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Building a Global Intelligence Paradigm

Roger Z. George

> **"**
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> *Post-Cold War and post-9/11 challenges raise questions about the effectiveness of the traditional intelligence paradigm.*
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> **"**

The Challenge

In the six years that have passed since the shock of the attacks on 11 September 2001, a great deal of change has occurred within the US Intelligence Community (IC). Legislation created a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with authorities to develop overall strategies and promote integration of intelligence activities; specific intelligence units have been established within the FBI and as part of the newly created Department of Homeland Security, as well as new IC-wide centers like the National Counterterrorism Center and the National Counterproliferation Centers.

The Intelligence Community is revitalizing clandestine collection of human intelligence and enhancing the cadre of intelligence analysts and their foreign language capabilities.[1] These and many other changes are occurring at a time when the United

States is facing entirely new challenges unmatched since the end of the Second World War.

The essence of many such efforts—all necessary and long overdue—is to improve the effectiveness of what has been the dominant intelligence paradigm for the past half century. That is, a paradigm which develops critical information through a national, classified system of collection and analysis. This paradigm has been effective in organizing US intelligence—as well as many other national intelligence systems in other countries—for what have been largely state-centric challenges.

Despite occasional surprises, the United States and its allies did a good job of monitoring the Soviet Union's domestic, military and foreign policy activities for most of the Cold War. While crises occurred, intelligence helped policymakers avoid going beyond the brink into a nuclear Armageddon.

At the Cold War's end, there were many critics who claimed the IC—perhaps most especially the CIA—had outlived its principal adversary and its *raison d'etre*. Like it or not, this assertion proved sadly incorrect as the

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[1] See Director of National Intelligence, *Report on the Progress of the Director of National Intelligence in Implementing the "Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,"* May 2006, 5–11. Available on line at http://www.dni.gov/reports/CDA_14-25-2004_report.pdf.

The world is now confronted with a host of border-spanning trends which challenge our traditional intelligence and law enforcement practices.

series of terrorist attacks culminating in the 9/11 attacks brought home to the American people the enduring need for organizations focused on anticipating and warning about major threats to our nation's security.

What has been less well understood, however, is that many post-Cold War and post-9/11 challenges raise questions about the effectiveness of the traditional intelligence paradigm. In fact, many of the post mortems which followed the 9/11 attacks pointed directly to the need for an entirely new way of developing insight and anticipating surprises, one which places less emphasis on secrets or restricted channels for sharing information and more emphasis on open source information and creating networks of expertise that connect diverse thinking across disciplines as well as continents.

Indeed, the DNI's July 2006 Intelligence Community Directive 301 on "National Open Source Enterprise" establishes the goal of making open source "the source of first resort."[2] What

follows here is a description of a new way of thinking about intelligence collaboration that is designed to leverage open sources, multi-disciplinary and multi-national sources of expertise, and pooled international resources. The objective is not to eliminate the old paradigm, but rather to complement it with a new way of handling 21st century transnational challenges.

Transnational Issues

What distinguishes today's tests and makes the traditional intelligence paradigm less effective is the transnational and global character of many trends. As Thomas Friedman's "flatness" metaphor notes, the compression of time and space and the easy movement of people, weapons, toxins, drugs, knowledge and ideas have transformed the way threats emerge and challenge the way intelligence must operate.[3]

Many of the major international terrorist attacks, including those of 9/11, follow the pattern of having been conceived, planned and launched from many different countries, making the individual actions of any single government or intelligence service ineffective in detecting, deterring or preventing those attacks.

It would be short-sighted, however, to focus exclusively on the "terrorist" threat, as the world is now confronted with a host of border-spanning trends that challenge our traditional intelligence and law enforcement practices. International organized crime, narcotics trafficking, illicit sales of weapons—WMD as well as conventional—not to mention the spread of disease, internet-driven jihadist and other militant forms of radicalization, and the geo-political implications of climate change head the list of new transnational challenges we are collectively facing. In his excellent book, *Illicit*, Moises Naim calls many of these the international community's "blind spots," which our current analytical lenses are not able to make sense of.[4]

Slices of the New Transnational Reality

- The globally stored information produced annually equals more than 37,000 new Library of Congress collections (Global Business Network)

- Four million people are smuggled across international borders each year (UN)

- The illicit global economy accounted for $500 billion in world trade (Interpol)

- Over 80,000 computer viruses exist today, with 80 new ones per month (Symantec Corp)

- SARS, Marburg virus, Avian flu, antibiotic-resistant bacteria are on the rise (WHO)

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[2] The Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 301, promulgated on 11 July 2006, establishes open source as an enabler and precursor to traditional intelligence disciplines. It attempts to build an infrastructure and capability to hold all open source in a single repository with the US Intelligence Community. This was mentioned in the DNI "Strategic Horizon: DNI Newsletter of the Office of Strategy, Plans and Policy," 1 August 2006, 2.

[3] Thomas Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2005).

Other intelligence services are likewise faced with monitoring threats that are far more diverse, interconnected, and dynamic than ever before.

Not surprisingly, many of these transnational issues are becoming central themes of intelligence organizations. In a series of workshops in 2004, the CIA and the Rand Corporation examined what could be done to adapt analysis to better address threats coming from the transnational realm.[5] Among the many insights generated from those meetings was the idea that such issues could be better understood through a process of "sensemaking"—namely, a continuous, more free-wheeling, creative and collaborative process of questioning assumptions and exposing one's ideas to inspection by experts who do not necessarily share the same background, training, or nationality.

Simultaneously, within CIA growing attention has been given to so-called "strategic research themes" such as Islamic extremism and radicalization, terrorism, strategic threats emerging from transnational drug, crime, and illicit finance groups as well as proliferation of various weapons technologies.

This is not a uniquely US concern. For example, writing even before the 9/11 attacks, the German Foreign Intelligence Service's president, Ernst Urhlau,

noted that his service's mission was to provide early warning of transnational issues, including weapons proliferation, international terrorism, organized crime, trafficking and money laundering.[6]

Other intelligence services are likewise faced with monitoring threats to their national security interests and homelands that are far more diverse, interconnected, and dynamic than ever before. One of the rationales for creating a European Union's Situation Center, which now includes an intelligence cell, is to cooperate in the areas of transnational security.

As the 2003 European Security Strategy makes clear, the issues of international terrorism, proliferation, organized crime, and state failure head the list of what it calls "new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable."[7] It is also encouraging that—despite the many

reports of growing rifts in European and American views—there is a surprising consensus among publics on the importance of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, immigration, global disease and environmental changes. The German Marshall Fund "Transatlantic Trends" study showed that "large majorities—topping 70 percent of Americans and Europeans—continue to agree on a wide range of international threats in the next ten years."[8]

The question, then, becomes how can our intelligence services make better sense of these boundary-less, non-state, often global phenomena that are not explained adequately by the collection of "secrets?" To be sure, some secrets still remain regarding the actions of specific terrorist or proliferation networks. However, much about transnational phenomena are in "plain sight," but might not be visible because those insights are not

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[4] Moises Naim, *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy* (New York: Doubleday, 2005), 5.
[5] Sherman Kent School, "Making Sense of Trasnational Threats," *Occasional Papers*, vol. 3, No. 1, October 2004: 1–25. The principal authors were Gregory Treverton of the Rand Corporation and Warren Fishbein of the CIA's Global Futures Partnership.

[6] Ernst Uhrlau, "A Post-Cold War Intelligence Service," *Transatlantic Internationale Politik*, vol. 4 (2000): 1–7. Uhrlau, then the German chancellor's coordinator of intelligence and currently the president of the German Foreign Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendient, BND), emphasizes that "in the future the BND will have to confront the dynamics of the dangers arising from today's transnational issues, besides carrying out its share of intelligence-gathering duties in Germany's international peacekeeping, peacemaking, or humanitarian missions." (7)

[7] European Union, "A Secure Europe in a Better World," European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, Brussels. It was approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003 and drafted under the responsibilities of EU High Representative Javier Solana. Available at: http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
[8] German Marshal Fund, *Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2006* (Washington DC: German Marshall Fund, 2006), 7. Available at wwwhttp://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/doc/2006_TT_Key%20Findings%20FINAL.pdf.

"Open source," in the sense of not being classified, is not always to be found in a broadcast, a book or journal, or other media form.

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found among US government experts who hold security clearances or are generated by the few non-US experts in other intelligence services with whom we hold classified exchanges. Both the 9/11 Commission and Iraq/WMD Commission reports singled out IC's use of open sources and outside views as areas where more improvements are needed. In particular, the Iraq WMD Commission noted:

> *The need for exploiting open source material is greater now than ever before. Regrettably, the Intelligence Community's open source programs have not expanded commensurate with either the increase in available information or with the growing importance of open source data to today's problems.*
>
> *During the Cold War, the Intelligence Community built up an impressive body of expertise on Soviet society, organization, and ideology, as well as on the Soviet threat. Regrettably, no equivalent talent pool exists today for the study of Islamic extremism....Non-clandestine sources of information are critical to understanding society, cultural and political trends, but they are insufficiently utilized.*
>
> *Many of the intelligence challenges of today and tomorrow will, like terrorism and proliferation, be transnational and driven by non-state actors....The Intelligence Community needs to think more creatively and above all more*

strategically about how it taps into external sources of knowledge.[9]

Though much of this knowledge is "open source" in the sense of not being classified, it is not always to be found in a broadcast, a book or journal, or other media form. In fact, much of that knowledge is "tacit," meaning it resides largely in the minds of experts who have collected knowledge through study, experience, or other special skills. How can we access such "tacit knowledge" when the paradigm in which intelligence traditionally operates is based on controlling

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[9] The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Report to the President of the United States.* March 31, 2005.

access, limiting contact with foreign nationals, and focusing only on the most important, "hard" targets?

As the figure below illustrates, the knowledge that the United States can directly leverage is remarkably small in comparison with the global information environment; even granting that the IC has the best "secret" information, this amounts to a very small amount of knowledge (e.g., merely the thin outer "crust" of only one section of world of knowledge); in comparison, the open source information (e.g., various media forms) and the even larger amount of tacit knowledge (e.g., in the minds of experts) available globally dwarfs the world of secrets.

Speaking to an international audience in December 2006, Scottish innovation specialist David Robson remarked to an audience of intelligence experts that "all

the smart people do not work for you," nor would you want to employ them; however, research shows that "nobody is as smart as everybody," so using a more open, network-centric model would enhance one's knowledge the faster the network grows.[10] If we do not work to leverage this vast resource, are we not consciously blinding ourselves to much that can be learned about transnational challenges?

The New Paradigm: Collaborative Intelligence

The opportunity now exists to tap into a vastly larger amount of expertise than was previously available to US intelligence. However, this will require working from a very different paradigm from that which characterized much of our Cold War history. The key features of that traditional paradigm were: secrets; classified channels of information flows; a focus on a few hard targets (e.g., the Soviet Union, other so-called "denied area" Communist Bloc countries, their military forces and technologies and other observables); very limited contact with outside experts who were almost always US citizens; and focus on key facts and finished intelligence products.

The new paradigm, in contrast, will focus on "open source" infor-

The opportunity now exists to tap into a vastly larger amount of expertise than was previously available to US intelligence.

mation and reach out to a wide variety of experts who are non-intelligence professionals drawn from different sectors and often non-Americans. As the 21st century is expected to be far less predictable and dynamic, the objective is to scan the horizon for emergent issues and so-called weak signals that are harbingers of futures for which few governments have begun preparing.

This more collaborative paradigm is clearly a major departure from the traditional one, as the figure below suggests. While it cannot begin to replace the old model, it surely can complement it and build knowledge that can be used by those still working largely within the traditional "secrets"-driven paradigm.

This new collaborative paradigm is more than simply an open source collection model. Indeed, it is an approach that attempts to synthesize knowledge found in various academic, business, and other private sectors with government expertise. While the traditional paradigm would focus on specific "hard targets" for specific facts (also known as plans, intentions and capabilities), the collaborative model is scanning for interesting interconnections among issues, anomalies from what experts might normally expect to see, and other insights, which in the traditional para-digm would be considered irrelevant or too unconventional to be of use.

This collaborative model is based on a great deal of work done in

[10] David Robson, "Innovation in Business – Culture and Practice," Remarks to the Global Futures Forum Conference on Strengthening Partnerships to Meet Security Challenges, 3–6 December 2006; forthcoming publication.

academia and industry that suggests successful "knowledge management" and "innovation" require connecting people with diverse perspectives to harness their collective insights and combine their expertise in novel ways. As many business innovation experts are quick to point out, "new" ideas are generally not entirely new, but rather spring from existing ideas, which are either combined in new ways or built upon by experts who bring new insights to them. So, the iPod was born by combining the notion of miniaturized data storage with online music services. From that has grown the "podcast" phenomenon of broadcasting video/audio interviews to MP3 owners who can view this information at convenient times. And so on, and so forth.

The Global Futures Forum: The Transnational Agenda

In recognition of the dynamic and unpredictable nature of the 21st century security environment, the CIA has begun experimenting with the collaborative intelligence paradigm. In November 2005, following a series of intensive workshops cosponsored by Harvard University,[11] CIA's Global Futures Partnership invited 120 experts from over 20 foreign governments, intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and non-government think-tanks to participate in a conference in the Washington, DC, region aimed at creating a global intelligence network. Out of those meetings was fashioned the "Global Futures Forum (GFF)," an unclassified, multilateral and multi-sectoral network of experts who would collaborate in examining global security issues. The three-day-long discussions led to a strong consensus for networking among intelligence experts, academics, business, and other private-sector groups, which could work more cooperatively in understanding highly complex and very dynamic issues.

The form of the Global Futures Forum (GFF) would be a multi-national, multi-disciplinary community focused on transnational security issues. It would be:

- Exclusively unclassified, although the network would

Cracking SARS: A Model of Transnational Collaboration

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) occurred first in China in November 2002, but was only identified a month later and it was not until February 2003 that the Pro-Med internet-based alert system[1] notified the global medical community of this new infectious disease. Before the crisis was over, infections and deaths were recorded in mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Hanoi, Singapore, and Toronto as well as the UK and the United States. Some estimates placed the cost of this outbreak at $40 billion to the world economy in terms of trade and tourism.

The good news was that the World Health Organization convened regular teleconference meetings that allowed more than a dozen national public health agencies and leading medical laboratories to rapidly share information with each other. This collaborative approach enabled medical authorities to rapidly identify the virus and develop diagnostic tests and treatment regimes in a matter of weeks, not months, as would have been required had national health systems worked independently of each other.[2]

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[*] ProMed-mail was established in 1994 and since 1999 has operated as an official program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases, which is a worldwide non-profit professional organization. The ProMed-mail uses a multilingual staff to screen, review and investigate reports which are then posted immediately on the mail website, which currently reaches more than 30,000 subscribers in at least 150 countries.

[2] For a good case study of this success, see Dr. Stepen S. Morse, "SARS and the Global Risk of Emerging Infectious Diseases," International Relations and Security Network, 2006, Zurich, posted on the ISN Web site (www.isn.eth.ch/). Dr. Stephen Morse is the Director of the Columbia University Center for Public Health Preparedness and a "community leader" of the GFF global disease discussion forum.

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[11] See Sherman Kent School, *Insights: Strategic Issues for Intelligence Practice in the 21st Century: Responding to Future Intelligence Consumers*, April 2005, Harvard Executive Seminar Series. This report capped a two-year study by the CIA's Global Futures Partnership, State Department INR, and the John F. Kennedy School. The report examined the changing global security environment, dramatic scientific and technical changes, and new intelligence collection and analysis needs and encouraged a rethinking of intelligence outreach, national and global collaboration, and organizational frameworks. More than 100 senior intelligence managers with a wide group of prominent academic specialists and consultants from business, academia, the sciences, and IT business and learning firms participated in the five-day event.

operate under the "Chatham House" Rule that would facilitate frank and candid exchanges.

- As diverse as possible, drawing from both government and non-government to stimulate thinking and challenge prevailing assumptions.

- Focused on specific issues or themes around which strategic-level conversations could occur, driven by members' interests and knowledge.

- Operated in both a face-to-face and virtual (online) fashion by invitation only, in order to build trust and experiment with new thinking styles and IT tools.

At this initial meeting, discussions focused on the need to build subgroups of experts (communities of interest) around significant transnational themes that participants agreed lent themselves to unclassified, multilateral exploration.[12]

Since November 2005, the GFF, as it has become known, is now well established and gathering momentum in broadening its membership and its communities of interest. In just over a year, the GFF has hosted more

[12] The preliminary set of topics selected included: Socio-economic disparities resulting in migration and humanitarian crises; competition for resources (especially energy and water); synergies between terror, crime and drug networks; pandemics (including Avian flu and HIV/AIDS); extremism and societal intolerance of minorities; roots of radicalization and extremism; WMD; and global environmental disruptions.

The Global Futures Forum is now well established and gathering momentum in broadening its membership and its communities of interest.

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than a dozen events on a half dozen issues, with a similarly ambitious agenda for 2007.

Moreover, the initial Web site (www.globalfuturesforum.org) has become fully operational, hosting bloggers from a number of countries, with diverse backgrounds, as well as discussions for nearly a dozen global security topics. At the second annual GFF meeting in December 2006, more than 250 representatives from more than 30 countries and over 90 government and non-government organizations exchanged views on major transnational security topics, developed agendas for upcoming events on important topics, and committed themselves to get even more deeply involved in this new business practice.

The GFF is now promoting a series of face-to-face and online discussions among an international group of experts that touches on some of the most pressing global security issues like radicalization, terrorism, illicit trafficking, and pandemics.

To take one example, the forum has held three international meetings on "Radicalization," attended by more than a dozen governments' intelligence and security services, as well as academics, NGO experts, and other civil society leaders. At these meetings, discussions ranged from the conceptual ("what is radicalization" or "concepts of multiple identities") to more spe-

cific topics ("the deeper roots of extremism" or "impact of immigration and social policies on radicalization").

These meetings have also brought new experts and ideas to the attention of US analysts—for example, researchers from far-flung academic institutions in Sweden, Norway, India, and Singapore, who work with European institutions as well as the United Nations. Other knowledgeable Islam experts attending GFF events have also worked in such organizations as the International Crisis Group or direct strategic futures projects in South Asia.

This mix of perspectives has generated great interest on the part of all the participants to keep the dialogue going and to broaden it to include other diverse perspectives. One current interest is the idea of preparing a series of future scenarios looking at where "radicalization" as a global phenomenon might be by 2012.

The forum is simultaneously examining social networking tools (such as the Internet-based phenomenon Second Life) for their applicability to intelligence topics like illicit trafficking, organized crime, and sub-national power centers that might be challenging the central authority of weak governments in failing states. (See chart on right).

In another community of interest on "Foresight and Warning,"

the forum has already introduced the IC to new concepts for collaboration and anticipation of future trends. One such tool is a "horizon scanning" program being used in Singapore and the United Kingdom to scan for new emerging trends that might have important implications for national security policies. In Singapore, for example, this technique is being applied to develop a network coordinated approach to the fight against terror.[13]

Experimenting with this new paradigm opens up a number of avenues for new learning and insight. First, as many business and knowledge management experts have noted, bringing diverse perspectives together to work on a problem is inherently worthwhile, as it exposes organizations to the hidden assumptions and prevailing mindsets that prevent new thinking or new business practices from being taken seriously. This approach is also a practical way of harnessing the so-called wisdom of crowds by gathering a large number of views, not just more of those who hold ones we already share, to see if there is some nuances which we are missing.

