View the Document Collection

This collection consists of more than 250 previously classified documents, totaling over 1,400 pages, including some 120 that are being released for the first time. These documents cover the period from January 1977 through March 1979 and were produced by the CIA to support the Carter administration’s diplomatic efforts leading up to President Carter’s negotiations with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David in September 1978. The declassified documents detail diplomatic developments from the Arab peace offensive and President Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem through the regime-wide aftermath of Camp David. Newly released items include:

- Two National Intelligence Estimates on Egypt and the Middle East Military Balance.
- Selections from CIA’s briefing book on Camp David created for President Carter.
- Leadership profiles from the Directorate of Intelligence on the key personalities of the Camp David summit.
- The role of Jordan in the peace process
- Over four hundred pages of Foreign Broadcast Information Service reporting, capturing the press coverage of the negotiations, summit, and global reaction.

The documents convey a sense of the personalities, perils, and ambiguities that pervaded the lead-up to the Camp David Accords, which despite the many obstacles has had an enduring influence in the precarious peace between Israel and its largest Arab neighbor.

This collection is posted to the CIA Freedom of Information Act website at

http://www.foia.cia.gov/cartercampdavidaccords

View all the CIA Historical Collections at:

President Carter and the Role of Intelligence in the Camp David Accords

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
WEDNESDAY, 13 NOVEMBER 2013 // 9:00 – 12:00 PM

9:00 a.m. Welcome
David Stanhope
Acting Director, Carter Library
Joe Lambert
Director, Information Management Services, CIA
Opening remarks/introduction of keynote speaker
Jonathan Mann
Anchor and Correspondent, CNN International

9:05-9:30 a.m. Keynote Address:
Role of Intelligence in preparing for Camp David
President Jimmy Carter
39th President of the United States

9:30 a.m. Introduction of featured speaker
Jonathan Mann

9:30-10:00 a.m. Featured Speaker:
The Camp David Summit,
An Insider’s Perspective
William Quandt
Former Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

10:00-10:15 a.m. Break

10:15 a.m. Introduction of Panel
Jonathan Mann

10:15-11:45 a.m. Panel: The Role of Intelligence in Support of the Camp David Summit
Panel Chair: Matthew T. Penney
CIA Historian
Panelists: Jerrold Post
Founding Director, CIA’s Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior
Martha Neff Kessler
Former CIA analyst on the Middle East and South Asia
Adam Howard
General Editor, Foreign Relations of the United States Series, Department of State

11:45-11:50 a.m. Presentation of Awards
Joe Lambert and David Stanhope

11:50-12:00 p.m. Closing Remarks/Wrap up
Jonathan Mann

12:00 p.m. Adjourn
The Information Review and Release Group (IRRG) of the CIA's Information Management Services is responsible for executing the Agency's Historical Review Program (HRP). This program seeks to identify and declassify collections of documents that detail the Agency's analysis and activities relating to historically significant topics and events. The HRP's goals include increasing the usability and accessibility of historical collections. To do that, IRRG works with partner organizations to organize release events to highlight each collection and make it available to the broadest audience possible.

The mission of the HRP is to:

- Promote an accurate, objective understanding of the intelligence information that has helped shape major US foreign policy decisions.
- Broaden access to lessons-learned, presenting historical material that gives greater understanding to the scope and context of past actions.
- Improve current decision-making and analysis by facilitating reflection on the impacts and effects arising from past foreign policy decisions.
- Showcase CIA's contributions to national security and provide the American public with valuable insight into the workings of its government.
- Demonstrate the CIA's commitment to the Open Government Initiative and its three core values: Transparency, Participation, and Collaboration.

The History Staff in the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence fosters understanding of the Agency's history and its relationship to today's intelligence challenges by communicating instructive historical insights to the CIA workforce, other US Government agencies, and the public. CIA historians research topics on all aspects of Agency activities and disseminate their knowledge through publications, courses, briefings and Web-based products. They also work with other Intelligence Community historians on publication and education projects that highlight interagency approaches to intelligence issues. Lastly, the CIA History Staff conducts an ambitious program of oral history interviews that are invaluable for preserving institutional memories that are not captured in the documentary record.

The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum in Atlanta, Georgia houses U.S. President Jimmy Carter's papers and other material relating to the Carter administration and the Carter family's life. The library also hosts special exhibits, such as Carter's Nobel Peace Prize and a full-scale replica of the Oval Office, including a copy of the Resolute Desk.

The Carter Library and Museum includes some parts that are owned and administered by the federal government, and some that are privately owned and operated. The library and museum are run by the National Archives and Records Administration and are part of the Presidential Library system of the federal government. Privately owned areas house Carter's offices and the offices of the Carter Center, a non-profit human rights agency.

The building housing the library and museum makes up 69,750 square feet, with 15,269 square feet of space for exhibits and 19,818 square feet of archive and storage space. The library stacks house 27 million pages of documents; 500,000 photos, and 40,000 objects, along with films, videos, and audiotapes. These collections cover all areas of the Carter administration, from foreign and domestic policy to the personal lives of President and Mrs. Carter.
One of the classic episodes in U.S.-Middle East relations was the meeting between President Franklin Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz al-Saud on the deck of the USS Quincy in February 1945. Roosevelt was returning from the Yalta conference, where he had discussed the post-war disposition of Europe with the leaders of Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Believing that the United States would play a more active role in international affairs after the war, Roosevelt was especially concerned about the Middle East. The meeting was part of a series of direct U.S. bilateral engagements with regional heads of state—the others were King Farouk of Egypt and King Haile Selassie of Ethiopia—without the customary deference paid to the European allies, a forecast of the post-war order.

The iconic meeting aboard the Quincy relates to the present topic: Roosevelt wanted to discuss Palestine. After Roosevelt raised the issue, King Saud asked that the United States not support a Jewish state there, and Roosevelt agreed not to take action on the issue without due coordination with King Saud and other Arab leaders. Much later, William Eddy, the U.S. chargé in Saudi Arabia who had arranged the meeting, would grapple publicly with what he called a historic broken promise: the U.S. recognition of Israel and commitment to Israeli security.⁹
Just weeks after its creation in September 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency issued two major analytic pieces that, among other things, warned of protracted instability in the Middle East over the issue of a Jewish state in Palestine. They said that the Arab popular response to the partition would force the new state, lest they be perpetually vulnerable to overthrow. Not only was a Jewish state in the Middle East intolerable to the Arab world, the Agency said, but fear of Israeli expansion would put its Arab neighbors on a permanent war footing. One of the two CIA pieces said that the goodwill generated by the Rosh-Evet-Saud conference had expired. Perhaps most importantly, the second of the two pieces—which allegedly owed much of its language to Eddy, by then at the State Department—said that the power wars would have to intervene to enforce the partition and that an Arab military front would defeat a Jewish state within two years unless the United States bolstered Israeli security.

In its post-war engagement with Middle Eastern heads of state, the U.S. government sought leaders with whom it could maintain amicable relations. At one point in the early 1950s, U.S. policymakers hoped that Egyptian President Gamal ‘abd al-Nasser might bring a coalition of Arab states into a defense alliance friendly to the West. Though Nasser would be a thorn in the side of U.S. officials for most of his presidency, he was nevertheless the kind of Arab leader whom the United States could tolerate—a leader who maintained his own course in international affairs (despite accepting enough Soviet military aid to alarm U.S. policymakers) and one in his actions, was moderate toward Israel. One National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in 1953 irrationally said that an Egyptian-led regional defense pact could be a forum for Western influence that would counteract—that is, contain the kind of Arab leader whom the U.S. preferred: a moderate with enough clout to remain in power yet willing to work toward a peace settlement with the West and Israel.

Following the quick Israeli victory in the June 1967 war, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) monitored the Arab leaders’ efforts to regain favor with their populations, from what was a stunning loss known in the Arab world as “the setback.” In the 1967 war the U.S. Intelligence Community considered the potential for an Arab counterassault, even one that the Arab leaders expected to lose militarily. This contradicts the conventional wisdom that the IC did not imagine such a case: As a recently declassified NIE from May 1972 shows, analysts assessed that the domestic pressure on President Anwar Sadat to redeem Egypt’s loss was such that Sadat might find even a failed invasion of Israeli-held territory politically favorable to inaction. Though the NIE stopped short of predicting war, its pages convey an astute understanding of the political climate in which Sadat operated—a far cry from the ostensible superp-
It said that:

• “demilitarized areas, limited forces zones, forward monitoring sites, third-party reconnaissance” alone will not give Israeli leaders the confidence they now lack that the Arabs have peaceful intentions for the long term.

• “It is unlikely that either side in the foreseeable future will modify its stated intention to control East Jerusalem.”

• “The nonmilitary benefits Israel will expect to receive in return for a withdrawal to the 1967 lines will have to be provided by the US — and to a lesser extent by the USSR and the UN — as well as the Arabs.”

That November, President Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem to address the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) gave reasons for both optimism and caution. The CIA Directorate of Intelligence (DI) Weekly Summary for 25 November 1977, after Sadat’s speech, called the trip “a major shock treatment comparable to the one produced by his equally bold war initia- tive in 1973.” Perhaps it could indeed be compared to the 1973 military campaign in its boldness and impact. But whereas the 1973 war had vindicated Israel’s hard line against its Arab neighbors, the 1977 event undercut this position: with the speech, an Arab leader was calling not for war but for peace. For all of the goodwill that he generated with the West with the visit, it prompted outrage from most Arab quarters, especially Syrian leader Hafez al-Asad, on the grounds that Sadat’s trip was a de facto recognition of Israel and betrayal of the Arab cause. This assertion was shared among the most vocal elements within Egypt as well:

The collection shows the IC’s attention to this important relationship between for- eign governments and their citizens. Ana- lysed monitored the drive state of Egypt’s economy and its struggle to provide basic services as well as the local unpopularity of Sadat’s commercial orientation to the West. Sadat’s critics made much of his closeness to the United States specifi- cally, and a 1977 NIE declassified for this collection considers the intense domestic pressure on Sadat to get something out of his relationship with Washington. The collection also features analysis on the Egyptian military’s dissatisfaction with its ill-preparedness for another war with Israel. Agency assessments of Middle Eastern security services in general, and Egypt specifically, left little question that the IC viewed the region’s security services as key instruments for not only quelling political dissent but also as potential agents of regime change. The notion that popular unrest created a hospitable environment to Communist assistance tended to make U.S. policy- makers tolerate the security services’ efforts to maintain the established order, and a great deal of U.S. bilateral aid went toward helping them do so.

The 1977 NIE on Egypt opened with a discussion of Sadat’s need to make progress on the Israeli issue to stave off domestic frustrations. The NIE said that “negotiating progress would serve, at least temporarily, to reinforce Sadat’s credibility, to lessen the military’s urgency about securing new sources of weapons, and to divert popular attention from economic woes” and that “domestic ills are an impetus for rapid improvement in negotiations.” It depicted Sadat as wanting Egypt to “maintain its status as a significant regional power beyond the time when a peace settlement with Israel might change the focus of world attention from issues of war and peace in the area to issues of oil and economics.”

Another issue, thoroughly explored in the outside writing on the Camp David process, was that of the Palestinians. Hardly any serious discussion about a peace ignored it even when euphemisms or other terms were used instead of explicitly naming the Palestinians, the West Bank, Gaza, or Israeli settlements. President Carter wanted each side to make some sort of gesture that the other would find welcoming. He wanted the PLO to accept UN Security Council Reso- lution 242, which had called — in famous vogue language — for Israel to withdraw from the territory it had taken in 1967. However, Resolution 242 also implicitly recognized the Israeli state. Carter hoped that PLO acceptance of the resolution would force Israel to see the Palestinians as “reasonable,” as the United States viewed it. But not only was the resolution hazily worded, it neither mentioned a potential Palestinian homeland nor, for that matter, even the word “Palestinians.” The PLO had indicated it would accept the resolution only if the United States would guarantee Palestinian statehood. A complicating factor in all of this was President Sadat’s seeming ambivalence toward the Palestinian issue, in which he displayed no real commitment to a Palestinian state in favor of a moderate Palestinian leadership with which he could negotiate. Nor was Begin’s position on the Palestine issue a giving one. During his electoral campaign in 1977, he had made the Palestinians synonymous with “terrorist,” and rejected the notion of Palestinian self-determination. The PLO did little to help the image of the Palestinians in rela- tion to Israel, with the March 1978 Fatah raid on the Israeli coast and bus hijack- ing. In the attack, Fatah killed 38 Israelis, prompting the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. All of this came just after the Abu Nidal organization’s assassination of Yusef al-Sibai, a Sadat associate who had been part of the Egyptian Jerusalem delegation. According to a CIA Weekly Summary for 17 March 1978, the Fatah operation and Israeli response were seen in Egypt as “serious, perhaps fatal, blows” to the peace initiative.

The collection gives the reader the sense that Carter’s role in the Camp David talks was not that of a broker between Sadat and Begin, but rather that of a negotiator in two separate talks, one with Sadat and the other with Begin. All three men would be present, but the two most meaning- ful dialogues could be expected to be between Carter and Sadat, and Carter and Begin. Sadat’s and Begin’s messages would most likely be designed first for Carter, second for an international audi- ence, and only third for each other. Nor did analysts anticipate the result to be a settlement between the two sides, but rather statements that Sadat and Begin could later cite as validating his position. Mindful of Arab-Israeli relations up to that point, U.S. policymakers and Agency analysts had no illusions by that time that Camp David was the only hope to and the conflict. Agency analysts assessed that the Accords would be successful if Israel and Egypt continued meaningful negotiations afterward. Conversely, they would be a failure if negotiations ended, especially if a persistent impasse pushed the two sides toward war, or prompted the Saudis to play the oil card as they had in 1973. Another ramification of a failure at Camp David would be the loss of the United States’ clout as a broker and the decline of U.S. influence in the region.

Almost immediately after the Accords concluded, it was evident that their success or failure was in the eye of the beholder. For the United States, they met the minimal criteria for supporting U.S. interests. They resulted in a freeze of the Egyptian-Israeli violence and a closer U.S. relationship with Egypt. Yet the Accords avoided the all-important issue of the Palestinians. Egypt’s Arab neighbors assembled in Baghdad and denounced the Accords as being only an Egyptian agreement with Israel without any benefits to other Arab states. Because they lacked any real commitments from Israel on the most important issues, most Arab leaders and commentators saw the Accords as a capitulation to Israel.

