating doubt as to how it all ties together. A disappointing account.

***Forging Secrets: Faces and Facts Inside the Nazi Operation Bernhard Scheme***, edited by Kiel Majewski et al (The Florence and Laurence Spungen Family Foundation, 2022) 250 pages, photos, index.

In early 1940, Nazi SS officer Reinhard Heydrich established a counterfeiting unit in Berlin in which the Nazi intelligence service produced British £5 notes to be used in an attempt to destroy the British economy. The project was named Operation Andreas. After printing some £3 million in counterfeit notes, it was abandoned after Heydrich was assassinated in May 1942.

In July 1942, the operation was resurrected by Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler and given the name Operation Bernhard. Its objective was the financing of German espionage operations. *Forging Secrets* tells that story.

Based on accounts from historians, descendants of Holocaust survivors, and the granddaughter of the Nazi who ran Operation Bernhard, *Forging Secrets* tells how the Nazis forced Jewish prisoners to forge the money while working in special workshops in various concentration camps. Some 140-plus prisoners produced enough fake currency to equal the face value of all reserves in the vaults of the Bank of England.

Compelling eyewitness accounts by the forgery workshop's survivors are combined with historical analysis of new information on the counterfeit notes. They also tell of attempts to forge other material, including US dollars. The detailed descriptions reveal how the forgeries were made and how some were eventually recovered. Photos document many of the individuals and steps in the counterfeiting process.

Several espionage agents and supporters were paid with the counterfeit bills. Most notable was CICERO (true name Elyesa Bazna), played by James Mason in the 1952 film *Five Fingers*. Others mentioned include British double agent Dusko Popov (codename TRICYCLE), German SS officer Walter Schellenberg, and a "black market runner known as George Soros." (31)

*Foreign Secrets* is a limited edition book and each copy contains a counterfeit "Operation Bernhard" £5 note produced by the prisoners of Block 19 in Sachsenhausen. A movie version of the operation, *The Counterfeiters*, won the Academy Award in 2007 for best foreign film, but it contained many inaccuracies that the book corrects.

An interesting bit of intelligence history that documents Operation Bernhard.

***Hitler's Trojan Horse: The Fall of the Abwehr, 1943-1945***, Vol. II, by Nigel West (Frontline Books, 2022), 272 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

The Abwehr was the German Army organization responsible for intelligence and security from 1920 until the end of WWII. British historian Max Hastings, commenting on the Abwehr's performance, wrote that its "wartime shortcomings were the product of indolence and incompetence."<sup>a</sup> Nigel West's two-volume study of the Abwehr, based largely on newly released archival records, supports that view with examples of how initial organizational and operational successes crumpled into failure.

In the first volume, *Hitler's Nest of Vipers: The Rise of the Abwehr*,<sup>b</sup> West describes the types of files discovered, the early Abwehr cases, and how they changed the early postwar assessments of Abwehr performance from the late 1930s to 1943.

In *Hitler's Trojan Horse*, he deals with its decline and abolition by completing descriptions of operations begun in volume I and adding ones that occurred after 1943. Intertwined are the bitter disputes with other Nazi intelligence organizations and personnel that eventually resulted in the demise of the Abwehr and its leader, Wilhelm Canaris.

An example of a case partially treated in volume I is the story of Erich Vermehren and his eventual defection to the Allies in Turkey. When interviewed in London in May 1944, he discussed "several members of a very determined plot determined to overthrow the government." (246ff)

Operations that came to Allied attention after 1943 included the story of Abwehr agent Otto John—codenamed WHISKY. West reveals John's role in the July 20 plot to assassinate Hitler, noting also that WHISKY's contribution was excluded, for unexplained reasons, from the SIS (MI6) official history, published in 2010. (243ff)

Another interesting case not mentioned in volume I concerned Halina Szymanska, Abwehr chief Canaris's Polish mistress. West tells how she helped establish links with the Abwehr officer Hans Bernd Gisevius, OSS, MI6, and Canaris. (187)

A final example, in what West terms "the Klatt Mystery," is alluded to only briefly in Volume I but is examined in detail in Volume II. Klatt refers to Abwehr officer Richard

a. Max Hastings, *The Secret War: Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas* (New York: HarperCollins, 2016), 64.

b. See Graham Alexander review of *Hitler's Nest of Vipers* in *Studies in Intelligence* 67, no. 2 (June 2023).



