

## Impact of Intelligence Integration on CIA Analysis

*Peter A. Clement*

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This article looks at the impact of 9/11 on all-source intelligence analysis, informed by my vantage point as a senior manager in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (Directorate of Analysis) during 2005–13. I focus on two key phases, beginning in 2001 with the creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and the subsequent establishment in 2004 of the National Counterterrorism Center. The second phase focuses more broadly on the impact since the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2005.

This article focuses on the integration of intelligence analysis, just one important element of the US Intelligence Community's national security mission. I do not delve into the fusion of the IC's analytic work with operational and collection activities—especially among CIA, NSA, NGA, US military services, and liaison services around the world. This is addressed, in part, in the overview (page 1) by former DNI James Clapper. These varied analytic efforts play a key role in the work of US diplomats, negotiators, and military forces in the field, as exemplified in the May 2011 take-down of Usama bin Ladin.<sup>1</sup>

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### ***Integrating Analysis: 2001–2004***

Many readers will recall that in the Mid-Atlantic Region September

11, 2001, began as a beautiful day. Blue skies, billowy clouds, and lots of sunshine—perfect for our office picnic. Around 8:45 I popped in to say good morning to my colleague in an adjoining office; he was watching CNN and remarked “Peter, looks like someone flew a plane into the World Trade Center building.” We both speculated that some inexperienced Piper Cub aircraft pilot may have gone badly astray. Some 15 minutes later, we understood how wrong we were. Soon, hundreds of my work colleagues were evacuating CIA Headquarters, concerned that CIA could be a target.

In literally one hour of that fateful morning, I felt as though I had been transported to an alternative universe. My world, our world, would never be the same, though the sheer magnitude of change was beyond anyone's comprehension. By late 2004, the outlines of a blueprint for change of the US Intelligence Community and CIA were taking shape, but the lines of this new architecture would require much more time to come into sharper relief.

Intelligence integration within the then comparatively small CIA Counterterrorism Center was quite advanced before 9/11, in the view of some of my former colleagues. Centers like CTC, the Counterintelligence Center, and the Counternarcotics Center (now

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the Crime and Narcotics Center) prefigured the direction CIA would eventually take under Director John Brennan when he reorganized CIA and established regional and functional mission centers, but they were not the norm.

Before 9/11, senior CTC management had integrated operations and analysis to advance both missions—necessitating significant information-sharing that advanced both analytic and targeting work. This kind of joint work greatly expanded within days after 9/11, as hundreds of analysts and operations officers were directed to CTC.<sup>3</sup> As one senior manager stated, “I decided to err in doing too much in transferring analysts to CTC.”<sup>4</sup> One immediate consequence: many DI and DO officers would quickly see firsthand the benefits and challenges of sharing sensitive intelligence information.

Another variant of intelligence integration took root when DCI George Tenet created the CIA Red Cell the day after 9/11. This small cell, principally comprising analysts from the DI, focused initially on terrorist threats, but its portfolio later grew to cover most regional and functional issues. Over the years, some IC analysts have done rotational tours in the Red Cell. It continues to this day, playing an important role of challenging assumptions, offering alternative perspectives, and conjuring out-of-the-box scenarios.<sup>5</sup>

Outside of CIA, a significant tremor in the IC’s tectonic plates could be felt in May 2002, when CIA

sent a senior analytic manager and some two dozen analysts to the FBI to set up an Office of Intelligence. In a May 29 announcement, FBI Director Mueller didn’t explain exactly how this office would function, given the regulatory firewalls between FBI and CIA; he did acknowledge that both agencies “have a lot to learn from each other in ways that we have not worked in the past,” and consequently the new office “would be handled by an . . . experienced CIA intelligence officer.”<sup>6</sup>

Even bigger change was afoot, however, as Congress debated throughout the summer of 2002 what intelligence reforms were required to better position the US against future attacks. Toward the end of his January 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush instructed “the leaders of the FBI, CIA, Homeland Security, and DoD to develop a Terrorist Threat Integration Center to merge and analyze all threat information in a single location.” This major move was largely overshadowed by the speech’s focus on the looming conflict with Iraq, but it would have a lasting impact.

