

New Light on Old Spies: A Review of Recent Soviet Intelligence Revelations

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Espionage is needed by those who prepare for attack, for aggression. The Soviet Union is deeply dedicated to the cause of peace and does not intend to attack anyone. Therefore it has no intention of engaging in espionage -- Nikita Khrushchev to Saneo Nozaka, Chairman of the Japanese Communist Party, 1962.

Until recently the average Soviet citizen, had he been asked, would have denied that his Government engaged in espionage against other states. Such a dirty practice, he could have added if he faithfully followed the official propaganda line, was employed only by the imperialists, with the USSR as their target. Had not the Soviet Union been compelled to create and maintain a state security service to protect itself from just such imperialist machinations?

The average Soviet, if he was ever so naive, is now disabused of his illusions. His government has reversed a policy in force since Lenin's day to admit that it has been practicing espionage abroad all the time. For reasons not yet clear, it has created a new hero: the intrepid intelligence agent spying abroad in peacetime for the Soviet fatherland at great personal sacrifice and danger.

By this action the Soviet regime has in effect surfaced the military intelligence service (GRU) to its own citizens. The hero intelligence operative has joined

the hero Chekist in the Soviet pantheon. Moreover, the hero Chekist, hitherto portrayed as the valiant defender of the regime against foreign and domestic enemies, has now become an aggressive collector of intelligence abroad. For the first time since the Revolution the espionage exploits of the Soviet military intelligence service and state security have been officially acknowledged. True, the official accounts of these exploits must seem inadequate to any Soviet mind bold enough to reflect on the matter, but their quality is not the point at issue. The crucially significant fact is that Soviet espionage activities were surfaced at all. An official policy dating back to the Revolution has been dramatically and unaccountably revised.

Richard Sorge

When surfacing the GRU, the Soviet authorities chose to highlight Richard Sorge, the German citizen whose exploits for Soviet military intelligence in China and Japan before the second world war, although never revealed in the Soviet Union, have been known in the West for almost two decades. Sorge's career in espionage, and especially his penetration of the Japanese government and the German embassy in Tokyo, had been earlier examined in detail by General Charles Willoughby, Hans Otto Meissner, and Chalmers Johnson.¹ Their works, although differing in detail and interpretation of events, are largely based on reports of the Japanese investigation of the Sorge network and certain memoirs and secondary publications. All are inaccurate in varying degrees. The Japanese investigation, the principal non-Communist source on the case, was inadequately handled and left many unanswered questions but did supply the broad outlines of the affair. David Dallin, it should be noted, has barely mentioned the case.² As of 1965, little had been added to our knowledge of the operation.

Richard Sorge has been surfaced in the Soviet Union by means of a series of newspaper articles and popular books. His glorification was begun in late 1964 with an article by Viktor Mayevskiy in Pravda.³ Written after a visit to Sorge's grave in Tokyo, this article is an unrelieved panegyric on its subject. Other articles on Sorge in the Soviet central and provincial press quickly followed. Ya. Gorev, who is said to have served in the GRU with Sorge in Berlin, presented what seems to be an official account of Sorge's career.⁴ Gorev claims to have helped prepare Sorge for his Far East assignment and to have operated near him there. His use of Sorge's letters and messages indicates that he had access to official files, but he has furnished little new data on the case. Sorge is presented as a paragon of virtue; his weakness for alcohol and women is ignored. Gorev's version of the Sorge operation generally corresponds to that presented by Meissner and Willoughby. In all probability

he drew heavily on these sources.

Although Moscow has for some reason suppressed Gorev's account, the glorification campaign has continued unabated since late 1964. Persons who knew Sorge even slightly have given interviews for publication. On occasion, these individuals have admitted they did not know Sorge was engaged in intelligence work. Gerhardt Eisler has contributed a short memoir.⁵ V. Kudryavtsev, a Tass correspondent in Tokyo during 1931-1937, told of meeting Sorge and Branko Vukelic in Japan.⁶ He had no knowledge of their intelligence work at the time. Gerhard Stuchlik and Horst Pehnert, East German journalists, wrote a series of articles drawing on those by Mayevskiy and Gorev, interviews with Max Klausen, Sorge's radio operator, and with Gerhardt Eisler, and such Western sources as Meissner and Willoughby.⁷ Except for certain details on Sorge's early life, these add relatively little.

