Training for War and Espionage

Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II

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In the histories of the Office of Strategic Services, the heralded predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency in World War II, what has been largely neglected is the challenge OSS leaders faced in developing a program to train the “glorious amateurs” of America’s first central intelligence and covert operations agency. OSS’s response to the challenge of preparing operatives for missions deep inside enemy-controlled territory began in 1942 with a paramilitary training program in two national parks. One of its legacies is the CIA training program today.

In examining OSS training, this article draws on the author’s recent 600-page report to the US National Park Service on OSS training in the national parks as well as his subsequent research for a forthcoming book on OSS training and service in World War II. The article deals primarily with the two main direct action branches, Special Operations (SO) and Operational Groups (OG). In the process, it also refers to training in other operational branches: Secret Intelligence (SI), X-2 (Counterintelligence), Morale Operations (MO), and the Maritime Unit (MU), plus the Communications (Commo) Branch. Most of the organization’s other components, such as the Research and Analysis Branch, employed people who were already skilled in their fields and who did not generally require OSS training.

This essay addresses several questions. Why were the national parks chosen as training sites? How was the training program created? What were its aims and methods? How did it evolve? Most importantly, how effective was the training and what was its legacy?

Origins of OSS

The OSS engaged in new forms of warfare for the United States: centralized intelligence, “fifth column” activities, psychological or “political warfare,” and the kind of sabotage, commando raids and directed guerrilla activity now known as...
irregular warfare. The British had begun such operations in 1940 through the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the former established as a result of Prime Minister Winston Churchill's order to rouse resistance against the German army in occupied countries and "set Europe ablaze." 4

In the United States, William J. Donovan, a World War I hero and a Wall Street lawyer with extensive contacts on both sides of the Atlantic and a keen interest in modern warfare, sought to create a comparable organization. President Franklin D. Roosevelt named him director of the new, civilian Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) in July 1941. Existing agencies, especially the Military Intelligence Division, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the FBI, vigorously opposed the new and centralized intelligence agency, but the US entry into World War II in December 1941 led to a dramatic expansion for Donovan's organization.

In June 1942, Roosevelt reorganized COI as the OSS, in which military and civilian personnel had responsibilities in the fields of intelligence and counterintelligence, psychological warfare, and guerrilla operations, including sabotage and the coordination of resistance movements. Donovan now reported to the newly formed Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he also retained direct access to the president. 5

Among the units established in the new OSS were the Special Operations and the Secret Intelligence Branches. SO took the lead in obtaining instructors and recruits and setting up a substantial paramilitary training program. Its driving force was Lt. Col. Garland H. Williams, a no-nonsense character with a highly successful career in federal law enforcement and the Army Reserves. The native Louisianan had been head of the New York office of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and a reserve major when the army called him to active duty in January 1941. That year, he created a training program for the army's new Counter-Intelligence Corps and then went on to assist at the army's infantry and chemical warfare schools. Transferring to Donovan's organization in early January 1942, Williams began recruiting and training the first SO force. 6

First Thoughts on Training

In establishing the SO training program, Williams drew in part on Britain's experience in unconventional warfare since 1940. Donovan had visited the training schools SOE and SIS had set up in secluded country estates in Britain. Now he, Williams, and other senior officers inspected a new, secret SOE training camp in Canada located on 275 acres of rolling farmland on the edge of Lake Ontario, 25 miles east of Toronto. SOE's Camp-X was designed to provide secret agent and saboteur training for Canadians and for some Americans. In early 1942, at least a dozen American instructors for SO, and a few for SI, attended all or part of SOE's basic four-week course; beginning in April, they were followed by the first of several dozen American recruits who trained there. 7

A typical day for trainees at Camp-X began with a five-mile run and two hours of gymastics followed by lectures on various topics, such as personal disguise, observation, communications, and field craft. The afternoon might include training with explosives in an open field, practice with small arms at a basement firing range, parachute jumping from a 90-foot jump tower, or crawling under barbed wire while machine guns fired live rounds overhead. In the evening, students might study assignments, go out on night maneuvers, or undergo simulated interrogations by instructors or by one of the German officers from an enemy officer internment camp nearby. The course ended with the field testing of students: finding their
way back to the camp after parachuting into a forest 30 miles away or infiltrating a local defense plant.\textsuperscript{8}

Garland Williams also drew on his own experience with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the US Army as well as Donovan’s vision for the organization. Williams rejected British-style country estates as inappropriate for training saboteurs and guerrilla leaders who were known to operate from forest and mountain hideouts. The ideal special operations training camp, he wrote, would be “situated in the country and thoroughly isolated from the possible attention of unauthorized persons” with plenty of land, at least several hundred acres, located “well away from any highway or through-roads and preferably far distant from other human habitations.” But it should be within about 50 miles from OSS headquarters in Washington.\textsuperscript{9} Williams found what he was looking for in two nearby national parks.

**The First Sites**

Operated by the National Park Service, the two woodland properties, then called Recreational Demonstration Areas, were located in the Catoctin Mountains near Thurmont, Maryland (where the presidential retreat called Shangri-La, now Camp David, would later be built), and in rolling woodlands in the watershed of Chopawamsic and Quantico Creeks near Quantico, Virginia. Each park comprised more than 9,000 forested acres and contained several, recently built cabin camps. The appeal of Catoctin Mountain Park and what was later called Prince William Forest Park was their secluded yet convenient location; expansive wilderness terrain; existing, rustic accommodations; and the fact that they were already owned by the federal government.\textsuperscript{10}

Neither the National Park Service nor the Department of the Interior wanted to turn the parks over to the OSS for paramilitary training camps. The Park Service’s mandate was to conserve the nation’s parks for the public, and its cabin camps there were used for summer recreation by charitable organizations serving needy, urban youths from Baltimore and Washington. But the declaration of war enabled the War Department to declare their use a military necessity, and a reluctant acting secretary of the interior signed an agreement, leasing the properties for the duration, albeit with provisions that the military abide by certain conservation restrictions and restore the parks as much as
Throughout the war, park superintendents made regular visits and informal inspections of the properties, and they did not always like what they saw.

possible to their prewar condition. 11

Between 1942 and 1945, the OSS pretty much did what it wanted in the two national parks. The public was excluded, the park rangers gone, and the park superintendents moved out to the nearest towns. OSS erected obstacle courses, firing ranges, and demolition areas, winterized the facilities, expanded the dining halls, constructed some classrooms and a few barracks and built armories and munitions magazines. Every SO training camp had a commanding officer and a chief instructor, each with a separate staff.

Groups of trainees began to arrive in closed army trucks to these undisclosed locations. At their peak, Catoctin’s two subcamps could accommodate up to 400 men, including trainees and staff members, and Prince William’s six subcamps could hold 900 men (there were no women at the training camps in the parks). 12

The Stomach-Churning Rough House

Throughout the war, park superintendents made regular visits and informal inspections of the properties, and they did not always like what they saw. Some abandoned farm houses were destroyed during mortar practice and field exercises. Park rules against hunting wildlife and cutting down trees were violated. The Catoctin superintendent complained to the camp commander when trainee hunters killed a rabbit; he lodged a formal protest when a dozen large trees were cut down; and he expressed dissatisfaction when trainees shot several wild turkeys. Midway through the war, the Prince William superintendent was commissioned an officer at the adjacent Marine Base in Quantico and assigned to supervise control of brush fires there, as he did in his park. Accompanied by his dog and in his park ranger hat and uniform, the superintendent continued to inspect the park property on weekends. Appalled at the ruthlessness involved in the training of the OSS saboteurs and guerrilla leaders, he later complained of what he called “the stomach-turning roughhouse of the OSS!” 13

Although SOE had considerable influence in the beginning, not only through Camp-X, but by temporarily lending instructors and providing copies of its manuals, lectures, and training materials, as well as the latest explosives and Allied and Axis weapons, OSS eventually went its own way. It never adopted the British model of two entirely separate government agencies for secret intelligence and special operations (SIS and SOE). It rejected the class formality between officers and enlisted men and the rigid military discipline of SOE training camps. By mid-1943 only one British instructor remained with the Americans.

The OSS was a most un-military military. With little attention paid to regular army protocol and procedure, OSS training camps fostered a highly informal atmosphere. There were few distinctions between officers and enlisted men and little or no saluting or drill in the manual-of-arms or marching in ranks. Emphasis was on individual responsibility and initiative. “I’d rather have a young lieutenant with guts enough to disobey an order than a colonel too regimented to think and act for himself,” Donovan declared. 14

Special Operations Curriculum

The training program that Garland Williams envisioned in early 1942 consisted of a general curriculum that provided preliminary, basic, and advanced training courses to SO and SI recruits before they prepared for their different types of missions. His training plans provided elasticity and allowed for varying the instruction according to a person’s previous experience, special qualifications, or assignment. Williams believed that the preliminary two-week, “toughing
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"The students will also be physically and mentally conditioned...for the aggressive and ruthless action which they will be called upon to perform at later dates."

up” course of demanding physical exercise, obstacles, night marches, and tryouts in close combat and weapons skills would weed out the unqualified and help to classify accepted individuals for future instruction and assignment.

Toughening up was to be followed by two weeks of basic SO training drawing on more intellectually demanding skills derived from SOE’s curriculum: identification of targets of opportunity, observation, intelligence gathering, sabotage, and so on. In addition to learning new skills, the students, Williams explained, “will also be physically and mentally conditioned during these two courses for the aggressive and ruthless action which they will be called upon to perform at later dates.”

After completing the preliminary and basic courses, the student would go on, under Williams’s plan, to either parachute or seaborne infiltration training and then to one of the advanced schools that would be set up for intelligence work, propaganda, sabotage, or guerrilla leadership. Throughout all of the training, the focus was to be on imparting skills, building up the candidate’s physical condition and self-confidence, and developing the student’s individual initiative, personal courage, and resourcefulness. All instruction, Williams emphasized, should be practical, not theoretical. Instructors should keep lectures short, rely more on the “discussion or conference method of instruction” and make good use of “interest-provoking equipment and materials.” Indeed, OSS produced hundreds of training films, several of them by Hollywood director John Ford. Classroom instruction, Williams added, should alternate with outdoor demonstrations and practice. As he summarized his pedagogical philosophy: “Whenever possible, the system of instruction will follow the principles of explanation, demonstration, application, and examination.”

Later, the advanced courses would include “schemes”—mock attacks on real targets. Students would be assigned, for example, to place imitation explosives under a nearby railroad bridge or radio tower, or directed to infiltrate a defense plant in Baltimore or Pittsburgh and obtain classified information or leave a dummy explosive charge. Williams continued to stress that the focus was on the individual:

Constant thought will be given to the building of a high state of morale and a high esprit de corps. However, the military indoctrination will be so handled as to develop to the maximum extent his individual initiative, personal courage and resourcefulness. Emphasis will be constantly placed on the development of this agent as an individual and not as a fighter who is only effective when under close leadership. The guerrilla concept of warfare will be the guiding principle.

The first classes in basic special operations training began in early April 1942 at Catoctin National Park, which was designated Training Area B for basic OSS training. The first advanced course began a few weeks later in Prince William Forest Park’s western sector, some 5,000 acres, designated Area A for advanced training. At Area B, a dozen instructors taught about two dozen students per course in those early days. The number of instructors and students would grow into the hundreds at the peak use of the camps in the two parks during 1943–44. Because of the drive to produce substantial numbers of SO agents, this basic course lasted two to three weeks.

During the war, the topic titles in the basic special operations curriculum remained roughly the same, but the content would change as a result of new information from overseas. Basic SO training, although initially held at Area B, came to be known as A-4 training because, for most of the war, it was cen-
OSS jettisoned standard marksmanship in favor of practical combat shooting. With their pistols, students learned “instinctive fire.”

Instructors William Fairbairn (left) and Hans Tofte.

nered at Area A’s subcamp A-4 in Prince William Forest Park. It included such topics as physical conditioning, close combat, weaponry, demolitions, map reading, field craft, first aid, as well as intelligence gathering and reporting, and enemy organization and identification. Field problems included night map and compass exercises, reconnaissance and patrol, and simulated sabotage.

Physical conditioning in Special Operations’ courses for members of SO, or SI, MO, or whoever took its paramilitary training, meant not just morning calisthenics but challenging exercises testing limits of stamina and nerve. On a giant, timbered jungle-gym more than 40 feet in the air, at Area B, Catoctin Mountain Park, for example, trainees climbed poles, walked narrow planks and swung from perilous platforms, testing themselves and simulating clambering around bridge or tower beams or repelling down cliffs. They learned how to cross surging streams and rivers on a single rope while gripping two overhead lines for balance. On obstacle courses, they crawled under live machine gun fire and dodged along booby-trapped trails studded with explosive trip wires.

In 1942, William Casey, a future director of central intelligence, but then a young naval officer and trainee in Secret Intelligence, did not crouch down enough on the trail at subcamp B-2. When he accidentally snagged a trip wire, it triggered a block of TNT attached to a nearby tree. The blast sent a chunk of branch hurtling through the air, striking him on the side of the face and breaking his jaw.

Because of the OSS emphasis on prowess, self-confidence, and self-reliance on hazardous missions, instruction in close-combat techniques, armed and unarmed, was a major component of the training. Its chief instructor was a William (“Dangerous Dan”) Fairbairn, legendary former head of the British Shanghai riot squad, who had taught for SOE in Britain and Canada and then for OSS from 1942 to 1945. He had fought Chinese street gangs, mastered Asian forms of martial arts, and invented a slim, razor-sharp stiletto for use on sentries. Fairbairn knew a hundred ways to disable or kill an enemy with his hands, his feet, a knife, or any instrument at hand. “Forget about fighting fair,” was Fairbairn’s mantra. “In war, it’s kill or be killed.”

Under the direction of Fairbairn and Rex Applegate, a reservist and military police instructor from Oregon, OSS jettisoned standard marksmanship in favor of practical combat shooting. With their pistols, students learned “instinctive fire.” Instead of carefully aiming at fixed “bull’s-eye” targets, OSS trainees jerked into a crouched position and quickly squeezed off two rounds at a time. The idea was to kill or startle an armed enemy before he killed you.

For realistic training and testing, Fairbairn created special, dimly lit structures that he called “pistol houses” or “indoor mystery ranges.” “Under varying degrees of light, darkness and shadows plus the introduction of sound effects, moving objects and various alarming surprises,” he explained, “an opportunity is afforded to test the moral fiber of the student.
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Training in the "House of Horrors," with Fairbairn (right) observing the student's reactions.

Students called it a "house of horrors," and one remembered it this way:

Each of us over a period of a couple of days would be awakened in the middle of the night and hauled off to carry out a special mission. When it came my time, I was told that there was a Nazi soldier holed up in a building and that it was my job to go in and kill him. I was given a .45 and two clips. The house I was sent into was a log house with long corridors and stairways. I wasn't sure whether there really was a Nazi soldier there or not. I kicked a door open with my gun at the ready. Paper targets with photographs of uniformed German soldiers jumped out at me from every corner and every window and doorway. We had been taught to always fire two shots at the target. There must have been six targets because I got two bullets in each one. The last one was a dummy sitting in a chair with a lighted cigarette in his hand. If you didn't shoot him you failed the test.25

For sabotage training, OSS instructors taught students about various forms of explosives, including the new moldable, gelatin-like "plastic" compounds, which were more stable and contained more explosive power than TNT. Trainees learned how to use various kinds of explosives, fuses, and timing devices to destroy railroad tracks, trains, bridges, tunnels, dams, radio towers, supply depots, and industrial facilities to impede enemy operations.

In practical field exercises, students practiced escape, evasion and survival techniques, as well as tactical operations. As training progressed, the intensity increased. Lt. John K. Singlaub, SO, then a young UCLA graduate fresh from paratroop school who would soon serve in France, later wrote:

By the end of November [1943], our training at Area B...had become a grueling marathon. We fired American, British, and German weapons almost every day. We crawled through rain-soaked oak forests at night to plant live demolition charges on floodlit sheds. We were introduced to clandestine radio procedure and practiced typing out code and encrypting messages in our few spare moments. Many mornings began with a run, followed by a passage on an increasingly sophisticated and dangerous obstacle course. The explosive charges under the rope bridges and wire catwalks no longer exploded to one side as exciting stage effects. Now they blasted directly below, a moment before or after we had passed.26

OSS field training exercises often culminated in mock espionage and sabotage missions.
Local bridges and dams were handy simulated targets for nighttime raiding parties, and nearby industrial facilities offered similar opportunities for practicing reconnaissance and sabotage. Most students succeeded in penetrating the plants, using cover stories and forged documents, but some were nabbed by the police or the FBI. A most embarrassing incident was the capture, “red-handed,” of the professional baseball catcher and spy Moe Berg trying to infiltrate a defense plant in Baltimore. 

**Other Branches/Other Schools**

The other operational arms of OSS established their training programs more slowly and with fewer students than Special Operations did with its vision of the mass production of commando-like saboteurs, bold, brash gung-ho men with sub-machine guns and plastic explosives, whom other branches sometimes belittled as the “bang-bang boys.” Secret Intelligence, which had taught a handful of agents in a room at OSS headquarters in the first four months of 1942, opened its school in May 1942 on a 100-acre country estate 20 miles south of Washington. Designated RTU-11, but known informally as “the Farm,” it began with a class of eight. It had a capacity of nine staffers and 15 SI students for its four-week course in espionage, ciphers, communications, concealment, and handling agents, as well as weapons and martial arts.

In the fall of 1942, the Communications Branch established its school in the NPS cabin camps in the eastern sector of Prince William Forest Park. Labeled Area C, it trained the radiomen who would operate the regional base stations and many of the portable field radios in Commo’s global clandestine shortwave radio network. Communications training at Area C took three months.

OSS established Area D in what may have been an old Civilian Conservation Corps camp in 1,400 isolated wooded acres on the rural eastern shore of the Potomac River some 40 miles south of Washington. Its mission was instruction and practice in waterborne raids and infiltration. After the Maritime Unit was formed in 1943, it moved its training sites for underwater demolition teams and others first to Florida, then the Bahamas, and finally to California.  

Area E, two country estates and a former private school about 30 miles north of Baltimore, was created in November 1942 to provide basic Secret Intelligence and later X-2 training—as a result, RTU-11 became the advanced SI school. Area E could handle about 150 trainees. When the Morale Operations Branch was established to deal in disinformation or psychological warfare, “black” propaganda, men and women of the MO Branch also trained at Area E, although men from MO, SI, and X-2 often received their paramilitary training in the national parks.
The Congressional Country Club and OG Training

In stark contrast to the rustic cabins of the national parks, OSS's grandest training facility was the magnificent Congressional Country Club, with its palatial clubhouse, its fancy tennis courts and Olympic swimming pool, its 400 acres of manicured lawns, well-maintained fairways and greens of its acclaimed golf course, and the surrounding woods. Established in the 1920s, with Herbert Hoover as founding president, the club had been hard hit by the Great Depression and in 1943 was bankrupt and in foreclosure proceedings. Consequently, the board of directors was delighted when Donovan offered to lease the facility for the duration at a monthly rent that would more than meet the mortgage payments. In addition, the War Department agreed to restore the property to its prior condition at the end of the war. 31

Designated Area F, its location in Bethesda, Maryland, made it easily accessible for dignitaries from the capital less than 20 miles away, and it provided a dramatic locale for Donovan to showcase one of his most original concepts, ethnic, commando-like Operational Groups (OGs). For their training the club was transformed—its entrance way lined with tents, fairways torn up into obstacle courses and firing ranges, and the elegant clubhouse converted into classrooms and a mess hall. It was one of Donovan's great insights that he could obtain from America's multiethnic population combat guerrilla teams that could successfully infiltrate enemy-occupied countries because its members spoke the language, knew the culture, and, in fact, were often the descendants of immigrants from that country. By 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted not only increased numbers of Special Operations teams but also Donovan's proposal for these larger ethnic, or at least foreign-speaking, OGs. 32

Special Operations teams and Operational Group units had many similarities. Recruits for both had to meet the high physical standards required for parachute infiltration and wilderness survival as well as superior mental and psychological standards of uncommon stability, judgment, and independent thinking. Both SOs and OGS were supposed to be fluent in a foreign language and both would be engaged in sabotage and irregular warfare, but SO generally worked in teams of two or three and often focused on particular acts of sabotage or subversion. The most famous SOs were the "Jedburghs"—nearly 100 multinational, three-man teams, two officers and a radio operator—most of which were composed of a Frenchman and either a Briton or an American, who received substantial extra training at SOE schools in Britain and were parachuted behind German lines in conjunction with the invasion of France. 33

In contrast, OGS were organized into sections of 34 men as well as half sections of two officers and 13 NCOs, including weapons and demolitions spe-
Training emphasized that unconventional warfare behind enemy lines was a hazardous undertaking and required not only skill but a certain degree of ruthlessness.

OGs trained as units under their own officers together with OSS instructors. To create the OG training program, a team of bright and bold young officers from the army’s new airborne units was assembled under the leadership of Lt. Col. Serge Obolensky, a former Russian prince and New York socialite who had fought the Germans in World War I, the Bolsheviks in the Russian civil war, and who had gone through SO training and studied guerrilla fighting after joining the OSS at age 51.

The training curriculum for the new Operational Groups included a six-week basic training course. It emphasized the need for trainees to achieve proficiency, self-confidence, and determination and to recognize that unconventional warfare behind enemy lines was a hazardous undertaking and required not only skill but a certain degree of ruthlessness.

In the OG curriculum, the Preliminary Course taught at Area F began with an hour introducing and going through the training’s objectives. Over the next few weeks, it would include 22 hours of map reading, sketching, and compass work, both theoretical and field problems; 20 hours of scouting and patrolling; 14 hours of physical training; seven hours of camouflage and fieldcraft; four hours of close combat and knife fighting; six hours training on the obstacle course; four hours instruction on the .45 caliber pistol; and four hours on the submachine gun. There would be seven hours of training films. The longest amount of time, 57 hours, was devoted to tactics. That included compass runs, target approach, and day- and night-time field problems. Finally two hours were devoted to hygiene and camp sanitation; and four hours went for special subjects: enemy organization, communications, security, and current events. Total OG preliminary instruction and training was 152 hours.

Then the OG section moved on to either Area B or Area A, where the final OG course involved eight hours of physical training, 22 hours of demolitions, and 40 hours of weapons training, which included two to three hours each on the mechanics and firing of the M1 rifle, carbine, light machine gun, Browning Automatic Rifle, Colt .45 automatic pistol, British Sten gun, Thompson submachine gun, Marlin submachine gun, M1 and AT rocket launcher, 60-mm mortar, 81-mm mortar, and the .50 caliber machine gun. There was also a bit of hand grenade and antitank training. One French OG, Ellsworth (“Al”) Johnson, remembered firing a bazooka at Area B, “just to get the feel of how it worked.”

Thereafter, students went through four hours on the care of clothing and equipment, four hours on hygiene and camp sanitation, and eight hours of training films. Finally, there was ground training for the parachute jumps that would be made at Fort Benning, Georgia, or more often at OSS or SOE jump schools overseas. Total advanced training was 106 hours. A grand total of 250 hours of stateside training was prescribed for an OSS Operational Group.

The size of the Operational Groups ranged from about a hundred men in the Norwegian group to some four hundred in the French OG. In all, there may have been up to 2,000 members of OSS Operational Groups. Another 1,600 Special Operations personnel were sent behind enemy
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lines. The extensive destruction caused by what Donovan liked to call his “glorious amateurs” and their local partisans was accomplished by only a few thousand SOs and OGs, a number not much larger than a single army brigade.

Obtaining Recruits and Instructors

Most of the Americans who volunteered for hazardous duty in Special Operations or the Operational Groups were recruited from high-aptitude, citizen-soldiers of the wartime armed forces. They had already undergone basic military training and often advanced training as well, but OSS demanded even higher proficiency. To weed out recruits unqualified physically or emotionally for dangerous and unpredictable situations behind enemy lines, OSS ultimately developed a highly effective psychological assessment program. Beginning in 1944 at a country estate (Assessment Station S) in Fairfax County, Virginia, candidates underwent three days of tests to determine not only their mental and physical aptitude but their judgment, independence, emotional stability and their ability to act effectively under pressure. Ranging from their capacity to withstand harsh interrogations to dealing with frustration when, for example, alleged assistants surreptitiously impeded the assembly of a complicated wooden platform, the tests were designed to provide an assessment of a person’s entire personality. Not surprisingly, the evaluation teams learned that, beyond the specific skills and training, what made an effective saboteur in France, an able spy in Germany, a successful commando in Burma, or a reliable clandestine radio operator in China was a secure, capable, intelligent and creative person who could deal effectively with uncertainty and considerable stress.

In 1942, when Garland Williams had first sought instructors to train men for clandestine operations, he had drawn on two main sources. One was former law enforcement officers, who, like him, were experienced in undercover work and in the use of firearms and the martial arts. He recruited instructors from officers in the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol, as well as state and local police.

For other skills, Williams, who was also a reserve army officer, drew upon activated reservists: army engineers for instruction in explosives and demolition work; military police for pistol shooting and close combat techniques; and infantry officers for the use of small arms, hand grenades, machine guns, and mortars, plus map-reading, field craft, and tactical maneuvers. Signal corpsmen often taught wireless telegraphy, coding and decoding. Paratroopers became instructors in parachute infiltration; and navy and the coast guard instructors taught small craft handling and waterborne landing.

There were some problems in initial instruction, particularly with the use of law enforcement officers. Despite their qualifications in weaponry and undercover work, law enforcement officers were deeply imbued with a respect for the law and a belief that lawbreakers and fugitives should and would be apprehended. But the aim of the operatives behind enemy lines was to break the law and not get caught.

Some of the regular army officers who joined the OSS also proved too set in their ways for the path-breaking organization. Donovan himself recognized this by recruiting bold, risk-taking, rule-breaking individuals. In time many of the law enforcement and regular army instructors left or were reassigned, and OSS came to rely primarily upon citizen-soldiers for SO and OG instructors, rather than already established, fulltime, career professionals in the officer corps.
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Similarly for trainees, OSS also sought intelligent, independent-minded individuals. One OSS recruiter remembered looking for activists, from free-lance journalists to trade union organizers. “What seemed like faults to rigid disciplinarians of the regular services often appealed to us as evidence of strong willpower and an independent cast of mind.”

OSS’s Personnel Procurement Branch scoured training camps and advanced schools of all the services looking for intelligent candidates knowledgeable in a foreign language who were willing to volunteer for unspecified challenging and hazardous duty behind enemy lines. As a subsequent Special Operations field manual explained, “SO agents and operatives are selected for their intelligence, courage, and natural resourcefulness in dealing with resistance groups. In addition, they must have stamina to be able to live and move about undetected in their area of operation.”

Training Overseas

As the number of OSS personnel overseas increased dramatically and as they sought to train indigenous agents, the overseas detachments established their own training schools. In addition to training local agents, the overseas OSS schools also provided advanced training and field exercises for graduates of the training camps in the United States and for Americans who enlisted in the OSS in the war zones. The most famous of the latter was Virginia Hall in France.

As the war progressed, the direct action branches came to view the stateside schools as mainly providing only testing and preliminary, introductory training. The overseas training facilities offered advanced and more directly relevant training. Overseas, combat veterans provided practical and up-to-date instruction, and training, including intensive simulations in the field that usually continued until the operatives were deployed for their missions. The main OSS training camps abroad were located initially in Great Britain, French Algeria, and Egypt; later as the Allies advanced, a school was established in southern Italy. In the Far East, OSS training facilities were established in India, Ceylon, and then China.

“It was the strangest job of wartime educational administration ever assigned to a former college president,” remarked James L. McConaughy, a former president of Wesleyan University in Connecticut, whom Donovan selected to oversee OSS training from 1943 to 1945.