Second, global collaboration holds the promise of developing more common vocabularies for thinking about problems with fewer inter-cultural and international misunderstandings. This can be as simple as trust-building among experts from a variety of governments, disciplines, or philosophies; or it can be as complicated as developing accepted definitions of what radicalization or terrorism means. Enabling experts from a number of fields to exchange and debate different perspectives must often follow the establishment of a common basis of trust and understanding of the topic.

Third, collaboration in the GFF will inevitably lead to some changes in our work practices simply by virtue of having to operate in a different way when meeting within the GFF paradigm. This learning does not come easily and sometimes our organizations are themselves reluctant to permit this type of learning; however, the more we experiment with new methods, the more we will find practices and partners that can help us adapt to the 21st century challenges.

What's in it for intelligence organizations and other participating experts and stakeholders? Surprisingly, the past year's experience in exposing this model to other intelligence services in North America and Europe has already been very positive. Canadian officials quickly agreed to partner with the Global Futures Partnership, recognizing the power of exploiting more open

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[13] The Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) in Singapore has pioneered much of this work on "horizon scanning" and is sponsoring a series of symposiums in 2007 to examine how the technique might be applied to many of the transnational threats facing many nations. The UK Department of Trade and Industry has also been developing its own scanning approach that tries to identify emerging scientific and technical trends that would impact the global economy and the UK's economic prospects.

Current Global Futures Forum Communities of Interest

Radicalization: focusing on root causes of radicalization, the role of identity, and differences across continents and countries

Terrorism and counter-terrorism studies: focusing on identifying best studies, methodologies, and experts on a wide range of terrorism-related topics

Illicit trafficking: focusing on model building that can be applied to a variety of trafficking problems and their interaction with other transnational threats (e.g., terrorism and proliferation)

Foresight and warning: focusing on examining new 21st century, non-state actor problems for possible new approaches to warning and developing tools for perceiving emergent issues.

Global disease: focusing on the geo-strategic and security implications of potential global outbreaks of infectious disease

Proliferation: developing a network of specialists to examine the next wave of proliferation threats and assessing the implications of technological surprise

Practice of intelligence: focusing on introducing best practices from other sectors to intelligence, as well as developing better training methods for intelligence professionals

Social networks: focused on social network theories and tools to understand globalization's impact on societies and future political dynamics

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and diverse sources of information.

Other services have over the past 12 months identified points of contact for the GFF and asked for a dialogue on how the forum can be managed in a way that provides all participants with influence in developing the activities and therefore the value. Moreover, many non-government experts have not only supported this activity as a useful countermeasure to the IC's traditional insularity, but also because the forum presents a novel opportunity for them to deal with intelligence experts on an equal footing and also air their ideas in front of government specialists normally not available to them.

Looking Ahead

As the global environment continues to move toward more multipolar sets of relationships, there will be increasing pressure on intelligence agencies to develop a new intelligence paradigm. The Global Futures Forum is but one example of the kind of innovations which must occur to keep the IC flexible and adaptive to a new environment.

Other important initiatives and experiments are underway in other parts of the IC as well. The CIA's Office of Transnational Issues has created a "CoLab" (Collaboration Laboratory) designed to test new methods of collaboration across the IC and to

> *The forum gives non-government experts opportunities to deal with intelligence experts on an equal footing and to air their ideas in front of government specialists normally not available to them.*

engage with outside business and scientific entrepreneurs to practice using new technologies in the pursuit of faster and smarter team work.

The Open Source Center (OSC) has initiated the use of online "bloggers" to encourage postings from worldwide users of its services who have comments on open source materials posted to the OSC Web site. The DNI itself is underwriting a number of IT-related experiments, including the drafting of unclassified national estimates on infectious diseases by inviting global experts to post their information, perspectives and comments on an unclassified Wiki space. This effort has so far produced more than 1,000 pages of data and insight. The DNI has also initiated a strategy for analytic outreach that seeks to harness "expertise, wherever it resides."

In April 2007, the newly appointed Director of National Intelligence, Admiral Mike McConnell, acknowledged this overall objective of global collaboration in his "100 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration."[14] Many of the ideas central to the

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[14] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, News Release, *DNI Announces 100 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration*, April 11, 2007; a copy of the plan is available at www.dni.gov.

DNI effort go to the heart of creating a global intelligence paradigm.

- First, the plan aims at creating a culture of collaboration that can foster the diverse community of professionals needed to provide the best intelligence possible for decisionmakers.

- Second, it commits the IC to fostering transformation and removing obstacles to collaboration.

- Third, the IC must begin modernizing business practices to operate more effectively in a dynamic and interconnected global environment.

- And fourth, it sets out to accelerate information sharing to eliminate out-dated controls and streamline authorities to provide useful information to those that need it.

All these efforts will be necessary to fashion a more global intelligence network that will harness the combined insight and knowledge now available to the United States and its allies. If the DNI is able to put these broad goals into practice, we will indeed have the makings of a new intelligence paradigm for the 21st century.

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Reflections of DCI Colby and Helms on the CIA's "Time of Troubles"

From the CIA Oral History Archives

On 26 June 2007 the CIA released a 700-page collection of documents known as the "Family Jewels," compiled in 1973 under Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) James Schlesinger, who had asked Agency employees to report activities they thought might be inconsistent with the Agency's charter. Schlesinger's successor, William Colby, delivered the documents to Congress.

Given the release of the "Family Jewels" documents and continuing interest in this aspect of CIA history, the Studies in Intelligence *Editorial Board elected to publish portions of transcripts of CIA Oral History Program interviews of William Colby and Richard Helms, Schlesinger's predecessor, on this period of the Agency's history.*

Colby and Helms were interviewed on 15 March and 2 February 1988, respectively, as part of an effort by the Center for the Study of Intelligence to compile the perspectives of former Agency leaders on what has often been termed the CIA's "Time of Troubles" in the 1970s. The perspectives of these two officials, different in several respects, illustrate the dilemmas a secret intelligence agency faces in serving a democracy.

The transcripts were edited by Nicholas Dujmovic, director of the CIA Oral History Program—Editor

The Origins and Context of the "Family Jewels"

Interviewer (hereafter in italics) to both DCIs: There is some indication that younger Agency officers were troubled by some domestic practices in the years before 1973.

William Colby. There were concerns during the period of the anti-war movement, 1968 to 1972, among some of the people as to whether we were going outside our charter. We would hear just little bits and pieces of it. I think they had doubts about the reassurances they were getting, that we were sticking to our charter. And, essentially, we did. They slipped over here and there, but most of the things were within the charter.

Richard Helms. I think what these junior officers were alleged to have been concerned about was the whole issue of whether or not the Agency had a role in the domestic aspects of student unrest. On one occasion I got some of these younger officers into a conference room and pointed out that the Agency had been asked to look into this question by the president, that there was a legitimate role for the Agency in attempting to find out what foreign elements or foreign powers might have been influencing student unrest on our campuses.

William Colby (cont.)

[DCI] Helms had a pretty clear sense of that and kept it very much on track. See, there is nothing wrong with Track II[1] under the rules back then—if the president tells you to do it, he had a perfect right to tell you to do it. [Regarding] the domestic stuff, there were a couple of things that went over.

Schlesinger had just taken over [as DCI] when we started the [internal] investigation. He got upset hearing about the McCord letters.[2] "What the hell, something is going on here? Did you know about these things?" And I said, "No, they've been in the General Counsel's office." He was sore as hell; he said, "I thought we were supposed to get everything from Watergate together. Goddamn it, let's find out where these time bombs are." So that is

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[1] The covert action ordered by President Nixon to bring down the Allende government of Chile.

[2] In Colby's memoir, he states "the Security Office informed me of the fact that the Agency had received some letters from James McCord [the former chief of security] who had been arrested as a Watergate burglar, in which letters he made veiled accusations that an attempt was being made in the White House to pin the blame for Watergate on the Agency." William Colby with Peter Forbath, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 339. Colby writes, however, that this revelation from security about the McCord letters was a *result* of the directive to collect what became the "Family Jewels," not the *cause* of it as he says in his Oral History. In his memoir, Colby recalled that Schlesinger and he drafted the directive after the revelation that Howard Hunt—another former CIA man arrested and convicted for the Watergate break in—had also helped burglarize the office of Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist. Colby, 337.

what launched the investigation. Just that day they announced that I was going to be succeeding, so we signed the thing jointly that asked for the report on questionable activities.

The Schlesinger memo of May 1973, asking for anything that might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of the Agency—did you write that up?

Yes.

How was the memo received, as you recall?

Oh, down in the directorates they were upset that this could drag out a lot of things. The point was that, here you got a new director and he didn't know about one of the important elements of the Watergate thing; we've got to find this stuff out and keep it to ourselves. Find it out and then after we found it out, correct it. By then I was in charge, so I wrote the series of directives, "Thou shalt not this, Thou shalt not that." I have long taken the position that when you get into a controversial subject, write your instructions down very clearly, make it clear on the record what your policy is and what your position is. I did that when I started the Phoenix program in Vietnam—"This is not a program of assassination." Fine, put it down in clear text. People will argue, "Why do you have to say that?" "Because people say it is." You know, make it damn clear.

That same thing applied to the questionable activity. I remember my impression after looking at the whole set of items was that

they were pretty small potatoes. They really were. The wiretaps were on employees or ex-employees, I think in almost all cases. The surveillances were mostly of employees or ex-employees. There were a couple of journalists who had leaked [information]; there was a lot of pressure, "Where did those leaks come from?" It was really not a very wise business putting a tail on Jack Anderson, for instance. But even then there was a legal basis for it. The director is charged with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Now I could give you a lawyer's argument that that requires him to go out and find out where a leak comes from; because it says so in the law. You can also give another interpretation that it means he can do what he can within existing rules and policy, and it would not justify his surveilling an American citizen. But there is an ambiguity to it. I go back to the old concept of the spy service—if you get a leak you go find it—in the good old days. The change in American mores is what caused all this change, because of the fundamental contradiction that did exist between the old spy service idea and the separation of powers.

After the "Family Jewels" had been collected in 1973, you shared the material with Senators Symington and Stennis, and took it to [Representative F. Edward] Hebert.

Schlesinger and I both agreed that we should let our committees know about this exercise. Since I had been named, he said, "Why don't you go down and do

William Colby (cont.)

it?" So, I went down to Hebert and he politely listened to me a little bit, then he asked me to brief Lucian Nedzi, who he had appointed as his watchdog for the Agency.[3] So, I went in. Nedzi went over it in great detail, asked further questions about lots of things and all the rest of it. He said, "Well, why don't you release this and get the catharsis out of the way?" I said, "Oh, no. No way. Sensationalized, trumpeted, exaggerated, it would be a disaster." And I talked him out of it. He said, "Well, nothing like that anymore?" "Absolutely not, no sir."

That's when I put out the directives. Stennis asked me to brief Symington. And Symington was a bit of the old school, really wasn't all that anxious to know about it, I don't think. But, I went over it with him. At the end, "OK, thanks."

White House Blindsided by the "Family Jewels"

The curious thing, I never really thought about it, why didn't we brief the White House? Say, Kissinger? I think I didn't think of it because Schlesinger was still in charge, and he didn't think of it, and I don't know why he didn't think of it. I asked him about it one time and he said something to the effect that, "Oh hell, with that bunch of characters down there." It was almost as though he had made a decision not to brief them. But, I never had a

conversation with him about it. It just never arose; never answered the question, never even posed the question. In retrospect, it is curious that you don't think of such an obvious thing. If you are going to brief the two chairmen, the least you ought to do is to brief somebody in the White House that you trust.

Seymour Hersh and the New York Times Exposés

There was some concern in the Agency that Seymour Hersh as early as late 1972 was working on some stories relative to the Agency and domestic involvement.

Let's see, the articles came out in December '74. Well, I know a year before I heard that he was on to the Glomar.[4] And I went down and actually stopped that by just flatly appealing to him. I went down and said, "Look, not only don't write about this, don't even talk about it—don't do anything. It is much too important." I put all the sincerity I could into it. I didn't tell him what I was talking about. He did, he dropped it. Therefore, I owed him one. I thought I owed him a lot by sitting on that one, because he had worked on it and could have gone on, as he did later.

Later, Hersh ran into bits and pieces of that assembly of information we conducted in 1973. He couldn't have made that [*New York Times*] report if we hadn't done the review in '73.

Did you ever wonder where he got the bits and pieces?

I long ago gave up trying to figure out where journalists get their information. I mean they develop lots and lots of sources. Very rarely do they have a source who gives them the whole thing. They are very clever about the way they call somebody to get the remotest kind of a hint that there might be something; then they ask this one, they ask that one, and they ask the other. You know, inside of a few hours on the telephone, they have most of the story in this town.

Did you feel that Hersh had very much information regarding abuses when he met with you in December of '74?

Oh, yes. He had them all in exaggerated terms when he walked in, yes. He said "you guys have been in wiretaps, you have been in mail openings, you have been in surveillances, you have been breaking into people's houses." He had it all.

Did he mention assassination, by chance?

No. He didn't have assassinations—domestic [operations], you see, that was the thrust of it. He said this thing is bigger than My Lai—he's the guy that broke My Lai. "This is a much bigger story"—that was his phrase. I said, "Sy, you've got it all wrong. What you have gone into is a few little things here and there over the 25 years that we did that were a little bit over the line. They were few and far between. There was no massive, no big

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[3] Nedzi was chairman of the House Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittee at the time.

[4] CIA's effort to salvage a sunken Soviet submarine.

William Colby (cont.)

[domestic] intelligence operations." And I frankly feel that that was the eventual story even though you had a lot of hullabaloo—when you read the Rockefeller Report, and the Church Report on the domestic side, you really have kind of odds and ends here and there.

So I told him, "Come on in, I'll talk to you. You got it all wrong." I was hoping to bring him down. He was going to write something, I knew it. I was hoping to bring him down a bit and didn't. He took it as a confirmation, you see. That's the other thing that is frequently said, if I had said nothing, he wouldn't have had a confirmation. But since I said, "There are some little things that happened," that was confirmation. He took it as confirmation, even though I was saying it didn't happen.

Wasn't there also a question about assassinations and was it you who said, "Not in this country"?

Yes. Daniel Schorr came to me and he dropped that little bombshell on my desk. President Ford, in a background discussion, had been asked, "Why are you defending this?" And he said, "Well, there are a lot of things in there you can't handle." "Such as?" And he said, "Assassinations." They were all under background rules. The *Times* couldn't use it. But as the newsmakers go, they talked. So, Schorr had the view that there's a story here if I can just get something to hook it on to.

He came to me and said, "I understand from the president that there's been assassinations going on in this country." I said [to myself], "Oh, shit." I really clammed up at that point because I knew I was in deep trouble. I said, "Well," and I reverted to what I have done frequently [which was to] answer exactly what the man said. I said, "Well, no, not in this country." But, I didn't say anything beyond that.

Another fellow, another newsman had come to me one time about the Glomar. He said, "I understand you are raising a Russian submarine in the Atlantic." And I said, "That is absolutely false." And I was right. You know, answer exactly the question; don't get caught in a lie because it won't work. Or, if you can't answer the question, then for heaven's sake get off it, get on to some other subject, some way. You have to turn it off before you see it going in the wrong direction.

Did you feel there was much leaking from Agency personnel to the Congress or media prior to and during the congressional investigations?

I could no longer tell the White House that the CIA never leaked [information] because I had enough evidence that things coming out—the Chile thing and some others—that seemed to me that we were having leaks. Part of it was retirees and part of it was smart newsmen. You know, asking the right question. The guy doesn't think he is saying anything wrong, is giving a little

tiny piece of the jigsaw for the newsmen to put together. It's exactly the way intelligence operates. So, I don't think there were any sort of flagrantly disloyal people.

In the fall of 1974, before the Hersh articles, Senators Mansfield and Mathias were seeking to create a "Select Committee" to study governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities. Would there have been investigations even without Hersh?

Yes, I think there would have been some congressional motion, there had to be.[5] That was the contradiction that had to be resolved somehow. And I think that both Mathias and Mansfield were trying to do it in a responsible manner, to get this thing moving in the right direction, sensibly, responsibly. It was obvious, you know, that the climate of the post Vietnam, post Watergate times were going to bring some modifications. But, you might have had more a sensible way of doing it rather than the hysterical way we went after it, which did hurt.

The Congressional Investigations: The Church and Pike Committees

What do you see as the most important factors for bringing about the congressional investigations in the mid 1970s?

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[5] Senator Church in 1973 had already conducted an investigation of the Chile covert action.

William Colby (cont.)

I think a combination of the Vietnam War, and Watergate, and then the [Seymour] Hersh articles [in the *New York Times* on alleged CIA abuses]. Those are the three stepping-stones that caused the investigations. The first idea was for the Rockefeller Commission to investigate the allegation of domestic action. That really didn't work very well to contain the degree of concern. I thought, well, here's a chance to get a good resounding stamp of approval on the Agency as a whole. It was a very reputable bunch of people. If you could be straight with them, convince them, you could get a good report out of them. I think it might have worked except for the president's mention of assassinations. That blew the roof off.

It was also clear that we were in that period of revolt in the Congress where that group elected in '74 were some pretty strong-minded younger people out to throw over the old, cozy system.

Some critics say the congressional committees overseeing the Agency before 1975 were "blind and toothless watchdogs," that members of Congress were unaware or unconcerned about Agency excesses.

I think that is unfair. The Church Committee criticized that Congress did not do its job supervising the Agency. And that is true if you look at it in isolation. Sure, the Congress is supposed to have an active supervision over the activities of government. On the other hand, very clearly the intelligence business had always been thought of as something

special—it still is. It was the sovereign's business. That is the way it runs in most countries. In France you don't have the great assembly review what the intelligence services do, if anything happens, everybody shuts up right away—it's a tradition. And we essentially adopted consciously that model for how to run our intelligence service during the early decades of it.

In those days, the understanding was that these committees, Armed Services and Appropriations, had a responsibility to vouch to their colleagues in the Congress the fact that the Agency did need X millions of dollars. And they would vouch for it. And how did they do it? They did it the way you always did appropriations in the American government until recently, which was that you talked to the guy in charge and got a sense that he seemed to be decent and level with you; and then well, if he said he needed a hundred million, fine, give him a hundred million or, if that's too much, cut it down to seventy-five, something like that. You didn't nitpick every little detail; that was not the way it was done in the old days. [We would see] only the chairman and maybe the ranking minority member. They said, "You come out here on Sunday afternoon at three o'clock, so nobody will see you." They met in a closed room, the chairman's office or something, and that was the hearing—just a nice conversation.

Now that was changing as a result of Vietnam and Watergate. Trust didn't exist. It did

exist in previous years. So, the Congress then was groping around for ways to exhibit its distrust.

Some writers say that you believed salvation for the Agency lay in cooperation with the investigations, while other intelligence professionals thought that intelligence secrets were forever.

Sure, there is a basic difference of opinion about my role here. Various of them said that I should have stonewalled the whole thing because intelligence is too important, resigned and all the rest of it. I didn't think that would do any good at all. In the context of the politics of the time, we had just had Watergate, you really weren't going to get away with stonewalling them. It just wasn't going to work. On the other hand, if you could go to a committee which starts out with a prosecuting mission and give them the whole view of American intelligence, which is a very good story, then these become rather small against that larger picture. And in order to do that, you've got to tell them quite a lot, but you don't tell them names. And that was a basic point that we came to with the committees as soon as the chairmen were appointed.