Several people living outside the Soviet Union have recently contributed reminiscences of Sorge. Kai Moltke and Richard Jensen, former Communists, have written of Sorge's stay in Denmark during 1928.⁸ Sorge's wife Christine has published a short and uninformative memoir in a Swiss periodical.⁹ None of these accounts makes any significant contribution to an understanding of the Sorge operation.

A popular, semi-fictional version of Sorge's career was carried by the Soviet periodical *Ogonek*, beginning on 28 February 1965. Its authors, Sergey Golyakov and Vladimir Ponosovskiy, fail to throw new light on the case. They present Sorge as declaring himself a Soviet citizen to his Japanese jailers. A sizable paperback edition of this series (300,000 copies) was published early in 1965.¹⁰

It is clear that the Soviet authorities wish to present Sorge as a popular hero but have no desire at this time to publish an accurate history of his intelligence operation. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, on 5 November 1964 he was posthumously awarded the title, Hero of the Soviet Union. In January 1965, Max Klausen was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and his wife Anna received the Order of the Red Star. Branko Vukelic was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War (First Degree). The East German Government has conferred on Max and Anna Klausen the Gold Medal of Merit of the National People's Army. But perhaps the most significant honor bestowed on Sorge was the issuance, early in 1965, of a Soviet stamp bearing his portrait. He thus joins Nathan Hale as an intelligence agent who has been paid philatelic honors by his government. No further proof is required of the intention of the Soviet authorities to add Sorge to the Soviet pantheon.¹¹

Other GRU Cases

Soviet authorities have also seen fit to give publicity to an obscure officer of the GRU surfaced under the name of Colonel Lev Yefimovich Manevich. This man was made posthumously a Hero of the Soviet Union in early 1965,¹² presumably for wartime services. He is credited in the Soviet press with service in an unidentified foreign country, possibly Germany or German-occupied Europe. According to the Soviet accounts he was betrayed through the cowardice of an assistant and imprisoned in German concentration camps, where he was known under the name Ya. N. Starostin. Before his death from tuberculosis at the Ebensee camp in Austria on 12 May 1945, he is said to have confided to a fellow inmate, one Grant Gregoryevich Ayrapetov, that his cryptonym was Etienne and to have asked that the Soviet authorities be notified.

Manevich is portrayed as a devoted intelligence agent who continued his work despite serious illness. According to Ayrapetov, Manevich compiled files on Soviets in Vlassov's unit, on followers of Bandera, the Ukrainian nationalist leader, and on other collaborators, all of which he turned over to one F. N. Dontsov for transmittal to the Soviet authorities. Interviews with Manevich's sister and Ayrapetov have appeared in the Soviet provincial press.¹³ The reason for surfacing Manevich in particular is unclear, unless the script called for an intelligence agent whose activities could be related to the second world war. This criterion could also be applied to Sorge.

One former chief of Soviet military intelligence, a victim of the great purge, has recently been rehabilitated, apparently as part of this publicity campaign. Yu. Geller has written a brief account of the career of Semen Petrovich Uritskiy, chief of the GRU between 1935 and 1937 until he was purged and executed by Stalin. Only the most general information on Uritskiy's career is given. His intelligence work is passed over with the excuse that it cannot yet be made public, but he is credited with having directed officers of the caliber of Sorge and Manevich.¹⁴

The German portion of the loosely connected Soviet wartime espionage operation now known as Rote Kapelle has been surfaced in the guise of a German resistance movement. Through the device of an interview with Greta (Margareta) Kuckhoff, a member of the group and presently a banking official in East Germany, the Soviet authorities have lifted a corner of the veil that still covers their wartime military intelligence operations in Europe.¹⁵ Rote Kapelle (the Nazi origin of this name is admitted by the Soviets) is portrayed as an antifascist group that began to take shape before the Hitler dictatorship was established. Although the upper-class origin of its leaders, Arvid Harnack and Harro Schulze-Boysen, and of other members is admitted, a determined effort is made to show that it also contained many persons of working-class origin.

