The Beginning of Intelligence Analysis in CIA
Thoughts on Learning for Intelligence Professionals
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Cover image: From CIA’s creation in September 1947 until the opening of its Northern Virginia headquarters in 1961, the complex of buildings pictured here at 2430 E Street, NW, in Washington, DC was home to CIA’s Headquarters-based staff, including the new analysts of the Office of Reports and Estimates.
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Letter to the Editors

We agree with Dr. Usowski’s concluding remark in his essay, “CIA Director Richard Helms, the Nixon White House, and Watergate” (Studies in Intelligence 62, no. 2 [June 2022]): Helms’s experience from 50 years ago is indeed instructive. Picking up where Dr. Usowski left off, we might reach further conclusions about Helms’s actions through the lenses of history and ethics as taught at CIA’s Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis. The Helms–Watergate saga may be a half-century behind us, but its utility in guiding moral action amid the complexities of contemporary intelligence work continues.

Every analyst who attends our Intelligence Successes and Failures course learns about Richard Helms and the CIA’s role in helping the Johnson administration navigate the run-up to the Six-Day War in 1967. We teach them how Helms’s Intelligence Credos—“The director serves one president at a time” and “Always keep a seat at the table”—helped propel Helms and the CIA back into the good graces of a skeptical Johnson administration. The intense focus on service suggested by these credos prompted the agency to anticipate Johnson’s needs as the crisis came to a head, handing the White House the sorts of robust assessments that preserve US initiative and freedom of political maneuver.

We might retrospectively situate Helms’s credos in the consequentialist ethical tradition: the ends justify the means to accomplish those ends. If we can trust our judgment of the historical record, Helms’s credos assert that the CIA should perform the tasks necessary to bring about a president’s use of the CIA’s services. The implied logical corollary is that CIA’s relevance to and use by the president is sufficient justification for CIA actions, even if those actions are ethically dubious, as in the case of Helms directing the CIA’s Office of Medical Services to compile a psychological profile of a US citizen.

The placid current of Helms’s consequentialism of the late 1960s becomes tumultuous in the face of the Pentagon Papers and Watergate. The modern reader may receive at least one instruction from Helms’s Watergate affair. If we use a consequentialist ethical framework for guiding our work—and our experience with students here indicates we do—then we ought to transcend Helms by remembering that the security of the Constitution and the people of the United States are the ends we serve, not the president as such. Moreover, we might exceed the boundaries of naked consequentialism and pose the still-open question that we ask each of our students: Does the end always justify the means, or are there things as Americans and as an agency that we just won’t do?

Sincerely,

Timothy Schulz & Thomas Q.
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The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.
The Office of Reports and Estimates: CIA’s First Center for Analysis

Woodrow Kuhns

Editor’s note: This article is offered as a contribution to reflections on CIA’s history 75 years since its creation in September 1947, which had been directed by the National Security Act of 26 July 1947. CIA’s community functions defined in that act and its analytical organizations have evolved substantially since then, but the core missions of intelligence analysis have remained, notwithstanding changes over the years. The article is an adaptation of the preface to a declassified document collection Dr. Kuhns edited in 1997, Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years (available at https://cia.gov/resources/csi/books-monographs/assessing-the-soviet-threat/). The intelligence documents cited in this essay can all be found there.

During World War II, the United States made one of its few original contributions to the craft of intelligence: the invention of multisource, nondepartmental analysis. The Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) assembled a talented cadre of analysts and experts to comb through publications and intelligence reports for clues to the capabilities and intentions of the Axis powers. R&A’s contributions to the war effort impressed even the harshest critics of the soon-to-be dismantled OSS. President Truman paid implicit tribute to R&A in late 1945, when he directed that it be transplanted into the State Department at a time when most of OSS was being demobilized. The transplant failed, however, and the independent analytical capability patiently constructed during the war had all but vanished when Truman moved to reorganize the nation’s peacetime intelligence establishment at the beginning of 1946.

“Current” Intelligence Versus “National” Intelligence

The Central Reports Staff, home to the analysts in the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), was born under a cloud of confusion in January 1946. Specifically, no consensus existed on what its mission was to be, although the president’s concerns in creating CIG were clear enough. In the uncertain aftermath of the war, he wanted to be sure that all relevant information available to the US government on any given issue of national security would be correlated and evaluated centrally so that the country would never again have to suffer a devastating surprise attack as it had at Pearl Harbor.\footnote{a} How this was to be accomplished, however, was less clear. The president himself wanted a daily summary that would relieve him of the chore of reading the mounds of cables, reports, and other papers that constantly cascaded onto his desk. Some of these were important, but many were duplicative and even contradictory.\footnote{b}

In the jargon of intelligence analysis, Truman wanted CIG to produce a “current intelligence” daily publication that would contain all information of immediate interest to him.\footnote{c}

Truman’s aides and advisers, however, either did not understand this or disagreed with him, for the

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\footnote{a}{The name of the Central Reports Staff was changed in July 1946 to the Office of Research and Evaluations, and again in October 1946 to the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), by which name it was known until it was abolished in November 1950. CIA veterans typically use “ORE” as the shorthand name for the analytical office for the whole period 1946–50.}

\footnote{b}{Truman wrote in his memoir that he had “often thought that if there had been something like coordination of information in the government it would have been more difficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor.”}

\footnote{c}{Current intelligence was defined in National Security Council Directive No. 3, “Coordination of Intelligence Production,” 13 January 1948, as “that spot information or intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs, which is used by them usually without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation.”}

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.
presidential directive of 22 January 1946 authorizing the creation of CIG did not mention current intelligence. The directive ordered CIG to “accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence.” Moreover, at the first meeting of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) on 5 February, Secretary of State Byrnes objected to the president’s idea of a current intelligence summary from CIG, claiming that it was his responsibility as secretary of state to furnish the president with information on foreign affairs.\(^{a}\)

Byrnes apparently then went to Truman and asked him to reconsider. Admiral Sidney Souers, the first director of central intelligence (DCI), told a CIA historian that Byrnes’ argument ran along the line that such information was not intelligence within the jurisdiction of the Central Intelligence Group and the Director [of Central Intelligence]. President Truman conceded that it might not be generally considered intelligence, but it was information which he needed and therefore it was intelligence to him. The result was agreement that the daily summaries should be “actual statements.” The Department of State prepared its own digest, and so the president had two summaries on his desk.\(^{b}\)

This uneasy compromise was reflected in NIA directives that outlined CIG’s duties. Directive No. 1, issued on 8 February 1946, ordered CIG to “furnish strategic and national policy intelligence to the President and the State, War, and Navy Departments.”\(^{c}\) NIA Directive No. 2, issued the same day, ordered the DCI to give “first priority” to the “production of daily summaries containing factual statements of the significant developments in the field of intelligence and operations related to the national security and to foreign events for the use of the President.”\(^{d}\)

In practice, this approach proved unworkable. Without any commentary to place a report in context, or to make a judgment on its likely veracity, the early Daily Summaries probably did little but confuse the president. An alarming report one day on Soviet troop movements in Eastern Europe, for example, would be contradicted the next day by a report from another source.

Everyone involved eventually realized the folly of this situation, and analytical commentaries began to appear in the Daily Summaries in December 1946—episodically at first, and then regularly during 1947. The Weekly Summary, first published in June 1946 on the initiative of the Central Reports Staff itself, was also supposed to avoid interpretative commentary, but its format made such a stricture difficult to enforce. From its inception, the Weekly Summary proved to be more analytical than its Daily Summary counterpart.

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\(^{a}\) The National Intelligence Authority was composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and a representative of the President, Flt. Adm. William Leahy.

\(^{b}\) After CIA was established, National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1, “Duties and Responsibilities,” issued on 12 December 1947, again ordered the DCI to produce national intelligence, which the Directive stated should be “officially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial dissent.” National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3, 13 January 1948, gave CIA the authority to produce current intelligence: “The CIA and the several agencies shall produce and disseminate such current intelligence as may be necessary to meet their own internal requirements or external responsibilities.” See Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1,119–22; 1,109–12.

\(^{c}\) Interestingly, Souers, who drafted both NIA Directive 1 and Directive 2, continued to believe that CIG’s principal responsibility was the production of strategic and national policy intelligence. In a memorandum to the NIA on 7 June 1946, Souers wrote that the “primary function of C.I.G. in the production of intelligence … will be the preparation and dissemination of definitive estimates of the capabilities and intentions of foreign countries as they affect the national security of the United States.” “Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence to the National Intelligence Authority,” 7 June 1946, in Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 361.
States, and that it should be of value to the highest policymaking bodies.

The devil was in the details. High-ranking members of the intelligence and policy communities debated, without coming to a consensus, most aspects of the estimate production process, including how who should write them, how other agencies should participate in the process if at all, and how dissent should be handled. Some of this reflected genuine disagreement over the best way to organize and run the Intelligence Community, but it also involved concerns about bureaucratic power and prerogatives, especially those of the director of central intelligence, the newcomer to the Intelligence Community. Even the definition of “strategic and national intelligence” had implications for the authority of the DCI and thus was carefully argued over by others in the community.\textsuperscript{a, b}\n
DCI Vandenberg eventually got the NIA to agree to a definition in February 1947, but it was so general that it did little to solve the problems that abounded at the working level. After the establishment of CIA, National Security Council Directive No. 3, 13 January 1948, similarly defined national intelligence as “integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one Department … and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department.”\textsuperscript{10}

Ray Cline, a participant in the process of producing the early estimates, wrote in his memoir that

\textit{It cannot honestly be said that it [ORE] coordinated either intelligence activities or intelligence judgments; these were guarded closely by Army, Navy, Air Force, State, and the FBI. When attempts were made to prepare agreed national estimates on the basis of intelligence available to all, the coordination process was interminable, dissents were the rule rather than the exception, and every policymaking official took his own agency's intelligence appreciations along to the White House to argue his case. The prewar chaos was largely recreated with only a little more lip service to central coordination.}\textsuperscript{11}

Another veteran of the period, R. Jack Smith, who edited the Daily Summary, made the same point in his memoir,

\textit{We were not fulfilling our primary task of combining Pentagon, State Department, and CIA judgments into national intelligence estimates…. To say it succinctly, CIA lacked clout. The military and diplomatic people ignored our statutory authority in these matters, and the CIA leadership lacked the power to compel compliance.}\textsuperscript{12}

In practice, much of the intelligence produced by ORE was not coordinated with the other agencies; nor was it based on all information available to the US government. The Daily and Weekly Summaries were not coordinated products, and, like the other publications produced by ORE, they did not contain information derived from communications intelligence.\textsuperscript{c} The Review of the World Situation, which was distributed each month at meetings of the National Security Council, became a unilateral publication of ORE after the first two issues.\textsuperscript{14}

The office’s ad hoc publications, such as the Special Evaluations and Intelligence Memorandums, were rarely coordinated with other agencies. By contrast, the “ORE” series of Special Estimates were coordinated, but critics nonetheless condemned many of them for containing trivial subjects that fell outside the realm of “strategic and national policy intelligence.”\textsuperscript{d}

Whatever CIG’s written orders, in practice the president’s interest in the Daily Summaries, coupled with the limited resources of the Central Reports Staff, meant that the production of current intelligence came

\textsuperscript{a} See Bianca Adair, "Sidney Souers and the Emergence of CIA's Covert Action Authority," in \textit{Studies} 65, no. 2 (June 2021).

\textsuperscript{b} The NIA agreed that “strategic and national policy intelligence is that composite intelligence, interdepartmental in character, which is required by the President and other high officers and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security…. It is in that political-economic-military area of concern to more than one agency, must be objective, and must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department.” “Minutes of the 9th Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority,” 12 February 1947, \textit{Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment}, 492.

\textsuperscript{c} ORE began receiving signals intelligence in 1946 and was able to use it as a check against the articles it included in the Summaries. Security concerns prevented its broader use. Signals intelligence was sent to the White House by the Army Security Agency (from 1949 on, the Armed Forces Security Agency) during this period. CIA did not begin including communications intelligence in the successor to the Daily until 1951.
to dominate the staff and its culture. National estimative intelligence was reduced to also-ran status. An internal CIG memo stated frankly that “ORE Special Estimates are produced on specific subjects as the occasion arises and within the limits of ORE capabilities after current intelligence requirements are met.” It went on to note, “Many significant developments worthy of ORE Special Estimates have not been covered … because of priority production of current intelligence, insufficient personnel, or inadequate information.” This remained true even after the Central Reports Staff evolved into the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) in CIA.

If the analysts in CIG, and then CIA, had only to balance the competing demands of current and national intelligence, their performance might have benefited. As it happened, however, NIA Directive No. 5 soon gave the analysts the additional responsibility of performing “such research and analysis activities” as might “be more efficiently or effectively accomplished centrally.” In practice, this meant that the analysts became responsible for performing basic research as well as wide-ranging political and economic analysis. To accommodate this enhanced mission, functional analysis branches for economics, science, transportation, and map intelligence were established alongside the existing regional branches.

A high-ranking ORE officer of the period, Ludwell Montague, wrote that this was a deliberate, but covert, attempt to transform ORE (or CRS, a staff designed expressly for the production of coordinated national intelligence) into an omniscient … central research agency. This attempt failed, leaving ORE neither the one thing nor the other. Since then, much ORE production has proceeded, not from any clear concept of mission, but from the mere existence of a nondescript contrivance for the production of nondescript intelligence. All our efforts to secure a clear definition of our mission have been in vain.

Another veteran of the period, George S. Jackson, agreed with Montague’s assessment: “It would not be correct … to say that the Office … had failed utterly to do what it was designed to do; a more accurate statement would be that it had done not only what was planned for it but much that was not planned and need not have been done. In consequence, the Office had unnecessarily dissipated its energies to the detriment of its main function.” He noted that Requests [for studies] came frequently from many sources, not all of them of equal importance, but there seemed not to be anyone in authority [in ORE] who would probe beneath any of them to make sure that they merited a reply. Nor was there anyone who took it upon himself to decline requests—no matter from what source—when they were clearly for a type of material not called for under the responsibilities of the Office of Reports and Estimates.

**A Mixed Reception**

NIA Directive No. 5 opened the door to proliferation of various kinds of publications and, consequently, to a dilution of analysts’ efforts in the fields of current and national intelligence. Perhaps as a consequence of the confusion over the analytical mission, these products received mixed reviews. The president was happy with his Daily Summary, and that fact alone made it sacrosanct. RAdm. James H. Foskett, the president’s naval aide, told ORE in 1947 that, “the President considers that he personally originated the Daily, that it is prepared in accordance with his own specifications, that it is well done, and that in its present form it satisfies his requirements.”

President Truman’s views on the Weekly Summary were less clear, but ORE construed lack of criticism as approval: “It appears that the Weekly in its present form is acceptable at the White House and is used to an undetermined extent without exciting comment indicative of a desire for any particular change.”

Other policymakers were less impressed with the current intelligence

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a. The Scientific Intelligence Branch of ORE was established in January 1947 and shortly thereafter incorporated the Nuclear Energy Group, which had been in charge of atomic energy intelligence in the Manhattan Project, within its ranks. At the end of 1948, the branch was separated from ORE and elevated to office status, becoming the Office of Scientific Intelligence.

b. In addition to the publications mentioned above, ORE produced Situation Reports (exhaustive studies of individual countries and areas) and a variety of branch-level publications (daily summaries, weekly summaries, monthly summaries, branch “estimates,” and reports of various types).
publications. Secretary of State George Marshall stopped reading the Daily Summary after two weeks, and thereafter he had his aide flag only the most important items for him to read. The aide did this only two or three times a week, telling a CIG interviewer that “most of the information in the Dailies is taken from State Department sources and is furnished the Secretary through State Department channels.” Marshall also stopped reading the Weekly after the first issue. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal considered both Summaries “valuable but not indispensable,” according to one of his advisers. By contrast, an aide to Secretary of War Robert Patterson reported that the secretary read both the Daily and Weekly Summaries “avidly and regularly.”

The analytical office’s work came in for the most severe criticism in the so-called Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report of January 1949, which assessed both the performance of CIA and its role in the Intelligence Community. This report, commissioned by the National Security Council in early 1948, was prepared by a trio of prominent intelligence veterans who had left government service after the war: Allen Dulles, William Jackson, and Mathias Correa.

Their report candidly admitted that “There is confusion as to the proper role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of intelligence reports and estimates” and that “The principle of the authoritative national intelligence estimate does not yet have established acceptance in the government.” They nevertheless took ORE to task for failing to perform better in the production of national intelligence, noting that, although ORE had been given responsibility for production of national estimates, “It has … been concerned with a wide variety of activities and with the production of miscellaneous reports and summaries which by no stretch of the imagination could be considered national estimates.”

The trio found unacceptable ORE’s practice of drafting the estimates “on the basis of its own research and analysis” and then circulating them among the other intelligence agencies to obtain notes of dissent or concurrence. “Under this procedure, none of the agencies regards itself as a full participant contributing to a truly national estimate and accepting a share in the responsibility for it.” They recommended that a “small group of specialists” be used “in lieu of the present Office of Reports and Estimates” to “review the intelligence products of other intelligence agencies and of the Central Intelligence Agency” and to “prepare drafts of national intelligence estimates for consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.”

The three also were not impressed with ORE’s efforts in current intelligence: “Approximately ninety percent of the contents of the Daily Summary is derived from State Department sources…. There are occasional comments by the Central Intelligence Agency on portions of the Summary, but these, for the most part, appear gratuitous and lend little weight to the material itself.” They concluded, “As both Summaries consume an inordinate amount of time and effort and appear to be outside of the domain of the Central Intelligence Agency, we believe that the Daily, and possibly the Weekly Summary should be discontinued in their present form.”

The trio concluded disapprovingly that “the Central Intelligence Agency has tended to become just one more intelligence agency producing intelligence in competition with older established agencies of the government departments.”

The Analysts

The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report was extremely, perhaps unfairly, critical of ORE’s production record. Intelligence analysis is not an easy job in the best of times—the available information on any given analytical problem is invariably incomplete or contradictory or flawed in some other important way—and these clearly were not the best of times. Signals intelligence, which had proved devastatingly effective against the Axis powers in the war, was less effective against the security-conscious Soviets, and, as noted above, in any event could not yet be cited directly in CIA publications, even in those sent to the president.

The sophisticated aircraft and satellites that would one day open

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a. From unsecured Soviet communications, signals intelligence provided reliable information on such things as foreign trade, consumer goods policies, gold production, petroleum shipments, shipbuilding, aircraft production, and civil defense. A weekly all-source publication that did contain COMINT, the Situation Summary, was created in July 1950 and sent to the White House. The Situation Summary’s purpose was to warn, in the wake of the North Korean invasion of South Korea, of other potential acts of aggression by Communist forces.
the whole interior of the USSR to surveillance were not yet on the drawing board, and the intelligence collection arm of the new CIA was finding it impossibly difficult to penetrate Stalin’s paranoid police state with agents. In the end, the analysts had little to rely on but diplomatic and military attaché reporting, media accounts, and their own judgment.

The paucity of hard intelligence about the Soviet Union placed a premium on the recruitment of top-notch analysts. Unfortunately, CIG and CIA had trouble landing the best and the brightest. CIG was in a particularly difficult situation; it had little authority to hire its own staff employees and thus depended on the Departments of State, War, and Navy for both its funding and personnel. Ludwell Montague complained to DCI Vandenberg in September 1946 that these departments were not cooperating: “From the beginning the crucial problem … has been the procurement of key personnel qualified by aptitude and experience to anticipate intelligence needs, to exercise critical judgment regarding the material at hand, and to discern emergent trends. Such persons are rare indeed and hard to come by, [and] the recruitment of them is necessarily slow.” Montague was particularly bitter about Army intelligence’s (G-2) efforts to fob off on CIG what he termed “low-grade personnel.”

When the Central Reports Staff began operations, it consisted of 17 people—five assigned to it by State, eight by War, and four by Navy—all of whom immediately became preoccupied with preparing the Daily Summaries for President Truman, the first of which they published on 15 February 1946. The Staff published its first piece of national intelligence, ORE 1, “Soviet Foreign and Military Policy,” at the end of July. See Document 4.

The establishment of CIA in September 1947 ended the Office’s dependence on other departments for personnel and funds. It permitted the rapid expansion of ORE from 60 employees in June 1946 to 709 staff employees by the end of 1950, 332 of whom were either analysts or managers of analysts. Although this solved the quantity problem, quality remained an issue.

Hanson W. Baldwin of The New York Times in 1948 noted that “personnel weaknesses undoubtedly are the clue to the history of frustration and disappointment, of friction and fiasco, which have been, too largely, the story of our intelligence services since the war. Present personnel, including many of those in the office of research and estimates [sic] of the Central Intelligence Agency, suffer from inexperience and inadequacy of background. Some of them do not possess the ‘global’ objective mind needed to evaluate intelligence, coldly, logically, and definitively.”

A senior ORE officer, R. Jack Smith, shared Baldwin’s view, noting that

> We felt obliged to give the White House the best judgment we could command, and we continued to try as the years passed by. Eventually ...the cumulative experience of this persistent effort, combined with the recruitment of some genuine specialists and scholars, produced a level of expertise that had no counterpart elsewhere in the government. But this was a decade or more away.\(^{42}\)

Ray Cline agreed with Smith’s views. Cline wrote that “the expansion under [DCI Vandenberg] made the Agency a little bigger than before but not much better. It was filled largely with military men who did not want to leave the service at the end of the war but were not in great demand in the military services. The quality was mediocre.”\(^{43}\)

During the critical year of 1948—which saw, among other crises, the Berlin Blockade—38 analysts worked in the Soviet and East European branch: 26 men and 12 women. As a group, their strength was previous exposure to the Soviet Union: nine had lived there, and 12 spoke Russian—both high figures for an era when knowledge about the USSR was limited, even in academia. Their backgrounds, however, were less impressive in other respects. Only one had a Ph.D., while six had no college degree at all. One had a law degree. Of those with college experience, a surprising number majored in fields far removed from their work with CIG/CIA: civil engineering, agriculture, and library science, for example. Far from being stereotypical well heeled graduates of the Ivy League, many had attended colleges that, at least in that period, were undistinguished. Although military experience was widespread, only one had served in the OSS.\(^{44}\)

To be fair, the analysts faced a number of impediments that made it difficult for their work to match expectations. The information at their disposal was, for the most part, shared by others in the policy and intelligence communities.
Moreover, the pace of the working day was hectic, and the analysts were under constant pressure. The pressure came from outside—from government officials who demanded immediate support—and within, from individuals who realized that career advancement rested on quantity of production. Consequently, analysts had precious little time for reflection. In perhaps the best known example, Ludwell Montague in July 1946 was given only three days in which to research, write, and coordinate with other agencies the first estimate produced by CIG, ORE-1, “Soviet Foreign and Military Policy,” (See following page.)

Nowhere was the pressure greater than in the production of the Daily Summaries. Each morning, at nine o’clock, couriers would arrive at CIA headquarters with the previous day’s cable traffic from State and the Pentagon. Between nine and 10, an editor would read the cables, write comments on those he thought worthy of using in the Daily Summary and sort them according to ORE’s branch organization. The analysts had on average of only one hour, between 10 and 11, to draft their articles. Between 11 and noon the articles were edited, and at noon the branch chiefs, editors, and office leadership met to decide which articles should be published. “By one o’clock, the Daily was usually dittoed, assembled, enclosed in blue folders, packaged, receipted for, and on its way by couriers to its approximately 15 official recipients.”