Initial reactions from the Palestinian community criticized the vague lan- guage and the lack of concessions to the Palestinians. The Israeli military and settlements in the West Bank, it seemed, would stay. Little was to be found that...
The Egyptian-Israeli peace talks that went into 1979 also coincided with a transformative event elsewhere: the revolution in Iran. By the time of Camp David, Iranian public opposition to the Shah had swept the country, and in January 1979, the Shah of Iran and his regime were overthrown. Iranian revolutionaries were not only calling for the Shah’s removal from power, but also for significant changes in the Middle East. The Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers declared that the Shah’s departure was precipitated by the U.S. and Israel’s decision to support the Shah. They vowed to challenge U.S. influence in the Middle East and to demand the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iran. The revolution in Iran was seen as a major setback for U.S. policy in the region, and it raised concerns about the future of U.S.-Iran relations.

Despite these challenges, President Carter remained committed to the Camp David Accords. The accords were seen as a significant achievement, and Carter hoped that they would lead to a lasting peace in the region. However, the accords were not without their critics, and there were concerns about the impact of the accords on U.S. policy in the Middle East.

In conclusion, the Camp David Accords were a significant event in U.S. policy in the Middle East. They were seen as a major achievement, but they were also a source of controversy and concern. The accords were a testament to the power of diplomacy and the importance of strong leadership, but they were also a reminder of the challenges that face U.S. policy makers in the region. The accords were a turning point in U.S.-Middle East relations, and they continue to shape the landscape of U.S.-Middle East policy today.
Personality Profiles in Support of The Camp David Summit

Jerrold Post, M.D.

Among the briefing materials President Carter carried to Camp David for his historic meetings with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin in September 1978 were a personality profile on each of the two Middle Eastern leaders and a third profile comparing their personalities and negotiating style. Following his diplomatic triumph, the President conveyed his appreciation to the Central Intelligence Agency for the intelligence support provided him and singled out the personality profiles for special praise: “After spending 13 days with the two principals,” he said, “I wouldn’t change a word.”

The history of studies relating personality and political behavior predates the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency, but controversy over the validity of such studies is as strong today as when Walter Langer and his associates probed the psyche of Adolf Hitler for the OSS. Much of the current controversy is over causality: was a particular political occurrence caused by a leader’s psyche, or did it result from the action of political, historical, and cultural forces? This, I submit, is an unnecessary focus of contention, for we believe, along with most historians, that most leadership decisions are multiply determined, and it is when a leader’s psychological and political needs are congruent that there is a particularly strong drive toward action. Even the most diehard critic would probably agree that if there is any occasion on which personality features weigh heavily in political proceedings, it is during unstructured negotiations among world leaders from different cultures with different perceptions, values, attitudes, and styles. Such was the case at Camp David.

On a visit to the Agency in August 1978, President Carter interrupted a briefing to ask the assembled analysts and intelligence production managers how they could help him before the forthcoming summit meeting, which had only recently been announced. He particularly indicated that he wanted to be “steeped in the personalities of Begin and Sadat.”

1 This article was originally published in CIA’s in-house journal, Studies in Intelligence, vol. 23, summer 1979.
In developing personality studies several kinds of data are reviewed. In addition to drawing on all classified reporting, a thorough review of the open literature is conducted. Official and unofficial biographies have often provided key background material and insights, as have television, newspaper and magazine profiles. When there are significant holes in the data, requirements are sent to the field to attempt to develop the missing information. But the data which is particularly rich and especially helpful in developing a solid feeling for the complexities of the personality of a leader is derived from debriefings of senior government and military officials and individuals from the private sector who have had significant personal contact with the object of the study. Official reporting has often been so heavily slanted toward current political concerns that a wealth of astute observations concerning perceptions, attitudes, and negotiating styles of the actors has never been recorded. These perceptions and observations can be lost during the transition from one administration to another, especially if the observations were made during the course of extremely sensitive negotiations, the details of which were necessarily closely held.

The strategic importance of the Middle East, the relative imperviousness of the Near Eastern mind to Western perceptions, and the highly personalized leadership styles of its rulers have had the effect of focusing a disproportionate share of CAPPB's efforts on the personalities of Near Eastern leaders. In the process of developing studies of such leaders as King Hussein of Jordan, Yitzak Rabin of Israel, and Hafiz al-Assad of Syria, we had regularly debriefed key officials whose concern was the Middle East, including participants in the shuttle diplomacy of the Kissinger era. So when we began research for our study of Sadat in the winter of 1977, we had some material already on hand and were able to rein interview those who had significant contact with Sadat.

Several themes emerged as we collated interview impressions. Sadat's concern with his role in history and his preoccupation with "the big picture," coupled with his abhorrence of details, were regularly mentioned. By appealing to Sadat's long-range goals, Secretary Kissinger was often able to overcome negotiating impasses over technical details. Ambassador El-Sit confirmed that the personality of a leader is derived from a solid feeling for the complexities of the policy-making environment, the way in which that environment is perceived, and the highly personalized process of leadership. In order to anticipate the moves of the leader, the analyst must have a clear picture of what the leader is trying to do, which is a function of the leader's personality, the analyst's perception, and the highly personalized perceptions of the Near Eastern mind to Western reports. Official reporting has often been so heavily slanted toward current political concerns that a wealth of astute observations concerning perceptions, attitudes, and negotiating styles of the actors has never been recorded. These perceptions and observations can be lost during the transition from one administration to another, especially if the observations were made during the course of extremely sensitive negotiations, the details of which were necessarily closely held.

The strategic importance of the Middle East, the relative imperviousness of the Near Eastern mind to Western perceptions, and the highly personalized leadership styles of its rulers have had the effect of focusing a disproportionate share of CAPPB's efforts on the personalities of Near Eastern leaders. In the process of developing studies of such leaders as King Hussein of Jordan, Yitzak Rabin of Israel, and Hafiz al-Assad of Syria, we had regularly debriefed key officials whose concern was the Middle East, including participants in the shuttle diplomacy of the Kissinger era. So when we began research for our study of Sadat in the winter of 1977, we had some material already on hand and were able to rein interview those who had significant contact with Sadat.

Several themes emerged as we collated interview impressions. Sadat's concern with his role in history and his preoccupation with "the big picture," coupled with his abhorrence of details, were regularly mentioned. By appealing to Sadat's long-range goals, Secretary Kissinger was often able to overcome negotiating impasses over technical details. Ambassador El-Sit confirmed that the personality of a leader is derived from a solid feeling for the complexities of the policy-making environment, the way in which that environment is perceived, and the highly personalized process of leadership. In order to anticipate the moves of the leader, the analyst must have a clear picture of what the leader is trying to do, which is a function of the leader's personality, the analyst's perception, and the highly personalized perceptions of the Near Eastern mind to Western reports. Official reporting has often been so heavily slanted toward current political concerns that a wealth of astute observations concerning perceptions, attitudes, and negotiating styles of the actors has never been recorded. These perceptions and observations can be lost during the transition from one administration to another, especially if the observations were made during the course of extremely sensitive negotiations, the details of which were necessarily closely held.

In short order, the several components produced the required material. CAPPB's contribution consisted of three pieces: an updated personality profile of Begin, which called attention to the increasing trend of oppositionism and rigidity in his personality; an updated profile of Sadat, entitled "Sadat's Nobel Prize Complex," which stressed his increasing preocu-
We were in the midst of the first drafts when the stunning election upset occurred which brought Menachem Begin to power. With retrospective wisdom, most analysts have attributed Peres’ loss to Labor Party complacency and widespread voter disgust with allegations of corruption by the Labor government. With the election of Menachem Begin, the material on Peres was put aside for another day, and research was immediately commenced on the new prime minister. In contrast to Peres, who was well known to a number of US Government officials, there had been little official contact with Begin. But there was a rich source of information in the open literature, for in two autobiographic works, the “White Nights” and “The Revolt”, Begin had revealed a great deal of the experience which had honed his attitude. His preoccupation with legal precision and his inability to restrain himself from clarifying impression was well illustrated by his arguing with his Russian jailers about details of the Soviet legal code. Furthermore, in analyzing the form as well as the content of his writings, it was possible to understand some of the complexities of his cognitive style. Later, Ambassador Lewis provided particularly illuminating personal observations of the new prime minister’s personality. The CAPPB study was disseminated in July 1973, in time for Begin’s first visit with President Carter.

Once a personality study is completed, with a thorough analysis of the basic personality structure, it forms a basis for continued monitoring of the subject. This is particularly important for an individual like Begin, who had not coped with national leadership before. A major question raised but unanswered by the initial study was whether this leader, who had spent his lifetime in opposition, could function as a leader for all the people, utilizing skills of compromise and developing consensus.

The creative diplomacy of November and December of 1977, highlighted by Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem, placed even greater emphasis on the personalities of the two key actors. A particularly interesting aspect of this visit, and something probably insufficiently attended to, was the impact of the media upon political behavior and the conduct of negotiations. Sadat’s already special view of himself was given a new boost. We initially characterized this personality reaction “the Barbara Walter syndrome,” but by summer of 1978, as it grew exponentially, designated it as Sadat’s Nobel Prize complex. As we followed his political behavior particularly closely over the next several months, one of the most interesting changes had to do with the sharp increase in the first person singular. The frequency of the word “I” increased dramatically in Sadat’s statements. There were accounts suggesting that Sadat would not accept reports indicating that his goals for Egypt and himself were in trouble. There was a consequent shrinkage of the leadership circle around Sadat to those who would support his optimism.

In parallel, Prime Minister Begin demonstrated a continuing facility for statements of a provocative nature, often precipitated by reporter’s questions. A member of our center traveled to Israel to update the earlier study of Begin and focused extensively on some of the growing oppositional properties in Begin’s personality. The prominence of these personality features led to a proposal that one of the dinner seminars hosted periodically by the Director of Central Intelligence be devoted to the topic of “The role of personality in the Middle East conflict.” The dinner was held in the spring of 1978, attended by a number of those who had been intimately involved in Middle East negotiations, including Ambassador-at-large Alfred Atherton, Ambassador to Egypt Herman Eilts, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs Harold Saunders, and Dr. William Quandt, the NSC’s senior Near Eastern specialist.

In pulling together materials for this meeting we focused particularly on matters of form, entirely apart from political substance, and addressed such issues as Sadat’s abhorrence of detail compared to the more inclusive Begin’s personality in the Middle East conflict.”

Suggested reading:

- The dinner seminars hosted periodically by the Director of Central Intelligence should never be brought together in the same room. The task of personality differences were so profound that the two leaders problems these differences made when they were being dealt how different Begin and Sadat were as personalities, and the by the Director of Central Intelligence be devoted to the topic of “The role of personality in the Middle East conflict.”

Top: Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin at Camp David for the Camp David Summit. (Photograph courtesy: Jimmy Carter Library)

Bottom: Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat, and Menachem Begin at Camp David for the Camp David Summit. (Photograph courtesy: Jimmy Carter Library)
President Carter
Camp David Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 MAR</td>
<td>Carter makes a statement on the three key ingredients of a Middle East settlement: real peace, secure borders, and Palestinian rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 MAR</td>
<td>Carter meets Syrian President Assad in Geneva.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-20 JUL</td>
<td>Carter meets Prime Minister Begin in Washington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-20 JUL</td>
<td>Carter meets Prime Minister Begin in Washington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 JAN</td>
<td>In Aswan, Egypt, Carter makes a statement on the Palestinians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 NOV</td>
<td>The Arab summit in Baghdad criticizes Camp David Accords.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 JAN</td>
<td>Sadat and Begin sign the Camp David Accords at the White House. Carter signs as witness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 JAN</td>
<td>Carter meets with Begin in Washington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4 MAR</td>
<td>Brezhnev meets with Sadat in Cairo to convey the new proposals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-13 MAR</td>
<td>Carter travels to Egypt and Israel to bring the negotiations to an end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 MAR</td>
<td>Sadat and Begin sign the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in Washington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 JUL</td>
<td>Carter decides to invite Sadat and Begin to summit meeting at Camp David.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 SEP</td>
<td>Carter holds a National Security Council meeting to discuss the Camp David summit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-17 SEP</td>
<td>Carter, Sadat, and Begin meet at Camp David.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14 DEC</td>
<td>Vance travels to the Middle East to complete the text of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 FEB</td>
<td>Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 AUG</td>
<td>Vance visits Jerusalem to invite Begin to Camp David.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 NOV</td>
<td>The shah of Iran leaves his country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-19 JUN</td>
<td>Vance visits Alexandria, Egypt to invite Sadat to Camp David.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-22 JUN</td>
<td>Carter meets Begin in Washington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-26 DEC</td>
<td>Begin meets Sadat in Ismailiya, Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 DEC</td>
<td>Carter leaves on trip that takes him to Iran, where he meets with King Hussein; he subsequently visits Saudi Arabia and Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4 FEB</td>
<td>Carter meets Sadat at Camp David in Maryland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 FEB</td>
<td>The Policy Review Committee meets on the Middle East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5 APR</td>
<td>The Israeli government decides to hold early elections in May.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-20 FEB</td>
<td>Secretary of State Cyrus Vance travels to the Middle East and meets with Rabin (Israel), Sadat (Egypt), and Asad (Syria).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5 APR</td>
<td>Carter meets Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in Washington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 MAY</td>
<td>Israeli elections favor Likud bloc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-19 JAN</td>
<td>Riots occur in Cairo following sudden food price increases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 MAR</td>
<td>The Israeli government decides to hold early elections in May.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 MAY</td>
<td>Israeli elections favor Likud bloc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-19 JAN</td>
<td>Riots occur in Cairo following sudden food price increases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 MAY</td>
<td>Carter meets with Egyptian President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin in Washington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 JUN</td>
<td>Menahem Begin becomes prime minister of Israel, with Moshe Dayan as his foreign minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4 FEB</td>
<td>Carter meets Sadat at Camp David in Maryland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Leadership Profiles

President Carter and the Role of Intelligence in the Camp David Accords

Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Begin meeting at Camp David Summit Meeting (Courtesy: Jimmy Carter Library)
Anwar al-SA-DA'it
(Phonetic: saDAHT)
President (since September 1970)
Addressed as: Mr. President

When Anwar al-Sadat, a former revolutionary and ardent nationalist who rose from peasant origins, assumed the Presidency after the death of Jamal 'Ahd al-Nasir, it was widely assumed that he had neither the strength nor the political astuteness to be successful. He has, however, long since shaken his image and proved to be a moderate leader and a pragmatic politician and diplomat. He has become known for his realism, political acumen, and capacity for surprising, courageous and dramatic decisions.

He has continued to seek a peace settlement with remarkable self-confidence and optimism in the face of both risk and failure.

Leadership Style

Sadat's dominance of the decisionmaking process—especially in foreign policy—has become increasingly evident in the peace talks with Israel: senior foreign affairs advisers are not always certain what the President has in mind, and they must refer major decisions to Sadat personally.

Egyptians are superior to other Arabs. He takes pride in his peasant origins and in his reputation for being sensitive to his people's needs. He wants to go down in history as the man who improved the economic and social well-being of the ordinary Egyptian. Sadat has, however, far less understanding of or interest in economic matters than he has in foreign affairs or politics, and he devotes little time to this major problem area. A consummate politician, he looks at most issues in political terms, and if he is confronted with policy problems in which political factors and economic considerations are in conflict, his decision is likely to be influenced by the former.