The espionage role of the group is presented in rather incidental fashion, without emphasis. No mention is made of the GRU networks that existed in France, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland. Greta Kuckhoff presents East Germany as the heir to the cause for which the Rote Kapelle fought.

State Security: Abel

The admission to the Soviet people that the state security service, long portrayed as a defensive, counterintelligence arm of the state, does in fact engage in peacetime espionage abroad is equally dramatic. By virtue of its internal, repressive activity, the security service is only too well known to the Soviet population. Few Soviet citizens can have avoided some brush with the heavy hand of the security component, but equally few of them have known until recently what every literate Westerner has long known, that the state security service is also a principal arm of Soviet espionage abroad. In keeping with the dogma that only aggressive imperialist states engage in espionage, the existence of the First Chief Directorate of the security service, the foreign arm, was never admitted. The surfacing of its espionage in foreign countries, therefore, represents a major shift in Soviet intelligence policy.

This policy shift was signaled by an article on the career of Col. Rudolf Abel that appeared in *Nedelya* (The Week) during May 1965.¹⁶

According to its author, Abel was born in a city near the Volga, entered the state security service about 1927, and worked before and during World War II as an intelligence agent against Germany, being covered as a member of the German minority in Latvia. It is significant that Abel's espionage activity after the war is shown as motivated by a personal desire to neutralize the activity of "fascist criminals" who had taken refuge in the West. The theme of working against Nazi criminals presumably would be popular with the Soviet people and fits the time-honored portrayal of state security as a defensive organization.

Colonel Abel is also the hero of a novel by Vadim Kozhevnikov now being serialized in *Znamya*, the organ of the Union of Writers.¹⁷ Kozhevnikov's novel has not yet appeared in book form in the USSR. It is also being serialized in the Yugoslav newspaper *Borba*.

According to the author, Abel's true name is Aleksandr Ivanovich Belov. Since the work is frankly fiction, however, none of the data it contains can be accepted without verification. The significant fact is that the Soviet government has thus belatedly chosen to portray Abel as a hero Chekist

employed in espionage abroad.

The theme of work against postwar Nazis, it is interesting to note, also appears in the purported memoirs of Gordon Lonsdale (Conon Molody), the state security officer who was convicted of espionage in the United Kingdom and later exchanged for Greville Wynne, a British subject involved in the Penkovskiy trial. Lonsdale claims that he wished to operate against former Nazis who were employed in the United Kingdom. The Lonsdale "memoirs," which have been serialized in the British press¹⁸ but not published in the USSR are clearly designed as a deception operation. Their accounts of his Canadian birth, a childhood spent in Poland, and intelligence work with Colonel Abel in the United States before going to the United Kingdom are, from evidence on hand, complete fabrications. They are designed to confuse Western intelligence services, sow dissension between the British and American governments, and denigrate both British security and British justice. Any truth they may contain is merely incidental to these purposes.

Dzerzhinskiy

For several decades the Soviet regime has endeavored to justify the counterintelligence activity of its security service, calling it the "punishing sword of the Revolution," the defender of the Soviet nation and state against foreign and domestic enemies. Its intimate relationship to the party leadership was deliberately blurred; its full role in intra-party struggles for power has been concealed.

The participation of the security service in these struggles and the purges they brought forth, events that are well remembered by the Soviet people, made difficult the task of investing it with any sort of glamour. In practice it was necessary to concentrate on the earliest period of its history, the period of revolution, civil war, and early post-revolutionary years, when it was headed by Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinskiy, the Polish revolutionary idealist, friend and associate of Lenin, who died before Stalin began his purges. The Dzerzhinskiy period of the service is portrayed as a time of high idealism, a golden age.