Because there were few contacts between the analysts and editors on the one hand and senior policymakers on the other, choosing which stories to include in the Daily was a shot in the dark. As R. Jack Smith, then editor of the Daily recalled, “The comic back-drop to this daily turmoil was that in actuality nobody knew what President Truman wanted to see or not see… How were we supposed to judge, sitting in a rundown temporary building on the edge of the Potomac, what was fit for the President’s eyes?” After gaining experience on the job, Smith decided that

Intelligence of immediate value to the president falls essentially into two categories: developments impinging directly on the security of the United States; and developments bearing on major U.S. policy concerns. These cover possible military attacks, fluctuations in relationships among potential adversaries, or anything likely to threaten or enhance the success of major U.S. policy programs worldwide.

The combination of uncertainty over what the president needed to see and the analysts’ need to publish as much as possible brought editors, analysts, and branch chiefs into frequent conflict. The analysts and their branch chiefs believed that they, as the substantive experts, should have the final say on the content of the Summaries, while the editors felt that the experts were too parochial in outlook to make such decisions. Neither side held command authority, so the disputes had to be settled through argument and compromise. The most intractable cases would be bucked up to the office leadership to decide. This situation remained a source of tension within the office throughout ORE’s existence.

The Threat of War in Europe …

From the beginning, the current intelligence sent to the White House contained numerous alarming reports about Soviet behavior from nearly all corners of the globe: the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and Korea in particular. A policymaker reading the Summaries, or the original reports on which the Summaries were based, could easily have concluded that Soviet military aggression was an imminent possibility.

The most consistent—and perhaps most important—theme of CIG/CIA analysis during this period, however, was that Soviet moves, no matter how menacing they might appear in isolation, were unlikely to lead to an attack against the West. This judgment looks even bolder in light of President Truman’s evident intention that ORE was to warn the US government of another Pearl Harbor—that is, a sudden surprise attack on American forces or Allies. Denied the ability to make comments in the Summaries for most of 1946, CIG’s first opportunity to put these reports into perspective was ORE-1, published on 23 July 1946. It noted that, although “the Soviet Government anticipates an inevitable conflict with the capitalist world,” Moscow “needs to avoid such a conflict for an indefinite period.”

Similarly, a Special Study published a month later and sent to the president noted that “during the past two weeks there has been a series of developments which suggest that some consideration should be given to the possibility of near-term Soviet
The authors judged, however,

The most plausible conclusion would appear to be that, until there is some specific evidence that the Soviets are making the necessary military preparations and dispositions for offensive operations, the recent disturbing developments can be interpreted as constituting no more than an intensive war of nerves. The purpose may be to test US determination to support its objectives at the [Paris] peace conference and to sustain its commitments in European affairs.

Subsequent crises did not shake this assessment. During the March 1948 “war scare,” touched off when General Lucius Clay, the US military governor in Germany, sent a message to the Pentagon warning of the likelihood of a sudden Soviet attack, CIA analysts bluntly rejected the notion. During the scare, the State Department reported, in separate cables, that senior members of the Czechoslovak and Turkish governments also feared the Soviet Union was prepared to risk an attack. In comments on these reports made in the Daily Summary on 16 March, 1948, analysts said “CIA does not

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a. On 9 February 1946, Stalin had given a harsh speech that convinced many leading Americans, including Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, that war with the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly likely. Other incidents of this period that caused particular concern were Soviet diplomatic pressure on Turkey over joint Soviet-Turkish control of the straits, Yugoslavia’s destruction of two US aircraft, and a vicious Soviet propaganda campaign and internal crackdown (the Zhdanovshchina) against Western influences.

b. Clay’s message, sent on 5 March 1948, stated that “For many months … I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least 10 years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude, which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness.”

4. ORE 1, 23 July 1946, Soviet Foreign and Military Policy

By the time ORE produced its first study in late July 1946 (summary above), the unit had been producing Daily and Weekly Summaries for the White House since February. ORE-1 included a two-page summary and two “enclosures” containing nine pages of analysis of foreign and military policies.

The summary above included one more judgment on its second page:

11. The Soviets will make a maximum effort to develop as quickly as possible such special weapons as guided missiles and the atomic bomb.
believe that the USSR is presently prepared to risk war in the pursuit of its aims in Europe.” On the following day, they added that “CIA does not believe that the USSR plans a military venture in the immediate future in either Europe or the Middle East.”53

During the Berlin blockade, CIA’s position remained the same. “The Soviet action … has two possible objectives: either to force the Western powers to negotiate on Soviet terms regarding Germany or, failing that, to force a Western power withdrawal from Berlin. The USSR does not seem ready to force a definite showdown.”54 The explosion of the Soviet Union’s first atomic bomb, on 29 August 1949, similarly failed to change the analysts’ judgment: “No immediate change in Soviet policy or tactics is expected” was the verdict in the Weekly Summary.55

… and in the Far East
ORE initially (29 October 1948) deemed the possibility of aggression by the Soviet client regime in North Korea as more likely.

An armed invasion of South Korea by the North Korean Peoples’ Army is not likely until US troops have been withdrawn from the area or before the Communists have attempted to “unify” Korea by some sort of coup. Eventual armed conflict between the North and South Korean Governments appears probable, however; in the light of such recent events as Soviet withdrawal from North Korea, intensified improvement of North Korean roads leading south, Peoples’ Army troop movements to areas nearer the 38th parallel and from Manchuria to North Korea, and combined maneuvers.56

ORE earlier (16 July 1948) had predicted that Soviet withdrawal from North Korea would be followed by “renewed pressure for the withdrawal of all occupation forces. The Soviet aim will be to deprive the US of an opportunity to establish a native security force in South Korea adequate to deal with aggression from the North Korean People’s Army.”57

Unfortunately for ORE and the policymakers who read its analysis, this line was revised in a Weekly Summary published on 13 January 1950. “The continuing southward movement of the expanding Korean People’s Army toward the 38th parallel probably constitutes a defensive measure to offset the growing strength of the offensively minded South Korean Army.” ORE further stated that “an invasion of South Korea is unlikely unless North Korean forces can develop a clear-cut superiority over the increasingly efficient South Korean Army.”58

Although this assessment appears naive in retrospect, it actually fit in well with the views held by senior American military officers, who believed the South Korean Army was sufficiently strong and no longer required US military aid. South Korean strongman Syngman Rhee, moreover, had begun making noises to American officials about reunifying Korea under his control; the possibility of South Korean provocation thus was not as remote at the time as it seems now.59 (See next page for an excerpt from a 19 June 1950 estimate of the North Korean regime’s “current capabilities.”)

The day after the North Korean attack on 25 June 1950, the Daily Summary counseled that “successful aggression in Korea will encourage the USSR to launch similar ventures elsewhere in the Far East. In sponsoring the aggression in Korea, the Kremlin probably calculated that no firm or effective countermeasures would be taken by the West. However, the Kremlin is not willing to undertake a global war at this time.”60

After initially suggesting that “firm and effective countermeasures by the West would probably lead the Kremlin to permit a settlement to be negotiated between the North and South Koreans,” the analysts within days concluded that “It is probable … that a concerted attempt will be made to make the US effort in Korea as difficult and costly as possible.”61 A week later, the analysts amplified this theme:

All evidence available leads to the conclusion that the USSR is not ready for war. Nevertheless, the USSR has substantial capabilities, without directly involving Soviet troops, for prolonging the fighting in Korea, as well as for initiating hostilities elsewhere. Thus, although the USSR would prefer to confine the conflict to Korea, a reversal there might impel the USSR to take greater risks of starting a global war either by committing substantial Chinese Communist forces in Korea or by sanctioning aggressive actions by
ORE 18-50 judged, among other things, that North Korean forces “have a capability for attaining limited objectives in short-term military operations against southern Korea, including the capture of Seoul.”

ORE analysts quickly concluded, however, that Chinese intervention was not likely. They reasoned that, although a North Korean defeat would “have obvious disadvantages” for the Soviet Union, “the commitment of Chinese Communist forces would not necessarily prevent such a defeat and a defeat under these circumstances would be far more disastrous, not only because it would be a greater blow to Soviet prestige throughout the world, but because it would seriously threaten Soviet control over the Chinese Communist regime.” Moreover, if the Chinese were to emerge victorious, “the presence of Chinese Communist troops in Korea would complicate if not jeopardize Soviet direction of Korean affairs; Chinese Communist prestige, as opposed to that of the USSR, would be enhanced; and Peiping might be tempted as a result of success in Korea to challenge Soviet leadership in Asia.” Finally, the analysts believed that Chinese intervention was unlikely because “the use of Chinese Communist forces in Korea would increase the risk of global war, not only because of possible UN or US reaction but because the USSR itself would be under greater compulsion to assure a victory in Korea, possibly by committing Soviet troops.”

The Weekly Summary of 15 September 1950 briefly described the evidence that suggested Chinese intervention was likely but still concluded that Beijing would not risk war with the United States:

Numerous reports of Chinese Communist troop movements in Manchuria, coupled with Peiping’s recent charges of US aggression and violations of Chinese territory, have increased speculation concerning both Chinese Communist intervention in Korea and disagreement between the

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a. Three days after the war began, ORE analysts assured President Truman that “No evidence is available indicating Soviet preparations for military operations in the West European theater.” Nevertheless, the analysts cautioned, “Soviet military capabilities in Europe make it possible for the USSR to take aggressive action with a minimum of preparation or advance notice.” Daily Summary, 28 June 1950, Document 175.
USSR and China on matters of military policy. It is being argued that victory in Korea can only be achieved by using Chinese Communist (or Soviet) forces, that the USSR desires to weaken the US by involving it in a protracted struggle with China, and that the Chinese Communists are blaming the USSR for initiating the Korean venture and thus postponing the invasion of Taiwan. Despite the apparent logic of this reasoning, there is no evidence indicating a Chinese-Soviet disagreement, and cogent political and military considerations make it unlikely that Chinese Communist forces will be directly and openly committed in Korea.  

The first Chinese warnings of intervention in the war if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel were published in the Daily Summary on 30 September without comment, perhaps because they were downplayed by the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, to whom others in the Moscow diplomatic corps had passed the warnings. On 3 October, the analysts drew on a similar report from the US Embassy in London to state that “CIA estimates … that the Chinese Communists would not consider it in their interests to intervene openly in Korea if, as now seems likely, they anticipate that war with the UN nations [sic] would result.”

In the same article the analysts warned, as they had before and would again, that “The Chinese Communists have long had the capability for military intervention in Korea on a scale sufficient to materially affect the course of events.” Nevertheless, in eight subsequent Daily Summaries, CIA analysts restated their belief that China would, first, not intervene, and then—as the intervention got under way—that it would not develop into a large-scale attack. The last Summary containing this judgment came on 17 November, three weeks after the first Chinese troops, wearing Korean uniforms, entered combat in far northern Korea.

The Danger of Subversion in Europe

Throughout this period, ORE analysts were far more concerned about Soviet use of local communist parties to subvert pro-Western governments than they were about the possibility of armed aggression by the USSR or one of its communist allies. As ORE expressed it in September 1947, “The USSR is unlikely to resort to open military aggression in present circumstances. Its policy is to avoid war, to build up its war potential, and to extend its influence and control by political, economic, and psychological methods.”

CIG had reached a very similar conclusion about the first serious postwar confrontation with the Soviet Union—its refusal to withdraw its forces from northern Iran and its subsequent support for the breakaway Iranian provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. After the worst of the Iran crisis had passed, the first Weekly Summary warned that the Soviets, having recognized that their policy toward Iran was “heavy-handed and over-hasty” would rely on “gradual penetration.” It declared that “the Soviets clearly feel that ‘time is on their side’ in Iran and that the general economic backwardness of the country and the unpopular labor policy of the British oil companies will forward their cause.” “Their cause” was identified as “gaining control over Iranian oil and blocking closer military ties between Iran and the West.”

ORE tracked the gradual but inexorable consolidation of communist power across Eastern Europe, as brought about through a combination of political manipulation by local communists and pressure from Soviet occupation forces. The political and economic undermining of the prospects for democracy in Eastern Europe reinforced the analysts’ conclusion that this type of subversion was the greatest danger from the Soviet Union. The analysts observed that Moscow’s objective in the region was to “establish permanent safeguards for their strategic, political, and economic interests, including … stable and subservient, or at least friendly, regime[s].”

The analysts were most troubled by the consolidation of Communist power in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, judging that it would diminish the possibility of a compromise in Europe between the ideologies of the Kremlin and the principles of Western democracy and individual freedom. Such a compromise had apparently been achieved in Czechoslovakia…. The coup … reflects the refusal of the Communists to settle for anything less than complete control and their conviction that such dominance could never have been achieved under a freely operating parliamentary form of government.

On Germany, ORE anticipated that Stalin would use subversive tactics to try to create a unified German state from the occupied ruins of the Third Reich: “A German
administration strongly centralized in Berlin will be much more susceptible than a loose federation to Soviet pressures…. Posing thus as the champions of German nationalism and rehabilitation, the Soviets can attempt to discredit the policy of the Western powers and to facilitate the Communist penetration of their zones.\(^75\) The analysts warned that the removal of zonal barriers would place the Soviets in a “position to launch a vigorous campaign to communize the Western zone.”\(^76\)

After the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) conference in Moscow in the spring of 1947 failed to reach agreement on Germany’s future, ORE analysts advised that the Soviets may be trying to (1) “prolong the unsettled conditions in Europe conducive to Communism; and (2) to encourage the US to expend its patience and energy in a vain quest for agreement until forced by its internal economic and political conditions to curtail its foreign commitments and to leave Europe to the USSR by default.”\(^77\)

ORE noted that Soviet efforts to penetrate the western zones of Germany focused on attempts to “extend the SED [Socialist Unity Party, the Communist’s stalking horse in the eastern zone] political structure to the west, while, simultaneously, efforts are made to establish Communist front organizations, such as the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ), and to penetrate Western Zone labor unions.”\(^78\) ORE warned that if “Soviet efforts at the [November 1947] CFM fail to achieve a united Germany on Soviet terms, the USSR will attempt to blame the Western powers for failure of the conference. At the same time, the Kremlin may announce the recognition of a ‘German Republic’ east of the Elbe and attempt to secure the removal of the Western Allies from Berlin.”\(^79\)

Once the first signs of the Berlin blockade emerged in April 1948, ORE analysts advised that Stalin wanted “a negotiated settlement …on terms which would permit ultimate Soviet control of Berlin and Communist penetration of western Germany.”\(^80\) After the blockade was lifted in the spring of 1949, CIA assessed that Soviet objectives in Germany remained unchanged: “Soviet agreement to lift the Berlin blockade and enter into four-power discussions on Germany does not represent any change in the Soviet objective to establish a Germany which will eventually fall under Soviet domination.”\(^81\)

The analysts also highlighted the communist threat in France and Italy. Both countries had emerged from the war with widespread devastation and strong communist parties sharing power in coalition governments. After the French and Italian prime ministers expelled the communist ministers from their governments in the spring of 1947, ORE predicted that

\textit{The Kremlin apparently proposes for countries such as France and Italy: (1) intensive agitation against their present governments and against non-Communist liberals; and (2) the development of highly-disciplined Communist cores which, at the proper moment, could assume control. Such a program is well-adapted to the current situation in France where, [now] relieved of governmental responsibility, the Communists are in a position to threaten (by propaganda, subversion, and trade-union agitation) the stability of the present Government. Where Communism is less powerful, the Kremlin desires to concentrate on gaining control of trade unions and other liberal organizations.}^82

ORE warned in September 1947 that “the sudden overthrow of the De Gasperi government [in Italy] by Communist-sponsored armed force, following [the December 1947] withdrawal of Allied troops,” was “within the realm of possibility” because of the Italian Army’s weakness. But the analysts thought that outcome was unlikely. They wrote that “the USSR is unwilling to support directly such a step because it might involve war with the US” and because the potential failure of the much anticipated European Recovery Program (better known today as the Marshall Plan) could deliver Italy into the hands of the communists in the April 1948 elections. ORE worried more that a communist-inspired general strike could paralyze the important north Italian industrial area; such an event could “defeat the operation of the European recovery program and eventually throw not only Italy into the Soviet orbit, but possibly France as well.”\(^83\)

A \textit{Special Evaluation} published on 13 October 1947 concluded that Moscow’s establishment of the Communist Information Bureau in September 1947

\textit{suggests strongly that the USSR recognizes that it has reached a point of diminishing returns in the attempts of the...}
Communist parties of Western Europe to rise to power through parliamentary means and that, consequently, it intends to revert to subversive activities, such as strikes and sabotage, in an effort to undermine the stability of Western European governments. This move likewise tends to substantiate the contention that the USSR considers international subversive and revolutionary action, rather than military aggression, as the primary instrument for obtaining its worldwide objectives. 84

ORE concluded that, “In its efforts to sabotage the European recovery program, which is the USSR’s immediate and primary target, the Kremlin will be willing even to risk the sacrifice of the French and Italian Communist Parties” by ordering them to use sabotage and violence against the Marshall Plan. “If these Parties are defeated and driven underground, the USSR will have lost no more than it would lose by the success of the European recovery program. CIA believes that the unexpectedly rapid progress of the [proposed] Marshall program has upset the timetable of the Kremlin and forced this desperate action as the last available counter-measures.” 85

The unexpectedly severe defeat of the Italian communists in the April 1948 national election considerably eased the concerns of ORE’s analysts. Noting that the election results had “vastly improved the morale and confidence of the anti-Communists in both Italy and France,” the analysts predicted that “for the immediate future, Communist activities in Western Europe are likely to be directed toward rebuilding the popular front rather than an early or determined bid for power.” 86 Nevertheless, “the Communists are not expected to relax their efforts to prevent recovery in Europe…. Strikes and industrial sabotage … therefore can be expected.”

The civil war in Greece, which had begun in 1946, received relatively little attention in the current intelligence publications until the British Government announced in early 1947 that it would have to withdraw its forces from the country and significantly reduce its assistance to Greece’s non-communist government. The Weekly Summary of 28 February published seven days after the British announcement, summarized the dire situation facing Greece:

Alone, Greece cannot save itself. Militarily, the country needs aid in the form of equipment and training. Politically, Greece’s diehard politicians need to be convinced of the necessity of a housecleaning, and the prostrate Center … requires bolstering. Economically, it needs gifts or loans of commodities, food, foreign exchange, and gold to check inflation. Of these needs, the economic are the most vital…. Without immediate economic aid … there would appear to be imminent danger that the Soviet-dominated Left will seize control of the country, which would result in the loss of Greece as a democracy. 87

ORE analysts believed the chain of command for the communist forces in Greece started in Moscow and ran through Yugoslav leader Josip Broz-Tito to Bulgaria and Albania before reaching the Greek Communists. 88 Nevertheless, they rejected the possibility that armies of those countries would assist the Greek guerrillas, despite numerous rumors to the contrary:

CIG considers direct participation by the Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian armies unlikely. Such action would obviously have far-reaching international repercussions and might even involve the USSR in a world war for which it is unprepared. The likelihood of direct participation by Soviet troops in Greece or Turkey at this time is so remote that it need not seriously be considered. 89

In July 1948, ORE advised the President that Tito’s rift with Stalin, which appeared in March, would considerably lessen the pressure against Greece. 90 It soon followed with a report of slackening Bulgarian support for the guerrillas, although ORE was unable to specify the cause of the change. 91

The Threat From Revolution in the Far East

In their coverage of the Chinese civil war in the late 1940s, ORE analysts noted that “the Soviet Union has scrupulously avoided identifying the Chinese Communist Party with Moscow, and it is highly improbable that the Soviet leaders would at this time jeopardize the Chinese Communist Party by acknowledging its connection with the world Communist movement.” 92 They later affirmed that the USSR had “given renewed indications that it is not ready to abandon its ‘correct’ attitude toward the Nanking government in
favor of open aid to the Communists in China’s civil war." Moreover, "Because of the intensely nationalistic spirit of the Chinese people ... the [Chinese] Communists are most anxious to protect themselves from the charge of Soviet dominance."

Not until the end of 1948 did ORE analysts begin to worry about what a communist victory in China might mean for the global balance of power: "A tremendously increased Soviet war potential in the Far East may result eventually from Communist control of Manchuria and north China." At the same time, the analysts began warning that "Recent statements from authoritative Chinese Communist sources emphasize the strong ideological affinity existing between the USSR and the Chinese Communist party ... and indicate that Soviet leadership, especially in foreign affairs, will probably be faithfully followed by any Communist-dominated government in China."

After the communists’ final victory over Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime in the autumn of 1949, the analysts doubted that Mao’s protracted stay in Moscow, which began in December 1949 and lasted for nine weeks, was a sign of potential trouble in the alliance: "Although the length of Mao’s visit may be the result of difficulties in reaching agreement on a revised Sino-Soviet treaty ... it is unlikely that Mao is proving dangerously intractable. Mao is a genuine and orthodox Stalinist, [and] is in firm control of the Chinese Communist Party." The analysts believed that "The USSR can be expected to gradually strengthen its grip on the Chinese Communist Party apparatus, on the armed forces, on the secret police, and on communications and informational media." ORE initially devoted little attention to the French struggle in Indochina against the Viet Minh independence movement led by Ho...
Chi Minh—indeed, he was portrayed by ORE as either a communist or a Soviet ally. The analysts referred to him as “President Ho.” The first mention of a tie to Moscow, made in May 1948, was a grudging one: “Ho Chi Minh … is supported by 80 percent of the population and … is allegedly loyal to Soviet foreign policy.” As late as September 1949, analysts wrote that “Ho’s relationship with the Kremlin and the Chinese Communists remains obscure….”

Moscow’s recognition of Ho’s government on 31 January 1950 prompted the analysts to change their stance dramatically, however. They saw the likelihood of a series of regional governments falling in turn under Soviet influence:

*If France is driven from Indochina, the resulting emergence of an indigenous Communist-dominated regime in Vietnam, together with pressures exerted by Peiping and Moscow, would probably bring about the orientation of adjacent Thailand and Burma toward the Communist orbit. Under these circumstances, other Asian states—Malaya and Indonesia, particularly—would become highly vulnerable to the extension of Communist influence.*

Meanwhile, by recognizing the Ho regime, the USSR has revealed its determination to force France completely out of Indochina and to install a Communist government. Alone, France is incapable of preventing such a development.

The analysts concluded that, although only the United States could help France avoid defeat, the “Asian nations … would tend to interpret such US action as support of continued Western colonialism.”

**Soviet Aims in Israel**

Like many in the State Department and elsewhere in the US government, ORE, worried by reports that the Soviets were funneling arms and money to Zionist guerrillas, suggested that the creation of Israel could give the USSR a client state in the Middle East.

*Formation of a Jewish state in Palestine will enable the USSR to intensify its efforts to expand Soviet influence in the Near East and to perpetuate a chaotic condition there…. In any event, the flow of men and munitions to Palestine from the Soviet Bloc can be expected to increase substantially. The USSR will undoubtedly take advantage of the removal of immigration restrictions to increase the influx of trained Soviet agents from eastern and central Europe into Palestine where they have already had considerable success.*

Not until November 1948, six months after Israel declared its independence and defeated a coalition of Arab opponents, did ORE suggest that events might turn out otherwise: “There is some evidence that Soviet … enthusiasm for the support of Israel is diminishing.” ORE later suggested that the change in attitude stemmed from a Soviet estimate “that the establishment of Israel as a disruptive force in the Arab world has now been accomplished and that further military aid to a country of basically pro-Western sympathies would ultimately prove prejudicial to Soviet interests in the Near East.”

**Conclusion**

ORE met its end shortly after Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith and William H. Jackson, of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa survey team, arrived in late 1950 as Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Director, respectively. They abolished ORE that November and replaced it with three new units: the Office of National Estimates, the Office of Research and Reports, and the Office of Current Intelligence. These steps finally ended the confusion over the analytical mission, primarily by splitting the competing functions of national, current, and basic intelligence into three offices.