Kauder, who claimed to head the long running (1941–45) MAX agent network that supplied important military intelligence on the Soviet Union to the German Army. West explains why some thought MAX was an NKVD deception campaign, while others were convinced it was an undetected spy-ring benefiting the Allies. West acknowledges that a degree of uncertainty remains.

Despite increasing high-level bureaucratic problems, the Abwehr, in conjunction with the Sicherheitsdienst (the SS intelligence element), prepared extensive plans for stay-behind operations across France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. West tells how, thanks to the 212 Double Agent Committee (a duplicate of the Double

Cross Committee) and the OSS, all stay-behind nets were penetrated.

*Hitler's Trojan Horse* provides documented detail about Abwehr personnel, operational units, and the many cases in which they were involved. In fact, there is so much detail—unit designations and lengthy quotations from reports—that in reading the narrative one can lose track of the subject at hand. It would have been helpful had comments been included that better explained the detail while establishing context.

Nigel West has presented the most complete account of the Abwehr to date. It will serve as a valuable reference work.

***The Lion and the Fox: Two Rival Spies and the Secret Plot to Build a Confederate Navy***, by Alexander Rose (Mariner Books, 2022), 270 pages, photos, index, bibliography.

Alexander Rose's engaging, readable volume recounts a tale of covert operations and diplomacy during the Civil War. Rose's book is worthwhile if only for a glimpse into the time before national intelligence organizations had been created and when important covert operations were performed by diplomats, who often had little or no experience in directing such history-changing operations. Similarly, Rose shines light on the Union naval blockade, a vital reason behind the Union victory that has too long been given short shrift by historians in favor of emphasizing the more easily digested accounts of land battles and political struggles.

Rose focuses on the operational duel between two Americans who in 1861 found themselves on differing sides. Ship captain James Bulloch ("the Fox") became the covert operative charged with securing new, highly advanced steam vessels with which the Confederacy could strike Union ships forming a floating barrier at sea designed to starve the South of imported goods—particularly weapons—and choke its economy. Confronting him was US State Department diplomat Thomas Dudley ("the Lion"), a Quaker lawyer who opposed slavery before destroying the institution became a Union strategic objective, who was charged with uncovering and stopping Bulloch's covert operations. This struggle was carried out in Liverpool, England, a thriving shipbuilding center in the 1860s and hotbed of pro-Southern sentiment that

was fueled by British desire for profit and indulgence in self-propagating fantasies of the "sunny South." Further complicating Dudley's work was that the British government remained uncertain which side it would support, ambiguity that helped Bulloch and the South.

Although Bulloch's efforts were initially successful—launching British-built Confederate raiders Florida, Alabama, and Shenandoah—these ships served not as blockade-busters battling Northern warships but as "commerce raiders," harassing unarmed Union commercial shipping. That they became storied vessels whose myth considerably outweighed their impact on the war was due in part to Dudley's enduring diplomatic pressure on London, which in turn kept Richmond from striking the blockade in favor of "running" its curtain. To accomplish their respective covert missions, both Bulloch and Dudley recruited assets to collect intelligence and uncover the opponents' efforts, let secret contracts or tried to expose and stop these commercial deals, and collaborated with shady characters of often-swiveling loyalties. In short, Rose tells a story of the sort that were it not true, would make good fiction.

Rose does an excellent job throughout weaving an often-complicated story into a coherent narrative that both experienced intelligence officers and the public will find compelling and entertaining. He particularly excels

in taking readers deep into side issues or quirky personal stories, only to neatly return to the main narrative and explain why he led readers into the rabbit holes in the first place. He also vividly brings to life the seedy, Dickensian world of mid-nineteenth century Liverpool, which is central to how both the crafty Bulloch and the stolid Dudley were able to operate successfully.