The exigencies of Soviet internal politics have made it impossible to glorify Dzerzhinskiy's successors, who were either nonentities (Menzhinskiy), mere tools of Stalin (Yagoda, Yezhev) or latter-day villains in their own right (Beriya). Soviet party leaders will do nothing that might undermine the effectiveness of the security service as the defender of the regime, hence the history of the service under Stalin's dictatorship is not likely to be revealed. Their efforts to refurbish its image will never be allowed to endanger its internal efficiency. It

is unlikely, therefore, that any detailed history of state security will appear in the foreseeable future.

Perhaps the most interesting volume on Dzerzhinskiy to appear in recent years is Mme. Dzerzhinskiy's memoirs, published in 1964. She gives the texts of letters never before published or previously published only in part. She also provides an interpretation of her husband's background and development based on an association of many years that should contribute significantly to an understanding of the man.²⁷ It will be interesting to see whether Soviet historians produce additional significant material on Dzerzhinskiy's career as chief of state security. If, as one authority contends, the Cheka archives were destroyed, that task may be difficult.²⁸

Historical material on the service nevertheless continues to appear. As noted above, much attention is given to the life and personality of Dzerzhinskiy, so much in fact that something of a cult of personality seems to have grown up around him.¹⁹ In 1956, selections of his diary and family letters, all pre-revolutionary in date, made their appearance.²⁰ P. G. Sofinov published during the same year a popular biography of Dzerzhinskiy that made use of certain hitherto unpublished archival material.²¹ In the following year, a selection of Dzerzhinskiy's writings that emphasized his work in other components of the Soviet government such as the Commissariat of the Interior, Commissariat of Transportation, and Supreme Council of the National Economy made its appearance.²² A more rounded view of his career is thus now available.²³

During recent years Soviet authors have continued to mine the ore of Dzerzhinskiy's life and career. A. Khatskevich published a careful biographical study of him in which he uses his subject's prerevolutionary documentary files.²⁴ On the other hand, N. Zubov has produced another popular biography repeating well-worn facts and stories.²⁵ Dzerzhinskiy's eighty-fifth birthday was commemorated by the appearance of a rather barren volume of reminiscences that adds little or nothing to our knowledge of the man.²⁶

Perhaps the most interesting volume on Dzerzhinskiy to appear in recent years is Mme. Dzerzhinskiy's memoirs, published in 1964. She gives the texts of letters never before published or previously published only in part. She also provides an interpretation of her husband's background and development based on an association of many years that should contribute significantly to an understanding of the man.²⁷ It will be interesting to see whether Soviet historians produce additional significant material on Dzerzhinskiy's career as chief of state security. If, as one authority contends, the Cheka archives were destroyed, that task may be difficult.²⁸

Other Chekists

Few other officials of state security have been honored with biographies. I. V. Viktorov's rather sparse and matter-of-fact biography of Mikhail Sergeyevich Kedrov, an old Bolshevik and associate of Dzerzhinskiy, is unusual in that it covers in part the period of the great purges. According to Viktorov, Kedrov's son Igor and a friend, one Volodya Golubev, both employed by state security, discovered in early 1939 that Beriya and his associates were betraying the USSR in the interest of Hitler. The two young Chekists, after consulting the elder Kedrov, who by then was out of the service, decided to make the facts known to Stalin and the Party Control Commission. When the young men were arrested, as they anticipated being, M. S. Kedrov was to approach Stalin, reveal the facts of the matter, and call Stalin's attention to a letter accusing Beriya that he (Kedrov) had written to Dzerzhinskiy in 1921.