George Tenet, then the dual-hatted director of the IC and CIA, noted that the secrecy behind the high-level planning to create the TTIC “made the bureaucratic players even more paranoid. I had to calm the jangled nerves of my senior deputies, who feared that the loss of people to TTIC would render their own organizations ineffective.”<sup>7</sup> Tenet’s observations about his senior deputies’ concerns were well-grounded. One senior CIA

manager with wry understatement described the internal reaction as “less than receptivity.”<sup>8</sup>

Many elements within the IC had CT portfolios, usually to support their specific missions, but launch of TTIC on May 1, 2003 would fundamentally alter the landscape. These changes accelerated as TTIC soon morphed into the full-bodied National Counterterrorism Center in August 2004.

With the creation of TTIC, CTC had to greatly expand its information-sharing circle to a new center filled with many non-CIA officers. TTIC’s first director, John Brennan, has described how his new start-up TTIC faced significant “ingrained bureaucratic resistance,” especially from CIA and FBI, who worried about disclosure of their most sensitive sources or ongoing investigations.<sup>9</sup> Nonetheless, Brennan was able to assemble a strong inter-IC team of senior managers who believed in intelligence integration and pushed hard to meet the mission assigned it by the President.<sup>10</sup>

Two big issues were at the heart of a contentious TTIC-CIA relationship: resources and turf.

***Resources: The People Challenge***

Standing up any new organization—including within the IC—is a vexing challenge. Of course, resource issues like funding and physical office space are always issues, but the hard part always involves people. Predictably, when IC officers are asked to take—or are directed to take—a new assignment, they likely will ask: “Is this simply a rotational tour? Or a permanent reassignment? Who is my new boss? Who writes my

performance reviews? How will this affect my career?"

During one memorable, not-so-collegial, meeting, I was the "plus one" to help negotiate a compromise on this thorny staffing issue. What I observed resembled something like hand-to-hand combat in a losing bureaucratic war to minimize regular NCTC calls for more CIA analysts. NCTC needed many analysts, but in its early years it did not yet have its own permanent career service; it was primarily staffed by IC officers on temporary assignment to NCTC.

In the end, CIA agreed to send a set number of newly hired CIA analysts directly to NCTC for their initial two-year tours. Those analysts would then return to CIA to pursue their careers. This compromise—hard fought and grudgingly accepted—was gradually mitigated after NCTC created its own a career service. Of course, a narrowly focused career service created other issues, but the move did reduce the need to borrow people from CIA and other IC elements.

Exacerbating the people challenge was the argument of who in the IC had primary responsibility for the CT mission. CIA, which was lending officers to NCTC, believed it had the lead. One senior manager who served at both CIA and NCTC noted, "The people [at CIA] who since 2001 had labored incredibly hard, 24/7, to respond to the attack, overthrow the Taliban, target al-Qa'ida leadership, who took such pride in what they were doing, what they had accomplished, and were suddenly being told 'you need to share,' and they simply

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didn't want to. They saw the NCTC as a punishment, not a bureaucratic reordering . . . one result was that some in CIA's CTC were vehemently opposed to cooperating with NCTC . . . being sent to NCTC was considered career-ending."

**Turf: Who Writes for the President?**

From the analysts' perspective, the central problem was substantive turf: Who had responsibility for writing on CT issues, especially in the *President's Daily Briefing* and other senior-level publications? In a few cases, managers and analysts devised ways to collaborate—a matrixed joint cell on weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear technologies was set up, for example. A former IC colleague who lived through this challenging transition period summed it up as well as anyone: "Over time, the relationship became more civil, and productive; while some of the rancor disappeared, there were many in CIA who would never forgive NCTC for being a constant reminder of the many mistakes that led to 9/11, no matter that blame was spread widely and we were trying to learn, not point fingers."

Another critical element of this conflict was information-sharing. Brennan described how the daunting physical and technical aspect of this sharing—requiring him to toggle between a half-dozen computers under his desk—paled in comparison to procuring approval for TTIC access to the databases of other agencies,

particularly CIA's and FBI's. In the end, only the threat of raising the problem with President Bush led to a resolution.<sup>11</sup>

Over time, rotational assignments of many senior CIA managers, branch chiefs, and analysts to NCTC would ameliorate these tensions. These officers quickly experienced that timeless and sage observation: where you stand depends on where you sit. One NCTC manager smartly encouraged CIA analysts to volunteer for a rotational tour by describing exactly what NCTC analysts did and the kinds of unique information and access they enjoyed with other parts of the US government. His bottom line: a tour at NCTC can make you a better-informed and connected CT analyst.