*The Lion and the Fox* might have been an even better work of history had the author stuck to his guns, rather than bowing to the publisher's marketing will (I confess to having heard Rose discuss this in a podcast). The subtitle

indulges in commercial hyperbole as neither Dudley nor Bulloch were "spies" and the latter's objective was never to "build a Confederate navy," which existed quite apart from his covert operations in England. Similarly, rather than conventional endnotes the volume presents references in entire chapter-covering collections at the end, making the reader do the work of figuring out where material in the text came from. Even so, intelligence readers will find an enjoyable and informative read in *The Lion and the Fox*.

*The reviewer:* David Welker is a member of the CIA History Staff.

***The Madam and the Spymaster: The Secret History of the Most Famous Brothel in War-time Berlin***, by Nigel Jones, Urs Brunner, and Dr. Julia Schrammel (Pegasus Books, 2023), 304 pages, bibliography, photos, index.

The "Madam" was Kitty Schmidt who ran a brothel in Berlin for VIP clients during the Weimar Republic. The "Spymaster" was SS General Reinhard Heydrich, who after Hitler came to power, the authors argue, ordered his chief of foreign intelligence, Walter Schellenberg, to take over the brothel for espionage purposes. There they used a combination of hidden microphones and prostitutes to collect information from clients during their erotic engagements. The establishment was called Salon Kitty.

In telling the story of Salon Kitty, *The Madam and the Spymaster* gets off to a candid, though curious start, stating that "The truth about the establishment's history and functions has proved tantalizingly elusive." (ix) At the end of their story the authors can only conclude, "We can also be fairly certain that some sort of espionage operation did indeed take place in Salon Kitty." (256) But none are described. The authors also remain "uncertain whether

'Madam Kitty' was a 'trusted informant' or a willingly co-operative agent of the Nazis." (253)

Despite claiming that to tell the story they had to assemble a puzzle from "official documents, and from literature, films, documentaries and photographs, as well as from personal interviews and memoirs," no source notes are provided. (254)

The authors do provide historical background and comments on the morality of various characters from Hitler, Heydrich, Kitty, and even Nazi martyr Horst Wessel, but they include no evidence of any actual espionage. (117)

*The Madam and the Spymaster* relies on Walter Schellenberg's memoir (also undocumented) to establish the existence of Salon Kitty. But its actual contribution, if any, remains in doubt. Caveat Lector!

***The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, The Cold War, and the World on the Brink***, by William Inboden (Dutton, 2022) 592 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Before Ronald Reagan became president, he visited the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) complex in Colorado's Cheyenne Mountain. The commander explained that if the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) policy failed, an incoming ballistic missile could be detected and give the president time to launch a

counterstrike. When Reagan asked what could be done to stop the attack, he was told that it was not possible.

As historian William Inboden points out in *The Peacemaker*, Reagan recognized that this was an unsatisfactory situation, especially since he had been informed

that “the Soviet nuclear arsenal had eclipsed America’s and several Soviet officials had voiced the belief that the USSR could survive—and win—a nuclear exchange.” (32–33) Reagan later expressed the view that “we should have some way of defending ourselves against nuclear missiles” before they can do damage. (202) At that moment, the seeds of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) were sown.

The SDI story is just one of the issues dealt with in Inboden’s lucid account of the Reagan presidency’s failures and successes in international policy. In each instance, he includes the influence of intelligence in its various forms. SDI stirred fierce opposition in the Soviet Union and among the Western allies, but Reagan relied on CIA’s assessment that the Kremlin was hemorrhaging its cash reserves on “skyrocketing imports from the West—especially grain—and a soft world market for Soviet oil.” (122) This was subsequently reenforced by a CIA report saying, “No amount of capital that the Soviet Union can invest would permit them to compete successfully with the United States in terms of SDI.” (311)

At the same time he ignored CIA analysis predicting overall Soviet economic growth. Where CIA’s Soviet analysts “saw growth and resilience, Reagan perceived decline and weakness.” (301) Inboden argues that Reagan’s insights gave him critical negotiating leverage with Gorbachev that he used to good effect.

*The Peacemaker* also comments on CIA efforts to improve the analytic product and revitalize the Directorate of Operations. (87) On other fronts, Inboden describes

the contributions to and consequences of CIA operations in Nicaragua and Afghanistan, the SALT talks, and CIA’s role in the Iran-Contra affair.