Much maligned by insiders and outsiders alike, ORE’s record is perhaps not as bad as its reputation.
Its analysis holds up well when compared to both the views held by other agencies at the time and our current understanding of events in that period. Of course, ORE, like all intelligence organizations in all eras, had its failures. Dramatic, sweeping events, such as wars and revolutions, are far too complex to predict or analyze perfectly. Even with the benefit of unprecedented access to Russian and Chinese sources, for example, contemporary historians are unable to conclusively pinpoint when and why Mao decided to intervene in Korea.\textsuperscript{111}

Gaps also exist in our knowledge about what intelligence President Truman saw, understood, believed, and used. Judging the impact of intelligence on policy is difficult always, and especially so from a distance of 50 years. On many issues, such as the communist threat to Italy, ORE’s work tended to reinforce what many policymakers in the administration and officials in the field already believed.

It does seem fair to conclude that ORE’s repeated, correct assurances that a Soviet attack in Europe was unlikely must have had a steadying influence when tensions were high and some feared a Soviet onslaught. In this, the analysts of ORE served President Truman well, and their accurate assessment ultimately must be considered ORE’s most important contribution in those early, fearful years of the Cold War.

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The author: At the time Woodrow Kuhns wrote the preface and edited the volume on early CIA Cold War analysis, he was serving as a member of CSI’s History Staff. He would later become its deputy of director, serving in that post until his retirement.
Endnotes

The declassified ORE-produced reports in this article can be found at https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/books-monographs/assessing-the-soviet-threat/ as can a digital version of the entire book Assessing the Soviet Threat, The Early Cold War Years. Also available there are four PDFs containing the documents broken into four chronological sections for easier downloading and a PDF containing only the front matter (the original version of this preface, table of contents, a chronology of key events in the period and complete list of documents). For documents affecting CIA’s evolution immediately after ORE became ORR, see Michael Warner (ed.), Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution: Historical Perspective and 19 Foundational Documents (CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001), available at https://cia.gov/resources/csi/books-monographs/origin-and-evolution/

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5. “Minutes of the First Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority,” Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 328.
6. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, 81, 82.
9. Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 367.
10. Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1,111.
13. Smith, The Unknown CIA, 34, 35.
14. The delays involved in interagency coordination made it difficult to meet the publication deadline while still including the most recent events in its contents. George S. Jackson, Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946–1951, Miscellaneous Studies, HS MS-3, vol. 3 (Central Intelligence Agency, 1954), 279–87. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 263, History Staff Source Collection, NN3-263-95-003.
16. Memo from Chief, Projects Division to Assistant Director, R&E, “Proposed Concept for Future CIG Production of Staff Intelligence,” 1 July 1947. CIA History Staff Job 67-00059A, Box 2, Confidential. Nevertheless, during its existence ORE did produce over 125 estimates, 97 of which were declassified in 1993 and 1994 and deposited in the National Archives. For a complete list of declassified estimates published during the years 1946–84, see https://cia.gov/resources/csi/books-monographs/listing-of-declassified-national-intelligence-estimates-on-the-soviet-union-and-international-communism-1946-1984/.
17. This point is made repeatedly throughout George S. Jackson, Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946–1951. Jackson himself served in the office during the period of this study.
19. Montague to Babbitt, “Comment on the Dulles-Jackson Report,” 11 February 1949. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 263, History Staff Source Collection, HS/HC 450, NN3-263-94-010, Box 14. Montague’s reference to a “deliberate but covert” attempt to increase the responsibility of ORE refers to the efforts of DCI General Hoyt Vandenberg to boost himself, and CIG as a whole, into a dominant position in the Intelligence Community. Opposition from the other departments largely scuttled his attempts in this direction. See Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 366.


21. Ibid., 98.


23. Ibid.


25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 5.


29. Ibid., 65, 69.

30. Ibid., 6.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., 6, 7.

34. Ibid., 84, 85.

35. Ibid., 85, 86.

36. Ibid., 11.


39. Ibid.


42. Smith, The Unknown CIA, 36.

43. Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars, 92.

44. Author’s survey of CIA personnel files. Another veteran of the period, James Hanrahan, recalls that pockets of greater academic expertise existed in other branches of ORE, such as the West European Branch. Interview with James Hanrahan, 16 July 1997. Hanrahan would be interviewed again in 2003, an interview in which he covered management of changes under DCI’s after 1950.


47. Smith, *The Unknown CIA*, 34–51.
48. Ibid., 31–33.
52. Quoted in Frank Kofsky, *Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation* (St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 104.
64. *Weekly Summary*, 15 September 1950, Document 191. For the contemporary research on this issue, see, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford University Press, 1997), 77–82.
67. Ibid.
70. In December 1945, Iranian rebels under the protection of Soviet forces proclaimed an independent Azerbaijan and an independent Kurdish People’s Republic. The Government of Iran protested this Soviet interference in its internal affairs before the UN Security Council in January 1946.
73. *Weekly Summary*, 5 July 1946, Document 2. The quotation refers specifically to Bulgaria, but the same point was repeated about other East European countries as well. *Weekly Summary*, 19 July 1946, Document 3, for example, contains a piece on Hungary that notes the “Soviet desire to establish the control of the minority Communist Party in anticipation of the peace settlement and the ultimate withdrawal of Soviet troops.”
79. Ibid.
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90. Weekly Summary, 9 July 1948, Document 86.
96. Weekly Summary, 3 December 1948, Document 111.
103. Weekly Summary, 9 September 1949, Document 143.
104. Communist China had recognized Ho’s government on 18 January 1950.
106. Ibid.
111. The two sets of sources appear to be at least partially contradictory. See the discussion in Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, 65–69, and in John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know, 77–80.
A Mission for the National Intelligence University

Transformational Learning for Intelligence Professionals

Julie Mendosa, EdD

This article presents the findings and implications of a small qualitative study meant to assist educators and others charged with developing the IC workforce. I wanted to explore how NIU students make meaning when they arrive at NIU and to understand how that evolves during their time as full-time students.

The National Intelligence University (NIU) is a unique Intelligence Community institution that offers masters’ and bachelors’ degrees in intelligence. Students directly apply their educations to their work in protecting the United States and our nation’s interests abroad. Given the nature of their work, intelligence professionals, including NIU students, should be able to think autonomously and adaptively. As they do, they must adhere to rigorous methodical requirements. Intelligence professionals need both concrete and abstract thinking abilities.

At the same time, the IC has an ongoing need to expand the perspectives of intelligence professionals to keep up with changing, interconnected global security conditions while meeting the demands of laws, rules, and procedures. Abstract, adaptive thinking is, however, a different way of understanding than concrete, rule-based thinking. NIU offers educational opportunities intended to expand the ability of intelligence professionals in both of these abstract and concrete forms.

This article presents the findings and implications of a small qualitative study meant to assist educators and others charged with developing the IC workforce. I wanted to explore how NIU students make meaning when they arrive at NIU and to understand how that evolves during their time as full-time students. I expected students to show strength in mastering information and requirements from external sources of authority (i.e., the standardized approaches to intelligence work), which is a goal of NIU programs.

As an educator, I also expected to see students show growth in their ability to make meaning autonomously, or what some educators refer to as self-authoring thinking. In other words, are the students thinking on their own? Although the sample size is small, the findings indicate more concrete, rule-based thinking than independent, abstract thinking among the intelligence professionals in the study. Additional research and larger sample sizes would help validate the findings and potentially yield improvements in performance.

Transformative Growth for Intelligence Professionals

Before diving into the results of my study, a short orientation on how adults learn and the jargon of learning might be helpful. I approached the topic from the perspective of adult learning theories, specifically a family of theory called transformational learning theory. Transformational learning theories pertain to how adults understand the world around them, how they learn, and how they grow. Transformational learning begins with the belief that adults interpret the world around them...
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through mental frameworks composed of their experiences, beliefs, and assumptions. Intelligence practitioners might recognize echoes of Richards Heuer’s seminal book, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, in which he observed,

Training of intelligence analysts generally means instruction in organizational procedures, methodological techniques, or substantive topics. More training time should be devoted to the mental act of thinking or analyzing. It is simply assumed, incorrectly, that analysts know how to analyze.

In practical terms, individuals experience transformational learning when their mental frameworks expand. They incorporate divergent ideas or perspectives into an enlarged mental framework, becoming able to see or understand a situation in new ways. They gain additional paradigms or mental models from which to consider a situation, and an expanded ability to recognize that the “truth” can be different depending on the way one looks at it. These expansions represent developmental growth.

IC Context

In the IC, we use terms like critical thinking, advanced tradecraft, and sophisticated analysis to describe what learning specialists would characterize as moving from primarily concrete, rule-based ways of understanding toward more conceptual, abstract, adaptive, and autonomous ways of understanding. This understanding gained from interpreting the world through one’s mental frameworks is called “meaning-making” in transformational learning theory. Developmental growth may take an individual from making meaning outside the self, through the rules or beliefs of others, and toward meaning making inside the self, adaptively and autonomously. IC terms like critical thinking, advanced tradecraft, or sophisticated analysis reflect this kind of autonomous thinking.

National security issues are shaped by multiple interdependent factors, requiring intelligence professionals to be able to reassess their assumptions and shift perspectives. Adaptive thinking abilities can be enhanced through transformational learning.

Intelligence literature points out many requirements of intelligence work that call for the expanding frameworks and mental adaptations brought on by transformations. Objectivity and critical thinking are important for intelligence analysis, as is an ability to question one’s assumptions. Most importantly, intelligence professionals face more complexity in security issues than they did in the past; their ways of knowing and understanding also need to change.

Research Methods

In my study, I sought to compare students’ ways of making meaning when they arrived at NIU and at a later point in the academic year. A questionnaire collected short answers to questions related to the students and their workplaces that were designed to draw out indications of how students made meaning:

Q1. In your view and experience, what is intelligence analysis?
Q2. What is the purpose of leadership in your organization, and what do leaders do?
Q3. How does your work contribute to the intelligence community/national security/US interests?
Q4. What are the ways you learn things that help you in your work?
Q5. What do you hope to gain from your time at NIU?

Approximately 45 students received questionnaires in the first two weeks of classes in the fall (Time 1). The students were adults approximately 25–55 years of age who worked in the IC or in intelligence-related roles in the US military. The responses were submitted anonymously and did not include demographic information in order to protect identity and privacy.

Twenty-one students returned completed questionnaires (Time 1). Four students returned follow-up questionnaires in the spring (Time 2), after approximately eight months of in-person, practice-oriented education. The Time 2 questionnaires asked the same first four questions, as well as asking if students saw anything in new ways, and what the NIU experience had meant in their lives. The findings provide detailed analysis of
For adults, there are three primary ways of knowing (making meaning)—instrumental, socialized, and self-authoring. These categories guided the data analysis.

Textual Analysis
The content of the short answers was first reviewed for wording and content; phrases received labels indicating what they mentioned. Many labels repeated across the various participants’ answers. For example, many answers referred to the mission of their organization or of national security. These were labeled “Mission.” Others referred to processes intelligence work follows; these were labeled “Attention to process.”

The next step in analysis was to determine more about what the respondents meant with the phrases they used. Did they mention an active role they had in meeting the mission, or was the mission a force that existed outside themselves? Did they indicate individuals’ or groups’ thinking or meaning-making was part of intelligence analysis, leadership, their work, or their own learning? Or did they primarily describe these activities as responsive to decisions and thoughts of other people, outside of the individuals performing them?

These codes and their meaning provided a basis for understanding whether respondents understood their work world through an outside authority source (informational meaning-making), through others (socialized), or within themselves (self-authoring).

Ways of Knowing
For adults, there are three primary ways of knowing (making meaning)—instrumental, socialized, and self-authoring. These categories guided the data analysis. I looked for indications of these ways of making-meaning within the responses.

Instrumental: Understanding Comes From Outside the Self
Thinking is concrete, follows rules or steps; prefers existing processes over new ones; a choice is either right or wrong; decisions are based on knowledge, and knowledge comes from appropriate authorities; expertise is based on knowing information; sees situations as competitive, as good or bad for one’s interests and goals; accepts one perspective at a time, rather than recognizing multiple possible views at the same time; decisions may seem unsympathetic, not attuned to others.

Socialized: Meaning Is Made Through Other People
Decisions are based on the prevailing norms, such as “This is how we do things here”; beliefs are based on others’ expectations; needs to see the self as part of the group; disagreement between people is difficult, seen as a threat; can sympathize with others’ perspectives; can be reflective.

Self-Authoring: Internalized values and beliefs guide the thinking
Recognizes knowledge as situational, contextual; sees a situation as having various potentialities; accepts differing views as normal; may be able to assess own assumptions; can reflect on oneself within a situation; can integrate ideas and paradigms.

My analysis of the responses showed a predominant pattern toward respondents seeing their work as a piece or step within larger systems and processes. That larger system or process is expressed impersonally: something that gets done but we do not see who does it. Additionally, the responses were more attentive to handling information than to thinking about it. This indicates the respondent’s understanding during Time 1 best fit the Instrumental way of knowing, with meaning coming from outside the self.

Assessing the Data
I broke the data into three categories. First is a brief summary of the codes and locus of meaning-making across all Time 1 questionnaires. Second is a breakdown by each question (at Time 1). The third area of discussion addresses trends across individual respondents. This includes assessment of the four who filled out Time 2 questionnaires, and changes to their meaning-making.

The 21 students sampled at Time 1 reflected a tendency toward instrumental ways of knowing and external meaning-making when they arrived at NIU. In other words, their answers focused on the system they were a part of and its functions, missions, and requirements. The most frequent label (or code) applied to portions of text was “Attention to Process,” with “Mission” in second place. Two other frequent codes were similar in placing the respondent inside a larger effort, “Contribute to Enterprise” and “Self as part of large system.” Codes indicating autonomous thinking were infrequent (such as referring to insight, ambiguity, synthesis or
The process of analysis actually involves both breaking the issue apart (analysis) and bringing factors together (synthesis), and requires intellectual activity.

integration of ideas, interpretation, or empowerment).

Breakdown by Question

Responses at Time 1 demonstrated a firm foundation in following an external authority, seeing the self as part of a large enterprise, and working toward a mission or goals (instrumental ways of knowing). However, participants’ sense for learning and what they wanted from NIU reflected more socialized meaning-making. Students learned and understood through classmates, peers, faculty, or other social interactions—as well as from experiential, hands-on learning.

Intelligence Analysis

Q1 responses described analysis as physical steps or processes involved in handling data or information, rather than as thinking performed by people. Responses barely touched on the role of people, interpretation, understanding, or integrating feedback.

Leadership

Q2 responses focused on the actions leaders take within the organization’s structure, guiding and directing subordinates toward the mission. None of the answers indicated leaders had autonomy, and few responses associated leadership with enabling subordinates’ autonomy.

Work

Q3 responses tended to focus on concrete aspects of the work, such as outcomes, processes, responsibilities or information processing. Two thirds of participants described their indirect impact within the system, and one third indicated they had a direct impact or some autonomous thinking.

Learning and NIU

Q4 and Q5 indicated concrete ways of knowing, but also something additional: interest in learning through experiences, through other people (discussion, networking and collaboration), as well as value for individual learning through reading or writing. Generally participants indicated a tendency toward socialized knowing when it came to their own learning.

Breakdown by Individuals

The answers of 14 respondents indicated primarily instrumental knowing, but six of them also had a tendency toward making meaning through others (socialized knowing). Four respondents indicated primarily socialized knowing. Three respondents demonstrated noticeable attention to independent or autonomous thinking, though only one of the three appeared to favor that as a primary way of knowing.

Demonstrating Growth

Four respondents filled out the questionnaires at Time 2; all demonstrated expanded perspectives and developmental growth. Responses to Q1 and Q2 reflected that all respondents began Time 1 with concrete, rule or step-based, external authority (instrumental) meaning-making regarding intelligence analysis and leadership. All had moved more toward socialized meaning-making at Time 2, with increased involvement of people in the processes, more attention to context, and some recognition of leaders and others having autonomous thoughts.

The responses for Q3, regarding work roles, also reflected primarily instrumental ways of knowing at Time 1, with most attention toward inanimate aspects of work or requirements. All four respondents at Time 2 reflected some growth toward abstract thinking. Three demonstrated increased socially situated meaning-making, and one indicated increased sensitivity to context.

Responses to Q4 (learning) at Time 1 were primarily instrumental for three respondents, and the fourth indicated socialized meaning-making. Three indicated greater appreciation at Time 2 for elements of socialized meaning-making (appreciation for context, learning with or through others, or experiential learning.)

Q5 at Time 1 asked respondents what they hoped to gain while at NIU. One Time 1 response was primarily instrumental, one was between instrumental and socialized, and two indicated socialized meaning-making. Two Time 2 questions followed up in this area: “Do you see anything in new ways after your time at NIU?” and “What has your NIU experience meant in your life?”

The Time 2 responses indicated all respondents increased their appreciation for others’ perspectives. The respondent who had an instrumental answer at Time 1 seemed to have gained unexpectedly from networking and learning from others’ perspectives. One, who had a socialized response at Time 1, noted at Time 2 an increase in being reflective and collaborative, and increased autonomy of meaning-making.
Initial Focus on Process

The Time 1 answers to Q1–Q3 predominantly focused on systems, processes, and mission. They only minimally reflected the presence of people and individual meaning-making, although the answers were describing work done by individuals, requiring thinking. This is true for the respondents’ work as well as the leaders they described.

Respondents demonstrated an interest in socialized meaning-making in their own learning and educational desires. This suggests respondents may have a general preference or tendency toward socialized meaning-making, but it is not apparent in most answers about intelligence analysis, leadership, or their own work. Indications of self-authoring meaning-making were rare across all questions. Four respondents at Time 2 did indicate developmental growth toward appreciating and incorporating more perspectives and contextual considerations in their thinking.

The questionnaires allowed for a spectrum of answers ranging from concrete to abstract or philosophical. The questionnaires also invited respondents’ own views and their first-person experiences. Despite these opportunities, respondents tended to address inanimate processes and positions within a system, mission, or enterprise. These intelligence professionals subordinated people to the core processes and requirements of the organization. This is important for ensuring compliance, but counter-productive for taking on complex, changeable security challenges.

Respondents’ Time 1 answers regarding intelligence analysis, leadership, and their own work (Q1–Q3) reflect concrete, system-focused (instrumental) meaning-making. In other words, the vast IC enterprise was making meaning for them. The Time 1 responses about respondents’ own learning and educational goals (Q4 and Q5) indicated a tendency toward discursive and experiential meaning-making. Discussions, and relationships with peers from different agencies, were significant for many students’ development as professionals. This difference may indicate respondents personally tend toward socialized meaning-making, but their understanding of work roles draws more from instrumental meaning-making patterns.

With Experience, More Focus on People

The Time 2 answers included more mentions of people, of leaders’ roles in developing the workforce, and recognition of the value of learning others’ views. Although small in number, the Time 2 responses gave a larger role to individual thinking and meaning-making than the Time 1 responses. An NIU education invites students to consider various possible interpretations and perspectives. The modest shift from Time 1 to Time 2 supports the expectation of this study that students grow at NIU. The surprise for this researcher was in how instrumental the responses were when students arrived, and the overall absence of responses reflecting autonomous thinking.

More than half of respondents expressed they learn through workplace experiences, with a slight favor for informal or everyday situations compared to intentional instructional settings.

Conclusion

This study highlights a fundamental paradox in national intelligence. Intelligence professionals are expected to produce amazing feats of accurate, well-informed assessment. Yet my research suggests respondents did not feel invited to truly think on their own at the beginning of the academic year. They presented limited indications of autonomous or internalized meaning-making.

The self-authoring ways of making meaning are needed for adaptive thinking and addressing complex challenges. These patterns could potentially have relevance to intelligence professionals beyond the individuals sampled here. If they do, they present a challenge at the enterprise and organizational levels, and should be cause for concern.

Two organizational-level recommendations offer a starting point for change: one relates to workforce development, the other to leadership.

Developmental Culture

Intelligence organizations should cultivate a developmental culture, providing ongoing opportunities for meaningful discourse (discussion, collaboration, teamwork) across all levels. Workplaces must intentionally cultivate environments and cultures inviting to discourse and sharing of ideas.

Some commercial and nonprofit organizations have adopted an orientation called Deliberately Developmental Organizations.
They feature regular, even scheduled, opportunities for discourse among employees, as a core part of their work-life and professional development. Intelligence organizations need to increase their attention to development to keep pace with the security challenges they address.

**Leadership**

Leadership beliefs and practices are inherently connected to workforce development. The findings suggest that top-down leadership is alive and well in US intelligence organizations. The data from this study heavily feature what I refer to as “one-way arrows”: communication from a designated role-holder toward those the role-holder has identified as needing the message.

The *Time 1* responses about leadership represent leaders as almost mechanistic conveyors of mission requirements to the workforce. The locus of decisionmaking rests primarily with the enterprise itself; respondents refer to very little autonomous thought by supervisors or the workforce. One-directional flows prevent organizations from learning, either institutionally or from their members’ experiences. Traditional organizational models do not allow for adaptation. Knowledge work calls for bottom-up flows of awareness and sharing.22

Intelligence organizations must train, educate, and structure themselves to move beyond the traditional mechanistic views of leaders as people who occupy high-level positions and implement the will of the organization. Leadership is a way of being and thinking, not a position one holds. All organizational members, at every level, must feel they have a voice. And all should be made to feel they have a responsibility for thinking critically. National intelligence requires each person to contribute their knowledge, skills, and ability to the larger effort and for organizations to leverage them effectively.

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4. Richards Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), 5.

5. E. Drago-Severson, Becoming Adult Learners: Principles and Practices for Effective Development (Teachers College Press, 2004); Mezirow, “Learning to Think Like an Adult.”


12. The original 45 students who received questionnaires were approximately two-thirds male, one-third female, and 90-percent White.

13. New full-time students filled out the Time I questionnaires as their one year of full-time study began (late August/early September), some in 2018 and others in 2019.


15. Drago-Severson, Becoming Adult Learners; Drago-Severson and Blum-DeStefano, Tell Me So I Can Hear You.

16. Ibid.


18. Drago-Severson, Becoming Adult Learners.


**Intelligence in Public Media**

**Collective Discussion: Toward Critical Approaches to Intelligence as a Social Phenomenon**


**Reviewed by Joseph Gartin**

For the intelligence practitioner, Ben Haffel, et al., on balance have presented a constructive examination of the state of intelligence studies and the need for alternative ways of understanding the intelligence ecosystem. Fair warning, however: finding the gems in their arguments will require the reader to sift patiently through the academic tailings, among them the introduction in praise of Edward Snowden and the often dense prose.

Sometimes, these combine with wearying effect, as in Alvina Hoffman’s discussion of the “social space” of intelligence: “We began this article with Snowden, whose spectacular act of resistance profoundly challenged the unhindered and evermore expansive transnational practices of intelligence agencies. This opened up possibilities for other forms of contestation.” For this reviewer, that contestation ought to have begun with interrogating Hoffman’s unexamined judgment that Snowden’s was an act of resistance, rather than an act of supreme narcissism and an alleged crime for which he ought to face a jury of his peers.