Another former NSA colleague cited a perfect example of a metric for success: "The first time an NSA integree at CIA's CTC called me at my NSA office and yelled at me about NSA not sharing (as a CIA officer would have), I knew we were making progress."<sup>12</sup> In short, there is nothing that alters one's perspective like putting people in positions where they become "the other."

**Shock to the System**

The creation of TTIC and NCTC moved some of the IC's tectonic plates, but passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act in December 2004 firmly repositioned them. Coming in the wake of high-profile failings and subsequent investigations by the 9/11 and WMD

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commissions,<sup>a</sup> the creation of an ODNI was the single biggest change since the CIA and modern IC was created by the National Security Act of 1947. Quite naturally, most observers and IC leaders focused on the core change: The CIA director no longer oversaw the Community; the CIA was now one of 15 IC elements under the DNI.

For CIA analysts, however, the most important change was captured in two short passages of the 236-page IRTPA: The DNI shall “act as the principal adviser to the President, to the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security.” The DNI would be responsible for providing national intelligence to the president, the heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch, to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders, to the Senate and House of Representatives, and to other persons as the DNI deemed appropriate.

Summed up in a DI “bottom-line up front” writing style, those passages would read: “The DNI is the president’s top intelligence adviser, and he owns the PDB.” That bottom line represented a serious shock to the system as it went right to the core of the DI analytic culture and identity: the DI’s near exclusive authority to write for, produce and deliver the PDB and, more broadly, CIA’s assured seat at the highest level

policy deliberations—Deputies and Principals’ Committee meetings at the White House.

Early in his tenure as the DDI, John Kringen convened a town hall meeting of analysts and managers. One distraught officer pointedly highlighted the “loss of the PDB” and asked what steps Kringen would take to wrest back control. Kringen did not miss a beat, and in a thoughtful and quite strategic reply he made three points:

*Congress passed a law. It says the DNI is the president’s principal adviser on intelligence issues and that the DNI owns the PDB.*

*My job is to make sure we [the DI] become the DNI’s best friend.*

*So, let me get this straight. For years, analysts have complained about the burden and responsibility of producing the PDB each day. Now you are complaining that others might be taking on some of that burden?*

My recollection may be a bit fogged by time, but I recall that a deafening silence followed his response.

The transition from a CIA-led PDB process to one managed by ODNI had its bumps, but overall, I believe it went quite smoothly. Early on, Kringen met with his counterparts from State/INR, DIA, and NSA

to discuss how best to effect this transition. One former senior CIA manager noted the “organizational agility” of CIA and its IC partners in transitioning to an ODNI PDB.<sup>13</sup> Several on-the-ground realities help explain why this transition in stewardship was not the trauma feared by some DI analysts—and why the percentage of PDB articles authored by non-CIA analysts usually hovered around 10 percent.<sup>14</sup>

Most importantly, the PDB had to be produced each day, irrespective of new management or organizational differences. There was no time-out to set up a new process, let alone stand up an entirely new production team. In the early months of ODNI, CIA PDB staff largely ran the machine as usual, until the ODNI PDB staff was set up. The ODNI PDB staff, which managed coordination and oversaw the PDB briefers, had been led by senior CIA officers with deputies from other IC agencies. This has provided connectivity to CIA while facilitating IC engagement in the process. Logistics also were an important factor: the ODNI PDB staff set up shop across the hall from CIA’s PDB production staff and contiguous to the PDB briefers’ offices.

CIA’s nearly 50 years of experience in running the PDB’s production machinery ensured that CIA would continue to be a major force on the PDB. Muscle memory remained critical, as the production of PDB articles was—and is—a complex process with many moving parts. Indeed, it was this complexity that had long inspired DI analysts’ complaints about the work of conceptualizing, drafting, coordinating, editing, reviewing, pre-briefing,

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a. Formally, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.

and so on. With the stand-up of the DNI, the PDB added more layers with ODNI review, including by the DNI or a senior deputy.

Well-intentioned ODNI calls to make the PDB a more IC product initially had little resonance with key IC players. Analysts at DIA, INR, and other agencies or departments had to meet the requirements of their bosses, who determined their promotions and careers. CIA analysts, on the other hand, for many years had viewed their main customers as the president and senior policymakers who received the PDB.

Several former IC colleagues believe the new IC PDB coordination process made for a more rigorous substantive review (a view I share), although they also agreed it sometimes made for longer days and more headaches. Senior ODNI PDB reviewers had to ensure all agencies had fully considered and coordinated on all PDB items. At times this could be stymied by classification or something as simple as differing schedules.