As soon as they were named, I went down and talked to them. I said, "Look, you are going to investigate us; I understand that. Not much I can do about it; you are going do it. I'd like to give you a full picture so that you'll see whatever may have happened in proper proportion and context. Now, I'm not going to

William Colby (cont.)

argue with you about your constitutional right to know everything in the Agency because we'll never end that argument. You'll take the right that you have constitutional authority to learn everything. I'm just going to convince you that there are some things that you don't want to know; you don't need to know, and consequently, that you should not know. Particularly, you don't need to know the names of people who work for us around the world—foreigners, Americans, all the rest. To convince you that you don't need to know them, I'll tell you something: I don't know them. I've made a deliberate point of not learning names of agents. Why? Because I had no reason to, I didn't have to know them to do my job. I have to know that there is an agent there, about their reliability; but I don't have to know the name. You don't need to know their names. Now, let's make a deal. We'll be responsive to your questions as much as we can, but I'm going to ask you to let me leave the names off."

And we made the point. And it pretty much stuck. We came to issue on a couple of names, but not very much. One time I went to court to protect the name of one of our guys the committee was going to release. They said this guy is known around too broadly, we're going to put the name down. I said, "The hell you will. Put that name down and he's subject to violent retribution, and I'm not going to have him exposed to that." So, I went down to district court and met the lawyers. Filed an injunction

and the committee gave up. They folded; we protected the name.

It cost me telling them what was going on, sure; but I protected the names. I thought that was a reasonable trade-off. Now, other people say, "No. Shouldn't have told them anything." And certainly we scared a hell of a lot of people around the world with what we told them; and it was just what I told Nedzi, it was sensationalized, it was exaggerated.

Were these discussions with Church?

Church and that jackass, Pike.

You wanted to place what was happening in perspective?

Yes. I thought we could make a good story out of it. American intelligence is a pretty good story. If you read the Church report, there is a little sanctimony in it, but it's not bad. I wasn't really afraid that they'd disband the Agency, but I thought there was a very good chance that they would bar all covert action. That was an obvious potential. In the end, they said, "Shouldn't do it that much, but got to be able to do it."

You didn't think the Agency would be dismembered, dissolved?

There were days. But if you asked, thoughtfully, I would have to say that I didn't believe they could possibly do it. I mean, that they would be so stupid. And particularly after I told them what the Agency really was all about. I took the right guys down to brief

them every now and again. I happened to have as my personal assistant a fellow who had been in Stanleyville and told about being there—the Simbas coming in the house. Everything was so still when he was telling us there. They got the message that there are some very special people [in the Agency]. It was deliberate. I was trying to get it out that these are serious things, serious people.

Some suggest that your cooperation during the investigations saved the Agency from serious harm; do you agree with them?

I still think I took the right choice. Now, I don't know whether that saved the Agency a lot of trouble as a result. I can hardly say it came out scot-free. It created an awful lot of trouble abroad—people saying how can we deal with you, you guys put all your stuff in the newspapers all the time. This was a real problem. So, I wouldn't say it saved it from any problems. It did get hurt. No question about it. It would have gotten hurt more if I had taken the totally negative [approach]. Then I think the thing would have just sort of disintegrated, all sorts of chaotic hullabaloos, then the names would have come out.

Do you feel the hearings were beneficial for the Agency?

No. You have to say they weren't because they were sensationalized, exaggerated, and did a lot of harm. I think the revision of the congressional relationship is beneficial for the Agency. The hearings were the worst possible way

William Colby (cont.)

to do it. Maybe it was the only way to do it, but it is a bad way to do it. But the revision of the congressional relationship, I think, is good for the Agency and gives it much more support.

One Agency officer commented in 1976, "The Congressional investigations were like being pillaged by a foreign power only we had been occupied by the Congress with our files rifled, our officials humiliated and our Agency exposed."

He must have been dealing with some of the Pike Committee people. There were elements of that, but if you ran into too egregious a thing, you could step in and stop it.

Your offer to bring the dart gun to the hearing and so on, were you...

That wasn't an offer. We had a demand out of the Church Committee that it be brought up and a statement that if we didn't, they'd subpoena it.

Do you think you were treated fairly by the Church Committee?

Yes. The Church Committee was responsible. Had sharp questions from Mondale, Gary Hart, others. Some of them were quite supportive, Goldwater was like that. They were very responsible. [Senator Frank] Church is the guy who asked, "Is CIA a rogue elephant?" as a question; he didn't say it as a statement, and he is the guy who signed the final report which said that CIA was not out of control. He raised the question and then he answered it in the final report:

CIA is not out of control; it has been too much under the control of presidents, and Congress has not done its job. That was the basic point.

The Pike Committee was hopeless. They were hopeless. Curiously, too, because Pike had identified three good questions: How much does intelligence cost? How good is it? What are the risks? They are very good questions. But then he hired a staff that was just sloppy, and he didn't pay attention to them. It sort of just ran all over the place.

Are there lessons to be learned from the Church and Pike investigations?

Sure, deal with them straight and don't try to run around them the way this jackass Ollie North did. Don't try to stonewall, try to handle it in a fashion that gives you a majority, not unanimous, but majority support.

What are your reflections regarding support from the White House during the congressional investigations?

I don't have any real complaints. People in the White House wished it wouldn't happen. Henry [Kissinger] would fulminate, you know. Brent [Scowcroft] was always very level, straight. President Ford was supportive when you got it up to him. I tried not to bother him. You see, the president was easy because he came from Congress. He understood what we were dealing with and the problems.

I knew I would get fired sooner or later, which didn't bother me. [I wanted to] just get the Agency through most of the heat. I knew that Henry [Kissinger] basically didn't agree with my tactic; he didn't make any secret of it, used to tease me about it. There were a couple of things I did without telling him about it sufficiently in advance, kind of hit him like a bombshell. I thought I sort of had the job of handling it myself. There was no way I could get them to handle it for me; I had an obligation to keep them informed but I had the responsibility of handling it. And I think that's right.

Did you ever have the feeling that you wished President Ford would take a firm stand regarding the security of CIA files and thus force the issue into the courts?

No, if we went to court, we'd lose it. That's my judgment. The only thing that you could hang it on was the executive privilege and even that is fairly dubious, it's a legal question. Because certainly you can't hang it on classification, so what [are] you going to hang it on? Intelligence is special? Where does it say that?

The Hearings and the Jewels: Mail Opening, Drugs, Assassination, Journalists

I said [the mail opening] was wrong. It shouldn't have been done. Actually, I don't think there is any doubt, it shouldn't have been done. I can understand why it was done; I can understand the thinking at the

William Colby (cont.)

time—it was started in the 1950's and it was handled so secretly. It was, after all, fairly legitimate when you think of it—reading the mail coming from the Soviet Union to the United States, looking for hints. Never produced anything that I know of. And, like everything bureaucratic, it just went on and on and on. It went on long after it should have stopped.

What did Schlesinger think?

Well, my memorandum [to him] said that I didn't see that we had got anything out of it; my review of it was that it should be stopped. I wrote him a memorandum in which I said that I reviewed it and found conflicts with postal law here. In addition, it just doesn't seem to be producing anything; therefore, I recommend it be terminated. That led to a series of discussions which Jim [Angleton] defended. But I still couldn't find any result from it. And I think that is probably what swayed Schlesinger, how it doesn't seem to be producing much.

How about drug experimentation? What were your reactions at that time on that issue?

I was understanding of the fact that you had a group of people in the Agency who were curious about the properties of some of these drugs and were legitimately fearful that they would be used against us. They had an idea of learning something about the properties. You can understand a scientist wanting to know how things work. Now, there are ways to do legitimate testing.

You don't want CIA to be on record as doing it, so you need some kind of a front to do it for you. But, there are rules about testing on human beings. The medical profession has them. I think you assume you would follow those rules. Apparently, they didn't. This gets back to the old mystique idea—intelligence is different, we do things differently—which is nonsense.

You know, that's the thing that really scares you about intelligence agencies—where they go wrong is when they do violate people's rights under the "higher good." The KGB should not be our rationale.

Were you surprised about the assassination issue?

No, not terribly. I don't think I was morally shocked at it. If you really think about assassination, that's what I was forced to do, it seems to me it just doesn't add up. You think you can solve something by eliminating a guy—it's playing God. You have no idea who is going to succeed him, you have no idea what the repercussions will be, or, the worst, you getting caught doing it. The repercussions are potentially enormous.

For intelligence operations, it seems to me, that you have several simple questions to ask before you start one. One, how important is it? What are the risks? What is the impact if it goes sour? And on the last issue, it seems to me, you have to turn it down. Now that is being pragmatic, not moral. I think there are moral considerations, too; but being pragmatic, I just think that assassination doesn't work. Polit-

ically, it's dynamite. We may do dumb things, we chased all the Japanese-Americans off the west coast because we were scared. Countries do dumb things when they get scared.

What if the president orders it?

Well, that gets into this whole goddamn plausible denial thing, which I think is gone. I think plausible denial died when Dwight Eisenhower accepted responsibility for the U-2. He had no choice; he had to accept responsibility for it. Jack Kennedy, the same thing with the Bay of Pigs. We had the elaborate structure that this was just a bunch of ragtag Cubans, baloney. Anything that big, he is responsible for it. So, the whole plausible denial is just totally impossible. And now with a Presidential Finding, no way.

What do you think about employing journalists?

Oh, that is a terribly false issue. I mean, I've used journalists as agents, and case officers have, and our rule was what they wrote for the journal was their business. I didn't tell them what to write or not to write for an American journal. We understood that. They were useful agents and then this crazy business got loose—you can't use journalists, you can't use academics, you can't use missionaries, you can't use something else, you can't use this, you can't use that. There's nobody left. So, that's a totally false issue. Everybody says, "Oh, it's all right, yes, go ahead and do your intelligence operations; but don't use me."

William Colby (cont.)

Angleton, Golitsyn, Nosenko, and Counterintelligence

The author [Edward Jay] Epstein suggests that the "Family Jewels" story was leaked by you as part of a maneuver to relieve you of an extremely vexing problem, that is James Angleton, and so on.

I don't know why [Epstein] said this. You know he's the one also that was on the edge of calling me a big mole in the CIA. Bullshit. I've been called every name in the world by somebody, so it doesn't bother me.

How about your relations with Mr. Angleton?

I had first known of him when I was in Italy. He had superb Italian contacts. He had been there in the latter part of the war and met a lot of people. He is a very opinionated guy, which is all right except the idea was that his reports should go straight to God. I remember really getting upset when I heard that he was back in Washington one time, stood on a street corner and a car drove by with Allen Dulles and the secretary of state, picked him up and they had a talk in the car. I said, "My God! Is this a serious intelligence agency?" Having this guy with his strong opinions directly at the policy level without any analysis, any comparison with the other factors going on. It just violates my sense of what intelligence is all about.

I spent some time gradually working him into a more normal pattern so that his reports would go in in an ordinary way and go into the ordinary analytical process. While they were valuable, they weren't just rolled gold. I sort of had that sense that the Angleton approach was to run these highly personalized things. Then, remember, I was appointed for a while to take over the Soviet Division. I began the briefing and it was pretty clear that the Soviet Division in the Agency had been all tied up the last several years in this whole series of Nosenko and Golitsyn and all that crap. Every time they tried to move an inch, the CI people said, "No, it's a fake." I think that's why Helms was going to send me there to try to straighten the goddamn thing out. Let Angleton do his thing, but get something going there that made sense.

Then, of course, I went over to Vietnam, but that left a bad taste in my mouth. Seemed to me that we were hurting ourselves. I never thought that the object of CIA was to protect itself against the KGB. The object of the CIA is to get into the Kremlin; that's what our function is. Sure, you protect yourself, but you goddamn well better have the offensive mission. So, I had doubts about that.

Then I ran into the goddamn mail thing and Jim's insistence on holding it. Then I ran into the Israeli business when I became DDO—here the Israeli account was over here in a corner someplace and had nothing to do with the rest of the Middle East. The officers in those stations were prohibited from communicating with each other. I said, "This can't be serious! You've got a common problem in the Middle East and you've got two separate teams working on it that never talk to each other!" I mean it's just nutty. I understand some of the reasons for it and all this, but I felt I had to change this.

Then I found that he had a whole lot of people, a very large staff— I've forgotten how big it was— and I was under pressure to cut at that point. I had been trying to find out what the hell these people did. I couldn't find that they were doing anything that I could understand. Seemed to me this was a good place to cut. So then when I was DDO, I broke off the Israeli thing, gave it to the NE Division; then I made some cuts. Of course, we cut off the mail opening and so forth. It was obvious that I had no confidence in Jim actually running it. So, I tried to sort of edge Jim toward the door in a nice way, in as nice a way as possible by taking these things away, hoping he would get the point. I had a couple of conversations with him, but I didn't force it. I didn't sort of say, "Out." I should have. I now realize that I should have; it would have been much cleaner and noisier. I should have done it right when I came in, but I was, you know, concerned about him. He had done a lot for his country and I did not want to shame him. I wanted to edge him away. I had two or three conversations over the year with him, long conversations about moving, doing something else—all very subtle. He knew exactly what I was talking about and didn't want any part of it. So, he dug his heels in.

Then, finally, when the Hersh thing blew I figured, "Oh, God, we're going to get blamed for this but I am not going to go into this with Jim on my hands. I've got to

William Colby (cont.)

be able to handle this without Jim's problems." So, I said, "Jim, go. You are finished. I will give you a job of writing the history of the CI Staff or something so you can be around, keep involved and so forth; but I am going to put in a new chief and a new staff, new systems." And I did it.

What about Nosenko?

I'm not an expert on the Nosenko case, but I spoke to [former DDO Thomas] Karamessines about it, and I know that both Karamessines and Helms signed off on the fact that they accepted Nosenko's story as basically true. Both of them are good, careful guys and they are not going to sign something that's false. So, period, that did it. The Golitsyn thing is all over the place. I ran into the fact that some people were shoved out to outer darkness because they had somehow been in Berlin at the wrong time or something with no evidence—again, I am a lawyer— no evidence that they were in any way involved, but you had careers ruined. I said, "Bullshit, we are not going to do that."

How do you feel counterintelli-gence was affected by the hearings?

Oh, I don't think it was very much affected by the hearings. Counterintelligence buffs will tell you that I destroyed counterintel-ligence. I contest that because I don't think it was doing any-thing before I moved, and I think it was as least as good after I moved it as before I moved it. I made the point that I wanted them to do the protective side through the normal divisions as much as they could. But I wanted

them to do the offensive of get-ting guys into the enemy camp. That I still wanted them to do. That was actually a priority—to get some guys into the other side. That was what we needed. Because I became director, and then I left it to the DDO to run counterintelligence. I didn't want it to come out of the director's office anymore the way it had. It had essentially gone around channels. I said, "No, let the DDO handle it."

Reflections as DCI

In your book, you noted that one of your errors as director was a failure to press for greater access to the Oval Office. Would it have made much difference?

I don't think it would have been a hell of a lot different. I mean, Stan Turner came in, Carter promised to see him twice a week or something, drops back to once a week, drops back to once every two or three weeks. You know, it is the normal thing. Henry [Kiss-inger], of course, was not about to let me get around him. And I say that with respect. I don't think he should have. If he is the National Security Advisor, he should be informed of anything on top, the president. Otherwise, he can't do his job right.

You know, each president is very different. Eisenhower used the military staff system to help com-plete his staff work for him. Jack Kennedy would get 30 people in the room [and have] everybody argue the case. President Johnson had his Tuesday lunch, which sometimes met Friday morning, but nonetheless, it's the eight or 10 guys close to him. Nixon, he used the machinery to

surface the options in written form, and he would go away and study it, really study it, read the 60 pages or whatever, annotate it and so forth. A very studious kind of guy. And Ford would use the regular machinery more: the NSC would have a meeting, and you'd have a discussion of the meeting, just the NSC, be sort of a more formal relationship. And Carter.... Each one different.

Did you feel it was much more difficult to be DCI after Water-gate?

Oh, I suppose so because there was more astir. The Bay of Pigs was trouble. The U-2 was trou-ble. Directors are supposed to pay for trouble. That's what they are there for, to handle things that go wrong. You know, you are not going to be an intelligence officer if you just take the safe way. You've got to take chances and that means some of them will go sour on you.

Did you hope to stay on as DCI after the investigation ended?

I sort of realized that people down in the White House didn't like the way I did some of the things so probably.... I was always very con-scious of the phrase on the com-mission, "You serve at the pleasure of the president." When-ever he decided, I'd go. When Pres-ident Nixon left, I sent in a letter of resignation to Ford. He's the new president; he has the right to appoint his own guy. They sent it back in two days. No, you don't have any lock on that job.

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Richard Helms (cont. from page 11)

So this was a perfectly legitimate role for the Agency to play.

Later on, this became blown out of all proportion. Not because of young people in the Agency who had any misgivings about it, but because when the hearings were held about these things, and principally in the Church Committee, the fact that the operation was known as MHCHAOS was one of the things that triggered a lot of focus on this. Actually, that was quite an innocent code name. Anybody inside the Agency knew that digraphs were used for various general categories of operations and the digraph in this particular area was MH and then there was a list of perfectly ordinary words then went along with it and CHAOS happened to be the one that came out of the registry at that time, and that's what it was called. It had nothing to do with the operation itself.

Now when it was established that on one occasion, in an effort to put a man into the student movement and give him some real legitimacy in there, that he was put into a demonstration here in the United States, that he did see some things, he did report to the Agency about it, and the Agency in turn passed this on to the FBI. That may have been a misjudgment; we shouldn't have let that fellow report, but it was necessary to get him in there because we wanted to send him [abroad] to report on student unrest overseas. He needed credentials and he needed to be able to say he'd done this.

Also, in an effort to work with the FBI on this whole issue, the FBI sent the Agency a lot of reports so we'd know about the names of these various individuals and so forth. Well, that was bitterly criticized later on—that the Agency never should have had reports on domestic individuals and so forth. But quite frankly, I thought the thing was way overblown; I didn't think the Agency had really overstepped the bounds. If it had a little bit, okay, but it wasn't egregious. This was just a congressional fire storm over nothing.

As for mail opening and a couple of other operations, these young people didn't know anything about them, so there was no basis for their criticizing something they didn't know about.

The Congressional Investigations: The Church and Pike Committees

What do you think are the most important factors for bringing about the congressional investigations in 1975?

Certainly the *Ramparts* business[1] and what flowed therefrom had a role in this, but I think that more important than that was all the dust that was created by Watergate and by the Watergate investigation. Even though the Agency was cleared of any involvement in Watergate finally by the Watergate Commit-

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[1] Revelations in 1967 that CIA was funding the National Student Association and other American non-governmental organizations.

tee, that whole aura and investigation brought about this opportunity to conduct an investigation, and Senator Church was very anxious to do this.

Church wanted to run for president, and he felt this was a great launching platform to bring his name before the public and get a lot of media attention, which it certainly did. And there was no reason not to hold such an investigation if they felt it desirable at the time to have been done in a responsible fashion. But it struck me that Senator Church's political ambitions ran far ahead of his interest in really doing a thoughtful and serious job. I was in Tehran [as US ambassador] all this time and came back spasmodically to testify. But even from that distance it was not difficult to see that this was a hearing run to get the headlines rather than to really find out whether the Agency was doing its job or not doing its job. The conclusions it came to about the estimating process was unfair to the Agency, because the allegation that the Agency in those days was giving in to political pressures is simply not true. There were times when estimates were changed, after all they were the director's estimates, and he had the right to change them.