But Igor Kedrov and Golubev were arrested in late February 1939 and shot. The elder Kedrov was arrested several months later. Despite the fact that he succeeded in proving his innocence, he was not freed, and in late 1941 Beriya disposed of him also. This story, which also serves to denigrate Stalin, is reported without details or substantiating facts. Viktorov's book perhaps serves to rehabilitate M. S. Kedrov, but it adds little or nothing to our knowledge of the state security service.²⁹

An Estonian official of the Cheka, Viktor E. Kingisepp, has also been honored with a biography.³⁰ Kingisepp took a prominent part in the investigation of the attempt on Lenin's life in August 1918. Memoirs of old Chekists are rare in Soviet literature. The memoirs of F. T. Fomin, a retired member of state security, were published in 1962 in an original edition of 350,000 copies, certainly a very large printing for a book of this type. A second, revised edition appeared in 1964.³¹ Fomin, it is interesting to note; admits that Chekists could misuse their authority for personal goals, citing the activities of a Baltic baron in the Ukrainian Cheka to prove the point. Perhaps it is significant that the miscreant was of noble birth. It is also noteworthy that Fomin presents a highly favorable picture of V. R. Nlenzhinskiy, Dzerzhinskiy's successor as chief of state security, a weak man whose tour at the head of the service is considered an interregnum between Dzerzhinskiy and G. G. Yagoda. Fomin, however, does not mention the much more significant Yagoda, whose role in state security until he was purged by Stalin was considerable.

Operations

Histories of the state security service and its operations have been even more rare. When they do appear, such volumes cover the early period of the service, the time of the Cheka. The most significant historical study of the Cheka to appear in recent years is P. G. Sofinov's volume, *Historical Sketches*, published in 1960.³²

The Soviets have also seen fit to surface in part the highly successful TRUST operation of the mid-twenties. This counterintelligence operation, which was mounted by state security, was designed to neutralize the anti-regime activities of Russian émigrés and the intelligence operations of European services. Using as decoy a national organization, the "Monarchical Organization of Central Russia," usually called TRUST, Soviet state security was able to deflect and control the attempts of its enemies to overthrow the Soviet regime during the time of its greatest weakness. A new and untested service thus succeeded in misleading the most experienced intelligence services of Western Europe and in almost completely neutralizing the dedicated work of its émigré opponents.

Not the least of its achievements was the enticement into the Soviet Union and seizure in 1925 of Sidney George Reilly, an able British intelligence officer who had operated in Russia with Robert Bruce-Lockhart in 1918. Lev Nikulin has described the enticement and seizure of Reilly in an article in *Nedelya*.³³ Not unnaturally, Nikulin shows great pride in this achievement of the security service and its young officers. He undertakes to smear the image of Reilly, however, quoting what purports to be Reilly's offer to Dzerzhinskiy to give full information on the organization and staff of the British intelligence service, members of the Russian emigration with whom he had worked, and -- significantly -- the American intelligence service. Since U.S. intelligence was moribund by the middle twenties, any information thereon supplied by Reilly, if indeed he wrote such a letter to Dzerzhinskiy, would have been historical.

Nikulin's article was described as a chapter from his forthcoming "novel-chronicle" on TRUST. This book, *Mertvaya Zyb* (The Swell) apparently has not been published up to this time.³⁴

Soviet Motives

As is often true of Russian policy, the objectives to be served by the surfacing of Soviet espionage activities abroad are not immediately evident. The reasons for the adoption of such a policy are difficult to disentangle. Perhaps the interplay of personal ambitions and jealousies among Party and government leaders has played its part. Although no evidence on the point is available,

this unusual Soviet frankness may reflect the growing influence of Alexander Shelepin, former chief of the KGB who has played an increasingly prominent role in Soviet affairs since the overthrow of Khrushchev. It may be assumed, in any case, that the decision to admit to the Soviet people that their government also engages in actions hitherto credited only to bourgeois and fascist states was not lightly reached on the spur of the moment. Undoubtedly it was made at the highest Party levels, after lengthy and possibly acrimonious discussion. Party leaders must have agreed that the advantages of such a revelation outweighed any ill effect on the Soviet population.

What are the possible advantages of the revelation?