Over time, hundreds of IC analysts have written for the PDB, encouraged by the intrinsic reward of writing for—and sometimes briefing—the president, the opportunity to collaborate on multiagency analysis and modest but gratifying recognition, such as annual DNI awards for frequent PDB authors.

#### **Toward a Community Culture**

As worrisome as loss of the PDB seemed to some, a bigger challenge faced CIA's analytic directorate: how best to best reconcile its ongoing efforts to improve its analytic tradecraft with ODNI's initiatives for improving analysis and, more broadly, to instill

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a sense of shared identity and build a new IC-wide analytic culture.

To advance their vision of a more integrated community of analysts who could work more effectively to improve IC analysis, ODNI leaders launched myriad new innovative programs and training, including: the Analysis 101 course for all new IC analysts, *Intellipedia*, Rapid Analytic Support and Expeditionary Response (RASER) program, the Summer Hard Problem program (SHARP), Analytic Space (A-Space, now I-Space), and the IC Olympics.<sup>15</sup>

In concept, a shared analytic ethos was a legitimate goal. Based on my own experiences as an analyst, I knew that regular interaction with my counterparts across the IC was valuable. Through hundreds of PDB coordination conversations with IC counterparts, countless NIE coordination sessions, joint briefings at the NSC and Congress, I had met and developed friendships with fellow Russia analysts across the IC. Through this shared work, I felt I had become a better analyst and, in turn, produced better analysis.

While the DI understood the value of, and supported, such innovative ODNI programs as *Intellipedia*, the A-Space exchanges, and the Library of National Intelligence, in a few cases—Analysis 101 and RASER, for example—we voiced concerns that led some in ODNI to view us as resisters. As one senior ODNI manager noted in May 2007, its “community-led approach has met with resistance at individual organizations;

they want their analysts to adopt the local cultures before they learn the global culture.”<sup>16</sup>

This perceived resistance only reinforced the view among some IC counterparts of CIA's arrogance, insecurity, and insularity. DDI John Kringen was not surprised, as he told DI officers more than once: “Only when you have served in another agency can you see just how much we are disliked in parts of the IC.” Having served at NGA for more than two years, Kringen knew this first hand. Awareness of this reality made it even harder to resist some new ODNI initiatives.

#### **Analysis 101**

The DI's pushback on the Analysis 101 course warrants a closer look, as it exemplifies the “where you stand depends on where you sit” conundrum. Early on, a key element of the ODNI vision of an IC community of analysts was the building of a shared analytic foundation through the introduction of a four-week course for all new IC analysts. As one senior ODNI official put it: “The goal is to have new hires adopt a common way of thinking about analysis before they are captured by any individual culture.”<sup>17</sup>

The challenge for CIA was that in 2000 it had launched its own rigorous course for all new DI analyst hires known as the Career Analyst Program. This multiweek course (the length has varied somewhat and is now 19 weeks) took new analysts offline at a time when DI office directors were clamoring for more analysts

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to carry an ever-expanding workload after 9/11. For context, the DI (like other IC components) had suffered major personnel losses in the post-Cold War era, and it was only after 9/11 that hiring ramped up again, initially to bolster our CT capabilities. By 2005, a few hundred new analysts were entering the workforce annually. Taking those new analysts offline another month for an ODNI course that we judged was redundant to CAP was hard to justify. Consequently, the DI agreed to only a token participation.<sup>a</sup>

**Meanwhile, Back at CIA**

To appreciate more fully how ODNI and CIA analytic managers came to be out of sync on some issues—despite a shared goal of improving analysis—it is important to see exactly what was going on in CIA’s analytic directorate. While ODNI was conceptualizing and later launching its new initiatives to build a better, more integrated analytic culture during 2005–2007, CIA’s DI was well into its own variant of culture change, which had begun in 2003, largely because of our failing to correctly assess Iraq’s WMD programs. The DI made it a top priority to conduct a major internal review of the Iraq case because it was essential to learn, firsthand, how we went wrong—and to propose ways to ensure that similar

problems in the analysis process would be averted in the future.

This DI effort began in earnest in the summer of 2003 under DDI Jami Miscik with the creation of the WMD Review Group and a high-profile analytic stand-down intended to take a fresh look at the DI’s approach to key intelligence topics.