But, Inboden notes, “the Kremlin could still hit back” and did so with the KGB. He discusses the impact of the CIA agent losses due to Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen. (359) And to some extent, Inboden suggests these losses were compensated by the defection of KGB officer Vitaly Yurchenko and the revelations of the French agent in the KGB, Vladimir Vetrov, who exposed KGB efforts to steal Western technology and gave CIA an opportunity to reply with “just the sort of tradecraft that Casey and Reagan loved.” (122)

Valuable contributions to foreign policy also came from cooperation from the Vatican and Ryszard Kuklinski, the Polish army colonel who became a CIA agent and reported on the communist regime’s intentions. (113) But the most important KGB defector, from a foreign policy perspective, was Oleg Gordievsky who counseled Prime Minister Thatcher and met with President Reagan. (181)

The title for the book comes from a comment made by Mikhail Gorbachev, who said Reagan had decided at the right moment “to be a peacemaker.” (475) Inboden discusses their relationship in detail, while showing how intelligence was an important factor in the Reagan presidency. Inboden doesn’t claim that Reagan won the Cold War, only that he “oversaw the American strategy for the successful end of the Cold War.” (476) *The Peacemaker* illustrates how intelligence functions for a US president.

***The Soldier Statesman in the Secret World: George C. Marshall and Intelligence in War and Peace***, by David Robarge (Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2023) 241 pages, footnotes, bibliography, photos, index.<sup>a</sup>

Gen. George Catlett Marshall, US Army chief of staff during World War II, and later secretary of state and defense, is well known for his military achievements and the postwar European economic program that bears his name. He has been the subject of several well-regarded biographies that, with one exception, portray his many accomplishments. The exception is his contribution to

the profession of intelligence. CIA Chief Historian David Robarge treats that topic in *The Soldier Statesman in the Secret World*.

Robarge tells how Marshall confronted tactical intelligence for the first time during World War I when, as a lieutenant colonel, he was assigned to General Pershing’s

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a. The book is available to the public at <https://cia.gov/resources/csi/books-monographs/the-soldier-statesman-in-the-secret-world-george-c-marshall-and-intelligence-in-war-and-peace/>

staff in France. Tasked to prepare a plan for the reducing the St. Mihiel salient, he found the US Army intelligence section inadequate and turned to the headquarters of the 2nd and 8th French Armies for the necessary data. (2)

Marshall had encountered a problem with military intelligence that would not be solved until 1962: the US Army had no intelligence branch that trained personnel. Unit intelligence positions were filled with officers of other branches—often combat arms—and required to learn on the job. The result was not always positive, and intelligence assignments were not considered career enhancing. Robarge shows that Marshall never addressed the issue comprehensively. And though he dealt with intelligence-related issues before and during EEII, he was less proficient managing them “than any other area of responsibility he had as Chief of Staff.” (8)

*The Soldier Statesman in the Secret World* presents examples that support that view, keeping in mind that his primary responsibilities were leading an army fighting on two fronts while coordinating with the Navy and responding to Congress.

Robarge shows how Marshall had continuing difficulties with the heads of Army intelligence (G-2) and in achieving integration among service intelligence components. He did strongly support cryptographic matters and encouraged cooperation with British counterparts. He also recognized the need for better strategic intelligence. Robarge also describes Marshall's support, with some reservations, for William Donovan in the creation of OSS. (39) Tactical intelligence was left to the theater commands.

On the domestic front, Robarge describes how Marshall handled a “turf dispute” with the FBI (26) and later the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) that created a problem involving First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. The president was much concerned, and Marshall took decisive action. (29) After the war, President Truman sent Marshall to China to seek an agreement between the warring Nationalist Party and the Communist Chinese, a mission doomed to failure. The intelligence situation there was also unsatisfactory since Truman had abolished OSS and several competing agencies were producing poor quality and untimely results, some of which irritated Zhou Enlai, Marshall's principal contact. Robarge explains how Marshall resolved these issues and why he ended up complimenting his intelligence support in China. (128–29)

It was also in China that Marshall had a curious experience with espionage. Robarge tells how Marshall obtained Zhou's notebook naming a communist agent spying on the Nationalists. He returned the notebook to its owner, who assumed it had been copied, but Robarge found no indication that it was. (132–33)