Setting that aside, albeit it with some difficulty, there are themes that bear further exploration by future contributors to *Studies in Intelligence*, beginning with the inherent but often unexamined biases of an intelligence literature that “has been shaped by its founding relationship with Anglo-American state intelligence practice.” (324) As the authors note, this very much begins with the creation of this journal in 1955 by Sherman Kent and has extended over the years with the publication of official histories by many Five-Eyes agencies and the periodic releases of considerable historical material through routine declassification and processes like the Freedom of Information Act and its foreign equivalents. Imperfect as it might be, this corpus of intelligence theory and practice assuredly dwarfs comparable libraries available to researchers seeking to understand the conduct of intelligence in, say, China, Russia, Cuba, North Korea, and the like. Even among more open societies, there is a considerable gap compared to English-language publications that is closing only gradually. There are availability biases in the intelligence literature, but not by design.

The authors reprise a dichotomy observed by Marrin (2016), et al., between the *study of* and *study for* intelligence,² noting the predominance of intelligence veterans who tend to practice the latter (and it should be said tend to write for *Studies*). This, they argue, points to the need to think of intelligence as a social phenomenon involving state and non-state actors, including individuals, but also involving the “mundane practices of policing, surveillance, and vigilance.” (326)

Where and when one draws the line between intelligence and information is a vexing problem, made more difficult still by the emergence of the “data citizen,” who produces data for the “purposes of public knowledge, rather than just being a passive object on whom data is collected.” (338) They close with a call for research “to study the dynamics of expansion, retreat, and contestation that constantly redefine the boundaries of a social space of intelligence.” (340) I think Sherman Kent would argue such dynamics ought to animate the discussion on these pages as well as in academia.

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The reviewer: Joseph Gartin is the managing editor of *Studies*.

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Intelligence in Public Media

Russia Without Putin: Money, Power and the Myths of the New Cold War
Tony Wood (Verso Books, 2018), 210 pages, endnotes, bibliography, index.
Reviewed by Allen N.

In mid-April 2022, two months after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Moscow-based Levada Center released results of public opinion surveys regarding Russian parties and politicians, the conflict in Ukraine, and international sanctions. In this series of surveys, President Vladimir Putin had an 82-percent approval rating, an increase of 11 points from the same survey in February 2022; 81 percent of respondents supported the recent actions of Russian armed forces in Ukraine; and attitudes toward the West continued to deteriorate.

These numbers bring into sharp focus the relationship between Russians and elite politics. Historically, the Russian public meshed politics with cynicism, simultaneous with unified support for political elites. Indeed, the dominant feelings among Russians caused by Putin’s military actions in Ukraine are “pride for Russia” (51 percent), “anxiety, fear, horror” (31 percent), and “shock” (12 percent), according to the Levada Center. Because there is potential for collective opinion to sustain Moscow’s continued commitment to military actions in Ukraine, the Levada surveys leave defense analysts, like this reviewer, with the impression that the belief and values of the Russian people continue to shape Russian leaders and politics—something approaching a less Putin-centric nation.

In 2018, Princeton lecturer Tony Wood anticipated these issues in his prescient Russia Without Putin, which deserves a relook by today’s intelligence practitioner. Wood shines a spotlight on the Russian popular mindset without fixating on Putin, instead emphasizing a country engaged in the implications of great power competition.

Russia Without Putin is purposeful with its research questions: How is Russia ruled, and for whose benefit? What are the consequences for Russian society? And, how can we best explain Russia’s mounting clashes with the West? The challenge here is, according to Wood, “to discard several core assumptions behind most discussions of Putin’s Russia.” (4)

Wood adds four structural insights to the conversation about the relationship between the Russian popular mindset and the Moscow’s political commitment to invading Ukraine. First, deeper and detailed conversations are needed about the conditions that allowed Russia to thrive and whether they will continue beyond Putin. (30) Second, Wood explicates a largely underestimated factor that social structures held over from the Soviet era shield the Putin regime and its allies. (85) In chapters two and three, for example, Wood demonstrates that since 2000, Russia operates on two drivers, one rooted in neoliberal principles and the other in a strategic statism, which creates an unequal society. To Wood, there is a particular form of capitalism in Russia that blurs the boundary between the state and the private sector. (23) Wood goes on to show how that system and political elites will not be affected by sanctions, nor will it be altered in the unlikely event of Putin’s removal from power before his term is up. (55)

For Wood, the new Russian middle class, transformed by the political elites who coopted the Soviet skilled labor and intelligentsia classes, is kept alive by the Soviet past at the expense of democracy. (57) Putin inherited an authoritarian system, and he used Russian institutions in it as tools to shift between promoting pro-West policies in the early 2000s and reacting offensively against Western intervention in the 2010s. (5) In chapters three and four, Wood suggests the Russian political system is designed to exclude the opposition and foster disunity among anti-Putin movements, which better renders and exacerbates far-right nationalism. (91–110) The front man to anti-Putinism, Aleksei Navalnyi, likewise has often endorsed chauvinistic and nationalistic slogans, which materialized in organizing support for Russia’s intervention in Chechnya and the 2008 war with Georgia. (104–5)

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The third structural insight is further evidence that the Soviet past drives Russia’s international stature and that it is therefore necessary to focus on the superpower worldview lingering within the collective Russian mindset. (115–21) In chapter five, for example, Wood traces Russian nationalism back to a “pervasive and deepening anxiety about Russian weakness” to accomplish a Eurasian destiny. For Wood, an emerging Novorossia—New Russia—compelled the Putin administration to reassert Russia’s global relevance and reset a strategic imbalance with the United States on the world stage. (126–33) Deploying Novorossia thinking primes Russia for an inevitable confrontation with the West, and its dominance over its periphery continues as a historical and geopolitical necessity for the Russian public. (153)

Wood’s fourth insight is that Russia’s geopolitical influence is essential to how Russians see their future and the obstacles and opportunities en route. (148) In chapter six, Wood suggests that Russia’s attempts to establish a liberal order over the former Soviet bloc, simply because of its physical location (155) and its resource-dependent economy (159–65), will incite more unpredictable operations. According to Wood, Moscow’s support to Syria, annexation of Crimea in 2014, and support for secessionist rebels in Donbass are symptoms of Russia’s short-term tactical maneuvers to halt the West’s expansion. (156, 169) Unfortunately, Moscow’s expeditionary adventures have opened a Pandora’s box of separatisms that Russia had apparently fought so hard to keep shut since the 1990s. (169)

Russia Without Putin is an essential contribution to the conversation about Russian national consciousness and foreign policy. Wood reminds Western analysts that Russian popular sentiment is a post-Soviet space saturated with previously established ideas and institutions rather than an innovative national identity. (176) In turn, his work highlights the importance for Western policymakers in carefully considering both the audience and the message if we are to have any hope of shaping Russian strategic behavior in ways conducive to US interests.

The reviewer: Allen N. is a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst at US Central Command.
Intelligence in Public Media

The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War
Craig Whitlock (Simon & Schuster, 2021), 346 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Reviewed by Graham Alexander

With The Afghanistan Papers, Washington Post investigative reporter Craig Whitlock has tendered a summary of US involvement in Afghanistan beginning with the 2001 invasion and ending in summer 2021, just after the Biden administration announced plans for a complete withdrawal. The Afghanistan Papers lacks a fitting climax because it concludes immediately before Taliban forces seized control of the country in September 2021, as two decades of blood and treasure disintegrated almost overnight. Whitlock’s survey, however, suggests the collapse was inevitable simply by asking the people who knew the ground truth. He draws persuasively from interviews of more than 1,000 people directly involved in the war culled from lessons-learned interviews, Defense Department memos, State Department cables and other government reports previously hidden from public view.

The Afghanistan Papers makes for sober, sometimes emotional reading that demonstrates how historical amnesia, hubris, cultural ignorance, and unfounded optimism confounded successive generations of politicians, policymakers, and military minds. Whitlock’s crisp survey is a worthy examination of a complex, sometimes successful, and ultimately tragic episode in US history with more than coincidental echoes of The Pentagon Papers and Vietnam.

Whitlock often sketches with broad brush strokes when covering key moments during the Afghanistan war. The Afghanistan Papers includes summaries of the initial invasion, the hunt for Osama bin Ladin at Tora Bora, the Bonn Conference, Hamid Karzai’s fraudulent 2009 election, the Abbottabad raid in 2011, the aborted US withdrawal in 2014, and the endless negotiations with an increasingly confident Taliban. He argues persuasively, albeit with the benefit of hindsight, that the United States and its allies had numerous opportunities to leave Afghanistan with their prestige intact and al-Qa’ida all but eliminated as a viable force inside its borders. Slowly and almost imperceptibly, however, the mission transformed from one of righteous vengeance into a nation-building project that consumed first tens and then hundreds of billions of dollars. A small military footprint eventually swelled to over 100,000 by 2010 with rising casualties to match. Successive civilian and military policymakers insisted that Afghanistan had turned the corner, but Whitlock provides compelling evidence, sourced directly to interviews, that they were cherry-picking and even outright distorting the data. Opium production, kleptocratic-level corruption, and civilian deaths continued. Rigorous reviews of Afghanistan policy under successive administrations and generals were nearly as frequent as assurances of improvement. But again, Whitlock marshals testimony from those who were there that they lacked a clear definition of the enemy, the mission, and the criteria for departure.

Perhaps paradoxically, Whitlock often makes his most vivid impressions with small stories illustrating how the Afghanistan experience was born under a bad sign, despite US goodwill and the sincere commitment of many who served there. For example, he recounts how psychological operations forces distributed soccer balls to Afghan children with the flags of several countries as a gesture of goodwill. To their chagrin, the balls triggered protests because the Saudi flag on them depicted the Koranic declaration of faith in Arabic. The reader winces while learning that, while US combat deaths rose, German rules of engagement prohibited night time patrols or combat missions. The German contingent elected instead to perform a short-lived police training mission while ensconcing their small contingent on a base with copious supplies of beer and wine. Efforts at nation-building often seemed to achieve little. Afghan police were unable to understand the door-opening mechanism on an expensively designed and constructed facility featuring a

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glass atrium. USAID workers sparked backlash through a public health project aimed at teaching people to wash their hands, since hand washing was routinely performed five times a day before prayer. On another occasion, aid workers realized to their chagrin that they had paid one Afghan to repair a sabotaged bridge that his Taliban-affiliated brother had recently destroyed with just this goal in mind.

These vignettes provide Whitlock’s account with a potent, often unexpected, punch. Not for the first time in US history, they beg a painful but essential question: How, despite their first-world technology and cutting-edge militaries, could the United States and its allies have hoped to win a conflict whose parameters they could not define and to build a nation whose culture and people they did not fundamentally understand?

The reviewer: Graham Alexander is the pen name of a CIA officer in CSI’s Lessons Learned Program.

Additional Readings in Studies in Intelligence
J. Daniel Moore, review of First In, by Gary C. Schroen, Studies 49, no. 4 (December 2005).

J.R. Seeger, review of The Horse Soldiers, by Doug Stanton, Studies 53, no. 3 (September 2009).

Stephen J. Garber, review of Triple Agent, by Joby Warrick, Studies 55, no. 3 (September 2011).


J.R. Seeger, review of The Last Warlord, by Brian Gwynn Williams, Studies 58, no. 2 (June 2014).


J.R. Seeger, review of Foxtrot in Kandahar, by Duane Evans, Studies 61, no. 4, (December 2017).


Mike R., review of First Casualty, by Tony Harnden, Studies 66, no. 1 (March 2022).
Intelligence in Public Media


Swords of Lightning, Mark Nutsch, Bob Pennington, and Jim DeFelice (Permuted Press, LLC, 2021), 334 pages, photos.

Reviewed by J.R. Seeger

Revolutions and civil wars often produce charismatic figures whose power and influence stretch far beyond their country and, for that matter, their lifespan. Ahmad Shah Massoud was one such figure. He burst onto the scene in the early 1980s as a tactical wizard using a small number of fighters from the Panjshir Valley in Afghanistan to fight the Soviet army to a standstill. This was the legend of the “Lion of the Panjshir,” or as Sandy Gall puts it in his recent biography, the Afghan Napoleon.

Only part of Massoud’s success was due to terrain. The Panjshir River cuts through a narrow valley in the Hindu Kush and empties into the Kabul River near the town of Sorubi. Soviet invading forces in 1980 found the single track through the valley narrow and filled with perfect ambush locations. The narrow valley also meant that Soviet helicopters and close-air-support aircraft faced a daunting navigational challenge. Any Soviet motorized rifle commander could expect to take heavy casualties in the Panjshir no matter who commanded the Panjshir Tajiks.

But it wasn’t just anyone who commanded the Panjshirs. It was a young, college-educated man who was a student of 20th century military and political history. Massoud was also a multi-lingual, charismatic leader who created a disciplined militia of Tajiks who would take the fight to the Soviets using classic guerrilla tactics. Soon, the Soviets realized that the Panjshir was a killing zone and that Massoud was the master of the Panjshir. It would be so until the Soviets departed across the Termez bridge in 1989. And, with each year of Soviet occupation and Panjshiri resistance, the influence of Massoud among Tajiks throughout Afghanistan grew.

Massoud was the son of an Afghan army colonel and received a Western education at the lycée in Kabul, then attended Kabul Polytechnic in the mid 1970s. Although his primary school education was in a French-sponsored school, Kabul Polytechnic was a Soviet-sponsored engineering and architecture school with a heavy dose of communist ideology as part of the program. Massoud entered university just as Afghanistan was transitioning from a relatively stable parliamentary monarchy to a period of instability with warring factions of communists, the Parcham (Flag) party and the Khalq (People’s) faction. Few students in Kabul universities at the time focused on their formal studies. Instead, they concentrated their attention on political issues siding with one of the two communist factions, or factional groups associated with different aspects of political Islam and a conservative movement of pro-monarchists. These individuals who would change the course of Afghan history for the next 40 years would be involved in the Kabul’s whirlpool of political conflict. Massoud was one of many.

What made Massoud different was his understanding of the strategic, geopolitical nature of the conflict. While many in the same year group such as Gulbuddin Hikmatyar focused exclusively on building personal power and influence, Massoud focused on creating political power taking the long view well past the time of Soviet occupation. He expanded his influence first through the political faction known as Jamiat Islami, which was primarily managed by ethnic Tajiks. Eventually, Massoud’s personal influence would expand well beyond the boundaries of ethnicity in Afghanistan.

In fact, until the day he died, Massoud was probably the most “Afghan” of the political leaders of his generation. Other political leaders established their political power through ethnicity and locale. They were first and foremost Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, or Turkmen. Massoud focused on issues that would be very familiar to any Western leader: security for the entire Afghan population, education for the entire Afghan population, and building an economy for the entire Afghan population. He was a voracious reader, even during the worst years of the Afghan war. He believed in training his fighters and even focused on making sure his soldiers were well fed. He

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was a father and a devout Muslim. To a Westerner, it was hard not to be captured by this man who offered a romantic image of the ideal resistance leader.

Gall’s *Afghan Napoleon* reflects the charismatic power of Massoud. Gall first met him after a long trek from the Pakistan border into the Panjshir in the summer of 1982. Massoud charmed Gall with his understanding of the West and his skills as a resistance leader. Gall met him several times during the Soviet occupation, each time traveling into Afghanistan at great risk to his own life. Gall remains the consummate war correspondent who understands the complexities of war and does his best to translate those complexities into stories that any reader can understand. However, the real power of this book is the fact that Gall was given access to Massoud’s personal diaries. This means that the reader is given insight into the mind of one of the greatest resistance leaders of the 20th century. For this reason alone, *Afghan Napoleon* book is essential reading to any intelligence professional regardless of whether they have any interest in Afghanistan.

One shortfall in the book is Gall’s complete acceptance of one of the more annoying bits of misinformation that has survived the story of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan: The US government (and specifically the CIA) was said to be unwilling to support Massoud. Time and again, Gall accepts the standard story that Massoud’s fighters received little or no assistance from the CIA because the CIA was either blind to the Pakistani manipulation of the supplies or complicit in this effort. According to this story, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar was the favorite of Pakistan’s Interservice Intelligence Directorate (ISID) and he received most, if not all, the advanced weapon systems.

This was accepted wisdom by the journalists and some of the diplomats in Pakistan in the 1980s. That accepted wisdom was enhanced by the fact that the Reagan administration prevented any US government official, and most especially a CIA officer, from traveling into Afghanistan. The White House was determined to avoid any opportunity for the Soviets to capture an American and use that capture for propaganda purposes. The policy did prevent “eyes on” reporting that might have further demonstrated to the nay-sayers that the United States was blind to Pakistan’s ambitions.

In fact, Massoud was well known for complaining to virtually any Western media contact that his fighters received little assistance from the West. At the same time, Massoud had to know that he was receiving substantial support from the CIA because his closest advisers were the focal points for receiving that support. A careful reading of earlier works like *Ghost Wars* (Steve Coll, 2005) or *First In* (Gary Schroen, 2005) demonstrates that Massoud’s complaints were simply not true. What was true was ISID’s interest in picking the winner among the Afghan resistance; they wanted that winner to be Hikmatyar. What is not true is the claim that the CIA blindly supported ISID and shortchanged Massoud or any other of the resistance fighters in Afghanistan. Gall conflates the two issues but, in his defense, he probably heard the complaint directly from Massoud, who used every tool to increase Western support to his own fighters, including misinforming journalists about his resources.

It is hard to imagine what a post-9/11 Afghanistan would have been like if Massoud had survived the al-Qa’ida suicide bombing that killed him on September 9, 2001. Even in a Taliban-controlled country, Massoud’s influence had spread throughout northern Afghanistan with resistance figures as diverse as Abdul Rashid Dostum in Jowzjan and Sar-e-Pul, Mohammed Atta in Mazar-e-Sharif, Ismail Khan in Herat, and all of the Hazara leadership in Bamian accepting his nominal leadership.

Of course, even at his peak during the early 1990s, Massoud suffered from Pashtun prejudices about who were true Afghans. It was one of the reasons why Gulbuddin Hikmatyar felt he was justified in leveling large portions of Kabul in the rocket and artillery duels during the civil war that followed the Soviet departure. Would Massoud have been able to mobilize the entire Afghan nation? We will never know, but certainly that was precisely why Mullah Omar and Usama bin Ladin decided to kill this charismatic leader on the eve of 9/11.

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*Swords of Lightning*

For many, including members of the military and the Intelligence Community of a certain age, the chaotic scenes in Kabul in August 2021 after 20 years of success and failure recalled the arc of the United States’ involvement in Southeast Asia during 1954–75. While that may
not be the best context reviewing a book about US operations in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11, it is important for intelligence professionals to understand why the most honorable and successful operations can end up as strategic failures. As with the Vietnam War, historians will argue for decades over why it ended so badly. For now, *Swords of Lightning* offers a chance to consider how it started and what enabled the early successes.

**From Indochina...**

The CIA role in Southeast Asia had its antecedents in the actions of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. After several years of wrangling with their Republic of China counterparts who demanded control over OSS special operations, OSS officers eventually started working with the highland tribes in Thailand, the Free Thai forces operating in and around Bangkok and the Viet Minh forces in rural French Indo-China. CIA collaboration with the Thai government expanded as the post-war world began to bifurcate into pro-Soviet and pro-Western blocs. By 1954, the same Viet Minh forces the OSS supported in driving the Japanese out of Indochina were victorious over French colonial forces.

In 1960 and 61, President Eisenhower and then President Kennedy focused attention on the Kingdom of Laos and dispatched CIA officers to prevent yet another “domino” from joining a pro-Soviet bloc. The Kennedy administration also agreed to send CIA officers to South Vietnam to build support for President Diem’s regime and to begin a program with US Special Forces called the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG).

As its name suggests, CIDG was a series of local programs using local fighters to combat Viet Minh raiders determined to undermine Saigon government authority through terror tactics. By 1964, the US military command in Saigon required the CIA to cede control of these small forces to the larger, centralized command. The focus in Saigon was in creating capability to defeat the Viet Minh (by then known as the Viet Cong) and their supporters in the People’s Army of Vietnam. A small program of partnership between CIA and Special Forces became a very large program focused on campaign success rather than local, tactical goals.

**To Afghanistan**

In the wake of 9/11, US resolve to strike back at Usama bin Ladin, al-Qa’ida, and the Taliban regime would confront some hard military realities. Although the United States had operational plans for nearly every country in Central Command, the plans for a response to the 9/11 attacks were based in part on the coalition response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990: build a strong conventional force, invade the target country, defeat the enemy. For Afghanistan, the only organization that had any near term, realistic option was the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) inside CIA.

That plan involved leveraging established contacts with Afghan resistance leaders and link those resistance leaders with US Special Forces detachments that could direct air strikes. Operations would be highly dispersed and the units would have to operate on their own with little command influence or, for that matter, logistic support. CIA Director George Tenet presented the plan to President George W. Bush, who gave the go-ahead. By late September 2001, the first CIA team was in the Panjshir valley working with the Northern Alliance leadership. By October, CIA teams were inserted behind Taliban lines to work with the resistance and to serve as the pathfinders for Special Forces operational detachments. The plan was classic unconventional warfare.

*Swords of Lightning* provides a clear description of the earliest US operations in north-central Afghanistan. Two of the authors, Mark Nutsch and Bob Pennington, were leaders in the Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha 595 (ODA 595). The third, Jim DeFelice, is a well-regarded writer of thrillers as well as non-fiction works focused on modern warfare, particularly special operations. The book follows much of the same history detailed in Doug Stanton’s *Horse Soldiers* (2009) and Toby Harnden’s *First Casualty* (2021). As with those excellent books, the reader gets an opportunity to understand what it is like to be in combat where a small number of Americans are fighting side by side with Afghan resistance forces against the established, Islamic extremist government of the Taliban.

These operations required the Americans to use techniques that would have been familiar to historical figures like British officer T.E. Lawrence in World War I, OSS Detachment 101 commander Colonel Carl Eifler in World War II, or CIA paramilitary officer Anthony Poshepny (aka Tony Poe) in Laos in the 1960s. They needed to balance the operational objectives of the US against the
capabilities and personal objectives of the Afghan resistance leaders. As T.E. Lawrence wrote in 27 Articles, his short pamphlet on irregular warfare, “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are there to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.”

In brief, the Special Operations command TF Dagger deployed ODA 595 into central Afghanistan on October 19, 2001. The ODA linked up with the CIA Alpha Team that inserted in the early hours of 16 October and with the Afghan resistance leader Abdul Rashid Dostum. This combination of Afghan resistance, Special Forces combat capability, and CIA local expertise turned the tide. Alpha Team split into sections supporting Dostum, the Shia force under the command of Mohammed Mohaqeq, and the Tajik leader Mohammed Atta.

The distances and terrain required the CIA team to split into two (Alpha and Bravo) and working with TF Dagger leadership, another Special Forces team (ODA 534) was added to support Atta. At the same time, TF Dagger dispatched a battalion command team with USAF members from the Special Tactics Squadron providing enhanced close air support capability. During a series of fast advances, the resistance fighters defeated the Taliban in northern Samangan and southern Balkh provinces and on November 10, 2001, the Afghan resistance forces, US Special Forces and the CIA entered Mazar-e-Sharif as the Taliban and their al-Qa’ida allies retreated east. In late November, both teams traveled to Konduz for a final battle with the Taliban. Although ODA 595 was not in Mazar-e-Sharif during the battle at Qalai Jangi that resulted in the death of CIA officer Mike Spann, they were involved in the handling of prisoners taken from the fight, and it was ODA 595 that identified John Walker Lindh, the so-called “Afghan Taliban,” as one of those fighters captured in Qalai Jangi.

As stated above, the story has been well documented. That said, in irregular warfare, nearly every individual involved in combat will have a different perspective and that perspective is well worth understanding. In this case, almost immediately on arrival, the 12-man team was forced to break into smaller teams operating far apart with little or no communication other than satellite voice communications. In many war stories, the officers and non-commissioned officers involved in combat share the same events as their soldiers. This was not the case with ODA 595. At any given time in their first month of deployment, the detachment was split into as many as three different teams spread over 50-plus miles of mountainous terrain. Swords of Lightning does an excellent job of capturing the insights from each of those teams, even though 20 years of war resulted in several deaths of team members.