Personal Data

In accordance with his upbringing, Sadat remains a deeply religious man. He speaks good English, but he does not always pick up nuances or follow complex reasoning. Soft spoken and serious, the 59-year-old President is warm in manner. His wife, Jihan, is an elegant, graceful woman. The couple has four children.

23 August 1978
Menachem Begin  
(Phonetic: BAYghin)

Prime Minister  
(since June 1977)

Addressed as:  
Mr. Prime Minister

Israel's sixth Prime Minister, Menachem Begin is the first in the history of the state not to be a member of the Labor Party (LP). As such, he may well instigate a major shift in Israeli policies, both national and domestic.

A highly principled man with strong beliefs, Begin is regarded as a hardliner on most issues. He holds a master's degree in jurisprudence.

Since his election, however, a new image of the Prime Minister has begun to emerge in Israel—that of a sober and thoughtful national leader, a man of integrity whose forthrightness could renew Israeli pride and refurbish the country's image abroad.

As the almost undisputed leader of the political right wing, Begin spent 29 years in parliamentary opposition to LP-led governments. He has consistently maintained a strong even autocratic control of Herut (Freedom Movement), GANAL (Herut-Liberal Party alliance) and the Likud bloc (GANAL and other right-wing groups). Begin is primarily concerned with political issues. Domestic issues, particularly if they involve the economy, have in the past been the concerns of the Liberal Party faction of Likud, and the economic portion of the Likud electoral platform was largely written by the Liberals. Recently Begin has indicated that Minister of Finance Simcha Ehrlich, the leader of the Liberal Party and its key economic policy maker, will have a free hand in such matters and will set the tone, if not the substance, of economic policy.

The Begin government has highly ambitious goals for the economy. The new administration will not continue the Labor Party's socialistic approach toward the economy, which included heavy governmental involvement in that sector. Begin has stated that his government will encourage private enterprise and pursue a liberal laissez-faire economic policy, with governmental guidance only to assure its prosperity. Through a decrease in government expenditures and imports, increases in exports, and real currency devaluations, the new government plans to reduce the current balance-of-payments deficit by half--to $1.5 billion over and above the differential inflation rate, the new government plans to reduce the current balance-of-payments deficit by half--to $1.5 billion over and above the differential inflation rate, the new government plans to reduce the current balance-of-payments deficit by half--to $1.5 billion over and above the differential inflation rate, the new government plans to reduce the current balance-of-payments deficit by half--

Economy

The Likud's electoral platform calls for the return to an economic growth rate of 5 to 8 percent, to be achieved mainly through marked increases in productivity. The platform stated that there would be no increase in taxes for at least 2 years and that through wage and price freezes during the same period, inflation could be curbed substantially—it would be gradually cut to 15 percent. Begin has also said that there will be programs to extend educational and housing assistance to large families in an effort to abolish poverty.

With the objective of continuing the present state of full employment, Begin's coalition will, of necessity, be active in labor-government relations. The Prime Minister has promised greater restrictions on the Histadrut, Israel's monolithic trade union, even though the LP alignment maintained its control in that organization's June elections. These restrictions will include compulsory arbitration as a means of curtailing wildcat strikes, which the government feels can have a ruinous effect on the entire economy. Begin has often stated that the Histadrut will have to distinguish between what he calls its positive functions as a trade union and its ownership of commercial enterprises.

The Likud platform proposed that the entire government trading unit in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry be dismantled and its functions be taken over by private and/or cooperative trading firms. If this occurs, it could have marked impact
on US-Israeli trade. Such a change would be particularly obvious in the agricultural realm, where Israel has long been an almost captive market for US exports—because of the established commercial ties between the purchasing mission in New York and its US suppliers, and because of the liberal US export credits.

Foreign Policy

Begin was forced to flee Poland at the outbreak of World War II, having lost his mother, father and brother to the Nazis; and later he was imprisoned for a time in a concentration camp in northern Russia.

In the mid-1940's Begin was the leader of the Irgun Tsvai Leumi, a Jewish underground movement that operated in Palestine during the British Mandate. The ideology of the Irgun— that all of Eretz Israel is historically and historically the rightful homeland of the Jewish people—is projected in Begin's strong stand on that issue today.

Begin has consistently stated that he opposes withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza or any return to the borders that existed before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, though he has left open the possibility of minor concessions on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai. He says that his government will encourage settlements on the West Bank—lands he considers to have been liberated rather than occupied by the Israelis in the 1967 war. He also considers the area to be of strategic importance to national security. Begin is opposed to the creation of a Palestinian state and to any negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Instead, he favors direct negotiations with the Arab states and has recently said that Israel is prepared to attend a reconvened Middle East peace conference in Geneva in the fall. Although his stated West Bank policy seems to impose a condition, he has said that all participants should come to Geneva without prior conditions and that all issues are negotiable.
Arab Leadership Perceptions of the US

“arab this memorandum attempts to identify broad trends in the Arab states toward the US. It is not meant to be all-inclusive, for the sake of brevity, it does not examine each Arab state in detail. Rather, individual states are discussed as they exemplify trends and illustrate the wide range of opinion among Arabs. It reflects impressions gained following extensive discussions with officials of US embassies in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Algeria.”

Egypt: Sadat’s Domestic Position

“Despite President Sadat’s refusal in control, there are grounds for concern about the strength of his domestic position. Reports from a variety of sources over the past several months have conveyed a mixed picture of the stability of his regime and the degree of support for his leadership.”

The Situation in the Middle East:

“The principal developments in the Middle East over the past several months have been the reconciliation of Egypt and Syria; the willingness of Saudi Arabia to break with its OPEC partners on oil pricing and to use OPEC as a forum for underscoring the necessity for progress on the Arab-Israeli dispute; the imposition of a more durable cease-fire in Lebanon; and the resignation of Prime Minister Rabin and the scheduling of early national elections.”

President Sadat and Jordan’s King Hussein ended their year-long estrangement during Hussein’s visit to Egypt last week. Sadat used the opportunity to explore his strategy for encouraging peace negotiations by providing for a federated relationship between Jordan and any future Palestinian state. The fact and the shape of any future Palestinian-Jordanian relationship must finally be decided by the parties themselves and not be dictated by Egypt or Israel.”

Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC - Middle East

“The President has directed that the Policy Review Committee, under the chairmanship of the Department of State, undertake an analysis of policy alternatives in the immediate short-term issues in the Middle East and on the broader question of an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Issues of immediate concern that should be specifically addressed include:...”

Interest of PLO Chairman Arafat Establishing a Dialogue with the US

“Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat is seeking ways of establishing a dialogue with United States Government officials but is uncertain about how to accomplish Arafat expressed interest in having [less than one line redacted] contact you to discuss ways in which a dialogue could be established. Arafat indicated that the idea for a dialogue originated with Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat.”

The Arab Peace Offensive

“Egypt and Syria have called for a resumption of the Geneva conference by March—not intending that this date should be taken literally, but wishing to underscore the urgency of the Arab peace offensive. The Syrians are almost certainly even more sure of sweeping the Egyptians that rapid movement is possible.”

National Intelligence Estimate: Egypt-1977

“Meaningful progress this year in Middle East peace negotiations will be critical for President Sadat. Egypt’s domestic problems limit his ability to wait long for substantial movement, while intra-Arab pressures constrain his ability to negotiate independently of the other Arabs.”

PRC Meeting on Middle East: Aid and Anti-Boycott Issues

“It was the consensus of the group that, on strictly military and assistance grounds, option 1—not increase over the Ford budget of $1.5 billion assistance to Israel—would be justified. However, out of desire to achieve a favorable political atmosphere for Secretary Vance’s trip to the Middle East, we propose to explain to Ambassador Diniz that, while we believe that $1.5 billion ($1 billion FMS, $500 million SAA) is adequate, we will ask for an increase of $285 million in FMS in the FY 78 budget to bring the total up to FY 77 level.”

Egypt: Anti-Subversion Law

“The approval this week by Egyptian voters of a tough new anti-subversion law caps off President Sadat’s campaign to restore the government’s prestige in the wake of violent riots last month.”

Egypt: Containing Consumer Pressures

“The lasting week in January, rioting by Egypt’s normally docile population focused international attention on the political-economic tightrope that President Sadat is walking... For almost a decade, the discontent among urban Egyptians was kept under control by the threat of war... To the average Egyptian, however, the Sinai II agreement of 1975 marked the end of war and the beginning of a perplexing new economic era.”

Lebanon-Palestinians: Restrictions

“The series of new restrictions on Palestinian activity in Lebanon apparently agreed to on Saturday by the quadripartite committee—representatives of Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait charged with overseeing the Lebanese ceasefire—appear designed to bring the fedayeen movement under closer Syrian control and to limit the ability of the Palestinians to obstruct the peace process.”

Israel Prepares for an Election

“Israel’s national election on May 17 is likely to be the closest in the country’s history. The governing Labor Party, which has generally dominated Israeli politics since independence in 1948, is in trouble and could emerge considerably weakened. It might even lose to the right-wing Likud bloc by a narrow margin. The election results could thus have a significant impact on the timing and pace of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.”

Arab and Israeli Reactions to US Steps in the Middle East (Reactions to Vance’s Trip)

“The Israelis appear to have been reassured by the outcome of their discussions with Secretary of State Vance [less than one line redacted] to the present. The Arabs also seem outwardly pleased by the Secretary’s visit as a concrete demonstration of US concern about the area, which they sought in initiating their so-called ‘peace offensive.’”

Israel

“Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin narrowly won endorsement on February 23 as the Labor Party’s candidate for prime minister in the general election scheduled for May 17... Rabin’s margin of victory over his challenger, Defense Minister Shimon Peres, was only 41 votes out of some 3,000 cast.”
Jordan-PLO: Beginning a Dialogue
DI // Current Intelligence // 04 March 1977

The Jordanian government has been seeking to gain the support of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in its conflict with Israel. A meeting between Jordanian and PLO representatives in Amman has been described as a “productive” discussion on future cooperation.

Syria-USSR
DI // Finished Intelligence // 25 February 1977

“Syrian President Assad wants to reduce his country’s overall dependence on the Soviets and thereby weaken Soviet political leverage in situations—such as occurred in Lebanon—where it is in their interest to do so. The Syrians want to develop alternative relationships with other Arab states.”

Cooperation and Conflict Among the Gulf States
DI // Finished Intelligence // 01 March 1977

“The nations of the Persian Gulf are not merely enormously wealthy; they have longstanding historical, ideological, cultural, and territorial differences. Despite these, however, several factors work for tolerance, if not complete cooperation, among many of the major littoral states, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia... This study assesses the range of conflict and cooperation among the Gulf states... It starts with the assumption that the general character of the regimes of the Gulf states will remain unchanged for the next 5 years or so, and that the principal judgments are made in that framework. Section IV deals with the array of contingencies involving major change in regimes or policies.”

Jordan-Palestinians
DI // Current Intelligence // 04 March 1977

“Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization last week began formal talks in Amman aimed at reconciling their feud in the interest of developing a common Arab position and strategy for peace negotiations with Israel.”

Lebanon
DI // Current Intelligence // 04 March 1977

“Fighting in southern Lebanon between Palestinian-leftist forces and Christian militiamen supported by Israeli artillery fire has continued almost unabated since late January. The Palestinians are getting the worst of it and may lose all access to the border with Israel.”

Sudan-Egypt-Syria
DI // Current Intelligence // 04 March 1977

“A meeting of the presidents of Sudan, Egypt, and Syria held in Khartoum on February 27 and 28 underlined the close relations that have developed among their moderate governments. The three presidents plan to get together privately with Sudan’s Crown Prince Fahd when he is in Cairo next week to represent his country—their common benefactor—at the first Afro-Arab summit.”

Libya-Egypt-Relations
DI // Current Intelligence // 09 March 1977

“Radio Tripoli reported on Sunday that Egyptian authorities had closed the border between Libya and Egypt. The Libyans also said the Egyptians were interfering with Libyan aircraft and had turned back a number of scheduled flights.”

Israel: Rabin’s Resignation
DI // Current Intelligence // 08 April 1977

“Israel’s Prime Minister Rabin’s resignation, following press disclosures that he had maintained illegal bank accounts in the US, seems certain to hurt the ruling Labor Alignment’s prospects at the polls next month. Because of its reformist image, the new moderate Democratic Movement for Change led by Yigal Yadin seems likely to gain the most from Labor’s latest misfortune.”

USSR-Egypt-Lebanon
DI // Current Intelligence // 09 April 1977

“Soviet-Egyptian relations on the mend as indicated by the signing of the annual 1977 trade protocol. Fighting between Christian extremists and Palestinian-leftist forces has increased in southern Lebanon over the last two weeks.”

Your Analysis on Syria
DI // Finished Intelligence // 02 May 1977

“Defence Minister Peres as its candidate for prime minister, party leaders are trying to achieve some measure of unity between Peres and those groups within the coalition Labor Alignment that have long opposed him.”

Israel, Lebanon, Egypt-Libya
DI // Current Intelligence // 15 April 1977

“Exposure of financial irregularities and Rabin’s withdrawal from Labor’s electoral list lead to uncertainties for Israel’s national election in May. Fighting in southern Lebanon between Christian extremists and Palestinians subsides; mounting tensions between Egypt and Libya give way to violence: ‘The Egyptian consul in Benghazi was sacked last weekend, and its workers confined in a nearby hotel... Egypt has retaliated in kind to almost every incident. Egyptians burned the Libyan consulate in Alexandria.’ The government of Libya reportedly executed 20 Libyan military officers ‘convicted of participating in a coup attempt against President Gadhafi in 1976.’”

Israel
DI // Current Intelligence // 29 May 1977

“Little success in Begin’s attempt to form a broadly-based government; upcoming meeting in Cairo between Egyptian Prime Minister Saleim and his counterpart, Abd al-Ubaydi, to discuss Libyan-Egyptian tensions along the border.”

Nonmilitary Compensation for an Israeli Territorial Withdrawal
DI // Finished Intelligence // 26 May 1977

“The political, cultural, humanitarian and economic compensation that Israelis expect, assuming that any comprehensive settlement will require Israeli withdrawal to positions near the 1967 borders.”

The Soviet Role in the Middle East
DI // Finished Intelligence // 01 June 1977

“The Soviets’ economic, military, and political position with the principal Arab states has eroded over the past five years, and shows no sign of early improvement. The low state of relations between the USSR and Egypt stands out as an important failure of Soviet foreign policy under General Secretary Brezhnev... Soviet leaders want to reconvene the Geneva conference to demonstrate that the USSR plays a central role in Arab-Israeli negotiations. Moscow has neither the desire nor the ability, however, to force the Arabs or Israelis to make the political concessions that will be necessary to restart the conference.”