In January 1947, Marshall was recalled to Washington and nominated to be secretary of state. Robarge emphasizes how, during Marshall's two-year tenure, he improved the department's intelligence capabilities and assured they would not be undermined by the new CIA while cooperating on covert action programs. Marshall advocated that the CIA should have the preeminent role in foreign clandestine operations; he believed that a “‘neutral,’ non-military agency was needed to avoid disputes between the Army and the Navy.” (140)

Marshall retired in January 1949, only to be recalled to duty in September 1950, as secretary of defense. During his one-year tenure, two areas of concern were the Korean War and CIA. Robarge describes how Marshall dealt with his dissatisfaction with CIA's intelligence reporting on the Chinese role in Korea. Marshall was also concerned with CIA's strategic estimates, the “Agency's roles in foreign espionage and counterintelligence, and in covert action.” (169)

The final issue Robarge examines is Marshall's response to the so-called Red Scare, or communists in the US government, which overlapped his service at State and Defense. Senator Joseph McCarthy would accuse Marshall of being a communist appeaser among other scurrilous charges.

*The Soldier Statesman in the Secret World* is a thoroughly documented account that tells how a very remarkable man contributed to the evolution of US intelligence. It adds previously unknown details and is an important contribution to the literature.

***Spy Ships: One Hundred Years of Intelligence Collection by Ships and Submarines***, by Norman Polmar and Lee J. Mathers (Potomac Books, 2023) 305 pages, endnotes, bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

Norman Polmar is an analyst and consultant specializing in the naval, aviation, and intelligence. His coauthor, Lee J. Mathers, is a retired naval surface-warfare officer with an intelligence specialty. In *Spy Ships*, the authors begin with a short review of ship and small-craft intelligence collection up to the twentieth century. This is followed by a discussion of how the inventions of radio and radar spurred signals collection by ships and submarines during the world wars.

The principal emphasis of the book is on spy ships—including submarines—of the Cold War to the present, as operated by the Soviet Union/Russia, Japan, and the United States, with special attention in the latter case on episodes involving Israel and North Korea. One of the appendixes treats China, Norway, France, Germany and several other countries.

After World War II, the Soviets used East German-built fishing trawlers for SIGINT collection. *Spy Ships* describes the evolution to more sophisticated collection operations using diesel and nuclear submarines under the control of the GRU (Russian military intelligence). (60–62)

The Soviets also employed ships of the line for SIGINT collection and the authors mention a famous example, the cruiser Ordzenikidze that carried Premier Nikita Khrushchev to England in April 1956. The ship had a team of electronic intercept specialists, and while the ship was docked at Portsmouth, British Cmdr. Lionel “Buster” Crabb, a diver operating for MI6, was decapitated, apparently while examining the ship.

Turning to the United States, *Spy Ships* discusses several SIGINT collect operations. They include the joint efforts of CIA and the seldom-mentioned National Underwater

Reconnaissance Office. Their main mission, only partially successful, called Project Azorian, was the recovery of the nuclear warhead in the sunken Soviet nuclear submarine, the K-129, using the CIA-sponsored ship *Glomar Explorer*. (42)

The authors also provide a short discussion of the use of submarines for intelligence purposes, citing the 1971 program known publicly as Ivy Bells—actually named Declension. In this case, the submarine USS *Halibut* was employed to install a recording device on a Soviet underwater communications cable. (44)

US surface ships were also used as collection platforms. (94) *Spy Ships* gives detailed accounts of two operations. The first involved the NSA controlled SIGINT ship, the USS *Liberty*—a converted merchant ship—that was attacked and nearly sunk by the Israelis in 1967. The Israeli government admitted the error and issued an immediate apology. But the authors discuss why some still think the attack was deliberate. (126ff)

The other case study is the seizure of the USS *Pueblo* by the North Koreans in January 1968 with much of its classified equipment intact. This enabled the Soviets to read US encrypted communications for some time because a KGB spy inside the US Navy, John Walker, had provided details about the equipment. (37) The ship remains in North Korea. (180ff)

The authors conclude with the comment that today the sobriquet “spy ships” is “most accurately applied to the specialized intelligence collection ships sent to sea by the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States during the Cold War and after.” (209) *Spy Ships* provides well-documented and illustrated evidence that the authors have it right.