A lot of the fighting in late October and early November 2001 sounds very similar in summary: we saw targets, we called in air support, and the targets were blown up. Heavy enemy concentrations were destroyed, and the militia moved in to finish off the survivors. In truth, most of them blur together now. Living in the moment, though, each attack had its own nuance, its own slightly different shade. There were constant reminders of the danger we were in, whether it was a shelling or a minefield or a machinegunner who happened to open up as we attempted to move. If our victory seems preordained now, it surely did not seem that way then.

There are moments in Swords of Lightning where command tensions that existed in 2001 return. ODA 595 and ODA 534 were perfectly capable of conducting their tactical operations with little assistance from TF Dagger. The authors remain convinced that the arrival of the battalion headquarters component, the Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) and, eventually, the arrival of the Special Operations Commander for Central Command were political rather than tactical considerations. That might be true, but the addition of both command elements allowed for more combat power and more resources as the fight changed from a simply tactical battle along the Balkh River to a battle that involved multiple provinces and a far greater adversary force.

While not precisely outlined in Swords of Lightning, there is no doubt that the fact that the SOCCE in Konduz was able to call in AC-130 gunships and save the day when the only friendly force comprised 30 Americans and fewer than 100 Afghans. By late November 2001, the war had already changed beyond the scope of the two Special Forces teams commanded by two captains. The tension was certainly real, but in the end it was also the logical consequence of the transition from a small, irregular war to a larger campaign.
The stories of both Special Forces and CIA intrepidity in 2001 serve as a prologue to a larger and longer commitment to Afghanistan. Just as the CIDG partnership between the CIA and Special Forces in the early 1960s transformed into a more conventional war managed by senior officers in Saigon and in Washington, the CIA paramilitary and US Special Operations Forces experience in 2001–2002 changed dramatically as US and allied conventional forces arrived. There were still opportunities for success and certainly opportunities for exceptional bravery, but there was little chance of turning back to a smaller US footprint working in partnership with regional Afghan leaders. It is unfair to draw direct parallels between the US operations in Vietnam and Afghanistan, but at the very least, it is useful for intelligence professionals to see that in both cases small unit operations and CIA-Special Forces partnerships delivered tactical and, perhaps, even operational (campaign) success when they are given clear direction and authority to do what needs to be done.

The reviewer: J.R. Seeger is a former CIA operations officer and regular contributor to Studies.
A Drop of Treason: Philip Agee and His Exposure of the CIA

Reviewed by Brent Geary

In October 1974, former CIA case officer Philip Agee called a press conference in London. With attention growing in the media about a sensational book he planned to publish in the coming days, and stories on both sides of the Atlantic calling his character into question, Agee wanted to state plainly his intentions: to have the CIA abolished and to expose its officers wherever they operated. With that, he named 37 CIA operations officers and administrative personnel at the CIA station in Mexico City, the start of a career of attacking his former organization and its employees.

*De mortuis nil nisi bonum*—loosely translated as “Do not speak ill of the dead”—is a dictum dating to roughly 600 BCE. Because the dead are unable to defend themselves, so the thought goes, it is best to speak of them with only kind words or—barring that—none at all. For many, including this reviewer, Agee’s actions disqualify him from such consideration. Jonathan Stevenson’s new Agee biography *A Drop of Treason* tries in vain to depict Agee as a troubled soul whose actions were not entirely the result of base instincts and weakness. Agee, who died in exile in 2008 in Cuba, was despicable and deserved far worse than he got.

*A Drop of Treason* reads very much like a book its author never intended to write, at least not in its final form. Stevenson, a longtime instructor at the US Naval War College and a former member of the National Security Council staff during the Obama administration, must have once thought that Agee was worth a more careful examination than he had previously been given. Why else devote the time and energy to conduct a thorough, well-researched account such as his? The evidence he marshaled and carefully documented, however, points to a conclusion that he struggles to resist.

Agee was the son of a Florida millionaire who made his fortune in the laundry business and belonged to all the highbrow social and business clubs in Tampa. Agee attended Catholic high school, drove a vintage hot rod, and was reasonably popular. Stevenson found Agee to have been a “model student” who participated in several clubs and excelled in the classroom and had a few close friends, one of whom was “just floored” and “stunned” by the anti-American rhetoric and actions of Agee’s later years. (13) At the University of Notre Dame, Agee was elected to the student senate, participated in several clubs, and graduated with honors.

In every respect, Agee’s was a traditional, moderately conservative upbringing, based on Stevenson’s research, although the author argues that Agee’s later conversion to radical politics might have taken root while at Notre Dame. Regardless, after a brief attempt at law school, Agee joined CIA in 1957, serving first an abbreviated stint in the air force as part of his cover before joining the CIA as an operations officer.

Stevenson devotes relatively little space to Agee’s CIA career—mostly as a case officer assigned to Latin America—before his resignation in 1968, focusing specifically on the incidents Agee later claimed turned him against US foreign policy and the CIA. He details, for example, Agee’s claim of having overheard the torture of a Uruguayan communist—fingered by Agee—at the hands of local security forces (48) as well as the massacre of protesters decrying the cost of the Mexico City Olympics in 1968 by a pro-US Mexican regime. (62–63) He also describes Agee’s failed first marriage, his bad performance evaluations from his last posting, and his efforts to retain custody of his children.

With the exception of accounts Agee wrote years later, Stevenson finds little to suggest that Agee had truly turned against his country and CIA until after his 1968 resignation. Without that evidence, Stevenson tries to position Agee within the larger socio-political turmoil of the late 1960s in the United States, while noting that Agee’s posting overseas during that time meant he did not experience much of it firsthand. He also points to other evidence that Agee’s claim to radicalization during his time in the Agency did not quite add up.
Stevenson points out, for example, that Agee’s resignation letter was filled with praise for the people he had worked with and his desire to “maintain their friendship … in the years to come.” (65) Agee’s stated reason for his departure was “personal circumstances incompatible at this time with the best interests of the Agency,” alluding to his forthcoming divorce and custody battle for his children. When Agee resigned, he stayed in Mexico City—his last CIA posting—attempting and failing at two separate business ventures completely unrelated to politics. Only then did he propose to write a book about the CIA, but he could find no takers for a fairly straightforward account of the business of intelligence buoyed by a “vanilla critique” of US foreign policy. By Stevenson’s own reading, Agee only decided to write “a sensationalized exposé” after several publishers indicated to him that it was his only avenue to publication. (70) “It seems safe to say,” Stevenson wrote, “that had any of Agee’s politically tamer enterprises been a success, he might well have turned out like many an unsung retired CIA officer: cynical and disenchanted but content to keep his demons private.” (72)

Left unmentioned here, but referred to later in the book, is a claim by former KGB case officer Oleg Kalugin—and a similar account by a defector from Cuban intelligence—that Agee in 1973 approached the KGB in Mexico City and offered to sell secrets, but that the Soviets feared he was disingenuous or a “dangle” and turned him away, so Agee instead approached the Cubans. (227–28) Stevenson mentions this story in his concluding chapter but explains it away as being unlikely. He does detail, however, that at some point in 1971, Agee traveled to Cuba—after obtaining a visa in Canada—where he spent the last half of the year conducting research for his book, and Stevenson states that it is clear that Cuban intelligence supported him in his work then and for years thereafter. (72)

When he finally published his first of several books, Inside the Company: CIA Diary in 1975, Agee went all in denouncing both US foreign policy and the CIA and voicing his support for socialist and communist causes. While he was not the first to write a scathing “tell all” from within the agency, he was the first to do so without submitting his work for CIA’s prepublication review. More importantly, Agee listed the names of over 400 CIA officers, agents, contacts, and programs around the world. He dedicated the book to one of several female revolutionary activists who became his lovers during these years, in this case the Brazilian Angela Camargo Seixas. Stevenson recounts how the US government became aware of Agee’s intention to write a book and monitored his progress but, without any laws at the time against naming CIA officers and after several attempts to convince him to stop, was ultimately unable to prevent its publication.

After the release of Inside the Company, Agee became a minor celebrity for a few years, rubbing elbows with leftist artists, writers, and activists in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Stevenson recounts how Agee’s notoriety opened doors to speaking engagements on college campuses across the United States until the government revoked his passport during the Carter administration, leaving him stranded abroad.

One factor that contributed to his exile was the 1975 assassination of CIA officer Richard Welch in Athens, Greece. Welch had been “outed” by the Greek media after first being named in the magazine Counterspy, whose founders had been inspired by Agee’s actions and featured a separate article by him in the same issue that named Welch. Stevenson argues that while Agee became the focus of blame for Welch’s death, he had played no direct role in the affair. While technically correct, the author misses—by a wide mark—the larger point: Agee did not care about the lives of CIA officers or had convinced himself that they were expendable. In a letter to the editor of the Washington Star, Agee wrote that while he had not “fingered” Welch, he would have done so had the Greek media asked. Moreover, he claimed that his actions produced “no danger of violence” to CIA personnel if exposed officers “return to Langley, [Virginia].” Likewise, in a letter to British authorities appealing his 1977 deportation from the United Kingdom, he wrote that “My work on balance is serving the vital interests of people vastly greater in number and worth than any lives of the CIA’s employees.”

While Stevenson rightly critiques some of Agee’s actions at points throughout the book, he seeks to rationalize and explain away others. For example, Stevenson points out that both the journalist James Risen and two of the retired CIA officers who helped identify CIA mole Aldrich Ames tell a similar story about Agee. They wrote that while claiming to represent the CIA’s inspector general, he attempted to solicit classified information
from a CIA officer in Mexico City in 1989, probably at the behest of Cuban intelligence. Stevenson explains this away as highly unlikely given Agee’s notoriety, although Agee and his second wife split their time between apartments in Germany and Cuba for over two decades, clearly with the at least tacit support of Havana. Most importantly, Stevenson admits that Agee’s exposure of CIA personnel undoubtedly wreaked havoc on their families and careers but plays down the threat to their physical safety or that of the CIA’s assets and contacts similarly revealed, arguing that no evidence has ever surfaced of physical harm having come to anyone Agee compromised.

This is his most puzzling—and disturbing—rationalization of all. Even if Welch’s death could not be attributed directly to Agee, his actions popularized the idea of identifying CIA officers posted overseas and spawned a cottage industry of the same for several years. In another example that Stevenson mentions, in 1980 CIA officer Richard Kinsman and his family survived an attempt on their lives and were forced to relocate from Jamaica after an Agee collaborator exposed Kinsman and provided his home address to the local media. Stevenson calls the incident mere “pot shots” taken at Kinsman’s house (115) and as a “rather pathetic attack.” (249) In fact, someone fired more than 20 bullets into Kinsman’s home, including through the window of his daughter’s bedroom. Had Kinsman or a member of his family been killed, would Agee have been to blame? Would Stevenson have written this book? Stevenson admits that “Agee’s revelations easily could have resulted in the assassination of a CIA officer, and it is arguably a matter of luck that they didn’t.” (115) So why, then, did he expend such effort minimizing the instances where Agee might have played a part in putting CIA officers and assets in harm’s way?

In his conclusion, Stevenson derides Agee’s critics with the following passage:

*His detractors might say he just got mildly disenchanted with CIA work; tried to take the quiet, non treasonous way out; got frustrated; was seduced by a couple of lefty women; felt the allure of dissident celebrity; and only then became a real dissenter.* (257)

This view, Stevenson writes, is a “gross oversimplification.” Simplified? Yes, but not overly so. Stevenson’s own work illustrates that Agee—the privileged son of a millionaire—chose not only to turn his back on his country but rejected the very idea that the people he had worked with for over a decade were good and moral and worth protecting. He callously upended and endangered lives, destroyed careers, and gave aid and comfort to America’s enemies not because of deeply held ideological differences but because—after a succession of failures—he was paid to do so and enjoyed the notoriety it brought him.

Stevenson grudgingly acknowledges that “Agee behaved far more objectionably than necessary or proper to make his point,” (254) yet ties himself in knots trying to avoid admitting something else: that he wasted his time and effort examining someone who was not worth it. I encourage prospective readers to learn from Stevenson’s mistake and give Agee—and this biography—wide berth. For those who insist on reading it, particularly counterintelligence officers, there may be some lessons here to learn about turncoats, but I rather doubt it. Money and ego, after all, are already well-documented motivations for treachery. Agee found a lucrative grift and—lacking any other options after the fact—stuck with it until his death. End of story.

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The Korean War (1950–53) is often referred to as the Forgotten War. For those who remember it and the estimated 2.5 million killed, it was the first hot war of the Cold War, when the United States and its United Nations allies stepped in to defend South Korea after a surprise North Korean attack in June 1950. The war would rage up and down the peninsula before stalemating where it began at the 38th Parallel. Fewer Americans know how negotiations over prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges extended the war or the role intelligence officers played in determining POWs’ fates.

The status of POWs was one of the most difficult issues to resolve during the peace negotiations that began in July 1951 and would drag on for two years. As the United States, China, South Korea, and North Korea searched for a path to end the conflict, discussions regarding an exchange of prisoners took an untraditional turn. In the history of warfare, POW swaps were typically a straightforward “all-for-all” proposition, and mandatory repatriation was enshrined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. As historian Monica Kim’s *The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War* reveals, Korea would not be so simple.

In the United States, evidence of atrocities against UN prisoners, thousands of missing in action, and fears about communist brainwashing (a term that entered the lexicon after some US POWs seemed to have switched sides) alarmed US military leaders and stoked anti-communist attitudes. South Korean leaders were worried about the fate of thousands of South Koreans impressed into the North Korean army and now trapped in the North. Beijing objected to anything but an all-for-all exchange. In January 1952, President Truman declared that the United States would not repatriate any prisoners against their will because forcing them to return to communism was inhumane. Armistice talks broke down repeatedly over the issue of “voluntary repatriation.” Determining the fate of Chinese and Korean POWs would pose a monumental operational challenge for the UN Command.

*Interrogation Rooms* paints a vivid human story playing out as US intelligence agencies—the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID), Military Intelligence (MI), and a new Central Intelligence Agency—sought to determine each POW’s fate, with neutral observers from Sweden and India as the final arbiters. Kim, a professor at the University of Wisconsin, weaves the narratives of US, North Korean, and South Korean POWs together with those of their US interrogators, many of whom were Japanese-Americans who had been interned in camps established by the Roosevelt administration after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The US reliance on a segment of the population it had once imprisoned based on race to test the allegiances of others was a cruel irony.

Issues of race reverberate through Kim’s book. Racial bias shaped US relations with Korea before, during, and after the war and for many veterans helped define their wartime experiences. Kim recounts the experience of Sam Miyamoto, a second-generation Japanese-American whose family was rounded up, sent to a camp in the Arizona desert, and then shipped to Japan as part of the Gripsholm Exchange (named for the Swedish ocean liner used for civilian prisoner swaps with the Axis powers).

Miyamoto returned to the United States after the war, was drafted, and by November 1950 was in Korea. When asked by a North Korean POW why he would fight for a government who saw him and his family as an enemy, Miyamoto recounted he was honest with his prisoner. “I’m here because I was ordered to come here. I didn’t

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come here by choice. I was ordered to join the army and I was ordered to study the Korean language, and I was ordered to come here and talk to you about this.” (123)

As Kim reminds us, Miyamoto’s experience is a lesser known subplot of the war: the US Army funneled Japanese-American soldiers to Korean language school and then to Korea, assessing that it would be easier for them to communicate with Koreans (Korea was a Japanese colony from 1910 to the end of World War II). Several thousand Japanese Americans—the precise number is unclear—served in the Korean War. For North Korean POWs, Japanese-American GIs merely affirmed the Korean Workers’ Party line that the United States was no different than Imperial Japan and US troops were on the Peninsula to enslave the Korean people.

It was Korea’s status as a Japanese colony that brought the US military to the Peninsula in the first place. The US military arrived in Korea, south of the 38th Parallel, one month after Japan surrendered to the Allies in August 1945; the Soviet Union occupied the northern half. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge had the unenviable task of overseeing the US occupation of South Korea from 1945 to 1948. After the initial euphoria following the end of decades of Japanese rule, public attitude toward the Americans quickly soured. Many saw the United States as new occupiers, especially when Washington floated the idea of a multi-year conservatorship before Koreans would be civilized enough to take care of their own affairs. Amity turned into enmity and students and labor groups took to the streets.

The chaotic politics of the post-colonial era in Korea added fuel to the fire. Leaders of the Korean independence movement descended on Seoul, staked their own claim to rule, and resisted the US military decision to keep in place Korean bureaucrats, including the police, who had worked for the Japanese. Within this volatile mix of nationalist fervor, occupation, resentment, activism, and North Korean agitation, US military and civilian leaders came to rely on military police and intelligence to identify troublemakers and quell civil unrest. Nation-building is messy, and South Korea would be no exception.

The intelligence history of the United States and Korea is cautionary. North Korean agents indeed tried to organize and agitate South Koreans to revolt, but US intelligence personnel far too often were tasked with determining the ideological leanings of civilians whom the South Korean military or the police brought to them with little context, facing life-threatening consequences if judged a leftist. Many were people from all walks of life who joined a protest or a political movement because they were fed up with a corrupt, brutal authoritarian government that labeled anyone who opposed its rule as communist. US intelligence officers were left basing their judgments on nothing more than a gut feeling and frequently being misled by South Korean interlocutors with a political agenda or old scores to settle.

The most exhaustive account of US involvement in Korea before the war remains Bruce Cumming’s Origins of the Korean War, but Kim’s book is more approachable for the general reader. She weaves an engaging and informative narrative from the years before the war to the armistice. Interrogation Rooms is not a typical military history, and it is an intelligence history by coincidence and not design. The author sets out to tell a moral tale about how the contest of wills between superpowers victimizes individuals, and she looks at US actions through a lens focused on race and violations of personhood. In the process of telling this story, Kim helps readers better understand the history of US intelligence in the early days of South Korean nationhood.

Kim’s historical lens is informative but restrictive, however. She is dismissive of the international context of the conflict and is editorializing with her selective use of quotation marks, such as when she uses “war,” as though World War II and the Korean War were superpower-manufactured constructs. That said, Kim’s first book is well-researched and exhaustive in detail. Although readers and students of intelligence history and the Korean War may disagree with some of her argument and analysis, it is hard to dispute that Kim has given a voice to the voiceless and shed light on parts of the war and the role of intelligence that were previously little known. For this, if for nothing else, Interrogation Rooms deserves a wide audience and is a welcome addition to the historiography.

The reviewer: Yong Suk Lee is a former deputy associate director of the CIA and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
In today’s era of unmanned aerial vehicles and satellites, which remove the need to place a human life at risk to collect overhead intelligence, it may be tempting to gloss over an earlier time when accepting such risks was unavoidable. Those who want an in-depth, in-person view of this era need look no further than Robert Richardson’s engaging *Spying From the Sky*.

In essence, this is William Gregory’s life story, a man who spent his career piloting some of the nation’s most important intelligence collection aircraft before the launch of CORONA—the first photographic reconnaissance satellite—in June 1960 ushered in a new era. Throughout the volume Richardson skilfully weaves intelligence history with Gregory’s personal recollections, helpfully highlighting the latter in italics so the reader is never unsure what is objective history and what is William Gregory’s views and experiences.

Although readers might be tempted to skip over material giving Gregory’s background and youth to get to the flying and spying, this would be a mistake because his story is an inspiring tale of an average American who faced considerable challenges to make a difference. Today’s media is replete with such stories—and lacking a modern hook, probably would ignore Gregory’s biography—but his transition from boyhood on a Tennessee sharecropping farm to the doorstep of outer space reflects the lives and experiences of so many intelligence officers who served from the 1940s to the 1980s.

The advent of World War II changed Gregory’s life, as it did so many in the Greatest Generation, and the first third of *Spying From the Sky* recounts his pilot training and wartime experiences piloting a P-38 Lightning fighter-bomber. Although not directly relevant for those seeking to learn about intelligence collection, this section is nonetheless an exciting and insightful read into the sacrifices of the rapidly fading World War II generation. This material alone makes it an engaging read.

Like many who emerged from war intact but changed, William Gregory soon found his way back into the cockpit, transitioning from fighter aircraft to bombers. Flying both combat aircraft—the B-29 Superfortress, the massive B-36 Peacemaker, and the rocket-assisted–takeoff B-47 Stratojet—and tankers like the KB-29M for Strategic Air Command, Gregory was well-prepared for his next role as an intelligence-collection pilot.

Following Gregory’s experience after being tapped by the Air Force to fly collection aircraft, readers learn of Operation BLACK KNIGHT, the US Air Force’s first strategic, high-altitude reconnaissance program. This is the story of efforts to collect intelligence over the Soviet Union during the early days of the Cold War, when overflights were still possible but increasingly dangerous. Answering critical questions generated by raging US fears of the “bomber gap”—joined later by the “missile gap”—left no choice but to place men like Colonel Gregory into the cockpit of both the RB-47 and RB-57 photographic reconnaissance planes. Today, the contributions of those aircraft and crews are largely glossed over in the rush to tell the CORONA program’s history, but until the early 1960s, these aircraft were the only game

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
in town. Richardson tells this story in a thorough and engaging way.

Next up for Gregory was flying the famous U-2 and a move from the Air Force to CIA, which came with new challenges. One was adapting to a new culture in CIA, which was quite different from the USAF life he’d lived for so long. As challenging as these changes were for Gregory, they were similarly obstacles for his wife and daughters to overcome. Richardson’s account of their sacrifices in supporting his career are insightful, showing that although in a different way, they, too, served. Some of these accounts of CIA life are particularly interesting. In one example, for years Gregory regularly sent letters to “friends” in Texas, which in truth was meant to demonstrate to CIA that he retained mastery of a crypto code. When his CIA service concluded, Gregory admitted to his surprised wife one December that these friends, for whom she had already prepared a Christmas card, did not exist.

Gregory’s U-2 experience begins as a pilot and eventually transitions to leader of Detachment G—which in 1960 became CIA’s only U-2 unit—which gives readers a look at two important aspects of this historic program. Similarly valuable are his recollections of the effort to develop an aircraft-carrier-launched U-2. Richardson’s book also discusses the move to flexibly deploy CIA’s U-2 fleet—shifting from permanent deployments to as-needed postings at airfields around the globe—which is another side of this historic program that has been too frequently overlooked in the glare of the aircraft’s revolutionary technology. It is this important development that enabled the U-2’s vital, long-running contribution during the Vietnam conflict and throughout the Cold War. Gregory was there, too, when the U-2 flew over Cuba in 1962, giving the reader a jump-seat view of the CIA aircraft’s role in that international crisis.

His final flight opportunity came when he was offered a leadership position in the unit that would operate CIA’s new A-12 OXCART plane—which would become more famous as the USAF SR-71 BLACKBIRD—but it was not to be. Recognizing that his family had sacrificed much for his benefit over the years, it was time for Gregory to hang up his wings. It was the kind of selfless act that perhaps reflects more about William Gregory as a man than could any World War II combat mission or risky overflight of the USSR.

Reading this volume offers a look into not only the ground level of some of the nation’s most consequential intelligence collection systems, but also the life of a man who was there during events and moments great and routine. At the same time, readers are treated to a survey of the era before satellite imagery. It’s a journey worth your time.