Israel, Lebanon
DI // Current Intelligence // 03 June 1977

“Begin delays appointment of Moshe Dayan as foreign minister, in turn leading the Democratic Movement for Change to resume negotiations on a coalition, improving Begin’s chances at forming a broadly-based government. The Syrian government tries to promote the Cairo accords which would ‘lay down ground rules for Palestinian activities in Lebanon.’”

Israel
DI // Current Intelligence // 15 June 1977

“President Carter and the Role of Intelligence in the Camp David Accords
Bibliography

President Carter and the Role of Intelligence in the Camp David Accords
Bibliography

24

25
Egypt-Israel; Israel

DII // Current Intelligence // 17 June 1977

Little progress in repairing Soviet-Egyptian relations after Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi’s visit to Moscow; Menachem Begin likely to become Israel’s prime minister next week.

Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 24 June 1977

Israel’s parliament formally approves a right-wing coalition government headed by Menachem Begin. Discussion Paper for PRC Meeting on Middle East

DII // Finished Intelligence // 05 July 1977

“Beyond recognizing that it will be difficult at every stage to produce Israel or Arab concessions, we cannot predict how successful we will actually be in our efforts. Our strategy, as we go along, will depend to a significant degree on the amount of success we have, however... To begin with where we are today, the first questions concern preparation for and conduct of the Begin visit. Depending on how the visit comes out, we will then have choice to make in our subsequent strategy.”

Economic Consequences of a Middle East Peace Settlement

DII // Finished Intelligence // 05 July 1977

“This paper is a conceptual look at potential economic benefits from genuine peace in the Middle East; it is not an intelligence estimate of what would likely take place with a settlement. Three critical conditions exist: First, a peace settlement acceptable to all sides. The second is that foreign aid will be sufficient to cover all reasonable financial needs. The third is a building of mutual confidence.”

Summary of PRC Meeting on the Middle East

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 05 July 1977

“Two key issues for discussion during Prime Minister Begin’s visit will be a framework of agreed principles prior to Geneva and the question of a Palestinian representation in the negotiations. Most of the PRC meeting concentrated on these two issues.”

Leadership Profile: Menachem Begin

DII // Finished Intelligence // 07 July 1977

Brief overview of the political background, accompanied with photo of Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

Summary of Policy Review Committee Meeting on Middle East

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 12 July 1977

“It was the PRC’s consensus that the President should open the meeting with Prime Minister Begin with a broad overview of our strate-egical assessment and of the basic elements of our policy. It should be clearer, however, that it might lead to the overthrow of one or more of the key Arab leaders and/or push the Arab states toward exercising a military option involving a phased offensive on three fronts executed in conjunction with a Saudi-imposed oil embargo.”

DII Cabinet Briefing—Israel: Economic Prospects

DII // Finished Intelligence // 15 July 1977

“Briefly, we believe that Begin will continue to give overriding priority to defense and that, as a result, the civilian economy will continue to be hamstrung despite large amounts of US aid. Labor shortages and austerity measures will hold growth to a mere two percent or so at best.”

Arafat Message

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 18 July 1977

“Arafat wants following message conveyed to U.S.: He is willing to make a public statement clearly implying PLO willingness to live in peace with Israel with both Israel and Palestine enjoying mutually acceptable and secure borders. Clarifying use of word ‘implying’, he said there would be no possibility of two meanings to his statement.”

Israel Press Coverage of Begin Visit

DII // Finished Intelligence // 18 July 1977

“We believe that Israeli press reports, citing ‘government sources’, accurately reflect the outlines of the closely held Middle East peace plan that Prime Minister Begin intends to discuss with President Carter. We have no information on the details of Begin’s plan that goes beyond articles in the Israeli press or reporting from the US Embassy in Tel Aviv.”

Israel: Economic Prospects

DII // Current Intelligence // 12 July 1977

“Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s month-old government, although preoccupied with preparations for possible Middle East peace negotiations, announced an economic program last week that closely parallels the proposals of the former Labor government—with a few new austerity measures tacked on. The new measures, designed to reduce the 40 percent inflation rate, call for restraint on wage demands and reductions in budget deficits through increased taxes on gasoline, elimination of food subsidies, and minimal cuts in military spending.”

NIE: Middle East Military Balance

DCI/MC // NIE // 15 August 1977

“Israel has increased its margin of military superiority over the Arabs since the 1973 war. It is currently capable of countering any Arab attempt at either a full-scale or a limited war of attrition and of decisively defeating its opponents on any or all fronts. Israel will retain, and may even expand, its current margin of military superiority over the next five years despite efforts by the Arabs to improve and expand their armed forces and the potentially greater contributions by peripheral Arab states... Perhaps the most important factor bearing upon Middle Eastern developments is the progress of negotiations toward peace. As long as peace negotiations hold some promise of success, Arab leaders will not be under great pressure to initiate a major military operation against Israel. An impasse, however, could lead to the overthrow of one or more of the key Arab leaders and/or push the Arab states toward exercising a military option involving a phased offensive on three fronts executed in conjunction with a Saudi-imposed oil embargo.”

Israel

DII // Current Intelligence // 08 August 1977

“A series of recent actions by the Israeli government under-scores Prime Minister Begin’s intention to retain permanent control of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.”

Current PLO Position on 242; Soviet and Arab Advice to PLO on 242

DO // Cables // 20 August 1977

“The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has not finally rejected the idea of announcing acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 which would open an official dia-logue with the United States. The prevailing mood within the PLO leadership, however, is increasingly against such an announce-ment. The Saudis, Egyptians and the Soviets have urged PLO leadership to make a reserved announcement of acceptance of Resolution 242. The Syrians have advised the PLO not to announce acceptance of the resolution unless the United States offers a more tangible quid pro quo than just a PLO-US dialogue.”

Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 229

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 31 August 1977

“We share the concern of Embassy Damascus over the growing criticism of the US and the US peace effort which has appeared in the Syrian press during the last week... Furthermore, a growing number of Syrians have become convinced that Arab ‘flexibility’ has gained nothing while the Israeli hardliner has ‘created facts’ that make the peace process even more difficult. As a conse-quence, the Syrians may be in the process of developing a strat-egy to counter the Israelis and not to concede anything more.”

Egypt: Financial Outlook Brightens

DII // Current Intelligence // 08 September 1977

“By 1978 improved export prospects and a compromise eco-nomic reform agreement worked out with the International Mon-etary Fund last spring should alleviate Cairo’s current foreign payments problem. The agreement, which requires a measure of austerity that the Sadat regime believes will be politically acceptable, should help regularize the flow of Arab aid and reduce the need for stop-gap financing.”

Israel: Foreign Minister Dayan

DII // Current Intelligence // 17 September 1977

“Israel Foreign Minister Dayan, who meets Monday with Presi-dent Carter, has a policy 9-10 percent apart from Prime Minister Begin in temper-ament. Dayan is a pragmatist and a flexible, resourceful nego-tiator, while Begin, after more than a generation in opposition, remains an ideologue. Thus far, however, the two men—both strong-willed and independent—have worked well together.”

Israel: Prospects for Stability of the Begin Government

DII // Finished Intelligence // 18 October 1977

“As long as foreign policy overshadows all other issues, the key factor that is likely to affect the stability of Begin’s government will be his management of Israeli-US relations. Begin is aware that he must strike a delicate balance enabling him to avoid a serious crisis with Washington while still opposing major ele-ments of the perceived US peace plan.”

Peace Negotiations and Israeli Coalition Politics

DII // Finished Intelligence // 24 October 1977

“We believe Prime Minister Begin remains very much in charge, despite some reported grumbling within the Israeli cabinet over accepting a united Arab delegation in Geneva. So long as he is convinced that Foreign Minister Dayan is not playing a lone hand or is not going further than Begin himself would approve in demonstrating tactical flexibility, the prime minister’s preem-inent authority will enable him to override any objections from hardliners in the cabinet.

Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 05 October 1977

“Prime Minister Begin’s ruling coalition gained a much more comfortable majority in the Israeli Knesset this week when the moderate Democratic Movement for Change joined the govern-ment, boosting its margin from four to 19 seats. The broadening of the coalition, which was previously limited to Begin’s right-wing Likud grouping and two religious parties, should strengthen the ability of Begin and Foreign Minister Dayan to control Israel’s tactical approach to peace negotiations.”

Comments by Soviet Ambassador in Cairo Concerning Significance of Visit of Foreign Ministry Middle East Department Chief Sytkenko to Arab Countries

DO // Cables // 08 November 1977

“[Less than one line redacted] that the visit of Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Middle East Department Chief Mikhail Sytkenko to the Arab world in November represented a potential shift in Soviet policy vis-à-vis Middle East peace negotiations... The 1 October 1977 joint Soviet-American statement on the bases for a Middle East peace whetted Moscow’s appetite to play a greater role in Middle East negotiations.”

Factors Affecting Saudi Arabia’s Position on an OPEC Oil Price Increase

DII // Finished Intelligence // 10 November 1977

“Given the above factors and the present climate of pessimism in the Arab world over the prospects for a Geneva conference, we believe it highly unlikely that further US démarches to Saudi Arabia aimed at preventing an oil price increase at Caracas would be successful. Prince Fahd told Secretar y Blumenthal that the Saudis are prepared to argue initially for a price freeze but he implied that the Saudis would be forced to accept some increase because they could not be sure the other OPEC members would agree to a price freeze. A revised US démarche to Saudi Arabia to hold down any increase in oil prices at Caracas would be unnecessary expenditure of political capital because the Saudis probably would work on their own to hold any price increase to the 5-10 percent range.”
Israel: Begin's Speech to Egypt

D/I // Current Intelligence // 02 December 1977

“Israeli Prime Minister Begin’s radio broadcast to Egypt yesterday was almost certainly an attempt to wrest the propaganda initiative from President Sadat and demonstrate that Israel is no less interested than Egypt in peace. Egypt has characterized Begin’s broadcast as ‘unsuccessful’ because his remarks were confined to Egypt.”

USSR-Middle East Response

D/I // Current Intelligence // 18 November 1977

“The USSR has responded negatively to the current Egyptian-Israeli dialogue [less than one line redacted]. Moscow is clearly concerned that recent developments will enable the US to resume its role as the major participant in step-by-step talks from which the Soviets would be excluded.”

Egypt-Israel

D/I // Current Intelligence // 18 November 1977

“Egyptian President Sadat’s startling proposal on 9 November to plead the Arab cause before the Israeli parliament in London, Paris, Bonn, Madrid, and the sacking and burning of the Egyptian Embassy in Tripoli; massive demonstrations occurring in Lebanon, Iraq, and Libya; the unprecedented cancelling of official ceremonies marking the Muslim holy day celebration in Egypt; the breaking of diplomatic relations with Egypt by Gadhafi and the reported withdrawal of 15,000 Libyans from Egypt.”

International Reaction to the Sadat and Begin Speeches

D/I // Finished Intelligence // 21 November 1977

“Except in the Arab world, international reaction to the speeches yesterday by Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin has thus far been minimal. Arab commentary on the speeches has followed rather predictable patterns. Syria has castigated Sadat for acknowledging the ‘existence of Israel’ and Begin for ignoring the rights of the Palestinians. Iraq and Libyan commentary has been particularly harsh. One militant official of the Palestine Liberation Organization has also criticized Sadat for ‘turning his back’ on the Arabs and Begin for failing to mention the PLO.”

Middle East: Sadat’s Knesset Speech

D/I // Current Intelligence // 21 November 1977

“Egyptian President Sadat’s speech to the Knesset contained no departures from Egypt’s terms for a peace settlement, nor did it propose any new specific ways for negotiating a settlement. True [to] his promises before undertaking his historic visit, the Egyptian President delivered a direct and forceful restatement of the primary Arab requirements for a peace agreement, bowing to Israeli sensitivities only in avoiding, when possible, language—such as direct references to the Palestine Liberation Organization—that would have added a contentious tone to the occasion. The Israeli public, while still euphoric over Egyptian President Sadat and Begin’s efforts to end the Arab-Israeli disputes. Syrians of all walks of life—lawyers, shopkeepers, farmers, professional men and even a segment of the Syrian military (the Sunnis)—believe that Sadat has made an important breakthrough towards peace and that he should now be supported in his initiatives by other Arab states.”

Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments, No. 305

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 28 November 1977

“By sealing the initiative in the peace process, Sadat has created very difficult problems for the states involved. For the first time in several months each of the parties is being forced to reevaluate basic policy positions and to reformulate their disposition in several months. For the first time in several months each of the parties is being forced to reevaluate basic policy positions and to reformulate their disposition to toward a settlement. Sadat apparently believes that he is secure at home and has sufficient influence within the Arab world to force the peace of negotiations so that they do not bog down on procedural issues.”

Middle East: Diplomacy

D/I // CIA Finished Intelligence // 29 November 1977

“Israeli Prime Minister Begin’s speech to the Knesset yesterday contained no surprises or hints of greater flexibility. Begin did little more than recount the public events of the past two weeks and reiterate his desire for peace and for negotiations with all of the Arabs, except the Palestine Liberation Organization.”

Syria: Asad’s Mideast Position

D/I // Current Intelligence // 01 December 1977

“Syrian Arab summit of Arab states opposed to Egypt’s anti-Soviet moves and immediately postponed their meeting until today.”

Iraq: Anti-Soviets Moves

D/I // Current Intelligence // 05 December 1977

“Egypt’s recall for consultations of its ambassador to the USSR underscores President Sadat’s displeasure with Moscow’s refusal to attend the Cairo preparatory conference.”

Arab States: Tripoli Summit Landing

D/I // Current Intelligence // 05 December 1977

“The Libyan-hosted summit of Arab states opposed to Egypt’s initiatives toward Israel appears to have ended, and a final communique reportedly will be issued later today. There apparently has been considerable dissension among the participants. The reported walkout by the Iraqi representative suggests that the final results of the conference may prove to be milder than some radical Arab had wished. Moreover, a militant statement announced by the Palestinians in Tripoli yesterday is likely to be stoked by President Sadat’s inability to persuade the Arab states and reiterate his desire for peace and for negotiations with all of the Arabs, except the Palestine Liberation Organization.”
“Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and his subsequent drive for further face-to-face negotiations with the Israelis have resulted in an intense, emotional and enthusiastic response from the Arab people, not only in those states supporting Egypt but also in such countries as Syria and occupied Palestine. The slogan of the Sadat supporters is ‘Peace—not War,’ but it is assumed by all (including Sadat) that ‘Peace’ means one in which the occupied Arab lands are returned to Arab control. The dramatic offer which Sadat has made is for Egypt to accept Israel as a friendly Middle Eastern state with full diplomatic recognition and secure, recognized boundaries.”