***WMD Review Group***

Comprising about 10 fulltime officers (and another 10 parttime or short-tour officers), the group was tasked with examining all the intelligence on Iraqi WMD from the mid-1980s through 2003. They constructed a massive timeline to identify key inflection points in the analytic line as well as other issues that affected the analysis, such as sourcing and information technology problems.

The group’s findings would reach a wide audience. Shared with the WMD Commission, they helped inform the commission’s investigation and recommendations.<sup>18</sup> The group’s work also was critical in helping DCI Tenet answer many questions from Congress, policymakers, and the media about what went wrong. Finally, the results were shared with the DI workforce, policymakers, congressional committees, ODNI leadership, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and many IC agencies.

***Analytic Stand-Down***

Another of Miscik’s key effort was declaration of a stand-down in our analysis. Of course, day-to-day production continued, but the DI used

this period to revisit its analytic lines, assumptions, and tradecraft on key intelligence topics. Managers and analysts involved in these reviews then briefed their findings to the entire DI workforce in several large sessions at CIA Headquarters.<sup>19</sup>

Miscik’s successor, John Kringen, arrived in January 2005. He built on these actions, investing significant resources, time, and energy to try to ensure that lessons learned about analytic tradecraft were translated into new processes and procedures at all levels of the DI.<sup>20</sup> Key follow-on measures included:

- Publication of a structured analytic technique (SAT) handbook detailing tools like testing assumptions, devising strong hypotheses, and red teaming.<sup>21</sup>
- Launch of a mandatory two-day course for the entire DI cadre that covered the use of these SATs in a discussion of analytic tradecraft.
- Incorporation of the Iraq WMD case study and the use of SATs into DI training programs like CAP.
- Creation of tradecraft cells to apply these lessons, tools, and techniques into daily analytic work.

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***Analytic Intelligence Integration: How and Where It Happens***

The creation of the ODNI and its authorities gave real impetus to institutional and procedural changes aimed at deepening intelligence integration among the IC’s analyst cadre.<sup>22</sup> From my vantage point and firsthand experiences, several processes,

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a. Although CIA remains an outlier, Analysis 101 has been a resounding IC success. The course is now eight days long and is aimed at instilling a sense of an integrated analytic enterprise. As of August 2021, it had graduated more than 8,000 students, of whom fewer than 2 percent are from CIA.

activities, and programs helped forge closer IC collaboration and integration during these early years of the ODNI. The common theme in these activities is people-to-people interaction—usually constructive and collegial—that builds the working relationships critical to deep intelligence integration.

The most obvious example of regular daily interaction is the coordination and review process among IC analysts and managers at many levels—from authors to editors to senior reviewers—helping them to become more familiar with and gain understanding of each other. Such analytic engagement and collaboration occurred in many venues.

Beyond expanding participation in the PDB process, supporting the White House Deputies and Principals Committee meeting process has furthered intelligence integration. President Bush's Chief of Staff Andy Card asked inaugural DNI John Negroponte to bring the DCIA to PDB briefing sessions, which then carried over to the PC and DC meetings.<sup>23</sup>

This “two seats” procedure at these high-level policy deliberations continued under President Obama and preserved the opportunity for senior-level IC collaboration. The ODNI and CIA representatives usually consulted beforehand to discuss the division of labor and afterward how to respond to taskings. This had the effect of broadening opportunities for the IC. Before the creation of the ODNI, the NIC had primarily relied on CIA analysts for such support.

#### **Joint Duty**

In response to the IRTPA, ODNI created a joint duty requirement that

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all officers seeking promotion to senior executive level spend one year in more than one IC element. This is one of the most effective means of developing senior IC analysts and managers with broader IC perspective and advancing the intelligence integration process. Having senior officers from one's home agency often facilitated access to and knowledge of other key counterparts—as I discovered in multiple dealings with CIA officers serving at State, DIA, FBI, Treasury, and DoD.

#### **Presidential Transition**

The handoff of this important task from CIA to ODNI during the 2008–2009 transition from Bush to Obama went quite smoothly, considering this was the first time ODNI managed the process, thanks to extensive engagement between senior officers in both agencies.