Now one of the great changes that came out of the Church Committee hearings and in subsequent years was the beginning of sending classified papers, analyses, reports and estimates up to Congress. When I was director, *no* secret papers went to Congress—to *anybody*—unless they were taken up there by the direc-

Richard Helms (cont.)

tor for some reason. The only testifying was done by the director, and it was done by other people when the director wasn't normally there, but it was very rare that anybody else went up to testify. In those days when somebody in the Congress wanted somebody from the Agency, the director went. And it was after I left that this business of sending documents to the Congress and briefing the congressmen by people all through the Agency began.

Some critics, speaking of congressional committees overseeing the Agency before 1975, have called them "blind and toothless watchdogs," saying that members of Congress were unaware or unconcerned about Agency excesses. Do you feel congressional oversight of the Agency was effective and helpful before 1975?

Well, that is a hard question to answer and a rather complex one. When Senator Russell was the chairman in the Senate and Congressmen Rivers and Boggs had oversight of the House and then Clarence Cannon and later George Mahon had Appropriations in the House, there was a good interchange between the members of Congress and the Agency. And there were no leaks. Members of Congress were extremely careful about their secrecy responsibility. In fact, Senator Russell's Committee had just one staffer who was cleared. I think the House Appropriations Committee had one, possibly two staffers who were cleared. In other words, this was a very close-hold operation in those days, and these senators and congressmen really went bail

for the Agency and did a good job of it.

With the change in American culture, which came about as a result of the '60s and spilled over into the '70s, and the whole seniority system in the Senate and House in its traditional form broke down, at this point we got the Church Committee hearings and the Pike Committee hearings. It was this era in the Senate that a lot of senators had the impression that the oversight responsibility was not being executed, which in some respects it was not. So this issue of toothlessness and so forth may be a valid charge, but this was not true of the House. We always gave full information on the budget, line-by-line, item-by-item, to the House Appropriations Committee. It's a total canard [to assert] that this wasn't going on. From day one they got a report with everything in it.

And did it happen that you wanted to tell them more than they wanted to hear?

Sometimes. Senators and congressmen are not wild to know about some of the types of things that go on. Sometimes they would just say, "Look, forget it and don't bother to tell us." At other times, "All right now we've heard about it, let's go on to something else."

Seymour Hersh and Colby

Were the writings of Seymour Hersh a significant factor in the congressional investigations?

Very significant factor. If you look for a single issue that would have caused the focus on the Agency that led to the Church Committee hearings, it was the Hersh story in the *New York Times* that was on the front page. That was, I believe, in December of 1974. I don't think that the Watergate Hearings and the *Ramparts* business, in and of themselves, would have coalesced an interest in the examination of the Agency until this Hersh story came along. And, obviously, Hersh's source was Colby. That has been attested to by various people, including Colby himself, I guess. Colby thought that by leveling with Hersh he was going to protect himself. All he succeeded in doing was getting on the front page of the *New York Times* with headlines.

I was then in Tehran. I remember getting a back-channel message from Kissinger; I had worked for four years with Kissinger when he was the national security advisor in the White House, so we were well known to each other. I remember his saying, "This is an issue that's not going to go away," meaning that this is going to cause congressional focus and the newspapers are going to be after it and all the rest of it. Of course, he was right about that. Colby used terrible judgment on that by thinking that he could sweet talk this fellow [Hersh] out of printing this stuff.

Then later on there was an episode in connection with Daniel Schorr about which I'm not particularly proud but it caused a fair to-do at the time. I came out

Richard Helms (cont.)

of one of the hearings with the Rockefeller Commission, and there he was, and he asked me a question about assassinations and I called him a rude name. After I had a little press conference, he followed me down the hall and he said, "What did you get so mad at me for?" And I said, "Dan, I got mad at you because that's a crock. Where do you pick up this stuff?" He said, "Let me tell you where I heard that. President Ford had a luncheon with the *New York Times* editors and during that luncheon he talked about these so-called Crown Jewels or whatever they were that he heard about from Colby, and among them were these assassination plots."

Well, here was the president of the United States talking off-the-record, theoretically, to the editors of a big New York newspaper and then one of those fellows leaks the thing to Schorr who was working for CBS, and so Schorr feels free to use it. Terrible judgment on Ford's part, I thought. But terrible judgment on Colby's part to go around collecting these things the way he did by circularizing [sic] everybody in the Agency and then packaging the whole thing together and sending it down to the White House. So when you add all that, on top of this of turning the papers over to Congress, you can see why I disagree with Bill Colby. I'm sure that you're going to talk to him and let him defend himself. But I would appreciate it if, when you talk to him, that you don't handle this thing in such a fashion that it gets into the newspapers. I'm not interested in having any

public squabble about this. I think it's bad for the Agency. The Agency has enough problems.

The Report of the Rockefeller Commission[2]

I didn't think it was a particularly good report. I was particularly resentful of the recommendation in there that the director of central intelligence ought to be a man with either considerable means or powerful political backing. I distort the wording a bit, but that was the general thrust of it, the thought being that a fellow who had made a career of intelligence, as I had, didn't have the strength to stand up to a president who wanted certain things done, that I would be afraid for my job or not able to stand up to the pressure, and I resented that.

It seemed to me that I had stood up very well to Nixon when he was trying to get us to cover up with the Watergate, and I don't know of any time when I yielded to that kind of political pressure on any front, so I resented the implications of the report. As for the rest of it, on the only really difficult thing they had to deal with which was the whole assassination issue; they punted and let that go to the Church Committee.

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[2] President Ford on 4 January 1975 announced that Vice President Nelson Rockefeller would head a blue-ribbon commission to investigate CIA's domestic activities. Ford had hoped to quell growing controversy about CIA and forestall a congressional investigation, but the creation of the Church and Pike Committees followed within weeks.

The Hearings and the Jewels: Mail Opening, Drugs, Assassination, Journalists

What's your view of what the hearings revealed about mail openings?

The issue of mail opening has certainly been a controversial one and one of the things that interested me as much as anything was to watch various postmasters general go up before the Church Committee, take the oath and then lie about what they knew about these things. I don't want to make too heavy a point on that, I don't want to get you involved in something that might lead to legal procedures later on, but the directors of the Agency always cleared this with the postmaster general. Orally, obviously, you don't write pieces of paper about something like that.

How about the issue of drug experimentation that was raised by the committees?

Well, that has been a controversial issue from day one. There was the feeling, from Allen Dulles's time on, that these drugs were available, that the Russians had access to them, maybe they were using them, so we should therefore know what they could do and what they couldn't do, both for protection and in case it was felt at some time that it was desirable to make use of them. So that's where the drug testing program originated. I know there's been a great hoohah and lawsuits and all kinds of jiggery-pokery about whether this was done legally or illegally,

Richard Helms (cont.)

morally or immorally, and there's absolutely no percentage in my trying to sort this out and say which was which or which I thought was which. But it was established that that was a legitimate function of the Agency to try and do this, and we went ahead and did it.

One of the things that I think a thoughtful person might ask is: why is a country spending so much of its time complaining about a minor operation of this kind which has a useful function to it? Why is it that as a country we always have to wait until disaster strikes and then we want to spend billions of dollars trying to solve the problem? AIDS is a good example; cancer is a good example. We're always late in the game, trying to run to catch up. So I have no apologies for that whole affair, and I think that some of the lawsuits have been absolutely egregious, I mean ridiculous. I can't possibly explain why certain psychiatrists did the things that they did, but at least they were supposed to be reputable people at the time that they were given financing.

How about the issue of employing journalists, which came up in the Church Committee? Were you surprised by the outpouring of opposition?

I wasn't surprised at all. The press and the Congress have a synergistic arrangement. They were always protecting each other. It takes a lot to get an investigation of a congressman or a senator.

Now, as far as journalists are concerned, I was a newspaperman before I went with the Agency. I knew very well what the rules and regulations were of the journalistic fraternity, what their traditions were. So when I had anything to do with these things, I controlled what journalists were used and what were not used. To use a journalist you had to have my signature on it. For a long time I was the chief of operations in the Deputy Directorate for Plans, that's what [the operations directorate] was called in those days, so I was the number two there for a long, long time; seven years I think, and then I was deputy director. So I had a hold on all of these things all the way through, and I just okayed or approved ones that I thought made sense, where we couldn't get this material any other way, [through] people I felt we could trust not to blow the operation.

Obviously, the newspaper fraternity is very sensitive about this because they're afraid that their access in foreign countries would be closed down if they become involved in intelligence or anybody thinks they're spies. But this doesn't give me any heartburn because in this twentieth century of ours the Soviets use newspapermen all the time. So do other countries.

Newspapermen in this country think that they're a special breed because they are protected by a First Amendment, in a way that they're protected in no other country in the world. They've come to think that they're rather special and that they have to be taken care of in a very special

way, and they get away with it most of the time. But I have no apologies for using newspapermen. After all, we're all in the United States, we're all Americans; we all should be working for our country. If these newspapermen think their calling is higher than the calling of anybody else, that's their opinion, not necessarily the public's.

How about employing academics, which also came up in the hearings?

I was all in favor of that, too, if any of them would be useful. In World War II, in the OSS, we had priests, academics by the score, lawyers, anybody that you could find, doing espionage for the United States, and nobody thought twice about it. Why? Because the Nazis were nasty. Nowadays people take a slightly different view. They don't think that these other fellows were all that nasty. Why? Because they haven't dropped any bombs on our head, I suppose. I see no reason why Americans shouldn't serve their country in one capacity or another, if they're personally willing to do it.

How about the issue of assassinations?

The Agency never assassinated anybody, ever. I was there from the day the doors opened until I left in '73, and I know the Agency never killed anybody, *anybody.* You can take my word for it. If you can find anything in the record of anybody the Agency killed, bring it in here and show it to me. This whole business about Castro was caused largely

Richard Helms (cont.)

by the fact that the task force that was working on Cuba had some ideas floated as to ways to get rid of Castro, to make him sick or to do something about him. I don't want to go into a long disquisition about this assassination business. I've said everything I have to say before the Church Committee and there's absolutely no percentage at this late date in my going over this whole area again because it gets complicated by nuances and who said what and who didn't say what. I just really don't want to go into it any further. I've told you we didn't kill anybody, and it seems to me that's the important thing. We didn't even try to kill anybody.

What were the most difficult demands on you during the congressional investigations of 1975?

A seventeen-and-a half-hour trip one-way from Tehran to Washington; by that time I had some experience with this because I was called back in connection with the Watergate hearings as well. In one 36-month period I made 13 round-trips to the United States. I would arrive in time to get some kind of a night's sleep and have a day to prepare myself for whatever the investigation was going to be before the Church Committee. That was hard work to get brought up-to-date. And it was particularly hard on me because they were focusing on what I thought were extremely minor issues, which I didn't remember very well. Maybe I had signed the papers, maybe I did go to this place and that place, but certainly I didn't remember it then. One of the

things that was, I thought, fatuous in the extreme was all this issue about that poison that came up. There was some that was kept back after the poisons were destroyed. It was shrimp or some kind of a poison deriving from fish.

Shellfish toxin.

Shellfish toxin, that's it. And I didn't remember anything about shellfish. I didn't know this fellow hadn't destroyed it all. I remember issuing the orders that we were going to change our approach in these matters. But to make such a big issue out of that was absolutely ridiculous. Maybe the fellow's desire to save this stuff for use in some extreme situation was pretty sensible. But for this committee to go ape about the thing I thought was ridiculous. And there were a lot of other picky things that they wanted to quiz me about. The larger things certainly I could talk about, but I thought that whole hearing was charged with the interest in headlines and in making the Agency look foolish and emphasizing every little thing that they thought the public would be interested in, even though it wasn't terribly important in the wider scale of affairs, and trying to make it look as though the Agency wasn't under control.

On those covert actions, every single one was cleared with the Executive Committee, which was set up to deal with these matters, called the Special Group or the 404 Committee; it had various names in various other administrations. Everybody had

very clean hands with respect to this. This idea of Church's—that the Agency was a "rogue elephant"—I'd never heard anything so ridiculous in my life. And, of course, that just went zooming over the country. Everybody thought that was a great term. If the Congress isn't careful, they're going to so micromanage the Agency that it's going to be put in a straight jacket with by various laws. And then it isn't going to be nearly as useful to the American people as it should be.

Do you have any reflection on the senators on the Church Committee?

The senator who was the most aggravating was Church himself. Mondale didn't play much of a role; he just was there for the cameramen. Tower and Mathias, I think, did their best as Republicans but also as sensible men to try and keep this hearing on the rails, to try to make it useful and bring about examination of information, if whether this was a good idea or bad idea, whether things should be done differently and so forth. So I think they were a good influence.

There was another fellow on there who used to be a foreign service officer, and he was one of those who was absolutely bound and determined that the Shah must go. Church encouraged people of this kind and it isn't a question that they weren't bright or it isn't a question that they weren't very well educated, it had nothing to do with that. It's just that they were interested in

Richard Helms (cont.)

other things than improving the intelligence process.

Was the Pike Committee much different from the Church Committee?

I only testified before the Pike Committee once and that wasn't a very long testimony. I had known Pike before; when I finished he said, "I've known you and I believe what you say and so forth but, you know, this hearing's got to be seen through the usual pyrotechnics." But Pike was more responsible than Church, I mean that, you didn't have to agree with Pike to know that at least he was doing a more businesslike job. That was my impression.

At one point you said that during the congressional investigations so much paper and so much information were released that it's almost impossible to tell what has been compromised—is that still your feeling?

That's still my feeling. Even more so.

How did the congressional investigations affect your morale and feelings about the Agency?

Well, I found them unpleasant, obviously. And I found them unfair. But certainly I live in this world and I'm familiar with Washington practices, and this is what happens sometimes if the pendulum of public opinion swings in this country from one side to another. And so I have no feeling of heartburn that the hearings were held. I was sad

about Church because I thought it was silly.

The recommendations they came out with later—putting into legislation the thing that Admiral Turner apparently wanted, a statement of exactly what the Agency's functions and responsibilities are and so forth—were ridiculous, particularly in the field of secret intelligence and covert action. If you want to do something like that then do away with the organization. I mean, if you feel you've got this whole legalistic, moralistic incubus over your head, and then I think you ought to stop this entirely. It's easy to do, just disband it and don't do that kind of thing. But to put it in legal terms and write it down on paper, and tell the world this is what we're going to do and this is what we're not going to do and so forth, it belies the whole idea of having a secret intelligence organization. And I think we ought to face up to this. Why are we so gutless about it?

I think the American people, if they had to vote on it, they would vote on it. Americans are peculiar in this particular respect. As one very wise American said to me one day, "Look, this is simple. The American people want you to go out and do these things, they just don't want to be told about them, and they don't want to have them on their conscience." Period. I think that's true. That's part of our Puritan ethic.

Colby's Openness

What are your impressions of Mr. Colby's cooperation with the Church and Pike Committees?

Well, I have been very careful in the years since to say nothing publicly about Colby. But I think Colby did this just wrong, and I believe that to this day. My feeling about Bill Colby is that he should have gone to the president and said, "I don't think we ought to do this, sending these documents about secret operations and so forth up on Capitol Hill. Will you support me?" And then if they insist on it, you'll have to go to the Supreme Court, and I think that's what should have happened.

Instead of that, Colby went the last mile in cooperating with the Church and Pike Committees. He felt he was constitutionally obligated to do this, and in his book he says this, I believe. I don't know what gave him the idea that he was a constitutional lawyer but, anyway, this is what he did. A lot of people on the inside know my feelings, which, I say, I avoided saying publicly because I think it's unseemly for prior directors to be squabbling with each other in public about who did what to whom.

A lot of people think that I'm mad at Colby because he sent those papers down to the Justice Department to try and get me convicted of perjury. I'm not mad at him about that. I'm mad at him about the way he handled the Congress and about sending all these papers down there. And "being mad at" is a colloquial-

Richard Helms (cont.)

ism. I think he was wrong. As far as that perjury thing is concerned, if his lawyers and the people he appointed felt this way, fine, send the papers down to the Justice Department. I don't think he used very good judgment because I think that in doing something like that about his predecessor he opens himself up to getting the same thing done to him.

But leaving that personal element out of it, it tends to set up a precedent. I mean, he who lives in glass houses shouldn't be throwing stones. But that was a pain in the neck for me, and it was very difficult for me to handle, and it certainly didn't do my reputation any good. But he felt he had to do it.

Had you heard the term "Constitutional Intelligence Agency" while you were director?

No.

That's a term used later on by Colby.

I know. This was his effort to protect himself. I don't think he was the one to make that judgment. I was told by Henry Kissinger that, on one occasion, there was a meeting in the Cabinet Room with President Ford and Kissinger and various other worthies; maybe it was a National Security Council meeting. And they asked Colby about certain documents that were being requested by the Hill and said that he shouldn't send them down there. They had a long talk about whether they should or they shouldn't and finally Colby

said, "Well, it's really kind of an academic question because I've already loaned the documents to the committee." And I think that both Ford and Kissinger were very irritated about this. I don't know if it had anything to do with Colby's being let go by President Ford or not, but it may well have.

CIA and Congress

You said in an interview in 1978 that the Agency is part of the president's bag of tools. Is the Agency also part of Congress's bag of tools?

That, I think, is a question for the Supreme Court. I'm surprised that it hasn't been forced up there. That basically was my quarrel with Bill Colby's handling of the Church and Pike Committees in 1975. I never thought he should have sent all those documents up to those committees. I thought that he should have sought the support of the president to stonewall and force that issue into the Supreme Court to find out whether we were obliged to send all those secret documents about secret operations, overseas relationships with foreign security and intelligence services, all of those things—whether or not we were required to do that. I think it should have been forced into the Supreme Court, and instead of Bill Colby's saying that he was a lawyer and he knew what the Constitution required, I think we should have found out what the people who really are supposed to interpret the Constitution thought about all this. I still

think that to this day. In fact, I've become more convinced of it as time goes by.

Some observers think the congressional hearings in 1975 were a watershed in CIA history; do you think that's correct?

Yes, I think they undoubtedly were. I wouldn't have picked the word watershed; that's the kind of newspaper language that I hope is not appealing to academics because it isn't descriptive of anything. A watershed for the CIA, what does that mean? But if you are referring to the fact that from the Church Committee hearing on, the Congress got far more involved in CIA affairs, got far more briefings from the CIA, got far more documents from the CIA, began to try and manage intelligence relations and so forth, then it was a watershed.

What do you think are the lessons to be learned from the Church and Pike Investigations?

That they shouldn't be conducted that way again. If you're going to have intelligence oversight it ought to be done on a reasonably current basis and such an investigation shouldn't be necessary again.

Do you think the Agency today is more effective because of the hearings?

No, I think it's less effective.

Do you think it very important to tell congressional committees about something before they read it in the newspapers?

Richard Helms (cont.)

I believe that firmly. They don't like surprises. Presidents don't like surprises; senators and congressmen don't like surprises.

And how about directors?

Directors don't like them either.

Do you think the Church and Pike Committees appreciated the DCI responsibility for the protection of sources and methods?

No, I think that [because] that was put into the law, it had to be observed. As director, I attempted to comply with it and then when I did I was criticized for having done so.

A retired Agency officer said in 1976, "The congressional investigations were like being pillaged by a foreign power, only we have been occupied by the Congress with our files rifled, our officials humiliated and our agents exposed." Think that's too strong?

It's a good statement.

It was Jim Angleton.

Good statement. Jim Angleton was a believer in secret intelligence, to be run in the tradition of the British and other good European services. You have to do this in secrecy and with the confidence of your superiors and with a whole network of trust and mutual support. And it cannot be done properly without that, he's quite right. And you can find all kinds of people who are going to argue with everything I have said. Certain senators and congressmen would gladly argue with it, newspapermen will argue with that, fellows out at the Agency to protect themselves would argue about it. What I've tried to do is give it to you with the bark on, and I believe that anybody who would give me 15 minutes might not end up agreeing with me but they would certainly know that side of the case. I think it's time

some people stop playing hopscotch or fun and games with the Intelligence Community.

Do you believe it's much more difficult to be DCI after Watergate in comparison with the decades before that?

Much more difficult because it's much more complicated. You've got many more constituencies to worry about. I don't think the intelligence side of the job is any more difficult, I think in some respects, it's easier because you've got a lot of gadgets these days that help you with intelligence collection, particularly regarding the Soviet Union. Where it's more difficult is handling the Congress, the White House, the press, the public. Particularly the Congress.

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Revisiting Sherman Kent's Defense of SNIE 85-3-62

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The crucial lesson of the Cuban analytic experience is that simply being aware of mental traps is not enough.

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CIA's Board of National Estimates (ONE) was criticized for the conclusion its members reached in Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 85-3-62, published on 19 September 1962, that the Soviets were unlikely to introduce strategic offensive weapons into Cuba.[1] In 1964 Sherman Kent, ONE's chief from 1952 to 1967, penned a defense of the analytic reasoning and process that produced the flawed judgment.[2]

Kent's article is interesting because he highlighted many of the pitfalls new analysts in the Intelligence Community are now taught to avoid.[3] His defense also indicates that he had most of today's preferred techniques in mind when the estimate was written. Here I will review the analytic tradecraft Kent set forth in his article, examine the pitfalls the estimate's drafters fell prey to, and conclude with ideas on what Kent's essay can still teach analysts.[4]

In 2005, the Kent School published a paper looking at common analytic errors identified in CIA critiques of events considered "intelligence failures."[5] The paper judged that analysts were guilty of

- having a restrictive mind-set;

- engaging in mirror imaging and using a rational actor model;

- engaging in group think;

- employing status-quo thinking;

- exhibiting the paradox of experience;

- being fooled by denial and deception activities; and

- not offering alternative scenarios.

A close examination of Kent's article shows that the drafters and authorizers of the SNIE did not commit all of these errors and that institutional analytic practices of the period obscured some of the techniques they were accused of omitting.

On one point there is no ambiguity, the estimate incorrectly concluded that the Soviets *would not* place strategic weapons in Cuba.

> *We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from*

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it, and consequently that the main purpose of the present military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it.... At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose.[6]

In hindsight, we know Soviet leaders did worry about a US invasion, but Nikita Khrushchev calculated that the presence of operational intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Cuba would prevent the United States from acting after the presence of the missiles had become known to US leaders. Thus a key assumption of the drafters was off kilter: Moscow saw a way around the possibility of "provoking US military intervention" that apparently was not considered by the analysts.

This judgment was accompanied by the opinion that

> *The USSR could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the establishment of a Soviet submarine base there. As between these two, the establishment of a submarine base would be the more likely. Either development, however, would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate.*

Here we have an alternative hypothesis to the central judgment, but one that is dismissed

as a transgression of previous Soviet practice and likely to produce a US reaction Moscow did not want.

Kent acknowledged that "even in the best minds curious derelictions occur," but he specifically rejected the idea that the analysts went "for the comforting hypothesis, by eschewing the painful."[7] He noted that the CIA inspector general's postmortem of the DI's performance in the crisis identified a mere eight reports out of hundreds coming in on activities in Cuba that "indicated the possible presence of strategic missiles" and that "none of these was available before the crucial estimate was put to bed."

Kent further argued that photographs available before the SNIE appeared did not provide evidence of missile emplacement and "over and over again it made fools of ground observers by proving their reports inaccurate or wrong." And he specifically absolved the analysts of "neglect[ing] or wishful misevaluation of evidence because it does not support a preconceived hypothesis."

In current DI parlance, Kent would have written that his analysts did not fall prey to a rigid mind-set and thus reject a high-impact hypothesis or exhibit an anchoring bias in evaluating information from human intelligence or other sources. Critics, however, have argued that mind-set was a problem because analysts did raise the right question but dismissed what turned out to be the right answer because of a scarcity of confirming evidence.

Kent explained how the error occurred: lacking direct evidence before the U-2 photographs of October, the analysts tried to discern "indicators" that pointed to an explanation of what the Soviets were up to. This led them to conclude the buildup was defensive.

Before reaching this judgment, the analysts considered how Moscow might view the idea of using Cuba as a strategic base and applied historical actions to reach their conclusion. This led the analysts to believe the Soviets would be as cautious in 1962 as they had been during earlier Cold War crises and to believe that US outrage at the creation of a communist regime in Cuba was known to Moscow.

Kent speculated that hindsight suggested the Soviets may have believed US resolve had weakened after the Bay of Pigs, erection of the Berlin Wall, and the growth of Communist power in Laos; that they saw the strategic value of offensive weapons as outweighing the risks; or that they miscalculated and underestimated the consequences of a resolute US reaction.[8] He then wrote:

> *Even in hindsight it is extremely difficult for many of us to follow their inner logic or to blame ourselves for not having thought in parallel with them.*

We ask analysts today to avoid a similar misstep by understanding that historical precedent isn't an infallible guide and to use an analytic tool, such as analysis of competing hypotheses, to see if there is a break in the historical pattern or if a break is of such

high impact that the possibility should be conveyed to policymakers.

Today's analysts have the benefit of more cases in which a foreign leader has acted on a logic alien to that of a "rational" US policymaker. This has sensitized them to the danger of expecting leaders in other countries to act like us (mirror imaging) or calculate the workings of a situation as a US policymaker might.

Kent's quote also shows the power of an undocumented assumption—that the Soviets understood how angry Americans were over the Castro revolution. There is no indication in Kent's article that this assumption was ever challenged or subjected to validation. Today we also ask analysts to identify their assumptions just so they can be examined explicitly. And when it seems appropriate analytical papers will list the assumptions or alternative view laid out using different assumptions.

Kent would have been skeptical of the current practice of providing more than one avenue for a policymaker to consider. He argued in the article that a lack of evidence was not an excuse for simply saying this or that may happen, or that the worst case is going to transpire. This, he contended, was of little use to policymakers, and in the instance of presenting the worst case, ran the danger of leading policymakers to stop listening because the analysts "cry wolf" too often.

He also expressed reservations about a common technique used today, the creation of a "red team." Just tasking a group to

try to mimic enemy responses to a situation, argued Kent, did not mean that it would do so successfully. He dismissed the general utility of such efforts and noted that in the case of missiles in Cuba, CIA experts were consulted "as usual." That they failed "to work out the propositions of an aberrant faction of the [Soviet] leadership," was not a failure, Kent asserted, because "no estimating process can be expected to divine exactly when the enemy is about to make a dramatically wrong decision. We were not brought up to *underestimate* our enemies." He then added:

> *We could not believe that Khrushchev could make such a mistake.*

This opinion is an example of the fallacy of the "rational actor model," although Kent decried the related mirror-imaging pitfall, when he wrote "that objectivity of judgment about the other man's probable behavior is the crux of the intelligence business."

Then Kent stated, "this...suggests that perhaps we do not know some things about Soviet foreign policy decisionmaking that we should." Kent was oblivious to the possibility that it wasn't the Soviet decisionmaking process that was opaque and misleading for agency analysts, but the limitations of experts to recognize a radical change in their field.

This we call the "paradox of expertise." Forty years after Kent made the argument, intelligence analysts *are* expected to warn, if they can, before an opponent makes a major decision, includ-

ing a decision that might lead to unusual or unprecedented behavior. There have been too many instances since the Cuban Missile Crisis of leaders choosing paths that wouldn't seem "rational" to US decisionmakers to do otherwise.

My examination of Kent's defense leads to two conclusions:

- The analytical process in 1962 pressured analysts to "make a call."

- The analytic practices of the era had many of the techniques in use today but omitted several current checks and balances specifically designed to avoid analytic pitfalls.

Kent's words on the uselessness of providing multiple scenarios or worst-case analysis imply that his was then conventional wisdom. They also undoubtedly reflected the desire of most policymakers of the period for such definitive judgments.

Since at least the mid-1990s, however, senior policymakers have increasingly been requiring intelligence analysts to identify and explain plausible scenarios in the estimates they prepare. These are to include those we now label "high impact, low probability" outcomes. On occasion, the outcome may be truly identifiable and a "single outcome prediction" justified, but most of the time the complexity of world affairs precludes such certainty.

Despite acknowledging the pitfall of mirror imaging and the need to "cast yourself in his [the enemy's] image and see the world through his eyes," Kent and his

colleagues do not appear to have examined their model of a Soviet decisionmaker, which was essentially a Russian-speaking Western rational actor who made choices with an understanding of US public opinion and pressures on our policymakers.

An "assumption check" would have raised the question of just how well Moscow actually understood US unhappiness with Castro and might have led to Washington's explicit statement of that feeling to the Soviets. Whether that would have changed the thinking about Khrushchev is debatable, but it could have alerted the analysts to the need to qualify their prediction by presenting this assumption openly in the estimate.[9]

There is no suggestion in Kent's article that Soviet denial and deception activities played any role in misdirecting the analysis. The crucial lesson, therefore, is that simply being aware of our mental traps is not enough. To reduce the potential for analytic errors, some form of analytic structuring technique must be used to overcome cognitive traps.[10]

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Notes

1. "The Military Buildup in Cuba," SNIE 85-3-62, 19 September 1962. Now declassified and available in several places, including *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1962*, Volume X, *Cuba, 1961-1962*. A portion of the estimate and many other documents related to the crisis can be found in *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962* (Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, 1992)

2. Kent, Sherman. "A Crucial Estimate Relieved." *Studies in Intelligence* 36, no. 5 (Spring, 1964): 111–19. Originally Secret, now declassified and available on cia.gov. Unless noted otherwise, all quotes by Kent are from this article.

3. One element of the Career Analyst Program, a required four-month long training program for new analysts, is a theme addressing the history, mission, and values of CIA and the profession of intelligence analysis. Analysts are required to present briefings to classmates on a variety of historical events that have had a major impact on how the Directorate of Intelligence does its work. The Cuban Missile Crisis is one of those events.

4. For another take on this subject, see Peter Clement, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," in *Fifty Years of Informing Policy* (Washington, DC: Directorate of Intelligence, 2002)

5. A few intelligence officers do not hold that the SNIE was an "intelligence failure." A future head of the Directorate of Intelligence, Russell Jack Smith, agreed with Kent that the Cuban missile crisis was not a failure of analysis. See Smith's, *The Unknown CIA* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989), 155.

6. Cited by Kent.

7. Kent may have been alluding to the well-documented dissent of the Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone. The DCI believed the Soviets would take the risk of installing offensive missiles in Cuba and said so to a special NSC group on 10 August. He maintained this position despite the opposition of Kent and the Director of Intelligence Ray Cline and the failure of initial photographs to show the weapons. An Agency history of McCone's directorship highlights this difference of opinion. Published memoirs by some participants also claim McCone wasn't convincing in his arguments, and one scholarly study goes so far as to assert that the DCI's "discrepant judgment holds no interesting general lesson for intelligence assessment and hardly seems worth the attention it has received." See "What Can Intelligence Tell Us About the Cuban Missile Crisis, and What Can the Cuban Missile Crisis Tell Us about Intelligence?" in James G. Blight and David A. Welch (eds.), *Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis*. London: Frank Cass, 1998, 6.

8. Khrushchev actually viewed the United States as aggressive, not weak, and he was very concerned about losing Cuba to a US invasion. He did see the strategic value of the missiles, but this appears to have been a secondary motivation. See John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know, Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Chapter Nine.

9. Ibid, 262–63. The point here is that this was a crucial assumption underpinning the judgments. Today, policymakers want to know foundational assumptions in order to better evaluate IC assessments.

10. McCone and the IC were criticized after the crisis in classified postmortems and newspapers. In November 1962, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) tasked the DCI for an all-source, community-wide examination of collection and analysis relating to the crisis. The result, which characterized IC efforts as on the whole positive, infuriated the board. One member termed McCone's praise for CIA's performance a "snow job." The PFIAB report of 4 February 1963 gave the IC poor marks for its performance before the 14 October 1962 imagery revealed the offensive missiles. The IC's work after that was given high marks. The Board's report is in *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis*.

Legacy of Ashes: The History of CIA

Tim Weiner. New York: Doubleday, 2007. 516 pages and notes and index.

Reviewed by Nicholas Dujmovic

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> ## Legacy of Ashes *is not the definitive history of the CIA that it purports to be.*
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Tim Weiner's *Legacy of Ashes* is not the definitive history of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that it purports to be. Nor is it the well researched work that many reviewers say it is. It is odd, in fact, that much of the hype surrounding the book concerns its alleged mastery of available sources. Weiner and his favorable reviewers—most, like Weiner, journalists—have cited the plethora of his sources as if the fact of their variety and number by themselves make the narrative impervious to criticism.

But the thing about scholarship is that one must use sources honestly, and one doesn't get a pass on this even if he is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist for the *New York Times*. Starting with a title that is based on a gross distortion of events, the book is a 600-page op-ed piece masquerading as serious history; it is the advocacy of a particularly dark point of view under the guise of scholarship. Weiner has allowed his agenda to drive his research and writing, which is, of course, exactly backwards.

History, fairly done, is all about context, motivations, and realistic expectations in addition to the accurate portrayal of events. Weiner is not honest about con-

text, he is dismissive of motivations, his expectations for intelligence are almost cartoonish, and his book too often is factually unreliable. What could have been a serious historical critique illuminating the lessons of the past is undermined by dubious assertions, sweeping judgments based on too few examples, selective or outright misuse of citations, a drama-driven narrative, and a tendentious and nearly exclusive focus on failure that overlooks, downplays, or explains away significant successes.

The irony is that a new history of CIA is needed to fill the gap left by the now dated works of John Ranelagh (*The Agency*, 1986) and Christopher Andrew (*For the President's Eyes Only*, 1995). Having read the book, I have to conclude that this is not it; anyone who wants a balanced perspective of CIA and its history should steer well clear of *Legacy of Ashes*.

The Deceit in the Title

The phrase "legacy of ashes" comes from a critical remark President Dwight D. Eisenhower uttered near the end of his administration when, Weiner

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tells us, Ike finally blew up at Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles and the failings of CIA generally, and more particularly at Dulles's resistance to recommendations for intelligence reform from the president's board of consultants. Here's how Weiner treats the episode, under the subhead "An Eight-Year Defeat" (page 166).

> *"A great deal has been accomplished," Dulles insisted to the president at the final gatherings of Eisenhower's National Security Council. Everything is well in hand, he said. I have fixed the clandestine service. American intelligence has never been more agile and adept. Coordination and cooperation are better than they have ever been. The proposals of the president's intelligence board were preposterous, he said, they were madness, they were illegal. I am responsible under the law for intelligence coordination, he reminded the president. I cannot delegate that responsibility. Without my leadership, he said, American intelligence would be a "body floating in thin air."*

> *At the last, Dwight Eisenhower exploded in anger and frustration. "The structure of our intelligence organization is faulty," he told Dulles. It makes no sense, it has to be reorganized, and we should have done it long ago. Nothing had changed since Pearl Harbor. "I have suffered an eight-year defeat on this," said the president of the United States. He said he would "leave a legacy of ashes" to his successor.*

This incident serves as an iconic moment in the book, the cornerstone of the entire edifice, a sort of literary fractal that encapsulates in microcosm all that Weiner thinks is wrong with CIA: its unrelenting record of failures, its non-responsiveness—and even duplicity—to presidents, its cowboy-ish autonomy and resistance to accountability and oversight. But this central episode in Weiner's book is an invented dialog, a created exchange that never happened. An examination of the source documents shows that:

- Dulles made his remarks ("body floating in thin air") at a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) on 12 January 1961, and he was speaking against a Defense Department proposal to separate the position of DCI from the management of CIA.

- Eisenhower's supposed retort ("eight-year defeat...legacy of ashes") occurred a week earlier, at the 5 January NSC meeting, and had nothing to do with CIA. Eisenhower was expressing frustration at what he considered his major failing regarding intelligence—his inability to reform and streamline *military* intelligence.

- Far from criticizing Dulles and CIA, Eisenhower at both meetings affirmed the Agency's cen-

tral role in the collection and correlation of strategic intelligence while criticizing the redundancy and expense of having four separate military intelligence agencies.

- The words "preposterous" and "madness" are nowhere to be found in the record of Dulles's remarks on proposals to reform intelligence.[1]

Here is the critical paragraph from the minutes of the 5 January meeting.

> *The President then remarked that soon after Pearl Harbor, he was engaged in an operation which required him to have certain information which he was unable to obtain from the Navy, i.e., the strength the Navy had left in the Pacific. The President also noted that the U.S. fought the first year of the war in Europe entirely on the basis of British intelligence. Subsequently, each Military Service developed its own intelligence organization. He thought the situation made little sense in managerial terms. He had suffered an eight-year defeat on this question but would leave a legacy of ashes for his successor.*

A prize-winning journalist has distorted what was said, why it was said, when it was said, and

[1] Memoranda of Discussions at the 473rd Meeting (5 January 1961) and the 474th Meeting (12 January 1961) of the National Security Council; documents 80 and 84, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963: Volume XXV* (2001). See also document 79, a record of the 3 January meeting of Eisenhower, National Security Advisor Gordon Gray, and General Andrew Goodpaster.

the circumstances under which it was said—all to support his thesis that CIA has been a continuous failure from 1947 up to the present. Weiner's use of the plural "final gatherings" in the excerpt from his account suggests he knows what he is doing.

The Preface as Fractal

The book's preface, an "Author's Note," is another literary fractal that in four-and-a-half pages reveals all the problems of interpretation, evidence, and scholarship that follow throughout the entire book.[2] Weiner is on thin ice from the opening lines: "the most powerful country in the history of Western civilization has failed to create a first-rate spy service." Yet at no point in the 671 pages of narrative and notes does Weiner offer a basis for his standards—other than suggesting that mistakes just shouldn't be made—or explain what his "first rate" intelligence service might look like.

The intelligence services that are often judged to be superior to CIA—the Israeli Mossad, the Cuban DGI, the East German Stasi, and even the British SIS—are far more limited in focus and scope. CIA from the beginning was charged with worldwide coverage in all intelligence areas, something no other service, except perhaps the Soviet KGB, was required to do. If making no mistakes is Weiner's only standard, he has adopted an unrealistic one—a Platonic ideal for

[2] Weiner, xiv–xvii.

> *There is a difference between warning of the day and time of the next attack and providing analysis that helps presidents and other policymakers understand circumstances and act to affect outcomes.*

intelligence—that CIA, dealing with the world as it is, could only have failed to meet.

CIA's central "crime," as Weiner puts it in the opening pages, is its consistent failure to inform presidents, which he equates with predicting the future. This is a rather sophomoric view of what intelligence can reasonably be expected to do. Throughout the book Weiner repeats the mantra that the Agency was created "to prevent another Pearl Harbor." True enough, but if CIA had existed in the fall of 1941, it would have been telling policymakers of Japanese capabilities, analyzing Tokyo's intentions, drawing attention to the vulnerabilities of our Pacific bases, including Pearl Harbor, and by November estimating that war was imminent—not going for a prediction that at 0755 on 7 December, the Japanese would strike (though, of course, credible intelligence of that sort would have been welcome).