Arab States: Egyptian Reaction

“Egypt reacted sharply to the Tripoli communiqué by announcing yesterday that it will sever diplomatic relations with Syria, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and South Yemen. The move could have the effect of forcing the summit participants to adhere to anti-Egyptian measures that they might otherwise have circumvented.”

Egypt-US-Soviet Union: Further Action

“Egyptian President Sadat told US officials yesterday that he intends to take ‘further action,’ which will be announced today, against the USSR. Sadat did not indicate what he had in mind. In his current mood he may announce a full diplomatic break with Moscow. It seems more likely, however, that Sadat’s recent public commitment to work toward reconvening the Geneva conference will constrain him from further compromising the Soviets’ role as co-chairman of the conference.”

West Bank: Opinion on Sadat’s Plan

“The reaction to President Sadat’s diplomatic initiatives could create further divisions in the Palestinian movement, and they are skeptical about Israel’s willingness to withdraw from Sinai.”

Egypt-US-Soviet Union: Expulsion Reaction

“The Soviets have thus far not reacted to Egyptian President Sadat’s move yesterday to close their consulates and cultural centers.”

Arab States-Israel

“The deepening splits in Arab ranks over Egyptian President Sadat’s trip to Israel have prompted those Arab states caught in the middle to intensify their mediation efforts. Visits by Jordan’s King Husayn to Syria and Egypt on 7 and 8 December and by Syrian President Assad to Saudi Arabia on 8 December are not likely, however, to produce any reconciliation between Cairo and its hard-line Arab critics, including Syria, in the near future. Sadat will probably open the preparatory Cairo peace conference on 14 December without the public backing of any Arab state, and with only Israel and the US behind his new approach to peace negotiations.”

US-Soviet-Middle East: Comments

“Comments in Soviet media yesterday on developments in the Middle East indicate a Sino-Soviet consensus over Secretary of State Vance’s visit to the area. A TASS statement in English complained of ‘definite circles’ in the US administration ‘set on pressuring’ Arab states to support both the meeting in Cairo and direct contacts between Egypt and Israel.”

Egypt-US-Soviet Union: Criticism

“The USSR has apparently decided at least for now to soft-pedal its criticism of Egyptian President Sadat [less than one line redacted]. The timing of this tactical shift suggests that the sudden closure of the US consulates and cultural offices in Egypt convinced Moscow to moderate its public positions. The shift follows discussions between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Undersecretary Habib in Moscow last Sunday and Monday.”

Jordan: Husayn and the West Bank

“King Husayn has indicated in recent interviews that Jordan would assume an active role in West Bank negotiations only if Israel is prepared to offer him substantial territorial concessions. Husayn’s remarks are probably designed to impress on Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat that he must have firm indications of Israeli willingness to pull back from most of the West Bank before he will take the substantial risks involved in participating in the Cairo conference or a truncated Geneva Conference.”

West Bank: Palestinians to Cairo

“Delegations of conservative Palestinian representatives from Gaza and the West Bank are traveling to Cairo this weekend to endorse Egyptian President Sadat’s peace initiatives. These delegations are not likely to present an alternative to Prime Minister Begin and Jordanian President to represent any significant body of Palestinian opinion.”

Egypt-Israel

“The preliminary Arab-Israeli peace conference called by Egyptian President Sadat opened in Cairo on 14 December with only the Egyptians, from the Arab side, sitting down with the delegations representing Israel, the US, and the UN. The talks nevertheless appear to be a success for the Egyptian President’s peace drive, which was his primary purpose in convening the conference.”

Israel: Cairo Conference Begins

“Hopes are running high in Israel as the Cairo conference begins. Although the public remains in the dark on where the negotiations are headed, there is a general feeling that at least a settlement with Egypt is within reach.”

Egypt: Financial Implications

“The initial Arab public reaction to press accounts of Israeli Prime Minister Begin’s new proposals for home rule on the West Bank and Gaza has generally been negative. Arab commentators have complained that Begin’s plan fails to deal with the nearly two million Palestinian refugees living outside of Israel and the occupied territories. The Arab press has also noted that the plan continues Israeli control over East Jerusalem.”

Brezhnev Letter: Brezhnev’s Health, Gromyko on Middle East

“Gromyko on the Middle East: Gromyko said he would like to comment on the Middle East situation, quite independently of the president’s letter. He had received a report from the Soviet embassy in Washington of Secretary Vance’s recent conversation with Dobrynin on this topic, and in that context wished to state the following: the Soviet Union is not accustomed to accepting or approving agreements concluded without the participation of the Soviet Union; this is not our way of conducting business, and we don’t like this practice.”

Egypt-Israel

“The pace of Middle Eastern diplomacy quickened this past week with Prime Minister Begin’s sudden trip to Washington and the subsequent announcement that Begin and President Sadat would meet in Ismailia on Christmas Day for talks on Israeli peace proposals. Begin’s decision to brief President Carter is being interpreted in some quarters in Israel as an attempt to nestle close coordination between Washington and Tel Aviv on peace efforts.”

Egypt-Israel: Summit Results

“The initial assessment of the US Embassy in Cairo is that the summit meeting in Ismailia was less than a success for Egyptian President Sadat. Although both he and Israeli Prime Minister Begin are seeking to project a positive image of the two-day summit and are pointing to upcoming negotiations, the US administration, at a ministerial level, the Egyptian President appeared to have had little success in modifying any significant points of Begin’s comprehensive peace plan, many details of which had been published before the summit negotiations began on Sunday.”

Egypt-Israel

“Sadat was unable to get agreement on a ‘Declaration of Principles’ for which he had been holding out hope right up to the beginning of the meeting. The most serious disagreements were over the future of the West Bank and the Palestinian Arabs, which Sadat described as the ‘crux of the whole problem.’ The question of an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai appears less intractable, although many details are yet to be worked out.”

Syria: Asad’s Opposition to Sadat’s Peace Initiative

“Syrian President Asad has reacted to Egyptian President Sadat’s readiness to deal directly with the Israelis with genuine shock and disapproval. The symbolism of Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem aroused similar distaste in some other Arab capitals, but the more moderate of these states have come to recognize the opportunity the visit opened for further movement toward peace negotiations. Asad has not. He regards Sadat’s visit not merely as a blunder to be criticized and later forgiven but as a major concession to the ‘enemy.’ Asad is particularly incensed that Sadat is looking beyond a nonbelligerency treaty with Israel toward a true reconciliation with Israel. Asad is not ready for a peace that would also bring normalization of Arab-Israeli diplomatic relations, and he cannot accept with equanimity the fact that Sadat is.”

President Sadat’s [less than one line redacted] Reaction to President Carter’s TV Comments on 28 December Regarding the West Bank

“The less than one line redacted] Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat made the following comments regarding U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s remarks on television concerning the West Bank. Sadat said he was not really angry over incident, as he realized Jimmy Carter’s remarks on television concerning the West Bank. Sadat said he was not really angry over incident, as he realized that the president’s letter. He had received a report from the Soviet embassy in Washington of Secretary Vance’s recent conversation with Dobrynin on this topic, and in that context wished to state the following: the Soviet Union is not accustomed to accepting or approving agreements concluded without the participation of the Soviet Union; this is not our way of conducting business, and we don’t like this practice.”

Egypt-Israel

“The pace of Middle Eastern diplomacy quickened this past week with Prime Minister Begin’s sudden trip to Washington and the subsequent announcement that Begin and President Sadat would meet in Ismailia on Christmas Day for talks on Israeli peace proposals. Begin’s decision to brief President Carter is being interpreted in some quarters in Israel as an attempt to nestle close coordination between Washington and Tel Aviv on peace efforts.”

Egypt-Israel: Summit Results

“The initial assessment of the US Embassy in Cairo is that the summit meeting in Ismailia was less than a success for Egyptian President Sadat. Although both he and Israeli Prime Minister Begin are seeking to project a positive image of the two-day summit and are pointing to upcoming negotiations, the US administration, at a ministerial level, the Egyptian President appeared to have had little success in modifying any significant points of Begin’s comprehensive peace plan, many details of which had been published before the summit negotiations began on Sunday.”

Egypt-Israel

“Sadat was unable to get agreement on a ‘Declaration of Principles’ for which he had been holding out hope right up to the beginning of the meeting. The most serious disagreements were over the future of the West Bank and the Palestinian Arabs, which Sadat described as the ‘crux of the whole problem.’ The question of an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai appears less intractable, although many details are yet to be worked out.”

Syria: Asad’s Opposition to Sadat’s Peace Initiative

“Syrian President Asad has reacted to Egyptian President Sadat’s readiness to deal directly with the Israelis with genuine shock and disapproval. The symbolism of Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem aroused similar distaste in some other Arab capitals, but the more moderate of these states have come to recognize the opportunity the visit opened for further movement toward peace negotiations. Asad has not. He regards Sadat’s visit not merely as a blunder to be criticized and later forgiven but as a major concession to the ‘enemy.’ Asad is particularly incensed that Sadat is looking beyond a nonbelligerency treaty with Israel toward a true reconciliation with Israel. Asad is not ready for a peace that would also bring normalization of Arab-Israeli diplomatic relations, and he cannot accept with equanimity the fact that Sadat is.”
Egypt-Israel
DI // Current Intelligence // 15 January 1978
“An Israeli delegation headed by Defense Minister Weizman arrived in Cairo on 11 January to meet with Egyptian counterparts in the first session of a joint military committee, one of two such working groups agreed to at the Israel-Saudi summit. A political committee, with Foreign Ministers Dayan and Kamal heading their respective countries’ delegations and attended by Secretary Vence, convenes in Jerusalem on 16 January.”

Egypt-Israel: Sadat Recalls Kamal
DI // Current Intelligence // 19 January 1978
“Egyptian President Sadat’s recall yesterday of Foreign Minister Kamal from the political talks in Jerusalem underscores his frustration with the slow pace of peace negotiations and is part of his effort to increase pressure on Israel to alter its approach. Sadat also called an extraordinary session of the People’s Assembly for Saturday; in the past he has used this forum to make dramatic announcements.”

Egypt-Israel
DI // Current Intelligence // 20 January 1978
“Prospects for a negotiated peace settlement in the Middle East dimmed this week when Egypt’s President Sadat, alleging Israeli intransigence, broke off talks between foreign ministers in Jerusalem after only two days of meetings.”

Israel: Begin’s Knesset Speech
DI // Current Intelligence // 24 January 1978
“Israeli Prime Minister Begin in his Knesset speech yesterday left open the possibility of an early resumption of the military talks in Cairo. Begin hinted Israel’s approval of such a resumption on President Sadat putting an end to the ‘anti-Semite’ campaign in the Egyptian press. Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal dismissed the charges of anti-Semitism, but suggested that both sides could ‘calmly redefine their stands’ and may resume negotiations.”

Egypt: Negotiating Tactics
DI // Current Intelligence // 25 January 1978
“Egyptian President Sadat appears in no hurry to resume talks with Israel, preferring for the moment to keep alive the threat—implicit in his dramatic action last week, when he recalled his delegation from Jerusalem—that negotiations will fail unless Israel and the US modify their positions and approach to the peace process. Timing is all-important to Sadat now; he must decide when he has secured maximum advantage from the current standstill in talks, yet he must be careful that the situation does not deteriorate into a permanent breakdown.”

Egypt-Israel
DI // Current Intelligence // 27 January 1978
“Egyptian President Sadat seems content for now to play out his gamble... So far, Israeli Prime Minister Begin has not publicly moderated his position and most Israelis agree that Sadat’s tactics should be answered by Israeli firmness.”

USSR-US-Middle East: Harsh Line
DI // Current Intelligence // 27 January 1978
“The current pause in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations has not eased Soviet concerns about the possibility of ‘separate’ agreements in the Middle East. Soviet spokesmen have conceded that Moscow’s position has become ‘more complicated’ as a result of President Sadat’s initiatives, and Soviet commentary has become significantly more critical of the role of the US. Moscow clearly anticipates additional Egyptian-Israeli contacts and increasingly less favorable conditions for Soviet-US relations as a result.”

Israel: Contradictory Attitudes
DI // Current Intelligence // 27 January 1978
“Most Israelis support Prime Minister Begin’s decision to delay the resumption of the military talks in Cairo as an appropriate and justified response to President Sadat’s pressure tactics and to what Israel views as a tough, unyielding Egyptian negotiating stance. This consensus, however, masks some uneasiness in Israel over Begin’s handling of the negotiations and an ambivalence on the issues of Israeli settlements in the Sinai.”

Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 364
NSC/W/STATE // Memorandums // 02 February 1978
“Despite the avoidance of public speculation about its outcome, it is becoming apparent that he hopes for some ‘dramatic and courageous act’ on the part of the US to commensurate with his trip to Jerusalem. Against this background, there are suggestions from Sadat’s entourage that he is giving some consideration to pulling back from his initiative.”

Arab States
DI // Current Intelligence // 02 February 1978
“The second summit of hard-line Arab states opposed to Egypt’s President Sadat’s peace initiative begins today in Algiers. Algerian President Boumedienne, Syrian President Assad, South Yemeni party chief Abd al-Fattah Ismail, and probably Libyan President Gadhafi will attend. The Palestinian delegation will represent all shades of opinion and may include Yasin Arafat as well as radical leader George Habbash.”

Egypt-Israel
DI // Current Intelligence // 03 February 1978
“Egyptian President Sadat caps his diplomatic campaign to rally international support for Egypt’s position in peace negotiations by visiting the US and five European countries over the next 10 days. Private and public opinion in Egypt is pessimistic that this largely public diplomacy will produce a substantive breakthrough.”

China-Egypt: Support for Sadat
DI // Current Intelligence // 16 February 1978
“Peking has officially endorsed Egyptian President Sadat’s Middle East peace initiative. The endorsement came in a statement by Premier Hua Kuo-feng broadcast on Saturday by the official Chinese news agency.”

Arab States
DI // Current Intelligence // 16 February 1978
“The summit meeting of hard-line Arab states in Algiers last week produced no public evidence that the participants... came up with an effective way to challenge seriously Egyptian President Sadat’s peace initiative.”

USSR-Egypt: Establishing a Dialogue
DI // Current Intelligence // 16 February 1978
“The Soviets are testing Egyptian willingness to establish a ‘constructive dialogue’ between the two countries... Some improvement in relations with Egypt is certainly desired by the Soviets. They continue to view that country as the most important Arab state politically and are anxious to end their exclusion from Middle East peace negotiations.”

Israel: Right-wingers to Protest
DI // Current Intelligence // 16 February 1978
“Right-wing Israeli activists, who oppose Prime Minister Begin’s peace proposals, are planning to challenge the government’s West Bank settlements policy on Sunday. Rabbi Meir Kahane, a leader of the Jewish Defense League, has announced that his group and some Gush Emunim followers will attempt to over a former hospital in the old Jewish quarter of the West Bank town of Hebron.”