After their respective national conventions, the IC provided background briefings to the Democratic (Barack Obama and Joseph Biden) and Republican (John McCain and Sarah Palin) candidates. Briefing teams comprised analysts from across the IC, including FBI, NCTC, CIA, NIC, and ODNI. During the transition, the Obama and Biden briefers usually were CIA officers. Analysts from across the IC provided daily substantive support to Obama's national security team at the transition team's building in downtown Washington for over a month.<sup>24</sup>

#### **Analysis Training**

Common analytic training was another important factor in building

bonds between IC analysts. Most NCTC analysts went through CIA's CAP, while DIA's program, Foundational Professional Analyst Career Education program had many elements in common. Thanks to the ODNI there is also significant cross-IC collaboration on analytic training. Quarterly meetings of the IC Analysis Training and Education Council help to deepen analytic collaboration as it brings together the heads of all the IC analysis training programs to set standards, share curriculum, and develop joint courses.

#### **National Intelligence Council**

The NIC had long been an IC integrated entity, responsible for production of national intelligence estimates and other coordinated IC products. National intelligence officers and deputy NIOs lead IC analysis on regional and functional issues and provide valuable opportunities for analytic collaboration and information sharing among top IC analysts. With the creation of the ODNI, more non-CIA officers joined the NIC.<sup>25</sup> A good number of outside experts from academia and the think-tank world also have served as NIOs, providing other channels for IC analysts to engage top experts in their fields.

#### **National Intelligence Managers**

Charged with integrating IC collection and analysis, the NIMs gain unique insights into the collection world and work with analytic counterparts to focus and drive collection on specific topics. Created by DNI James Clapper, and staffed by officers from across the IC, NIMs

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provide another means of integrating collection and analysis.

***National Intelligence Board***

Chaired by the DNI or PDDNI, and managed by the NIC chairperson, these meetings bring together analytic managers of all the IC elements to finalize the coordination of NIEs. Quite apart from the substantive exchange and the identification of analytic differences, these gatherings are an important venue for fostering and expanding IC-wide relationships among senior managers. I attended many NIBs chaired by DNI Clapper and NIC Chair Chris Kojm; both conducted a very collegial process—one that proved extremely valuable for advancing the kinds of collaboration and relationship-building central to effective intelligence integration.

***Senior IC Forums***

In the early years of the ODNI, the DDNI for Analysis convened monthly meetings of the National Intelligence Analytic Production Board (NIAPB, now the National Intelligence Analysis Board). This board comprises the heads of analysis of all the IC entities and proved to be a highly valuable activity. Apart from developing relationships with analytic manager counterparts, these meetings provided a venue to discuss common problems and issues, share best practices, and essentially, create a shared community of interest. Such relationships also helped facilitate consultations on rotational assignments and problem-solving on resource or turf issues.<sup>26</sup>

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***Closing Thoughts***

In my conversations with former IC colleagues, the most cited challenge in navigating the post-9/11 landscape has been culture change. This vast subject is well beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say that the establishment of TTIC/NCTC and the ODNI were especially difficult because they required changes in deeply rooted CIA cultures. I can vividly recall serious discussions with CIA analysts about whether the creation of the ODNI meant that CIA was no longer “Central”—and whether we could even call ourselves the Central Intelligence Agency anymore.

Culture change often entails the redefinition of a long-established identity. The degree of resistance faced by the change-agents seems to correlate closely with the magnitude of that identity shift. Effecting a psychological shift in one's core identity takes time, patience, and the right kind of leadership.

In the case of CIA's analytic directorate, the advent of the ODNI did lead the DI to adjust its culture and become more open, engaged, and collaborative with IC partners. I believe this expanded and regular interaction with IC counterparts enhanced and strengthened CIA analysis and that of the IC writ large. At the same time, there is no denying the early tensions between ODNI and the DI. Those tensions, in my view, revolved around the issue of “culture change.”

While adjusting to post-9/11 changes, the Directorate of Analysis

culture has retained its core elements: an ethos of service to policymakers and, more broadly, to the national security of the US; a strong “can-do” attitude that responds to the many taskings and requests from a range of US policymakers in the executive and legislative branches; and an unwavering commitment to provide objective analysis—even if it is unwelcome.

Success in the analytic mission will depend, in part, on how well we nurture and sustain a learning culture that draws upon the lessons of past failures and successes, regularly reviews the basis of key assumptions, and considers alternative views—much like the Red Cell. Improving analysis is a never-ending quest; in my view, intelligence failures can never be eliminated. They can, however, be reduced.<sup>27</sup> Effectively drawing on the expertise of the IC's many talented officers is essential to that quest.