## Intelligence Abroad

***Revealing Secrets: An Unofficial History of Australian Signals Intelligence & The Advent of Cyber***, by John Blaxland and Clare Birgin (University of New South Wales Press, 2023) 457 pages, endnotes, bibliography, index.

Initially commissioned in 2019 as an official history of the Australian Signals Directorate by then Director-General Mike Burgess, the ground rules for *Revealing Secrets* were changed by his successor, who denied access to archival documents originating after 1945. The result is an unofficial history with the chapters covering the post-World War II years based on open sources.

After a discussion of cryptological history from its origins in the ancient world, *Revealing Secrets* offers history of Australian SIGINT and cybersecurity, from 1901 to the present as it developed under a number of leaders. The authors explain why Australia has a national signals intelligence agency and its sometimes troublesome relationships with its counterparts in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand.

During World War II, Australian SIGINT was subordinated to the Central Bureau under General MacArthur's command, and the authors make clear that while the Australian SIGINT contribution to the Allied victory is virtually unknown, its role was important. A key example, they assert, is Australia's unrecognized contribution to the Battle of Midway. Citing Australian sources, they claim

Australian SIGINT identified Midway as the Japanese target before the United States and the latter only confirmed it. (197)

In the post-war era, *Revealing Secrets* conveys the dramatic transformation of Australian SIGINT. The authors discuss Australia's military commitment in Vietnam, the impact of the internet, challenges of the cybersecurity era. Of particular concern are the new SIGINT organizations created and how they dealt with the security leaks that threatened to exclude Australia from the close-knit Five Eyes intelligence relationship. (260)

It was also during this period that the US-Australian Joint Defence Space Research Facility was created at Pine Gap (276) and that according to media reports a sophisticated joint US-Australian operation bugged the Chinese embassy in Canberra with fiber-optic devices. (305)

*Revealing Secrets* concludes with the proclamation that the "book opens the door to a deeper understanding of Australia's role in world history" and shows how "SIGINT influenced, some-times determined, major events." (332) It is a positive contribution to the literature.

## Fiction

***Citizen Orlov***, by Jonathan Payne (CamCat Publishing, 2023) Kindle Edition, 288 pages in print.

We all know the first law of horror movies: never open the door. Now we can add a corollary, this one for espionage novels: never answer someone else's phone. That simple act, by the eponymous protagonist in first-time novelist Jonathan Payne's *Citizen Orlov*, starts the action in a tale that is as witty as it is engaging.

The story begins when Citizen Orlov, a simple fishmonger, hears a telephone ringing through an open window as he walks down an alley between two office buildings. Unknown to him is that the buildings are occupied by the Ministries of Security and Intelligence. Unsure at first

whether to answer, Orlov eventually reaches in the window and winds up taking an urgent, life-or-death message for an Agent Kosek. In an attempt to find Kosek, Orlov climbs through the window and enters the building, where he is immediately drawn into a bewildering world of plots and counterplots.

*Citizen Orlov* is a picaresque take on the classic spy story of the innocent outsider who lands in the conspiratorial world by accident. Payne, who formerly worked for the UK Home Office, sets his tale presumably the inter-war years in an unnamed mountainous central European

country in a manner recalling early Graham Greene and Eric Ambler, with a little of Vladimir Voinovich thrown in. In an echo of George Orwell, moreover, Payne never tells us the characters' given names—they address one another formally, as Citizen, Comrade, Agent, or His Majesty

Orlov himself, however, is anything but the simple man he appears to be. He proves to be a shrewd and resourceful fellow, quickly learning how to manipulate those who

are manipulating him and, eventually, outwitting them. The reader will enjoy following his adventures and rooting for him.

Orlov also learns a lot about the intelligence world. "It occurs to Orlov that the security business is complicated and sometimes taxing on the brain," writes Payne about two-thirds of the way through. "He cannot imagine why anyone would want to do this sort of thing for a living. It must be exhausting." No argument there.

*The reviewer:* John Ehrman is a recently retired CIA analyst.

