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

Perspectives on Artificial Intelligence
Devil's Advocacy
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Intelligence in Public Media

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Cover image: General Marshall meeting with General MacArthur and others in New Guinea in 1943. Photo courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

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Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf—December 2023
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George C. Marshall as Special Envoy to China, December 1945 to January 1947

David Robarge

Truman recalled his brief telephone conversation with Marshall: "Without any preparation, I told him: 'General, I want you to go to China for me.' Marshall said only, 'Yes, Mr. President,' and hung up abruptly."

Editor's note: *David Robarge is CIA's chief historian. This article is an adaptation of a chapter drawn from his* The Soldier-Statesman in the Secret World: George C. Marshall and Intelligence in War and Peace *(Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2023, which is available at https://cia.gov/resources/csi/books-monographs/the-soldier-statesman-in-the-secret-world-george-c-marshall-and-intelligence-in-war-and-peace/). This chapter describes Marshall's continuing service to the United States after he retired more than 40 years, including two world wars, after first pinning on his second lieutenant's bars in 1902.*

The challenge Marshall accepted just months after the war against Japan ended in September 1945 was to attempt to negotiate an end to the civil war that had been raging between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the ruling Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (KMT), since the early 1920s. During his 13 months of effort, he would be frustrated by both sides and, although he was aware that the CCP had planted agents in KMT organizations, he could not have known how his efforts were damaged by at least one secret CCP operative, a stenographer in the KMT's Executive Secretariat.

The Call to Serve Again—in China

On November 18, 1945, Gen. George C. Marshall retired from active service in the US Army. The next day, President Truman appointed him as a special envoy to China, partly to mitigate a political flap that the intemperate resignation of the blustery US ambassador, Patrick Hurley, had caused. President Roosevelt had sent Hurley to China in 1944 to stop the feuding between Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party) and Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Hurley angrily resigned on November 6, 1945, after his negotiations failed; he blamed "communist sympathizers" in the State Department.

Marshall, hoping for a respite at his home in Leesburg, Virginia, from the strains of running the Army in the just-won war, instead reluctantly embarked on an unsuccessful, 13-month–long mission to parley a rapprochement between Chiang and Mao. President Harry S. Truman recalled his brief telephone conversation with Marshall: "Without any preparation, I told him: 'General, I want you to go to China for me.' Marshall said only, 'Yes, Mr. President,' and hung up abruptly."[1]

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

Marshall with Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer in China, December 1945. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

Marshall left on December 14, one day after finishing his lengthy testimony before the Congressional Pearl Harbor Committee, for a multistop, five-day airplane journey across the Pacific. Notwithstanding the administration's overt assertions, he was not charged with being a neutral arbiter. Recounting a private conversation with Truman, Marshall

> *stated that my understanding of one phase of my directive was not in writing but I thought I had a clear understanding of his desires in the matter, which was that in the event that I was unable to secure the necessary action by the Generalissimo, which I thought reasonable and desirable, it would still be necessary for the U.S. Government, through me, to continue to back the National Government of the Republic of China—through the Generalissimo within the terms of the announced policy of the U.S. Government. The President stated that the foregoing was a correct summation of his direction regarding that possible development of the situation."*[2]

Marshall brought with him some experience in the complexities of China's domestic scene gained while he was stationed there during 1924–27. Just over two years into his tour, he wrote to Pershing:

> *How the Powers should deal with China is a question almost impossible to answer. There has been so much wrongdoing on both sides, so much of shady transaction between a single power and a single party; there is so much of bitter hatred in the hearts of these people and so much of important business interests involved that a normal solution can never be found. It will be some form of an evolution, and we can only hope that sufficient tact and wisdom will be displayed by foreigners to avoid violent phases during the trying period that is approaching.*[3]

Marshall was determined to employ that tact and wisdom in his attempt to secure an accord between the KMT and the CCP. Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, who had replaced Gen. Joseph Stillwell as commander of the China Theater, greeted Marshall with a dismal assessment:

> *He would never be able to effect a working arrangement between the Communists and the Nationalists since the Nationalists, who still had most of the power, were determined not to relinquish one iota of it, while the Communists for their part were equally determined to seize all power, with the aid of the Soviet Union. General Marshall reacted angrily and said: "I am going to accomplish my mission, and you are going to help me."*[4]

At the time, the United States found itself, in the words of influential commentator Walter Lippmann, in "a horrible dilemma—to become entangled by intervention in China's civil war, or to get out of China in such a way as to leave China hopelessly divided, and dangerously weak."[5] Operating, as Marshall put it, "between the rock and the whirlpool," and with only a small support staff, he participated in 300 meetings with leaders of the rival forces in an immensely frustrating attempt to end a civil war, eliminate the CCP army, and prod both sides to build a coalition government.[6]

Despite exceptional effort and after some early, sporadic successes—most notably, arranging a cease-fire after only a few weeks—Marshall failed to achieve what he had set out to do. Chiang and Mao were both obdurate negotiators, but Mao, at least superficially, showed more flexibility, and Chiang knew that Washington would support him against the Maoists in the end, so he had little reason to make needed compromises and reforms.

Marshall returned to the United States in January 1947 with very little to immediately show for the stressful time he had spent in China—"a tale of earnest perseverance and ultimate disillusionment," wrote one historian.[7] The lack of proximate accomplishments notwithstanding, another

historian called Marshall's mission "one of his greatest services to the American people." In part because of the firm stand Marshall took with Chiang and his resistance to pressure from certain conservative politicians, media outlets, and business and religious leaders in the United States, the Truman administration did not intervene to aid Chiang's KMT, which, despite its apparent military superiority over the CCP, was "busily digging their own graves and trying to pull us in with them."[8]

The American Intelligence Muddle

While in China, along with the rigors and vexations of mediating with the warring adversaries, Marshall also had to deal with some serious matters concerning US intelligence services' activities and their clashing authorities. He assumed his position soon after Truman had dissolved OSS on October 1, and its espionage and counterintelligence elements were placed in the War Department in a new component called the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). The China branch of OSS had established itself in Shanghai in Wedemeyer's headquarters since late October 1944. Soon after Wedemeyer took charge, he advised Marshall that "One outstanding weakness in [the] Allied war effort in China is the fact that there are so many different [intelligence] agencies operating independently and uncoordinated, running at cross purposes, competing for limited Hump tonnage and altogether confusing the situation."

Those organizations included OSS (which had developed a relationship with the communists), various separate Army and Navy elements, the service attaches, the Joint (Army-Navy) Intelligence Collection Agency, and US diplomats. That chaotic arrangement had improved somewhat by the time Marshall arrived, but with China an important target for US intelligence after the war, confusion persisted in some areas of operation, causing difficulties with intelligence support to Marshall during his early negotiations and in his relations with the Chinese Communists later on.[9]

The intelligence situation in China, Marshall told his successor as Army Chief of Staff, Dwight Eisenhower, in January 1946 was "unsatisfactory."

The intelligence situation in China, Marshall told his successor as Army Chief of Staff, Dwight Eisenhower, in January 1946 was "unsatisfactory." He was receiving a surfeit of hard-to-reconcile reporting from the intelligence components of the Army, Navy, State Department, and SSU; "there have been too many separate agencies reporting on China which is bound to create confusion, may easily lead to unfortunate leaks and requires too much of my time to examine to see if erroneous impressions may be given." To partially address the situation, he asked Eisenhower to put G-2's China activities under the supervision of the military attache, which the new Chief of Staff did. More serious was the disarray and lack of coordination among US intelligence elements in Mukden, the largest city in Manchuria, the most fought-over region in the Communist–Nationalist conflict.

> *The military attaché was antagonistic to the SSU senior, his side was accused of being pro-Soviet while the SSU was accused of being pro-Kuomintang. Both were criticizing each other and declining to pool or cooperate. . . . The American Consul General, a very fine fellow, was sitting in the middle of this unfortunate American muddle in the center of the most delicate region in the world, possibly, at this moment.*

Marshall employed his familiar management approach of consolidating control in one place.

> *I therefore directed that all United States intelligence agencies in Manchuria be coordinated by the Consul General. I anticipate that there may be objection from* [Army General and Director of Central Intelligence Hoyt] *Vandenberg's new agency* [the Central Intelligence Group]*, but while I recognize its independency [sic] from one point of view, I cannot accept its independence unless it goes completely under cover, which will take time and the introduction of new personnel. I also anticipate some disagreement from your G-2, but again I cannot accept the responsibility for action out here with such fumbling and almost public muddling as inevitably goes on under divided control.*[10]

Marshall further complained that the intelligence he was receiving was poor in quality and arrived too late to aid him in the negotiations. He told Eisenhower that "I need immediate radio Top Secret code reports if I am to be benefited in my work in this

Marshall now evidently saw value in having the SSU as an intelligence provider supporting his negotiations and rethought his earlier position about closing it down.

manner." To G-2 Chief Bissell he wrote: "What I would appreciate are frequent evaluations of world matters as they effect [sic] China, Manchuria in particular."[11]

A major point of contention arose around that time when Zhou Enlai, Mao's lead representative in the talks, complained to Marshall about SSU's spying on the Chinese Communists in northern China and Manchuria.[a] Initially uncertain whether he should accede to CCP demands that the SSU withdraw, Marshall sought advice from the principal US officials involved with intelligence in China. John King Fairbank, a former OSS analyst who was then chief of the US Information Service in China, was critical of the SSU. Conversely, Col. Ivan Yeaton, head of the US Army Observer Group (the Dixie Mission) in Mao's stronghold of Yenan and an expert on Chinese Communism, supported continued SSU operations in northern and eastern China.[b,12]

Presumably hoping to move the talks along, Marshall deferred to Chou and encouraged Wedemeyer to stop SSU activities in those areas. Wedemeyer, who wanted the SSU to remain operational, did not respond immediately but then grudgingly recommended deactivating it. During his trip to Washington, DC, during March–April 1946 for consultations, Marshall got into a back-and-forth with the JCS, which at first opposed Wedemeyer's recommendation but reversed itself after Marshall met with them. The War Department's Operations Division then weighed in on the SSU's side after SSU leadership told it that the organization "was furnishing practically all the intelligence emanating from the China Theater and also the intra-China radio net of SSU was a valuable asset."

At this point, Marshall backed off, saying that "he was not familiar enough with the situation and desired to leave the decision on the continuance of SSU to General Wedemeyer," who changed his mind and allowed the SSU to remain.[13]

Marshall now evidently saw value in having the SSU as an intelligence provider supporting his negotiations and rethought his earlier position about closing it down. After the War Department deactivated the China Theater effective on May 1, 1946, the SSU's headquarters office in China continued operating until the beginning of July. After that, the SSU's China personnel reported to its headquarters in Washington and got logistical and liaison support from the Army, but they preferred that the Navy's Seventh Fleet take over command of their organization. Marshall agreed and sent this message to Wedemeyer in early July:

> *Some form of China SSU organization after 30 September is desirable for essential intelligence coverage, and its continuation under limited control and full logistic support of Seventh Fleet may be necessary. However, realistic steps should be taken to reconstitute it as an undercover agency if possible, particularly if we are to avoid Chinese Government's right to press for a similar unit in United States or avoid Soviet right to establish similar unit in China. At present, SSU in China lacks cover as counter espionage agency and is of definite value only as an intelligence unit.*[14]

a. Shortly before arriving in China, Marshall had to deal with a similar flap involving Soviet complaints about OSS operations in Manchuria. In August 1945, an OSS team codenamed Cardinal was dropped into Mukden to learn about Soviet activities in the region and to track down POWs. The Soviets ordered the OSS unit out of its occupation zone. Marshall initially wanted to file a formal protest, but after receiving further information about the situation, he relented and instructed US commanders in China and the Soviet Union to "take no actions . . . concerning this matter," thus ending OSS's collection efforts in Soviet-occupied Manchuria. Yu, 242–47.

b. As Chief of Staff, Marshall had encouraged President Roosevelt to dispatch the Dixie Mission, hoping that it would acquire useful intelligence and help American pilots who had crashed behind Japanese lines evade capture. Roosevelt's message to Chiang read: "Thank you for the steps you have initiated as stated in your message of February 22 to facilitate our plan for sending American observers into North China to gain more accurate information regarding large Japanese concentrations there and in Manchuria. The area of North and Northeast China should be a particularly fruitful source of important military intelligence of the Japanese. We shall therefore plan the dispatch of the observer mission in the near future." Marshall stayed at the unit's spartan outpost in Yenan when he met with Mao in March 1946. One of the mission's original members, S. Herbert Hitch, was on Marshall's staff during the negotiations. Yeaton advised Chou about Marshall's personality and encouraged him to set up a "war room" so Marshall would take him and the Communists seriously (the Americans helped build it). Yeaton also instructed Marshall about the Communists' ideology and goals and accompanied him to the meeting with Mao.(For sources see endnote 12.)

However, Marshall did not want to have any direct tie to the SSU to avoid displeasing the KMT, the CCP, or the Soviets. Chiang and the KMT were concerned that the continued operation of a US intelligence service in China violated its sovereignty; the CCP had already protested to Marshall about SSU activities in north China and Manchuria; and the Soviets had demonstrated their hostility to US intelligence operations in the north since the end of the war. The SSU chief in China reported that "Marshall and [Henry] Byroade [head of Marshall's executive headquarters in Peking] have stated that they want nothing to do with SSU directly, although all admit [the] value of our work."

In late July, Marshall indicated his preference that the Navy's Seventh Fleet "assume control and support of SSU China as soon as practicable in order to disassociate officers in the military advisory and executive groups from connection with an intelligence agency." That occurred on September 30, and SSU/China was renamed External Survey Group 44 and then External Survey Detachment 44, or ESD 44. The Washington-based Central Intelligence Group, created on January 1, 1946, as OSS's successor, took charge of ESD 44's finances. All elements of the SSU were eventually integrated into CIA, which was established in September 1947.[15]

Three-Sided Intelligence Intrigues

As the negotiations with the KMT and the CCP dragged on, Marshall grew increasingly frustrated as he learned from various sources, including the SSU and the Dixie Mission, that Soviet collusion with the CCP was growing. In May 1946, the Dixie Mission delivered this analysis:

> *Direct positive proof based upon personal observations together with much circumstantial evidence definitely establishes the fact that the Soviet Union is guiding the destinies of one of its strongest allies, the Chinese Communist Party, as it has in the past and will in the future.*

Other intelligence reporting concluded that Moscow was supplying Mao's troops with rifles, mortars, machine guns, and tanks.[16]

Marshall was not able to get definitive evidence of a CCP-Soviet nexus through COMINT—"intercommunication back and forth I never was able to pick up exactly," he later said—because Chou appeared to rely on one-time pads to encrypt his messages. In contrast, Marshall often knew what Chiang's supporters were up to ahead of time because American cryptanalysts had much less trouble reading their communications.[17] He also was aware that the CCP had planted agents inside the KMT, including its espionage and counterintelligence apparatus—they even got hold of Chiang's codebook—but he did not know that the Soviets had penetrated his own side.

An economic adviser in the Nanjing embassy, Solomon Adler—whom Marshall called "indispensable"—had passed information to KGB handlers during the war when he worked at the Treasury Department, and now he was informing the Soviets about Chiang and the KMT from his current post.[18] Adler was designated in KGB traffic with the codename "Sax." Presumably the Soviets passed on some of his information to the Chinese Communists, but how or whether that espionage complicated Marshall's mission is not apparent from the record.

Notwithstanding his awareness of the expanding Soviet-CCP relationship, Marshall continued trying to avoid alienating Mao and his confederates.

Notwithstanding his awareness of the expanding Soviet-CCP relationship, Marshall continued trying to avoid alienating Mao and his confederates. Beyond Marshall's conduct of the negotiations, he demonstrated that attitude in two intelligence episodes. In mid-May 1946, he learned that ONI planned to present a posthumous citation to Dai Li, the KMT's brutal spymaster who ran what at the time was the world's largest espionage organization, with around 500,000 case officers, assets, and informers as of 1945. Dai Li had died in a weather-related plane crash two months earlier that many local observers regarded as suspicious.

The US Navy had decided to help Chiang build a modern surface fleet, and senior US officials, including Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and Admiral King, had promoted Dai Li to be commander of the new KMT navy—a prospect the Maoists abhorred. In a message sent to Forrestal on May 19, Marshall warned that presenting the citation

> *will seriously prejudice my efforts by virtually egging on the Communist propaganda against American support of National Government in present conflict.*

Marshall's mediation efforts never regained any momentum after he returned to China from Washington in mid-April 1946.

> *Importance of naval recognition of Dai Li's assistance . . . I think is of negligible importance compared with settlement of present crisis. Cannot this matter be delayed?*

Emphasizing the urgency with which Marshall viewed this development, the message's routing instructions to his aide Col. Marshall Carter stated: "Please see Secretary Navy personally immediately and give him the following orally. Repeat orally." According to Cmdr. Milton Miles, a professional friend of Dai Li's who headed the US Naval Group China, Marshall prevented both him and Adm. Charles Cooke, the commander of the US Seventh Fleet who had a Legion of Merit for Dai Li, from attending his funeral. (Miles did so unofficially wearing civilian clothes.)[a, 19]

Presumably for the same reason that he opposed the Dai Li citation, and perhaps out of personal respect for CCP lead negotiator Zhou Enlai, Marshall did not take advantage of an amazingly serendipitous intelligence windfall that came his way—a notebook that Chou had dropped when he dozed off on a Marshall's airplane on a flight from Manchuria—where there had been a negotiation—to Nanjing in June 1946. It contained many valuable secrets, including the name and address of one of the top CCP spies in the KMT. On June 9, Marshall sent an aide to Chou's estate to deliver a thickly wrapped packet. Chou was astonished to find his notebook inside. He was sure that Marshall had had its contents copied and prepared to have the spy in the KMT activate his escape plan. Nothing indicates Marshall had the notebook copied, but if he did, he did not disclose any of the information to the KMT, and the spy continued to operate in place under CCP control.[20] Critics of Marshall's handling of the China mission would later use this incident to demonstrate that he was too willing to defer to Mao to secure an accord with him.

Frustration and Disheartenment

Marshall's mediation efforts never regained any momentum after he returned to China from Washington in mid-April 1946. Chiang's nationalists and Mao's communists had staked out irreconcilable positions, violated earlier agreements, and tried to take advantage of Marshall's attempts to find grounds for compromise. As historian Ernest May succinctly observed, "The Nationalists would make no real concessions, and the Communists only pretended to do so."[21] More expansively, then Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated in 1949:

Marshall with Zhou Enlai. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

> [O]*ur policy at that time* [of the Marshall mission] *was inspired by the two objectives of bringing peace to China under conditions which would permit stable government and progress along democratic lines, and of assisting the National*[ist] *Government to establish its authority over as wide areas of China as possible. As the event proved, the first objective was unrealizable because neither side desired it to succeed: the Communists because they refused to accept conditions which would*

a. In late 1942, Dai Li had tried to control US intelligence operations in China—particularly OSS's—by proposing an agreement to create a Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization (SACO) that he would lead. The JCS took up the proposal in February 1943. King supported it, but Marshall strongly disapproved of the portions of the draft charter that had the US officer in charge of US equities report to Dai Li and not to the commander of US forces in China, Gen. Joseph Stillwell. Stillwell, however, agreed to relinquish control of intelligence to SACO, thereby disarming Marshall's opposition. The agreement establishing SACO was signed in China on July 4, 1943, but neither OSS nor Army intelligence were ever completely subordinated to it. To circumvent SACO, William Donovan collaborated with the commander of the 14th Air Force, Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault, to set up the 5329th Air and Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff (with the infelicitous acronym AGFRTS) and enable OSS to run operations inside Japanese territory under Air Force cover. No documentation indicates that Marshall got involved in that maneuver in any fashion. After OSS was disbanded on October 1, 1945, SACO's dissolution followed 10 days later.

> *weaken their freedom to proceed with what remained consistently their aim, the communization of all China; the Nationalists because they cherished the illusion, in spite of repeated advice to the contrary from our military representatives, that they could destroy the Communists by force of arms.*[22]

By the fall of 1946, Marshall concluded that his mission was futile. He later lamented that "I tried to please everyone. The result was that by the time I left, nobody trusted me."[23] As early as October, he proposed to President Truman that it be terminated, and in November he ended mediation efforts. In late December, he told the president that "It is quite clear to me that my usefulness will soon be at an end for a variety of reasons," as he had become "persona non grata." "It is now going to be necessary for the Chinese, themselves, to do the things I endeavored to lead them into."[24] Truman announced Marshall's recall to Washington on January 6, 1947, and his appointment as secretary of state the next day. In a personal statement issued on January 7, Marshall complained that

> *The greatest obstacle to peace in China was the almost overwhelming suspicion between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang. . . . They each seemed only to take counsel of their own fears. They both, therefore, to that extent took a rather lopsided view of each situation and were susceptible to every evil suggestion or possibility. . . . Sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been*

1946 photo of Marshall seated between top KMT and CCP negotiators, Chang Ch'un and Zhou Enlai (left and right, respectively). Photo courtesy of the Marshall Foundation.

CCP Moles in the Kuomintang

According to American China scholar Maochun Yu, the CCP intelligence figure named in the unopened notebook was Xiong Xianghui, who wrote a memoir—*Zhou Enlai and My Twelve Years Underground*—published in China in 1991.[25] Xiong was embedded in the headquarters of a KMT field army from where he revealed KMT military plans, including an attempt to overrun the CCP's headquarters in Northwest China. Zhou ordered Xiong out of China to the United States when Xiong's situation became untenable in 1947. There he studied at Case Western Reserve University before returning after the CCP takeover in late 1949. In Beijing, he would serve in the new government as an intelligence chief and diplomat. In 1962, he was charge d'affairs in China's embassy in London. Xiong played a leading role in negotiations in China in 1971 that paved the way for President Richard Nixon's visit to China the following year. Xiong died in 2005.

Not mentioned in Yu's book was another mole of critical importance to the CCP at the time. That mole was a woman named Shen Anna, who served as Chiang Kai-shek's stenographer. According to her memoir published in 2016, five years after her death, Shen had been serving the Communists for years in lower-level government offices, sending to the CCP via her witting husband and couriers transcripts of secret leadership discussions and planned military operations.

In time, the KMT would promote Shen to the party's Executive Secretariat as the senior notetaker. During the several failed attempts after the war to create a unity government and during KMT/CCP reconciliation negotiations in which Marshall participated, Shen attended the KMT leadership meetings that followed each day's negotiations. In those meetings the leadership discussed the negotiations and formulated strategy for the next session. Shen dutifully and in detail transcribed their discussions, secretly made copies and had them delivered immediately to Zhou Enlai, in time for his reading before the next round of talks.[26]

> *frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both sides.*

One of the few positive passages in Marshall's message was his praise for the intelligence support he received from US elements in China, with due recognition given to the difficult circumstances under which they operated. "It was only through the reports of American officers in the field teams from Executive Headquarters that I could get even a partial idea of what was actually happening and the incidents were too numerous and the distances too great for the American personnel to cover much of the ground."[27]

The following day, Marshall boarded the aircraft that took him and his wife, Lily, to Hawaii for a week of rest before he returned to Washington to start his next assignment. Marshall tried to arrange with the White House for the announcement of his recall and appointment to have a maximum impact in China. He wrote to his aide, Marshall Carter, on January 5:

> *. . . my decision is to leave here Wednesday a.m. the 8th local calendar, stopping over for rest in Honolulu. Request following White House announcement be made 24 hours earlier:*
>
> *The President has directed General Marshall to return to Washington to report in person on situation in China. He will probably leave Nanking tomorrow morning.*
>
> *In case there is a leak from out here, which is quite possible, make the announcement immediately correcting time element accordingly. I decided that the general effect out here would be better, first to have the shock of my immediate departure with its various implications, to be followed a few days later by the added shock of the January 10 announcement.*

However, outgoing Secretary Byrnes apparently disclosed news of Marshall's appointment, dissipating that intended effect.[28] Soon after he arrived and took up his new post, Marshall would have to deal with the political and security ramifications of his failed mission in the fevered, espionage-inspired atmosphere of the "Second Red Scare" of the latter 1940s.

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dation.org/library/digital-archive/to-the-war-department-office-of-the-chief-of-staff/, and Marshall message to Lt. Gen. Alvan Gillem, August 1, 1946, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-the-commanding-general-china-service-command-gillem/. Gillem commanded US Army forces in China.

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Artificial Intelligence for Analysis: The Road Ahead

Dennis J. Gleeson, Jr.

Today's chatbots are not intelligent, but they are innovative, exciting, and full of potential in the context of the volumes and varieties of information the IC collects, processes, triages, and uses in support of its global mission.

Chatbots like OpenAI's ChatGPT, Google's Bard, and Anthropic's Claude provide us with interesting and exciting new ways to interact with information. These products respond to users queries by transforming a statistical analysis of patterns existing in a large amount of information—a large language model (LLM)—into a natural language response that mimics human intelligence. *Mimic* is the key word here: these platforms do not understand the data they are analyzing and interpreting in the same ways that people do.

The problem that these products represent for sophisticated consumers of information, such as analysts, academics, and journalists, lies in their design: to date, LLMs preclude insight into or an understanding of the basis for the answers they generate. Users are being asked to trust the technology, but they are not given the opportunity to verify the way the underlying algorithms weigh information (or even what information is, or is not, being used in the formulation of answers). In short, both the "dots" and the connections between those dots exist within a black box at a time when organizations like the IC continue to work toward greater transparency about the underpinnings of their judgments and actions.