Arab States: Concern over Palestinians
DI // Current Intelligence // 17 February 1978
“Some 2 million Palestinian Arabs are living outside the area they consider their homeland, the bulk of them in four countries—Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Kuwait. These countries are concerned that a Middle East settlement—even if it provides some autonomy for the 1 million Palestinians now living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—may not provide for the resettlement of the Palestinians abroad.”

West Bank: A Prospering Economy
DI // Current Intelligence // 17 February 1978
“The economy of the Israeli-occupied West Bank of the Jordan River has been prospering in the past few years—in sharp contrast to that of its Arab neighbor, which is only slowly emerging from a prolonged recession.”

Egypt: Financial Outlook
DI // Current Intelligence // 17 February 1978
“Egypt’s financial outlook has improved substantially during the last few months. Late last year, we estimated that Cairo’s unfunded payments gap would be roughly $1 billion annually through 1978. We now believe that strong private transfers and favorable oil production prospects could mean that the gap is smaller. Moreover, despite President Sadat’s peace initiative, the Saudi-sponsored Gulf Organization for the Development of Egypt appears willing to provide substantial import financing.”

Egypt: Aftermath and Reactions
DI // Current Intelligence // 21 February 1978
“The failure of Egyptian troops to capture the terrorists who assassinated Yusuf al-Sibai, the editor of Al-Ahram, and seized hostages on Cyprus has embarrassed Egypt’s President Sadat and other leaders, and seems likely to damage the President’s prestige. We believe, however, that the assassination and bungled commando operation will ultimately have little impact on Sadat’s efforts to provide for Palestinian self determination in any settlement with Israel.”

Egypt-Cyprus: Relations Broken
DI // Current Intelligence // 23 February 1978
“Egypt announced yesterday the breaking of relations with Cyprus and hinted at the possibility of further retaliation for the killing of Egyptian commandos at Larnaca airport on Sunday. President Sadat expressed his personal bitterness to Ambassador Ellis yesterday at the funeral for the 15 Egyptian commandos killed in the Larnaca incident.”

Israel: Settlement Politics
DI // Current Intelligence // 23 February 1978
“The Israeli Cabinet continues to try to resolve its policy differences on future settlements, but it may be unable to reach an agreed position when the cabinet addresses the settlements question again this weekend. The US Embassy in Tel Aviv believes that even if a policy decision is made, it will not be made public. Whether Prime Minister Begin decides in favor of proceeding with settlement activity, a general stand-still, or some middle course, the cabinet dissension that emerged during last Monday’s special session is likely to continue to bedevil him.”

Middle East-Africa
DI // Current Intelligence // 24 February 1978
“The assassination of Sibai has led to public condemnations in Egypt of Palestinians of all stripes... Sadat must consider a number of political imperatives, such as the need to include other Arabs in peace negotiations, and is unlikely to reverse his policies because of a single terrorist attack by opponents of those policies.”

Israel: Negotiating Position
DI // Current Intelligence // 28 February 1978
“Public statements last weekend by Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan and Minister without Portfolio Landau suggest that Prime Minister Begin will find it difficult to modify his negotiating position and may adopt an unyielding line during talks in Washington in mid-March.”

President Center and the Role of Intelligence in the Camp David Accords
Bibliography
Egypt-Palestinians: Media Attack
DI // Current Intelligence // 28 February 1978
“Egypt’s semi-controlled media continue harshly to denounce the Palestinians following the killing of Egyptian editor Sabi in Nicossia in mid-February. Thus far, Cairo’s only reproach is Prime Minister Sadat’s announcement yesterday that Egypt will strip Palestinians within its borders of some special privileges they have enjoyed for over 20 years. The media, however, hint at more drastic retaliation.”

Palestinians: Terrorism Increase
DI // Current Intelligence // 03 March 1978
“Palestinians of various political stripes apparently have attempted to increase the level of their terrorist operations on the West Bank and in Israel during the past three months. A substantial number of incidents have occurred since early December, including the assassination of at least three Palestinians accused of ‘collaborating’ with Israel. Israeli antiterrorist measures often are successful but cannot prevent all Palestinian operations.”

Egypt-Palestinians
DI // Current Intelligence // 03 March 1978
“Egypt’s angry reaction to Palestinian involvement in the Sibai killing includes the suggestion that Cairo is reviewing its recognition of Yasir Arafat as leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its acceptance of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians.”

Israel: Rising Labor Unrest
DI // Current Intelligence // 03 March 1978
“The Israeli Government faces rising labor unrest that could place additional strains on the ruling coalition. Prime Minister Begin probably will soon be forced to devote more attention to domestic problems in order to avoid a further erosion in the unity and prestige of his government.”

Four Scenarios for the Egyptian-Israeli Talks
DI // Finished Intelligence // 12 March 1978
“The Egyptian-Israeli talks are foundering. Having been unable to bridge their differences over the principles that are to govern a comprehensive settlement, the two sides have also lost momentum and flexibility needed for peace talks to move forward.”

Sadat’s Views
NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 24 March 1978
“Sadat has expressed a willingness to play a role in any interim arrangements worked out for Gaza, and would support a similar Jordanian role in the West Bank. He has mentioned this to us on several occasions, along with his acceptance of a limited and well-defined Israeli security presence during the interim period. Sadat has not implied that he sees a permanent joint Israeli-Jordanian administration as a viable solution for the West Bank and Gaza… Sadat has virtually given up hope that Begin will show the imagination and flexibility needed for peace talks to move forward.”

Israel: National Unity Government
DI // Current Intelligence // 25 March 1978
“Defense Minister Weizman’s proposal that the opposition Labor Party join the Likud coalition to form a national unity government is, in fact, political camouflage for a serious challenge designed to upset Prime Minister Begin’s leadership. Despite Weizman’s protestations that his plan is meant to share up Begin’s government and not to US pressure on peace issues, Weizman clearly hopes to supplant Begin as the leader of a broadened government.”

Egypt: Reaction to Begin Visit
DI // Current Intelligence // 25 March 1978
“Egyptian officials are pleased with President Carter’s firmness on key issues and his refusal to be diverted by events in Lebanon. They are somber and apprehensive, however, over the future and what can be done to restore momentum to the peace process.”

Israel: Rallying Knnesset Support
DI // Current Intelligence // 29 March 1978
“Israeli Prime Minister Begin is likely to give an impassioned defense of his peacemaking proposals before the Knesset today in an effort to orchestrate another show of coalition solidarity in the face of sharp differences with the US. Begin has already had some success in rallying public support and blaming the US for the ‘failure’ of his talks in Washington.”

Arab States: Solidarity Moves
DI // Finished Intelligence // 30 March 1978
“The Arab League Foreign Ministers, meeting in Cairo this week, have renewed and broadened the diplomatic inroad offered by the Syrian-dominated Arab peacekeeping force in Lebanon and called for Arab solidarity. An editorial published last week by an authoritative Syrian newspaper suggests that Syrian President Assad is cautiously prepping for a reconciliation with Egyptian President Sadat.”

Israel
DI // Current Intelligence // 31 March 1978
“After winning a display of unanimity by the cabinet last weekend, Begin orchestrated a strong show of support in the Knesset on 29 March for his negotiating position, and sent Defense Minister Weizman to Cairo to explore prospects for resuming direct negotiations. Begin doubtless hoped not only to probe Egyptian President Sadat’s intentions but also to use the visit to counter criticism from the opposition Labor Party that he has let the chance for peace with Egypt slip through his fingers because of his inflexibility.”

Egypt-Israel: Weizman Trip
DI // Finished Intelligence // 01 April 1978
“The lack of progress during Israeli Defense Minister Weizman’s trip to Cairo on Thursday and Friday cannot have come as a surprise to either side. Both the Israeli and Egyptian governments played the visit primarily for its domestic and international impact, although they share a genuine interest in keeping alive their channel of communication through Weizman.”

Israel: Criticism of Begin Peace Proposals
DI // Finished Intelligence // 09 April 1978
“Perhaps 25,000 Israelis, mainly middle-class Ashkenazi Jews of European origin sympathetic to Labor and the DMC, demonstrated last week in Tel Aviv in favor of greater government flexibility in seeking some way to share up the impasse with the Egyptians. If this or similar movements build up momentum they could have a significant impact in swaying public opinion and strengthening the hand of moderates who favor a more flexible approach to negotiations.”

Israel: Government’s Popularity
DI // Current Intelligence // 07 April 1978
“Israel’s sharp differences with the US and the dimming prospects for a negotiated settlement with Egypt do not appear to have substantially affected the care of Prime Minister Begin’s public support.”

Jerusalem: Some Aspects of a Complex Problem
DI // Finished Intelligence // 11 May 1978
“For the first time in some years, hope for progress toward a political solution to a diplomatic inroad offered by the Syrian-dominated Arab peacekeeping force in Lebanon and called for Arab solidarity. An editorial published last week by an authoritative Syrian newspaper suggests that Syrian President Assad is cautiously prepping for a reconciliation with Egyptian President Sadat.”

Egypt: Referendum Results
DI // Current Intelligence // 12 May 1978
“Egypt’s voters predictably answered ‘yes’ yesterday to Presi dent Sadat’s referendum campaign to award the people the right to decide on the future political life. The voting on his referendum containing six principles governing political behavior was not marred by violence. The main question remaining is how hastily Sadat will apply his mandate.”

DCI Discussion/Dinner on Personalities and Politics, 31 May 1978
DI // NIC // Memorandum // 31 May 1978
“You are invited to participate in a Discussion/Dinner hosted by Admiral Turner in his Conference Room on May 31. The discussion will be concerned with the influence of personality factors on political behavior (less than one line redacted). Jerold Post will open the discussion with brief remarks.”

President Center and the Role of Intelligence in the Camp David Accords
Bibliography

44
45
Succession in Egypt: The Process, Problems, and Viable Successors

DI // Finished Intelligence // 01 June 1978

“An undercurrent of unrest that has been building in Egypt over the stalemated peace process, new prohibitions on political activity, and continuing economic dislocations have given rise to questions about President Sadat’s tenure, and thus about the country’s future. In our view, Sadat remains in control of events and can still draw on substantial assets, most notably his political acumen. He is a master at manipulating the myriad contradictions and pressures that exist in Egypt. Nonetheless, the central role played by Egypt in Middle East politics puts a premium on its stability and moderation...and it is therefore important to consider the consequences of his departure.”

Egypt-Israel: Sadat’s Policies

DI // Current Intelligence // 02 June 1978

“Egyptian President Sadat, by suggesting in a press interview on Tuesday that October would be the decisive moment for his peace initiative, is trying to create a sense of urgency in order to revitalize the faltering negotiating process. Even so, Sadat’s statement does not appear to be just a tactical ploy, and he probably does intend to shift policies should no breakthrough in negotiations occur.”

Israel: Political Pressures

DI // Current Intelligence // 03 June 1978

“Israel’s Prime Minister Begin has come under new and contradictory political pressures, much like Shush Emunim settlers and the organization and the moderate Democratic Movement for Change, reflecting these groups’ growing restiveness with his foreign policy.”

Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 475
NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 08 June 1978

“There is little doubt that the referendum in Egypt and its aftermath constitute a ‘debehavioralization’ of the political scene. It is necessary however, to put recent events in historical perspective. It should be noted that strong rule by an authoritarian figure has been the norm throughout Egyptian history, with scarcely a trace of what could objectively be termed a ‘liberal tradition.’ In effect, the Egyptian tradition has been government by beneficent autocracy, with the democratic institutions of recent decades used primarily as a safety valve...Sadat has done quite well in countering this authoritarian tradition until the last month.”

Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 478
NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 12 June 1978

“Syrian politicians over the past several weeks have increasingly discussed the impact of Sadat’s initiative on the peace process. Almost to the man, according to Embassy Damascus, they admit the positive effect Sadat’s initiative has had on Amer-ican and Western European public opinion. The Arab world’s image has not been shown to be a ‘relic- tant stumbling block’ to peace. Nevertheless, these Syrians are convinced that the Sadat initiative has been a step backward from real peace. To the Syrians, more than so the other Arabs, the heart of the Middle East conflict remains the Palestinian question. According to the Syrians, neither Syria nor the US or any Middle Eastern state can bring peace to the area unless the Palestinians have a homeland.”

Israel-Egypt: Debate on Negotiations

DI // Current Intelligence // 16 June 1978

“The Israeli cabinet remains divided over how to respond to US questions concerning eventual sovereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and arrangements for Palestinians in those areas to express their views. The next and perhaps conclusive cabinet debate on these issues will be held on Sunday. Prime Minister Begin may seek to rally support for some compromise formula...President Sadat, for his part, is stressing the need for Israeli concessions but he is vague about what Egypt will do if these are not forthcoming.”

Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 488
DI // Current Intelligence // 23 June 1978

“Sadat is facing severe problems in three principal policy areas — liberalization, economic reform, and his peace initiative.”

Israel: Begin-Weizman Emnity

DI // Current Intelligence // 29 June 1978

“Weizman has become increasingly disillusioned with Begin and Dayan’s handling of negotiations with Egypt, and he fears that both have given up hope of political accord with President Sadat. Weizman’s frustration flared last week after the cabinet voted to approve Begin’s vaguely worded response to US questions concerning the future of the West Bank. His sharp, intemperate criticism of Begin and Dayan was immediately replaced in the Israeli press, provoking a storm in some quarters of Likud and a call for his resignation from Minister of Commerce Hurwitz, a close supporter of Dayan.”

Analysis of Arab Israeli Developments No. 494
NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 30 June 1978

“Relations between Dayan and Weizman have reached a new low in recent days, following Weizman’s charge earlier during the debate on the US questions that Dayan was leading the Cabinet around by the nose and his allegation that Dayan and Begin were leading the country toward another war. On a more fundamental level, the problem between the two men derives from longstanding differences in policy perspectives, the continuing competition for succession to Begin, and intensified personal antagonism in the wake of Weizman’s harsh remarks two weeks ago.”

Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 30 June 1978

“Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Weizman have temporarily parted over their sharp split in the recent Cabinet debate on whether to occupy the occupied West Bank, apparently at the strong urging of other leaders of the ruling coa-lition who fear an open break might precipitate a Cabinet crisis.”

Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 514
NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 12 July 1978

“On the Middle East aspects of the speech he [Sadat] criticized Begin as the ‘only obstacle’ to peace.”

Egypt: Sadat and His Arab Critics

DI // Current Intelligence // 18 July 1978

“Egyptian President Sadat’s speech on Thursday was short on substance but did leave the door open to additional direct talks with Israel. Sadat’s statement should lay to rest recent spec-ulation that a significant Arab reconciliation agreement was hammered out at the nonaligned meeting in Belgrade.”