Such foreign espionage operations as have been surfaced up to this time are related to the Germany of Hitler and the second world war. The work of Manevich, if that was in fact his name, is presented as having been done in Eastern Europe, probably in Germany or a German-occupied area, and in a Nazi concentration camp. A series of paperbacks on the frontier guards and wartime partisan operations continue the anti-Nazi defense theme.³⁵ Abel, it is said, worked against the Germans; his postwar activities were motivated by a desire to get at former Nazis who were active in the West. Lonsdale is made to admit the same motivation. Although Sorge's prewar operational activity cannot be denied, his intelligence targets were obvious -- the German embassy in Tokyo and Japan, Germany's ally. Work against the Nazi, at whatever time it was undertaken, would be applauded by Soviet citizens. Such espionage operations, although carried on abroad, can be interpreted as defensive in intent and purpose. The Soviets, it must be noted, have not yet admitted that their postwar operations were directed primarily against the British and Americans.

The Soviet authorities may believe that revelations of Western espionage against the Soviet Union in recent years call for defensive action. Operations such as the U-2 flights and the Popov and Penkovskiy penetrations have certainly resulted in talk and speculation within the USSR. The Powers and Penkovskiy show trials must have convinced even optimistic Soviets that, despite official disclaimers, some harm had been done to Soviet security. Many must have asked, why don't our people do that same thing? It is possible, therefore, that several terminated espionage operations have been surfaced to assure the Soviet people that their government is also active in such operations abroad. The first line of Soviet defense, they are being told, is in good hands.

The new publicity is probably designed to improve the image and morale of military intelligence and the state security service. The Penkovskiy case (and the Popov case as well, although it received little publicity) must have been disastrous to the morale of military intelligence officers. State security officers must have been affected adversely by previous efforts of the Soviet

authorities to create a bland image of their service. Public acclaim of service heroes, even of those who at first glance appear to have failed in their missions, has undoubtedly improved the tone and morale of both services.

Such revelations can also be made to serve operational purposes. It will be noted that the Soviets use fictionalized biographies to surface both operations and intelligence agents. Fictional techniques permit the telling of a lively story without need to adhere to the facts of the case. Embarrassing aspects and significant operational details may be distorted or omitted without endangering the seeming integrity of the account. Even though not so labeled -- possibly because they were intended for foreign consumption -- the Lonsdale "memoirs" are largely fictional. The Soviets have enlisted fiction as an intelligence weapon.

Although at first glance it would seem to be a pointless task, these fictionalized memoirs and biographies should be subjected to expert counterintelligence analysis. Such accounts must contain at least a substratum of fact. This may be discovered through analysis. Significant omissions and distortions may be ascertained by comparison of the fictionalized versions with data available in counterintelligence files. But the most important purpose of such analysis is the discovery of the disinformation objectives that these accounts may serve. We must assume that all memoirs, biographies, and historical studies of the Soviet intelligence services are prepared with the aid of disinformation experts.

A careful watch must be kept on this new Soviet program of controlled intelligence revelations. Although their goals are not yet clear, for the Soviets it is a new technique and one that may do serious injury to Western morale. It must be analyzed and closely followed.

Olivia Halebian

1 Major General Charles Willoughby, *Shanghai Conspiracy, The Sorge Spy Ring* (New York, 1952) ; Chalmers Johnson, *An Instance of Treason* (Stanford, California, 1964); Hans Otto Meissner, *The Man With Three Faces* (New York, 1955). A German edition of Meissner's book, the title of which indicates its partially fictional character (*Der Fall Sorge: Roman Nach Tatsachen*) was published in Munich during the same year. Several short accounts of the Sorge case have appeared in espionage anthologies. Branko Vukelic, a member of Sorge's network in Japan, has been the subject of Yugoslav newspaper articles. See Dushan Cvetic, "Ko Je Branko Vukelich?" in *Politika Ekspres*, 4-20 November 1963.

2 David J. Dallin, *Soviet Espionage* (New Haven, 1955).

3 Viktor Mayevskiy, "Tovarishch Zorge" (Comrade Sorge) in *Pravda*, 4

September 1964.