The opportunity in front of us lies beyond the words often used to describe these technologies. The idea of developing artificial intelligence dates back to the 1940s and 1950s. Today's chatbots are not intelligent, but they are innovative, exciting, and full of potential in the context of the volumes and varieties of information the IC collects, processes, triages, and uses in support of its global mission. The challenges and opportunities for organizations looking to implement generative AI (GenAI) start with the breadth, depth, richness, and cleanliness of the data itself.

Why GenAI Isn't Enough

GenAIs appear to be most successful when the scope of user requests, the rules around requests, and users' expectations roughly align. If I ask ChatGPT to write a poem in French about frogs wearing hats, it does so. My objective is loosely defined but is specific enough for the algorithm to produce a passable response because the rules around the request, while not explicit, can be inferred. In other words, frogs wearing hats are the subject of an undefined narrative and, while there are several styles of poetry, a rhyming scheme is a reasonable place to start; specifying the type of poem—ode, haiku, limerick—would further help the AI understand the task and rules around the task.

At the other end of the spectrum is a task that is as likely to be defined by the rules as it is by the objective.

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AI Terminology

When prompted, Google Bard offered these definitions:

Artificial general intelligence is a hypothetical type of AI that would be as intelligent as a human or even more intelligent. It would be able to learn and adapt to new situations and to perform any intellectual task that a human can.

Generative AI is a type of AI that can create new content, such as text, images, and music. It does this by learning from existing data and then using that knowledge to generate new outputs that are similar to the data it has seen.

The main difference between AGI and GenAI is their scope of capabilities. AGI is designed to be intelligent in a general sense, while GenAI is designed to be creative and generate new content.

If I ask an AI to write the Python code to perform an analytic task using a dataset I am familiar with, AI is almost certain to accomplish the task far better than I—a nondeveloper. That said, despite my lack of technical coding expertise, I would assess the AI's efficacy against what I expected or suspected the answer should be, based on my understanding of the data.

The expectations of analytic users are the admittedly imperfect bars against which experts are likely to judge AIs: does the AI they are using generate responses consistent with their understandings of the issues? This is the fundamental challenge with trying to apply GenAI to (qualitative) analyses: analytic users have much more than general understanding of the domain in which they work. Based on my experiences with an earlier generation of commercial AI, the first questions analysts are likely to ask an AI are ones they know the answers to. If the AI fails to answer in a manner consistent with their expectations, they'll judge the AI—rightfully or wrongfully—as not being ready to support them in their work.

A simple test for this is to take an issue that you are aware of and ask an AI about it. Is the AI's answer consistent with your understanding of the issue? Is the AI's answer at least as informative and detailed as the Wikipedia page on the topic? If the answer is no, legacy approaches to search and discovery—such as Boolean queries—will persist, even as we know they are not up to the challenges and opportunities presented by big data.

Experts: A User's Guide

When I left government service, a friend who had never worked in the IC asked, "How do analysts think?" My response was a snarky but honest "idiosyncratically." The style of their thinking is a function of factors like temperament, education, and experience. In short, the idiosyncrasies in how they think contribute to the collective insights of an analytic cadre.

As individuals, analysts tend to be intelligent, inquisitive, insightful, and tenacious. They are likely to hold graduate-level degrees in fields related to their work. As communities of experts, they hold themselves and their peers to incredibly high standards because their work has real-world implications: During their training, analysts are taught not just about good analytic tradecraft, but about intelligence failures, their causes—notably information gaps, issues with sourcing and information quality, and logical fallacies—and the human—and reputational—costs of failure.

Analysts will hold AIs to the same standards they are held to and to the same standards they apply to their colleagues across the IC, government, think tanks, academia, and media. The basis for and the sourcing behind an assertion, and the confidence they have in that assertion, are every bit as important as the answer itself. For this reason, AI is going to have to be sufficiently transparent and explainable for analysts to take it seriously.

To understand analysts, it's worth starting with Philip E. Ross, contributing editor for *Scientific American.* In a 2006 article on expert minds, Ross observed:

> [K. Anders Errcson of Florida State University] *also cites studies of physicians who clearly put information into long-term memory and take it out again in ways that enable them to make diagnoses…. The researchers explained these findings by recourse to a structure they called long-term working memory, an almost oxymoronic coinage because it assigns to long-term memory the one thing that had always been defined as incompatible with it: thinking. But brain-imaging studies done in 2001 at the University of Konstanz in Germany provide support for the theory by showing that expert chess players ac-*

tivate long-term memory much more than novices do.[a]

This description of long-term working memory struck me because it reflects my experiences as an analyst and as part of a community of analysts: the analyst's power of recall often is uncanny.

As a result, this is why GenAIs are likely to be somewhat limited in intelligence applications: users will be experts, not generalists. They will be up-to-date and have historical understanding of the issues they and their colleagues work on. To work alongside and in support of analysts, GenAIs will need to not just use the information that informs analysts' understanding of current events, but also be aware of the evolution of analytic lines. As a result, the first step for analytic organizations is focusing less on the AI and more on knowledge and insights they and their organizations have generated.

Institutional Knowledge

Today's AIs are still in their infancy; the volume and variety of research, development, and refinement around the technology are staggering. Wanting to adopt AI makes sense for organizations like the IC's all-source analytic elements because they have been awash in information since the advent of the internet. The problem is, at this stage, the best AI that exists at the time of acquisition and implementation might be embarrassingly unsophisticated one year later. From an enterprise perspective, chasing "the best" AI is likely to be a Sisyphean task. There are several steps the IC can take.

Toward Responsible AI

In 2019, Alejandro Barredo Arrieta and his colleagues published "Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI): Concepts, Taxonomies, Opportunities and Challenges toward Responsible AI," which explained that one of the dangers of machine learning systems is "creating and using decisions that are not justifiable, legitimate, or that simply do not allow obtaining detailed explanations of their behaviour." [*Information Fusion* 58 (June 2020): 82–115] Echoing Arrieta, et al., the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in its *Artificial Intelligence Ethics Framework for the Intelligence Community* (June 2020) sees explainability as an element of transparency. Unfortunately, the Center for Strategic and International Studies in its Tech Recs database notes there has been no progress on creating standards for explainable AI (https://techrecs.csis.org/, accessed September 27, 2023).

Clean and enrich the data

AI is a tool. Insights and information are assets. The quality of an organization's information is all but certainly going to affect the sophistication and success of its efforts to implement and use artificial intelligence. Cleaning and enriching the data isn't glamorous, but it is essential. For the software engineer, data cleanup and enrichment are nowhere near as shiny and exciting as working on user-facing products and services. For analysts, data clean-up lies far outside of the work on which their performance is evaluated. The job of data engineer is coming into vogue but if that person does not have a substantive understanding of the domains in which analysts work or of the value of the work of analysts to their organizations' customers, it is unlikely they will be able to unlock anything approaching the full potential of an organization's information. Why? Tacit knowledge.

Leverage tacit knowledge

Tacit knowledge—defined as "skills, ideas and experiences that are possessed by people but are not codified and may not necessarily be easily expressed"—cannot completely elude capture in an enterprise setting: metadata, audit data, and knowledge management tools (e.g., filing, tagging) can serve as the basis for novel weighting systems.[b] Analysts weigh information intuitively as part of their workflow: they open, read, tag, file, and use only the documents they think contain insights that are the most relevant to their work.

The documents analysts produce and the talks they give are not just explicit knowledge. This output should also be used to train AIs on how experts think and how that thinking has evolved over time: an unexplained assertion today masks the evolution of the thinking that underpins that assertion. To intellectually curious analysts (or to the policymakers and decisionmakers they serve), an unexplained assertion—even if seemingly reasonable—might as well have come from a fortune cookie. Experts need to be able to understand the bases on which AIs make their assertions because their reputations and the reputations of their organizations lie

a. Philip E. Ross, "The Expert Mind," *Scientific American*, August 1, 2006.
b. Ritesh Chugh, "Do Australian Universities Encourage Tacit Knowledge Transfer?" *Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Discovery, Knowledge Engineering and Knowledge Management* (2015): 128–35.

AI is not a quick fix to the challenge of the big data that is part and parcel of our professional and personal lives. Rather, it is a strategic shift in how we think about interacting with massive volumes of data.

in their ability to explain not just the what but also the why.[a]

Realign corporate structures

In the last decade, we saw the rise of data scientists and chief data officers (CDOs). With AI, we're seeing the rise of prompt engineers—specialists in creating text that generative AI can interpret and understand—but we also might need to reconsider the idea of a chief knowledge officer. Knowledge is more than the documents in which insights and information are contained. Information technologists and engineers are unlikely to be familiar with the substantively meaningful contours of the information analysts use, the tradecraft analysts employ, or the prompts that are most likely to produce the responses and user experiences that will resonate with analysts and their customers. The chief knowledge officer could be the voice of both the user and customer by working with the CDO and the chief technology officer to develop the strategies most likely to transform enterprise data holdings—raw information through finished intelligence—into knowledge that can be accessed by and interacted with through AIs as appropriate.

Rethink analyst responsibilities and reimagine their training

CIA often looks back to Sherman Kent as the "father of intelligence analysis." Kent died in 1986, years before the internet first became commercially available, decades before the language of big data and data science entered our vernacular. What is as true now as it was when Kent was alive is that analysis is more an art than a science: Uncertainties, variables, and information gaps still persist, now compounded by misinformation, disinformation, and oceans of low-value information. The practice of intelligence analysis evolves as customer needs and producer capabilities evolve (or fail).

It is worth noting that AI is not new to the IC: In-Q-Tel made a strategic investment in Primer in 2017. AI today, however, seems different: the breadth, depth, and pace of change is dizzying. Despite this, the Pew Research Center in May 2023 reported that only 14 percent of Americans had used ChatGPT.[b]

As a result, the first step toward adoption might simply be to expose analysts to AIs in training classes. There they can begin to understand, at a conversational level at the very least:

- the design considerations and limitations of the systems they are expected to use or interact with;
- large language models (or the successors to LLMs); and
- design and prompt engineering as functions of analytic methodologists.

In the classroom they might begin to learn how to map out their tacit knowledge and determine how it might be made explicit, and they might discuss the broader ramifications of AI for their profession.

I expect there will be a tsunami of open-source information, disinformation, and low-quality information that might, at first blush, seem passable. While the demand for open-source information is voracious and rarely satisfied, sober assessments about the nature of sources will be more important than ever. In this, the work of public benefit corporations and nonprofits like Ad Fontes Media or Truth in Media is critical to ensuring that experts have a deep understanding of the reliability and biases of the sources that they use to craft their analysis.

Insights and Knowledge First, then Artificial Intelligence

There's good reason to be excited about AI and its potential applications in the IC and in support of national security. Satisfying a global coverage mission across multiple mission areas and numerous analytic disciplines areas requires triaging and making sense of volumes of information that scale well beyond human capacity. GenAIs like ChatGPT represent promising and exciting alternatives to search even as they fall well short of

a. For an examination of tacit knowledge in a historical setting, see Michael Aaron Dennis "The Less Apparent Component Tacit Knowledge as a Factor in the Proliferation of WMD: The Example of Nuclear Weapons" in *Studies in Intelligence* 57, no. 3 (September 2013). At the time of publication, Dennis was adjunct lecturer in Security Studies at Georgetown University's Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service. His article would be selected as a Studies Annual Award winner in 2013.

b. Emily A. Vogels, "A Majority of Americans Have Heard of ChatGPT, but Few Have Tried It Themselves," Pew Research Center, May 24, 2023, www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/05/24/a-majority-of-americans-have-heard-of-chatgpt-but-few-have-tried-it-themselves/

the professional standards to which members of the IC hold themselves. AI is not a quick fix to the challenge of the big data that is part and parcel of our professional and personal lives. Rather, it is a strategic shift in how we think about interacting with massive volumes of data.

If we start with that task—finding relevant information and insights in what are currently overwhelming volumes of information—the implementation of any given type or brand of AI is not nearly as important as preparing the data. Vendors will rise and fall; enterprise data holdings are a constant of sorts. They represent both the explicit knowledge of the organization (as captured in their written products) and the source material that informs their sense of the world and the trends most likely to affect the world's trajectory.

Recalling the old saw about data scientists spending 60 percent of their time cleaning data, we should be asking if data cleanup and enrichment are getting 60 percent of the resources being devoted to acquiring, implementing, operating, and maintaining AI. The answer probably falls between a deafening silence and a resounding no.

The quality of AIs will improve. Brands will come and go. What an organization—be it CIA, the broader IC, or any one of the thousands of other knowledge- or information-based organizations around the world—knows is the constant.

Data cleanup and enrichment are grueling and thankless tasks even if they are the most likely means of enabling better outcomes using AI. Working on user-facing applications is usually more appealing to technologists; transforming massive amounts of information into clear and compelling narratives is the job of analysts. Clean, enriched data are essential to the success of both parties but, all too often, it is the primary responsibility of neither.

Rather than try to apply a brand of AI to all enterprise data, it may be best first to go through a period of A/B testing of various AI offerings, using as the key variable the quality of data each AI is asked to consider. For example, in Test A the data examined should be data as it exists in enterprise data holdings at the time of the testing. In Test B, the tested data would first have been cleaned and enriched in ways that seem to allow for maximum analytic flexibility (irrespective of the brand of AI being tested or used). Each data set would be queried by the same brand of GenAI. This could help tell us which data set more accurate, less hallucinatory results; how the various AI tools compare; and where we need to enhance data quality and richness.

Today's AI is in its infancy. It is exciting and promising, yes, but it is immature. There is an incredible amount of research, development, testing, and evaluation being done to improve the capability and quality of AI. The quality of AIs will improve. Brands will come and go. What an organization—be it CIA, the broader IC, or any one of the thousands of other knowledge- or information-based organizations around the world—knows is the constant. How any organization processes, structures, cleans, and enriches its knowledge is likely to be the key determinant in its success with using AI in support of its missions both today and tomorrow.

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The End of Human Intelligence Analysis—Better Start Preparing

John F. Galascione

As a follow-on thought experiment, it might be useful to look beyond the future Gartin visualizes to a more distant and very different future.

Editor's Note: This article is a slightly updated version of the original published internally in 2020. It is reprised here as a complement to Dennis Gleeson's article "Artificial Intelligence and Analysis," beginning on page 11 of this edition.

My reaction to reading Joseph Gartin's excellent "The Future of Analysis" (*Studies* 62, no. 2, June 2019) was that it described a step on the way to the future of analysis. It envisions human analysts using enhanced computer-based tools to produce finished products and insights for delivery to customers. This sounds familiar to me, as if the future will be just a more idealized version of the present—the same basic job but with better and more reliable tools. One can only hope.

As a follow-on thought experiment, however, it might be useful to look beyond the future Gartin visualizes to a more distant and very different future. In the spirit of certain structured analysis techniques, we can then step back to see what actions can and should be taken now and in the near future. The intention is not to debate the timeline of this more distant future but instead to assume it is approaching and to outline its implications. Some key assumptions about this more distant future are needed:

- Assume the paradigm that people will use computers still exists (and not the other way around). For a distant future, this largely involves hope,but if such an assumption is wrong, then the rest of this discussion doesn't much matter.
- Assume computer-based systems will become—and from then on will always be—better than human beings at processing and analyzing information. By "better" I mean more complete, more accurate, faster, less biased—all the hallmarks we recognize from our own analytical training and all the qualities to which we analysts aspire.
- Assume that our mission persists, which in its basic form involves anticipating and warning to enable senior officials in our government to respond to and/or shape the course of events. This belief in mission is tied, somewhat, to the notion that we (human beings) can use what we do here to control or direct the course of history. A key assumption here is that this will remain the case into the not-so-distant future.

The 2030 that Gartin describes—a time in which the intelligence analysis-production-and-delivery system will be a more-or-less tweaked version of the current system—is different from what I would argue will be an inevitable future in which computer-based systems will be able to perform these functions:

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In this future, which is probably not as distant as we think, it seems as if an argument would need to be made for how and why humans would still be included at all in the intelligence analysis profession.

- track and synthesize information faster and better than any human or group of humans.
- better anticipate customer interests and needs by tracking an overall larger dataset of government and international activities than any analysts could and ever would follow.
- produce adequately "written" finished products that lay out assessments clearly, use language consistently from product to product, are relatively immune to review, style, and editing fads, and are clear about how each aspect of those assessments is changing and may be vulnerable to change.
- anticipate future intelligence needs, generate requirements, and more accurately and completely track the validity or suspiciousness of reporting streams.

The systems will also be truly multiculturally diverse, having ready access to worldwide patterns of thought, cultural histories, and priority systems and be able to apply them specifically to localized intelligence-related assessments and they will be less prone to experience bias, confirmation bias, and cognitive dissonance.

What's a Person to Do?

In this future, which is probably not as distant as we think, it seems as if an argument would need to be made for how and why humans would still be included at all in the intelligence analysis profession. Some arguments for continued human involvement arise automatically from traditional roles and functions of intelligence analysts, but these arguments are not without problems.

Briefer Version 2.0

If we assume that our key consumers will continue to be human beings, then perhaps analyst-like humans will be needed to act as interfaces between computer-based assessment-generation systems and those human consumers. This is unlikely to be practical, however, because the deep-learning-based systems will pump out assessments likely to defy the explanation of humans, even those working alongside them. Could the programmers of AlphaGo[a] explain the infamous "move 37" in one of its historic games against one of the world's best Go players? Not really, and neither could the world's best Go player. Similarly, humans will almost certainly be inept at explaining all of the reasons why a certain assessment is being made, being made now, or is changing from its previous form.[b] This version of "briefer," then, devolves to mechanically transferring information and attempting to translate between the customers and the algorithms. Or worse, it becomes the job of analyzing the computer-generated analysis.

Data Scientist Version 2.0

Some would also argue, as part of the assumption that humans will still be key actors in this future, that people will be needed to develop and tweak the algorithms that generate these assessments. Even this idea is becoming increasingly falsified, however, by how deep-learning systems are being developed to use only limited, if any, human insights from which they can quickly "outthink" humans. So far, most progress is on domain-specific tasks, as in the case of AlphaGo, but even this is changing as self-learning systems have been developed to conduct more generalized "learning" with little-to-no input from humans.[c] In terms of the

a. AlphaGo, a computer system developed by DeepMind (now part of Google), used a combination of human data and self-play to become proficient in the ancient game of Go, and then beat some of the world's best players. DeepMind has since developed variations of AlphaGo—AlphaGoZero and AlphaZero—that developed domain-specific expertise solely through self-play and with no actual human input or human-supplied data.

b. In an unrelated but similar example, researchers in 2018 developed an AI machine learning tool to detect depression (in people) based on speech patterns during interview responses—without additional context. This research led to an accurate prediction tool but the opacity of its conclusions was seen to be a drawback—basically the tool was capable of diagnosing a person with depression but did so in a way that was too opaque to the psychiatrists themselves to be completely useful.

c. DeepMind, the same group behind the development of AlphaGo, had earlier developed a self-learning system that trained on a wide variety of Atari video games using only the pixels on the screen and game scores, from which it was able to develop the capability to play multiple games at professional human levels. See V. Minh, K. Kavakcuoglu, D.Silver, et al., "Human Level Control Through Deep Reinforcement Learning," *Nature* 518 (2015): 529–33.

impact of these developments on the future of intelligence analysis, it's difficult to imagine how humans will be expected to make substantive changes to algorithms they were not involved in developing in the first place. The idea that humans will be somehow needed to "assist" computers seems increasingly more laughable.

Propagating machine-learning and computing trends makes it seem as if 20 to 30 years from now—and possibly sooner—the idea of humans doing intelligence analysis professionally will be of historical significance only. A debate about the future of AI and its development timelines is beyond the scope of this article, but the truth is that some advances in domain-specific AI and deep-learning techniques have surprised many, and experts have been somewhat poor in their ability to predict the future of AI-related progress.

Although skeptics continue to assess that "generalized" artificial intelligence is still a distant development, it's not clear that this argument falsifies the future of the analytical profession proposed here. The progress to date in domain-specific machine intelligence makes such a future seemingly inevitable, especially given that intelligence analysis is a domain-specific task. Just as no single person would ever have the generalized intelligence and expertise required to do all analytical jobs, it's not difficult to imagine a suite of separate artificial intelligent systems that handle different analytical "accounts."

Between Now and Then . . .

In keeping with the spirit of structured analytic techniques, we should be asking what we can do to prepare for this future. Interestingly, I think some of the possible steps we can take and issues we'll confront will mirror those our predecessors faced. This time, however, we'll be tasked with ensuring that our machine-based successors are able to do this job at least as well as we think we do it now.

On the October 8, 2023, episode of the CBS news program *60 Minutes*, AI guru and pioneer Geoffrey Hinton underscored the extent to which AI tools may well leave humans out of the loop. While noting that the algorithms themselves are designed by humans, once these algorithms interact with data they produce "complicated neural networks," and the developers (much less the users) "don't really understand how they do what they do." Unpacking the AI-derived analytical conclusion may one day be beyond the grasp of human intelligence analysts.

Technical Analysis Goes First

Technical intelligence analysis, specifically weapons-related analysis, is likely to be the first to be transitioned into a completely humanless process. Technical analysis is about numbers, linear cause-and-effect relationships, predictability, and tracking of R&D activities (much of which is already computer based). Technical expertise—and by extension technical intelligence analysis—has always been severely stovepiped. Nuclear analysts view reporting through a strictly nuclear-technology filter, biological weapons analysts see developments as they fit into that specific technology, and so forth. This is how human expertise has worked for generations and there's no good reason to believe that the future includes a different type of more generalized human technical expert.

Initially, technical analysis will be most amenable to domain-specific AI techniques, but then—as in the case of other AI-related advances—the "domain" is likely to be expandable to include subjects across multiple technical fields. Having a much deeper background in a much wider range of technologies, the computer-based technical "DA analyst" of the future is less likely to automatically view developments as fitting into a narrow field in the way most human analysts would. This machine-based analyst is also more likely to identify connections in technologies, materials, and people across multiple fields—something human analysts are practically incapable of doing.

As a constructive step toward this future, technical analysts now and for the next decade should be establishing robust knowledge-management efforts and standards with which to more efficiently enable ingestion by their machine-based successors. It sounds as if we're handing the bank robber the combination to the vault, but in the future we're imagining here, such an approach makes more sense than the alternative. We speak of our legacy, and this has always meant passing along knowledge to the next generation of analysts. Wouldn't this still be important even though the next generation of analysts are not people? We also speak of mission focus and we assume the mission will persist. Wouldn't this mean that it's actually our duty to ensure that the next generation of analysts—human or otherwise—serve that mission well?

Finally, analysts of all stripes probably should be finding ways to become comfortable with the inevitable and be developing strategies for transitioning from what is now an almost completely human process to what is likely to become a nearly completely humanless process.

Documenting How We Played the Game

A key aspect of teaching and training the next generation of analysts has always involved documenting and explaining our past successes, failures, and everything in between. If we truly care about the health of our enduring mission after we're gone, then documenting what is right and wrong about our analysis should become a large, or larger, part of our job over the next decade. AlphaGo learned partly from about 100,000 human-played games of Go, which served as the foundation upon which it built even better and more perplexing strategies and learned how to teach itself. The same groundwork needs to be put in place for the DA, even if it's almost certainly more difficult to characterize and document our results than the moves of a tightly constrained game whose rules never change.

Be the Solution, Not the Resistance

Finally, analysts of all stripes probably should be finding ways to become comfortable with the inevitable and be developing strategies for transitioning from what is now an almost completely human process to what is likely to become a nearly completely humanless process. We are not the first industry to face this, and we have the advantage of having studied our own jobs and our own history extensively. The self-reflection and recursive self-analysis that have long been hallmarks of CIA analysis probably should be brought to bear on establishing a graceful transition from humancentric intelligence analysts. Indeed, CIA and other intelligence agencies are in the business of delivering finished analysis; they are not necessarily in the business of employing analysts.

As present-day intelligence analysts staring down a very different future, we are also responsible for ensuring that the transition to this future is relatively painless for everyone. As with any revolutionary change, resistance is inevitable and false arguments will abound. Replacing all automobiles with the current self-driving technology—even right now when this technology is arguably only in its infancy—probably would reduce the number of accidents overall. Nonetheless, every accident involving a self-driving car will enable skeptics to compare machine-based results to an absolute (impossible) standard instead of seeing how they are actually better than humans despite being imperfect. It's not difficult to see that such false comparisons will continue to be employed to undermine assessments of the actual progress and inevitability of advances, including in the field of intelligence analysis. A nonsensical result from early machine-based intelligence analysts would be met with a similar response, even though such events only help those focusing on resisting this inevitable future—slowing, but not preventing, its arrival.

All Is Not Lost (Yet)

The future posited here is one in which many if not all the people who do this job today are likely to be replaced. One could even imagine a time when the term "intelligence" would refer implicitly to the machine-based type and "human intelligence" (HUMINT!?) would refer to our particular human flavor of the stuff. Nonetheless, to the extent that we remain committed to the mission of the Intelligence Community, we should be transitioning—mechanically, mentally, and emotionally—into enablers and facilitators of this inevitable future—if not its most ardent supporters, developers, and champions. One could argue that this is actually our job.