Sadat on 242
NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 02 August 1978

“We are seeing increasing indications that, under strong pressure from the moderate Arab states and from within his own government, Sadat is finding it difficult to defend the continu-ation of his peace initiative and seems positioning himself for a shift in Egyptian policy.”

Syria and the Peace Process

DI // Current Intelligence // 04 August 1978

“Assad considers the current stalemate as proof that his initial opposition to the Sadat initiative was correct. Last November, he predicted that Israel would not make any major concessions from Minister of Commerce Hurwitz, a close supporter of Dayan.”

Discontent in Egypt and Syria, Memorandum for David Aaron from Gary Sick
NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 07 August 1978

“Less than one line redacted] Sadat is under pressure to produce some kind of concession or tangible evidence that his initiative has yielded results. Those pressures are mounting but are probably manageable at least for the moment. CIA and I both disagree with the suggestion in the State report that the continuation of the Sadat initiative will result in internal prob-lems for the Syrians...In fact, my view would be that Sadat’s ‘failure’ has tended to vindicate Assad and lend some strength to him internally.”

Egypt-Israel: Expectations

DI // Current Intelligence // 18 August 1978

“The reaction of Egyptian officials, military men, and intellectuals to the announcement of the tripartite meeting at Camp David next month has been overwhelmingly positive. The danger may be that expectations Sadat has raised unrealistically high and that there could be a reaction against Egyptian President Sadat’s policies if the talks do not produce measurable progress. Public statements of Israeli officials reflect concern that the US will present a peace plan.”

Middle East Developments, Memorandum for the Vice-President from Bill Quandt
NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 13 August 1978

“Secretary Vance’s Trip: Both Begin and Sadat immediately accepted the President’s invitation to meet with him at Camp David. The talks are now scheduled to start on September 6, Begin will be accompanied by Dayan, Weizman, Yalin, and Barak, Sadat will bring Kamel, but we are not sure about Gamsy. We expect the talks to last about 3-5 days.”

Presidential Visit to CIA Headquarters
CIA // Memorandum // 14 August 1978

“President’s visit is essentially defensive in character, and its purpose is to rebut to the public the charge that the CIA is involved in the Watergate.”

“I am the last number of the year, the purpose of the CIA has been changing. Your assignment is different now from what it was. There was a time not too long ago when your almost unique responsibility was to assess the activities and the potential activities of the Soviet Union. That, obviously, is still one of the important assignments that you have. But now your duties extend to analysis of almost every region of the world, almost every country on Earth, our close allies and friends.”

Saudi Arabia: Camp David Meeting
DI // Current Intelligence // 16 August 1978

“Saudi Arabia has been explaining its support for the tripartite talks at Camp David to key Arab leaders and trying to persuade them to withhold comment on the meeting between Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin until the outcome is known.”

Muhammad Ibrahim Kamel
DI // Finished Intelligence // 17 August 1978

“Lack of real peace. To the Syrians, more so than the other Arabs, the heart of the Middle East conflict remains the Palestinian question. According to the Syrians, neither Syria nor the US or any Middle Eastern state can bring peace to the area unless the Palestinians have a homeland.”

Middle East Developments

DI // Current Intelligence // 18 August 1978

“The reaction of Egyptian officials, military men, and intellectuals to the announcement of the tripartite meeting at Camp David next month has been overwhelmingly positive. The danger may be that expectations Sadat has raised unrealistically high and that there could be a reaction against Egyptian President Sadat’s policies if the talks do not produce measurable progress. Public statements of Israeli officials reflect concern that the US will present a peace plan.”

President Carter’s Remarks to Agency Employees
DCGNSC // Memorandum // 19 August 1978

“The last number of the year, the purpose of the CIA has been changing. Your assignment is different now from what it was. There was a time not too long ago when your almost unique responsibility was to assess the activities and the potential activities of the Soviet Union. That, obviously, is still one of the important assignments that you have. But now your duties extend to analysis of almost every region of the world, almost every country on Earth, our close allies and friends.”

Jordan and the Peace Negotiations

DI // Current Intelligence // 18 August 1978

“Hussein sees lack of movement on negotiations as posing a serious threat to the moderate Arab regimes. He believes a strong stand against negotiating with Israel will lead to a split within the Arab world and possibly lead to an Egyptian leader’s overthrow, an event that would place serious pressure on moderate governments. Hussein sees little inclination, however, to move the negotiations along by offering to mediate on the West Bank and Palestinian issues that are the stumbling blocks.”

Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s Perceptions of the Camp David Summit as of 18 August 1978
DI // Cable // 21 August 1978

“Attached for your information is a report [less than one line redacted] concerning Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s perceptions of the Camp David Summit in which he has expressed hope for the attainment of most of the goals that he had hoped for the Camp David Accords.”
achievements. This information, known to very few Egyptian officials, is a rare report, not finally evaluated intelligence. The report is also being made available to the Secretary of State.

Israel: Political Poll Results

DI // Current Intelligence // 22 August 1978

A recent poll indicates that a significant majority of Israelis are satisfied with the Begin government’s efforts toward peace.

Moshe Dayan

DI // Finished Intelligence // 22 August 1978

Leadership profile on Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Anwar al-Sadat

DI // Finished Intelligence // 22 August 1978

Leadership profile on Egyptian President Sadat.

Ezer Weizman

DI // Finished Intelligence // 24 August 1978

Leadership profile on Israel’s Minister of Defense.

Personality Profiles of Sadat and Begin.

Memorandum from DCI Turner to the President

DI // Finished Intelligence // 24 August 1978

“I respond to your request for analyses of the personalities involved in the Middle East negotiations. I am sending you brief personality profiles of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin.”

Notes from the Director: President Carter’s Visit

DG/NIC // Memorandum // 28 August 1978

DCI Turner’s note to Agency employees sharing the President’s remarks.

Preparations for 1 September National Security Council Meeting, Memorandum for the DCI from the Presidential Briefing Coordinator

DG/NIC // Memorandum // 29 August 1978

“In addition to background material, it contains: draft talking points for a 5-7 minute presentation which attempts to: set the scene quickly of the history of Israel…State the views Begin and Sadat bring to the meeting…Discuss the consequences of failure.”

Briefing Book - CIA Briefing Book Table of Contents

DI // Briefing Book // 31 August 1978

Includes cover, transmittal slip to National Security Advisor Brzezinski, and table of contents.

Briefing Book - DCI Turner’s Cover Memo to the CIA Briefing Book

DG/NIC // Briefing Book // 31 August 1978

Memorandum for the President from DCI Turner.

Strategy for Camp David, Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 20 August 1978

“For the talks at Camp David to succeed, you will have to control the proceedings from the outset and thereafter pursue a deliberate political strategy designed to bring about significant changes in both the Egyptian and Israeli substantive positions. I strongly suggest that you bear the following points in mind.”

Briefing Book - Arab Reaction to a US Military Presence in the Middle East

DI // Briefing Book // 31 August 1978

“Ever since the 1952 Egyptian Revolution the stationing of non-Arab troops in Arab countries has been anathema to all but the most conservative of Arab states. With the closure of the US communications facility in Morrocco this year and the cosmetic change of the COMIDEASFOR ‘Base’ in Bahrain to a ‘porting facility,’ independent American military presence no longer exists in the Arab World, even in the conservative states. Non-placement, positive neutrality, the Third World, anti-colonialism, etc. are the shibboleths on which the structure of modern Arab policy has been built.”

Briefing Book - Camp David: The Consequences of Failure

DI // Briefing Book // 31 August 1978

“The Camp David talks will have failed if: 1) The US is unable to persuade both Sadat and Begin to continue the present negotiating process…or 2) A breakdown at Camp David does not at least set in motion forces in Israel that could either cause Begin to moderate his position or lead to the collapse of his government.”

Briefing Book - The Military Backdrop to Egyptian-Israeli Peace Negotiations

DI // Briefing Book // 31 August 1978

“This paper begins with a brief overview of the Intelligence Community’s assessment of the current and likely future Arab-Israeli military balance. It outlines the military prospects of Egypt and Israel from the perspective of conservative military planners in each country. This ‘worst case’ perspective provides insights into the pressures on both Sadat and Begin to reach an agreement.”

Briefing Book - Soviet Reaction to a US Military Presence in the Middle East

DI // Briefing Book // 31 August 1978

“We have high confidence that Soviet reaction to even the prospect of a US military presence in the Middle East in any foreseeable context would be unreservedly and stridently negative.”

Briefing Book - Israe:-Egypt: Economic Benefits of Peace

DI // Briefing Book // 31 August 1978

“Any gains from a peace settlement would depend upon a substantial change in the siege mentality in both Israel and Egypt to a more optimistic view of the future.”

National Security Council Meeting:

Middle East - Camp David Summit

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 01 September 1978

“The President began the meeting by asking Ambassador Eilts and Ambassador Lewis to discuss briefly the personalities who would be with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin at Camp David.”

Israel: New Public Opinion Poll

DI // Current Intelligence // 01 September 1978

“A recent telephone survey conducted by the Dahaf polling organization indicates that more than 60 percent of the Israeli public would support the return of some of the occupied West Bank if this would enable Israel to obtain an agreement with Egypt at Camp David.”

Israel: Palestinian Terrorism

DI // Current Intelligence // 01 September 1978

“Palestinian terrorist groups have stepped up their operations in Israel and the occupied territories in accordance with plans developed several months ago. Israeli security forces are able to counter most but not all of the terrorist operations, which have a new momentum as the Palestinians try to draw attention to their cause just prior to the Egyptian-Israeli US summit talks to be held at Camp David next week.”

Israel: Middle East Tensions Cloud Economic Outlook

DI // Current Intelligence // 07 September 1978

“This article assesses some of the economic trade-offs and potentialities of an open-border peace settlement and, alternatively, of an escalation in Middle East tensions.”

Israel: Aftermath of Split in Democratic Movement for Change

DI // Current Intelligence // 15 September 1978

“Two parties of equal parliamentary strength have formed in Israel and the occupied territories in accordance with plans developed several months ago. Israeli security forces are able to counter most but not all of the terrorist operations, which have a new momentum as the Palestinians try to draw attention to their cause just prior to the Egyptian-Israeli-US summit talks to be held at Camp David next week.”

Israel: Palestinian Terrorism

DI // Current Intelligence // 01 September 1978

“Palestinian terrorist groups have stepped up their operations in Israel and the occupied territories in accordance with plans developed several months ago. Israeli security forces are able to counter most but not all of the terrorist operations, which have a new momentum as the Palestinians try to draw attention to their cause just prior to the Egyptian-Israeli-US summit talks to be held at Camp David next week.”

Israel: Dayan Smoothing the Way

DI // Current Intelligence // 22 September 1978

“Syrian President Assad is apparently trying to develop an Arab consensus to isolate Egyptian President Sadat. In his first public comments since the Camp David talks ended, Assad somberly criticized Sadat for abandoning the Arab cause and agreeing to a separate peace with Israel.”
Egyptian Military Discontent

**Israel: Knesset Debate on Accords**
DI // Current Intelligence // 27 September 1978

"Although Prime Minister Begin probably will easily win Knesset approval for the agreements he negotiated at Camp David, the margins may not be as large as first expected. There is uneasiness in almost all parties over the implications of the accords; much of the concern is focused on the agreement to dismantle the Sinai settlements."

**Israel**
DI // Current Intelligence // 29 September 1978

The agreements negotiated at the Camp David summit, which the Israeli parliament approved on 28 September by a large majority, have given Prime Minister Begin’s popularity in the country as a whole a dramatic boost and further entrenched his government in power. Ironically, the adamantine opposition of a vocal minority of ultra-hardliners—especially to the required sacrifice of Jewish settlements in the Sinai—has weakened Begin’s support within the ruling coalition.

**Palestinians: Terrorism**
DI // Current Intelligence // 29 September 1978

"Radical Palestinian leaders such as George Habbash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, have publicly threatened to attack US targets abroad because of Washington’s role in arranging the Egyptian-Israeli agreements."

**Israel: Politics After Vote**
DI // Current Intelligence // 30 September 1978

"The Knesset’s approval of the Camp David accord is a major personal victory for Israeli Prime Minister Begin and a broadening of political support for his leadership on peace issues. Begin, however, paid a significant political price for his victory."

**Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 575**
NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 30 September 1978

"The Camp David agreements and the criticism that they have aroused in the Arab world beyond Egyptian borders have subjected King Hussein to conflicting political pressures. Hussein seems inclined, for the moment at least, to lean in the direction of Damascus and Assad’s hardline response while keeping his options open."

**Human Rights in the Middle East**
DI // Current Intelligence // 08 October 1978

"[Less than one line redacted] most Middle East states perceived the US policy on human rights as an unwarranted intrusion into their domestic affairs."

---

**Arab States: Steadfastness Summit**
DI // Current Intelligence // 02 October 1978

"Hardline Arab states, led by Syria, stepped up their efforts yesterday to form a broad Arab consensus opposed to the Camp David agreements. Libyan leader Qadhafi and Palestine Liberation Organization chief Arafat interrupted the hardliners’ meeting in Damascus to meet with Jordan’s King Hussein in northern Jordan."

**USSR: Reaction to Camp David**
DI // Current Intelligence // 23 September 1978

"Soviet President Brezhnev in a speech in Yaku yesterday firmly rejected the Camp David agreements, but stopped short of other inflammatory charges that Soviet media have recently raised against US Middle Eastern policy. In choosing to emphasize the points he did, however, Brezhnev gave no indication the USSR feels that either the tone or the substance of bilateral relations has improved in recent weeks."

**Jordan: Hussein Buying Time**
DI // Current Intelligence // 28 September 1978

"Jordan’s King Hussein is trying to pick his way through the dilemma into which he believes he was thrust by the Camp David framework for a Middle Eastern peace, which gave him a key role in the negotiating process. At the same time, he is being pressed by members of the Steadfastness Front, who are eager to bring him into their camp. Perhaps by buying time and to test the waters in Jordan, Hussein has set up a special working group on summit issues."

**Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 570**
NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 25 September 1978

"Sadat has again proven his ability to read the mood of the average Egyptian. Hundreds of thousands turned out to greet and cheer him when he returned to Egypt. Embassy Cairo notes, however, that the crowds were somewhat smaller and relatively more subdued than those which welcomed him upon his return from Jerusalem."

**Briefing Papers for Camp David, Memorandum for the Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence**
DG // Memorandum // 28 September 1978

"At the outset of my briefing with the President today, I congratulated him on Camp David. He replied that the briefing paper he received from CIA had been superb. He was particularly pleased with the profiles of the major leaders with whom he had to deal. He commented that based on his experience ‘you don’t need to change one word of the profiles.’"

**Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 571**
NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 26 September 1978

"The decision to combine the settlements issue with the vote on the Camp David framework and the Labor Party’s decision to support this single proposition, has assured Begin of what Maarrav calls an ‘anguished victory’ in the Knesset... Opposition to the accord is scattered; the loudest dissenter comes from Begin’s own Likud bloc."