While working to navigate the challenges of large culture change in the decade after 9/11, I could not know that even larger culture changes loomed closer to home inside the walls at Langley: then-DCIA John Brennan's massive restructuring of CIA in 2015, the single biggest institutional change in CIA since DCI Walter Bedell Smith's organizational changes to CIA in the early 1950s. Brennan's mission-center construct forced the integration of four very different CIA cultures (for analysis, operations, support, and science and technology) and added the new Directorate for Digital Innovation (DDI) to the mix. My post-9/11 experiences convinced me of the value and necessity of this ambitious restructuring, but I also

knew that such major cultural change also would engender serious tensions and even resistance, especially in the start-up years. As the deputy director of the new Europe-Eurasia Mission Center, I had a ringside seat at this amalgamation of some deeply rooted cultures. But that is another integration story.



### **Endnotes**

1. Not every intelligence integration effort resolves conflict. CIA's rendition, detention, and interrogation program after 9/11 engendered strong support and strong criticism, both within and outside the CIA. A review by CIA's inspector general in 2004 cited objections from senior program managers "as well as analysts, interrogators, and medical officers." The IG report and the declassified report in 2014 by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence attest to a highly acrimonious debate about the efficacy and ethics of that program.
3. David Priess, *The President's Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence Briefings to America's Presidents from Kennedy to Obama* (Public Affairs, 2016), 224.
4. Interview with former DDI Winston Wiley, June 19, 2021.
5. Micah Zenko, *Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy* (Basic Books, 2015), 90–106.
6. Shane Harris, "CIA vet heads new FBI intelligence office," *Government Executive*, June 12, 2002.
7. George Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* (Harper Collins, 2007), 452.
8. Peter Clement interview with former senior CIA manager.
9. John Brennan, *Undaunted: My Fight Against America's Enemies at Home and Abroad* (Celadon Books, 2020), 139–54.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 146–47.
12. Clement interview with former senior IC manager.
13. Clement interview with former senior CIA manager.
14. Priess, 266–72; James Clapper, *Facts and Fears: Hard Truths From a Life in Intelligence* (Viking Books, 2018), 141.
15. Robert Ackerman, "Cultural Changes Drive Intelligence Analysis," *SIGNAL*, May 2007.
16. Ibid., 3.
17. Ibid., 2.
18. Many references to CIA's WMD Review Group can be found in its *Report to the President of the United States* (US Printing Office, 2005). See page 199 for a discussion of the group's creation.
19. For a more detailed account of the analytic stand-down and the key tradecraft lessons in the WMD Review Group's study, see *Tradecraft Review: Continuous Learning in the DI: The May 2004 Review of Analytic Tradecraft Fundamentals* (Sherman Kent School, August 2004).
20. See the CIA press release, March 2004, on Miscik's speech to the DI workforce; John Kringen, "How We've Improved Analysis: Minimizing the Risk of Groupthink," *Washington Post*, April 3, 2006.
21. The SAT handbook can be found at: <https://cia.gov/resources/csi/books-monographs/a-tradecraft-primer/>.
22. Tom Fingar, "Building a Community of Analysts" in Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, editors, *Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives*, 2nd ed. (Georgetown University, 2014), 287–301; Tom Fingar, "New Missions, New Challenges 2005–2008," in Robert Hutchings and Gregory F. Treverton, eds. *Truth to Power: A History of the US National Intelligence Council* (Oxford University Press, 2019), 132–56; and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "The Cultural Revolution in Intelligence," *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2008, 47–61.
23. Priess, 267–68.
24. John Helgerson, *Getting to Know the President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates and Presidents-Elect, 1952–2012*, 3rd Edition (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2019) 197–224.
25. Chris Kojm, "Intelligence Integration and Reform," in *Truth to Power*, 176.
26. Note: This kind of IC collaboration among senior managers was occurring in limited ways before 9/11. In the 1980s, for example, I recall a senior office director for the USSR convening monthly meetings of a Russia executive board, which included IC collection managers as well as analytic managers, to discuss substantive issues, collection priorities, and strategies. As DDCI and then DCI, George Tenet created IC-wide Hard Target Boards for each of the "hard target" adversaries, such as Russia, China, and Iran. These boards included the heads of major regional offices at the major IC entities to discuss ongoing work and resource issues, but the primary focus was on devising ideas for driving (and funding) collection on the most difficult intelligence problems.
27. Richard K. Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security* (Columbia University Press, 2007); Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (Cornell University Press, 2010).