Our job also involves assessing what our professional futures as intelligence analysts will be, regardless of what that future might look like. We can argue about how quickly this future arrives, but we probably shouldn't argue about whether some form of it will arrive. The machine-learning-related advances to date suggest that those who disagree with the inevitability of this future have the responsibility of generating an alternative future that is somehow more likely than this one.

It would be ironic, would it not, for one of the last major (human) intelligence failures to be that we failed to identify our own extinction by failing to predict the future of our own profession?

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Intelligence Analysis, Synthesis, and Automation

Alice B. Borene

The premise that AI/ML will unlock correlations and relationships inaccessible to the human mind—often mixed with a dash of magical thinking—underlies much of the IC's interest in the field.

Editor's note: This article was originally published in 2020. We reprise it here because in the intervening three years, as she anticipated, large language models powering generative artificial intelligences like ChatGPT and Google Bard have moved from promise to reality and become the subject of worldwide use—and debate. As Borene makes clear, no knowledge industry, including intelligence, is immune from its effects.

The future of intelligence analysis has been a hotly debated topic in the last few years, as thinkers inside and outside the Intelligence Community have struggled to make sense of an analyst's place and value at a time when artificial intelligence, machine learning, and automation are changing the relationships between people and their work. As with other industries, the question is not so much if machines will be incorporated into the work but how and when and in what capacities.

Joseph Gartin's article in *Studies in Intelligence*, "The Future of Analysis," speculated about the analyst's role in this workflow of the future, positing that artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) tools are going to be essential to analysis in the coming years. In the world he describes, AI "sifts data, spots discontinuities, and synthesizes results; analysts provide theory and structure." His vision has analysts leveraging data science to deliver more insightful analysis on a wide array of problems with increased accuracy and shortened feedback loops. Gartin notes that many other fields of knowledge work such as medicine and law are undergoing a shift, "being outsourced to algorithms," and argues that similar changes are likely to come for intelligence analysis.

What sorts of changes those will be depend on what sorts of tools we are thinking about. In 2019, the Brookings Institution published a set of papers breaking the question down into two categories—AI/ML and automation—and examining the impact of tools in those categories on the workplace.[a]

Artificial intelligence and machine learning comprise a vast and growing set of applications. Many of them are focused on sifting through vast troves of data, recognizing patterns, detecting anomalies, and so on; this is work humans are largely unable to do, given the overwhelming quantity

a. Mark Muro, Robert Maxim, and Jacob Whiton, with contributions from Ian Hathaway, "Automation and Artificial Intelligence: How Machines Are Affecting People and Places," (Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, January 2019) and Muro, Maxim, and Whiton, "What Jobs Are Affected by AI: Better-paid, Better-educated Workers Face the Most Exposure," (Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, November 2019).

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We have traditionally treated writing analysis as something skill-based rather than task-based, something only a human can do.

of data and difficulties inherent to correlation at scale. The premise that AI/ML will unlock correlations and relationships inaccessible to the human mind—often mixed with a dash of magical thinking—underlies much of the IC's interest in the field.

Automation, on the other hand, is best suited for routine tasks, substituting for and complementing labor. In general, a routine task is one that is predictable and can be performed over and over with little or no variation. When we think of automation, we tend toward the physical— an assembly line of robots building a car—but routine cognitive tasks can be automated as well, such as transferring data from one system to another. This is work that humans are capable of doing but that a machine might be able to do more accurately, faster, or without succumbing to the boredom of repetitive work.

At first glance, this suggests that analysts might benefit from AI/ML, but they are likely to be immune to the effects of automation. After all, analysts are high-skill workers, who rely to a great extent on abstract thought, seeing the connections between disparate facts and building out probable consequences. To this end, much of the work done on the further integration of machines into the analytic workflow focuses on AI/ML as a tool to uncover patterns in big data sets or correlate seemingly disparate facts to generate a predictive capability.

However, it is premature to dismiss automation. Economists suggest we should conceptualize automation by thinking about tasks, not skills. Tasks are defined as what people do at work, while skills are the capabilities people possess to carry out those activities.[a] If we move away from viewing analysis as the application of a discrete skill or skill set and toward visualizing it as a series of tasks, a different picture emerges.

All Analysis is Not Equal

We have traditionally treated writing analysis as something skill-based rather than task-based, something only a human can do. After all, drafting analysis requires judgment, deep background knowledge, unstructured problem-solving, strategic thinking, and imagination, all things that could broadly be characterized as "sensemaking, the cognitive shortcut of putting new developments into a heuristic framework that we all use to categorize events and anticipate the future," per Gartin's description of analysis.[b] Sensemaking, writ large, is one of the key skills the analyst brings to the tasks of analysis, and the need for sensemaking is one of the prime reasons analytical writing is a task we often perceive to be poorly suited for automation.

That assertion holds true if we treat all analysis as equal. But what if all analysis is not equal? What if some of what we call intelligence analysis is not really analysis at all, but a set of predictable cognitive tasks suitable for automation? All-source intelligence comes in many different flavors. One is what we might typically think of when we think of analysis: strategic analysis based on specialized collection that informs the reader of something he or she would not learn through unclassified sources. This undoubtedly requires sensemaking, as the analyst puts the new facts into context and explains why this matters, how it changes the outlook, and what courses of action stem from this new information.

But there is another type of intelligence writing that does not require the application of the sensemaking skill. By far the most common type of finished intelligence production in the IC is what could be termed "news," production that simply informs the reader about world events. Perhaps half of what the all-source analytic community produces falls into this category, in my experience. By this I mean that the topic has no inherent connection to the work of intelligence, is not specifically curated to discuss the topic's impact on intelligence concerns, deals with global or regional issues widely discussed in the press, and is sourced overwhelmingly to open source material.

Take for example an analyst writing an article about the response of an international entity to COVID-19 early in the arc of the pandemic. The sources for that piece could be entirely unclassified and available on the internet, with perhaps one instance of what analysts call background and analysis—a point all

a. Ibid.

b. Joseph Gartin, "Future of Intelligence Analysis." *Studies in Intelligence* 63, no. 2 (June 2019).

know to be true but that cannot be attributed to a single source.

This is synthesis, not analysis: key points of several open source news articles have been combined into one, presumably so readers can gain maximum understanding of the issue without actually having to read a dozen essentially similar articles. Given the uncontested nature of the facts in play here, sensemaking is not a necessary component of this process; in that case, because application of skill is not necessary, does it meet the criteria for automation?

Synthesis is a low-skill task performed by high-skill workers—namely analysts. It is a predictable cognitive task, requiring little to no imagination, judgment, or strategic thinking. It is also time consuming, not only for the analyst doing the writing, but for managers, reviewers, and editors who collaborate on analytical production. Using the criteria set out by the task analysis above, this, the largely unclassified synthesis of commercially available open source articles, is better suited for a machine.

Read Stuff, Write Stuff—the Right Stuff

Leaving to others to discern the extent to which this volume of IC "news" production is worthwhile or adds particular value for consumers, the next question is whether it is important that analysts spend their time writing these articles. After all, such articles are drawn principally from open sources, and rarely include an intelligence-specific tie-in—is this really the work of analysis?

Synthesis is a low-skill task performed by high-skill workers—namely analysts. It is a predictable cognitive task, requiring little to no imagination, judgment, or strategic thinking.

Because of the focus here on open sources, these questions might read as a case study in the secrecy heuristic; they are not intended to be. In his article, Gartin boils down the essential functions of an analyst to "read stuff, write stuff." Of course, people in other professions read stuff and write stuff too, often on topics germane to the IC, like political or economic developments in foreign countries. They are journalists, academics, think-tankers, NGO workers, freelancers. Like Sherman Kent and his collaborators whom Gartin cites—and like analysts today—many are educated at prestigious universities and focus on political, economic, and social questions relevant to IC customers and to policymakers more broadly. Many are acknowledged experts in their field.

In addition to these traditional knowledge workers, whole industries focused on news generation and curation have proliferated. Some of these are industry-specific: the oil and gas industry is supported by several de facto intelligence publications, each focusing on developments, trends, and forecasts providing tailored information. Less narrowly, news aggregation services—some explicitly themed, others customized according to a user's preferences—perform sensemaking functions on the vast universe of news available on the internet by creating tailored feeds of stories likely to be of interest.

Here we come to the question of the value proposition: if the information is already easily accessible, with content directly relevant to policymakers and with a multitude of options allowing for customization to a particular set of specifications, why devote so much of the human capital and time of the very costly intelligence enterprise to producing bespoke news made from other news? And why are humans so involved in this process?

Giving People Their Time Back

In the private sector, this sort of predictable, non-novel production increasingly is automated. In early 2019, roughly a third of Bloomberg News content was computer-generated or augmented by automation, as were earthquake and homicide reports in the *Los Angeles Times*; high school football coverage and state and local election results in the *Washington Post*; and minor league baseball coverage in the Associated Press.[a]

To be sure, humans have a role in producing these stories. Behind every bot publishing a blurb about the outcome of a quarterfinal event at the Olympics is a team of people who crafted a template for that type

a. Jaclyn Peiser, "The Rise of the Robot Reporter," *New York Times*, February 5, 2019; Nicole Martin, "Did a Robot Write This? How AI is Impacting Journalism," *Forbes*, February 8, 2019; Lucia Moses, "The Washington Post's Robot Reporter Has Published 850 Articles in the Past Year," *Digiday*, September 14, 2017.

The Intelligence Community could follow a similar model when it comes to news production. Machines can curate stories, and even synthesize them, allowing the creation of a customized feed suiting a consumer's specific interests.

of story, tested it, and reviewed the final product. Humans are very much in the loop, even if they are not doing the writing for these types of stories.

And what of the journalists? To hear newspapers tell it, automation has freed journalists up to focus on stories that matter, stories that require imagination, creativity, and dedication—the human touch. In all, the AP reports its financial journalists got back 20 percent of the time they used to spend on financial reporting once the company started using a bot to write basic earnings reports. It gave them time they could use to dig deeper into stories.

The Intelligence Community could follow a similar model when it comes to news production. Machines can curate stories, and even synthesize them, allowing the creation of a customized feed suiting a consumer's specific interests. Analysts could be doing better things with their time, using this baseline news feed as a starting point and adding value by leveraging their skills—sensemaking, generating hypotheses, and exploring scenarios—and incorporating information derived from classified reporting.

One of the goals of incorporating automation and AI/ML into the analytic process is to let humans do things that only humans are good at, such as tasks involving judgment, unstructured problem-solving, strategic thinking, imagination, and collaboration. Freeing them from open-source synthesis would be a start.[a]

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a. See Puong Fei Yeh's article, "Automated Analysis: The Case for Using Robots in Intelligence Analysis, *Studies in Intelligence* 59, no. 4 (December 2015).

Commentary

The Enduring Importance of the Humanities in the Work of Intelligence

Andrew Skitt Gilmour

Intelligence analysts must increasingly reckon with ideas, histories, languages, and geographical claims dormant in the Cold War but now resurgent. National security needs a humanities comeback.

These are challenging times for the intelligence profession. The promise of an "end of history" has yielded to new transnational threats, assertive regional and global competitors, and doubts about the ability of the United States to influence the international system it shaped in the last century. Beneath this roiling surface, key states such as China, India, Russia, Turkey, and Iran are working out fundamental political and cultural orientations. They are adopting selectively the West's culture of science, individualism, and materialism while reviving earlier views of civilization and national identity. Intelligence analysts must increasingly reckon with ideas, histories, languages, and geographical claims dormant in the Cold War but now resurgent. National security needs a humanities comeback.

The humanities are analytic prisms through which US adversaries see their own interests. Shortly after NATO reiterated in June 2021 that "Ukraine would become a member of the Alliance," Russian President Vladimir Putin replied in detailed historical terms. He not only repeated his claim that Russians and Ukrainians are "one people" but anchored his lengthy personal assessment in the language and religion of the ninth-century Kievan Rus state.

However tendentious some may find Putin's reading of history, it has defined Russian interests and motivated Russian action in Ukraine. Similarly, the backwaters of Islamic jurisprudence that justify and motivate, for some, acts of extremism are understandable mainly through the study of philosophy, history, and religion in Islamic civilization.

In the wider Middle East, the humanities have returned as a necessary tool for assessing the region's internal dynamics since the upheavals in governance that began with the US invasion of Iraq. Intelligence efforts on the region have come face to face with a kaleidoscope of competing social groups and identities whose assessment demands more than the contributions of technical collection and data algorithms. Within and beyond the Arab world, the geographic determinants of persistent and ancient political communities, Islam's fractious intellectual history, Iran's self-perception as a regional and cultural leader, and Turkey's enduring pattern of vacillation between Europe and the Middle East are among the strategically relevant issues accessible primarily through the humanities.

Analysts are well prepared—especially because of the intelligence reforms of recent years—to understand and communicate to policymakers the surface forces of a changing world.

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Analysts are much less prepared for the civilizational and ideological terrain of the coming era of global competition because the necessary toolkit of the humanities is in eclipse.

Security threats, weapons capabilities, economic forces, refugees, public opinion, and transnational trends such as cyber, terrorism, and climate change are well suited to data rich collection systems and an improved analytic process that emphasizes logical argumentation and evidence.

Analysts are much less prepared for the civilizational and ideological terrain of the coming era of global competition because the necessary toolkit of the humanities is in eclipse. The physical and social sciences—along with STEM—dominate the academy, students demand money-making degrees, and ideas of critical theory increasingly taint what is left of humanistic learning with the distortions of political power pursuits. The national security risk is that we have an analytic talent pool insufficient for the analytic mission at hand.

An analytic workforce that privileges large datasets, nods to the academy's deconstruction of the content of humanistic learning, and accepts empiricism as the preferred form of knowledge will fail to understand a world whose actors take the content of the humanities more seriously than the United States does. Ideas, values, history, and language are at the core of strategic analysis because these define interests and motivate actions globally. Russia and China insist on the role of civilization in their strategic competition with the United States. Religious identity infuses politics globally. Ancient patterns and precedents echo in decisionmaking across the Middle East and South Asia.

We have been here before. The development of US strategic intelligence analysis capabilities in the mid-twentieth century was anchored in the humanities. Founding practitioners such as William Langer and Sherman Kent were historians, confident that knowledge of world history, languages, and cultures was essential to the analytic mission supporting US national security. This deference toward the humanities was well suited for the political and ideological competition with the Soviet Union and rested upon a then still dominant position of the humanities in US and European universities.

The waning of humanities in the strategic analytic mission has been decades in the making. First came rapid scientific advances and an academic shift toward the study of economic efficiency and material progress amid the rise of market-oriented neoliberalism. Innovations in intelligence collection that increased the quantity of information to be analyzed further shaped intelligence as an immediate and mostly empirical knowledge mission. The ascendancy of postmodernism within the humanities beginning in the late 1960s also led to an assault on reason and objective truth—the bedrock of the intelligence analysis enterprise. Yet, religion, national identity, historic memory, and struggles over the principles of social compacts are the global norms which strategic analysis must engage—and a traditional focus of the humanities.

The way CIA thinks about its analytic mission has also mirrored the declining fortunes of the humanities. In the mid-1970s, Director of Central Intelligence William Colby assailed the ivory tower that CIA's Office of National Estimates, led by Kent the historian, had become.[a] Colby created a new model of customer-driven intelligence, establishing national intelligence officers to engage more closely with senior policymakers, yielding some of the formulation of strategic intelligence questions to the immediate needs of consumers. Neoliberalism's market reach into intelligence gathered pace in the mid-1990s with the CIA's rebranding of the president as "the first customer."

The decline of the traditional humanities disciplines is changing the pool of applicants for the intelligence analysis profession, privileging STEM, social science, and physical science degrees. The atomization of knowledge and a bias toward material measures and efficiencies leave potential hires ill-equipped to manage the value and culture questions associated with foreign leaders and their political communities. These actors draw on history, religion, language, and literature in their policies and aspirations. The current preoccupation of many in the humanities with Marxist-inspired ideas, among others, of critical theory is well suited for specialists in the arcane veins of Western thought and those with political programs. Such perspectives, however, offer little that can provide policymakers with objective

a. John H. Hedley, "The Evolution of Intelligence Analysis." In *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations*, edited by Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (Georgetown University Press, 2008), 28.

understanding of foreign actors to empower US national security policies.

The AI revolution is bringing the humanities deficit in the IC to a tipping point. Key questions about how expertise in AI, data science, and humanities will collaborate on the vast, increasingly digitized, and diverse corpus of humanistic thinking require urgent and innovative planning. The humanities cannot be taught "on the job" so will need to be understood as a key component of the human capital needed to do strategic analysis. The patterns and precedents of history, philosophy, language, and literature will never offer pinpoint linear predictions of the strategic intent and trajectory of foreign leaders and societies but can give policymakers ways to think more usefully about the range of plausible futures facing US allies and strategic rivals. These patterns can also drive innovative collection and analysis across the IC.

A rebirth of the study of the humanities is needed for national security in order to discern and express the interaction of our values and purposes with those of other peoples. The more traditional humanities are fundamentally tied to national security because language, philosophical inquiry, and history have durable and discernible meanings that shape culture and politics globally. Analysts who are skilled in the substantive knowledge of the humanities and have the ability to convert their insights into the strategic analytic mission will be essential.

The humanities offer no predictive determinism in foreign affairs, but they can aid in assessing the range of an actor's strategic intent and in enhancing intelligence collection.

Humanities and Intelligence

The humanities constitute the study of human value and meaning in the context of culture and society. *Britannica*'s definition of the field includes the "study of all languages and literatures, the arts, history, and philosophy" using methods "derived from an appreciation of human values and of the unique ability of the human spirit to express itself." During the Renaissance, the humanities defined itself as in contradistinction to the divine knowledge claimed by the medieval church, but today the humanities include the study of religion in human culture and society.

The human experience is central to the field. Knowledge that is beyond the scope of the physical and biological sciences is the purview of the humanities. Particulars, unlike in the scientific method, do not matter for their ability to establish a general law but are worth studying on their own for the human meaning and purpose expressed. The social sciences also focus on human culture and society but differ from the humanities in applying more objective methods of inquiry and analysis.

Such a definition of the humanities has implications for intelligence. Individual leaders, groups, and whole societies subjectively and over time define their interests and culture through language, literature, the arts, history and philosophy and can choose to act according to their particular traditions. The humanities offer no predictive determinism in foreign affairs, but they can aid in assessing the range of an actor's strategic intent and in enhancing intelligence collection.

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Instituting Devil's Advocacy in IC Analysis after the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973

James D. Marchio

This article explores efforts to institutionalize the role of devil's advocacy in the IC during the mid-1970s. It fills an important gap in the literature surrounding the development of alternative analysis and structured analytic techniques (SATs) within the IC.

The apparent failure by Israeli intelligence to anticipate the massive and deadly attack by Hamas fighters in the Gaza Strip in October 2023 recalled the US Intelligence Community's largely unknown efforts to create a devil's advocacy program in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War 50 years before. The position popularly known as the devil's advocate (from the Latin *advocatus diaboli*) was created by Pope Sixtus V in the late sixteenth century in what today we might think of as part of a nominee-vetting process.[a] Although not exactly the function IC proponents envisioned for a devil's advocate, many—including past directors of central intelligence (DCIs)—saw value in creating a formal challenge mechanism to ensure divergent points of view were properly expressed in finished products.

Very little has been written on the development of alternative analysis within the IC, particularly during the 1970s. Larger studies focused on the actions of DCIs Richard Helms and William Colby either do not address the issue or only do so in passing. For example, Harold Ford's declassified study, *William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence, 1973–1976,* goes no further than to acknowledge that he "encouraged more competitive analysis and encouraged the airing of unorthodox interpretations and devil's advocate evaluations." Other works that address alternative analyses more broadly fail to address challenge mechanisms or efforts to institutionalize a devil's advocate position in the IC during the mid-1970s. Instead, they focus on the 1976 Team A/B "experiment."[1]

This article explores efforts to formalize the role of devil's advocacy in the IC during the mid-1970s. It fills an important gap in the literature surrounding the development of alternative analysis and structured analytic techniques (SATs) within the IC. Proposed by Colby in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973, the initiative to create a challenge mechanism failed to produce a decision to implement the idea concretely (i.e., by creation of an entity charged with that function or of a directive establishing a procedure to be followed in certain circumstances). Nonetheless, the lessons learned from this failed attempt helped engender IC efforts to institutionalize challenge mechanisms, such as the DCI Red Cell, created after 9/11, and encouraged alternative analysis and the use of SATs in the years that followed.

a. Formally the Promoter of the Faith, or *Promotor Fidei*, the devil's advocate role was to document all possible arguments against a candidate for beatification and canonization. In the 20st century the role has faded in importance within the Roman Catholic Church.

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

*Excerpts from Intelligence Documents Preceding the Outbreak of Hostilities on October 6, 1973.**

The CIA Draft on Israeli Thinking on a Peace Settlement with the Arabs, December 4, 1972. "The CIA draft…is a competent but unexciting piece of work…. Having just read the paper, I cannot now think of anything I learned in it, and I am far from being an expert on Israel…. Perhaps it is asking too much of an analyst, but I would like to see a bit more speculation and construction of some alternative courses of action that the Israelis might take."

Judgment (Redaction) that Syrian Military Preparations are Defensive in Nature. CIA Intelligence Report, October 3, 1973. "In his opinion, recently reported Syrian preparation on their front lines with Israel are defensive as opposed to offensive in nature…. The Syrian officer expressed serious fears of an Israeli attack into Syria…. But because of Syrian fears of an Israeli attack, this year the Syrians are sending their units to the front line, secretly if possible, and to tactically appropriate defen- sive positions. In other words, the Syrian officer stated, we are "massing" because of our fears."

Combined Watch Report of the United States Intelligence Board, October 4, 1973. "We continue to believe that an outbreak of major Arab-Israeli hostilities remains unlikely for the immediate future, although the risk of localized fighting has increased slightly as the result of the buildup of Syrian forces in the vicinity of the Golan Heights. Egyptian exercise activity under way since late September may also contribute to the possibility of incidents."

Israel-Egypt-Syria, Central Intelligence Bulletin, October 6, 1973. "Both the Israelis and the Arabs are becoming increasingly concerned about the military activities of the other, although neither side appears to be bent on initiating hostilities…. Exercise and alert activities in Egypt are continuing, but elements of the air force and navy appear to be conducting normal training activity… A build-up of tanks and artillery along the Suez Canal, this cannot be confirmed…. For Egypt, a military initiative makes little sense at this critical juncture of President Sadat's reorientation of domestic and foreign policies…. For the normally cautious Syrian President, a military adventure now would be suicidal."

Initiation of Middle East Hostilities, Memorandum from CIA Middle East Task Force, October 6, 1973, 1000 EDT. "The earliest confirmed military activity (redacted) so far was a high-speed Israeli serial reconnaissance mission at 0654Z (0254 EDT, 0854 Cairo time) along the Suez Canal. The flight terminated at 0732Z…. The Egyptian naval command center at Alexandria ordered a 'first state of readiness' at 1351 (1151Z)."

Arab-Israeli Hostilities and their Implications, Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 35/36-73, October 6, 1973. "Heavy fighting is almost certain to be short in duration—no more than a week. Neither side is logistically prepared for lengthy hostilities. The Israelis have the strength to blunt the Syrian offensive capability within a few days and, as quickly, to push the Egyptians back across the canal. Fighting on lesser scale, say an artillery duel across the canal, however, could be more prolonged."

Soviet Policies in the Event of Imminent Egyptian Collapse, Intelligence Memorandum, October 6, 1973. "For purposes of this paper, it is assumed that Egyptian forces face imminent and perhaps catastrophic defeat and that the ability of the Egyptian state to survive the defeat (and further Israeli military actions) is questionable. Soviet military options in the circumstances described are severely limited. Neither time nor resources will allow Moscow to influence decisively the course of the battle now being waged on both sides of the Suez…."

Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, Subject: Middle East. Summary of Conclusions. 7:22 p.m.–8:27 p.m. October 6, 1973. "Mr. Kissinger: 'Yes, but Israel won't accept it until the Egyptians and Syrians are thrown out. We'll have the situation where a Security Council resolution will be used against the victim. This will teach aggressors that they can launch an attack, then call for a Security Council resolution for a cease-fire and, if it is not accepted, call for its use against the victim. This makes the UN a completely cynical exercise. The Israelis will go to an all-out attack, get a cease-fire resolution drafted, grab as much territory as they can, then accept the cease-fire. If the Arabs were not demented, they will realize that in the long term, and I mean by Wednesday—If we can go in with a cease-fire resolution which Israel can accept, then we could use it against Israel if necessary. And the Soviets won't get the credit for stopping the fighting.'"

*These documents can be found in *President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, A Conference Report and Document Release*, January 30, 2013, at the Nixon Presidential Library in Yorba Linda, CA.

Alternative Analysis Roots in the 1970s

One of the earliest mentions of the use of alternative analysis in the IC as part of the analytic process occurred during the Vietnam War era. At the request of Defense Secretary McNamara, CIA analysts produced a report, *The Vietnamese Communists' Will to Persist,* that employed a red-team approach. Analysts during this period used "solid alternative analysis techniques (red team, devil's advocate, and competing hypotheses)." (*The Directorate of Intelligence: Fifty Years of Informing Policy, 1952–2002*, [CIA, 2002], 40–45.)