The reviewer: David A. Welker is a member of CSI’s History Staff.
On March 21, 1960, in a township outside Johannesburg, South African police fired into a large crowd protesting outside a police station. Sixty-nine were killed, 180 were injured. The Sharpeville Massacre is seen by many as the beginning of the worldwide anti-apartheid movement. Three decades later, that effort culminated in negotiations with the South African regime, the end of apartheid, and the country’s first democratic election in 1994. The African National Congress (ANC), not the only organization in the anti-apartheid movement but its vanguard, has governed South Africa since then.

More than any other cause or conflict in Africa in the 20th century, the anti-apartheid movement drew support from individuals, organizations, and nations across the globe. *International Brigade Against Apartheid: Secrets of the People’s War that Liberated South Africa*, tells their story. The book consists of 64 short essays about countries, organizations, and individuals outside South Africa who contributed to the struggle against apartheid. It was edited by Ronnie Kasrils, whose credentials for the task are impeccable. He served the anti-apartheid cause from the early 1960s, first within South Africa and later in exile, holding important positions in the ANC’s intelligence, military, and political structures.

*International Brigade* is divided into two parts: the first covers the contribution of non-South Africans in the secret work of the ANC within South Africa. The second half describes the internationalist effort on the world stage: economic and sporting sanctions, training, fund-raising, and political activism on behalf of the ANC and the anti-apartheid movement in general.

If the title of the book brings to mind the Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War, it is no accident. Kasrils draws the connection explicitly in his introduction. Both conflicts attracted global interest and support from nations and individuals. The anti-apartheid cause, like the Republicans in Spain, exerted an especially strong appeal on the political left. As a CIA officer with extensive Africa experience once stated, “If you look at southern Africa, you would think the Russians won the Cold War.” *International Brigade* reflects that, and abounds with language of the struggle, solidarity, and liberation.

The parallels with Spain end there, however. Internationalists in the Spanish Civil War fought as a unit in pitched battles against the enemy. The ANC and its military wing, by contrast, never posed a military threat to the Pretoria regime. As one contributor noted in “Internationalists who Joined the People’s War,” South Africa lacked the conditions for guerrilla struggle. The country was highly developed, with few mountainous or heavily forested regions that could serve as safe havens. South Africa at the time was governed by a well-resourced regime pursuing a total-war strategy not just against the ANC, but in and against neighboring nations that dared to support it. Although successful in infiltrating individuals and small groups in and out of South Africa, and carrying out small-scale sabotage on infrastructure and regime targets like police stations, the ANC’s ambitions for armed struggle were never fully realized.

The first half of *International Brigade* the book focuses on clandestine operations inside South Africa. Europeans and Africans (rarely Americans) played a key role smuggling weapons into South Africa and moving ANC operatives in and out of the country. For example, among the most long-running and successful operations, described in “The Truck Safari: 1 Trip, 1 Tonne,” involved hiding weapons in trucks used to ferry tourists from north to south across the African continent, ending in South Africa where the weapons were disembarked and cached. Some 40 such trips were made in the 1980s and early 1990s, ferrying tons of weapons and ammunition into the republic. Similarly, the need to move operatives secretly in and out of South Africa, and to communicate with them securely, emerges in *International Brigade* as one of the ANC’s most important tasks. That requirement became more acute as township unrest exploded in the 1980s. The ANC, fearing it was losing touch with mass movements inside South Africa, organized “Operation Vula” to infiltrate leaders into South Africa to bridge the...
gap between internal and external elements of the anti-apartheid struggle. (Although not specifically discussed in this book, the ANC was even able to establish contact with the imprisoned Nelson Mandela.) Several essays in the first half of *International Brigade* (e.g., chapters 27–29) deal with different aspects of Vula. This part of the book suffers from repetitiveness: while not diminishing the courage of those involved, there are only so many ways to describe emplacing an arms cache or crossing a border.

The second half of *International Brigade*, titled “Solidarity Across the Globe,” covers the contribution of internationalists on the world stage: the worldwide, grassroots effort to mobilize economic sanctions, sports boycotts, and diplomatic pressure against the apartheid regime; as well as securing support and safehaven for anti-apartheid activists in exile. It is, arguably, a more important story. Although the ANC was never able to mount a serious military challenge to Pretoria, it was successful in positioning itself as preeminent in the anti-apartheid movement. By the time the ANC and other organizations were unbanned in 1990 and negotiations began on a new democratic dispensation, no one seriously questioned that the government in waiting was the ANC, and that Nelson Mandela would be its president. This was a major achievement, and the ANC owes much to those who stoked the anti-apartheid fires and supported its political work around the world.

The essays are well-organized by geography and chronology, but the quality of the writing varies, as is to be expected in any book with 60-odd contributors. For example, the chapter by British journalist Victoria Brittain (“African Continental Solidarity Defied the Cold War”) is a clichéd and uninformative pastiche that does no justice to African countries that supported the anti-apartheid movement. By contrast, sections on the United States (“USA Protest Began with ‘Germ’ of a Movement”) and the Soviet Union (“The Soviet Union and the Liberation Struggle in South Africa”) are excellent, and stand on their own as succinct summaries of two radically different approaches to the struggle against apartheid.

Another challenge with *International Brigade* is also a function of its format: a reader not familiar with the events described in the book will quickly become lost in the welter of names, places, and acronyms that appear throughout the book. A list of abbreviations would have been helpful. *International Brigade* consists of essays solicited by the editors, but stylistically it is reminiscent of a succession of oral history interviews. That vehicle is of value in preserving the memory of specific events, but will appeal most to those who themselves were participants, or who already possess expertise on the topics in question. Readers looking for a more traditional, comprehensive account of the anti-apartheid movement may wish to read Kasrils’ exuberant and entertaining autobiography, *Armed and Dangerous* (2nd edition, Mayibuye Books, 1998). A more objective, critical treatment can be found in *External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960–1990* by Stephen Ellis (C. Hurst and Company, 2012).

The post-Mandela years have not been kind to the ANC. Thabo Mbeki’s incoherent response to the AIDS crisis, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela’s very public fall from grace, the epic corruption of the Jacob Zuma era, and other travails have fueled a sense of unfulfilled promise and missed opportunities in South Africa. A few contributors to *International Brigade* mention this; Kasrils himself asks in the epilogue, “was it worth it?” Most of the individuals who served in or alongside the brigade returned quietly to their professions and lives, in South Africa or elsewhere, after the end of apartheid. A small number went on to positions of power or wealth in the new South Africa—including Kasrils, who served as Minister of Intelligence Services, among other roles. Some of the latter betrayed the ANC’s ideals through greed and self-interest. Accountability for those failures belongs to them, not to “the good people,” as Kasrils calls them, of the International Brigade. To paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, if apartheid was an offense which history willed to remove, then it is hard to disagree with the book’s conclusion that yes, it was worth it.

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The reviewer: Paul Kepp is a retired CIA operations officer.
The PBS documentary *The Codebreaker* on American cryptanalyst Elizebeth Friedman is one of the latest efforts to bring long-overdue attention to a woman who played a key role in US history but whose contributions have either been overlooked or were pushed out of the spotlight by others. Elizebeth Friedman meets both these criteria, and her story is worthy of a larger movie than this concise PBS effort. Looking back on her life, it is clear she was determined to forge her own path. She was born in Huntington, Indiana, on August 26, 1892, to John and Sopha Smith. Her father did not want Elizebeth to go to college, but she was determined and convinced him to lend her the money for her tuition, which he did at 6-percent interest.

Elizebeth first attended college in Ohio and then transferred to Hillsdale College in Michigan as an English literature major. She enjoyed studying languages, including Greek, Latin, and German, a relevant fact left out of the documentary. After graduating in 1915, she spent a year teaching but then traveled to Chicago in search of more challenging work. Although the film depicts her introduction to eccentric, wealthy industrialist George Fabian through a Newberry librarian as luck, other sources say she was fully aware of Fabian’s obsession with the theory that William Shakespeare’s works were written by Sir Francis Bacon. Rather than luck, she cultivated a friendship with the librarian to get an introduction to Fabian.

Once they met, Fabian immediately invited Elizebeth to join him in a trip to his home at Riverbank Laboratories in Geneva, Illinois. Elizebeth did not hesitate to accept—she already had her bags packed—and she traveled alone with her new employer to live and work at his estate—a decision that would have raised eyebrows in the late 1900s if she was just responding to a spur of the moment proposition.¹

Fabian, and to a much lesser extent Elizebeth, believed codes hidden inside Shakespeare’s plays would prove Bacon was the real author. While the film credits Elizebeth with teaching herself the basics of cryptanalysis, other authors report that she began learning that art and science from Elizabeth Wells Gallup, who ran the laboratory’s cipher school and had published a book in 1899 on the *Bilateral Cipher of Francis Bacon*.

Gallup’s assistant William Friedman was both a plant geneticist and a photographer. William and Elizebeth soon agreed that Gallup’s and Fabian’s theories of hidden codes and patterns were nonsense, although they were both fascinated by codes and ciphers. Their mutual attraction and interests resulted in their marriage in 1917, less than a year after they met. They became a life-long team, although William became the more famous of the two, often called “the greatest codebreaker of his time” for his work in World War II. However, William would have failed if Elizebeth had not been there to support and care for him while he went through multiple mental breakdowns and heart issues later in life, while she simultaneously building her own career.²

Elizebeth Friedman’s work for the Coast Guard in the 1920s, solving codes used by smugglers and helping to put criminals in jail, is inspiring, and the story of her teaching a class in cryptology to a jury in a courtroom would certainly be a good scene in a movie. *Codebreaker* acknowledges that she was featured in *Look* magazine and *Reader’s Digest* and appeared in articles in the *San Francisco Chronicle* and other newspapers. She was definitely a celebrity at the time, even though the reports often wrote about how she looked or what she wore, more than what she had accomplished. Add in all the ways NSA has honored her, from awards to naming part of its headquarters after her, and she becomes less a hidden figure and more a trailblazer whose name the general public might not currently recognize but who was certainly famous for a time and still remembered at the intelligence agency she helped create.

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¹ See the NSA 1999 Hall of Honor Inductee citation, https://www.nsa.gov/About-Us/Current-Leadership/Article-View/Article/1623028/elizabeth-s-friedman/


All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Elizebeth Friedman also holds a special place among CIA pioneers. Although she was assigned to William Donovan’s Coordinator of Information (COI) office, which later became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), for less than a month, she and her team were responsible for establishing an operational cryptographic unit for COI’s communication net. They assembled the special locking envelopes for secret messages, cross-section paper needed for encoding and decoding, and the frames used by strip-cipher code systems. She obtained two Hagelin cipher machines destined for other agencies. The Hagelin was known as “lug and pin,” a portable machine that could also print.

Donovan wanted the unit up and running in an impossibly short amount of time, so Elizbeth and her team worked around the clock and within a few weeks had produced systems customized for COI operations that included double transpositions and strip ciphers. She called in favors from other professional colleagues and acquired two highly valued automatic encryption machines, after which she spent most of that December 1941 encoding and decoding COI’s first messages. Donovan considered her presence at COI invaluable and attempted to have her permanently shifted to his organization. However, at the end of December she returned to the Coast Guard, leaving Lt. Leonard T. Jones to assume responsibility for COI’s nascent crypto unit. Her work was praised in the War Report of the OSS.

At war’s end, the government combined cryptographic activities from several agencies and eliminated Friedman’s code-breaking position in the Coast Guard. She moved on to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1946–49, working as a “consultant in communications.” The details of her work there are sketchy, but brief references in her papers suggest she continued her quiet role as “fixer” helping the IMF secure and protect its communication resources.

Elizebeth Friedman died in a New Jersey nursing home on October 31, 1980, having never shared the details of her own wartime contributions, beyond oblique references to “spy stuff.” She spent the last years of her life compiling her husband’s papers and her own, and began her memoirs. While bringing her valuable story to life, Codebreaker also tends to exaggerate some aspects of her role in history, first with the dramatic claim that Friedman “lived a double life” during the war, when it would be more accurate to say that like many in wartime she balanced her life at home with a classified job. Second, the movie inflates her work against Nazi agents in South America during World War II to give the appearance that Friedman solved codes that saved many ships from German submarine attacks. The enemy spy networks she was working against were focused internally on South American countries and rarely were in possession of sensitive shipping information.

Elizebeth Friedman is already enough of a hero; she does not need the additional hype. Although she may have been forgotten for a time, Codebreaker and the books published about her have certainly restored her fame. Cryptographers have long regarded her as a legend in her own time. It is fitting that the next US Coast Guard “Legend” Class National Security Cutter (WMSL-760) will be named in her honor. (See also Hayden Peake’s review of a biography of Friedman, The Woman All Spies Fear, beginning on page 63.)

The reviewer: Randy Burkett is a member of CSI’s History Staff.

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Intelligence in Public Literature

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf—September 2022*

INTELLIGENCE PROCESS/TRADECRAFT

* Intelligence and the State: Analysts and Decision Makers, by Jonathan House

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

* The Perfect Police State: An Undercover Odyssey Into China’s Terrifying Surveillance Dystopia of the Future, by Geoffrey Cain

MEMOIR

* Black Ops: The Life of a CIA Shadow Warrior, by Ric Prado

HISTORY

* Chile, the CIA and the Cold War: A Transatlantic Perspective, by James Lockhart
* How To Stage A Coup: And Ten Other Lessons From The World of Secret Statecraft, by Rory Cormac
* The Man Who Knew Too Much: An Ex-CIA Officer’s Quest Through a Legend of Betrayal, by Howard Blum
* Secret City: The Hidden History of Gay Washington, by James Kirchick
* The Secret Royals: Spying and the Crown From Victoria to Diana, by Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac
* A Spy Called Cynthia: and A Life In Intelligence, by Anonymous
* The Woman All Spies Fear: Code breaker Elizabeth Smith Friedman and Her Hidden Life, by Amy Butler Greenfield

INTELLIGENCE ABROAD

* Russian Intelligence: A Case-Based Study of Russian Services and Missions Past and Present, by Kevin P. Riehle
* Spies, Spin and the Fourth Estate: British Intelligence and the Media, by Paul Lashmar
* A State of Secrecy: Stasi Informers and the Culture of Surveillance, by Alison Lewis

FICTION

* Damascus Station, by David McCloskey. Reviewed by Graham Alexander
* Gray Man (Film), reviewed by Mike R.
* Silveryview by John le Carré. Reviewed by Mike R.
* Spies in Canaan by David Park. Reviewed by J. E. Leonardson

* Unless otherwise noted, reviews are by Hayden Peake.

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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the reviewers. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
**Intelligence Process/Tradecraft**


The subtitle of this book reveals its true subject. Author and historian Colonel Jonathan House (US Army, retired), is professor emeritus of military history at the Army Command and General Staff College. He has also published a two-volume military history of the Cold War and served as an intelligence analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff during both the 1991 and 2003 Iraq conflicts.\(^a\)

In *Intelligence and the State*, House discusses a wide range of background subjects including the nature of the intelligence profession, its history since the war for independence, its basic elements and functions, its European antecedents, the pitfalls of mirror imaging, and the risk of confirmation bias.

But the principal thrust of the book is on three issues: (1) the relationship between senior political leaders and policymakers who believe they are better analysts than the professionals; (2) the problems that result when senior managers rather than expert analysts brief high-level policy- and decisionmakers; and (3) the rapid turnover and intelligence qualifications of the heads of intelligence services and their inspectors general.

In support of the first issue he offers historical examples. His position on the value of analysts briefing decisionmakers, if possible, is that it protects the managers from echoing the perceived views of their principals and thus helps assure objectivity. (138)

House also suggests that the heads of intelligence community agencies and their inspectors general should have more analytic experience. Historically, too few have been experienced practitioners of the craft. This policy coupled with less turnover would create greater organizational stability and consistency of operations. These position are mitigated, however, by his own discussions of the performance of CIA Directors Robert Gates, James Woolsey, and George Tenet. (127–28)

Colonel House generally avoids political judgments, he does warn that an inexperienced administration can view intelligence as a “deep state… or partisan conspiracy” working “to thwart the executive” even when it is actually following “the laws without partisanship or prejudice.” (163)

*Intelligence and the State* is well documented and presents an uncommon but valuable perspective on the intelligence profession.

**Contemporary Issues**


Geoffrey Cain was a Fulbright scholar at London’s School of Oriental and African Studies before spending 12 years as an investigative journalist reporting from Asia and the Middle East. *The Perfect Police State* is based on his travels in China during August 2017 to September 2020. While there he interviewed “168 Uyghur refugees, technology workers, government officials, researchers, academics, activists, and a former Chinese spy who was preparing to defect.” After acknowledging he has used pseudonyms to protect his sources, he explains the extensive steps taken to verify their statements. (ix–x) The result is worth reading.

In the Xinjiang region of western China, the local Uyghurs call the pervasive surveillance they endure, “The Situation.” (1) Cain describes how modern technology

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is used to monitor every aspect of a citizen’s behavior. The methods used include electronic ID cards, “cameras, artificial intelligence, and facial and voice scanners” that turn the “country into a panopticon.” (17) Those found “untrustworthy” are sent to reeducation camps if they are lucky, prison camps if they are not. Foreigners with visas are treated less severely. Cain’s own introduction to “the Situation” occurred in 2017, when the security police deleted the photos on his phone and detained him for two days.

The protagonist of Cain’s story is called Maysem, and he presents her account of Uyghur existence before and after the Situation was implemented. Broader descriptions of China’s burgeoning surveillance state, often effected by Western technology, are interspersed between Maysem’s interviews.

Currently in Turkey, Maysem grew up when it was possible for Uyghurs to attend Beijing University, where she received her bachelor’s degree. Subsequently she was even permitted to begin work on a master’s in Ankara, Turkey. Then while home for summer vacation she encountered the Situation when a scan of her ID card flashed social ranking: Untrustworthy. After interrogation, she was sent to the camps where among the indignities she suffered, “the guards picked Maysem up and dragged her to an iron chair fitted with cuffs and restraints” and left her in the sun for more than eight hours. (28) Cain describes her re-education in great detail before telling how Maysem’s mother managed to secure her freedom and eventual stressful return to her studies in Ankara.

The Perfect Police State also provides examples of China’s growing nationwide surveillance. In addition to a 24/7 intrusive neighborhood-watch system, the use of artificial intelligence to control CCTV cameras that flag suspicious behavior and provide facial recognition capabilities is pervasive. (110) Cameras are positioned in entertainment venues, supermarkets, schools, and homes of religious figures. Maysem’s family was required to install a government camera in their living room. (114) And then there are the “wifi sniffers,” which collect the unique identifying addresses of computers, smart phones, and other networked devices. (125) Cain documents China’s progress that drew heavily and unashamedly on Western software technology.

In an illustration of China’s reaction to those who deviate from the rule, Cain tells the story of Yusuf Amet whom he interviewed in Turkey. Coerced by the security forces to spy on his family and then on Uyghurs in Pakistan, he escaped to Turkey where he felt safe enough to tell his story on public TV. To no one’s surprise he was quickly tracked down and shot. (227)

The Perfect Police State concludes that the surveillance state cannot be blamed on technological advances, but on the decision to use the technology oppressively without due restraint or care. The Situation, he suggests, is the greatest humanitarian disaster of our century so far and a harbinger of what is to come if we don’t learn to cope with the rapid advance of technology. (229) A well documented admonition of the problem with no solution in sight.

Memoir


The 1959 Cuban revolution disrupted Ric Prado’s comfortable middle-class life in the Cuban mountainside town of Manicaragua. Gradually a combination of events, including Marxist indoctrination, “dominated every aspect” of his school life. (12) Then his father lost his business, and Ric was warned that he was in line to be sent to the Soviet Union for further “education.” He avoided the honor with the help of friend. Circumstances worsened after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, and the Prado family prepared to leave Cuba, a feat still possible when money crossed the right palms. Ric was sent to the United States first, where he spent some months in a Catholic orphanage until his family followed. Black Ops is his account of growing up in the streets of Miami, serving in the Air Force as a pararescueman, and joining CIA, where he would eventually become chief of operations in the Counterterrorism Center (CTC).

His entry into CIA took some time and effort. After he made some inconclusive attempts to join, CIA, in need of a Spanish-speaking medic, contacted Prado and offered him a short-term contract to work in the Special Activities Division (SAD), which conducted paramilitary operations. Soon he was hired full time, working with
the Contras, who were then operating out of Honduras against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Prado’s firsthand positive descriptions of their operations against the Sandinistas provides a perspective that differs greatly from the press coverage of the day.

After three years supporting the Contras, Prado returned to CIA Headquarters and entered George Mason University, where he wrote a senior thesis on counter-terrorism. That was followed by training to become an operations officer. His first assignments were in Latin America, the Philippines, and East Asia. One of his more interesting assignments was countering North Korean operations. Much of the detail is blocked out but he does acknowledge that North Koreans are “exceptionally difficult to penetrate or turn.” (223) Prado gives one example of their operations that involved “legal and undocumented immigrants from Latin America.” Using a combination of cash and coercion they were recruited before they were sent to the United States, some became to become sleeper agents, others bought high-tech electronic items that were then smuggled to North Korea. (226)

In 1995, Prado was assigned to the Counterterrorism Center as deputy chief of Alec Station, a group formed to track the then little-known Usama bin Laden. Aside from a special assignment in an African country he identifies only as “Shangri-La,” Prado would spend the balance of his career in the CTC as Chief of Operations. From that perspective he outlines the CTC’s organization, identifies its key players, describes their reaction to 9/11 and the operations that led to the location and of death of bin Laden.

Despite his obvious respect and admiration for CIA, its staff, and leaders, Prado’s designation of William Donovan—his childhood hero—as a former DCI will not result in a revision of agency history (Donovan was director of the Office of Strategic Services [OSS]). (87)

After retiring, Prado worked for private security firms before settling down as an instructor at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg. His memoir is a stirring, informative contribution from an author with a singular background.

History

Chile, the CIA and the Cold War: A Transatlantic Perspective, by James Lockhart (Edinburgh University Press, 2019) 282 pages, end of chapter notes, bibliography, index.

James Lockhart is an associate professor of history at the American University in Dubai. In Chile, the CIA and the Cold War he takes a revisionist view of the topic.

His account begins with the kidnapping and death of General René Schneider in 1970. He is quick to point out that although the CIA had known “some of the plans” and offered “financial support,” when asked to tell the Chilean president the Soviets were behind the act, the CIA refused. Nevertheless, “historians have tended to focus on the Nixon administration and the Agency when reconstructing Chile’s Cold War experience, particularly the coup that overthrew the [Salvador] Allende government on 11 September 1973.” (2)

Lockhart acknowledges that while the US intervention in the coup “exacerbated the human suffering,” (3) the primary causes of the coup sprang from the Spanish Civil War and were strongly influenced by the Castro revolution in Cuba and other inter-American factors. He goes on to quote historian Tanya Harmer who wrote that “it was the Chilean military leaders who launched the coup with the help of sympathetic Brazilian friends, not the United States.” (4)

Chile, the CIA and the Cold War analyzes these and other historical factors as effected by various governments and political movements until Agosto Pinochet stepped down after losing a referendum on October 5, 1988. Lockhart shows that the Allende coup was different because it “presented the spectre of a Marxist administration that would invite Chilean Communists, who had long cultivated Soviet ties, into government,” an outcome resisted since the1920s. (187–88)

Lockhart concludes by stating that he has attempted to divert the focus from the “United States and its intelligence services” to the far more complex story that finds Chileans, above all others, in the centre of their own politics and history.” (259) It is a different approach to the usual Allende narrative. Well written and documented, Chile, the CIA and the Cold War is worth serious attention.

The title of each of the 11 numbered chapters in this book begins with “How To” and is succeeded respectively by one of the following terms: assassinate, get away with murder, influence, subvert, wage secret war, rig an election, stage a coup, pick your rebels, sabotage, cyberattack, and wield a hidden hand. But the chapters stress “what” can be done, not “how to” do it. This book is about covert action.