There is a difference between warning of the day and time of the next attack and providing analysis that helps presidents and other policymakers understand circumstances and act to affect outcomes, an aspect of the process Weiner—who has written about US intelligence activities and organizations for some time—somehow seems not to have learned.

There are other lapses. Weiner's opening note asserts that, in CIA's history, US presidents ordered the Agency to undertake covert action when CIA could not provide knowledge of adversaries; that CIA lied to presidents to conceal its failures and preserve its standing in Washington; that CIA analysts "learned to march in lockstep" to conform to what the president wanted to hear; that all of the Agency's Soviet assets were executed; and that the "Islamic warriors" CIA supported in Afghanistan later turned on the United States. Overall, in his view, the few successes have been "fleeting," while the many failures are "long-lasting." Heady stuff, these assertions—but every one of them is wrong (some are not even consistent with each other), and this is just the tip of the iceberg.

Failures R Us

Moving into the book itself, the reader finds a ceaseless drumbeat of failure. The main theme of *Legacy of Ashes* is that the CIA has been a consistent and essentially inexcusable failure since the beginning, over the decades, and up to the present moment.

No objective observer of Agency history can fail to note that CIA in its history has failed—sometimes miserably—in what it set out to do or was ordered to do. As a CIA historian, I've been

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accused of dwelling too much, in fact, on the failures, a few of which are real doozies. Most of us in the profession take these cases very much to heart, endeavoring to learn as much from them as we can so we can do better.

It is a task that requires constant attention. Among difficult human endeavors the profession of intelligence is an activity that seems by its very nature to have a higher probability of failure. Everything intelligence is called upon to do is inherently, inescapably difficult: to reveal what is hidden, most often deliberately by people who mean us harm; to ascertain trends and look into the future; to push the bounds of science and technology to collect what otherwise would be uncollectible and therefore unknowable; to test the limits of human ingenuity and courage in old-fashioned spying and counterespionage; and to estimate what it all means. These are not trifling challenges.

Consider further that these difficult tasks are being attempted by mortal men and women, all of whom by virtue of the human condition are fallible and imperfect: not a superhero among them, outside of the imaginations of novelists and screenwriters. The logic is inexorable: if the tasks are very hard, and the human raw material is flawed, inevitably there will be failure.

This suggests that a fair treatment of intelligence and a realis-

tic assessment of its history, if not tending toward a sense of forgiveness, would at least attempt to understand the very human context of what must be a record that will include failures. This context is especially necessary in appraising the early years of CIA, when enormous challenges were faced by a new generation for whom intelligence was something learned through often-bitter experience.

Success versus Failure? Success IS Failure

Weiner's central theme of unremitting failure does an injustice to the truth, not least because the existence of real Agency achievements cannot be denied. Moreover, Weiner's secondary theme, that Agency leaders learned to lie to portray CIA's failures as successes, is inaccurate and requires one to believe US presidents are dolts.

Allen Dulles freely admitted to President Eisenhower that CIA had no sources in the Kremlin, that its Soviet estimates relied more on speculation and "the logic of the situation" than on hard evidence, and that the Agency could not reliably warn of a sudden Soviet attack (pages 73–75). This was not a unique occasion of truthfulness, and it does not sound like an Agency trying to hide its shortcomings.

Weiner even manages to portray genuine CIA successes as fail-

ures. For example, in 1948 CIA accurately assessed the chance for war with the Soviets as nil; according to Weiner, that was a failure because "no one listened"—likewise with accurate Agency predictions of genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

He portrays the development of the U-2 spyplane · a stunning technological achievement—as a failure because, he says, CIA should have had better human sources inside the USSR. If we had only developed "a bigger picture of life inside the Soviet Union" that revealed the Russians "were unable to produce the necessities of life" (page 114), we would not have had to create the unprecedented capability to take pictures of Soviet military power from 70,000 feet. Never mind that the Soviets had built and would continue to build a formidable and genuinely threatening military machine for decades to come.

Oddly, in the video trailer for the book on his publisher's Web site, Weiner contradicts himself about the utility of the reconnaissance efforts. He describes as a success the development of spy satellites, and the analysis from satellite imagery, that, in his words, "helped keep the Cold War cold." This is significant. If CIA had had no other success in its history, the Agency deserves more credit than Weiner allows for keeping the Cold War from becoming a hot war, presumably a nuclear war. In the book, Weiner gives the Agency no credit on this point.

Weiner has a distressing tendency to make compelling, usually damning statements about CIA—its leaders, operations, and programs—and about US presidents that are untrue.

Other successes Weiner obscures or otherwise marginalizes. For example, discussing the successful covert support of democracy in Italy in 1948, Weiner belittles the prospects of a communist takeover and then implies that CIA's achievement had little real effect other than to encourage more such operations. The Berlin Tunnel operation gets short shrift, and the story of CIA's first major Soviet spy, Pyotr Popov, is buried in a footnote. Weiner ascribes the Agency's spot-on call regarding the 1967 Mideast war wholly to liaison service information rather than to the rigorous analytic work that was behind the judgment.[3]

Dramatic Assertions, Cheap Shots

Throughout his book, Weiner has a distressing tendency to make compelling, usually damning statements about CIA—its leaders, operations, and programs—and about US presidents that are untrue. Many of these assertions he even undermines in his subsequent narrative.

A prominent early example, in which Weiner sets the stage for his view that CIA overstepped its boundaries from the beginning, is the first sentence of chapter 1: "All Harry Truman wanted was a newspaper." Weiner then repeats the myth, long discounted, that President Truman wanted his intelligence service just to pro-

duce a daily report. A few pages later, however, Weiner tells how Truman gave the first director of central intelligence a black hat, a cloak, and a wooden dagger—which make for a pointless joke if all Truman wanted was a classified version of the *New York Times.*

In fact, Truman signed NSC directives assigning the responsibility for covert action to CIA, a duty CIA officials had misgivings about at the time. Weiner goes on to mention that, by the way, there were 81 covert actions approved by the NSC and carried out by CIA during Truman's term, including significant paramilitary operations in the Korean War.

Weiner is forced by his own premise to then assert the incredible: that Harry Truman didn't know what was going on in his own administration regarding Cold War covert activities. To accept that, you need an imagination like Oliver Stone's to believe that Truman's secretaries of state and defense, his military commanders, his advisers Clark Clifford and former DCI Sidney Souers, his own secretary, plus George Kennan at the State Department, as well as Directors Vandenberg, Hillenkoetter and Smith—all conspired to keep this form of warfare a secret from the president.

Yet publicly available documents, which Weiner seems to be

unaware of or ignores, make an overwhelming case that President Truman was informed frequently of NSC and other policy discussions on covert operations and CIA's role in them. In Michael Warner, ed., *CIA Cold War Records: The CIA Under Harry Truman* (CIA History Staff, 1994) is a memo from the DCI dated 23 April 1952 to the NSC about CIA activities. It includes (pages 459–60) a discussion of "cold war covert activities, including guerrilla warfare." The document is marked "Included in the President's Book."

Weiner might also have read Hayden Peake, "Harry S. Truman on CIA Covert Activities," in *Studies in Intelligence* 25, No. 1 (1981). Peake demonstrates that, Truman's stated opposition to Eisenhower- and Kennedy-era covert operations notwithstanding, CIA officials of the late 1940s and early 1950s considered Truman to have been intimately involved in the development of CIA's covert mission.

Weiner might also have examined more closely the holdings of the Truman Library, where he would have been able to see a progress report sent by DCI Souers to the president in June 1946 on "planning for psychological warfare" on the part of the Central Intelligence Group;[4] he might also have taken note of the NSC memorandums for the pres-

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[3] See David Robarge, "Getting it Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War," *Studies in Intelligence* 49, No. 1 (2005).

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ident summarizing NSC discussions of 20 May and 3 June 1948 concerning psychological and political warfare, also in the Truman Library, President's Secretary's files.[5]

He misses other important evidence of Truman's knowledge of such activity, such as the Acting DCI's 16 January 1951 report to the NSC on "Responsibilities of CIA (OPC) with Respect to Guerrilla Warfare."[6] Weiner does cite the 23 October 1951 NSC report on "Scope and Pace of Covert Operations," but he misses the significance of this document's presence in the files of Truman's secretary—unless Weiner is implying that she was in on the aforementioned conspiracy to keep him in the dark.

A Circle of Incompetents?

Weiner's portrayal of CIA leaders, especially in the Agency's first decades, drips with hostility—something that even favorable reviewers have criticized.[7] His prose forces one to conclude

that the Agency was led by incompetent louts ignorant of the world and duplicitous with higher authority.

Frank Wisner, a passionate and driven man who led covert operations for many years, comes in for especially rough treatment. Weiner portrays him as absolutely autonomous, out of control, accountable to no one: "He alone would decide whether his secret mission's conformed to American foreign policy" (page 32). But even Weiner's animosity can't get in the way of unavoidable facts—*on the very next page,* one reads that Wisner created stay-behind agent networks in Europe on the orders of Secretary of Defense Forrestal. Reading on, one finds that both State and Defense were pressing Wisner to expand covert action programs in 1951, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered him to undertake covert operations against the USSR, and that all such operations were authorized by George Kennan at State.

Weiner says Wisner successfully resisted orders from DCI Smith to shut down any covert program, no matter how ineffectual, yet in reality Wisner complied with orders to end the heavily invested "Third Force" program in 1953. Wisner is lambasted for doing too much—except during the 1953 East German riots, when Weiner chastizes him for doing nothing.

Weiner asserts that Agency officers consistently misunderstood the world and communicated that misunderstanding to US presidents, who then reacted by ordering the CIA to conduct covert actions in order to change the world to their liking. This thesis is unsupportable from the historical record. Other commentators (Walter Laqueur, Angelo Codevilla, e.g.) have noted that one problem with covert action in the Agency's history is that it was not sufficiently informed by the Agency's analysis. For example, the analysts were completely cut out of deliberations before the Bay of Pigs, and they could have told the operators that there was no potential for an anti-Castro uprising that the operation was intended to foment.

One of Weiner's most unfair assertions is that CIA analysts "learned to march in lockstep" to conform to how the president saw the world (page xv). That judgment would come as a surprise to several generations of analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence, especially those who delivered unexpected or unwelcome assessments to various administrations on China, Soviet strategic intentions and capabilities, Vietnam, the Balkans, and more recently on terrorism and Iraq.

ISO Context

Weiner's predilection for the knockout punch or the cheap shot might make for successful tabloid journalism, but it is unsatisfactory as history because it neglects essential context that

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[4] "Progress Report" memo of 7 June 1948, Harry S. Truman Library, Papers of Clark Clifford, available through the Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS).

[5] These are reprinted as documents 277 and 283 in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment* (1996).

[6] Truman Library, President's Secretary's files and available through DDRS.

[7] See, for example, David Wise's review in the *Washington Post*, 22 July 2007.

would provide real understanding of complex situations. For example, he dismisses the first DCI to lead CIA, Roscoe Hillenkoetter. Labelling him as an ineffectual leader, Weiner gives him no credit for trying, as a lowly rear admiral in Washington, to lead this new venture called Central Intelligence. In an apparent rush to condemn Agency covert action, Weiner curiously fails to give Hillenkoetter credit for trying to keep the Agency out of it.

Similarly, Weiner focuses solely on CIA's problems with the Gehlen group, the former military officers of Nazi Germany who served as the basis for West German intelligence, and he omits mention of its valuable intelligence on the USSR, which "outweighed these problems during the hottest years of the Cold War," in the words of a declassified CIA historical assessment.[8]

Weiner also repeats the canard that CIA missed the decline of the USSR, something that was obvious to everyone in the world but the Agency. He ignores several important sources that have refuted this claim: the work of Bruce Berkowitz, Douglas MacEachin, Robert Gates, and the Case Program of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. CIA analysts warned of the USSR's socio-economic troubles from the late 1970s on.

A particularly telling cheap shot is Weiner's dismissal of Ronald

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> *Weiner, like a prosecutor in a trial, pulls from his source material only that which supports his perspective.*

Reagan as someone who came to the presidency knowing "little more about the CIA than what he had learned at the movies" (page 375). This is a wrong-headed view of a president who in 1975 had served on the Rockefeller Commission investigating intelligence activities and who had drafted for his own delivery, from 1975 to 1978, radio addresses on national security matters that included cogent discussions about CIA and intelligence issues. In addition, a large number of Reagan's letters and essays has emerged that dispel Weiner's notion.[9]

Sourcing Sins of Omission and Commission

Just as he fails to provide context or alternative plausible explanations, Weiner, like a prosecutor in a trial, pulls from his source material only that which supports his perspective. Concerning CIA analysis of the Soviet Union, he quotes the former director of national estimates at CIA, Abbot Smith, on page 154:

> *We had constructed for ourselves a picture of the USSR, and whatever happened had to be made to fit into that picture. Intelligence estimators can hardly commit a more abominable sin.*

Clearly Smith's idea of an "abominable sin" doesn't apply to this journalist-turned-historian, who doesn't mention that in the very next paragraph of the document from which he drew the above quote is the following:

> *Abbott balanced his critique by noting that many of the main points of political analysis of the USSR had turned out to be valid: emphasis on the continuing strength of party rule, the importance of heavy industry and the military, and the emergence of problems with Communist China.[10]*

That last point is especially important, for CIA analysis on the Sino-Soviet relationship was far ahead of the rest of Washington's and must be counted a success.

Another example: Weiner's treatment of CIA during the Korean War (chapter 6) is entirely one-sided, again supported by selective quotation of sources. His account of error and botched CIA operations relies on the work of Michael Haas, a former Air Force contract historian who had access to CIA internal histories on the Korean War.[11] To be sure, those internal histories speak of many failed operations, especially after 1952, but Weiner fails to report

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[8] Kevin Ruffner, ed., *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49* (CIA History Staff, 1999; redacted and released, 2002), xxix.

[9] On Reagan's views of CIA and intelligence, see Kiron Skinner et al., eds., *Reagan, In His Own Hand* (New York: Touchstone, 2002), 121–28.

[10] Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, eds., *Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union*, 70.
[11] Michael E. Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow: UN Special Operations During the Korean War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 172–205.

There is sloppy scholarship in the recounting of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, which in Weiner's hands becomes a tragicomedy.

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that Haas also wrote of "noteworthy" HUMINT successes early in the war—one of which contributed to the successful Inchon landing -as well as collection operations that yielded intelligence on the enemy's order of battle and critical targeting information that resulted in the destruction of a North Korean Communist Party facility.

The one Korean War internal history that has been released (and available to Weiner) speaks of many successful missions into North Korean territory, mostly to gather intelligence but also to destroy infrastructure and to kill enemy combatants.[12] All this is absent from Weiner's retelling.

Oddly, Weiner goes on at some length concerning what CIA's internal histories say about the Korean War, and throughout the book he frequently cites declassified Agency histories. So it is amusing to read that "CIA's covert operators never wrote 'lessons-learned' studies." What does he think those internal histories were for? While it is debatable whether needed lessons were really learned, these things were written by the Directorate of Operations for the Directorate of Operations and invariably included conclusions intended to improve operations in the future—sometimes explicitly called "lessons."

With respect to analysis during the Korean War, Weiner is not completely up front either. He meticulously documents CIA's inaccurate assessments of China's *intent* to enter the war in force—based on the Agency's flawed premise that Moscow was really behind events on the peninsula---but he ignores the same sources regarding the Agency's frequent and consistent warnings that Chinese deployments gave Beijing the *capability* of entering the war.[13] CIA warned President Truman on 1 September 1950—six weeks before Chinese troops crossed the Yalu into North Korea—that

> *Chinese Communist propaganda has portrayed the US as an aggressor.... Thus, the stage has been set for some form of Chinese Communist intervention or participation in the Korean War.... In any case, some form of armed assistance to the North Koreans appears imminent.*

On 30 September, CIA told Truman that most information pointed against a Chinese decision "to intervene openly in Korea," although the Agency also presented contrary reports—including intelligence from Indian diplomats in Beijing that

the Chinese leadership had swung toward intervention. As Weiner notes, CIA in mid-October told Truman there were "no convincing indications" of a Chinese intention "to resort to full-scale intervention."

What Weiner omits is that this report, "Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea," begins with the Agency's assessment that Chinese ground forces "are capable of intervening effectively" in the conflict; that the report discusses the factors arguing for a Chinese intervention, as well as the factors militating against it, concluding that continued covert aid was most likely; and that the last paragraph of the report repeats that "full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility" though it was assessed as "not probable in 1950."

There is sloppy scholarship at the very least in the recounting of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, which in Weiner's hands becomes a tragicomedy, with Frank Wisner ordering Radio Free Europe (RFE) to incite violence against the communist regime and against invading Soviet troops - only to see the uprising crushed. One of Weiner's major sources for his assertion of CIA's culpability is an RFE New York memo, allegedly the result of Wisner's "exhortations" to violence, telling the radio's Hungarian staff in Munich that "All restraints have gone off. No holds barred." It's a significant problem for Weiner's thesis that Wisner in 1956 actually had no direct involvement in RFE and that the memo was pro-

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[12] *CIA in Korea, 1946-1965*, released portions concern only the Korean War period.

[13] At the Truman Library, and available through DDRS, are CIA reports "Situation Summary 1 Sep 50," "Interim Situation Summary 30 September 1950," and "Threat of Full Communist Intervention in Korea," 12 October 1950. All these reports were declassified during 1977-79.

duced *after* the uprising was effectively over and dealt with rhetoric, not violence.

Weiner also points to an RFE broadcast that predicted the United States would come to the aid of Hungarian freedom fighters, without acknowledging that the broadcaster was doing a press review *after* the Soviet invasion and was quoting—by name—a London *Observer* editorial, and that even so this was a violation of RFE policy, or that this was the sole example of an implicit hint of assistance in two weeks of continuous broadcasting to Hungary. The idea that RFE was fomenting violence at the behest of Frank Wisner is not supported either by Weiner's sources or by other sources he failed to cite.[14]

On CIA's analysis of Soviet missile development, Weiner writes, "In 1960, the agency projected [that] the Soviets would have five hundred ICBMS ready to strike by 1961" (page 158), but Moscow in 1961 only had four. This item is often mentioned in reviews of *Legacy of Ashes* as an example of the Agency's total incompetence. How could we get it so wrong, especially after years of U-2 coverage?

The problem is that Weiner got the year wrong: it was in *1957*, three years earlier—not long after the shock of the first Soviet ICBM test and then Sputnik, when Soviet leaders had boasted of turning out rockets "like sausages," and while the U-2 program was in its early stages that CIA and the Intelligence Community (not just CIA) projected 500 Soviet ICBMs in 1961, *four years into the future.*

Weiner failed both to correctly read his secondary source and to check primary sources.[15] If he had been more careful, he would have found that a National Intelligence Estimate in 1960 told the president that the Soviets at that time probably had 10 operational ICBMs and would have 50, at most 200, the following year. In other words, the US Intelligence Community, still animated by worst case analysis as the prudent course, nevertheless used information from CIA's U-2 program to scale back significantly its earlier estimate, and CIA's CORONA satellite program and its intelligence from Oleg Penkovskiy would soon improve that score. This should be considered a success, but Weiner uses it as an occasion to ridicule the Agency.