The Nixon administration's dissatisfaction with the quality of IC analysis spurred other early efforts at producing alternative analyses. DCI Helms, for example, sent Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor, "a new kind of paper" on Soviet strategic weapons programs in February 1970 intended for the president. However, Kissinger never forwarded the assessment, telling Helms that while he thought the memorandum was "an interesting change of pace," the format was "probably too much of a general essay to be a regular publication." Kissinger advised Helms that "the trick … is striking the right balance between facts and judgments" and that "occasionally, I think it would be productive to play the devil's advocate and offer alternative hypotheses before choosing, or maybe not choosing." (Memo for Henry A. Kissinger, "CIA Memo to the President on Soviet Strategic Programs," March 6, 1970, LOC-HAK-4-5-2-9.)

Similarly, meeting with DCI-designate William Colby in June 1973, Kissinger urged Colby to ensure "analysts clearly bring out alternative interpretations and possible developments," requesting that "he not be subjected to any consensus language." (Memo for the Record, "Breakfast with Dr. Henry A. Kissinger on 15 June 73," June 18, 1973, CIA-RDP-80M01048A000800050023-6.)

These and most of the documents cited in this article can be found via the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST). CREST is available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/search_archive.asp. Documents located in the CREST database are referenced in the endnotes by their subject, date, and Agency Action Identifier, followed by the box, folder, and document number.

I use the term *alternative analysis* in this article to encompass a range of analytic methods and approaches to include competitive analysis, devil's advocacy, red cell/red team, other SATs, and simply the systematic evaluation of differing hypotheses to explain events or phenomena.

Origin of the Initiative

Although there are a few instances of the IC providing consumers with alternative analysis in its early decades, the trigger spurring the development of an IC challenge mechanism was the failure to foresee the outbreak of war in October 1973, which began just one month into Colby's time as DCI. The lack of warning was widely perceived as a major intelligence failure, spurring multiple actions and recommendations to improve strategic warning and prevent future surprises.[2] Colby surfaced some of these in a memo to Kissinger on October 27, 1973, titled "Critique of Middle East Crisis."[3] Colby wrote that the Intelligence Community Staff (1972–92, a forerunner of the Community Management Staff) had concluded there was "an initial analytical failure in the sense that the intelligence community did not issue a clear warning of impending Arab-Israeli hostilities," acknowledging Kissinger's observation that this was "not so much a question of turning up 'facts,' but one of interpretation and analysis." Colby concluded, "Somehow we must build into our analytical process an automatic challenge or advocacy of variations to the consensus."[4]

Much of the DCI's October memo to Kissinger drew on interim findings his staff had provided him. Colby used these findings to task the IC Staff to "develop regular systems to ensure that serious divergent points of view and conflicting elements of information not be submerged by managerial fiat or the mechanism of reinforcing consensus." The guidance specified that "such systems will also be charged with ensuring the establishment of means to provide the views of devil's advocates, adversary procedures, and use of gaming techniques as appropriate."[5]

These recommendations as well as others were presented to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) in December 1973 as "Interim Recommendations." Two of these recommendations addressed the nature of the problems the challenge mechanism was designed to address and what form it might take. One recommendation was to establish "a community-wide intelligence forum for the purpose of combating the 'mind set syndrome.'" The other was to "create a challenge mechanism external to the IC to combat the dual problems of analyst desensitization resulting from long-term exposure to confrontation situations and the problem of reinforcing consensus." Presciently, the memo forwarding the recommendations noted in

On April 1, 1974, a letter of instruction from Graham to the PRD's leadership specifically charged them to "formulate and gain acceptance of ways to introduce a systematic challenge mechanism into the workings of the finished intelligence community."

parentheses: "Everyone wants a challenge mechanism. Quarrel will be how the details will be worked out."[6]

Developing a Challenge Mechanism

The IC Staff responded quickly to Colby's direction. The Product Review Division (PRD) was tasked in January 1974 to produce a "study of challenge procedures which could enhance the Community's analytical prowess and which (through the Community's publications) help to answer some of the demands of the consumer for a better product."[7] The IC Staff also immediately began experimenting with the use of a devil's advocate (DA). Gen. Daniel Graham, then deputy director of central intelligence for the IC (DDCI/IC), notified Colby in January 1974 that he had one of his staff serve as DA during a IC-wide gathering of China analysts, noting "this is in line with the notion of establishing more effective challenge mechanisms in the production of intelligence." Graham detailed the DA's actions during the session and ended his memo asking, "The question now is: how can DA roles be institutionalized?"[8]

Graham went on to suggest several ways forward. One approach would have the national intelligence officer (NIO) responsible for drafting an estimate designate a DA "who would review previous papers on the subject in order to find loopholes … and highlight these weaknesses with a view toward forcing a fresh examination of the major judgments." Another method, especially in cases where there were analytic disagreements, was to have dissenting agencies, in effect, perform the DA function. However, Graham qualified this comment by observing, "Particularly for those NIEs which have passed unanimously year after year, it might be helpful to create the DA's 'artificial' dissent. This might be put at annex to the paper, clearly labeled as an artificial position." Graham concluded by advising the DCI that his staff was working up "a more detailed set of proposals on a challenge mechanism," but meanwhile he believed "the DA concept is worth further experimentation."[9]

Work on developing a challenge mechanism continued. On April 1, 1974, a letter of instruction from Graham to the PRD's leadership specifically charged them to "formulate and gain acceptance of ways to introduce a systematic challenge mechanism into the workings of the finished intelligence community."[10] In support of this effort, a study on potential challenge mechanisms was launched with completion scheduled for June, although it was nearly six months later before an actual draft proposal appeared.[11]

In November 1974, the PRD completed its work by publishing *A Proposal for a "Challenge Mechanism" for the Intelligence Community*. The PRD proposal, which had been nearly a year in the making, began with an introductory note describing its scope and purpose:

> *This paper looks at the feasibility of <u>institutionalizing</u> a "challenge mechanism," or "Devil's Advocate," … in the Intelligence Community.[a] The paper does not proceed with a full discussion of the pros and cons of formally <u>institutionalizing</u> challenges. Rather, it seeks to explore the working milieu in which an institutionalized challenge mechanism would have to function. This should enable interested parties to come to some conclusions about the feasibility of the concept.*[12]

The proposal was based primarily on interviews with "individuals who formerly held, or hold now, key managerial positions in <u>substantive</u> intelligence producing organizations, and NIOs." This approach was employed because of the study's focus on the "feasibility of the challenge in practice, and these folks are critical to the success or failure of the process."

PRD started by identifying the perceived problems the mechanism was designed to address. It noted an unstated but clear implication of the proposal "was that in the preparation of major substantive papers, such as NIEs [National Intelligence Estimates] and Interagency Memoranda, at least some key minority views were not being ventilated to the fullest extent, that other views were or could be overlooked, or that important contingencies might not receive full attention." The study pointed out NIEs no longer had

a. Here and throughout this article, emphases are as shown in the original documents.

the benefit of the former Office of National Estimate's (ONE's) process of multiple levels of review, including a final level conducted by the Board of National Estimates where "there were a variety of views … with one or more Board members acting in fact as a Devil's Advocate. Indeed, the role of the Board was to probe and question the entire paper."

Also, in the absence of that office's dedicated drafting staff, "the bulk of all papers prepared under NIO auspices must be produced by substantive organizations geared, in the main, toward producing current intelligence." "There may be a weakness in a system that relies heavily on current intelligence analysts to also prepare estimative and longer-range judgments," the proposal asserted, "at least in the sense of reducing the opportunities for other views to impact current wisdom."

The proposal went on to identify the concerns and questions many had regarding the form a challenge mechanism might take and particularly how it would be implemented. Intelligence officials questioned whether the mechanism was the best way to accommodate dissent and encourage alternative analysis. Many were in agreement with a former CIA deputy director for intelligence who argued, "Dissenting views can most effectively be dealt with at the working level of review, indeed as early as possible in the production process." Another officer endorsed this opinion: "A kind of Devil's Advocate should be part of the process in working up a paper through the working substantive levels. It is all part of the 'tightening process' in producing any paper."

The PRD proposal identified additional issues involving the creation of a challenge mechanism, ranging from its applicability to many intelligence products to its reception by policymakers.

In sum, the proposal concluded,

> *The strong inclination is to insist that differing views and judgments can best be threshed out by the analysts and producing offices, rather than by another entity or group organized and tasked specifically to prepare opposing views. This means that at each step along the way, drafters, branch and division chiefs, other offices and colleagues in other agencies should continually question judgments.*

The PRD proposal identified additional issues involving the creation of a challenge mechanism, ranging from its applicability to many intelligence products to its reception by policymakers. Those interviewed pointed out that not all papers "lend themselves to Devil's Advocating," in part due to their nature and in part because "papers must be prepared for the NSC on very tight deadlines."

Besides short deadlines, the timing of when to introduce a challenge mechanism for best results was raised, with some arguing a DA could be useful before a paper is written, while some contended it would be of most value once a draft was prepared. Others criticized the DA concept on grounds of artificiality, arguing the "DA role drives an individual to take increasingly extreme positions, partly because he and everyone else knows that he is role-playing and this contributes to an essentially artificial situation."

Equally significant were objections voiced over how consumers might react to a DA's end product. As one NIO asked, "What can you do after the Devil's Advocate cites another position—simply ask the policymakers to worry about it?, even though we have no basis for conceding the DA assessment is indeed the correct one." Echoing these sentiments, George Carver, the deputy to the director of central intelligence for NIOs (D/DCI/NIO), saw advancing such an assessment as "confusing policymakers."

Grudging Acceptance

Practitioners, however, acknowledged that a DA approach might be appropriate in certain instances. For example, a former head of CIA analysis opined that if the concept of a challenge mechanism has any merit, "it is probably in those cases where the minority view occurrence, should it take place, would have very serious consequences for the U.S." His sentiments were seconded by a former ONE official who asserted: "An estimate or substantive paper should come down hard, as hard as the evidence permits, on a judgment, and it should be as pointed and precise as possible. But in those instances where the outcome on the other side of the majority position would be very serious to US interests, then a 'worst case analysis' should be undertaken."

The PRD proposal concluded by recognizing that "although sentiment of those reached runs rather heavily against institutionalizing challenge,

"Majorities are sometimes wrong, but it is rash to make the assumption that they are invariably wrong and such an assumption indicates a rather disquieting lack of confidence in the professionalism (including objectivity) or knowledge of the Community's analysts."

a large number of possible ways to do just that are set out for possible consideration." The study also acknowledged that "in the spectrum of possibilities, the ones least likely to have a real impact on the substantive community are generally the ones most acceptable to the producing managers, that is, they are disposed to accept them and work with them." The study then addressed the questions of who might exercise this challenge function and how large the entity needed to be.

The range of options stretched from appointing an ad hoc challenger or consultants to establishing a new office that would need to be equal in size to the NIO structure to have the necessary personnel and resources to succeed in its mission. In between were multiple possibilities, including a panel consisting of "three or four very impressive and knowledgeable figures."

Other options focused on tasking existing organizations to take on this work, such as the NIOs, the IC's PRD, or CIA's Office of Political Research, a unit formed when ONE was abolished that welcomed some of ONE's former staffers into its ranks. Yet ultimately the study concluded by citing one of the DA's proponents: "The institution of a DA is not so important as the philosophy in producing substantive intelligence," a point shared by DA opponents as well.

Leadership Reactions

Senior IC officials were forthcoming with additional comments on the study over the next three months. Some saw no need to create a new entity to execute a challenge mechanism, suggesting that it would not address the real problems and might in fact make things worse.

Richard Shryock, the PRD chief who led multiple IC postmortem studies, including the assessment done in the aftermath of the October 1973 surprise, was one such voice. In a memo appearing ten days after the draft proposal, Shryock argued that "the development of a viable challenge mechanism would be more manageable and realistic if the term 'institutionalizing' were taken less literally and if the purpose of the challenge mechanism were more clearly defined."[13] He argued the primary purpose of a challenge mechanism was not to present dissenting views to the customer but rather to "assist production analysts to overcome three occupational hazards to which, according to our post mortems they are generally, and sometimes seriously, subject."

Shryock identified these as *preconceptions, reinforcing consensus,* and *the current intelligence syndrome*. Thus he saw the challenge mechanism as a means of "reminding, nudging, alerting the analyst—telling him, in fact, that in spite of his widely acknowledged expertise he may have overlooked or unconsciously suppressed something important." Shryock also had strong views of who should perform this role, asserting what was needed was "an individual or group that does not have preconceptions (at least not the same ones as the pros), is not burdened by the consensus of colleagues, and does not read every scrap of current intelligence."

Moreover, "the validity of [the DA's] challenge," he insisted, "would rest not primarily on the scope of his knowledge but rather on the different perspective he would bring to the problem at issue, a perspective untrammeled by the occupational hazards of the professional analyst."[14]

George Carver was harsher in his criticism of the proposal and warned that it might create new problems. In a memo titled "Devilish Advocacy," Carver wrote, "Institutionalizing the process also raises another potential difficulty … Majorities are sometimes wrong, but it is rash to make the assumption that they are invariably wrong and such an assumption indicates a rather disquieting lack of confidence in the professionalism (including objectivity) or knowledge of the Community's analysts."[15] At the same time he acknowledged, "I do agree, as do my colleagues, that we have to be particularly careful in papers where there is almost unanimous consensus or ones whose judgments have a direct bearing on vital U.S. interests along the lines indicated above—i.e., ones in which judgmental errors could be disastrous."[16]

What form the challenge mechanism might take and who should exercise the function drew even more attention from senior IC officials. Instead of a new entity, one argued in favor of something smaller in scale

in nature, much along the lines of an "alert memo," a new product being developed by the strategic-warning community at Colby's direction.[17] Most, however, were in agreement with Shryock's view that "there already is, in being, Community machinery, the NIO system, which could accommodate—effectively, if not easily—the establishment of challenge procedures."[18]

Not surprisingly, Carver reinforced this point even more strongly: "What is required here is simply that the NIO responsible for such a paper ensure that the chairman allow full scope to the interplay of debate. The whole NIO structure was deliberately set up to facilitate this and encourage it."[19] The chief of the IC Coordination Staff likewise believed that if a challenge mechanism was to be instituted, it should be limited to papers handled within the NIO system and urged that "the D/DCI/NIO should be charged with recommending to the DCI which specific estimates or other key documents involve matters of such evidential uncertainty that a challenge procedure could be used to advantage."[20]

In sum, Carver spoke for many when he offered General Graham's successor as the D/DCI/IC, Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, the following advice:

> *The problem which led to General Graham's original suggestion and has stimulated the DCI's concerns is a real one. My colleagues and I are aware of and bothered by it as anyone else in the Community. It needs to be addressed and we are endeavoring to address it. An elaborate, formal devil's advocate mechanism, however, does not seem to us to be the optimum way to tackle it.*[21]

The proposal General Wilson forwarded to the DCI in February 1975 reflected many of the concerns and suggestions contained in the November study and discussed by Shryock, Carver, and others.

D/DCI/IC Wilson's Recommendation for Colby

The proposal General Wilson forwarded to the DCI in February 1975 reflected many of the concerns and suggestions contained in the November study and discussed by Shryock, Carver, and others.[22] Wilson began the memo by acknowledging Colby's earlier tasking, noting the DCI's interest in "establishing within the community a regular system for the presentation of the views of devil's advocates, i.e., some sort of system which would ensure that majority views and the conventional wisdom concerning major intelligence judgments would be subject to effective challenge procedures."

Wilson, who had come to the IC job from a position leading DIA's estimative process, conceded that "though few would quarrel with the objectives of the proposal, several have, in fact, questioned the practicality of institutionalizing challenge procedures and have expressed the fear that the system's (non-monetary) costs might outweigh its benefits."[23] He admitted his own mixed feelings on the subject stating, "I very much favor the concept of regular challenge procedures, particularly as part of the normal production process, but recognize that there will be pitfalls attending their establishment as a separate institution."[24]

Accordingly, what Wilson recommended reflected a compromise. It envisioned key roles for the NIOs and the D/DCI/NIO. In producing assessments NIOs would ensure "minority points of view and dissents [were] adequately represented and discussed" and they would report to the USIB or DCI "principal issues in dispute, if any, and the extent to which he and his committee pondered contrary opinions and judgments."

The D/DCI/NIO, when appropriate, would appoint a devil's advocate to represent dissenting views. Such an appointment would normally occur only when "an interagency paper 1) is considered to be of unusual significance to US interests and policies; 2) contains judgments which are clearly controversial; or 3) makes estimates which, if wrong, would likely have very important (and adverse) effects on US attitudes and policies."

Wilson continued, saying the DA would be "a senior and experienced officer in the community" whose role would be to formulate and represent dissenting views throughout the life of the assessment under consideration as well as solicit the views of other dissenters within the IC. Finally, the NIO and DA would provide the DCI or USIB with a written report "in those instances when mistaken estimates might result in very serious damage to US interests."[25]

I have found no record indicating Colby made any decision or took action in response to the Wilson's memorandum regarding possible IC

The failure to institutionalize a challenge mechanism in February 1975 did not end the push to increase alternative analysis within the IC.

challenge procedures or that further formal discussion of the topic was undertaken by the USIB or any other IC forum. The available documentation and scholarship certainly suggest Colby was receptive to and encouraged alternative analysis.[26] Conceivably, Colby may have posed no objection to NIOs considering alternatives along the lines recommended in the memorandum, but I did not discover any document indicating formal initiation of an institutionalized system supporting one or more types of alternative analysis.

Team A/Team B Experiment

The IC's 1976 Team A/Team B "experiment," as it was known, in competitive analysis is certainly better known than the IC's efforts to institutionalize a challenge mechanism.[27] The experiment during DCI George H. W. Bush's tenure resulted not from an intelligence failure, but from growing political pressures against détente and concerns over the perceived Soviet strategic threat. The impetus came from outside the IC, and it was not seen in the same light as the exploration the IC Staff had undertaken to ensure appropriate substantive challenges to mainline analytic judgments. In addition, the historical record indicates no linkage between the 1975 challenge proposal and the Team A/Team B experiment a year later. General Graham, a key participant in the experiment and in the IC's efforts to institutionalize a challenge mechanism, included no discussion of it in his memoir, which details the experiment and his role in it.[28]

Cold War Concerns

The origins of the Team A/B experiment can be traced to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board's (PFIAB's) August 1975 request that a competitive analysis be conducted on Soviet strategic weapons systems. This request was initially deflected by Colby, with the DCI promising that the 1976 update of NIE 11-3/8-75, *Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through 1985,* would address its concerns. The PFIAB renewed its request for a competitive analysis to the Ford administration in the spring of 1976, and Bush and Deputy Secretary of Defense for intelligence Robert Ellsworth agreed to the proposal.

There were actually three A/B Team exercises, each addressing one of three issues, air defense, missile accuracy, and Soviet strategic objectives. The A Teams had IC analysts who were already working on updating NIE 11-3/8. DCI Bush and a PFIAB committee selected the B Team members. The B Teams that focused on Soviet missile accuracy and air defenses did their work collaboratively, constructively, and without fanfare or publicity. The third B Team—led by Harvard professor of history Richard Pipes—unfortunately dealt not with the military issue as initially proposed but with the broad topic of Soviet objectives. It produced a lengthy polemic intent on discrediting Team A analysts. This report was promptly leaked and became another anti-détente, the-Soviets-are-coming diatribe that angered the DCI.[29]

Although Team A/Team B is one of four contrarian techniques discussed in a March 2009 tradecraft primer devoted to "Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis," the 1976 experiment is not remembered in a positive light but rather as a classic example of the politicization of intelligence. Richards Heuer probably spoke for many when he wrote: "The Intelligence Community teaches a couple types of structured debate, which are useful, but they call these by the unfortunate name Team A/Team B. I say this is unfortunate because I'm old enough to remember the original Team A/Team B experiment, and what that brings to mind for me is predictable failure and entrenched warfare between long-term adversaries. I suggest this is not a good model to follow."[30]

Continuing Efforts

The failure to institutionalize a challenge mechanism in February 1975 did not end the push to increase alternative analyses within the IC. In fact, occurring concurrently with the DCI's initiative were efforts to restructure and revitalize the US warning community.[31] This push envisioned an important role for the that community in challenging IC analysis, a theme reiterated multiple times in the ensuing years. A memo in October 1974 from the DCI to the Ad Hoc Committee on Watch Mechanism observed "that the Watch mechanism's real value lies in its ability to challenge the conventional wisdom of the rest of the community, particularly as expressed in current intelligence production."[32]

Discussions sparked by the proposal to institutionalize a challenge mechanism reverberated throughout

the IC during the next four years. A memo to CIA's deputy director for intelligence in March 1977 noted the correspondence "relates to our discussion on February 16 about alternative approaches in intelligence analysis. Four of these—alternative hypothesis analysis, competitive analysis, devil's advocacy, and alternate conclusions to a best judgment—are discussed in the attached memorandum."[33] A Center for the Study of Intelligence monograph in 1977 on NIEs noted that while critics may have overstated the roles of group think, of reinforcing consensus, and of mind set in preventing "the adequate exploration of analytical alternatives and the formulation and presentation of alternative estimates," many consumers "nevertheless made it clear they wanted and expected all the informed views they could get."[34]

The CSI study cited an example of the use of devil's advocacy in the production of an NIE and found it to be "very useful." Several of those interviewed added the qualifier that "it would appear important, however, to confine use of the technique to important areas of estimates where there is substantial uncertainty and debate." "In all this," it concluded, "the problem is to encourage alternative analysis without artificiality and without a drop in the quality and coherence of the product, in a way that stimulates thinking rather than emotion, and within the constraints of available time and resources."[35]

Efforts to institutionalize a challenge mechanism—albeit on a smaller scale and focused on certain areas—did not cease either. One such initiative involved the warning community and its ongoing efforts to avoid another warning failure. Documents discussing the role and requirements of an IC warning system throughout 1978 highlighted the need for a challenge mechanism. A still largely classified paper, "The Role of the DCI in Warning and Crisis Management," for example, contained a section identified as "Warning and Current Intelligence: The Need for Challenge Mechanisms."[36]

Discussions sparked by the proposal to institutionalize a challenge mechanism reverberated throughout the IC during the next four years.

Similarly, a paper discussing the requirements for a national warning system emphasized, "It must incorporate mechanisms to challenge conventional thinking and bring out alternative hypotheses."[37] Finally, a response prepared to answer the question "What would be the impact of the elimination of the Strategic Warning Staff?" stated: "It serves as a devil's advocate in challenging conventional (analytic) wisdom. As such, it represents the DCI's 'insurance' against another Pearl Harbor."[38]

Senior Review Panel

In 1977, a unit outside the warning community—the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC)—was given a role in alternative analysis. NFAC had been formed by a merger of CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and the NIO structure, retitled the National Intelligence Council (NIC). Within the NIC a Senior Review Panel (SRP) was created to provide NFAC's director "an independent review of major intelligence products, especially those focusing on problems that have serious policy implications."[39]

The SRP was expected to:

> *serve not only as a Devil's Advocate—reviewing and critiquing selected intelligence production—but* [to] *surface alternative conclusions to best judgments (many of what have been described as 'intelligence failures' stem from analysts not giving sufficient weight to worst-case hypotheses), assist in identifying critical intelligence questions that merit formal alternative hypothesis analysis or competitive analysis and taking part in, managing or monitoring such products."*[40]

In 1982, the chairman of the NIC—by then answering directly to the DCI after abolition of NFAC the year before— solicited the SRP's views on more systematic use of devil's advocacy in the estimative process. The panel's response concluded that despite a mixed record,

> *the technique may have substantial values. Among the most important of the latter are: (a) encouragement of more thorough scrutiny of available evidence and all-source intelligence; (b) heightened analyst sensitivity to alternative hypotheses and inertial mind-sets; (c) increased consumer awareness of probability ranges, indicator ambiguity, and policy sequels.*[41]

Not unlike the earlier effort to explore institutionalization of a challenge mechanism, the SRP assessment anticipated problems impeding its adoption, including "community

The 1980s and particularly the 1990s witnessed a push within the IC to improve the analytic tradecraft and the methods it employed.

participation, analyst comprehension, and format and distribution of end products." Consequently the panel recommended that the DA technique be introduced into the estimative system. It further recommended its use be governed by two principles. First, that it be tried experimentally on one or two subjects; second, that the effort be mounted by the analytical production community—defined in this memo as the NIC's Analytic Group and "those who work the daily materials and the information flow."[42] "The aim of the initial exercise," the panel concluded, "should be not only to test the alternative line, array its consequences, and devise sets of early indicators but also to develop methodology and approaches for a possibly wider application of the technique."[43]

Ensuing Decades and New Efforts

IC interest in devil's advocacy and other means to elicit alternative analysis was evident intermittently over the next two decades. For example, an article discussing Israel's "devil's advocate shop," which was originally published in Israel's *Defense Forces Journal*, was reprinted in the 1985 winter edition of *Studies in Intelligence*. The article reviewed why the office had been established, how it operated and what were considered key factors in its success.[44] The next year an "interesting and provocative" alternative analysis piece was forwarded from the director for Near Eastern and South Asian analysis to the DCI. Noting that while "most observers believe that an Iranian victory over Iraq would threaten US interests in the Middle East by emboldening Tehran to export its revolution to other Arab states," this assessment presented a credible case for how an Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq War "would reduce the threat of additional Iranian military exploits, foster political moderation in Tehran and Baghdad and enhance US security ties to Saudi Arabia and the smaller Persian Gulf states."[45]

The 1980s and particularly the 1990s witnessed a push within the IC to improve analytic tradecraft and the methods it employed. This push—driven by a small group of senior leaders who recognized the need for rigorous analytic tradecraft and strongly supported initiatives and programs designed to strengthen it—produced new tradecraft manuals, training courses, and ultimately the creation of the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis in 2000.[46] These efforts were accompanied by the exploration and use of new analytic methods—later called Structured Analytic Techniques—that had begun in the 1970s as part of the IC's response to President Nixon's demand that the community explore new methods and improve the quality of analysis delivered to the nation's senior leaders.[47]

9/11 and Iraq WMD

The push for better tradecraft and methods was spurred further by world events and shortcomings in the IC's performance. Although the IC had been criticized in the past for failing to provide timely warning and accurate assessments—including of the testing of a Soviet atomic bomb in 1949, Soviet intentions before the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the outbreak of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and India's 1998 nuclear detonations—none matched the combined effects of the 9/11 attacks and the failure to find WMD programs in Iraq the IC had purported existed.

Two days after 9/11, DCI George Tenet commissioned the deputy director for intelligence to "create a 'red cell' that would think unconventionally about the full range of relevant analytic issues," an action accomplished within days. The DCI Red Cell was "charged with taking a pronounced 'out of the box' approach" and "periodically produce memoranda and reports intended to provoke thought rather than to provide authoritative assessment."[48] In addition, the Defense Intelligence Agency created a devil's advocate position to perform a similar function.

Congressional investigations into both 9/11 and flawed assessments of Iraq's WMD programs reinforced the need for the IC to expand and improve its use of alternative analysis. The 9/11 Commission concluded, for example, that it was "crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination."[49] Going further, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 specified that the newly created position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was to "encourage sound analytic methods and tradecraft" and "conduct alternative analysis (commonly referred to as 'red team analysis') of information and conclusions in intelligence products."[50]

This language was captured and expanded on in IC Directive 203, "Analytic Standards," in 2007. Under analytic standard four—"Incorporates alternative analysis where appropriate"—the policy directed that "to the extent possible, analysis should incorporate insights from the application of structured analytic technique(s) appropriate to the topic being analyzed."[51] In its 2005 report, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction echoed the same message contained in the IRTPA but was even more explicit in its call for alternative analysis and especially contrarian analysis, singling out the need for competitive analysis and use of red teams and devil's advocates:[52]

> *The Community should institute a formal system for competitive—and even explicitly contrarian—analysis. Such groups must be licensed to be troublesome. Further, they must take contrarian positions, not just ones that take a harder line (a flaw with the Team B exercise of the 1970s).*[53]

Insights

Colby's push in 1973 to institutionalize a challenge mechanism in the IC was a minor initiative that failed to take hold, but it was the most significant effort up to then to ensure that the IC allowed "serious divergent points of view [to be] properly expressed in finished products."[54]

Moreover, his attempt to institutionalize a challenge mechanism is still relevant for today's IC. The insights gained from Colby's tasking, subsequent studies and pilots, and the pushback they engendered shaped IC efforts to institutionalize challenge mechanisms—such as the DCI Red Cell—and to provide consumers with alternative analyses in the decades that followed. Preconceptions, reinforcing consensus, and the never-ending demand for current intelligence, for example, have changed little in 50 years; neither have their negative effects on the IC's ability to identify and warn of major strategic developments, as witnessed by the Arab Spring in 2011, Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014, and HAMAS's surprise attack on Israel in October 2023.

The objections voiced over institutionalizing a challenge mechanism ultimately contributed to the initiative's abandonment in 1975. This same resistance reinforced the need for the IC to find other methods to incorporate challenge mechanisms and facilitate alternative analyses. One such path was through the processes employed by NIOs and later the NIC in regularly encouraging dissent and alternative viewpoints. The imperative to find other ways to address the real analytic problems the challenge mechanism was designed to mitigate also proved beneficial for concurrent efforts, begun in the 1970s, to develop and use advanced analytic methods, many of which would become SATs.

The development of these techniques allowed for other ways to "challenge" and "explore different hypotheses" at lower levels and in a less confrontational, more bureaucratically palatable manner. The analytic tradecraft cells now found in multiple IC organizations—equipped with savvy analytic methodologists—can be traced in part to the valid requirements the 1974 challenge mechanism was designed to address and the reservations voiced over its adoption.[55]

The establishment and success of CIA's Red Cell and DIA's devil's advocate, and the greatly expanded use of red teams by military commands within the Department of Defense are likewise partly due to the insights from efforts in the 1970s to institutionalize a challenge mechanism as well as those garnered from Israel's experience.[56] In 2001, just as in 1973, it took an intelligence failure and strong support from the DCI to force the IC to consider and accept an organization whose mission was to challenge or go beyond mainline analysis. What emerged—a small unit outside the main producing organization selectively engaged on key issues involving significant US interests—conformed closely to the 1974 proposals deemed most likely to be accepted by the IC and perform its mission adequately.

The analytic challenges have not gotten easier with the passage of time. For one, the IC's formal strategic warning structure—once identified as the "DCI's 'insurance' against another Pearl Harbor"—was disestablished in 2011.[57] For another, as technology—particularly the growing use and importance of AI—and threats we face have evolved, so too have the analytic challenges and the tools that must be employed to overcome or mitigate them.

Yet history—and particularly Colby's effort in the 1970s—suggests the requirement to challenge widely accepted views and analyses certainly will remain in the future. The recently released Durham Report examining

the FBI's investigation into the Trump campaign's interaction with Russia during the 2016 presidential election recommended that the Department of Justice seriously consider identifying "an official to challenge both a politically sensitive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Application (FISA) application and other steps of an investigation," essentially acting as a devil's advocate.[58] History also makes equally clear the importance and continued need to depend on more than a single office or an individual to ensure alternatives are introduced to mainline conclusions. As noted in 1974, the philosophy of a devil's advocate must be inculcated "in all the producing divisions so that various and differing views are surfaced normally through the regular production mechanism."[59]

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The author: James D. Marchio is a retired US Air Force officer and former product evaluator in the Office of Analytic Integrity and Standards under the DNI. He has contributed several articles to *Studies*, most recently "Fostering Creativity in the IC: Lessons from Four Decades Ago," *Studies* 65, no. 4 (December 2021).

The author wishes to thank Dr. Douglas Garthoff and Professor Richard Immerman for their comments and insights on an earlier draft.

Endnotes

1. Micah Zenko, *Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking like the Enemy* (Basic Books, 2015).
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7. Memo for the Record, "Middle East Post-Mortem, Phase II," January 17, 1974, CIA-RDP83M00171R001800040031-1.
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9. Ibid. The report noted that an "experimental DA" had already been used on three occasions, including as a DA on a détente paper in May 1974. See Memo for National Intelligence Officer for USSR/EE, "A Devil's Advocate View of Soviet Détente Policy," May 15, 1974, CIA-RDP80M01082A000400090003-0.
10. Memo for Deputy Chief, PRD, "Letter of Instruction," April 1, 1974, CIA-RDP80M00165A002900090102-2.
11. Memo, PRD Post-Mortem Phase II Work Program, May 3, 1974, CIA-RDP83M00171R001800040024-9. Further emphasizing the seriousness with which the challenge mechanism was pursued is the fact that PRD'S proposed charter directed it to "develop regular systems (for implementation by the NIOs) to ensure that serious divergent points of view are properly expressed in finished products, and it should formulate ways to introduce systematic challenge procedures into the Community's deliberations." Charter for the Product Review Division (PRD) of the Intelligence Community Staff, May 15, 1974, CIA-RDP80M01133A000600190011-1.
12. "A Proposal for a 'Challenge Mechanism' for the Intelligence Community," November 19, 1974, CIA-RDP80M01133A000700150007-9.
13. Memorandum, "Challenge Mechanism," November 27, 1974, CIA-RDP80M01082A000800020002-4.
14. Ibid.
15. Memo for Lt. General Wilson, "Devilish Advocacy," February 12, 1975, CIA-RDP91M00696R000500150005-1.
16. Ibid. Although Irving Janis's *Victims of Group Think* (Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1972) was published a year before the 1973 war, I could find no evidence that it played a role in influencing the discussion surrounding institutionalizing a challenge mechanism. One

of the earliest reflections of this work in IC literature is a book review by Fritz Ermarth in *Studies in Intelligence* 18, No. 1, (1974): 61, CIA-RDP84B00890R000800050003-4.

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18. Ibid.
19. Memo for Lt. General Wilson, "Devilish Advocacy," February 12, 1975, CIA-RDP91M00696R000500150005-1.
20. Memo for Lt. General Wilson, "Comments on PRD's Challenge Procedures – A Proposal," January 8, 1975, CIA-RDP-80M01133A000700150006-0.
21. Memorandum for Lt. General Wilson, "Devilish Advocacy." The chief of the Intelligence Community Staff's Coordination Staff echoed this point, writing: "Essentially, I am very skeptical as to the usefulness of any formalized 'devil's advocate' procedure. In my view, it is a responsibility of the head of each production office to ensure that his analysts approach estimative problems with a 'devils advocate' set of mind so that tentative findings and conclusions are subjected to challenge from the onset. It is at an early phase in the development of an estimate that I consider challenges to analyst thinking most important." Memo for General Wilson, "Comments on PRD's Challenge Procedures – A Proposal," January 8, 1975, CIA-RDP80M01133A000700150006-0.
22. IC Staff Weekly Report, January 23, 1975, CIA-RDP80M01133A001200120030-0 and Memo for DCI, "Challenge Procedures for the Intelligence Community," February 1975, CIA-RDP80M01133A000700150003-3.
23. Memo for DCI, "Challenge Procedures for the Intelligence Community."
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27. For a detailed discussion of the 1976 Team A/Team B "experiment,' see Anne H. Cahn, *Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA*, (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998); Zenko, *Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy*, 76–83, and Kevin P. Stack, "Competitive intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security* 13, no. 4 (1998). For the actual IC assessments of the A-Team-B Team experiment, see Memo for Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, "NSC Staff Request for Evaluations of the A Team-B Team Experiment," November 16, 1982, CIA-RDP85B00134R000200090002-8.
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29. Lawrence Friedman, "The CIA and the Soviet Threat: The politicization of estimates, 1966–1977," *Intelligence and National Security* 12, no. 1, 122–42, DOI:10.1080/02684529708432402
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32. Memo for Members of the Ad Hoc Committee on Watch Mechanism, October 7, 1974, CIA-RDP80M01082A000200020008-4.
33. Author redacted, Memo for Sayre Stevens, "Improving Intelligence Analysis," March 7, 1977, CIA-RDP86B00985R000100110011-8.
34. CSI, Intelligence Monograph, *National Estimates: An Assessment of the Product and Process*, April 1977, CIA-RDP80-00630A000300040001-3.
35. Ibid.
36. "The Role of the DCI in Warning and Crisis Management," January 1, 1978, CIA-RDP83B01027R000200080008-0.
37. Draft, N.D., CIA-RDP83B01027R000200050009-2. Additional support for establishing a challenge mechanism within the IC is found in the 1978 House Select Committee's Subcommittee on Evaluation which recommended "a community-wide effort to provide the 'challenge teams,' training, and methodology support staffs to ensure that analysis is directed at the right questions and the appropriate techniques are used." Memo for Mr. Lehman, August 11, 1978, CIA-RDP83B01027R000200060006-4.
38. "What Would Be the Impact of the Elimination of the Strategic Warning Staff?" October 1, 1978, CIA-RDP-83B01027R000200130021-9. A similar message was being conveyed four years later. The Director of the Strategic Warning Staff wrote: "Consumers of intelligence and especially of warning intelligence have for some time—about ten years—pleaded for full expression of intelligence to be known as alternative hypotheses. The Strategic Warning Staff was directed to provide 'reasonable hypotheses not covered in other community publications, providing alternate explanations and short-term forecasts for situations of a threatening nature.'" Memo for the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, "Review of the Role of the Strategic Warning Staff," February 6, 1981, CIA-RDP83B01027R000100110011-3.
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40. Ibid. This panel originally comprised three experts with "impressive careers in Government, the Military, and Academia." One member was Ambassador William Leonhart; the second a retired US Army general whose name is redacted, and the third a "noted academician," also redacted. Memo for Ambassador Leonhart, "Response to the Senate Select Committee question relating to the Review Panel," March 14, 1979, CIA-RDP98S00099R000400750006-8.
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51. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203: (Analytic Standards), June 2007.
52. *The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States* (March 31, 2005) at Unclassified Version of the Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction - Content Details - (govinfo.gov) Discussion of Red-teams, Devil's Advocate, alternative and competitive analysis can be found on 25–26, 170–71, 328, 387–88, 406–7, and 415.
53. Ibid., 187, 769.
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55. In the ensuing years the IC responded with increased training on the use of SATs, complemented by primers on employing them to improve intelligence analysis, and the creation of methodology tradecraft cells within offices and organizations. Scholars and former intelligence practitioners—such as Richards Heuer and Randy Pherson—also contributed to the literature and training available on employing SATs. See US Government, 'A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Analysis; Randolph Pherson and Richards Heuer, *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*, 3rd ed. (CQ Press, 2021).
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Eighteen Days in October: The Yom Kippur War and How It Created the Modern Middle East
Uri Kaufman (St. Martin's Press, 2023), 386 pages, illustrations, maps.

Target Tehran: How Israel Is Using Sabotage, Cyberwarfare, Assassination—and Secret Diplomacy—to Stop a Nuclear Iran and Create a New Middle East
Yonah Jeremy Bob and Ilan Evyatar (Simon & Schuster, 2023), 351 pages, photos.

Reviewed by Alissa M.



Timing of the publication of books can be both a matter of forethought and, more rarely, serendipity. The first of the books reviewed here, *Eighteen Days in October*, appeared in late August, timed to fall shortly before the 50th anniversary of the surprise attack on Israel by Egypt and Syria in 1973. The second of these books, *Target Tehran*, appeared barely two weeks before Hamas's attack on October 7, 2023, against Israeli settlements near what was thought by the Israelis to be a secure border.

Eighteen Days in October

As of the day it was published, Uri Kaufman's history of the Yom Kippur War was the story of the biggest intelligence failure in Israel's history. That label now might be more aptly applied to events of October 2023. But there's no doubt the war was a defining event for the Israeli state. The battlefield status quo at its conclusion—Israeli, Egyptian, and Syrian positions at an ill-communicated moment of cease-fire—resulted in Israel's present borders.

It is hard to imagine a more engaging and engrossing telling of the political and battlefield developments of the 1973 conflict. Kaufman explains exactly what led to the intelligence failure of Egypt and Syria's surprise attack on Israel—both the collection failures (a small factor) and the analytic failures (the larger problem).

The book is organized as a straightforward chronology of the conflict. In the first five chapters, Kaufman describes the status quo after the previous conflicts (the 1967 Six-Day War in which Israel essentially routed Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and the War of Attrition, which dragged on until 1970) and sets the stage of the Egyptian, Israeli, and US politics in this period. Kaufman does this quite effectively, conveying the broad complexities of the Middle East in the Cold War, establishing the strategic imperatives of the region, and introducing us to some of the region's major players. Kaufman explains how precious every single Israeli F-4 Phantom fighter jet was at the start of the war, and the extent to which Egyptian success was predicated on the idea that they would pull Israel into a protracted conflict that Egypt (with its massive population) could fight for longer than Israel (whose economy would pause during a war, with an army so heavily dependent on reservists).

Chapter six ("The Angel and the Noise") is a crucial chapter for readers interested in the practice of intelligence collection and analysis. The Israelis had three intelligence gems to inform their decisionmaking—two human sources inside Egypt and one technical penetration of Egyptian communications. Even better than raw intelligence, Aman (the Israeli military intelligence service) had an analytic framework it called "The Concept" for understanding Egyptian military decision making, namely, that Syria would not go to war without Egypt and Egypt would not go to war without Scud short-range ballistic missiles.

The problem was that when sources reported that Egypt had its missiles and alongside Syria was in position to start a war, Aman's leadership refused to follow its own analysis to its logical conclusion. Instead it clung desperately to any evidence that pointed to sustained calm.

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Kaufman sums it up succinctly, and searingly: "[Military intelligence chief] Eli Zeira had by now imprisoned himself inside the intellectual trap of the Concept, skillfully repairing it each time some new piece of evidence offered him a chance to escape."

The rest of the war was a series of close calls, near miracles, and slim margins that mostly fell in Israel's favor. Thanks to what amounts mostly to luck and a bit of moxie, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) clawed its way back from a precipice it could have avoided if Zeira and company had recognized the cognitive biases undermining their own perfectly good analysis.

Chapters 7–14 cover the bulk of the fighting days of the war, with vivid descriptions of the sometimes razor-thin temporal margins between tactical progress and strategic disaster. For example, Kaufman judges that a few tank brigades arriving to the Sinai a few hours earlier might have shorted the war considerably. On the other hand, when the Syrian army moved into the Golan, the Israeli military leadership felt the difference between survival and defeat might be so slim that Defense Minister Moshe Dayan suggested readying nuclear weapons to save a few hours of preparation time if it became necessary to use them. (Prime Minister Golda Meir answered this request with a hard no, one of several moments of shining leadership by a leader Kaufman portrays as both heroic and very human.)

This midsection of the book also includes several entertaining tales of division commander (and future prime minister) Ariel Sharon's famously brilliant insubordination. For example, at a low point in the campaign on the Sinai, Sharon disobeys explicit commands from his superior officer not to attack and radios back that "in accordance with your instructions, we are advancing slowly [west] toward the Missouri hill." Kaufman dryly adds, "Of course, those were not his instructions." One of the many pleasures of this book is the vibrancy of Kaufman's descriptions of even well-known Israeli leaders like Meir, Sharon, and Dayan, who come newly alive in his telling.

Chapters 15–23 are the tale of the timing of the cease-fire, which might seem like a lot of space to devote for such a specific part of the story, but the positions of Egyptian, Syrian, and Israeli forces at the moment of cease-fire had enormous consequences for the status quo postbellum. Sadat rejects one cease-fire offer, resulting in time for the United States to resupply the Israeli Air Force, which at that point had dangerously few combat-ready aircraft, and leaving opportunity for the tables to turn.

After the Egyptians lost a critical tank battle, Sharon seized the opportunity to cross the Suez Canal and establish an Israeli foothold on the African continent. This was a massive risk, and it paid off, theoretically leaving Meir in a stronger position to negotiate a ceasefire from Jerusalem. But after crossing the canal, the Israelis were no longer ready to offer the ceasefire that Sadat was now asking for. At this moment—22 October—there was a lot of winking and nodding between Israel and the United States about allowing the IDF to encircle the Egyptian Third Army to leave Israel in the most advantageous possible position when the cease-fire terms were solidified.

Chapter 18, "The Chinese Farm and the Men Who Conquered It," describes a smaller intelligence failure: Aman had photos of a key piece of territory in the Sinai where Egyptian tanks and soldiers had dug in. But the IDF troops and commanders on the ground did not receive the images in time to make use of them on the battlefield and instead took cover in irrigation trenches watching antitank missiles fly overhead and pondering their mortality as Egyptian forces attacked.

After the war, Israel established the Agranat Commission to identify the root of the surprise of the Yom Kippur War and to account for those first terrifying days of intelligence failure, before luck and leadership pulled Israel from the brink of disaster. The commission determined that intelligence assessments are "more accurate when they rely upon numerous indications gathered from the field, rather than on a single source, no matter how good that source might be." (315)

Kaufman treats all sides with a wry sense of humor, informed by history but appreciative of how complicated the Egyptian, Syrian, and Israeli decisions were at the time. Although he focuses more on the Israeli side of the conflict, his analysis is dispassionate and his primary-source research includes archival material from Egypt, the Soviet Union, and even East German Stasi archives. The acknowledgments offer profuse gratitude to Kaufman's Russian-, German-, and Arabic-speaking research assistants who helped him access material not available to him in English or Hebrew.

There's little to critique in Kaufman's achievement here, which is all the more surprising when one learns he is neither a historian nor a political scientist, but a real estate developer for whom this book was a passion project, decades in the making. We followers of Middle East security issues are lucky that he committed to seeing his avocation through to a published volume because it is really a masterpiece of readable military history.

Target Tehran

If *Eighteen Days in October* benefited from timing, *Target Tehran* is especially unlucky, because two weeks after the book's release, one of its major premises—that Israel is a master of the Middle East and has shaped regional politics to its liking—was dramatically undermined by Hamas's attack in 2023.



There are two distinct stories in this book: one of Israel's covert operations against Iran and the other of Jerusalem's diplomatic courting of Arab states. They are not perfect complements, leaving this volume somewhere between a description of the process leading to historic change and a compendium of the best of Israel spy stories (that book already exists—*Rise and Kill First,* by Ronen Bergman).

Authors Yonah Jeremy Bob and Ilan Evyatar open with an account of the raid in which Mossad stole the documents comprising Iran's nuclear archive, which is undoubtedly one of the highlights of Netanyahu's political career. The narrative is gripping and engaging and the archive raid was clearly an operational success, but Netanyahu made a bit of a miscalculation in assessing that the international policy community would care about the biggest public revelation to come from the archive—that Iran had a prior military component to its nuclear research, which Tehran had denied for years. Netanyahu's claim that "Iran lied" went over like the claim that "water is wet."

After the opening chapter on the nuclear archive heist, the authors move on to more Israeli high-stakes derring-do (five Iranian nuclear scientists dead on their commutes, the bombing of the Syrian nuclear reactor, the infamous Stuxnet computer virus). From there, the chapters mostly alternate between the story of covert intelligence operations and the tale of the covert diplomacy that ultimately resulted in the Abraham Accords—with the Mossad director often appearing in both the operational and diplomatic channels.

The Israel portrayed in *Target Tehran* is a country with a sophisticated operational intelligence capability that outwits and outperforms its primary foe. That Israel is also a diplomatic Svengali that develops new friendships with Arab countries through careful statesmanship, close cooperation with a particularly helpful US administration, and a bit of fortuitous timing. That image is at odds with the Israel currently dealing with the aftermath of the biggest intelligence failure in its history, with uncertain long-term diplomatic and security consequences.

It is no surprise that this volume amplifies Israel's biggest intelligence and diplomatic achievements of the last decade, since the authors' sources include a who's who of Israeli and US intelligence and policy officials who helped steer the decisionmaking that resulted in the sabotage, cyber, and lethal operations the book recounts, and the diplomatic breakthroughs of the Abraham Accords. Sometimes their sources are even the decisionmakers themselves. The authors' close and repeated access to Israeli officials in particular gives the narrative real credibility when describing Israeli perspectives. But the same is not true when conveying the Iranian perspective. Many of the references to Tehran's thinking and decisionmaking are sourced to interviews with Israeli officials (69), which is hardly authoritative attribution, or not sourced at all.

The book is otherwise quite good at attributing specific information to specific sources and there is a thorough

index, so in that regard it is useful for the scholar or analyst looking at Israeli operations against Iran, though with the necessary caveat that it heavily reflects Israeli perspectives and treatment of Arab and Iranian perspectives lack nuance.

The intelligence operations and diplomatic accords described in *Target Tehran* are consequential and worth examination, though this volume is more like long-form journalism describing the ticktock of operations and diplomacy than a historical or political science analysis seeking to contextualize and explain the factors driving them. One red flag indicating that the authors are not dispassionate observers of events is that they consistently refer to Iranian leadership as "the ayatollahs." (23, 49, 149, 209) It is certainly true that Iran is a theocracy, but referring to its leaders collectively as "the mullahs" or similar is sloppy use of language that elides the complexity of decisionmaking authority between Iran's elected governing officials and unelected institutions. *Target Tehran* would have benefited from a more evenhanded approach to describing Iranian decisionmaking and priority-balancing, which are no doubt as nuanced as the Israeli ones the authors capably describe. On the other hand, when one side makes its intelligence chiefs and prime ministers available for interviews and the other would not allow the authors into the country even if they asked, it is inevitable that the perspective of the storyteller will be skewed.

As with all books dealing with Israeli covert operations authored by Israelis, this one bears the censors' imprint: coy references that might be summed up as "*If* Israel did the secret thing, here's one way they *might* have done it," along with oblique allusions to "foreign reports" when Mossad has not taken credit for something they are widely assumed to have done. (229)

The chapters on covert operations are, unsurprisingly, a lot more thrilling than the chapters on diplomacy. A lot more creditable, too, since those stories are more easily told with just an Israeli perspective. As with the discussion of Iran, the diplomacy chapters are sourced mostly to interviews with Israeli and US officials rather their Emirati and Saudi counterparts. (83, 107)

The book offers some relevant insights into the current crop of Israeli leaders. In chapter 3, the level of shock from then IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi and then Mossad chief Meir Dagan in reaction to Netanyahu's aggressive advocacy for a kinetic strike on Iran's nuclear facilities offers a glimpse into the uncompromising Netanyahu. And chapter 14 shows the attention Jerusalem pays to the thinking of US decisionmakers. Then Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, for example, told the authors he chose the timing of a release of information about Iran's deception of the IAEA to influence Washington.