---

**Egypt: Position on Lebanon**
DI // Current Intelligence // 02 October 1978

"Fatah leader Yasar Arafat apparently is opposed to an international conference on Lebanon. Palestinian forces have avoided involvement in the current upsurge of fighting in Lebanon, but significant Christian provocations could draw them in."

**Egypt: Sadat’s New Prime Minister**
DI // Current Intelligence // 02 October 1978

"Egyptian President Sadat’s detailed public defense yesterday of the agreements he signed at Camp David is likely to boost his stock further. His naming of Dr. Mustafa Khalid as Prime Minister should impart a new sense of direction to a bureaucracy convinced since late July that Prime Minister Saim was on his way out."

**Egypt: Reshaping the Government**
DI // Current Intelligence // 04 October 1978

"Egypt’s announcement yesterday that War Minister Jamasi and Chief of Staff Fahmi have been removed from their posts is probably part of President Sadat’s reshaping of the government and preparations for implementing the Camp David accords, although the announcement was unusually abrupt."

**Comments of King Hussein on his Perception of U.S. Pressure on Jordan to Join the Middle East Peace Negotiations and on his Recent Discussions with Saudi and Gulf Leaders**
DO // Cable // 06 October 1978

"In King Hussein’s contacts with the United States, and in particular in three letters and one telephone call he has received from President Carter, Hussein has discerned the following theme: entering the negotiations is a difficult and risky course, but the King has taken risks in the past; further more, not getting involved holds far more risks. These and other messages—indicating that if Jordan ‘falls into line’ its military and economic needs will be satisfied—add up in the King’s mind to an implied threat."

**Egypt**
DI // Current Intelligence // 08 October 1978

"President Sadat named a new Prime Minister this week—the latest step in his continuing effort to reshape the Egyptian Government. Another major change was the dismissal of General Jamasi, as Minister of War and his probable removal from the team named to conduct negotiations with Israel in Washington next week."

**Saudi Arabia: Peace Process**
DI // Current Intelligence // 13 October 1978

"Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud has urged the US to find a way to open direct contact with the Palestine Liberation Organization and to link an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty with progress on resolving the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip."

--

**Arab Summit**
DI // Current Intelligence // 13 October 1978

"Iraq, whose doctrinal rejection of any negotiations with Israel has led to its isolation even from the hardline Arabs, is having some success pulling together an Arab summit conference in Baghdad to try to work out a coordinated opposition to the Camp David agreements."

**Palestinians: Camp David Accords**
DI // Current Intelligence // 14 October 1978

"Official statements by the Palestine Liberation Organization continue to contain harsh criticism of the Camp David agreements. Some PLO leaders, however, are closely watching past Camp David developments and ultimately may be willing to exploit quietly the opportunities the agreements offer the Palestinians."

**Yasir Arafat’s Preference to Deal Directly with the United States Government rather than to Discuss a Middle East Peace with Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat**
DO // Cable // 13 October 1978

"Yasir Arafat conveyed a message to General Shawafti via an emissary on 12 October to the effect that he, Arafat, does not trust President Sadat and would prefer to deal directly with the United States (U.S.) on the matter of peace in the Middle East and the role of the PLO. Given the nature of the message, General Shawafti chose not to pass the message to President Sadat and instead sent an own emissary to contact Arafat for clarification of ‘Arafat’s precise views and desires.’"

**Recommendations for United States Assistance to Egypt, Memorandum for the Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from DCl Stansfield Turner**
DCl/NIC // Memorandum // 24 October 1978

"He has made the following two suggestions for the support of the military sector, which would have the highly beneficial effect of ensuring the continued support of the Egyptian military during the peace process."

**Israel-Egypt: Energy and the Sinai**
DI // Current Intelligence // 24 October 1978

"The return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt will make Israel almost totally dependent on imported oil for its energy needs, at least for the next several years. Israel will probably try to negotiate access, at preferential prices, to some of the oil and gas it has discovered in the Sinai. Oil purchases from Egypt would save Israeli money on transportation costs and would symbolize a major change in political relationships."

**Israel: Current Negotiations**
DI // Current Intelligence // 26 October 1978

"Despite the Israeli cabinet’s approval with changes of the draft peace treaty with Egypt, popular concern over the negotiating process continues. Israeli popular reaction to US Assistant Secretary of
**Arab States: Summit Meeting**  
DI // Current Intelligence // 30 October 1978  
“Developments in the Middle East during the past few days have lessened the likelihood of a major quarrel erupting between Arab hardliners and moderates when they meet in Baghdad next week to talk about the Camp David accords. The successful conclusion of reconciliation talks between Iraq and Syria this week, Israel’s decision to ‘apportion’ West Bank settlements, and speculation about a move of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and the Office of the Prime Minister to East Jerusalem have bolstered the hand of the hardliners and made it harder for Saudi Arabia and other moderates to blunt anti-Egyptian pressures. The moderate tone of the communiqué issued following the Iraqi-Syrian talks suggest, however, that an effective will be made at Baghdad to come up with proposals acceptable to all the conferences.”

**Arab States: Summit Strategies**  
DI // Current Intelligence // 02 November 1978  
“The Arab foreign ministers conference in Baghdad ended yesterday with agreement on ‘middle-of-the-road’ proposals, according to Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud. The draft proposals will be considered by the Arab summit, scheduled to open today in Baghdad.”

**Arab Summit**  
DI // Current Intelligence // 02 November 1978  
“The Arab world beyond Egypt is still reverberating from the impact of the Camp David accords and the signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the peace treaty.
Arab States: Split at Baghdad Conference
DI // Current Intelligence // 30 March 1979
“The conference in Baghdad where Arab Foreign Ministers have been discussing measures against Egypt since Tuesday is bogged down by sharp differences between moderates and hardliners, (less than one line declassified).”

Sadat’s Liberalization Policy
DI // Finished Intelligence // 01 June 1979
“Egypt is in the midst of an election campaign precipitated by President Sadat to rid the People’s Assembly of the most vocal critics of the peace treaty with Israel. The situation dramatizes Sadat’s paradoxical approach to liberalizing politics in Egypt. On the one hand, he has been responsible for unquestionable progress in moving Egypt away from authoritarian government and closer to Western-style democracy… On the other hand, the parties Sadat encourages… differ only slightly, while those offering real alternatives are barely tolerated.”

Personality Profiles in Support of the Camp David Summit
Studies in Intelligence // Article // 01 June 1979
“Among the briefing materials President Carter carried to Camp David for his historic meetings with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin in September 1978 were a personality profile on each of the two Middle Eastern leaders and a third profile comparing their personalities and negotiating style. Following his diplomatic triumph, the President conveyed his appreciation to the Central Intelligence Agency for the intelligence support provided him and singled out the personality profiles for special praise: ‘After spending 13 days with the two principals,’ he said, ‘I wouldn’t change a word.’”

Middle East Peace Negotiations
DI // Finished Intelligence // 31 July 1979
“Our analysis of the current autonomy negotiations leads us to believe that there is an increasingly urgent need to attract Palestinian interest in participation. The attached paper provides our assessment of the forces at work on the principal players.”

Syria: Assad’s Prospects
DI // Finished Intelligence // 17 March 1980
“President Assad has committed his minority Alawite government to a risky course with his reported decision to use the military more freely to crush civil unrest in Syrian cities. This may intimidate his domestic opponents in the short run, but unless Assad is able to reestablish order quickly, it will also further erode his domestic support and could eventually bring about his ouster.”

Syria, Memorandum for the National Security Council from Frank C. Carlucci
DCI/NIC // Memorandum // 11 July 1980
“Although not imminent, Syrian President Assad’s assassination or overthrow is significantly more likely today than it was before the 26 June assassination attempt. I believe that US policymakers need to focus sooner rather than later on the potential adverse regional consequences of Assad’s removal from the scene.”
JIMMY CARTER

39th President of the United States

Jimmy Carter was thirty-ninth president of the United States, serving from January 20, 1977 to January 20, 1981. Significant foreign policy accomplishments of his administration included the Panama Canal treaties, the SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union, and the establishment of U.S. diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. He championed human rights throughout the world. On the domestic side, the administration’s achievements included a comprehensive energy program conducted by a new Department of Energy; deregulation in energy, transportation, communications, and finance; major educational programs under a new Department of Education; and major environmental protection legislation, including the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act.

His determination to pursue peace in the Middle East led him to bring together the leaders of Israel and Egypt at Camp David. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (1982) provides a detailed account of negotiations during his administration. We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land: A Plan That Will Work (2009) provides a blueprint for the future.

In 1982, President Carter became University Distinguished Professor at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, and founded The Carter Center. The nonpartisan and nonprofit Center strives to resolve conflict, promote democracy, protect human rights, and prevent disease and other afflictions.

On December 10, 2002, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to President Jimmy Carter and initiated the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Dr. Quandt was also an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, worked at the Rand Corporation in the Department of Social Science from 1968-1972, and taught at UCLA and MIT.

WILLIAM B. QUANDT

Edwin R. Stettinius Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia and former senior staff member, National Security Council

William B. Quandt is the Edward R. Stettinius, Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia. He has been a member of the Department of Politics since 1994, and from 2000 to 2003 has also served as Vice Provost for International Affairs for the University. He teaches courses on the Middle East and American Foreign Policy. Prior to this appointment, he was a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, where he conducted research on the Middle East, American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, and energy policy.

Before going to Brookings in 1979, Dr. Quandt served as a staff member on the National Security Council (1973-1974, 1977-1979). He was actively involved in the negotiations that led to the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Dr. Quandt was also an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, worked at the Rand Corporation in the Department of Social Science from 1968-1972, and taught at UCLA and MIT.

JERROLD POST

Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International Affairs and Director of the Political Psychology Program at The George Washington University.

Dr. Jerrold Post has devoted his entire career to the field of political psychology. Dr. Post came to George Washington after a 21-year career with the Central Intelligence Agency where he founded and directed the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior, an interdisciplinary behavioral science unit which provided assessments of foreign leadership and decision making for the President and other senior officials to prepare for Summit meetings and other high level negotiations and for use in crisis situations. He played the lead role in developing the “Camp David profiles” of Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat for President Jimmy Carter and initiated the U.S. government program in understanding the psychology of terrorism. In recognition of his leadership of the Center, Dr. Post was awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit in 1979, and received the Studies in Intelligence Award in 1980. He received the Nevitt Sanford Award for Distinguished Professional Contributions to Political Psychology in 2002.

Dr. Post has published widely on crisis decision-making, leadership, and on the psychology of political violence and terrorism, and recently has been addressing weapons of mass destruction terrorism: psychological incentives and constraints, as well as information systems terrorism. He is the co-author of a study of the politics of illness in high office, When Illness Strikes the Leader: The Dilemma of the Captive King, Yale University Press, 1993, and Political Paranoia: The Psycho-politics of Hatred, Yale, 1997. His other books include: The Psychological Evaluation of Political Leaders, With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton (University of Michigan Press, 2003); and his most recent book The Mind of a Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

MARTHA NEFF KESSLER

Former CIA analyst on the Middle East and South Asia

Martha Neff Kessler was an intelligence officer with the CIA from 1970 to 2000, working on the Middle East, South Asia, and terrorism. She held positions throughout the Directorate of Intelligence and served three terms on the National Intelligence Council as the Director of CIA’s point person on the Middle East. For six years, she headed the Arab-Israeli Division and was liaison with US peace negotiators throughout the Madrid peace process. She was a fellow at the National Defense University’s War College where she published Syria: A Fragile Mosaic of Power. Martha was a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution where she contributed to the Middle Foreign Policy Journal. During her career, she was awarded the CIA’s Medal of Distinguished Service and the National Intelligence Community’s Medal of Achievement. She received numerous Outstanding Performance Awards during crises in Lebanon, the Gulf War, and the Iraq war and was also honored for her authorship of National Intelligence Estimates on the rise of religious extremism.
JONATHAN MANN  
Anchor and Correspondent, CNN International

Based in the network’s Atlanta headquarters, Jonathan Mann has nearly 30 years of experience in print, radio and television journalism. He is a leading member of CNN’s team covering the 2012 U.S. presidential election, drawing on his years as host of The Campaign Trail and Political Mann. He writes a weekly column about U.S. politics for CNN.com, which is distributed to publications and websites around the world. In January 2010, Mann was one of the first reporters to reach Port-au-Prince, Haiti following the devastating 7.0-magnitude earthquake. His thoughtful reporting – aided by his ability to speak French fluently – contributed significantly to CNN’s coverage of this ongoing story.

His international news coverage portfolio includes the release of Nelson Mandela from prison; the fall of the Berlin Wall; the last days of apartheid in South Africa; the September 11th terrorist attacks; the war in Iraq; the sex scandal in the U.S. Catholic Church; and the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in 2006. In addition, Mann travels to Oslo, Norway each December for “The Prize for Peace,” a special program focused on the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. Previously, Mann worked as an anchor on CNN’s U.S. network for a variety of weekend and prime-time weeknight programs. Before his duties as an anchor, Mann was CNN’s first Paris correspondent.

ADAM HOWARD  
General Editor of the Foreign Relations of the US series, Department of State’s Office of the Historian

Adam Howard earned a Ph.D. in U.S. history from the University of Florida and currently works at the U.S. Department of State as the General Editor of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, the official documentary history of U.S. foreign relations. He has compiled and edited three FRUS volumes covering the Jordan Crisis of September 1970, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s Shuttle Diplomacy during the mid-1970s, and the Carter administration’s year and a half of negotiations leading to the Camp David summit in September 1978. Dr. Howard is also an Adjunct Assistant Professor of History and International Affairs at George Washington University and is completing a book examining the American labor movement’s role in the development of Israel from 1917-48.

MATTHEW T. PENNEY  
CIA Historian

As a CIA officer, Dr. Matthew T. Penney has worked on a variety of Middle East issues and has served widely in the region. Dr. Penney received a B.A. and M.A. in history at Baylor University and a Ph.D. in history from Rice University. Dr. Penney joined the CIA History Staff in 2008 and concentrates on the Agency’s historical involvement in the Middle East. He is a frequent guest speaker and presenter at Intelligence Community programs and symposia on the Middle East, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism.

NOTES
The Historical Review Program—part of CIA Information Management Services—identifies, collects, and produces historically significant collections of declassified documents.

These collections, centered on a theme or event, are supplemented with supporting analysis, essays, and photographs, showcased in this booklet. Additional booklets are available for purchase through the Government Printing Office at https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/1581. Each collection is also highlighted through an accompanying microsite that includes: video, audio, additional photographs, and links to declassified documents. These microsites can be found at https://foia.cia.gov.

All of our Historical Collections are available on the CIA Library Publication page located at: