

of presentation—estimate, special estimate, information memorandum—and finally its value to the policymaker.

Of course, an estimate's value depends in part on the quality of relationships between analysts and policymakers, and George devotes considerable attention to that subject. His addresses politicization, presidents and their intelligence advisors, and intelligence at the center of policy disputes. In the last category his examples include Vietnam, the Iraq War decision in 2003, and Russian interference in the 2016 elections. The final comments in this area concern the dangers of politicization, for which he offers sound guidance.

One Nation, Under Drones: Legality, Morality, and Utility of Unmanned Combat Systems, edited by Capt. John E. Jackson, USN (Ret.) (Naval Institute Press, 2018), 229, end of chapter notes photos, index.

“Unmanned and robotic technologies are transforming the nature of conflict . . . and the conduct of military operations,” writes Francis Kelly, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for unmanned systems in his foreword to this book. Capt. Jackson, who teaches a course in unmanned systems at the Naval War College, presents examples of how this came about and is occurring in the defense establishment in the 13 contributions found in *One Nation, Under Drones*.

What we think of as a drone today was once called a robot and variations could fly or operate below the sea. But that definition didn't allow for a human at the controls and was unsatisfactory. Who selected the term drone is unknown, but Jackson defines drones as “unmanned aircraft or ships guided by remote control or through an onboard computer system.” (2)

Although the term may be modern, drones are not. They were used during both world wars, though technologically less sophisticated. While describing their early development, Jackson makes a minor digression to note that Norma Jean Dougherty (Marilyn Monroe) was discovered working on a drone assembly line. (5)

Subsequent topics include the use of drones in maritime systems; how to defeat drones; the legal aspects, especially with armed and reconnaissance systems; the problem

Intelligence and the National Security Enterprise concludes with a thoughtful essay on intelligence and American democracy. Not a topic often found in a textbook, but George's observations are worth close attention. For example, he discusses whether intelligence can be ethical, secret, and transparent while preserving privacy and national security, especially in the post-9/11 era. Then he turns to the many variations of congressional and executive branch oversight intended to assure citizens that the IC does not abuse its authority.

Roger George has given readers a firm foundation for thinking about how analysts and policymakers work in the effort to secure the nation's security and interests.

of non-combatants; and the debate over the ethical use of drone weapons systems. Each of the contributors provides photos and compares system capabilities and performance.

The ethical debate is discussed by Air Force Maj. Joe Chapa, who teaches philosophy at the Air Force Academy. After another critique of the inadequacy of the term drone, he zeroes in on a key issue, the ability of a drone system “to discretely target one individual while sparing the rest.” While this is a choice made by every infantryman in combat, Chapa sees it in terms of its strategic and tactical implications while invoking Just War Theory. (189) It is a thoughtful assessment.

Captain Jackson's concluding essay looks at the future of drones and likely technical improvements that will in some cases be driven by artificial intelligence (AI). On that point he notes that more than one-thousand scientists signed a public letter “warning of the threat represented by further research into military-focused intelligence machines.” (208) He acknowledges the theoretical truth of such concerns but argues that human beings can overcome the threat of an AI-dominated world.

One Nation, Under Drones is well documented and presents solid background to all aspects of the topic.

Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post-Cold War Relationship, by David P. Oakley (University Press of Kentucky, 2019), 248, endnotes, bibliography, index.

David Oakley is an Army lieutenant colonel serving as assistant professor at the National Defense University. During a previous break in service, he completed the CIA's clandestine service staff operations officer course. In *Subordinating Intelligence*, he draws on both experiences and attempts to show that the CIA's traditional mission of "trying to understand the intentions of world leaders or informing policy and strategic development" has been subordinated to the DoD, making the "military the dominant player in foreign policy." (x) In practical terms, he raises the questionable argument that this leaves the CIA without "the ability to focus its foreign-intelligence collection capability on the world more broadly." (7)

Oakley discusses these and other opinions influencing the topic and, in the process, asserts the curious notion that within the Intelligence Community "there is not a consensus on the purpose of intelligence," (7) since informing the decisionmaker is too broad a definition. He provides no immediate evidence to support his view and leaves the reader anticipating it will be found elsewhere: it is not.

Subordinating Intelligence does provide examples of how the Gulf War, 9/11, the Iraq War and major terrorism incidents affected the DoD/CIA relationship. This includes an analysis of the new flag-officer deputy director position intended to improve liaison, and it acknowledges there have been exceptions to the subordination

argument, e.g., the bin Ladin operation in which CIA held the command position. Oakley also discusses DoD and CIA reforms—some congressional, some departmental—and their effect on the relationship. In the latter category he describes the herculean efforts of defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld to create his own CIA, not subordinate to DIA and reporting to his undersecretary of defense for intelligence. (129ff)

The views of previous secretaries of defense, CIA directors, and high-level subordinates are brought to bear on contentious issues such as HUMINT collection, organization, and policies. Some argue for a single HUMINT service, but the consensus is not to make the change. (98ff) This point of view is important because Oakley's subordination argument implies that CIA is devoting too much effort to supporting the military while espionage and analytical missions suffer as a result. While Oakley cites several former D/CIA's who warn of this possibility, (158) neither they nor he provides examples of where this occurred.

Perhaps it is fair to say that foreign policy may be taking on an increasingly military cast and that intelligence has in recent times played a closer supporting role to the military. But Oakley doesn't come close to making the case for CIA subordination to the DoD. He needs to learn more about CIA missions.

Historical

Atomic Spy: The Dark Lives of Klaus Fuchs, by Nancy Thorndike Greenspan (Viking, 2020), 400, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

On September 5, 1945, GRU code clerk Igor Gouzenko defected in Ottawa, Canada, setting in motion events that exposed the penetration of the Manhattan Project and other agencies of the Canadian, US, and British governments by Soviet intelligence services. One of the best known cases of atomic espionage revealed involved Klaus Fuchs, a German-born, naturalized British subject, who delivered atomic secrets to the Soviets from the early 1940s until 1949. Many books have been written about the case and the emergence of another one prompts the question: can

it contain anything new? In the case of *Atomic Spy*, the answer is a qualified "yes."

But the new material has little to do with Fuchs's espionage career, which for completeness, author Nancy Greenspan briefly reviews. This includes his arrival in Britain to attend graduate school in 1939 and his short internment in Canada that enhanced his dedication to communism. But it was his recruitment to work on the Tube Alloys project—Britain's atomic bomb research—and the

acceptance by the Soviets of his offer to provide details of his work that made him a traitor. Equally important, she describes his assignment to the United States, his work at Los Alamos, and his continued contacts with Soviet intelligence through his American contact, Harry Gold, who had links to the Rosenberg net. Finally, she describes his return to postwar Britain where he worked on the British atomic bomb program. He continued supplying the Soviets with secrets until his espionage was revealed by the VENONA decrypts. His 1950 confession followed.

What is new in Greenspan's account is her description of Fuchs's virtuous commitment to Soviet communism from his university days in Germany until his death. At university he joined and was active in the Communist Party, becoming leader of one of its youth organizations, the Red Spark, "an agitprop troupe" that was "part entertainment and part hard-core political propaganda." (41) Greenspan

concludes that his life "was consistent and constant to his unwavering set of ideals. He sought the betterment of mankind that transcended national boundaries. His goal was to balance world power and prevent nuclear blackmail. As he saw it science was his weapon in a war to protect humanity." (353)

A sympathetic Greenspan speculates that his espionage "might have kept the United States from dropping an atomic bomb on North Korea. If so, was that a bad outcome? Was the person who made that happen evil or good, guilty or innocent, traitor or hero?" (354)

Atomic Spy is well documented with primary sources and covers the subject well. The facts presented leave the reader wondering whether MI5 could have caught Fuchs sooner. But they don't justify speculating on his guilt or innocence.

Emperor of Spies: Onodera's Wartime Network in Northern Europe, by C. G. McKay (Spinix Books, 2019), 91, footnotes, no index.

In his 1993 book on WWII Swedish intelligence, independent intelligence historian, C.G. McKay called the "multifarious dealings" of Japanese military attaché in Stockholm, Lt. Gen. Makato Onodera, legendary.^a Thaddeus Holt echoed this judgment in his 2001 book *The Deceivers*, calling Onodera "one of the best."^b Neither author added much supporting detail. Since then Onodera's debriefings by the CIA have been declassified and other archival material has become available. They provide the sources for McKay's monograph.

After a summary of Onodera's early life and a synopsis of the events that led Japanese intelligence to develop "highly secret cooperation with some its European sister organizations" (7) during the interwar period, McKay focuses on Onodera's career as a military attaché specializing on Russia, Japan's longtime strategic nemesis. Russian was a language Onodera could speak. After service in Latvia, Onodera was assigned to Stockholm, where he was based throughout the war. His mission was to collect intelligence on Russia, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, the Baltic countries, and the Western Allies. (12) He did not attempt to disguise his

position. He developed sources "within the fraternity of military attachés" and among "a cadre of close associates," including selected journalists, one with links to Max Klatt (Richard Kauders) who fooled the Germans. (81) McKay gives examples of relationships built with both groups—in particular those in Poland, Germany, Britain, and Sweden.

Before Hitler invaded Poland, the Japanese embassy in Warsaw had been "the centre for Japanese intelligence on Russia." (46) McKay explains how Onodera secured Polish help in Stockholm, where a Polish intelligence officer served as his "chief of staff." (47) Among his German Abwehr contacts, Karl-Heinz Krämer demonstrated reliability problems. OSS reports showed that some of his reports were fabricated, thus raising questions about others, and McKay is left wondering whether Onodera ever thought "that Krämer was merely an intelligence fraudster." (87)

One contact with British intelligence was peripheral in nature and involved a double agent, OUTCAST, who served MI6 officer Harry Carr and Onodera. Although

a. C. G. McKay, *From Information To Intrigue: Studies in Secret Service Based on the Swedish Experience, 1939–1945* (Frank Cass & Co, Ltd., 1993), 240.

b. Thaddeus Holt, *The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War* (Scribner, 2001), 112.

mentioned in the Jeffery history of MI6^a using only his codename, McKay identifies him as Aleksei Bellegarde. (60) McKay goes on to show that the Swedish service determined that Bellegarde had contacts with other intelligence organizations.

Emperor of Spies also describes Onodera's wartime communications with Tokyo. He filed reports on all

foreign contacts, some using a one-time pad, others embassy encryption, which the Allies could often intercept and decrypt. Nevertheless, his superiors and the Germans were pleased with his efforts; he was promoted by the former and awarded by the latter. But from history's perspective, while McKay has filled an interesting gap, the reader is necessarily left wondering what, if anything, Onodera's intelligence service accomplished?

From Kites To Cold War: The Evolution of Manned Airborne Reconnaissance, by Tyler Morton (Naval Institute Press, 2019), 304, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

After more than 2,500 hours in various reconnaissance aircraft, Air Force Col. Tyler Morton decided to write a history of his passion, airborne reconnaissance. Beginning with the Chinese use of man-lifting kites sometime in the sixth century CE, *From Kites To Cold War* describes major developments in the field, with only tangential mention of satellites since they have been covered elsewhere.

Although experiments with man-lifting kites continued into the 20th century, hot-air balloons proved far more practical after they were first launched in France in June 1783. Benjamin Franklin, then ambassador to France, followed balloon experiments with interest as did George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison. And while some experiments were conducted in the United States, the main progress was made in Europe. Morton reviews their gradual adaptation to military uses there and eventually in the American Civil War. In this period, the use of balloons went beyond human visual observation with the introduction of photography and the telegraphy. Further experience was gained in the Spanish America War. Attempts in the early 20th century to create maneuverable rigid and non-rigid airships were unsuccessful from a military point of view. Thus, airborne reconnaissance did not become a reliable part of the intelligence equation until World War I, when aircraft gradually supplanted balloons. Morton recounts the pioneering contributions of Lt. Col. George Squire and Col. Billy Mitchell in the effort.

In the early interwar period, the former belligerents struggled to improve their airborne reconnaissance capabilities while dealing with high priority issues, the need for more versatile aircraft, improved cameras, and training of interpreters. Each succeeded in varying degrees,

but only the Germans were ready for World War II. The Allies made quick progress once the war started, however. Morton shows how they dealt with bureaucratic and organizational issues while solving equipment—aircraft and photographic—problems so essential to targeting for strategic bombing and learning about Hitler's V weapons program. The Allies ended the war with impressive ELINT, COMINT—including on-board linguists—and IMINT capabilities.

Despite major reductions in force after World War II, airborne reconnaissance gained in importance as the Cold War took shape; it was the principal source of imagery and electronic intelligence on the Soviet Union until the emergence of satellites systems in the 1960s. And it remained, then and now, the only collection source suitable for certain missions. Colonel Morton explains how the WWII airframes were adapted for reconnaissance and applied in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. He then describes the advent of the U-2 and the SR-71 and the impact they had on airborne reconnaissance, especially in cases in which satellite coverage was unavailable.

What does the future hold for airborne reconnaissance? Colonel Morton acknowledges the answer is something of a mystery, but in his view, while unmanned platforms will “do much of the airborne collection, manned airborne ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance] assets will remain indispensable.” (209)

From Kites To Cold War is thoroughly documented with sources and photos, and it has an excellent bibliography. A valuable contribution to the history of airborne reconnaissance and a solid basis for thinking about its future.

a. Keith Jeffery, *MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service* (Bloomsbury, 2010), 516.

Getting To Know The President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates and Presidents-Elect (Third edition), by John L. Helgerson (Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2019), 269, footnotes, photos, index.

President Harry Truman established the practice of briefing presidential candidates and candidates-elect on world and intelligence affairs. John Helgerson has written the history of the program in the three editions of *Getting To Know The President*. Each edition summarizes the briefings given to the candidates and their staffs at various locations. The second edition ended with President George W. Bush, whom Helgerson characterized as a “Demanding Consumer.” The third edition adds President Barack Obama, “A Careful Reader,” and ends with the briefings given to Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan in 2012. Helgerson concludes with some general observations that make this edition some 60 pages longer than its predecessor.

What kind of things can one learn from such a book? The first lesson, writes Helgerson, is “the most fundamental truth of briefing presidents: no two are alike and you must tailor the approach to the commander.” Briefing President Bush on the *President’s Daily Brief (PDB)* was an interactive event, whereas for his successor, the *PDB* was presented as a book and Obama “read it . . . carefully and ideally, uninterrupted” before discussing supplementary issues. (195)

More generally, “the election of Obama and his transition to office were distinct in a number of respects.” Among them, the 2008 election was the first in which the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) had responsibility—assisted by CIA staff and other members of the Intelligence Community—for briefing the candidates and the president-elect. That the briefings went well, with a few exceptions, was due in large part to the cooperative attitude of the outgoing administration and the willingness of Obama’s transition team to comply with the many rules that his predecessor had set out and which Helgerson recounts.

The briefings began before the debates and the election. The topics, and those allowed to be briefed, changed after the election and Helgerson comments on the problems that were dealt with relating to those matters. For example, the first briefing of the president-elect occurred in the FBI office in Chicago, and one of his still-uncleared potential staff members asked to leave. Obama was not pleased but continued to attend. (202)

Helgerson notes the president-elect’s responses to the briefings he received on most days, wherever he was,

including Hawaii. He “thrived on exploring the reasons for analytical differences occasionally expressed by the various IC agencies.” (205) On occasion, “deep dive” briefings were presented on topics ranging from the “Middle East, South Asia, Iran, nuclear proliferation, homeland security and terrorism” and covert action. (210)

The vice president-elect received *PDB* briefings also, though not usually with the president-elect nor as frequently. Helgerson writes that “he impressed the briefers as being very knowledgeable about the subjects and having established views on most of the issues.” (207)

In the post inauguration era, President Obama continued to read his *PDB*—though eventually on a “tablet computer”—while briefers sat and waited to go over the material in their turn. Helgerson explains how DNI Clapper corrected this awkward situation while increasing the number of expert analysts who briefed the president. Obama continued to read the *PDB* throughout his presidency.

In 2012, President Obama followed the precedent set by earlier presidents in briefing the Republican candidates. Helgerson comments on the topics covered, including the “Issue of Benghazi” that was politically sensitive at the time. (227)

In a concluding assessment of the briefing program since its inception, Helgerson notes why the policy got off to a rocky start with Presidents Kennedy, Nixon, and Johnson and then includes the recommendations of four former presidents interviewed on this issue. All expressed the need for a president to have senior intelligence personnel who are apolitical—several cited William Casey as an example of a poor choice—and “with whom he feels comfortable.” (238) In a somewhat surprising conclusion, Helgerson writes that “the inescapable lesson from the history of the IC—albeit a lesson that neither presidents, DCIs, nor DNIs are eager to draw explicitly—is that it works better when a new president appoints his own director.” (239)

Getting To Know The President makes it clear that intelligence is important to presidents of both parties and that the IC has developed an effective means of meeting that need.

Guardians of Churchill's Secret Army: Men of the Intelligence Corps in the Special Operations Executive, by Peter Dixon (CLOUDSHILL Press, 2018), 225, footnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Former Royal Air Force pilot and now independent researcher Peter Dixon has found perhaps the only story unmentioned in the numerous accounts devoted to Special Operations Executive (SOE) exploits. In *Guardians of Churchill's Secret Army*, he tells about the officers and men in the British Army's Intelligence Corps Field Security Service (FSS) who were assigned to SOE F Section to train its officers how to conduct secure operations in occupied countries.

Dixon's "focus is on the relatively junior individuals" (3) whose job it was to keep "SOE's secret agents secure and safe." (4) But many of these guardians of security, for example Teddy Bisset, became SOE agents themselves. The book begins with his story, then provides historical background on SOE, and proceeds to describe some of its operations.

The Bisset case illustrates a key message of the book. Although Bisset was bilingual in French and English, what he contributed to SOE security training was more common sense than technical, and it is easy to understand why eventually he "applied to be relieved from F Section staff duties to take up other employment in the field." (28)

In a later chapter, "Securing SOE," Dixon describes how security procedures were "developed in an ad hoc way" (83) with the help of MI5, SIS, and Special Branch. While the basic field procedures were known and conveyed,

counterintelligence security was to some extent another matter. The most flagrant failure in this area occurred in the Dutch Section, where operations were thoroughly penetrated by the Germans, and SOE security ignored all signals to the contrary. Dixon doesn't claim a new revelation here and included the example for historical completeness.

Not all members of the Field Security Service were British, and Dixon discusses several. One example is the story of Canadian Rhodes Scholar Ken Macalister, who trained potential field agents in secure communication procedures and how to react to arrest by the Gestapo. How Macalister learned the procedures is not explained. He hadn't learned firsthand because, like Bisset, he, too, applied for and was granted a field assignment after his staff security work. But unlike Bisset, Macalister's field work was reported by M.R.D. Foot so that part of Dixon's account is not original.^a

Guardians of Churchill's Secret Army accomplishes the first of Dixon's objectives in that he focuses on the contributions of little known FSS/SOE officers. But, when it comes to the second, he conveys, perhaps unintentionally, the impression that the FSS security training mission was not particularly challenging to the personnel involved and could be handled by SOE staff. In the process he adds much SOE historical material covered elsewhere. Interesting while filling a narrow gap.

Information Hunters: When Librarians, Soldiers and Spies Banded Together in World War II Europe, by Kathy Peiss (Oxford University Press, 2020), 277, endnotes, photos, index.

Kathy Peiss is a history professor at the University of Pennsylvania. Reuben Peiss, an uncle she never met, was a librarian at Harvard who joined OSS in World War II. *Information Hunters* tells the story of his OSS career and the origins of what became the CIA's open source intelligence program.

Reuben was part of a group of "American archivists, scholars, spies and soldiers" OSS sent abroad to acquire "books, documents and . . . enemy publications" (6) in neutral cities and occupied zones of Europe. The concept

on which the program rested was that an intelligence service should know everything possible about the enemy's history, culture, and ideological proclivities. Books, newspapers, and other forms of propaganda from fascist and occupied nations were of particular importance. Little did the librarians realize that their mission would become "fraught with mystery, uncertainty, and even danger." (40)

What became the OSS information collection project grew out of discussions in 1941 between Archibald MacLeish, the Librarian of Congress (LOC), and William

a. M.R.D. Foot, *SOE In France* (Frank Cass, 2004), 278–80.

Donovan, the Coordinator of Information, soon to become director of OSS. Agents were dispatched to Europe before the United States entered the war and some were already in Europe. Among the latter was Maria Meyer, the LOC representative in Paris, “who quietly outmaneuvered German authorities to collect materials for the library,” while adding commentary on Nazi behavior. (34)

After the “phony war” ended in May 1940, agents were sent to operate out of neutral cities like Lisbon—where Reuben was first assigned—and Stockholm. Initially the tasking was open-ended and the collectors paid for what they found. As the war progressed, priorities changed and all sorts of material were acquired. Peiss writes, “even gossip columns provide clues to scandal which a secret agent could exploit.” (59) No examples of the latter are provided. Soon the sheer bulk of material overwhelmed the handling and shipping capabilities and microphotography laboratories were established.

As things became more organized, the collection effort was named the Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publication (IDC for short). Peiss tells how its potential customers in the states provided tasking and the IDC made keyword lists, cataloged acquisitions, created finding aids, and arranged distribution. It was at that point she writes “that the IDC changed from an acquisition group to an active producer of intelligence.” (62)

Night of the Assassins: The Untold Story of Hitler’s Plot to Kill FDR, Churchill, and Stalin, by Howard Blum (HarperCollins, 2020), 373, photos, index.

At a press conference in Moscow on November 18, 2003, the Russian foreign intelligence service (SVR) announced the publication of a book by Yuri Kuznets, *Tehran 43: Operation Long Jump*, which purported to tell the story of a Nazi plot to assassinate the Big Three during the 1943 Tehran Conference. This was not the first time the topic had surfaced. British journalist Richard Deacon gave an abbreviated version in 1972^a; Anatoli Sudoplatov

After D-Day, some collectors were formed into rapid-strike document teams, known as T-Forces, which worked with the military as they occupied cities and towns. These teams acquired documentation that would be used for war crimes trials, some for holocaust authentication, some for denazification processing. Scientific publications were a high priority, as were materials stolen from Jewish families and libraries, which the teams attempted to recover and restore to their owners. Some of the IDC members continued collecting after the war ended. Peiss tells how her uncle was part of a team that managed to secure materials from Leipzig in the Soviet Zone, after paying \$106,000.

The IDC worked with and sometimes in competition with libraries in the United States and its allies. Peiss mentions the Hoover Institution Library at Stanford and the Yale library where Sherman Kent supported foreign book acquisition and preservation programs before and after he joined OSS.

Information Hunters concludes by noting that “OSS and military efforts to acquire open-source intelligence. . . offered a model for collecting open sources for postwar intelligence” agencies. While the principal legacy of the program “was the books and documents themselves,” (211) the book also shows the contributions of the dedicated, unheralded librarians to the intelligence profession that continues to this day.

mentions the plot briefly in his book, *Special Tasks*^b; and Nigel West included its codename, Long Jump, in his short account.^c A variation on the story was offered by historian Gary Kern when he suggested Stalin spread the rumor of a Nazi assassination plot as an excuse to get FDR to reside on the Soviet compound, where his quarters were bugged, rather than across town at the US embassy.^d And lastly, invoking the Soviet track record for truth telling,

a. Richard Deacon, *A History of the Russian Secret Service* (Taplinger Publishing, 1972), 395.

b. Anatoli Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of a Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster* (Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 130.

c. Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of World War II Intelligence* (Scarecrow Press, 2008), 140–41.

d. Gary Kern, “How Uncle Joe Bugged FDR,” *Studies In Intelligence* 47, no. 1 (March 2003).

2014 Adrian O’Sullivan characterized the operation as “a Russian fabrication” and “a baseless epic.”^a

Night of the Assassins acknowledges these and other sources in its effort to sort out the truth by applying a curious method. Author Howard Blum asks the reader to accept that all the quotes, facts, statements, and deductions provided come from sources he has read and listed, without linking them to specific source notes. For example, he implies that an NKVD general informed the president’s bodyguard on arrival in Tehran that the “Nazis have dropped thirty-eight parachutists around Tehran over the past few days,” before adding that “they have all been captured by his men,” and that “six heavily armed commandos were still on the loose.” (283–84) The contradiction is not explained and no source is given.

At the same time, one cannot deny the book is an exciting read. From the opening account of the shootdown of the plane carrying *Gone With the Wind* actor Leslie Howard, Blum uses FDR’s Secret Service bodyguard, Mike Reilly, as a central character as he develops the evolution and planning of the assassination plot. We learn the roles of the British Secret Service, the NKVD, and the less than satisfactory—in Reilly’s eyes—contributions of the OSS and the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC). Then there is a German spy in the British embassy in Ankara—CICERO—and a key double agent (162–63) among the Nazis planted by the NKVD, who reveals the role of super commando Otto Skorzeny. (276)

Night of the Assassins reads like a novel and might make a good movie, but as intelligence history, it only qualifies as a great final exam for a fact-checking class.

Project Rainfall: The Secret History of Pine Gap, by Tom Gilling (Allen & Unwin, 2019), 306, bibliography, no index.

The function of the “Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap,” Australia, which is NSA codename RAINFALL, was a very controversial secret from its earliest days in 1965, until it was acknowledged publicly in 2017. Author Tom Gilling writes that the facility is staffed by Australian and US military and civilian personnel who perform its SIGINT and combat mission “including drone strikes.” (267) But it was not initially so, and he tells that story, too.

Project Rainfall describes how Pine Gap was selected as a base for intercepting Soviet ELINT signals during the Cold War and the political difficulties that had to be overcome in both countries to make it a reality. Gilling explains how its mission, kept secret under its official name, the Joint Defence Space Research Facility, created problems in the Australian Parliament as bits of its work leaked to the press. Examples of the latter include the books written by the late Australian academic Desmond Ball^b (9, passim), the details presented in Robert Lindsay’s book, *The Falcon and the Snowman* (105) and undocumented contributions from former CIA officer, the late Victor Marchetti. (124)

Much of the book is chronological as it examines how each prime minister and his cabinet dealt with the secrecy and domestic political issues that arose. As to secrecy, examples include the cover of American personnel, especially when their true affiliations were questioned in Parliament. Equally troubling was the mention of CIA and not the Department of Defense, as a major player, since that raised questions of nefarious secret operations that only resulted in further refusal to elaborate details. (149–51) And of course, the main reason for secrecy was to keep the true mission of Pine Gap from the Soviets. But as Gilling makes clear, the Soviets were very likely cognizant due to the “energetic KGB rezident in Canberra from 1977–1984,” Lev Sergeevich Koshlyakov.

In the domestic category, Gilling tells how the United States initially concurred with a Soviet request to establish a satellite tracking station in Australia, provided it was passive, but the Australians never allowed it to be built. (26) Of greater concern was the fact that Pine Gap made Australia a nuclear target for Soviet and Chinese missiles. And despite sharing the intelligence collected, the fact that it was an US facility over which they had little control was a constant source of irritation. (93ff)

a. Adrian O’Sullivan, *Nazi Secret Warfare in Occupied Persia (Iran): The Failure of the German Intelligence Services, 1939–1945* (Palgrave, 2014), 134.

b. Desmond Ball. *A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia* (Hake & Iremonger Pty Ltd., 1984).

Gilling doesn't provide endnotes, but he does cite some sources in the narrative, except in the final chapter. There, out of the blue, he attempts to link Pine Gap to UFOs, at

least in "the minds of some Australians." (298) *Caveat lector*.

RIGGED: America, Russia and One Hundred Years of Covert Electoral Interference, by David Shimer (Alfred A. Knopf, 2020), 367, endnotes, bibliography, index.

As a Yale University undergraduate, David Shimer spent the summer of 2017 as an intern in the Berlin office of *New York Times*. There he interviewed a former Stasi officer who had participated in rigging—at the Soviet's behest—of the no-confidence vote that kept the chancellor of Germany, Willy Brandt, in power in 1972. The parallels with the then-current stories about Russian interference in the 2016 US elections were obvious and when Shimer went on to graduate school at Oxford, he expanded his research into election meddling by the Soviet Union, Russia, and the United States. Then he wrote *RIGGED*.

The experiences of the two countries are quite different. The United States got a late start. After World War II it pressured Italy not to vote communist with the threat that "a Communist led Italy would not receive any Marshall Plan aid." (28) At the local level, the "Letters to Italy initiative" urged Italian Americans to "mail anti-Communist letters back home." (30) Shimer goes on to show how these efforts became a template of sorts for later operations in Latin America, Chile, South Asia, and Iran.

The history of Soviet meddling in foreign elections, by contrast, began with the revolution in 1917. Shimer gives examples of how it spread its ideology through influence operations and secret funding before World War II and by political coercion in the postwar era, mostly in East Europe. But the Soviets also attempted to influence the 1960 US election, when Khrushchev sent a letter to Adlai Stevenson urging him to run against Nixon because "we are concerned that America has the right president." (87) And when Nixon ran again in 1968, the Soviets secretly offered candidate Humphrey any conceivable help in his election campaign—including financial aid. (93) According to Shimer, the KGB also "worked against Nixon, Reagan, and 'Scoop' Jackson" because they were seen as anti-Soviet hawks. (99) He thus sets the table for Russian meddling in 2016, which he views as "the evolution of a practice rather than its creation." (7)

The purpose of Putin's meddling, since Russia cannot surpass the United States by strengthening Russia, was to

"reduce America's global influence by manipulating its allies and tearing apart its electorate. . . . The logical way to accomplish this mission is to support authoritarian-minded candidates in foreign democracies." And in today's world, the technical way to do it is to use the internet, which Putin once called a "CIA project." (144–5)

But the meddling requires more than internet skills to be successful; the target must not recognize the tools being utilized or at least not understand the nature of the media information warfare attacks deployed. Shimer demonstrates that this was the case prior to the 2016 elections by citing an impressive collection of interviews with high-level Obama administration officials who admitted they missed the meddling when it occurred and didn't know what to do about it when they finally realized what was happening. A typical response was, "Oh, this only happens in third world countries," admitted Jeh Johnson, Obama's secretary of homeland security. (154) Similarly, Susan Rice, the National Security Advisor, admitted that Russia's information warfare in social media remained "very poorly understood" through election day, (172) even though the Intelligence Community had already provided warnings of Russian meddling. Of course, the IC recognized its mission was to warn policymakers, not to take corrective action.

But when action was suggested, excessive caution prevailed. As CIA Director Leon Panetta characterized the president's response, "The more cautious [Obama] became, the more he sent a signal to adversaries that they could do things to take advantage of him." Even more damaging, Panetta, David Petraeus, and Michael Morell, each a former CIA director under Obama, believe "Obama signaled to Putin that he could interfere in an American election without suffering significant consequences." (159) Since they expected a Clinton victory, the worst that could happen was a Trump claim the election was rigged and that they could disprove.

Shimer concludes that "Moscow's objective has evolved from spreading communism to tearing down democracy,"

using the internet as his implement. Someone must “step in and defend America’s sovereignty,” hopefully before

the next election. (241) *RIGGED* is well argued and solidly documented.

The Saboteur: The Aristocrat Who Became France’s Most Daring Anti-Nazi Commando, by Paul Kix (Harper, 2017), 286, endnotes, no index.

Sixteen-year-old Robert de La Rochefoucauld was a young member of an old, wealthy, aristocratic French family, one member of which had been a friend of Benjamin Franklin. Rochefoucauld had been educated in France and Germany, where on an Alpine outing he had met Hitler. (32) When the Nazis invaded France and imprisoned his father, Rochefoucauld left his 47-room chateau and, answering de Gaulle’s call, escaped to London via Spain.

According to author Paul Kix, a deputy editor at ESPN magazine, Rochefoucauld soon received an offer of services from the newly formed Special Operations Executive (SOE) but hesitated to accept because “he wanted to join the Free French forces” under de Gaulle. (60) But, despite de Gaulle’s well known preference for the Free French forces and his antipathy toward SOE, Kix asserts, de Gaulle advised Rochefoucauld to join SOE since “It’s all for France even if its allied with the devil.” (62)

After completing the rigorous SOE training program, Rochefoucauld was parachuted into occupied France in 1943 and was met, writes Kix, by men “from the local

chapter of the Alliance . . . resistance and intelligence group formed by Marie Madeleine Fourcade.” (88) This is unlikely; the Alliance network was run by MI6, not SOE.^a Its mission was to collect intelligence, not conduct sabotage. A cause of Kix’s apparent confusion may be that none of the books written about the Alliance network mentions Rochefoucauld, either in true-name or pseudonym. The same is true of books written about SOE operations in France.^b

Whatever the correct name of Rochefoucauld’s first network affiliation, Kix describes a few instances of Rochefoucauld’s sabotage efforts and his later contacts with genuine SOE networks in the Bordeaux area. More exciting are his descriptions of the three times he is captured by and escapes from the Gestapo, though Kix adds little detail about Rochefoucauld’s interrogations.

Sourcing for *The Saboteur* may account for the factual inconsistencies. Kix relied on Rochefoucauld’s memoir—published in French—and interviews with family. And though he tells an interesting tale, he does not justify calling Rochefoucauld *France’s Most Daring Anti-Nazi Commando*.

Soldiers, Scouts & Spies: A Military History of the New Zealand Wars 1845–1864, by Cliff Simons (Massey University Press, 2019), 431, photos, index.

“The first Māori reaction to contact with the Europeans . . . was to kill and eat them.” So wrote the New Zealand historian James Belich in his study of the indigenous people of New Zealand, who settled on North Island in the 13th century. In 1642, Dutch explorer Abel Tasman was the first European to visit the island; there, four of his men were killed.^c After subsequent, less costly visits by Captain Cook and others, trade relationships with

the Māori were established, and New Zealand became a British colony in 1841. But that didn’t bring peace.

Soldiers, Scouts & Spies tells the stories of the seven or so wars—fought over land and weapons—that ensued between the British army and the indigenous tribes of New Zealand. The emphasis throughout is on how military

a. Lynne Olson, *Madame Fourcade’s Secret War* (Random House, 2019), xx.

b. Ibid; Marie Madeleine Fourcade, *Noah’s Ark: A Memoir of Struggle and Resistance* (E. P. Dutton, 1974); see also: M.R.D. Foot, *SOE In France* (Frank Cass, 2004).

c. James Belich, *The New Zealand Wars* (Penguin Books (NZ) Ltd, 1998), 19.

intelligence was applied in each one, a topic seldom addressed in histories of the New Zealand wars. (21)

Author Cliff Simons, director of the New Zealand War Studies Centre at the New Zealand Defence College, addresses the following questions: What happened when “two completely different cultures met on the battlefield?” (21) How did they learn about each other? What were their reasons for fighting? What weapons did they possess? What were their tactics? Did they have maps, informants, or allies? How did they overcome the language barrier?

While these are obvious questions British commanders would ask, Simons points out that at the time there was no Intelligence Corps in the British Army and that New Zealand was unknown territory. The Māori—and the several other tribes Simons mentions—on the other hand, were familiar with the terrain, were shrewd traders, and learned English from the missionaries. They also learned to do business with the British New Zealand Company

that controlled land distribution, (174) which in some cases led to the wars.

Simons tells of battles won and lost by both sides in which intelligence played significant roles, both positive and negative. For example, he explains why “the battle of Kororāreka, during what was called the Northern War, was an unmitigated disaster for the government.” (106) But overall, the British were successful in establishing their dominance.

In addition to explaining how intelligence contributed to New Zealand’s formative wars, *Soldiers, Scouts & Spies* conveys a good deal about the country’s colonial history, culture, and language. Simons uses many tribal terms, not all of which he defines—Google helps here. What stands out at the end is that the requirements of military intelligence are inherent to the task and both formal and tribal military forces learned quickly how to answer the questions war inevitably poses. A fine contribution to the canon of Five Eyes historical scholarship.

Spies On Trial: True Tales of Espionage in the Courtroom, by Cecil C. Kuhne, III (Rowman & Littlefield, 2019) 215, endnotes, appendices, index.

Cecil Kuhne is a lawyer in Dallas who has written extensively on litigation, but none of his cases touched on espionage. The closest he has come to that subject is his shelf of John le Carré novels. He does, however, know how to read court documents and extract the legal essence of decisions made. In *Spies On Trial* he discusses 16 espionage cases and analyzes their legal foundation, their trials, their verdicts and the results of their appeals. In each case Kuhne includes excerpts of the judges’ opinions.

Some of the cases will be familiar to readers. These include the suit on Philip Agee’s passport or travel restrictions, the Rudolph Abel hollow nickel trial, the CIA Ralph McGehee censorship case, the *Falcon and the Snowman* case, and the legal aspects of the MKULTRA project. Perhaps the Rosenberg case is the best known of all, though the legal facets Kuhne presents may be less so. These include the specifics of President Eisenhower’s refusal to grant clemency and the varied views of the

Supreme Court justices on the ruling upholding the verdict.

At the other end of the familiarity scale, Kuhne introduces the Ilya Wolston case. Some may recognize participants such as Boris Morros, a Hollywood producer of Laurel and Hardy films and musicals with Paulette Goddard and Fred Astaire. But Morros was also a Soviet agent and a double-agent for the FBI before Ernest Borgnine played him in the movie *Man On A String* (1960). In his memoir, *My Ten Years as a Counterspy*^a he named Wolston as a Soviet agent, a charge later repeated in a Senate Internal Security Subcommittee report. (122) But only after John Barron reiterated the charge in his book *KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Agents*^b did Wolston sue Barron and the publisher for libel. Non-lawyers may be astounded at the rationale the court applied; lawyers less so. In any case he eventually won on appeal to the Supreme Court. Kuhne

a. Boris Morris, *My Ten Years As A counterspy: The Fantastic Story of an America Double Agent* (Viking, 1959).

b. John Barron, *KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Agents* (Reader’s Digest Press, 1974), 188.

does not mention that Wolston was later identified in the VENONA decrypts as Soviet agent.^a

On a more recent topic, Kuhne discusses the legality of the NSA telephone metadata program exposed by Edward Snowden. A suit challenging the program on statutory and constitutional grounds was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union shortly after Snowden took refuge in Russia. The District Court granted the government's motion to dismiss the ACLU's petition. Kuhne summarizes the lengthy appeal that eventually favored the ACLU because the collection of data that might "become relevant

to a possible authorized investigation in the future" was an unwarranted expansion of the relevance concept. (105)

Five of the six appendices are extracts of various relevant laws: the Espionage Act, the National Security Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Economic Espionage Act, and the Freedom of Information Act. The sixth is a discussion of the legal cases surrounding the James Bond movies, which serves as an interesting diversion. *Spies On Trial* provides a unique and informative view of the intelligence profession.

Spying From The Sky: At The Controls of U.S. Cold War Aerial Intelligence, by Robert L. Richardson (Casemate, 2020), 301, endnotes, appendices, photos, index. Preface by Col. William J. Gregory, USAF (Ret.).

When author Robert Richardson was working on a book about the 49th Fighter Squadron, of the US Army Air Corps during World War II, he interviewed its two surviving members. He found one, William Gregory, so interesting that he decided to write his biography. *Spying From The Sky* is the result.

After deciding that he wanted more out of life than being a sharecropper in Tennessee, Gregory attended college and became a civilian pilot before being accepted for Army flight school. His final flight assignment was as commander of the CIA's U-2 unit at Edwards Air Force Base. In between, he flew P-38s in Africa during World War II, was a Strategic Air Command pilot, and an original member the Black Knights, the Air Force's first high-altitude surveillance program that commenced operations in the mid 1950s. This was a mission crossover time for Air Force reconnaissance: balloons with cameras were still being sent over China, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union; U-2 flights began over the Soviet Union; and the Black Knights began flying RB-57D-2 ELINT missions along the borders of denied area countries. (137–38) Richardson provides photos of the aircraft and

detailed descriptions of the missions they performed until the program was shut down in the late 1950s.

It was in this period that Gregory joined the U-2 program at Edwards, where he commanded Detachment G, which performed operational and testing missions Richardson describes. In that position he became a U-2 pilot, and at one point flew a mission after taking off from an aircraft carrier. He deployed with the unit on all its missions, which included support of the Bay of Pigs operation and later the Cuban missile crisis.

In the mid 1960s, Gregory was offered the position of operations officer in the CIA's A-12 Archangel program at Groom Lake, Nevada. But families were not allowed at Groom, and he had had enough hardship deployments, so he declined the offer. After attending the National War College, he spent five years at the Pentagon before accepting his final assignment at the Air Force Institute of Technology.

Spying From The Sky presents a pilot's firsthand view of manned high altitude surveillance. Truly a unique and valuable source.

a. John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev, *SPIES: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America* (Yale University Press, 2009), 455.

Memoir

American Spy: Wry Reflections on My Life in the CIA, by H. K. Roy (Prometheus Books, 2019), 304, endnotes, photos, no index.

“A good spy must be an apolitical seeker and speaker of the truth” writes former CIA case officer H. K. Roy in his adventure-filled memoir. And “despite almost constant friction” with the CIA bureaucracy that he hated, he adhered to those principles during his 13-year career. (15)

American Spy begins with Roy running operations in the Balkans, where he is betrayed to the Iranians by a member of a “friendly” intelligence service. Someone leaked the details—not all of them correct—to the *New York Times* after Roy returned to the United States, and he tells that story, too. Only then does he flash back to his upbringing and explain how “a former Catholic altar boy and (nondenominational) Boy Scout ended up working for the CIA” (62) after getting a law degree and serving in the US Attorney’s office in Washington, DC. (68)

Roy tells how he was accepted into the CIA Career Training Program, which included clandestine operations and paramilitary and parachute training. The training he calls “one of the greatest experiences of my life.” (77) Now qualified for an overseas assignment, he was initially slated for Africa but ended up in Latin America with his wife, Stacy. She helped with operations in Cuba and Nicaragua against Soviet and Chinese targets, which he describes in some detail.

After his Latin American tour, Roy and Stacy were considered a team and both participated in the “grueling

but phenomenal Soviet-East European Internal Operations course” before their assignment to Yugoslavia. (158) Roy’s description of its content is unusually detailed and worthwhile.

Amidst accounts of operations in Yugoslavia, Roy digresses a bit to reveal the strains of the clandestine life on family—they had two girls by then—that resulted in divorce after returning to the States. From then on, the operations he describes occur during TDYs to war-ravaged Croatia and Bosnia.

By 1996 he had had enough, and he resigned from CIA, settled in California, remarried, and “formed a private business intelligence firm.” (195) The balance of the book deals with the operations his firm conducted in Bosnia and then the Middle East mainly after 9/11 in Iraq. He also tried to help CIA, he wrote. At one point he had a client with “access inside the Taliban’s only foreign ‘diplomatic mission’ in Pakistan.” Roy assumed the Taliban was supporting Osama bin Ladin and might speak of his whereabouts or have documents that revealed his location. He proposed that the US government exploit the opportunity and then explains why no action was taken.

American Spy is a field officer’s memoir written with a sense of humor and a respect for the profession of intelligence that is evident throughout; a valuable contribution.

The CIA War in Kurdistan: The Untold Story of the Northern Front in the Iraq War, by Sam Faddis (Casemate, 2020), 226, photos, no index.

In 2009, Mike Tucker and Charles Faddis^a published a somewhat confused account of a CIA advance team sent to Iraq to prepare the way for the 2003 invasion. *The CIA War In Kurdistan* is an unsourced memoir that provides a much expanded view.

Faddis, a career operations officer who specialized in counterterrorism, begins with a detailed description of

an attempted recruitment, prior to 9/11, of an al-Qa’ida member who was rejected by Headquarters for political reasons. He uses this story to suggest the CIA didn’t do all it could have to prevent the 9/11 attacks and to illustrate what becomes even more clear later, that he is no stranger to infuriating bureaucratic opposition.

a. Mike Tucker and Charles [S.] Faddis, *Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War Inside Iraq* (The Lyons Press, 2009).

The latter becomes evident when Faddis, then working a desk at Headquarters, learns the United States is going to invade Iraq. As a first step, the CIA was to “put a team into Northern Iraq to work with the Kurds to prepare the battlefield for deployment of American military forces.”

(4) He immediately volunteered, or “demanded” to use his word, to lead the team. His persistence, and knowledge of Turkish, coupled with his prior experience in the region, gets him the job.

As he formed his team, Faddis monitored the diplomatic efforts to secure Turkish cooperation in allowing transit into into Kurdish-held areas of personnel and, even more important, heavy weapons promised the Kurds for their support. After initial agreements were reached, the Turks often changed them at critical points, sometimes at the borders, to gain an advantage since the Kurds were their enemies. After Faddis arrives in Turkey he must deal with these frustrations directly and, with help from Headquarters, manages to get his team into Kurd areas and commence operations.

In addition to providing the Kurdish factions with supplies, Faddis’s team conducted propaganda operations

with leaflets and radio broadcasts into Iraq, agent recruitment to assess conditions in the country, and double-agent operations to confound Iraqi intelligence.

Besides the classic intelligence mission, the CIA team had to convince a skeptical Kurd leadership it would support them until Saddam was toppled. After all, from their point of view we had left them to Saddam’s gas attacks after the 1990–91 Gulf War. This was not the only complicating factor. Eventually DoD Special Forces personnel arrived, but they were not subject to CIA direction, which created some awkward challenges for Faddis in his attempt to function as part of an integrated team. (130)

The CIA War In Kurdistan tells how Faddis managed to accomplish his mission despite constant operational and bureaucratic conflicts, many of which he left to those who replaced his team to resolve. The book concludes with an expression of frustration over how the United States dealt with Iraq militarily and politically after the fighting ended, and he lists a number of lessons which, if learned he argues, should avoid similar mistakes in the future.



Hayden Peake has served in the CIA’s Directorates of Operations and Science and Technology. He has been compiling and writing reviews for the “Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf” since December 2002.