Such criticisms notwithstanding, *Target Tehran* is a comprehensive telling of Israel's intelligence operations against Iran and documents—from Israel's perspective—the rationale and planning for those activities. It's a worthy addition to the canon of Israeli covert missions literature.

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The reviewer: Alissa M. is a CIA analyst focused on governance issues.

Agents of Subversion: The Fate of John T. Downey and the CIA's Covert War in China

John Delury (Cornell University Press, 2022), 408 pages, illustrations.

Reviewed by Bianca L. Adair



John Delury sets out in this book to paint the picture of how "unreasonable hopes and irrational fears of subversion aggravated destructive tendencies toward political repression" using US covert action in China as the backdrop. (4) He tackles a complicated period with respect to the US global position after WWII, the creation and evolution of the US Intelligence Community, and the cacophony of opinions about the course of US foreign policy in the 1940s and 1950s. What unfolds is less a narrative on covert action operations in Asia and more an evaluative political history of the difficulties in fusing US intelligence activities, specifically covert action, to foreign policy objectives for the emerging China under Mao Zedong.

Throughout the book, Delury frequently equates the United States balancing competing global interests of the Soviet threat to Europe and the reconstruction of Germany and Japan to the brutality of the communists led by Mao to oust Chiang Kai-shek in China. This underlying equivocation emerges as part of his stated theme and carries throughout the book. In framing the first two sections, Delury emphasizes his negative views of the policies of the United States and China, while remaining decidedly critical of CIA to the point of mocking covert action operations in Asia as ineffective as they were unsuccessful.

Delury also asserts a causality with respect to the execution of US covert operations in China creating a cycle of distrust and oppression in Mao's China. No doubt the capture of US intelligence operatives fueled counterintelligence investigations, but the causal link repeated throughout reflects more the author's personal views of US intelligence operations than the complex reality of a China only recently embroiled in a civil war. At the same time, in seeking to substantiate this causality, Delury neglects a deeper examination of events surrounding the creation of the CIA combined with protracted infighting in CIA and the burgeoning IC. These elements are discussed in chapters 2 and 4 as an overview and are mentioned periodically, but Delury does not provide a greater understanding of how White House and National Security Council (NSC) decisions affected CIA covert action in Asia.

Similarly, Delury neglects to contextualize the reason the United States focused primarily on the Soviet Union over China for intelligence collection and operations. He castigates US policymakers for not focusing on China but omits a critical concern that trained US attention on the Soviet Union: the August 1949 detonation of an atomic bomb in Kazakhstan. A mere two weeks earlier, the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 modified the act of 1947 and established the National Security Council (NSC), to provide for a more centralized, modern US Intelligence Community. At the forefront in the writing of the bill was provision of flexibility in the role of CIA not only to collect intelligence but also conduct other operations, eventually categorized as covert action. The momentum for this historic act came from US concerns over the increasingly assertive Soviet Union even before the atomic detonation. After the successful test, US resources focused on countering the Soviet Union. China reached a similar threat status by 1964 when it had its own successful nuclear detonation. The omission of this historic turning point weakens Delury's arguments insofar as they are made outside of history and the countervailing pressures on the United States.

These concerns notwithstanding, the first four chapters frame the underlying theme of the book: the trends of discourse and bureaucratic disagreements that characterized the IC's initial decade. Most important in this section is the presentation of the academic debates and the two theories of intelligence that dominated CIA in its infancy.

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Delury provides an excellent overview of what became competing ideas on the purpose of intelligence by Sherman Kent and Allen Dulles in chapter 4. Despite an admirable discussion of these theories of intelligence, Delury champions Kent's views in the narrative about operations when they serve to critique Dulles as a further justification of the folly of the covert action operations in Asia. For example, Delury presents Kent's equation of "strategic position minus specific vulnerabilities equals courses of action" as a foundation to criticize the use of anticommunist forces to overthrow the communist government in China, a position taken by policymakers and executed by the CIA. (147) What is lost in using Kent to critique Dulles is that CIA in the 1950s (as in the present) was directed to undertake high-risk operations that may not have succeed by measures of analytic standards. In avoiding this conflict, Delury misses an opportunity to dig further into the tension inside CIA and regarding CIA's role juxtaposed with the White House and NSC. While the latter is referenced, CIA's role for the Truman and Eisenhower administrations was far more complicated than presented in the book.

Finally, the inclusion of John T. Downey in the title appears somewhat misleading. Not only does it imply that Downey alone was central in this fatal operation—he was accompanied by fellow CIA officer Richard Fecteau, who like Downey, would endure nearly two decades in Chinese prisons.[a] In the introduction, Delury admits his coverage of Downey is limited, and a look at the index indicates that coverage of Fecteau is as well. He refers to Downey vanishing and periodically reemerging in the text as akin to following the White Rabbit in *Alice in Wonderland.* (4) His coverage of Downey, however, seems less White Rabbit and more "Where's Waldo?" insofar as the periodic mentions of Downey early in the book do not move forward the broader narrative.

Delury introduces Downey briefly at the end of the first chapter to highlight Downey's attendance at Yale as a student of Asia studies. Yet for most of the remaining text, up to chapter 10, Downey is brought up only briefly as a data point. Chapter 10 explains Downey's capture, although the emphasis is on the approval process for what was supposed to be an exfiltration mission that included a last-minute personnel swap. The detail in this chapter provides ample insight into the bureaucratic obstacles to operational approvals as well as the dangers of last-minute changes. Only beginning in this chapter is the reader also given glimpses into Downey's state of mind as a CIA officer held in captivity. The remainder of the book then focuses primarily on how Downey was finally released with the efforts of the Nixon administration amid opening relations with China.

Delury's work, while laudable in exploring CIA operations and spy swaps not well covered, should be read with some caution. The absence of critical historic events that affected the framing of the IC and the use of covert action presents a misleading underlying narrative that serves as a vehicle of criticism against the use of covert action. At the same time, readers will find the drama linked to the eventual release of Downey compelling, less as an account of covert action and more as a political history of events when the disclosure of covert action becomes propaganda by the target country.

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The reviewer: Dr. Bianca L. Adair is a retired CIA Operations Officer who serves as the Director of the Intelligence Studies Program and Clinical Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at The Catholic University of America. her article "Rear Admiral Sidney Souers and the Emergence of CIA's Covert Action Authorities," appeared in *Studies* 65, no. 2 (June 2021).

a. The stories of the men are detailed in former CIA historian and Catholic University of America professor Nicholas Dujmovic's two articles on the case: a. Nicholas Dujmović, "Two Prisoners in China, 1952–1973," Studies in Intelligence 50, no. 4 (December 2006): 21–36. (Extraordinary Fidelity is available on CIA's YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z0Mh7E); and "Captive in China: President Eisenhower and CIA Prisoners in China," *Studies* 66, no. 1 (March 2022). The first article addresses the events leading to Downey and Fecteau's capture and the death of their pilot and copilot. The second addresses the process of negotiating their release.

The Black Cats of Osan: U-2 Spy Plane Escapades and Calamities in Korea

Rick Bishop (Casemate Publishers, 2023), 288 pages, photographs.

Reviewed by Kevin Ayers



Former US Air Force pilot Rick Bishop's account of U-2 operations at Osan Air Base in South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, a particularly fraught period on the peninsula, is a revealing account of his experiences inside and outside the cockpit—sometimes perhaps more revealing than intended. The U-2 was then a key airborne intelligence platform for US and South Korean military and intelligence organizations trying to monitor North Korean forces along the Demilitarized Zone. In an era before ubiquitous, near-real-time space-based collection, the CIA-developed U-2 was irreplaceable.

From the outset, the book is missing historical context of the Koreas in 1984, when the author was the director of operations for U-2 Detachment 2 (Det 2), diminishing what could have been a compelling narrative. Bishop makes no mention of the Cold War tensions and political divisions of that era, marked in the South by assassinations and violent crackdowns on political protesters, the Soviet shootdown of a South Korean airliner in September 1983, and the North Korean attempted assassination of the South Korean president and cabinet officials in Rangoon, Burma, in October 1983. North Korea had started importing more Soviet arms, including fighter jets and air-defense systems, and Soviet warships were making port calls.[a] While the author may have been wary of disclosing classified information on what he knew about intended aims of missions, adding some level of situational awareness of what drove those strategic reconnaissance missions would have provided a richer narrative.

Bishop offers a combination of *Catch-22*–like absurdity and technological reverence, switching between a relaxed tone in which his personality shines through and a more professional, objective tone. Along the way, Bishop's depictions of the culture surrounding U-2 operations at Osan often are less than flattering. For example, the opening chapters detail the development of the U-2 as a tactical and strategic reconnaissance platform, and then readers are introduced to Oscar, Det 2's black cat mascot, along with a detailed account of the disposition of the cat's testicles after Oscar's been neutered and the condition of the U-2 camera bay after Oscar was taken on an "initiation" ride to 10,000 feet.

And thus the book goes on. Throughout, his use of language addressing certain groups and the absence of any mention of others paint what appears to be a toxic brotherhood of the "Right Stuff." Bishop sees the U-2 itself as the pinnacle of the hierarchy and portrays the aircraft as the most three-dimensional character of the book. The U-2 pilots occupy the next tier with fully fleshed out biographical descriptions and experiences, which go hand in hand with illustrating the aircraft itself. The maintenance crews and the Physiological Support Division (PSD) units are presented as the next most important and are given lots of space for their experiences, especially for their various pranks ("pimps") pulled on the new pilots or crews. All others are deemed as barely relevant.

Bishop's treatment of the female members of PSD is patronizing, as when he recounts "pimp" involving his urine collection device or recalls "Peppermint Patty," the sensually voiced sensor-link monitor at "Skivvy 9"—the collection ground station unit. Even less regarded are the "cone heads" or "bean counters" who are more hindrance than anything to the unit. Bishop claims:

> *All this good fun, which is some instances might be frowned upon today, actually had the effect of bringing the officers, enlisted, and tech reps closer together in this tight-knit unit at a faraway location, halfway around the world.* (101)

a. Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*. (Basic Books, 2001), 146, 157.

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South Koreans are draped in racist tropes that include wholly unnecessary, awkward approximations of their dialogue and references to eating cats and dogs. Women in the book are either paragons of virtue, like his wife, or "whores" in the *kijichon* (village). The reader is offered no introduction to how the air base is situated relative to the local population, minus the nearby "Strip" where US personnel shop for tailored suits, indulge in alcohol (some of which is enhanced by formaldehyde), and try the local cuisine. Bishop writes how the patrons of Miss Penny's "Honeymoon Club" were enticed in with free drinks and access to waitresses who provided escort services on the side, managed by Miss Penny's husband. Bishop could have cited scholars who have documented that for poor, rural Koreans—displaced, widowed, and orphaned by the war—US military bases were often the only source of income.[a]

It has been a long-held tenet in the Air Force that "real men fight wars, not observe them" and that "fighter pilots are carnivores, reconnaissance pilots are herbivores"[b] The author appears to be reframing the perspective: at least U-2 pilots faced unique circumstances that required the best-of-the-best to manage the characteristics of the aircraft and to face different dangers than fighter pilots. Certainly, flying through irradiated clouds to collect against Chinese nuclear tests took courage and patience with the decontamination process. And like fighter pilots, reconnaissance pilots seem to have an intimate relationship with their aircraft, which is very clear from the language used throughout the book. Bishop refers to the aircraft as "the Lady" or "Dragon Lady" and enjoyed the "dance" of each flight. The pilots "sweet talk the old girl" out of the reconnaissance orbit and "terminated the affair" on landing. New variants of the U-2 were referred to as "new chicks." So, the tenor of the book is one of a clear love affair between pilot and aircraft. However, the same love could have been expressed through attention to details of the capabilities and the operations, without the sexualized tone.

Bishop addresses how various problems with the aircraft were solved through ingenuity of the maintainers. *Black Cats of Osan* shines in these sections, which shifts into a professional, unemotional tone. His discussions on how to approach various landings in certain weather conditions tended to be riveting, especially when things start getting dicey. The calamities in the title—usually involving airframe failures in flight—were the best portions by far, including his own ejection-seat activations.

In the end, *Black Cats of Osan* cannot find its central theme or voice. In many ways, the book seemed to be trying to be a combination of Joseph Heller's *Catch-22,* the television show *M.A.S.H*, and Tom Clancy's oeuvre. It's no surprise that a book about U-2 pilots and operations would be centered around the author, but his ego clearly got in the way of competent storytelling. This would have been a richer description of U-2 operations with more social and historical context and less individual commentary from the author, who clearly has fallen into a nostalgia trap. In fact, the final chapter and epilogue are devoted to the declining standards of the US Air Force since the 1980s and its "wokeness," which struck an unnecessary final false note. With some edits, *Black Cats of Osan* could have been *The Right Stuff* for reconnaissance pilots. Sadly, the author's ego crashed the narrative before it could take off.

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The reviewer: Kevin Ayers is a CIA careerist and GEOINT analyst at NGA, currently on a joint-duty assignment in the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.

a. See Eui Hang Shin. "Effects of the Korean War on Social Structures of the Republic of Korea," *International Journal of Korean Studies* (Spring/Summer, 2001): 146.
b. Robert Stiegel, "Is the Air Force Serious About Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance?" War on the Rocks, June 25, 2019, accessed September 13, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/is-the-air-force-serious-about-intelligence-surveillance-and-reconnaissance/

Loyalty First: The Life and Times of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur's Chief Intelligence Officer

David A. Foy (Casemate, 2023), 288 pages, photographs, maps, appendices, bibliography, index etc

Reviewed by Stephen C. Mercado



America is the land of opportunity, where ambitious men and women have come in search of opportunity and success. Charles Andrew Willoughby, a German immigrant of multiple names and unclear origin, joined the US Army as a private before World War I and rose to the rank of major general before the end of World War II. Gen. Douglas MacArthur made Willoughby his chief military intelligence officer (G-2) in Manila the month before Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and invaded the Philippines in December 1941.

Willoughby served his mentor as G-2 throughout the Pacific Campaign, at MacArthur's headquarters in occupied Japan, and in the Korean War. At the side of the "American Caesar" for his highs and lows over the course of 10 years, Willoughby came under criticism for his "Prussian" mannerisms and alleged practice of producing intelligence to suit his superior's wishes rather than playing it straight. For students of intelligence and readers of military history, such a man's life deserves a telling. David Foy's *Loyalty First* is the first to do so.

Foy earned a doctoral degree in Modern European History before embarking on a career as a military analyst. Late in his career he served as the Intelligence Community historian in CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. Author of *For You the War is Over: American Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany* (Stein & Day, 1984), Foy has also reviewed numerous books, for the most part intelligence histories of Europe and the Soviet Union in World War II and the Cold War, including for this journal.

The author presents Willoughby's life from start to finish. Born in Heidelberg, Germany, in 1892, supposedly of a German father and an American mother, Willoughby came to the United States in 1910 and joined the army. Later, as MacArthur's G-2 and a member of his "Bataan Gang" in the years of war, occupation, and war again, Willoughby worked to build organizations to provide his superior with intelligence while keeping the Office of Strategic Services, the CIA, and other organizations out of MacArthur's area of operation or, at a minimum, under his control. Willoughby followed MacArthur's forced exit from the military in 1951 by retiring several months later. He then spent much of his time until his death in Florida in 1972 seeking to stay relevant as an intelligence veteran and defending his legacy and that of MacArthur against their critics.

Foy brings to readers a great deal of information on Willoughby as an intelligence officer. From the author we learn that Willoughby, the first chief editor of the Army journal *Military Review*, published overseas information in its pages by enlisting foreign students at the Command and General Staff School in Fort Leavenworth to produce summaries of articles from various languages in foreign publications. Elsewhere, he initiated the Military Dictionary Project that created valuable military reference works for officers and soldiers in World War II. In Australia, he commanded thousands of Japanese-American linguists who translated captured Japanese military documents in the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS). In occupied Japan, he directed intelligence and counterintelligence activities in Japan and elsewhere in Asia. In Korea, he failed to call the war's outbreak and was far too late in warning MacArthur about the Chinese forces crossing the Yalu River into Korea.

We also learn a few things about Willoughby the man. Working early in his career as a military attache in several Latin American countries, in 1923 he met and married Juana Manuela Rodriguez, born in Puerto Rico. Together they had a daughter, Olga. In 1951, he wed again, marrying Marie Antoinette Pratt, daughter of a Japanese mother and a British lawyer who had taken Japanese citizenship. Her sister married MacArthur's political adviser, William J. Sebald. In their sunset years the two sisters moved with their husbands to Naples, Florida, and lived as neighbors.

One problem with this book is that Foy often stumbles in telling a story that takes place largely in Asia,

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which is far from his area of expertise. In one passage, for example, he describes the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, as "a combat veteran of the Chinese Civil War," when in fact he had led Korean fighters under Chinese command against the Japanese in Manchuria. *Loyalty First* repeatedly fumbles Chinese, Japanese, and Korean names as well as the systems for transcribing them. Foy refers to Gen. Yamashita Tomoyuki, famous for taking the British bastion at Singapore early in the war, as Yamashita Tomoyuki and as Tomoyuki Yamashita.[a] Foy compounds the error by referring to him at one point as the "Tiger of Malaysia," a reference to his victorious Singapore campaign; Yamashita was the "Tiger of Malaya" and Malaysia came into existence only in 1963.

Other errors and omissions are simply hard to understand. He relates the ATIS coup in translating the *Japanese Army's Register of Officers*, disseminated as ATIS Publication No. 2, *Alphabetical List of Japanese Army Officers*, but mistakenly writes that ATIS disseminated it in May 1944; the document cover shows its release in May 1943. Foy states Willoughby's first wife died in 1940. Readily available genealogy records show she died in 1976. Her death certificate listed her as a widow, which raises the possibility that Willoughby had never divorced her before marrying a second time. Foy writes that Willoughby and his first wife had one child, their daughter Olga; in reality Willoughby was her second husband, she had had a son and a daughter with her first spouse, and Willoughby for a time had recognized her first two children as his stepchildren.

The book also suffers from the author's penchant for secondary sources over primary ones. For a biography of Charles Willoughby, we read very few words actually spoken or written by the man. The book's bibliography contains none of his many books and articles. The same is true for those who knew him. Col. Sidney Mashbir, who managed ATIS under Willoughby in Australia and briefly in Occupied Japan, expressed some harsh views about his former boss in his "Oral Reminiscences" interview with D. Clayton James, on file at the MacArthur Archives, where Foy did much of the research for the book. The interview, Mashbir's autobiography, and his magazine articles are missing from *Loyalty First*. The most glaring omission, however, is Willoughby's own account of his years in Tokyo, which he dictated in Florida shortly before his death to a former South Korean intelligence officer who had worked under him in Japan and during the Korean War. The resultant book appeared in Japanese in Tokyo soon after Willoughby's death.[b]

Finally, Foy condemns Willoughby for errors in intelligence and for putting loyalty to MacArthur above his duty to produce honest intelligence assessments, but what are we to make of his charges? It would have been helpful if the author had contrasted Willoughby with other G-2 officers of that time who had better batting averages and the courage to produce intelligence that contradicted the ambitions of their superiors.

Loyalty First ends by suggesting Willoughby's life and career offer valuable lessons on "speaking truth to power" and other important requirement of intelligence officers. In that Foy is quite right.

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The reviewer: Stephen C. Mercado is a retired Open Source Enterprise officer and a frequent contributor to *Studies*.

a. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean names in this review appear in traditional order, family name preceding given name.
b. C.A. Willoughby as told to Chong Yong, [*The Unknown Occupation of Japan: The Willoughby Memoir*] (Bancho Shobo, 1973). Chong also produced a biographic work with one of Willoughby's principal subordinates in occupied Japan, Lt. Col. James Canon, who led the notorious counterintelligence unit known as the Canon Agency until it was disbanded in 1952. [*Testimony from the Canon Agency*] (Bancho Shobo, 1973).

Covert Legions: U.S. Army Intelligence in Germany, 1944–1949

Thomas Boghardt (Center of Military History, 2022), 570 pages, illustrations, footnotes, bibliography, index.



Reviewed by Scott A. Moseman, PhD

Popular culture champions CIA as the arbiter of intelligence in postwar German. Spy novels and movies depict CIA agents working in the shadows to combat Soviet agents for the hearts and minds of Berliners. But was this agency the most the nascent US Intelligence Community had to offer in the emerging Cold War? After all, the reputations of intelligence organizations other than CIA and its predecessor Office of Strategic Services (OSS) were amateurish at best. Of Army intelligence, General Dwight D. Eisenhower said in his book, *Crusade in Europe,* that at the start of World War II his service's shadow warriors were disorganized, unskilled in classifying enemy capabilities, and useless in operations and planning meetings at the department level.[a]

Thomas Boghardt, historian at the US Army Center of Military History (CMI) whose work has appeared in this journal, offers an alternative to the common portrayal of inept Army intelligence outfits in his official history, *Covert Legions: U.S. Army Intelligence in Germany, 1944–1949*. He boldly argues that Army intelligence was an "indispensable agent" in the work of shaping US policy in the Allied occupation of Germany. It served as the "first line of defense" in Central Europe. (11) For the most part, *Covert Legions* succeeds in serving as an official history and in filling gaps in intelligence research.

Boghardt sets out to inform readers that the role of Army intelligence in the occupation of Germany had remained largely untouched by historians. When scholars write about covert operations in Germany, Army intelligence is spoken of on the periphery or touched upon with a few select aspects. (7) Boghardt lists tangential histories such as the US Army's enlistment of Nazi scientists, recruitment of former Gestapo members, and signals intelligence in Germany, citing authors Brian E. Crim, Jens Wegener, and Stephen Budiansky among others. The author excels at presenting CIA and OSS historians as dominating discussions of war and post-war US intelligence systems. He uses the works of researchers such as Michael Warner and R. Harris Smith to show the creation of the OSS and CIA and their relationship to Germany during 1944–49 but is quick to contend that these organizations had subordinate roles in the postwar intelligence system. (8) Boghardt has indeed cornered a largely unexplored portion of scholarship of postwar intelligence in Germany.

Covert Legions is divided into three parts: intelligence in World War II, intelligence organizations in occupied Germany, and intelligence operations in occupied Germany. The first part covers the intelligence apparatus and operations in 1941–45. It is the shortest section and is the most straightforward. The second section on intelligence organizations in 1945–49 explains in detail all the major players in an intelligence-saturated Germany. The last part explains every operation that Army intelligence participated in during a six-year period to include denazification, Soviet espionage, democratization, operational intelligence on the Red Army, and the Berlin Blockade. The reader is left wondering: Will the writer get to the topic I am interested in? Or the opposite question arises: What comes next? It is harder for the audience to follow the argument in time and space.

Covert Legions showcases Boghardt's deeply detailed and candid assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of Army intelligence. The work's bibliography is more than 25 pages long and shows that Boghardt visited primary research centers all over the United States and Germany. The hundreds of illustrations (pictures and maps) add to the richness of the narrative, putting faces and places to words. Boghardt does not shortchange a subject. For instance, a seemingly in the weeds but

a. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Doubleday, 1948), 32.

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important tactical–operational organization such as the Berlin Document Center receives a three-page treatment.

Although *Covert Legions* is a CMH publication, Boghardt demonstrates he had the freedom to be frank about how successful Army intelligence was throughout the period. Interspersed with the accolades of the service's intelligence were Boghardt's thoughts of what the Army could have done better. For example, he calls insufficient vetting and low-quality personnel in key positions the weakest points of US intelligence agencies in Germany, making them susceptible to Soviet espionage. (328) It is refreshing to read a government historian's honest take of past army operations.

But Boghardt could have set the conditions more thoroughly so that nonspecialists could understand the full story more clearly. Instead, *Covert Legions* aggressively drives into the narrative, leaving more novice readers of intelligence behind. The book has a list of abbreviations and a glossary in back sections, but flicking back and forth detracts from the reader's attention. Instead, the book might have provided such material, or notes on terminology, early in the book. Boghardt might then have been able to avoid defining in his text different types of intelligence—such as counterintelligence, signals intelligence, and covert operations to name just a few. In so doing, he might have given readers new to intelligence a better baseline for understanding before he immersed then in the details of his history.

A conscious effort to stratify the levels of intelligence would have helped avoid blurry explanations of organizations and incidents he describes. For example, there are distinct differences between strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence.[a] In Boghardt's work, examples of these levels are: Military Intelligence Division (MID G-2), strategic; Intelligence Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), operational; and Battalion Intelligence Section (S-2), tactical. But *Covert Legions* does not lay out their unique features. Line-and-block illustrations of the chains of command for Army intelligence at the end of World War II and in 1947–49 are more confusing than helpful without clear delineations of authorities and a stratification of echelons showing the levels of intelligence. (19, 114)

Covert Legions points to the relationship between Maj. Gen. Clayton L. Bissell (MID G-2), and Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Sibert (director of intelligence, European Command) as an example of the Army's top military intelligence officer repeatedly curtailing his European counterpart in the collection and analysis of intelligence. (414) Boghardt does not get to the root of the issue: the two generals have different ranks, levels of intelligence focus, missions, masters, and authorities. There was bound to be some friction. Describing the hierarchy of intelligence organizations at the time would have provided a fuller picture of what was happening in intelligence centers in Washington, Berlin, and the German countryside.