4 Ya. Gorev, "Ya Znal Zorge" (I Knew Sorge) in Komsomolskaya Pravda, 8 October 1964-1 November 1964. The Gorev articles were issued as a pamphlet under the same title in an edition of 240,000 copies (Moscow, 1964), but this publication was withdrawn from sale shortly after it appeared and has not been reissued up to this time. Gorev may be identical with Petr Aleksandrovich Skoblevskiy, a Soviet citizen who was arrested in Germany in 1923 and was tried in Leipzig two years later on charges of attempting the overthrow of the Weimar Republic. Skoblevskiy was later exchanged for Karl Kindermann and Theodor Wolscht, two German citizens who had been arrested in the USSR.

5 Gerhardt Eisler, "Errinerrungen an Richard Sorge," in Neues Deutschland, 2 November 1964.

6 V. Kudryavtsev, "Vstrechi s Rikhardom Zorge" (Meeting with Richard Sorge) in Nedelya (The Week), 1-7 November 1964, p. 14.

7 Gerhard Stuchlik and Horst Pehnert, "Wir Kannten Genossen Richard Sorge," in Junge Welt, 15 Oct. 1964 to 2-3 Jan. 1965.

8 Kai Moltke, "Da Mesterspionen Drak Bajere i Kobenhavn, in Politike, 27 December 1964; Richard Jensen, "Jeg Sa Sorge Sidst," Ibid., same date.

9 Christine Sorge, "Mein Mann -- Dr. R. Sorge" in Die Weltwoche, 11 December 1964. According to Weltwoche, Christine Sorge's article was written ten years earlier.

10 Sergey Golyakov and Vladimir Ponosovskiy, "Zorge, Dokumentalnaya Povest" (Sorge, a Documented Story), Ogonek (Light), 28 February-17 April 1965.

11 In 1937, 1951 and 1962, the Soviet Union issued postage stamps in various denominations with the portrait of Feliks Dzerzhinskiy. He is the only chief of Soviet state security who has been so honored.

12 Pravda, 21 February 1965.

13 Sovetskaya Latviya, 25 February 1965.

14 Yu. Geller, "Nachalnik Voyennoi Razvedki. K Semdesyat Letiyu so Dnya Rozhdeniya S. P. Uritskogo" (Chief of Military Intelligence Agents, On the Seventieth Anniversary of the Birth of S. P. Uritskiy) in Krasnaya Zvezda, 2 March 1965. Yan Karlovich Berzin, chief of Soviet military intelligence 1924-1935, has been mentioned as the teacher of Sorge. See O. Millers, "Estikos Ar Riharda Zorges Skolotaju" in Dzimtenes Balss, 5 January 1965. This newspaper is published in Riga.

15 L. Bezymensky, "Po Tu Storonu Fronta. Rasskaz Greta Kukkhof o Podpolnoi Antifashistskoi Organizatsii, Deystvovavskey v Gitlerovskoy Germanii" (On That Side of the Front. An Account of Greta Kuckhoff Concerning the Underground Anti-Fascist Organization That Was Active in Hitlerite Germany), in *Novoye Vremya*, 9 May 1965, pp. 28-31. This interview also appeared in the English-language edition of this periodical of the same date.

16 Major-General V. Drozdov, "Tovarishch Abel -- Soldat Nevidimogo Fronta" (Comrade Abel -- Soldier of the Invisible Front) in *Nedelya*, 2-8 May 1965, pp. 6-7. *Nedelya* is the Sunday supplement of the newspaper *Izvestiya*.

17 Vadim Kozhevnikov, "Shchit i Mech" (Shield and Sword), in *Znamya* (The Banner), No. 3, 1965.

18 Gordon Lonsdale, "How I Spied for Russia in Britain," *The People*, 7 March-25 April 1965.

19 Robert M. Slusser, "Recent Soviet Books on the History of the Secret Police," in *Slavic Review*, March 1965, pp. 90-98.

20 F. Ya. Kon, et. al., trans., *Dnevnik i Pisma* (Diary and Letters), Moscow, 1956. A second revised and enlarged edition, prepared by the same translators, *Dnevik. Pisma k Rodnym* (Diary. Letters to Relatives), appeared in Moscow in 1958. An English translation of this second edition, *Prison Diary and Letters*, was published in Moscow the following year.