Author Rory Cormac, professor of international relations at the University of Nottingham, first establishes that covert action is not the stuff of 007 or Jason Bourne. Then he compares the definitions adopted, at least in practice, by the United States, Britain, Russia, and China and Israel. The balance of the book addresses the chapter topics listed above with examples of their implementation and thoughtful reflection about the political and ethical considerations involved.

Some of the operations discussed fall in more than one category. For example, Iranian Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani was killed by a US drone strike and Russian intelligence poisoned Alexei Navalny. Cormac places each case in the “assassinate” chapter, recognizing Navalny survived. The death of Usama bin Laden, on the other hand, is described in the “murder” chapter. All three make the point that powerful states can conduct such operations and some acknowledge their role, while others do not. Cormac places Russia in the latter category, especially the GRU (military intelligence), which is “willing to embrace implausible deniability.” (22)

The chapter on “cyberattack” not only overlaps with the “influence” and “sabotage,” it is a relatively new and novel form of covert action practiced by many actors. Cormac illustrates this point with the Stuxnet operation against Iran, noting that it was the first time a cyberattack had caused major physical destruction. (238) Considering the implications involved, he warns about “the potentially devastating effects of “cyberwar” or a “cyber 9/11,” adding that the effects of a cyber Pearl Harbor would dwarf those of disruptive sabotage. (235)

The remaining chapters cover the more traditional forms of covert action, and Cormac provides examples in each case. In the process he makes several interesting observations. For example, he notes that while covert action is a term commonly associate with the United States, “the British have been doing this since before the United States existed,” and Russia has a broader approach in what it calls “active measures.” (24) He also raises the possibility of outsourcing covert action to to private companies as a complicating factor. (301)

Finally, Cormac’s views on US covert action are worth noting. In fairness he acknowledges that “Historians associate plotting against Salvador Allende’s socialist government in Chile almost exclusively with the CIA, but documents recently unearthed in local archives reveal the hidden hand of others. We now know that the Brazilian military played a covert role in abetting the coup.” (159) And he says “It is misleading to overlay the CIA hand when thinking about covert actions. Other intelligence agencies, including those of regional powers, have hands of their own.” (160)

More broadly, however, he is critical of covert action in general and US actions in particular. He warns that “Universally applying the clinically bureaucratic approach of the Americans risks misunderstanding the more fluid thinking of the Russians—or even the British for that matter.” (258) He subsequently concludes that “If a whole of government approach is essential, it is unfortunate that the US response has so far been incoherent and uncoordinated. It is not even clear who is responsible for combating foreign disinformation on social media, and how they measure their effectiveness beyond trumpeting the number of initiatives under way.” (296) These rather strong judgments are not illustrated in the text or in the excellent endnotes that include an impressive range of sources. On balance, though, Professor Cormac has produced a valuable and thought-provoking work, the most thorough treatment of the topic to date.

Marie Eder opens the book with a story actor Alex Borstein told in her 2019 Emmy Award acceptance speech. In it she told about her Holocaust-survivor grandmother, who asked her guard as she was standing in line on the way to being shot at the edge of a pit, “What happens if I step out of line?” The guard replied, “I don’t have the heart to shoot you but somebody will.” So she stepped out of line and survived.

Early in World War II, a common perception of a woman’s contribution was as a secretary “or a teaching career...at least until they married and had children.” But there were exceptions; those who chose to ignore convention, disregard established roles, and step out of line. Eder has selected 18 stories of women whose wartime service during exemplifies that principle.

Eder’s first story about tennis star Alice Marble is something of a surprise, as well as a disappointment. Marble had won 18 Grand Slam championships between 1936 and 1940. She continued playing during war. Recruited to spy for the US Army, she provided “information that was used to convict Nazi war criminals in the Nuremberg trials.” And that is where the surprise surfaces. Having depended heavily for material on Marble’s memoir published in 1991, a year after her death, Eder acknowledges, “Those who have tried to dig deeper and confirm the details of her marriage to a hand-some pilot or her role as a spy have been unable to find records that would corroborate her claims.”

The other stories, some well known, are more deserving of inclusion. Virginia Hall, who served in the Special Operations Executive, the OSS, and after the war in the CIA is a fine example. Others like Stephanie Raider was a member of X-2, the OSS counterintelligence branch, an experience she kept secret until 2008. In August 2022, marking its 75th anniversary, CIA inducted Virginia Hall into its group of honored trailblazers.

And then there was Ruth Gruber, a talented journalist who received a temporary rank of Army general, which meant she would have received Geneva Convention protections if her secret mission to bring a thousand Jewish refugees to the United States was discovered.

One of the more unusual cases involved the British opera-loving Cook sisters, who spent three years “escorting” Jewish citizens out of Germany. Another was the story of American Ola ‘Millie’ MacDonald, who overcame considerable odds to become a pilot in the Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASP).

Perhaps the most astonishing account deals with Lieutenant Colonel Charity Adams, the highest-ranking Black female officer during World War II. She commanded the first all-Black Women’s Army Corps unit, the 6888th Central Postal Battalion. The “Six Triple Eight,” as it was called, had 855 women who eventually operated out of Birmingham, England. Their mission: eliminate the monumental backlog of more than a million pieces of rat-infested military mail awaiting distribution. They accomplished the task in half the time allotted. Beyond that team accomplishment, Adam’s personal story is inspiring.

Setting aside the Marble story, The Girls Who Stepped Out of Line is, a valuable and well documented contribution to the history of women in prosecuting WWII.

The Man Who Knew Too Much: An Ex-CIA Officer’s Quest Through a Legend of Betrayal, by Howard Blum (Harper, 2022) 325 pages, photos, index.

The central character in The Man Who Knew Too Much is former CIA case officer Tennent (Pete) Bagley. The central theme, as envisaged by author Howard Blum, is Bagley’s long search for a high-level KGB mole in the CIA who protects other KGB penetrations while simultaneously furnishing Moscow with Intelligence Community secrets. The basis for Bagley’s mole theory is his well-known controversial belief that KGB officer Yuri

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Nosenko was not the bona fide defector he claimed to be. Rather, he was dispatched by the KGB to deflect attention from the high-level mole and cast doubt on the reporting of other defectors and agents. After multiple investigations and often bitter internal controversies that Blum summarizes, these views were ultimately rejected by the CIA but not by Bagley, who in retirement he would write about them in two books.\(^a\)

The prime argument of Blum’s attention-grabbing story is that after retiring in Brussels, Bagley learned of three CIA-related events that convinced him the mole was still active and he began an investigation to identify him. “It would be,” Blum writes, “his final mission.” (5)

The first event was the arrest and execution in 1977 of KGB officer and CIA agent Alexander Ogorodnik (codename TRIGON) in Moscow. Blum suggests that Bagley suspected a KGB penetration compromised TRIGON as opposed to the reasons put forth by the KGB. The second event involved a retired CIA officer, John Paisley, an apparent suicide in 1978, found floating in Chesapeake Bay under suspicious, if not bizarre, circumstances that Blum describes in great detail.\(^b\) That same year, CIA analyst David Sullivan reported his view that Paisley was a mole. (265) But it is not clear when Bagley learned of his conclusion. The third event was the 1984 arrest of Czech spy Karl Koecher, who had penetrated the CIA in 1972 and was later shown to have betrayed TRIGON to the KGB.\(^c\) Blum argues that while Bagley realized neither Nosenko nor Koecher had held a high enough position inside the CIA to be the high-level mole, Bagley “had no doubt that Paisley was the mole he’d been pursuing.” (271)

This conclusion is Blum’s alone and that raises a fundamental problem with the book—sourcing. Blum writes that every fact and quotation is documented and implies the reader should trust him. But nothing in the book explains what led Bagley to link the three CIA-related events or the Paisley conclusion. The Man Who Knew Too Much just offers undocumented speculation. For example, Blum states that Paisley interrogated Nosenko and they later became close friends. (188) As for Koecher, Blum suggests that Bagley concluded it “makes perfect operational sense for Koecher to be working hand in hand with Paisley,” (230) citing their common interest in sex clubs—Paisley owned one—while Koecher and his wife hosted sex parties that provided good cover. But Bagley never mentioned Paisley or Koecher in his books or articles and Blum does not cite any other sources.

Blum goes on to suggest that Bagley realized that the only proof of these relationships resided in a KGB vault and put his investigation on hold until the Berlin Wall came down. Then he decided “to try and convince these gray-faced former Soviet Bloc intelligence and counterintelligence officers that the time had come to talk.” (276) He was successful in part with one, retired KGB Lieutenant General Sergei Kondrashev. At their meeting in Prenden Germany, he told Bagley about a KGB officer dispatched to the CIA: “His name was Yuri Nosenko. His mission was to protect the source we had in America.” (291) Kondrashev did not identify that source.

Blum sets the penultimate events of The Man Who Knew Too Much in snowy Moscow and its Novodevichy Cemetery. (293) Here, writes Blum, Bagley asks Kondrashev about Paisley: “Tell me was he the mole? You know who was Nosenko’s control.” (293–4) Bagley never revealed Kondrashev’s response because, Blum suggests, he “understood the indefinite quality of the proof he’d found at the Novodevichy Cemetery would never sway unreasonable, predetermined minds.” (298) This assessment is imaginative and disingenuous if not fabricated. Bagley only visited Moscow once in the summer in the 1990s, as described in his book Spy Wars.\(^d\) He did meet with Kondrashev later as explained in his second book Spymaster, but not in Moscow. As Bagley wrote, “From 2000 through 2006, we met about twice a year… in Brussels. We worked in my personal study…. When not together, we exchanged drafts and comments via mail, email, and telephone between Brussels and Moscow.”\(^e\)

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\(^a\) Tennent H. Bagley, Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games (Yale University Press, 2007). David Ignatius wrote of book, quoted in Bagley’s Washington Post obituary February 24, 2014, “It is a stunner. It’s impossible to read this book without developing doubts about Nosenko’s bona fide. Many readers will conclude that Angleton was right all along — that Nosenko was a phony, sent by the KGB to deceive a gullible CIA.”


\(^c\) Martha Peterson, The Widow Spy: My CIA Journey from the Jungles of Laos to Prison in Moscow (Red Canary Press, 2012).

\(^d\) Bagley, Spy Wars, viii.

Besides the atrocious sourcing issues, two other features of the book deserve attention. First there is Blum’s frequent inclusion of imaginary assumptions. For example, Blum says Bagley “sat in his book-lined study and tried to sort it all out.” (14) In the same vein is the comment about a Bagley trip to nearby Waterloo battlefield: “there was no witness to his peregrination on the morning in the icy winter of 1980 when Pete, with the careful introspection of a born case man, pondered the decision he knew he had to make.” (36) And later, “At first his musings were vague and mawkish, a senior citizen waxing sentimental about living long enough to see everything. But Pete’s thoughts soon hardened.” (275) Blum never met Pete Bagley, and descriptions like these imply a nonexistent intimacy with the subject. They may serve Blum’s literary goal, “to shape this tale as a nonfiction narrative mirroring the actual adventure Bagley had lived,” (306) but they are pure speculation if not deception.

The second feature concerns factual errors. For example, Nosenko was not a KGB lieutenant colonel; David Murphy was chief of base not chief of station in Berlin; the intelligence from the Berlin Tunnel was not tainted; Vitali Yurchenko was never a general; and Blum’s description of Martha Peterson’s capture by the KGB is only partially accurate even though he references her book, which contains the correct version. The Man Who Knew Too Much is a deeply flawed account by an author who doesn’t know enough.


Secret City is a look at the experiences of gay and lesbian public figures and government employees in Washington, D.C., from the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration to the present. Author James Kirchick introduces the topic with two examples from America’s Revolutionary period. Baron von Steuben, who served with General Washington at Valley Forge, and Pierre L’Enfant, who designed the nation’s capital, were among those who concealed their sexuality. (7) And he mentions other 19th and early 20th century figures—presidents, generals, advisers, and professional colleagues—who may have done the same. His important point being that although condemned by the clergy and government institutions of the day, they could have a career while closeted if they exercised vigilance and discretion—until World War II.

Kirchick discusses two groups of gays and lesbians in Secret City: Washington high society and government employees. While the society figures are covered in detail, this review concentrates on those who were linked to the State Department and the intelligence services. Secret City shows how “from the Second World War to the end of the Cold War that followed, the specter of homosexuality haunted Washington.” Nothing posed a more potent threat to a political or government career than accusations of homosexuality. (6)

The justification for denying employment to government employees—including the military—was that their sexual orientation left them vulnerable to blackmail and Communist recruitment. Toward that end, President Eisenhower on April 27, 1953, issued Executive Order 10450 prohibiting those guilty of “sexual perversion” from holding any job in the federal government. (179) Kirchick writes that “Even at the height of the Cold War, it was safer to be a Communist than a homosexual. A Communist could break with the party. A homosexual was forever tainted.” (7)

Kirchick digresses to tell the story of DCI Allen Dulles’s search for a Northern Virginia location for a new headquarters building in the late 1950s. When he settled on its present location he was advised that “You’ll have to go around Miss Scattergood,” (210) who lived with her companion Florence Thorne in a house—now the Scattergood-Thorne Conference Center—on the desired property. Kirchick tells how Dulles gained her support.

Kirchick highlights several cases that show the gradual change in attitudes toward and treatment of gays and lesbians in government. The career of OSS officer Cora Du Bois, a University of California–Berkeley-trained cultural anthropologist, was unaffected during her OSS service. By war’s end, she headed the research and analysis branch in Sri Lanka, where she began a relationship with fellow OSS employee Jeanne Taylor. After the war, Du Bois, now with the State Department, was targeted by the FBI and left government in 1950. (65) In 1953, Princeton graduate and Finland desk officer John C. Montgomery,
faced with a background investigation, hanged himself. (164) By late 1980, however, Jamie Shoemaker, an NSA officer who was outed as gay and threatened with dismissal, successfully challenged his firing and set a precedent. (479) Secret City is a valuable, enlightening contribution.


The British fascination with James Bond and Queen Elizabeth II was evident to the world when they seemed to parachute into the Olympic stadium to open the 2012 Games. “A masterpiece of deception,” according to University of Nottingham historians Richard Aldrich and Rory Cormac in their new book, The Secret Royals. (1) But it is also powerful metaphor that reflects the level of interest between the intelligence services and the royals, at least most of them.

Despite the implications of the subtitle, the authors begin their tale with Elizabeth I and her active involvement with the clandestine operations of Sir Francis Walsingham. They continue by commenting briefly on events of the next two centuries until the reign of Queen Victoria when new countries had formed in Europe and technological advancements changed communications.

Queen Victoria’s uncle, King Leopold I of the Belgians, counseled her on the importance of foreign affairs and in the tradecraft of counterintelligence. She learned how to open and resell intercepted letters and to write them with deceptive messages when she knew they would be intercepted in turn. (47) Because her government had no formal intelligence service, she developed her own agents, mainly family members in Europe, and shared their reporting with her government. She corresponded with daughter Vicky by cipher. Vicky took huge risks and concealed her communications. After the World War II, Anthony Blunt, paradoxically loyal to the king but also a Soviet agent, visited her ancestral home in Germany and smuggled Vicky’s personal papers back to Windsor.

Security was also constant problem for Victoria and she survived several assassination attempts, fortunately by amateurs. (49) In response to Irish terror attacks in the 1880s, she saw to it that Special Branch was created in the Metropolitan Police. And she approved of the creation of the war office’s special duties sections in 1909 that later became M15 and M16. As the authors would have it, Victoria became an early version of Dame Judi Dench’s character M in several James Bond movies.

Edward VIII, the Duke of Windsor, also receives considerable attention in The Secret Royals. His involvement with intelligence operations was as a security risk. His marriage to an American divorcee and his pro-Nazi links raised many questions. His father placed him under almost constant surveillance by Special Branch. An MI5 officer, Thomas Robertson, tapped his phone in Buckingham Palace and became the first outsider to hear of the pending abdication. (220) The couple endured surveillance during the war and for most of their lives.

The Secret Royals naturally deals with the present royal family and the late Princess Diana. For example, after her divorce, Diana was worried there were hidden microphones in her Kensington apartment and tore up floor boards looking for them. She also “worried about devices being placed in plug sockets, light switches or lamps.” In each case nothing was found. (570) The circumstances of her death are reviewed but nothing new is added.

Queen Elizabeth II (who died September 8, 2022) is depicted as fully aware of secret service business but not as directly involved as Victoria. Along with other members of the Royal Family, she performed diplomatic services on government missions to improve foreign relations, and the comments on her links to the intelligence and security services are meager. But as the authors point out in their remarks on sources, the answers to many of their questions remain in the tightly restricted in the Royal Archives. Thus Aldrich and Cormac conclude that intelligence services and the royals have secrecy in common. Still, The Secret Royals is an interesting, well documented contribution.

Amy Elizabeth Pack (née Thorpe) was an American who became an agent for British Security Coordination (BSC), the awkwardly titled headquarters in New York City that represented MI6, MI5, and SOE during much of World War II. The source that describes her participation and assigned the codename Cynthia is BSC’s official history published in 1998.

Cynthia’s BSC’s case officer and self-admitted lover, historian Hartford Montgomery Hyde, wrote a book about her after the war called Cynthia: The Spy Who Changed the Course of the War. Hyde later acknowledged he had exaggerated her exploits. In 1992 Mary Lovell published a respected biography of Pack that set her record straight. Then came A Spy Called Cynthia.

Books by anonymous authors are generally suspect and A Spy Called Cynthia is no exception. The manuscript was surfaced by a former British ambassador to Washington, Robin Renwick, who promised the author, a close friend, not to publish it until all the participants were dead. Renwick refuses to identify the author but does say that he was a “British spymaster” who was involved with “Kim Philby and the Cambridge spies,” had “friendships with counterparts in the CIA,” and handled Cynthia during World War II. Then he adds the qualifier that he cannot “guarantee [the book’s] entire authenticity.”

There are several other aspects of the book that Renwick inexplicably did not mention. Fore-most among them is that the book barely mentions Cynthia! “Anonymous” gives a version of her wartime exploits in just three pages. The balance of the book is his memoir of MI6 service. With occasional brief mentions of their pre- and post-war relationship, he devotes more space to the CIA, the Cambridge spies, French intelligence, and other well-known Soviet espionage cases than to Cynthia. There are no source notes. Those interested in Cynthia’s espionage career should read Lovell.

The Woman All Spies Fear: Code breaker Elizebeth Smith Friedman and her hidden life, by Amy Butler Greenfield (Random House Studio, 2021) 328 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

There is a documentary about Elizebeth Smith Friedman. But as is often the case, for the full story, read the book. Historian Amy Greenfield’s contribution offers more and much new detail about Friedman’s challenging early life, her controversy with millionaire George Fabyan, her government service, and her relationship with her famous husband, William Friedman. And she includes short tutorials on cryptography.

Born on August 26, 1892, near Huntington, Indiana, Elizebeth was the youngest of nine children. Greenfield describes the bumpy path Elizebeth followed to get an education at Hillsdale College, before joining eccentric Col. George Fabyan, who tasked her with helping to decipher the alleged code in Shakespeare’s First Folio. William Friedman was later assigned to the problem, and they soon agreed it was a fool’s errand. A displeased Fabyan grumbled, but with World War I under way he asked them to set up a Department of Ciphers on his campus called Riverbank. They were soon training military codebreakers and decrypting secret messages for the War, Navy, and State Departments, and even the post office. They became a well-known and valuable team that inevitably evolved into mixed-religion marriage that shocked both families.

When William joined the Army and was sent to France where he worked on codebreaking, Elizabeth stayed at Riverbank for a while before leaving and returning home to wait for William. After his discharge, they accepted positions—over the heated objections of Fabyan—in the War Department. Happy to be in Washington, Elizebeth discovered she was to be William’s assistant at half his pay. She soon quit. Greenfield provides other examples

d. The Codebreaker (PBS, January 11, 2021) is reviewed by David Welker, page 83.
of the persistent gender discrimination Elizabeth encountered in her career.

She soon accepted a job with the navy but it didn’t last long due to a pregnancy. After returning to work, this time with the Coast Guard, her codebreaking career blossomed. She broke smugglers and bootleggers codes and helped the Royal Canadian Mounted Police on a drug case. Shortly before Pearl Harbor, Elizabeth was made “cryptanalyst in charge” of a unit in the Treasury Department and loaned briefly to Col. William Donovan, the Coordinator of Information. (186)

Elizabeth’s most impressive contributions came during World War II. She helped the FBI solve the Doll Shop espionage case (Velvalee Dickinson, a doll shop owner in New York, attempted to pass details about US naval forces to Japan), though the bureau didn’t acknowledge her contribution. Her reputation grew nonetheless when her unit broke the cipher traffic from German agents in South America. Great personal satisfaction followed her subsequent solution of ENIGMA traffic. She even broke codes for the FBI again, although they took the official credit. As the war drew down and men returned to take management positions, Elizabeth was gradually eased out of the most demanding work. After the war she helped write the unit history and then returned to the Coast Guard before demobilizing. But only two months later, she was hired by the brand-new International Monetary Fund where she remained until September 1949. William remained with what became the National Security Agency (NSA) until his retirement.

Their retirement years, Greenfield discovered, are not well documented. The Friedmans did write a book that analyzed the Shakespearean Ciphers controversy. Then in 1958, to their alarm and consternation, the NSA confiscated much of their personal library. Greenfield notes that NSA eventually returned some of the material and named its main auditorium after William in 1975.

After William’s death on November 2, 1969, Elizabeth arranged to send their books and papers to the Marshall Library at the Virginia Military Institute, on the condition that she would catalogue them first. That task consumed much of her remaining life. She died on October 31, 1980.

Aimed at young adults and teens, The Woman All Spies Fear is a very positive, poignant and important contribution to the intelligence literature.

See also Randy Burkett’s review of the PBS documentary The Codebreaker beginning on page 51.

Intelligence Abroad

Russian Intelligence: A Case-Based Study of Russian Services and Missions Past and Present, by Kevin P. Riehle (National Intelligence Press, 2022) 368 pages, endnotes, bibliography, index.

Before joining the National Intelligence University (NIU) as an associate professor of strategic intelligence, Kevin Riehle served more than 30 years as a counterintelligence analyst assigned to various elements of the US government and ending at DIA.

During the COVID-19 period of virtual attendance at NIU, subjects were adapted for unclassified presentation. As Riehle revamped his Russian security services course, he realized that “no single volume existed that credibly presented a complete, unbiased picture of Russian intelligence.” (8) Even Russian Intelligence does not quite meet his criterion. The historical period covered is from 1881 when Tsar Aleksandr III created the Okhrana, or security force, to the Putin era. Ronald Hingley’s The Russian Secret Police begins with the Oprichnina under Ivan the Terrible, in 1565, but ends much earlier. That anomaly does not detract from the value of the work.

Russian Intelligence begins with an essay on the extensive sources available in English, Russian, the former Warsaw Pact nations, many of which appear in the endnotes. The balance of the book is divided into three sections (although inexplicably the text says four).


Section one “answers the question who is Russian intelligence.” (9) Its focus is on the identification and history of security service organizations beginning with the Okhrana and continuing with its Soviet successors from the Cheka to the KGB. He explains how the post-Soviet services—the SVR, FSB, and FSO—are related to their Soviet predecessors. The military intelligence designation, GRU, was the same in both periods. But according to Riehle, its name was recently changed to RU (Main Directorate). Its present status is unclear, however, because President Putin expressed doubt that the change was a good idea. (54) The history described in this section identifies patterns that are found in today’s intelligence and security activities.