Enumerating cases of Weiner's selectivity would take another 600 pages, but I will close with the especially egregious incomplete explanation of events surrounding the famous "sixteen words" President Bush used in the 2003 State of the Union address about Saddam Hussein's alleged efforts to purchase uranium in Africa. Weiner, claiming that Bush was making "CIA's case," omits mention of the attribution of the information to British intelligence. Moreover, George Tenet's recent memoir makes it clear that the Agency had removed the assertion from previous speeches and simply had failed to do so for the State of the Union. CIA, in fact, did not support that statement.

Getting Simple Facts Wrong

The errors of fact in *Legacy of Ashes* are numerous and of the kind that a half-way diligent graduate student would spot. Following is a short list:

- OSS was not "barred from seeing the most important intercepted communications" during World War II (page 5); few in any organization could view ULTRA intercepts, but within OSS the X-2 counterintelligence branch had access.

> The errors of fact in *Legacy of Ashes* are numerous and of the kind that a half-way diligent graduate student would spot.

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[14] Weiner cites, for example, Arch Puddington's definitive *Broadcasting Freedom* (University Press of Kentucky, 2000) but unaccountably seems unaware, or chose not to use, A. Ross Johnson's paper, available on the Woodrow Wilson Center's Web site, "Setting the Record Straight: The Role of Radio Free Europe in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956," December 2006.

[15] Weiner relied on Raymond Garthoff, "Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities," in *Watching the Bear*, 135–86. The actual estimates have long been available for serious researchers in Donald Steury, ed., *Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950–1983* (Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, 1996).

Weiner gets better during the period when he started covering intelligence as a reporter.

- The distinction between the espionage and covert action missions did not emerge in the postwar period (page 11) but years earlier was already part of the organizing principle of OSS; the Secret Intelligence branch handled what would later be called HUMINT, and various other branches were responsible for paramilitary and other covert activity.

- The 1949 CIA Act did not provide the Agency with the legal authority to conduct covert action (page 40)—that legislation concerned DCI authorities regarding personnel, secrecy, and unvouchered funds (which certainly helped operations remain covert); the Agency construed its covert action authority from admittedly vague language in the 1947 National Security Act and from Executive Orders.

- Weiner obviously read (and quotes from) my *Studies in Intelligence* article on the ill-fated flight of Jack Downey and Dick Fecteau in 1952, yet he misrepresented a flight to pick up documents as a mission to "rescue" agents who had radioed for help (page 60).

- The reference to a "CIA colonel" (page 88) is odd; the KGB had colonels, but CIA never had military ranks—though it has employed military officers.

- Weiner also errs when he says that the current director,

Michael Hayden (page 510), is the first active-duty military officer to lead the Agency since the early 1950s—that was Admiral Stansfield Turner (1977).

- Weiner says that the 1950s-era program to encourage Soviet walk-ins outside the USSR, REDCAP, was not effective and had no significant successes by 1956 (page 124). He forgets the two Peters, Pyotr Deriabin and Pyotr Popov, both of whom were immensely important assets.

- The idea that the "Islamic warriors" CIA supported in Afghanistan would later turn on the United States (page xv) fails to make the basic distinction between the Afghan mujahedin, whom the Agency supported, and Arabs who went to Afghanistan in the 1980s— whom CIA did not support.

- John McCone was never a deputy secretary of defense (page 180) and did not, as DCI, begin mass firings (page 188).

So What's Right About Legacy of Ashes?

For all of its profound flaws, bits of *Legacy of Ashes* are not bad (though Weiner has not earned the trust of the careful scholar regarding his sources, so best to check).

Weiner accurately chronicles much of the chaos of the early

days of CIA espionage and covert action, particularly when the Office of Strategic Operations and Office of Policy Coordination were separate entities with separate stations in the field and competing programs (page 33).

I actually agree with Weiner that at some point, though I am not certain where that point is, the dispatch of ethnic agent teams into denied areas was unconscionable, based on the fact—observable to CIA at the time—that so few (about 25 percent) were ever heard from again. At the same time, no one put a gun to the heads of these ethnic agents; they were nationalists, willing to risk their lives (many fought, unheralded, for years as guerillas against the Soviets in their homeland without US help), and we were willing to take the chance that sending them might yield good intelligence or otherwise harm our adversaries. In the high pressure of the early Cold War—when everyone was concerned about communist expansion and no one knew how the struggle would come out— these operations, ill-advised though they may have been, were far more understandable, if not forgivable, than Weiner allows.

Weiner gets better during the period when he started covering intelligence as a reporter (Part Six). His recounting of events in the 1990s—the change in CIA's relationship with the military as a result of the Gulf War, the effect of the "peace dividend" on Agency resources, and the debacle of the Clinton administration's attitudes toward

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My hunch is that Weiner's work will soon be replaced by that of a historian who has seriously attempted to get at more of the "whole truth" of intelligence, rather than some carefully selected bits intended to highlight an interpretation.

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intelligence—seem accurate and useful summaries.

But these few plusses do not overcome the essential fact that *Legacy of Ashes* is a narrowly-focused and biased account. In his preface, Weiner claims to believe that the intelligence profession is critical to national security, but he is likely to have done consideraable damage, as the people who take up the profession will, I fear, have to deal with his inaccuracies and skewed perspectives for years to come.

As to the gap that we in CIA's History Staff hoped to see filled, my hunch, and hope, is that Weiner's work will soon be replaced by that of a historian who has seriously attempted to get at more of the "whole truth" of intelligence, rather than care-fully selected bits intended to highlight an interpretation. Then we will have a history that we can learn from to improve and advance the important work of our nation's security.[16]

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[16] In his acknowledgements, Weiner offered a "tip of the hat to the men and women of the history staff" in the cause of openness. An examination of his notes, however, suggests that he made relatively little use of the fruits of such labors, which seldom produce the biting lines and colorful turns of phrase found in interviews and oral histories, which he most relies on.

The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake

Current

Counterdeception: Principles and Applications for National Security—Michael Bennett and Edward Waltz

General Intelligence

Strategic Intelligence: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government – Volumes 1-5—Loch K. Johnson (ed.)

Historical

Alliance of Enemies: The Untold Story of the Secret American and German Collaboration to End World War II—Agostino von Hassell and Sigrid MacRae

American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA, Watergate & Beyond—E. Howard Hunt

The Enemy Within: A History of Espionage—Terry Crowdy

FDR's 12 Apostles: The Spies Who Paved The Way for The Invasion of North Africa—Hal Vaughn

GATEKEEPER: Memoirs of a CIA Polygraph Examiner—John Sullivan

My Father's Secret War: A Memoir—Linda Franks

The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence—Raymond J. Batvinis

The Politics and Strategy of Clandestine War: Special Operations Executive, 1940–1946—Neville Wylie (ed.)

Spies of the Bible: Espionage in Israel from the Exodus to the Bar Kokhba Revolt—Rose Mary Sheldon

SPY Satellites: and Other Intelligence Technologies That Changed History—Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith A. Hansen

Spying On Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany 1945–1961—Paul Maddrell

ZIGZAG: The Incredible Wartime Exploits of Double Agent Eddie Chapman—Nicholas Booth

Agent ZIGZAG: The True Wartime Story of Eddie Chapman—Lover, Betrayer, Hero, Spy—Ben Macintyre

Intelligence Services Abroad

Collusion: International Espionage and the War On Terror—Carlo Bonini and Giuseppe D'Avanzo

The Litvinenko File: The True Story of A Death Foretold—Martin Sixsmith

Current

Michael Bennett and Edward Waltz, *Counterdeception: Principles and Applications for National Security* (Boston: Artech, House, 2007), 335 pp., end-of-chapter notes, bibliography, charts, index.

Source validation is a critical step in all phases of intelligence. Michael Bennett and Edward Waltz have written a book that asks how one can be sure a source is valid and not deceptive and what can be done when deception is suspected and/or detected? Their answers appear in nine chapters brimming with historical precedent, theories, principles, models, case studies, and documentation. As former CIA officer James Bruce writes in the introduction, "Readers seeking a quick read or a simplistic solution here are bound to be disappointed, but those seeking deeper understanding or high-order complexity that bears on quality intelligence…will be handsomely repaid for the intellectual investment this book demands." Put another way, *Counterdeception* has the imperative substance and narrative elegance of an army training manual.

Although there are myriad endnotes and citations in the text, the 14-item bibliography is in the final section of the first chapter. The implicit suggestion is that familiarity with these sources will help when reading *Counterdeception,* and they are right. If one must choose from their list, Thadeus Holt's *The Deceivers* and R.V. Jones's *Reflections on Intelligence* are good for openers.

After a discussion of the need for counterdeception, the authors devote three chapters to deception itself on the theory that one must understand what it is that must be countered. The next five chapters discuss the principles of counterdeception, nontechnical and technical approaches, the architecture and technologies of counterdeception, the team structure and methods to get the job done, and the challenges of counterdeception in the modern and future global information age.

While most of the text is concerned with the use of the models and theories, there are practical examples such as the section on metadata, which assesses the factors that go into validating human source reporting.[1] Specific ideas and methods are presented for getting the job done.

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[1] "Metadata" is not defined in the narrative but is said elsewhere to be "descriptive statistical information about the elements of a set of data." Just how this applies to human reporting is not intuitively clear and is left unspecified.

Counterdeception is a comprehensive treatment of a long-neglected but currently important subject. Beginners will get the most value from it if it is a text for a class taught by an experienced instructor. As a general admonition, don't just read this book, study it.

General Intelligence

Loch K. Johnson (ed.), ***Strategic Intelligence: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government—Volume 1*** (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 322 pp., end-of-chapter notes, appendix, glossary, index.

Loch K. Johnson (ed.), ***Strategic Intelligence: The Intelligence Cycle—The Flow of Secret Information From Overseas to the Highest Councils of Government—Volume 2*** (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 366 pp., end-of-chapter notes, appendix, glossary, index.

Loch K. Johnson (ed.), ***Strategic Intelligence: Covert Action—Beyond The Veils of Secret Foreign Policy—Volume 3*** (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 332 pp., end-of-chapter notes, appendix, glossary, index.

Loch K. Johnson (ed.), ***Strategic Intelligence: Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism—Defending The Nation Against Hostile Forces***—Volume **4** (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 376 pp., end-of-chapter notes, appendix, glossary, index.

Loch K. Johnson (ed.), ***Strategic Intelligence: Intelligence and Accountability—Safeguards Against The Abuse of Power—Volume 5*** (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 310 pp., end-of-chapter notes, appendix, glossary, index.

The literature of intelligence contains some 10,000 books and many thousands of articles. The views on the nature of the profession expressed in them are often controversial, if not contradictory. Where might one start to get a handle on this complex profession? University of Georgia professor Loch Johnson provides an answer in this five volume set. The 49 original articles by academics and former intelligence officers from four countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Israel—discuss the profession from its modern origins to the present. The first two volumes consider the literature, the study of intelligence in academia, the problems of analysis, the essence of the so-called *intelligence cycle*, recent failures and their implications, the roles of oversight, imagery and signals intelligence, the value of espionage, the contributions of intelligence to globalization, the intelligence-policy nexus, and the value of post mortems. Volume 3 is devoted to the most controversial component of intelligence, covert action. Volume 4 is concerned with counterintelligence and counterterrorism. Volume 5 gives detailed attention to the problems of accountability and safeguards against abuse of power.

These volumes look at "the what" of intelligence, not "the how." Although cases are described to illustrate points, the tradecraft and legal details are not discussed, though aspects can be explored using the references provided. Each volume has extensive appendices that add documentary support.

While the subject of a general *definition* of intelligence is discussed, its context-dependent meanings, with one exception, remain unchallenged. The exception has to do with counterintelligence, which in several articles is said to include responsibility for cryptographic, physical, and personnel security. In practice, these functions are undertaken by separate organizational elements.

Several articles are notable for discussing unconventional topics. Katharina von Kop's *Women in Religious Terrorist Organizations: A Comparative Analysis*, and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones's *The Idea of a European FBI*, are two interesting examples. Similarly, the Israeli experience with covert action, Canadian views on legislative oversight, and the British analysis of the 9/11 failures, add valuable perspective.

The *Strategic Intelligence* volumes draw on the past to offer a broad view of the role intelligence is supposed to play in today's world and the realities of its challenging existence. The conscientious reader will learn of the myriad problems while developing an understanding of the difficult solutions required.

Historical

Agostino von Hassell and Sigrid MacRae, ***Alliance of Enemies: The Untold Story of the Secret American and German Collaboration to End World War II*** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2006), 391 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendices, index.

> The 1996 book *American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler* reproduces 102 documents, nearly all from OSS, on various aspects of German wartime plots, including those to assassinate Hitler, and the hoped for allied assistance.[2] While the principal plotters are identified, there is no narrative on their backgrounds, positions, motivations, conflicts or, in many cases, their executions. Agostino von Hassell adds that missing dimension and additional historical details in *Alliance of Enemies*.
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> After the war, writes von Hassell, "Americans were wholly, blissfully ignorant of what resistance to a totalitarian regime meant....There were no good Germans, only Nazis...and traitors of questionable motivation." (296) Allen Dulles did his best to correct this image in his book, *Germany Underground* (1946), but he was just "tilting at windmills" says von Hassell. Many postwar

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[2] Jürgen Heideking and Christoff Mauch (eds.), *American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).

Germans were contemptuous of the surviving plotters and their families, as von Hassell knows from personal experience: his grandfather was hanged for his efforts.

Alliance of Enemies traces the German resistance movements from prewar days through the war when Admiral Canaris and his Abwehr colleagues, plus the Kreisau Circle, to name two groups, made numerous muddled attempts to assassinate Hitler. Considerable space is devoted to the efforts of Allen Dulles to encourage the "good Germans," as he called them, in their efforts to end the war and form a democratic government. Dulles wanted to help them, but when this option was tabled in Washington, Donovan "reminded Dulles that his assignment was nonpolitical." (205) Dulles quietly ignored his orders and encouraged the *Breakers* group, as it was called, to carry out the notorious plot of 20 July 1944, which Hitler miraculously survived. Von Hassell describes several other OSS operations intended to boost German resisters. One in Turkey, the Dogwood Chain, got out of hand when a network grew to more than 60 agents and was penetrated by the Germans.

The final chapters of the book discuss what von Hassell calls the allied hypocrisy of dealing with the Nazis and collaborators after the war to advance Cold War objectives, while ignoring those who resisted Hitler. He asks rhetorically whether an early peace could have been negotiated had not the policy of *unconditional surrender* been so fiercely followed. Here too, the OSS is recognized for a study by the Research and Analysis Branch, which reported that German opposition to Hitler was "a tribute to human endurance and courage, and a revelation of a great hope." These views too were ignored.

Alliance of Enemies ends with a Churchill quote that WWII was an "unnecessary war." Von Hassell suggests that it might have been avoided had the prewar opposition to Hitler been supported. His view remains one of the unanswerable questions of history.

E. Howard Hunt, ***American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA, Watergate & Beyond*** (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007), 340 pp., photos, index.

American Spy gets off to a poor start, when, on page 1, the author identifies Bob Woodward's Watergate source Deep Throat as Howard (not Mark) Felt. Then, on page 16, Hunt notes that he served in OSS with "Jack Singlaub, who would later become an army general and supreme commander of all forces in Korea," a position General Singlaub never held. Disturbing doubt about the historical accuracy of the book is heightened on page 47 when General Eisenhower is designated president in 1950. The howlers are not confined to US history, as for example, Hunt's comment that "almost all of Spain's gold reserves" were sent to the Soviet Union at the end of the Spanish Civil War (56); they were transferred early in the war by Alexander Orlov.

This pattern of careless errors forces the reader to question the accuracy of Hunt's memoir, which covers his CIA career as chief of station in Mexico, his contributions to covert action operations, including the doomed Bay of Pigs invasion, the Watergate disaster that put him in jail, and his reflections on

the assassination of President Kennedy, in which he casually suggests President Johnson is the man to blame. And, when he opines on the "problem with Langley," implying that the "CIA should recruit more agents (he means officers)," in his image, one is left wondering if a better model might be found.

American Spy has little to recommend it.

Terry Crowdy, **The Enemy Within: A History of Espionage** (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2006), 368 pp,. endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Espionage histories are out of date when published, so it is not surprising that new ones appear periodically. This latest contribution comes from former rock group bassist turned espionage historian, Terry Crowdy. He begins with the ancient Egyptians and biblical stories, and moves through the major periods of history giving examples which show that the principal powers routinely engaged in military and political espionage. There is little new in the book beyond his views on the 9/11 intelligence failures. Crowdy uses mostly secondary sources and he pays the usual price: doubtful assertions and unforced errors. Beyond his persistent use of *agent* when he means *officer*, one is left wondering how he knows "the ancient Indians perfected the use of female spies and agents." Who beyond Crowdy says Wilhelm Stieber was "the Godfather of Secret Service"—a gross exaggeration—and why would Crowdy assert anew that J. Edgar Hoover never passed on information in the famous microdot questionnaire provided by the British double agent TRICYCLE—a false claim that has been conclusively disproven?[3]

And then there are errors closer to home: Philby joined SOE and then SIS, not the other way around, and he was not close to Allen Dulles during the war. (304) MI5 officer Michael Bettaney never worked for the KGB, though he tried hard enough. (330) Turning to the VENONA project, Meredith Gardner did not use "the charred remains of a Russian codebook" to do his pioneering work. Similarly, Julius Rosenberg did not join the "Army Signal Corps"; he was a civilian. (313) Regarding Soviet espionage, Crowdy's claim that Penkovskiy was "sold out" by "two Washington-based KGB double agents, Jack Dunlap and William Whalen" is unlikely, undocumented, and, in any case, neither was a double agent. (319) Careless errors in the recent material suggest caution throughout. Perhaps the paperback edition will be an improvement.

Hal Vaughan, **FDR's 12 Apostles: The Spies Who Paved The Way for The Invasion of North Africa** (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2006), 311 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

At age 92, Polish Major General Rygor Slowikowski published his memoirs to set the record straight.[4] The official British intelligence history in WWII had not mentioned him or *Agency Africa*, the intelligence unit he established in

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[3] See, Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the* CIA (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1980).
[4] Rygor Slowikowski, *In the Secret Service: The Lighting of the Torch* (London: Windrush, 1988).

1941 for the British in North Africa. OSS histories were no better. They not only ignored *Agency Africa*, they took credit for much of its work. Finally, what intelligence successes the British and OSS didn't claim, the American vice counsels in North Africa did. Slowikowsi's historical challenge was largely ignored at the time. *FDR's 12 Apostles* corrects the injustice and provides a detailed, stimulating account of the complex military, diplomatic, and intelligence relations among the allied government, the cantankerous Charles de Gaulle, the Vichy French, and numerous underground groups of various political persuasions.

Author Hal Vaughan, himself a former foreign service officer, describes how President Franklin Roosevelt recognized the need for intelligence about French North Africa long before the United States was in the war and before there was a US foreign intelligence service. In September 1940, the president personally selected and instructed diplomat Robert Murphy to go to Africa and assess the intentions of Vichy policy and not to inform the State Department of his mission. His report of the situation led to recruitment, with the cooperation of military intelligence, and serial dispatch to ports in North Africa, of 12 vice-consuls, beginning in spring 1941. Their cover mission was trade. Their actual mission was to collect intelligence on the ports, shipping, and the local political situation. Soon tagged the 12 Apostles, these amateur agents performed well. *FDR's 12 Apostles* tells how they did it. The emphasis is on their performance after the US entry into the war required cooperation with the British, OSS, *Agency Africa*, and various French resistance elements in preparation for Operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa.

Hal Vaughan tells an exciting, well-documented story that sets the record straight: General Slowikowksi would be proud.