Nonetheless, Boghardt accomplishes what he set out to do: convince readers that Army intelligence was instrumental in helping shape the transformative period between World War II and the Cold War in Germany. (489) He shows that there was more to the covert activities in Central Europe than OSS and CIA agents working in the shadows or decrypting intercepts of Soviet communications. *Covert Legions* should be a standard for the intelligence schoolhouses in US civilian and military sectors. Students can glean lessons of correct and incorrect ways to conduct counterintelligence, intelligence analysis, intelligence exploitation, and covert action. Ultimately, Boghardt reminds us through the postwar operations in Germany of Army intelligence, OSS, and CIA (among others) that it is not just one member of intelligence community that can solve wicked problems, but the collaborative efforts of the collective to help accomplish its missions.

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The reviewer: Scott A. Moseman, PhD, is a former naval intelligence officer and member of the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations at the Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

a. For useful definitions of these terms, see Jonathan M. House, *Military Intelligence 1870–1991: A Research Guide* (Greenwood, 1993).

OPERATION RYPE: A World War II OSS Railway Sabotage Mission in Norway

Frode Lindgjerdet (Casemate Publishers, 2023), 242 pages, photos, map.

Reviewed by J.R. Seeger



In this recent English translation of Frode Lindgjerdet's *OPERATION RYPE*, readers are offered an excellent fusion of a well-researched history coupled with just enough operational detail to make even the most jaded expert in World War II resistance operations keep turning the pages to find out what will happen to the OSS team in Norway. Often reviewers say a book reads like a fictional thriller. While Lindgjerdet never attempts to "fictionalize" this tale, the actual events coupled with his detailed research make this far better than any fictional tale of special operations during the war.

Allied intelligence and special operations in occupied Norway began almost as soon as the Germans occupied the country in 1940. Early operations included commando raids on the coastline, infiltration of Norwegian coast watchers supporting British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Royal Navy intelligence, and infiltration of Norwegian special operations teams created and trained by members of the Norwegian resistance (Milorg) and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). These special operations teams were supported by an SOE clandestine small-boat program based in Scotland and known colloquially as the Shetland "Bus."[a]

By the time the United States entered the war and the Office of Strategic Services had a special operations capability, the British considered Norway along with the Yugoslavia their exclusive area of responsibility. OSS started Scandinavian operations slowly by opening an office in Stockholm in 1943 to conduct intelligence collection as well as to support future ground infiltration into Norway. It wasn't until after the liberation of France, however, that OSS special operations personnel were available for operations in Norway. This is where Lindgjerdet begins his story.

After a detailed scenesetter in the first two chapters, the author outlines the complicated origin story of NORSO—the Norwegian Special Operations element of OSS/Special Operations. NORSO was made up of US soldiers with Scandinavian backgrounds who were also comfortable on skis and living in rough conditions. NORSO was activated in July 1943 with 80 enlisted men and 12 officers divided into 16-man teams with the understanding that each might further be split into two 8-man sections. NORSO was also one of several OSS/SO experiments in "operational groups." Lindgjerdet describes OGs having three missions: raids supporting allied strategic missions, enhanced support to resistance efforts, and combat operations designed to prevent retreating German forces from conducting scorched-earth destruction inside occupied territory. They wore US Army uniforms and were expected to live off the land, receiving resupply by air from the US Army Air Force special operations squadrons known as the Carpetbaggers.

Operation Rype was a creation of the allied Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ), a unified command created inside Allied headquarters in May 1944. It was designed to integrate various US and UK special operations as the Allies began the campaign to liberate Europe. By fall 1944, a main concern was that the hundreds of thousands of German troops occupying Norway might be recalled

a. In late 1945, then Maj. William E. Colby, future director of CIA, wrote his own account of sabotage operations in Norway. See "Skis and Daggers: OSS Operations in Norway," *Studies* 42, no. 3 (Fall 1998). See also David Howarth, *The Shetland Bus: A WWII Epic of Courage, Endurance, and Survival* (Lyons Press, 2018) and Stephen Wynn, *The Shetland "Bus": Transporting Secret Agents Across the North Sea in WW2* (Pen & Sword, 2021). A review by Hayden Peake of Tony Insall's *Secret Alliances: Special Operations and Intelligence in Norway 1940–1945* (Biteback Publishing, 2021) appeared in *Studies* 67, no. 2 (June 2023).

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Secret Alliances

Tony Insall's *Secret Alliances* (Biteback Publishing, 2021) provides a clear, concise, and very readable understanding of the entire resistance effort in Norway. While stories of successes—some familiar, like Operation Gunnerside to disable the heavy-water plant in Vermok, others less well known—are valuable, the book shines in its focus on the partnership between the British government and exiled Norwegian leadership, including the resistance organization Milorg, and the complex web of British entities that wanted to use the resistance. That web included the SIS, SOE, and the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI). Milorg had the human resources on the ground as well as Norwegian soldiers undergoing special operations training at British commando school and SOE schools. The British elements had very specific requirements that needed to be filled by these resources. More often than not, the parties could could not agree on whether an operation should be conducted. Risk versus gain became a highly sophisticated game of three-dimensional chess as Norwegians wanted successful operations that would bolster morale while minimizing Nazi reprisals, SIS and DNI wanted no paramilitary operations at all because of a fear that the operations might compromise their intelligence collection operations, and SOE wanted to conduct operations that fulfilled their informal charter from Winston Churchill to "set Europe ablaze."

Insall's account stands out for his precision based on scrupulous research. He describes in detail the level of legalistic negotiation among the British players. He concludes, "the rules to which both sides consented were more advantageous to SIS than they were to SOE, and sowed the seeds of future disputes." (56) Unfortunately, these tensions resulted in the capture of some of the SIS coast watchers. SOE operatives and their resistance counterparts were aware of the German successes in radio direction finding equipment used in Norway. Both because of compartmentation in the field and hostility in the UK, that information was not shared with the coast watchers.

American readers will find it hard to accept the dismissive tone that Insall takes with OSS operations in Norway later in the war. In part, it would appear that Insall relied on William Mackenzie's *The Secret History of the SOE* (St. Ermin's Press, 2000). Mackenzie's work is central to understanding SOE, but he has a strong bias against OSS efforts in any part of the European Theater, whether partnered with or independent of SOE. In the case of Norway, Mackenzie dedicated only two sentences to Operation Rype. Insall seems unimpressed that the team conducted multiple sabotage operations in northern Norway, cutting rail lines and destroying a large rail bridge before skiing to safety into neutral Sweden. In part, we have to assume this view reflects Rype was the only OSS operation in Norway and that it took place in March–April 1945, when such missions were receding in importance. Still, as Lindgjerdetit's *OPERATION RYPE* demonstrates, it certainly is part of the larger history of resistance operations in Norway.

to Germany for the final defense. One way to prevent that withdrawal would be to destroy the Norwegian railroads that headed south to port facilities on the North Sea. *Rype* (Norwegian for ptarmigan), commanded by Maj. William Colby, was the OSS/SO team tasked with sabotage of one set of rail lines.

The tale of Colby's team is filled with evidence of the travails any future special forces or CIA paramilitary teams might face in the arctic environment. Colby's team conducted a parachute jump onto a frozen lake, recovered whatever supplies survived the parachute drop, and traveled by skis to a safe site. Weather consistently limited both the resupply of men and equipment as well as creating a harsh reality as they moved toward their targets. Aerial resupply was inconsistent at best and, in the end, resulted in the loss of men and aircraft crashing into mountains either in Norway or in Scotland. The fact that Colby and his small team were able eventually to conduct sabotage operations at all is a wonder. They did complete their mission of disrupting their targeted rail line and then serving as a stabilization force preventing any scorched earth activities of German troops trapped in Norway after the German surrender.

In sum, *OPERATION RYPE* belongs on the shelf of anyone interested in World War II special operations. All of this is packed into just over two hundred pages.

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The reviewer: J.R. Seeger is a retired CIA operations officer.

Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf—December 2023*

Current Issues

The Future of National Intelligence: How Emerging Technologies Reshape Intelligence Communities, by Shay Hershkovitz

Russian Information Warfare: Assault on Democracies in the Cyber Wild West, by Bilyana Lilly

See It/Shoot It: The Secret History of the CIA's Lethal Drone Program, by Christopher J. Fuller

Striking Back: Overt and Covert Options to Combat Russian Disinformation, by Thomas Kent

General

Intelligence Power In Practice, by Michael Herman with David Schaefer

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An Excellent Idea: Leading CIA Surrogate Warfare in Southeast Asia, 1951-1970, A Personal Account, by James W. "Bill" Lair as told to Thomas L. Ahern, Jr.

History

The Birth of the Soviet Secret Police: Lenin and History's Greatest Heist, 1917–1927, by Boris Volodarsky. Reviewed by John Ehrman.

Crown, Cloak, and Dagger: The British Monarchy and Secret Intelligence from Victoria to Elizabeth the Second, by Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac

The Forever Prisoner: The Full and Searing Account of the CIA's Most Controversial Program, by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy

Guarding the Caesars: Roman Internal Security under the Flavian Dynasty, by Rose Mary Sheldon

Three Ordinary Girls: The Remarkable Story of Three Dutch Teenagers Who Became Spies, Saboteurs, Nazi Assassins—And WWII Heroes, by Tim Brady

Intelligence Abroad

Estimative Intelligence in European Foreign Policymaking: Learning Lessons from an Era of Surprise (Intelligence, Surveillance and Secret Warfare), edited by Christopher Meyer

A Faithful Spy: The Life and Times of An MI6 and MI5 Officer, by Jimmy Burns

I Was Never Here: My True Canadian Spy Story of Coffees, Code Names and Covert Operations in the Age of Terrorism, by Andrew Kirsch

Shadows Within Shadows: Spies and Intelligence in Historical China, by Ralph D. Sawyer

*Unless otherwise noted, reviews are by Hayden Peake.

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Current Issues

The Future of National Intelligence: How Emerging Technologies Reshape Intelligence Communities, by Shay Hershkovitz (Rowman and Littlefield, 2022), 165 pages, endnotes, index.

Now a senior research fellow at the Intelligence Methodology Research Center in Israel, Shay Hershkovitz acquired his basic knowledge in intelligence while serving 15 years in the Israeli Defense Force. His post-military service included consulting in the Israeli intelligence community, the private sector, and academia. Gradually he experienced a growing interest in cutting-edge emerging technologies and their potential impact on the intelligence profession.

The Future of National Intelligence discusses eight technologies that, Hershkovitz argues, are needed to radically transform contemporary intelligence organizations:

- the internet of things (IoT);
- 5G;
- big data;
- cloud computing and storage;
- AI;
- blockchain;
- quantum computing; and
- crowd sourcing, which he admits is not really a technology (xiii–xv).

While most of these technologies are not new to today's intelligence communities, Hershkovitz cautions that government, academic, and private-sector enterprises must be considered in their development. But then, instead of an orderly assessment of how each technology can improve the profession, he takes a functional approach. For example, he challenges the use of the intelligence cycle as an organizing principle and then recommends its replacement by activity-based intelligence (ABI) and object-based production (OBP)—techniques for organizing large amounts of data from multiple sources—or temporal intelligence (TEMPINT). The concept, he writes, has "produced impressive successes in exposing terrorist networks in those countries." Unfortunately, he provides no examples, and even adds that he didn't intend "to provide a fully detailed description of these approaches." (95) He takes a similar tactic to another "INT" he creates, CROWDINT, for crowd-source intelligence that allows groups of people to collaborate with agencies.

The one technology mentioned that is less familiar to the intelligence profession is blockchain, a concept often associated with cryptocurrency and considered to be hacker-proof. The blockchain technology has many potential uses but, above all, for transmitting and sharing data, verifying the authors of that data, and guaranteeing the data has not been tampered with. Hershkovitz argues that blockchain will be of great advantage to intelligence but, once more, provides no specific examples.

The Future of National Intelligence concludes by reiterating the central claim of the book: "The present age necessitates a broad-scale revolution in the intelligence world. . . . . Without such a revolution, intelligence organizations will struggle to maintain relevance in decision making at the national level." (113) Hershkovitz then proposes five principles that form a framework that will transform intelligence: collaboration, critique, creativity, content, and expertise. (113ff.)

While thought provoking, these concepts, like the others discussed in this book, lack any exemplary corroboration. Readers are left wondering whether the profession really needs more INTs, and if so, how they will help.

Russian Information Warfare: Assault on Democracies in the Cyber Wild West, by Bilyana Lilly (US Naval Institute Press, 2022) 384 pages, illustrations, endnotes, bibliography, index.

Cyber threat intelligence, AI, disinformation, ransomware, and information warfare are a few of the topics in which Bilyana Lilly acquired foundational knowledge while earning master's degrees at the Geneva Graduate Institute in Switzerland and Oxford University, and her Ph.D. from Pardee RAND Graduate School. With a focus on Russian cyber capabilities, she gained practical experience at the RAND, Deloitte, and now with the Krebs

Stamos Group, a cyber security firm. *Russian Information Warfare* analyzes why and how the Russian government uses cyber operations as a weapon to attack democracies from within and suggests what the United States and NATO countries can do to defend themselves.

To achieve this goal Lilly employs the case-study technique and applies it to seven countries that have experienced Russian cyberwarfare attacks as a tool of statecraft. After setting out the criteria for each case study, she reviews the methodology, the data collection employed, and the graphical techniques applied. Where possible she identifies the main Russian agencies conducting the operations—the SVR (Foreign Intelligence) and GRU (Military Intelligence) and elements of the FSB (domestic security agency). In that discussion, Lilly names some of the cyber programs or APTs (advanced persistent threats) as she calls them, used by Russian hackers: Cozy Bear or Cozy Duke, Fancy Bear or Sofacy, and Sandworm. While she describes the type of technical and psychological damage each program produces, she does not get into details of the programming.

Each of the seven case studies—Estonia, Bulgaria, the US presidential elections of 2016 and 2020, Norway, Montenegro, France, and Germany—are treated in separate chapters. Lilly describes the cyber methods employed, why a particular Russian agency was involved, if known, and comments on the effectiveness of the operation. For example, the cyber-attack on Estonia employed denial-of-service techniques against particular targets that shut down the network by overloading it with traffic. Although Russia was strongly suspected, neither Estonian nor NATO IT experts were able to prove a link. (49)

The example of the hack on the US Democratic National Committee is somewhat different. It involved what is called a phishing attack, in which an innocent-looking email containing a bug is opened that gives the hacker access to the user's system. Lilly concentrates on the 2016 penetration and its possible consequences and ramifications. While she does not identify the US agency that discovered the hack, she does attribute the attack in part to the GRU (85) and what she terms the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA), but she provides no further affiliation. As to impact, she concludes "it is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the effect Russia's release of illegally obtained information had on the outcome of the 2016 presidential election." (93)

Russian Information Warfare concludes by presenting recommendations for improving data collection and analysis followed by Lilly's suggestion to discuss policies and techniques to improve cyber operations and their psychological consequences. In neither case does she present anything new. A useful orientation and background book.

See It/Shoot It: The Secret History of the CIA's Lethal Drone Program, by Christopher J. Fuller (Yale University Press, 2017) 352 pages, endnotes, index.

The principal title of this book is taken from a comment by former White House adviser Richard Clark. While catchy, it is also inaccurate. The sequence of events in a drone attack is not that arbitrary. Author Christopher Fuller, a lecturer on American history at the University of South Hampton, makes that clear in this study of the US drone program.

Fuller's account is based on open sources that claim the US government operates three unmanned remotely operated aerial vehicle or drone programs. Two are conducted by the Defense Department. The controversial third program, often attributed to CIA alone, is run jointly by several US government components, is not officially acknowledged, and is the primary focus of this book. (9)

Fuller describes the criticisms emanating from academia and investigative journalists that challenge the legality of what they term targeted killings that amount to assassinations. It is, they contend, an unwarranted escalation of the counterterrorism program introduced after 9/11. In particular, they debunk the notion that civilian staff at CIA can give US Air Force personnel orders to undertake lethal drone strikes. To illustrate this point, Fuller presents a scenario that describes each agency's step-by-step contribution to the mission. (1–7)

More generally, Fuller challenges the assumption that CIA has become militarized as a result of the war on terror, claiming that its drone program began during the Reagan administration. Fuller also refutes the notion that

the program lacks congressional oversight and a domestic legal basis.

In this dispassionate balanced account, Fuller describes the various drone types in use, their capabilities, and their implementation strategy built upon two decades of innovations, which have "transformed the way in which the United States conducts its counterterrorism operations." (247)

Despite frequent noisy objections in the media, drones have become a weapon of choice for many countries because of their relatively low cost and minimum risk to operators. *See It/Shoot It* gives a commonsense account of why that makes sense. An informative contribution.

Striking Back: Overt and Covert Options to Combat Russian Disinformation, by Thomas Kent (Jamestown Foundation, 2020) 289 pages, footnotes, bibliography.

Former president of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Thomas Kent, is a senior fellow of the Jamestown Foundation and teaches Russian disinformation affairs at Columbia University. In *Striking Back*, he argues that contemporary Russia, robbed of communism's inspirational ideology, has adopted many of Stalin's means of control while adding a new method of state image creation through technologically sophisticated and aggressive disinformation operations.

Striking Back doesn't define "disinformation" and uses the term "misinformation" only a few times. But the context of the latter is unintended error whereas the former concerns calculated damaging inaccuracies. Kent also uses the term "information operations (IO)" when discussing "undermining national cohesion and public order within democratic societies." (1)

It is the IOs that form the focus of the book. Kent discusses their gradual development after the Soviet Union collapsed and points out that not everyone takes them seriously, holding that a little common sense and fact-checking will neutralize their impact. But others take a different view and Kent considers various countermeasures. He also stresses that in the Western responses the governments should not be the sole actor. Disinformation and misinformation both rely on private entities and friendly states to accomplish their objectives. He mentions several suggestions for countering Russian disinformation operations and explains why most won't work.

There is one weakness in *Striking Back* that limits understanding of the problem: Kent provides qualitative comments about IO types but no details or case studies. For example, he states that Russia "worked to destabilize formerly Soviet countries that had joined the European Union and NATO . . . and in Africa, it tried to revive Cold War relationships based on anti-colonialist solidarity and arms-dealing," but doesn't say how. (2) And later, on the same point, he notes, "There are plenty of examples in history where evil information operations overcame the truth." He just doesn't give any. (95)

What Kent does do is provide specific recommendations and options—ethical and operational—in the information sphere, including social networks, cyberoperations, covert action by Western countries and local NGAs, to counter IOs by Russia and its allies.

Striking Back is well documented, leaves no doubt there is a problem, suggests where to look for answers, and implies that some may be coming in a future book.

General

Intelligence Power In Practice, by Michael Herman with David Schaefer (Edinburgh University Press, 2022) 418 pages, end of chapter notes, index.

The late Michael Herman (1929–2021) read history at Oxford University, served in the Army Intelligence Corps (Egypt), and in 1952 joined GCHQ, retiring in 1987. During his GCHQ career, he served on the Defense Intelligence Staff and was seconded to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) as its secretary from 1972 to 1975. After retiring from GCHQ, Herman joined Oxford's Nuffield College as a research fellow and began his first book on intelligence, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War,* which addressed the roles and effects of intelligence organizations.[a] In addition to writing and teaching, Herman founded and directed the Oxford Intelligence Group, a forum for practitioners and academics to discuss intelligence issues. In 2005, he was made an honorary doctor of letters by the University of Nottingham.

David Schaefer, currently a researcher in the department of War Studies at Kings College, London, was asked by Herman to assist him with a new book he was contemplating to update some of his previous work. The result is *Intelligence Power In Practice*, a four-part collection of papers, some new, others republished.

Part one begins with an interview by Mark Phythian that discusses Herman's life and writings. Among those not previously published, "The Rush To Transparency" is of contemporary interest. The article on intelligence ethics notes that "CIA-bashing remains a world industry" but takes issue with judgment that the United States is "becoming the rogue superpower." (102)

Part two focuses on aspects of the Cold War such as the nature of national threats, did intelligence make a difference, and the origins of the SIGINT collection site in Berlin. The third part deals with organizational and reform issues in British intelligence, a topic Herman was concerned about throughout his career. Herman appeared before the Parliament's Butler Committee on these topics, and his testimony is published here for the first time.

The fourth section explores the neglected role of personalities in intelligence history and the Joint Intelligence Committee, among other topics

Intelligence Power In Practice is decidedly a book on the "British school" of intelligence studies—although CIA is mentioned in passing from time to time—but the topics discussed have applicability to all those interested in the profession. A valuable contribution to the literature.

a. Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Memoir

An Excellent Idea: Leading CIA Surrogate Warfare in Southeast Asia, 1951-1970, A Personal Account, by James W. "Bill" Lair as told to Thomas L. Ahern, Jr. (Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2022) 195 pages, photos.

A typical career for a CIA operations officer includes periodic assignments overseas and headquarters. Bill Lair did not quite meet those benchmarks. His first assignment sent him to Thailand in 1951, and with the exception of one two-year stint at headquarters, he spent his entire career there. In *An Excellent Idea,* Lair, with the help of his friend and collaborator Thomas Ahern, explains these unusual circumstances.

Born in Oklahoma on July 4, 1924, Lair overcame family instability and poverty and entered Texas A&M University in 1942 to study geology. But the dominant subject of the day was the war and Lair didn't want to be drafted, so he enlisted to gain some say in his assignment. He chose infantry; he got the 3rd Armored Division where he landed at Omaha Beach and ended up at the Elbe River at war's end.

Demobilized, Lair returned to Texas A&M and joined ROTC before graduating in June 1950 as a second lieutenant in the army. Having had enough combat, Lair wished to avoid the Korean War and responded to an ambiguous notice on a bulletin board inviting applications for intelligence work. To his surprise he was interviewed and accepted by the CIA and became a member of the first-ever class of junior officer trainees (JOTs), which convened in 1950. Given three choices for his first assignment, Lair listed Asia last. He arrived in Bangkok in March 1951.

For bureaucratic reasons Lair reported to the Southeast Asia Supply Company, or SEA Supply, a CIA proprietary officially a private contractor to the Royal Thai Government and dissolved in the mid-1950s. His assignment was to provide logistic support and training to teams of the Thai National Police chosen to resist communist expansion.

An Excellent Idea reveals how he succeeded under unusual circumstances. Lair so impressed his Thai superior that he was made an official member of the Thai police. With CIA approval he wore a Thai uniform; the agency kept his Thai salary. With only two years in the country, Lair went on to propose—in a private meeting with the director general of the National Police, Thailand's second most powerful figure at the time—a major new capability: an elite unit capable of rapid, airborne mobilization into at-risk border areas. "An excellent idea," the director general responded; he gave Lair license to work with Thai officers to create the unit, first known as the Airborne Royal Guard and later the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU). Under these conditions he became "the working partner of the Thai who managed their country's participation in the war in Laos," providing aerial, intelligence and security support. "Finally, I would wind up as the field manager of the largest paramilitary operation ever undertaken by CIA," Lair recounted. "In that capacity, I would support and guide the Hmong tribesmen in their courageous but ultimately doomed resistance to the North Vietnamese army." (42) The authors cover these operations in considerable detail.

While he never "went native," he learned the language, married a Thai, and, most important, developed a way of dealing with the Thai at all levels that did not seem pushy or overbearing, a major strong suit. He would consult rather than instruct, suggest rather than order. The Thai came to rely on his judgment in matters of training, logistical support, personnel selection, and paramilitary operations.

Besides several strong-willed CIA chiefs of station, Lair dealt with senior US and Thai dignitaries during his long tour. William Donovan, the ambassador to Thailand, discussed the OSS role in Thai independence. Allen Dulles "had heard of the innovative Airborne Royal Guard and asked for a look at [the] operation." (95) And on several occasions, he dealt with the king and members of the royal family. But it was recruitment of Maj. Vang Pao he long remembered. Vang Pao, leader of the Hmong tribesmen through the Vietnam War, would stay the course until the end when he was evacuated to the United States with fellow Hmong emigres. When Lair retired in 1977, he had the satisfaction of knowing his contribution had helped the Thai keep the war in Laos from spreading communism to northeast Thailand.

This is the story of a unique and precedent-setting career, not just for its singularity but for exemplary execution. It provides performance measures that those who succeed Bill Lair would be wise to adopt. A most worthy contribution to the intelligence literature.

History

The Birth of the Soviet Secret Police: Lenin and History's Greatest Heist, 1917–1927, by Boris Volodarsky (Frontline, 2023), 393 pages, notes, index.

A new history of the Soviet intelligence services is always welcome, especially if it takes advantage of fresh archival material to add details or correct errors in previous books as it updates the story. Former Russian intelligence officer Boris Volodarsky's *The Birth of the Soviet Secret Police*, an account of the first decade of Soviet intelligence, claims to do just that and so it was that I took it up with high expectations. Alas, it soon became clear that I was to be disappointed.

Volodarsky certainly has done his homework. His account of the establishment of the Cheka and the early years of Soviet intelligence, using the latest releases, is filled with detailed descriptions of plans, operations, and capsule biographies of the people who carried them out (or tried to thwart them). Some of these are well known, but others will be unfamiliar to all but the most dedicated students of Soviet intelligence. Volodarsky also takes a great deal of pleasure in pointing out and correcting the errors of previous authors—Wikipedia is a frequent, if easy, target and he seems to enjoy poking Christopher Andrew—as well as noting how many of the Chekists whose operations he chronicles were executed in the 1930s.