The second section “answers the question, why, explaining the primary directions of Russian intelligence” (9) from the Soviet era to the present. Here the focus is in part on the functional missions performed by the security services. These include internal security, foreign intelligence collection, counterintelligence and counterterrorism. Riehle devotes a separate chapter to military intelligence noting that its operations sometimes overlap with the SVR.

The final section addresses “how” Russian intelligence services conduct political, economic, S&T, and military collection and covert operations. Human intelligence methods are treated first followed by technical means from SIGINT, satellites, and various forms of cyber operations. Riehle also adds an equation developed earlier, with comments on its use, to aid analysts: threat = intent x capability x opportunity.*

*Russian Intelligence* is a impressive contribution to the intelligence literature.

**Spies, Spin and the Fourth Estate: British Intelligence and the Media**, by Paul Lashmar (Edinburgh University Press, 2020) 296 pages, end of chapter notes, references, index.

Paul Lashmar is currently head of journalism at City, University of London. Before entering academia, he had a distinguished forty-year career as an investigative journalist often covering intelligence. He may also be remembered for his earlier book *Spy Flights of the Cold War.* In *Spies, Spin and the Fourth Estate* he examines the intertwined “worlds of spying and journalism” that he finds “sometimes intimate and sometimes confrontational.” (viii) His goal is to provide an “insider’s perspective of intelligence and the media.” (ix) His bold underlying assumptions are that the task of making sense “of the intelligence community has largely fallen to journalists.” And when necessary, “it has been the journalist’s job to bring wayward spies to account.” (7)

Lashmar’s approach is chronological, beginning with Sun Tsu and ending with the war on terror. In the early 20th century his focus is British press reaction to charges of German spying and how this affected the formation of Britain’s modern intelligence and security services. He goes on to discuss the elements of “the huge U.S. intelligence community” and their relationship to American media. (xi)

The close links of the British intelligence services with journalists gets vigorous attention. Lashmar points out that many wartime intelligence officers were journalists and later were regarded with caution by their peers. Journalist Phillip Knightley “warned that MI5 had agents in most newspaper offices.” (74) He also wrote that MI6 maintained continuing close contacts with journalists and used journalist cover after the war. Lashmar does not favor such close links.

In the Thatcher years, Lashmar notes that “revelation after revelation over intelligence failures” and book exposés kept them busy. (152) One example is the hoax taped conversation between President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher that was exposed by the press. Another is the case of MI5 whistleblower Cathy Massiter, when the government attempted to prevent publication of her revelations. In the book category, the Spycatcher trial in Australia gained worldwide attention when the press reported the British government admitted to being “economical with the truth.” Sometimes the press plays catch-up. Lashmar gives the example of then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, who lied when he denied British intelligence was involved with the US “rendition and

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torture” program. His story stood for years until the truth was revealed by a Parliamentary committee. (251)

The controversy surrounding the documents leaked by Edward Snowden involved journalists from several countries. Lashmar comments that the Guardian newspaper acted responsibly by only publishing those documents that didn’t put lives in danger. He is absolutely certain that it was their call to make.

Lashmar concludes with mostly insightful observations about the media’s new challenging digital world. But one example he gives is questionable. He writes that the Bush administration allowed “the CIA to illegally wiretap targeted American citizens. It is estimated that up to 200,000 intelligence staff knew about this.” (262) Fact checking failed him in this instance.

Spies, Spin and the Fourth Estate gives interesting examples of the press informing the public about alleged wrong doing that spurred or monitored official oversight investigations. Whether the same results would have been obtained using other oversight mechanisms is not discussed, but Lashmar implies they would not when he recommends “a proactive accountability investigative capability over” these oversight bodies. (266) Finally, the assumption that it is “the journalist’s job to bring wayward spies to account” is left unproved.

A State of Secrecy: Stasi Informers and the Culture of Surveillance, by Alison Lewis (University of Nebraska Press, Potomac Books, 2021) 275 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Alison Lewis is a professor of German at the University of Melbourne. In a recent book chapter, “The Stasi’s Secret War on Books,” she discussed the case of a one-time Stasi unofficial collaborator whose website made no mention of her Stasi connection. A State of Secrecy takes a different approach. Its basic thesis is that the East German Secret Police, the Stasi, recruited virtually every writer and literary figure in the country as informants. The Stasi the considered the writers part of the political elite needed to support the socialist cause. Lewis uses their Stasi files to identify them and demonstrate the nature of their “cooperation.” The number of informants involved in this groups is not known, but Lewis suggests it was small compared to the 90,000 official Stasi employees who controlled 189,000 informants when East Germany collapsed in 1989.

To illustrate this situation, Lewis presents five in-depth case studies of informant writers—two women and three men—recruited by the Stasi. Each examines motivation and performance from the earliest recruitment in 1949 through 1989. In general, she shows that motivation was a mix of the thrills of secrecy, the excitement of role-playing, the desire for money, the drive for power, and at times the result of coercion. The exception was the one dedicated Communist and true believer. In the other four case studies Lewis concludes “the promise of the secret life of a Stasi agent was, at least initially, attractive and compelling to the new recruits.” (203) In these cases, she shows that informants also had secondary motives—to be allowed to publish—in addition to the nominally expressed political-ideological conviction.

In terms of their performance, the results are surprising. In one case, the informant quit, left the country and later was permitted to return. In another the informant refused incentives and defied intimidation before successfully breaking his pledge to work for the Stasi without further penalty. Others stayed until the end although with dwindling cooperation while missing assigned meetings and report deadlines. Lewis ascribes the Stasi’s tolerant attitude to belief that writers had great influence in a society that was teeming with secrets that the communist regime was desperate to know. And informants had several advantages over high-tech paraphernalia such as hidden cameras, telephone wiretaps, and mail intercepts. Not only could they evaluate information in ways that machines could not, they could get close to sources.

A State of Secrecy depicts an unexpectedly tolerant Stasi-informant relationship based on expediency. While it allowed the informants some opportunity to pursue their careers, the level of stress was high, the cooperation reluctant, and few were disappointed when the Stasi was no more.

**Fiction**


Former CIA analyst David McCloskey has made his first foray into the intelligence thriller genre with laudable panache. Damascus Station is a taut thriller that borrows generously from firsthand experience, with three-dimensional characters and page-turning plot twists. Damascus Station sets these elements inside the Syrian civil war where bomb blasts are never far away and the intelligence game is played with the highest of stakes. Its protagonist is Samuel Joseph, an experienced Arabic-speaking officer with no less than 15 recruitments (who somehow remains a GS-12), who travels to Paris to bump (orchestrate a meeting) Mariam Haddad, a Syrian government official.

What follows is an espionage case that drives to the heart of Syria’s chemical weapons program and the regime’s effort to crush internal opposition in a protracted civil war. McCloskey’s narrative suffers only occasionally from implausible twists and trivial errors that stretch the credulity of an experienced intelligence officer to the breaking point. The reviewer was ultimately willing to forgive these venial sins as the price of admission to a ride that does not cease accelerating until the final pages.

McCloskey’s narrative is the obvious product of insider knowledge used skillfully in the service of the story. Certain details are resoundingly right. Joseph reviews a targeting package for Haddad that includes personal information. He moves to bump her during a diplomatic event after noticing she is trapped in a boring discussion with a Bulgarian diplomat. Plausibly, Joseph succeeds in extricating Haddad by pretending they are long-lost friends renewing acquaintances. The rapport-building discussions are abbreviated but ring true enough, especially because the reader knows Haddad harbors serious doubts about her loyalty to the Assad government.

Later, McCloskey masterfully depicts Joseph’s eight-hour marathon surveillance detection route through Damascus by juxtaposing his growing suspicion against the bloodlust of adversaries who follow him on cameras and communicate to a large team relaying his movement across the city. Needed levity arrives during a passage depicting Joseph’s visit to the basement in CIA’s headquarters to sample the fare from a now notorious automatic hot dog machine.

This arresting authenticity is set against sometimes sensational or “movie-made” plot points that belie the tedious, bureaucratic grind of intelligence operations. For example, McCloskey asks the reader to believe on no less than three occasions that armed villains successfully ambush and outnumber the protagonists but yet are all killed without even inflicting serious injury.

As noted, Joseph’s meeting with Mariam is authentic. Less believable are details surrounding his near immediate, premeditated willingness to risk his career by having an affair with her. There are also serious questions about the CIA’s agreement to issue Mariam a proprietary communications system and to base missile strikes on her uncorroborated information despite the fact that Joseph does not even formally recruit her. All requests to headquarters are granted almost immediately, and support assets with luxurious safehouses stocked with food abound. Joseph is apparently free from the onerous burden of documenting his case and winning stakeholder approval for recruitment or operational strategy.

More puzzling than McCloskey’s predilection for the sensational are inconsequential mistakes or brow-raising plot points seemingly superfluous to the overall story. Mariam does not receive her cryptonym until the operation is well under way. Analysts in headquarters listen to noise-canceling headphones while reviewing intelligence reports. Canadian intelligence has a safe house rented in downtown Damascus. Sam demands, and is immediately granted, a reassignment to Syria over beers at his division chief’s house. Inside the station, he is apparently the only core collector despite the high priority of the Syrian target and works only with the assistance of a temporary-duty analyst and a headstrong chief of station. Besides her sensitive communications equipment, Mariam conducts computer-implant and surreptitious-camera operations in rapid succession, none of which is essential to the overall story.

Demerits aside, the primary task for any fictional espionage work is less authenticity than white-knuckle suspense and characters whose loyalties and motivations shift and move across the pages like mercury. This is where Damascus Station succeeds most emphatically and why...
its shortcomings are ultimately forgivable. From the opening pages, Joseph has a clear motive for revenge against the Syrians and the target seems clear—until it is not. Mariam makes the fateful choice to enter a secret relationship with the CIA and her commitment seems clear—until it is not. Joseph and his station chief in Damascus forge a plan skillfully concealed from the reader until the climax of the story.

After Sam finds himself under arrest and in Syrian custody, it seems impossible to believe that they are succeeding. The best testament to McCloskey’s skill as a writer is that most of the hanging threads are neatly tied by the end of the story while those left dangling likely will provide the fabric for a sequel. That book, and a Hollywood depiction, seem destined for an eager audience upon arrival.

The Gray Man, Film directed by Anthony Russo and Joe Russo (Netflix, 2022) 129 minutes. Reviewed by Mike R.

Talk about playing against type. Chris Evans, known worldwide to Avengers fans for his portrayal of Captain America, a paragon of American virtue and justice, plays the villain in this film: Lloyd Hansen, a sociopathic CIA washout operating as a mercenary for his former employer. Over the top probably understates both Evans’s acting and the destruction his character leaves in his wake. His cheesiness, from his mustache to his swagger, could even have been comical—in a good sense—had it fit in with the rest of the acting. But not everyone got the same memo; when one person hams it up far more than the others, it underscores the differences and calls into question the integrity of the whole effort.

The Gray Man, adapted from the eponymous 2009 novel by Mark Greaney, increasingly gives itself over to the mayhem and carnage that ensue in virtually any scene with Evans. It is not just that his character revels in this and has no moral balance—he has no qualms about collateral damage or using innocent family members as bargaining chips—but we are expected to believe that military-style engagements in the middle of a European capital can take place without much in the way of consequence. Perhaps this is not surprising, given the film’s direction by the Russo brothers, famous for several Captain America and Avengers films sporting big budgets and huge set pieces.

Hansen’s opposite number is the protagonist Sierra Six played by Ryan Gosling, the “gray man” of the title. Six and Hansen are not that different on the surface. Gosling is part of “Sierra,” a compartmented CIA program that took people out of prison and turned them into hit men for their country. Things then go awry, and the hunter becomes the hunted as Hansen tries to eliminate Six while securing a flash drive in Six’s possession containing evidence of corruption among the upper reaches of the Sierra program. Does any of this sound familiar?

La Femme Nikita by French director Luc Besson showed the way in 1990 with its evocative tale of a woman pulled out of what would have been life in prison in exchange for a faked death and a career as a government assassin under a new name. American audiences may be more familiar with its inferior remake, Point of No Return (1993), and multiple follow-on TV series, including Nikita, with star Maggie Q, in the early 2010s. It was at about this time that people started considering turning Greaney’s The Gray Man into a film.

Rather than Nikita, what may first come to audience’s minds, however, is Jason Bourne, particularly the series of movies starring Matt Damon beginning in 2002 based on Robert Ludlum’s 1980s-era Bourne novels. Swapping out the prison backdrop for volunteer recruits, the “Treadstone” program trained and deployed an elite group of individuals across the globe to covertly do the CIA’s bidding. Many other parallels appear between Sierra and Treadstone. Operatives are turned loose upon other operatives. Program managers are not immune from danger. Intrigue and internal power struggles run rampant. Officials are called to account, yet somehow the program carries on.

For all the action, The Gray Man does make a nod toward sentimentality. Just as Nikita found a husband and Bourne a girlfriend, Six forms a bond with a young girl (well played by 13-year-old Julia Butters) he is asked to look after—the niece of his CIA mentor. This aspect invokes comparisons with The Professional, another film by Luc Besson from 1994 in which Jean Reno’s assassin Léon takes under his wings the recently orphaned girl next door played by a young Natalie Portman. Reno
played his character in the strong and silent manner as well and was pitted against a semi-maniacal crooked cop played to the hilt by Gary Oldman.

Netflix is betting big on The Gray Man, hoping it becomes a major hit and an action vehicle for its lead. Already there is talk of a sequel. Gosling/Six is no Damon/Bourne, however. In The Bourne Supremacy, there is a scene where the title character appears almost catatonic while detained in a Naples airport holding room until he suddenly comes alive and overpowers his minders. For too much of this movie, it feels as if Gosling is similarly lethargic and we are left waiting for him to break out of his haze. Perhaps Gosling is channeling his inner Keanu Reeves as Neo in The Matrix, who could hold off opponents with one hand, but the more apropos Reeves analogy would be the recent John Wick movies. This is especially the case as Hansen sends out word to numerous fellow hit men to all converge on Six to take him out, just like when a bounty notice is distributed on Wick and people come out of the woodwork to try to collect. The Gray Man is a high-octane action flick that lets the body count do the talking; many scenes feel like they could have been plucked out of the latest Fast and Furious movie with Vin Diesel and Dwayne Johnson.

Perhaps The Gray Man’s greatest flaw is simply that we have seen it all before, and better done. That said, those looking for action will not be disappointed, and it appeals to one’s globe-trotting inclinations by hop-scutching in quick succession to half a dozen or so world capitals. The massive budget also shines through; it feels as if the studio spared no expense in securing some of these locations and then blowing them up. In addition, the movie features a top-notch cast, including a well-cast Billy Bob Thornton as the man who hired Six and an under-utilized Alfre Woodard as a former CIA chief. Ana de Armas stands out in what seems a reprise of her brief gun-toting appearance alongside Daniel Craig in his final James Bond installment No Time to Die (2021). Bridgerton star Regé-Jean Page and The Matrix Resurrections’ Jessica Henwick similarly deliver strong performances as CIA managers with questionable ethics.

In the end, gray is an apt word for the movie title. The true color of espionage, it occupies a middle ground between dark and light, black and white. Gosling has a gray demeanor, not conveying a broad range of emotion: a raised eyebrow here, a slight pause in cadence there are all that signal a deviation from his even-keeled demeanor. And most moviegoers will see The Gray Man as middle-of-the-road fare—enjoyable escapism yet quickly forgettable, just as the colors of our wardrobe blend into gray at the end of the dryer cycle. At least until the sequel comes out.

Silverview, John le Carré (Viking, 2021), 208 pages—Reviewed by Mike R.

Silverview is a throwback, shorter and starker than most John le Carré novels. Longer only than his inaugural efforts Call for the Dead and A Murder of Quality, its 208 pages are a refreshing change; the economy of language helps keep a tight focus and captures his essence in concentrated form. Silverview reflects a back-to-basics approach mated with a no-holds-barred attitude. The novel hearkens to his earlier days as an author, makes use of a Cold War-era back story, and embraces the nuts and bolts of the espionage business. Although not his finest creation, it is firmly in his upper tier, as much for the traditional elements that readers have come to expect as for the many ways in which it stands apart.

Le Carré, pen name of David Cornwell (b. October 19, 1931, d. December 12, 2020), rose to prominence as a spy novelist in the 1960s. The Spy Who Came in from the Cold set the standard, first in print (1963) and then on the big screen (1965)—but his novels over the years have become more explorations of the human condition and less explicitly the stuff of spycraft. To be sure, all of his novels involve espionage, but the profession is a means to an end. It would seem that le Carré, who served with MI5 and MI6 in the late 1950s and early 1960s, came away with more than a bit of disillusionment from his experience. He perpetually accentuates the glass-half-empty side of the trade and focuses on its personal toll. Government machinations and international politics provide context, but the focus is as if looking through a soda straw; nothing else matters but those two or three characters and the all-enveloping issues that take over their lives. Such single-mindedness comes to the fore as well in Silverview.

Silverview, largely written a decade before its 2021 release, was brought to publication by le Carré’s son Nick Cornwell—per the father’s wishes that Nick see through
to completion any unpublished manuscript at the time of his death. In an afterword, Cornwell claims little editing was necessary; we are reading it largely as he found it. Why the wait? Cornwell suggests le Carré may have held on to it because “it cut too close to the bone” (215) and chipped away at the image of British intelligence, which he had taken great pains to uphold. Cornwell believed that just as le Carré had tried to maintain a stiff upper lip about his real-life exploits in intelligence, he also had certain lines he chose not to cross in the fictional world. Whatever the reason, there can be little doubt as to its authenticity. Le Carré has a style all his own that few could replicate. Silverview is distinctly his and his alone.

The author draws inspiration from Friedrich Nietzsche, the 19th century philosopher famous for proclaiming “God is dead.” Nietzsche lived out his final years in a state of severe mental and physical decline at Villa Silberblick in Weimar. Le Carré, a lifelong admirer of German culture, places an anglicized version of this abode at the center of the eponymously titled novel. He hails Nietzsche as “our most fearless advocate of individual freedom” and links him and a central character as practitioners of the “‘Do what you think,’ not ‘Think what you do’” school (128), an undercurrent in many le Carré novels. He then invites comparisons between the enfeebled Prussian and the course of British intelligence and society writ large. Silverview is an unusually pointed title for the author, cutting to the core of the narrative and expressing deep-seated feelings amassed over a lifetime.

Silverview fires broadsides at the role and relevancy of Her Majesty’s Government. It feels as if the author is vicariously communicating long-held criticism through the voices of his characters: “if Head Office is working your joes to death, don’t say yes, sir, no, sir, three bags full, tell them to go to hell.” (98) And “Did [he] see the Service as the problem rather than the solution?” (199) The novel serves as a vehicle for le Carré to assess the trajectory of modern England and her intelligence servants, acknowledging past prominence but leaving no doubt that times have shifted. The narrative advances from a once-proudful historic sense of place—“Like all families of its kind, [they] knew from birth that the spiritual sanctum of Britain’s ruling classes was its secret services” (30)—to an acknowledgment of failure—“we didn’t do much to alter the course of human history, did we? … As one old spy to another, I reckon I’d have been more use running a boys’ club.” (111)—to a call for a changing of the guard: “[He] harbours the refreshing notion that Britain requires a new élite.” (126) Little can be said of the plot without giving too much away, but there are three distinct strands. The ostensible protagonist is a young Englishman, Julian Lawndsley, making a fresh start as a bookstore owner in a small seaside town after leaving London behind. Edward Avon, an elder visitor to his shop, insinuates himself into his life in surprisingly quick fashion, and we increasingly turn our attention to this second character, a self-described “British mongrel, retired, a former academic of no merit and one of life’s odd-job men.” (16) He takes on numerous names, and a web of intrigue emerges with everything he touches, as his life in the shadows is revealed. Yet while the reader is focused on these two men, le Carré has been expertly weaving in a third element in the form of M16’s lead “bloodhound,” Stewart Proctor, pursuing an internal security investigation that helps tie things all together in the end. Silverview plays up the security angle in ways reminiscent of the detective work exhibited by le Carré’s George Smiley in his earliest outings, and the M16 sleuth threatens to upstage his rivals and reflect the real soul of this novel.

Silverview largely unfolds in England, with prominent flashbacks to other European locales, particularly the Balkans conflicts of the 1990s. The historical distance of such events deprives the story of some of its immediacy. However, the venues serve their purpose well, and it is easy to see how le Carré would have been drawn to the first outbreak of war on the continent in 50 years that reopened old wounds and created new ones aplenty—a breeding ground for le Carré characters if ever there were one.

Like so many of the author’s novels, Silverview revolves around deception. When Lawndsley thinks of Avon, he believes “he has met two irreconcilable versions of the man. He wonders how many more there are to come.” (28) Proctor later questions “who are you, Edward—you who have been so many people and pretended to be still others? Who do we find when we’ve pulled away the layers of disguise? Or were you ever only the sum of your disguises?” (197)

Le Carré is no stranger to invoking autobiographical elements, but Silverview even incorporates what might be a veiled reference to his own legacy. When Avon pitches an idea to Lawndsley for a “Republic of Literature,”—a “shrine to the most challenging minds of our time” (23)—as a special section within the bookstore, might the author have been tacitly carving out the possibility of his own inclusion in such an honor even while he largely
refused such recognition for most of his life? He certainly deserves consideration. Le Carré has done as much as anyone to popularize the modern espionage novel and in the process became one of the most admired writers in the English language. Fellow novelist Philip Roth called A Perfect Spy (1986) “the best English novel since the war” – and that came only part way into le Carré’s run of some two dozen books.

Cinema has taken a liking to le Carré over the years, and in that respect he could perhaps best be seen as a spiritual cousin of the stereotypical French tragedy in contrast to the Hollywood preference for a blockbuster with a happy ending: that optic could even help explain his adoption of a French-sounding pseudonym. Le Carré novels tend to revolve around betrayal, heartbreak, and disappointment. Silverview, his presumed final work, does not disappoint and is a fitting coda to a career that has elevated intelligence literature to new heights.

Spies in Canaan, by David Park (Bloomsbury, 2022) 188 pages. Reviewed by J.E. Leonardson.

The retired intelligence officer contacted by someone from his past is an old plot device for starting a spy novel, one that usually plunges the protagonist into a quest to resolve a lingering mystery from years ago. Thus, when a DVD and short note arrive in former CIA officer Michael Miller’s mail, you immediately assume that Spies in Canaan will center on some unfinished business from the old days. You would be wrong, however, as this short novel goes off in unexpected directions.

Most of the story relates Miller’s time in Saigon, serving as a CIA linguist in the months before South Vietnam’s collapse in April 1975. This is the tale of a thoughtful man whose job is to translate documents, but who gets sucked into doing some questionable side jobs for Ignatius Donovan, a senior officer in the CIA station. Park provides a lot of atmospherics and introspection, all wrapped up in elegant literary prose, but almost no espionage. Rather, much of the book about is the routine of an office-bound intelligence functionary, albeit in the last few, uninspiring days of the US effort in Vietnam.

In the last third of the book, set some 40 years later, the DVD leads Miller to find Donovan, who now has cancer and is living his final days on a ranch in the desert Southwest. A few answers to lingering personal questions from the Saigon days, another unusual errand and, again, a wrapping of beautiful writing.

What Park is trying to say is unclear. Does Miller seek redemption for US behavior or his own (relatively mild) transgressions in Saigon? Is the reader supposed to meditate on what we do for loyalty and love? Are we victims of fate, with only our faith to sustain us? Is intelligence work just the drudgery of routine? Spies in Canaan will have you wondering about these and other questions but won’t give you answers. No doubt, that is the point.