John Sullivan, ***GATEKEEPER: Memoirs of A CIA Polygraph Examiner*** (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), photos, index.

The polygraph is a controversial subject both in the Intelligence Community and in many outside organizations. The National Academy of Sciences, has consistently declared it unreliable, while other government organizations rely on it. GATEKEEPER examines the controversy from the point of view of career CIA polygraph examiner, John Sullivan.

Sullivan's story begins in the late 1940s with the introduction of the polygraph as a standard practice in screening potential employees and reassessing staff and contractors for security purposes. He also discusses how the technique is applied to potential and recruited agents. Sullivan goes to great lengths to demonstrate that polygraphy is just one tool in the process and that it seeks to identify deceptive behavior, not detect lies. The examiner does not make the final decision on whether the subject has passed, though his recommendation is important.

GATEKEEPER comments on examiner training, the subjective aspect of the process, the propriety of questions, how examiners reach their conclusions, the dangers of false-positive results, and the distressing fact that subjects

beat the machine. He offers many examples that describe various scenarios encountered. These include what happens when deception is indicated, what happens when the results are inconclusive, and how follow-up interrogations are conducted when required. One case he offers to illustrate the challenges is that of Cuban CIA agents whose examinations were showing signs of deception; the examiner's recommendations were disregarded, with unfortunate consequences.

Sullivan uses his own career to illustrate how one becomes a polygrapher, the career options available, the areas of conflict that can occur, and what his experience has shown are the necessary personality characteristics of a reliable examiner. In response to those who argue that the polygraph has never caught a spy, Sullivan points to the Sharon Scranage and Harold Nicholson cases. In both instances, the polygraph alerted counterintelligence officers to improper contacts with foreigners; each went to jail. He is equally candid about the problems associated with the testing of Aldrich Ames.

GATEKEEPER also looks at the organizational growth of the Polygraph Division and the impact of the digital world on operations. The sometimes contentious relationship with various elements of the Office of Security and the Intelligence Community over the years is also discussed. Overall, he gives an insightful view of the problems the polygraph experience creates and the extensive efforts undertaken to minimize their impact on the subjects.

No other book gives such a comprehensive look at the polygraph and its utility as a security tool in the community. It should reduce the apprehension of both prospective and staff employees, while raising the anxiety level of would-be penetrators.

Linda Franks, ***My Father's Secret War: A Memoir*** (New York: Miramax Books, 2007), 320 pp., photos, index.

In his memoir, *My Father the Spy*, John Richardson tells of the personal and family problems that can result when a child learns his father has been an intelligence officer, not a government bureaucrat with the Department of Agriculture.[5] In *My Father's Secret War*, Linda Franks, the first woman to win a Pulitzer Prize for national reporting, relates how long after she was married, with children of her own, she came to suspect and then confirm that her father had been an OSS officer. She tells of his experiences in Europe, where he conducted surreptitious entries, interrogated concentration camp prisoners, and participated in *Operation Paperclip*, the program to recruit German scientists to work for America. He was then sent to the Far East.

But the real story is how she learned the details—in jumps and starts through interviews, old letters, and archival searches. As she put the pieces together she convinced her father to elaborate on what she had learned. She was hampered by his chronic passion for secrecy and his oncoming dementia. The

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[5] Hayden Peake, "The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf," *Studies in Intelligence* 50, No. 1 *(March 2006)*.

story is told roughly in the fashion that she learned it herself, with new facts popping up in between a busy family schedule—her husband is the New York City district attorney and she is a fulltime journalist. Franks makes no attempt to generalize her experiences, they are admittedly unique. But the issues of secrecy and pressures on an intelligence officer she raises are worth contemplating.

Raymond J. Batvinis, *The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 332 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

In 1908 the Justice Department formed a Bureau of Investigation (BOI) to deal with bankruptcy, fraud, and anti-trust violations. During WW I the BOI worked with the military intelligence services to counter domestic security and German espionage. After the war, it broadened its mandate to investigate a nationwide series of bombings, one of which blew up the front of the attorney general's house near Dupont Circle, Washington, DC, killing only the bomber. Assuming the bombs were the work of alien anarchists and communists, people panicked. The task of keeping records on these subversive elements was assigned in August 1920 to the attorney general's special assistant, J. Edgar Hoover. In 1924, Hoover was appointed director of the BOI, with instructions to limit bureau activities to violations of federal law. In 1933, the bureau was tasked with investigating the new threat of Nazi propaganda in America, and in 1934 the mandate was extended to communist activities. The BOI became the FBI in 1935. From these beginnings, former special agent Ray Batvinis tells how the bureau became the nation's domestic counterintelligence agency.

The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence describes the bumpy CI road Hoover encountered until the end of WW II. The initial attempts to counter Nazi espionage were only partially succesful—most of the spies escaped. As war drew near, Hoover engaged in a series of turf battles with the War and Navy Departments that eventually solidified the bureau's position as the lead counterintelligence agency. By 1941, German and Japanese espionage in America had been neutralized, and gradually the bureau's attention turned to the threat of communism, whose agents by that time had penetrated all important elements of the government and the defense.

Batvinis forthrightly tells the story of how the FBI developed techniques for dealing with foreign espionage. He describes the successful methods devised to "follow the money," and the wire tapping program based solely on the president's authority, contrary to recent law prohibiting the practice, and without informing Congress. One chapter is devoted to "opportunities missed," describing cases that, had they been handled properly, could have put an end to communist espionage in America and England before the war.

As the war in Europe approached, the bureau undertook a series of overseas assignments that led to the formation of the Special Intelligence Service, a secret FBI element that carried out political counterespionage in the Western hemisphere during WW II; the first foreign intelligence service in America's history.

The growth of the FBI counterintelligence program was aided by the British before and during the war, and Batvinis devotes a chapter to that sometimes stormy effort. Curiously, the well-known conflicts with the OSS are barely mentioned; OSS doesn't even appear in the index.

Only a few errors stand out in *Origins*: Patton was not yet the 3rd Army commander before the invasion; Alger Hiss began his prison sentence in March 1951, not January 1949; and Gaik Ovakimian did not recruit the Rosenbergs in 1938 or at any other time. That feat was accomplished by Konstantin Chugunov in September 1942, long after Ovakimian returned to the Soviet Union.[6]

The book's final chapter covers the DUCASE, the story of how the FBI used a double agent to identify, capture, and convict over 30 Nazi agents. It was a singular success and later became the basis of the movie, *The House on 92nd Street*.

For those interested in how the FBI crafted its niche in the American national security program, *Origins of FBI Counterintelligence* is the place to start.

Neville Wylie (ed.), ***The Politics and Strategy of Clandestine War: Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946*** (New York: Routledge, 2007), 214 pp., end-of-chapter notes, index.

In 1950, when actor and wartime naval intelligence officer Douglas Fairbanks Jr. was in need of a butler, "suitably trained staff" was hard to find. The only applicant was referred on the condition that no references would be requested. The interview went well, and Denis Rake was "engaged on the spot." While sorting the mail one day, Fairbanks found a letter addressed to Major Denis Rake, MC (Military Cross).. When queried, the butler reluctantly revealed his heroic SOE career. Like all SOE officers, Rake had been sworn to secrecy and for years held his tongue.[7] Thus, except for a few official accounts on SOE operations in specific countries,[8] plus some heavily edited memoirs, operational secrecy prevailed until the late 1990s when what remained of the wartime files were released to the public. Neville Wylie and his contributors have exploited these records for this volume.

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[6] Alexander Feklisov, *The Man Behind the Rosenbergs* (New York: Enigma Books, 2001), 109.

[7] Denis Rake, *Rake's Progress* (London: Leslie Frewin, 1968), Foreword by Douglas Fairbanks Jr., KBE, DSC. Rake was one of the SOE officers Virginia Hall helped in Lyon, France.

[8] See for example, M.R.D. Foot, ***SOE in France*** (London: HMSO, 1966).

The first two articles discuss how some SOE records survived end-of-the-war orders to destroy files. Another looks at the impact of communist infiltration of SOE Cairo in the person of James Klugman, the outspoken communist from Cambridge University. SOE involvement in European political warfare and foreign currency transactions are covered in separate contributions. Four of the 10 articles are about SOE operations in the Balkans, India, Spain, and the Middle East that have received little previous attention. The Middle East study describes the intense turf wars that limited operational successes and post-occupational planning issues with contemporary relevance. The article on the *Massingham* mission—the contentious first effort of OSS and SOE to operate jointly—shows how Donovan battled both the British and the US military to keep OSS alive.

In a time when lessons from earlier clandestine wars may guide current thinking, this is a welcome contribution.

Rose Mary Sheldon, ***Spies of the Bible: Espionage in Israel from the Exodus to the Bar Kokhba Revolt*** (St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing, 2007), 304 pp., endnotes, bibliography, glossary, maps, index.

In his book, *The Craft of Intelligence*, Allen Dulles used Biblical illustrations of "intelligence-gathering" to establish the "historical setting."[9] His point was that intelligence has ancient origins; he didn't question the truth of the biblical accounts. That challenging task is the subject of *Spies of the Bible*.

The book considers "intelligence activities" as they were practiced in ancient Israel, from the entry of the Hebrews into Canaan to the expulsion of the Jews from Roman Palestine about 1,000 years ago. Recognizing that the books of the Bible were written long after the events they describe, Professor Sheldon takes a different approach. While some historians "base their narratives on a literal reading of the Book of Joshua," she integrates "the accounts of the Bible, the archeological evidence, and recent literary studies in an attempt to see what they tell us about the intelligence history of Palestine." (15) She asks whether the events described took place where and when the Bible claims and then compares various accounts with those of Jewish, Greek, and Roman historians. Since most ancient intelligence involved military battles, Professor Sheldon provides the historical detail to understand the circumstances of the times and the intelligence requirements they generated.

The book has two parts. The first deals with spies of the Old Testament; the second with the battles the Jews fought during Roman occupation. A "postscript" at the end of each part summarizes her findings, and for those with little background in the subject, these might well be read first for context.

Spies of the Bible concludes that many of the espionage tales of the Bible didn't take place, at least as described. Professor Sheldon provides ample evidence to support her conclusions and in the process questions the historians who have "been so reluctant to benefit from the last fifty years of

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[9] Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), 10ff.

research in archaeology or biblical and literary criticism," allowing legends to exercise "great power over the minds of people." (124) As to the existence of spies in ancient times, Professor Sheldon argues that the documented military battles make their existence a practical necessity, but the best the historian can do with regard to specifics is make "an educated guess." *Spies of the Bible* is a bold attempt to do just that.

Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith A. Hansen, ***SPY Satellites: and Other Intelligence Technologies That Changed History*** (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2007), 162 pp., endnotes, bibliography, no index.

Monitoring the spread of nuclear weapons has been a strategic problem since the end of WWII. Soviet secrecy and refusal to allow overflights or onsite inspections spurred the development of the U-2 and eventually photo-satellites to do the job. In 1963, the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed. Subsequently, a series of negotiations produced additional agreements and, by 1993, reductions by both sides. *SPY Satellites* tells the story of these events. Keith Hansen was a CIA arms control analyst who worked with the data needed to monitor nuclear weapons programs. Thomas Graham was the general counsel for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, where he was concerned with verification—determining whether the monitoring data indicated compliance and what to do when violations were indicated.

The authors' narrative is not technical. They track the progress of the various agreements—in which verification was always a contentious issue—and the collection of monitoring data by what was euphemistically termed National Technical Means (NTM), now openly acknowledged as satellites (photo and signal). At the time, this approach avoided illegal overflight and security issues. *SPY Satellites* also shows how the complexity of both monitoring and verification increased with the development of chemical and biological weapons and with improvements in existing weapons and delivery means. Chapter 8 deals with monitoring "would-be proliferators," including terrorists, planning to join the nuclear club. These circumstances reveal both the strengths and limitations of NTM while making the case for additional monitoring techniques, which in turn complicates the legal issues.

For those wishing to know how NTM contributed to the end of the Cold War and to learn about the demands placed on them by the war against terror, *SPY Satellites* is an excellent place to start.

Paul Maddrell, ***Spying On Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany 1945-1961*** (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), 330 pp., footnotes, bibliography, index.

More than 2 million refugees from East Germany reached the West between the years 1945 and 1961. Each one was questioned and those with information of military, economic, political or scientific value were interrogated by the allied intelligence services. Defectors, former POWs, and attachés received similar but separate attention. In addition, traditional agents, special technical collection teams, mail interception units, and

telecommunications monitoring were also used. *Spying on Science* focuses on the scientific intelligence obtained from these sources and the beneficial results for Western military capabilities.

Chapters on each method of collection describe in detail the techniques used, the types of targets involved, the division of labor, and the roles of the various civilian and military intelligence services—Great Britain, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—and the political interactions guiding collection policies. In each case the reactions of the Soviet Union and East Germany intended to counter the Western espionage offensive are factored in.

In the summary and often redundant chapter on the uses of the intelligence gathered, Maddrell argues that substantial monetary benefits resulted from the intelligence, citing, though without examples, the $500,000 savings attributed to input from GRU agent Peter Popov. Maddrell gives only one example of a positive outcome from human intelligence: the improved knowledge of the location of Soviet airfields and military installations. In fact, much of this chapter is devoted to the high-quality intelligence acquired from other sources, SIGINT, aerial reconnaissance, and *Operation Paperclip*, to name a few. Though he concludes that "returnees and Soviet defectors also provided an unprecedented insight into the Soviet system of war-related scientific research and development," he is short on specifics here too. Maddrell gives the impression that the tremendous human intelligence effort he describes was less productive than he implied at the outset. *Spying on Intelligence* leaves the reader asking, was it worth the effort?

Nicholas Booth, ***ZIGZAG: The Incredible Wartime Exploits of Double Agent Eddie Chapman*** (London: Piatkus Books, Ltd., 2007), 360 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Ben Macintyre, ***Agent ZIGZAG: The True Wartime Story of Eddie Chapman—Lover, Betrayer, Hero, Spy*** (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, PLC, 2007), 372 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

Arnold Edward Chapman—former Coldstream Guardsman, movie extra, wrestler, nightclub owner, con-man and safe cracker—was in a Jersey jail when Germans occupied the Channel Islands in 1940. He promptly volunteered to become an Abwehr (German security service) agent and work for them in England. They accepted and gave him the codename FRITZ. After training, Chapman was inserted by parachute near Oxford and immediately turned himself in to MI5 and revealed his mission. The British knew he was coming because they had been reading the Abwehr ENIGMA traffic on FRITZ—part of the ULTRA material—and his story checked out. When Chapman offered to become an MI5 agent, they accepted and named him ZIGZAG.

Using MI5's facilities, Chapman established communications with his Abwehr case officer and began feeding carefully selected data from the Double Cross committee to his German masters. After his recall to the continent for debriefing and training, Chapman was again parachuted into England to

continue his work. He was ordered to blow up a factory, a task he convincingly faked with MI5 help. This pattern of espionage and counterespionage continued until 1944, when his services were no longer in demand. The Germans awarded Chapman the Iron Cross for his efforts; the British treated him shabbily and never officially recognized him.

Both books are based on primary sources on Chapman's wartime exploits, but the overlap ends there. Ben Macintyre has little to say about Chapman's pre- and-postwar life. Nicholas Booth had the cooperation of Chapman's wife and family, and his story is full of details about his origins, his numerous failed business ventures, his female admirers, his Rolls Royce, and his long, but successful, battles to publish his memoirs and make a movie about his double- agent life.[10]

Ewen Montagu (author of *The Man Who Never Was*) characterized Eddie Chapman as "a rogue but a very brave man." Denis Clift, president of the National Defense Intelligence College, said in an address at Harvard University, Eddie was "just the sort of person intelligence agencies would need in the twenty-first century." (321) *ZIGZAG* was a successful double agent, and his story is worth reading for that reason alone.

Intelligence Services Abroad

Carlo Bonini and Giuseppe D'Avanzo, ***Collusion: International Espionage and the War On Terror*** (Hoboken, NJ: Melville House Publishing, 2007), 245 pp., endnotes, appendix, index.

In June 2001 a shipment of 60,000 aluminum tubes destined for Iraq was intercepted in Jordan. A dispute arose in the US Intelligence Community over whether the tubes were intended for use in a centrifuge for enriching uranium or whether they were to be used in construction of rockets. If the former, Iraq would need concentrated uranium (yellowcake). When, in 2002, reporting "from a foreign service" indicated that Iraq was "vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake from Africa," it was the basis of a statement in an NIE that Iraq "had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program." Several months later it was discovered that the documents on which the foreign service based its reports were forgeries, and they were recalled.[11] Then, in February 2003, an Egyptian terrorist, Abu Omar, was kidnapped in Milan, Italy. How are these events linked? What damage did they cause? Italian investigative journalists Carlo Bonini and Giuseppe D'Avanzo, present answers in *Collusion.*

The link between these events, the authors assert, was the Italian intelligence service. With regard to the tubes, the Italians knew they were intended for an Iraqi adaptation of the Italian Medusa 8 air-to-ground missile system, but

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[10] Eddie Chapman, *The Eddie Chapman Story* (London: Allan Wingate, 1954); *The Real Eddie Chap- man Story* (London: Tandem, 1966). The movie starred Christopher Plummer as Eddie and Gert Frobe (Goldfinger himself) as Chapman's Abwehr controller. It was not an Academy Award contender.
[11] Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Report to the President* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 58.

they did not tell the Americans until November 2003. In the interim, some Intelligence Community elements concluded they were part of the putative Iraqi nuclear program. The yellowcake story is more complicated. It involves a group of known fabricators who provided documents that indicated Iraqi attempts to procure yellowcake. More disturbing, the authors charge that officials in several countries suspected that the documents the group had generated were forgeries. The kidnapping story is more complicated still. Abu Omar was abducted because it was thought, after a secret meeting between Americans from the US Defense Department and Iranians in Rome, that he could establish a link between Iraq and al-Qa'ida. The authors provide some complicated political explanations for the Italian behavior in each instance.

Collusion is well documented, well told and provides an explanation for some of the confused intelligence reporting leading to the war in Iraq.

Martin Sixsmith, *The Litvinenko File: The True Story of A Death Foretold* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007), 320 pp., color photos, no index.

In his book, *Blowing Up Russia*, former KGB officer Alexander Litvinenko accused the Russian government of blaming Chechen terrorists for bombing a Moscow apartment building in 1999 when elements of the domestic security service (FSB) had been responsible.[12] Four years later, Litvinenko was dead of polonium 210 poisoning. In *The Litvinenko File*, BBC Moscow correspondent Martin Sixsmith sets out to explain how and why Litvinenko was killed, and who was responsible. He does a plausible job on the former but leaves the answer to the latter in a haze of speculation.

Based entirely on interviews, Sixsmith reviews Litvinenko's life in Russia. After a promising start in the KGB, according to Sixsmith, Litvinenko's career began to falter when he refused to assassinate the so-called oligarch, Boris Berezovsky, a claim the FSB vigorously denies. Litvinenko was forced to escape to England, where he went to work for Berezovsky himself. After reconstructing the itinerary that led to Litvinenko's poisoning and identifying the various players involved, Sixsmith concludes that the Russian government was not directly involved in the death. But he is unable to explain how the polonium got to England or who it was that administered it. Thus, despite the implication of the subtitle, the "truth" about Litvinenko's assassination remains a mystery. *The Litvinenko File* will likely become a cold case before it can, if ever, be closed.

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[12] Alexander Litvinenko and Yuri Felshtinsky, *Blowing Up Russia: Terror From Within* (New York: S.P.I. Books, 2002).