21 P. G. Sofinov, *Stranitsy iz Zhizni F. E. Dzerzhinskogo* (Pages from the Life of F. E. Dzerzhinskiy), Moscow, 1956, edition of 200,000 copies.

22 Institute of Marxism-Leninism F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, *Izbranniye Proizvedeniya v Dvukh Tomakh* (F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, Selected Works in Two Volumes), Moscow, 1957. An earlier volume of Dzerzhinskiy's writings, *Izbranniye Staty e Rechi, 1908-1926* (Selected Articles and Speeches, 1908-1926) had been published in Moscow in 1947; a translation into German of this latter item (*Ausgewahlte Artikel und Reden, 1908-1926*) was issued in Berlin in 1953.

23 Slusser, op. cit., states that the editors' choice of material indicates that they were under orders to avoid his work in the security service, but he does not prove the point.

24 A. Khatskevich, *Soldat Velikikh Boyev: Zhizn i Deyatelnost F. E. Dzerzhinskogo* (A Soldier of Great Battles: The Life and Activity of F. E. Dzerzhinskiy), Minsk, 1961, edition of 5,000 copies. A second reworked and expanded edition of this volume in 17,000 copies was published in Moscow during 1965.

25 N. Zubov, *F. E. Dzerzhinskiy: Biografiya* (F. E. Dzerzhinskiy: A Biography), Moscow, 1963, edition of 100,000 copies.

26 Vospominaniya o Dzerzhinskom: K 85-Letiyu so Dnya Rozhdeniya (Memories of Dzerzhinskiy: For the 85th Anniversary of his Birth), Moscow, 1962.

27 Sofiya Sigizmundova Dzerzhinskaya, V Gody Velikhikh Boyev (In the Years of Great Battles), Moscow, 1964, in an edition of 31,000 copies.

28 Slusser, op. cit., quotes Boris Nikolayevskiy, the Menshevik historian, as citing an unidentified émigré source to the effect that the Cheka archives had been destroyed in order to prevent historians in future from studying the Cheka terror and Lenin's part in directing it.

29 I. V. Viktorov, Podpolshchik, Voin, Chekist (Underground Worker, Fighter, Chekist), Moscow, 1963.

30 D. Rudnev, Viktor Eduardovich Kingisepp, Leningrad, 1962. Another fictionalized biography of a Cheka official is that of D. N. Medvedev. See A. Tsessarsky, Chekist, Moscow, 1960.

31 F. T. Fomin, Zapiski Starogo Chekista (Notes of an Old Chekist), Moscow, 1962, 2nd revised edition, Moscow 1964.

32 P. G. Sofinov, Ocherki Istorii Vserossiiskoi Cherezvychainoi Komissii (1917-1922) (Sketches of the History of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission), Moscow, 1960.

33 Lev Nikulin, "Konets Sidneya Dzhordzha Reili" (The End of Sidney George Reilly) in Nedelya, 2-8 August, 1964. Another article by Nikulin, "Istoriya Odnogo Voyazha" (The Story of a Voyage) appeared in Nedelya, 11-17 October 1964, pp. 10-11. This article, presumably another chapter in Nikulin's book on TRUST, describes the clandestine visit to the USSR made by Vasiliv V. Shulgin in 1925-1926 under the auspices of TRUST, that is, under state security control. On his return to Western Europe, Shulgin described this visit in his book, Tri Stolitsy (Three Capitals).

34 An uneven and not completely satisfactory account of the TRUST operation, largely drawn from Western sources, is contained in Geoffrey Bailey (pseud.), The Conspirators, New York, 1960.

35 Since this article was sent to press an anonymous Soviet study of the role of the state security service in the fighting on the German front has become available. By Soviet standards rather copiously footnoted, it gives the service a most significant part in the victory and reproves Stalin for not accepting state security intelligence reports on German intentions and military plans. It is published under the title "Sovetskiye Organy Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti v Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny" (Soviet Organs of State Security in the Years of the Great Fatherland War) in Voprosy Istorii (Problems of History) No.

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