What all this adds up to is unclear, however. The mass of detail lands with a thud, overwhelming the reader with quantity but not providing any clear theme or conclusion. It must be said, too, that Volodarsky is not a master of prose. Even allowing for the fact that he is not a native English speaker, the text is repetitive, filled with stylistic quirks, and needs a good edit. All but the most determined readers, one expects, will give up and put the book on the shelf.

That might not be so bad, however. *The Birth of the Soviet Secret Police* is one of those books that serves best as a reference, where you can go to look up a case, check a name, or compare different accounts of an operation. But anyone looking for a readable history of the Cheka will have to go elsewhere.

The reviewer: John Ehrman is a retired CIA officer.

Crown, Cloak, and Dagger: The British Monarchy and Secret Intelligence from Victoria to Elizabeth the Second, by Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac (Georgetown University Press, 2023) 319 pages, endnotes, bibliography, appendix, photos, index.

Crown, Cloak, and Dagger is the US edition of *The Secret Royals: Spying and the Crown, from Victoria to Diana*, a review of which appeared in "The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf" in September 2022. Although the book is some 300 pages shorter, mostly because it uses a smaller font, the narrative is, with notable exceptions, much the same. Both begin with an anecdote about James Bond and Queen Elizabeth II and end with the Diana conspiracy, followed by some thoughtful conclusions.

In between is a historical account of how the royals dealt with intelligence matters. *The Secret Royals* has six parts, the US edition five. The deleted part—three chapters—concerns royal diplomacy. Chapters titled "Nuclear Secrets" and "Bugs & Bugging" also don't appear in *Crown, Cloak, and Dagger* but the material is covered in other chapters. Like many books about British intelligence, CIA enters at some point, and *Crown, Cloak, and Dagger* earned that distinction several times. If you haven't read *Secret Royals,* then *Crown, Cloak, and Dagger* is a worthwhile endeavor.

The Forever Prisoner: The Full and Searing Account of the CIA's Most Controversial Program, by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2022), 452 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

The forever prisoner is Abu Zubaydah. A Palestinian born in Saudi Arabia, he had lived in the United States and had a Swedish wife when captured by the FBI and CIA in Pakistan in 2002. When interrogated at a so-called black site, he identified Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and was waterboarded because it was thought he knew details about future terrorist operations. He was later sent to the US prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he remains. Journalists Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy tell the ominous story of his life during this time.

The central issues of the book are a consequence of the contention that what some called "enhanced interrogation" was in fact torture and that the techniques employed, whatever they were called, produced no actionable high-value intelligence. (2)

The well-known story is told chronologically with a few new names added. The authors struggle to be objective, interviewing many of the key players on both sides of the issues. Of particular interest are the responses of two civilian psychologists hired to conduct the interrogations and the circumstances surrounding the handling of the interrogation tapes. The authors also cite CIA interviews, CIA documentation, participant books, and the report of the Senate committee that investigated the interrogation program. They even imply they received some input from Abu Zubaydah, although they acknowledge they couldn't interview him.

But the authors' position is clear. Despite claims to the contrary, they argue Zubaydah wasn't hiding intelligence about an imagined coming "second wave" of al-Qa'ida attacks, which his interrogators could not possibly have known. (221) More generally, they state that CIA committed, if not condoned, torture and those involved were promoted.

The Forever Prisoner recapitulates a familiar story without noting that all the essential details may not be known.

Guarding the Caesars: Roman Internal Security under the Flavian Dynasty, by Rose Mary Sheldon (Rowman and Littlefield, 2023), 413 pages, endnotes, bibliography, index.

On the topic of intelligence in the ancient world, Rose Mary Sheldon, history professor emeritus at the Virginia Miliary Institute, is the preeminent authority. She has written more than 30 articles and eight books on the topic, two of which focused on Roman internal security. *Kill Caesar!* (published in 2018) was the first; *Guarding the Caesars* is the second.

Roman internal security, as defined by Sheldon, is akin to modern national security. Various components of government were responsible for maintaining a stable regime by protecting the emperor, preventing invasions, collecting intelligence, and monitoring the loyalty of the army, senators, and regional governments. The major difference, as she points out, is that reliance on imperial control of these functions was not always successful: three of the five rulers discussed were "murdered," while rumors of foul play "swirled around the deaths of the other two." (xi)

Guarding The Caesars deals with the internal security of the Flavian dynasty (69–96 AD) founded by Titus Flavius Vespasianus and the sons who followed him, Titus and Domitian.

Sheldon explains the historical circumstances that brought Vespasian to power and describes his nearly 10-year reign. She discusses his accomplishments—Rome's Colosseum was begun during his regime (63)—and the way he trained his son Titus to deal with threats to his rule. Although apparently not the target of political conspiracies he died under mysterious circumstances. Still, Sheldon gives him good marks. The situation changed when Titus's brother, Domitian became emperor—and Sheldon devotes more than five chapters to his troubled reign. While his principal duty was to hold the empire together and protect it from Rome's enemies as his father and brother had done, he did not share their reputation. As Sheldon points out, he had strong opposition. Some thought he had a personality disorder, and the Senate never accepted him. Tacitus, among others, considered him a monstrous tyrant; a recent work concluded he was "Rome's most productive, loathed, and forgotten emperor." (105)

Sheldon portrays a less harsh view and refers to Domitian as a competent and dedicated emperor. But in matters of internal security Domitian ultimately failed, and his assassination in a coup led to a new dynasty.

Sheldon's assertion that the book is aimed at the generalist is a little off target. Too many terms and names are left undefined. For example, she acknowledges that quellenkritik is the very heart of classical scholarship," (xvi) but she doesn't explain that the term means: critical analysis of sources. Likewise, she leaves it to the reader to search out who Augustus was and to determine the meaning of frumentarii or agentes in rebus from her earlier writings.

Guarding the Caesars is the first account of the internal security problems of the Flavian dynasty. For those interested in Roman security issues it will be very informative. For those considering the broader historical view,

it documents that heads of state have long had difficulty retaining power when they cannot maintain internal security. A valuable contribution to the literature.

Three Ordinary Girls: The Remarkable Story of Three Dutch Teenagers Who Became Spies, Saboteurs, Nazi Assassins—And WWII Heroes, by Tim Brady (Citadel Press, 2021) 298 pages, footnotes, photos, index.

Once a medieval northern Holland town, by the late 1930s Haarlem had become a modern city. Jewish teenage sisters, Truus and Freddie Oversteegen lived in one part. Non-Jewish, red-headed Johanna (Hannie) Schaft, a law student nearing 20, in another. All three shared the socialist views of their respective parents.

When World War II began, the Dutch government tried to remain neutral as it had during World War I. Toward that end, it had maintained relations with Germany during the interwar period and had not modernized its army beyond adding "two regiments of bicycles." (14) Shocked by the reality of the Nazi occupation and its increasingly oppressive treatment of Jews and other citizens, the Dutch slowly began to form resistance groups. The sisters joined one, Hannie another. They would eventually join forces. *Three Ordinary Girls* tells their story.

For the Oversteegen sisters, resistance began with the distribution of anti-Nazi pamphlets and leftist newspapers. It soon progressed to providing courier services and hiding and escorting Jews trying to avoid the Nazis. They did these things initially with their mother's support because the Nazis didn't find teenage girls suspicious. Hannie, on her own initiative, stole identification cards and gave them to a friend who knew how to make counterfeits for her Jewish friends. Out of necessity and applying common sense, all three developed effective tradecraft on the job to avoid capture. Their recruitment for more organized resistance work began when they were introduced to Frans van der Wiel.

Drawing on memoirs and interviews with survivors, author Tim Brady tells how Wiel recruited Truus and Freddie, tested their loyalty, trained them, and assigned them ever more risky tasks that eventually included sabotage and assassination. (85) Brady also explains how, late in the war, Wiel teamed Hannie up with the Oversteegens. (120) In addition to her work with the sisters, Hannie also bicycled past Nazi missile launch sites and reported their coordinates.

Three Ordinary Girls discloses a little-known story of wartime resistance that only two of the heroes survived. Their recognition was a long time coming, but well deserved. An interesting and valuable account.

Intelligence Abroad

A Faithful Spy: The Life and Times of An MI6 and MI5 Officer, by Jimmy Burns (Chiselbury, 2023) 384 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

Walter Bell was a career intelligence officer who served in both MI6 and MI5 in the UK, the United Sates, and several other countries. British journalist Jimmy Burns knew Bell and his wife Katharine ("Tattie") Spaatz, daughter of General Carl Spaatz, who commanded the Strategic Air Forces in Europe in WWII and would become the first chief of staff of the US Air Force in 1947. After Bell died in 2004, his wife gave his papers to Burns to use in his biography that otherwise would have "remained untold." (8)

The title of the book hints at its two intertwined but separate themes, one obvious—his intelligence career—the other less so—his loyalty. In the end, Burns concludes Bell was loyal, but throughout the book he hints at reasons others—even Kim Philby—were aware and sometimes concerned by the left-wing views he developed at the London School of Economics (LSE)—a contemporary of Richard Bissell, later director of CIA's operational directorate, the Directorate of Plans)—where he once sold copies of *The Daily Worker*. Even in retirement, Bell

would write of the "serene voices" of Harold Laski, John Strachey, and other Marxists. (327)

After a summary of Bell's family origins and his early life in Europe, Burns covers the second theme, Bell's professional career. Burns provides a chronological account of Bell's assignments, beginning with his recruitment by MI6 in the mid 1930s. His first posting was to New York City, officially as vice consul but actually as deputy head of station to the consul or passport control officer.

After the war began in Europe, Bell was assigned to a new intelligence unit in New York called British Security Coordination (BSC), which was headed by Canadian William ("Bill") Stephenson. Bell's duties, Burns tells us, involved developing US support for Britain and the war effort.

In late 1940 Bell was posted on a short-term assignment to Mexico City for BSC. There he worked with FBI Special Agents and elements of the US Navy to track German ships trying to run the blockade.

Back in Washington in 1942, Bell was unexpectedly reassigned to London as the MI6 liaison officer to the OSS station. He returned to Washington in 1946 as private secretary to the Ambassador Lord Inverchapel. It was during that assignment that Director-General (D-G) of MI5 Sir Percy Sillitoe asked Bell to join MI5, which he subsequently did. (182)

Burns records Bell's MI5 service in Kenya—Head of Station, Nairobi—and India. Then in 1957, he returned to London as private secretary to MI5 D-G Roger Hollis. After one year, he moved on to the Caribbean and then back to Kenya in 1961, his final posting.

In the late 1960s, Bell retired from government service with high awards from the US and British governments. In retirement, he wrote articles advocating for more transparency on intelligence matters and on related national security issues. He also worked for The International Documentation and Information Centre, a private organization that supplied reports to selected journalists and think-tanks about Soviet ideological subversion and Soviet strategy.

Regrettably, Burns doesn't comment on the details of Bell's intelligence work, presumably because they were not included in his private papers. He compensates to some extent by discussing espionage cases that Bell "keenly followed" during his service, while noting Bell was not involved. For example, Burns gives lengthy attention to Cedric Belfridge's role as a Soviet agent assigned to the BSC and to Dusko Popov's (TRICYCLE) interaction with the FBI. Likewise, Burns mentions Bell's social contacts with Kim Philby and Donald Maclean, while acknowledging he was unaware of their treachery. Burns also names several high level friends, for example, Dick White, who headed MI5 and MI6, but nothing about their intelligence relationship.

There are some inaccuracies, such as Burns's reference to Philip Agee, as "the CIA officer turned whistle-blower," adding that "Angleton would never forgive him." Of course, Agee was defector not a whistle-blower and Burns never knew Angleton. Burns also called Maclean a double agent, while noting Hollis lacked the qualifications to be one.

A Faithful Spy tells an interesting personal story but doesn't satisfy this reader's desire to know more about his professional one.

Estimative Intelligence in European Foreign Policymaking: Learning Lessons from an Era of Surprise (Intelligence, Surveillance and Secret Warfare), edited by Christopher Meyer, Eva Michaels, Nikki Ikani, Aviva Guttmann, and Michael S. Goodman (Edinburgh University Press, 2022), 351 pages, end-of-chapter notes, references, index.

Predicting the future is easy; anyone can do it. Estimating the circumstances of international crises in time to allow decisionmakers to take appropriate action is more difficult, as this volume demonstrates. Each of the nine academic contributors have experience writing and teaching strategic intelligence. One is a former UK senior defense intelligence officer. Another headed the German foreign intelligence service (BND) and is a former director of the little-known European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre, an organization seldom encountered in the literature. The study also has the benefit of consultation and draft-review by several intelligence professionals,

as for example, Sir David Oman, former head of GCHQ (the UK's equivalent of NSA) and author of his own important books on intelligence.

Seven of the eight articles in this volume take a lessons-learned approach to the way three major European polities—the UK, Germany, and the EU—dealt with estimative intelligence relating to three crises: the Arab Spring uprisings, ISIS's rise to power in Syria and Iraq, and the Russian annexation of parts of Ukraine. In particular, they examine the extent to which surprise was a factor in each event. (18)

The contributors' analysis is based on government and open-source—presumably corroborated—material. Another interesting feature is the focus on European intelligence operating conditions in both intelligence production and decision making while consciously avoiding the vastly different US approach, which they outline briefly.

Rather than employ a single-case analysis where each player is compared with a given instance of surprise, the core premise of this study takes a dual-comparison approach that analyzes the performance of the three intelligence entities with each other and with the three cases of surprise. This, the editors argue, allows for a "very thorough and comprehensive analysis" (14) while increasing the potential for learning more about estimative intelligence. (248) While this may be true, the details of implementation are not well demonstrated.

The first seven chapters are guided by these essential questions: What surprised the knowledge producers and/or decisionmakers? Were they "black swan" (unique unexpected) moments? How did those responsible perform? What were the underlying causes of any performance problems? And which are the lessons that individuals, organizations, governments and foreign policy communities should learn for the future so as to be less frequently and less completely surprised about major foreign threats and opportunities? (2)

The final chapter raises many questions associated with the dual-comparison approach but does not address them in order, thus creating a cloud of confusion. One interesting conclusion is that the better resourced and more experienced of three intelligence services considered did not produce better estimates of surprise. A second and more valuable result confirms that "fundamentally, it is doubtful whether the right lessons have been learned in a lasting way by European governments, ministries and agencies, foreign policy communities, and societies" may be correct, but the precise reasons remain obscure. (2) A challenging contribution.

I Was Never Here: My True Canadian Spy Story of Coffees, Code Names and Covert Operations in the Age of Terrorism, by Andrew Kirsch (pagetwo.com: Page Two, 2022) 230 pages.

After working as a financial analyst in the UK, Canadian Andrew Kirsch responded to the 2005 terrorist attack in London by asking Google, "How do I become a Canadian spy?" He got a response! After a few months processing, he joined the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) as an intelligence analyst and later served as a field investigator. After a decade on the job, he grew tired of the bureaucracy and "the grueling reality of being a spy" and left CSIS to form a private security-threat firm and to write a memoir. (4) The book's title comes from Kirsch's service on a covert operations squad that occasionally had to gain access to an activity legally but without leaving signs.

I Was Never Here address two audiences: one consists of potential intelligence officers and the other is the broader reading public. With respect to the first, Kirsch describes his own experiences, including his application, training, tradecraft, and working conditions, especially those of a field investigator. He then describes Canada's national security program and components—CSIS and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police—in particular, as well as the modern threats—terrorism, cyber warfare—with which it must deal. He compares CSIS to the British and Israeli intelligence services. Toward general readers, he issues an appeal for increased public alertness to cyber threats.

Kirsch provides a good introduction to a Five Eyes intelligence service.

Shadows Within Shadows: Spies and Intelligence in Historical China, by Ralph D. Sawyer (Independently published, 2023), 286 pages, footnotes, no index.

The study of Chinese military and intelligence history has been part of Ralph Sawyer's scholarly pursuits for more than five decades. His first book, *The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China* (Basic Books, 2007), included a translation of Sun-tsu's *Art of War.* He has also written numerous papers on related topics and, to satisfy the many requests for copies, has published nine of the most popular in *Shadows Within Shadows*. Each was presented at a professional conference and several have been published in professional journals, one in *Studies in Intelligence*. When given estimates of unit conventional publishing costs approaching $100 per book, Sawyer decided on self-publishing at about $12 a copy to increase accessibility.

While there is much to learn about Chinese intelligence history in *Shadows Within Shadows,* Sawyer's selection of the title, a line from an extended treatment of misinformation by a Ming Dynasty military thinker, is in and of itself difficult to understand, as most classical Chinese language expressions are. It is explained more fully in Sawyer's article, "Wisdom of the Ancients: Traditional Chinese Conceptions and Approaches to Secrecy, Denial, and Obfuscation (*Studies in Intelligence* 64, no. 1, March 2020).

Of the nine substantive chapters in the book, the first six deal with aspects of the intelligence profession—defectors, human agents, double agents, deception, Chinese disinformation theory—as developed during China's long history. In his discussions of them, Sawyer is strong on principles but light on detailed implementation examples. His sources are most often *The Art of War* though sometimes he includes frequently incomplete Chinese references. And, of concern to those not well acquainted with Chinese intelligence history, each of the chapters contain unfamiliar terms and references to Chinese historical personalities and events that are presented without context.

Should readers desire more detail and background on the topics mentioned here, two of Sawyer's books may be of help. *The Tao of Spycraft* (Hachette Books, 1998) presents an expanded treatment of the first six chapters (*Tao* is a Chinese term synonymous with "method" or "the way"). The second choice is Sawyer's *Book of Spies* (Independently published, 2020), his translation of *Jianshu* by Zhu Fengjia, which deals with premodern Chinese spycraft. For additional perspective on Sawyer's translation of this work it is recommended that readers consult the review article by Michael Schoenhals, "A Chinese Spy Manual From the Quing Dynasty" (*Intelligence and National Security* 36, no. 7 [2021]: 1076–80).

The final three chapters turn away from intelligence to focus on Chinese military thought and strategic warfare policy, including contemporary political developments in China. According to Sawyer, the "inexorable dominance of Xi Jinping's thought in every realm" in the current period "has mooted the relevance of traditional martial contemplations." Some examples are provided in the footnotes. (6)

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CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

Accidental Czar: The Life and Lies of Vladimir Putin, by Andrew S. Weiss and Brian "Box" Brown (*Studies* 67, 1 [March 2023]), reviewed by Ursula Wilder

The American Surveillance State: How the U.S. Spies on Dissent, by David H. Price (IO Bookshelf, *Studies* 67, 2 [June 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology, by Chris Miller; ***This is How They Tell Me the World Ends: The Cyberweapons Arms Race***, by Nicole Perlroth; ***The Lazarus Heist: From Hollywood to High Finance: Inside North Korea's Global Cyberwar***, by Geoff White (*Studies* 67, 3 [September 2023]), review essay by Yong Suk Lee

The Declassification Engine: What History Reveals About America's Top Secrets, by Matthew Connelly (*Studies* 67, 2 [June 2023]), reviewed by Travis D. Stolz

The Future of National Intelligence: How Emerging Technologies Reshape Intelligence Communities, by Shay Hershkovitz (IO Bookshelf, *Studies* 67, 4 [December 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

Hacker, Influencer, Faker, Spy: Intelligence Agencies in the Digital Age, by Robert Dover (IO Bookshelf, *Studies* 67, 2 [June 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake and separately by Graham Alexander

Intelligence for Homeland Security: An Introduction, by Jeffrey Douglas Dailey and James Robert Phelps (IO Bookshelf, *Studies* 67, 3 [September 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

Lessons from the COVID War, by the COVID Crisis Group (IO Bookshelf , *Studies* 67, 3 [September 2023]), reviewed by Radhika M.

The Real Special Relationship: The True Story of How MI6 and the CIA Work Together, by Michael Smith (IO Bookshelf, *Studies* 67, 3 [September 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

Russian "Hybrid Warfare": Resurgence and Politicization, by Ofer Fridman (*Studies* 67, 1 [March 2023]), reviewed by Christopher Bort

Russian Information Warfare: Assault on Democracies in the Cyber Wild West, by Bilyana Lilly (IO Bookshelf, Studies 67, 4 [December 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

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Spies: The Epic Intelligence War Between East and West by Calder Walton (*Studies* 67, 3 [September 2023]), reviewed John Ehrman

Spy Fail: Foreign Spies, Moles, Saboteurs, and the Collapse of America's Counterintelligence, by James Bamford (IO Bookshelf, *Studies* 67, 2 [June 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

Striking Back: Overt and Covert Options to Combat Russian Disinformation, by Thomas Kent (IO Bookshelf, Studies 67, 4 [December 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

Target Tehran: How Israel Is Using Sabotage, Cyberwarfare, Assassination—and Secret Diplomacy—to Stop a Nuclear Iran and Create a New Middle East, by Yonah Jeremy Bob and Ilan Evyatar (*Studies* 67, 4 [December 2023]), reviewed by Alissa M.

Understanding the New Proxy Wars: Battlegrounds and Strategies Reshaping the Greater Middle East, by Peter Bergen, et al. eds. (*Studies* 67, 1 [March 2023]), reviewed by Alissa M.

GENERAL

Communicating with Intelligence: Writing and Briefing for National Security (3rd edition), by M. Patrick Hendrix and James S. Major (*Studies* 67, 2 [June 2023]), reviewed by Michael J. Ard

Intelligence Power In Practice, by Michael Herman with David Schaefer (IO Bookshelf, Studies 67, 4 [December 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

A Philosophy of Lying, by Lars Svendsen (*Studies* 67, 3 [September 2023]), reviewed by Mike R.

Spying Through a Glass Darkly: The Ethics of Espionage and Counter-Intelligence, by Cécile Fabre (*Studies* 67, 1 [March 2023])***,*** reviewed by Joseph Gartin

The Third Option: Covert Action and American Foreign Policy, by Loch K. Johnson (IO Bookshelf, *Studies* 67, 1 [March 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

HISTORY

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Confronting Saddam Hussein: George W. Bush and the Invasion of Iraq by MelvynP. Lefffler (*Studies* 67, 3 [September 2023], reviewed by Michael J. Ard

Covert Legions: U.S. Army Intelligence in Germany, 1944–1949, by Thomas Boghardt (IO Bookshelf, *Studies* 67, 1 [March 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake; also reviewed in *Studies* 67, 4 (December 2023) by Scott Moseman, PhD.

Covert Radio Agents 1939–1945: Signals from Behind Enemy Lines, by David Hebditch (IO Bookshelf, *Studies* 67, 2 [June 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

Crown, Cloak, and Dagger: The British Monarchy and Secret Intelligence from Victoria to Elizabeth the Second, by Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac (IO Bookshelf, Studies 67, 4 [December 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

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The Forever Prisoner: The Full and Searing Account of the CIA's Most Controversial Program, by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy (IO Bookshelf, Studies 67, 4 [December 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

Forging Secrets: Faces and Facts Inside the Nazi Operation Bernhard Scheme, edited by Kiel Majewski et al. (IO Bookshelf, *Studies* 67, 3 [September 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

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Three Ordinary Girls: The Remarkable Story of Three Dutch Teenagers Who Became Spies, Saboteurs, Nazi Assassins—And WWII Heroes, by Tim Brady (IO Bookshelf, Studies 67, 4 [December 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

Unbreakable: The Spies Who Cracked the Nazis' Secret Code, by Rebecca E. F. Barone (IO Bookshelf, *Studies* 67, 2 [June 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

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White Malice: The CIA and the Covert Recolonization of Africa, by Susan Williams (*Studies* 67, 1 [March 2023]),reviewed by Charles Long

MEMOIR/BIOGRAPHY

An Excellent Idea: Leading CIA Surrogate Warfare in Southeast Asia, 1951–1970, A Personal Account, by James W. "Bill" Lair as told to Thomas L. Ahern, Jr. (IO Bookshelf, Studies 67, 4 [December 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

Capturing Eichmann: The Memoir of a Mossad Spymaster, by Rafi Eitan and Anshel Pfeffer, trans. Galina Vromen (*Studies* 67, 1 [March 2023]), reviewed by Ian B. Ericson

A Faithful Spy: The Life and Times of An MI6 and MI5 Officer, by Jimmy Burns (IO Bookshelf, *Studies* 67, 4 [December 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

I Was Never Here: My True Canadian Spy Story of Coffees, Code Names and Covert Operations in the Age of Terrorism, by Andrew Kirsch (IO Bookshelf, *Studies* 67, 4 [December 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

The Kneeling Man: My Father's Life as a Black Spy Who Witnessed the Assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., by Leta McCollough Seletzky (IO Bookshelf, *Studies* 67, 2 [June 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake; also reviewed by Darryl Lansey in *Studies* 67, 3 (September 2023)]

Loyalty First: The Life and Times of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur's Chief Intelligence Officer, by David A. Foy *Studies* 67, 4 (December 2023) reviewed by Stephen C. Mercado

Never Give an Inch: Fighting for an America I Love, Mike Pompeo (IO Bookshelf, *Studies* 67, 3 [September 2023]), reviewed by Hayden Peake

One Damn Thing After Another, by William P. Barr (*Studies* 67, 1 [March 2023]) review essay by Mike R.

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