The campus was scattered all over the world.... The students were of almost every type and race.... The teachers were nearly as diverse.... And we taught nearly everything, too: navigation, parachute jumping, how to kill wild animals and use them as food, lock picking, hiding microscopic sized confidential data, protecting oneself from dagger attacks and using one offensively, operating a wireless set, reading code and cipher, elementary foreign languages (French, Greek, Chinese, Japanese, Korean). Name me a weird subject of instruction and I will gamble that it was taught by O.S.S., somewhere, sometime!

Trying to Coordinate Training

When the United States entered the war, Donovan’s fledgling organization had not been prepared for the dramatic wartime expansion that would transform the COI, with somewhat more than 2,000 people, to an OSS which had a peak strength that would number at least 13,000 and perhaps several thousand more. As missions expanded, the
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organization confronted the need to send operatives into the field at the same time that it was developing its recruiting and training systems. Each of the operational branches established its own training program, although many male recruits took their basic paramilitary course in one of the national parks, at least in the first two years.

By August 1942, OSS headquarters began actively encouraging greater coordination, including some standardization, in the diverse training programs that were emerging. After several attempts at coordination, including a cooperative training directorate, Donovan in January 1943, established a Schools and Training Branch (S&T) independent of the operational branches to oversee and eventually operate the schools.

Internal difficulties within OSS as well as problems in dealing with the military caused the loss of some of the initial figures in the training programs, including Garland Williams and his successor, Kenneth H. Baker, SI, an Ohio State University psychologist and reserve army officer who had been the first head of the S&T Branch. The branch was in disarray throughout the summer of 1943.

Not until September 1943, with McConaughy’s selection—he was then president of United China Relief—would Schools and Training have a leadership team that would run the branch until the end of the war. To do the actual work of running day-to-day operations, Donovan selected as deputy director Col. Henson Langdon Robinson, a Dartmouth graduate, reserve army officer from World War I, and successful businessman from Springfield, Illinois. Donovan had first recruited Robinson to supervise OSS headquarters. Now he gave him the task of efficiently operating the faltering Schools and Training Branch.

Schools and Training Branch spent two years trying to coordinate the OSS training system and the numerous facilities and diverse curricula that had evolved since 1942 among the operational branches, particularly the two largest, SO and SI. Although Donovan’s headquarters gave it increasing authority over all OSS schools, first in the United States and then in August 1944 over those overseas, S&T never did control them completely. Despite increasing S&T efforts at coordination and at least some standardization, the operational branches proved resistant to its control, and they continued to exert the dominant influence over their trainees through the end of the war.

Schools and Training Branch created a common introductory course in early 1944. A basic two-week program for all OSS operational personnel—SI, SO, MO and X-2—it was first taught at Area E, and called the “E” or “E-type” course. The operational branches, particularly SO, thought it emphasized the wrong subjects and some of them called it a waste of time. Along with SI, X-2 and MO, SO was also angered by what all considered S&T’s overall inadequate curriculum and teaching methods, its seeming inability to incorporate up-to-date information from overseas, and what they believed were its inappropriate attempts to play the branches off against each other in order to consolidate S&T’s control.

With S&T under such intense criticism and plagued with problems, McConaughy apologized to the assistant director of the OSS:

Many of our difficulties stem from the haste with which OSS was organized, the fact that the concept of training followed a program of operations (ideally, it should have preceded it). Schools and Training was the “tail” of the OSS “dog.” For a long time, it was not given strong leadership, it did not achieve Branch status until recently, etc. Not very long
The number of OSS training camps in the United States increased to 16 in the last 12 months of the war as the original training areas and assessment stations in Maryland and Virginia were augmented.

...ago, the “chief indoor sport” of some persons in some Branches was to pick on Schools and Training—and our record probably justified their doing so.59

Area E was closed in July 1944, but OSS headquarters still wanted a standardized E-type basic course for all new operational personnel. It was not until S&T made changes to bring training into line with field experience and the demands of the operational branches and adopted a modified version of the basic SI training course, that a new OSS basic unified course was accepted. It was approved first by SI, X-2, and MO, and—only after it had been substantially modified to meet the needs of special operations recruits—by SO.

The new basic unified course, still called the E Course, was taught beginning in July 1944 at Area A, and subsequently at RTU-11, Area F, and the new West Coast training facility on Santa Catalina Island off Los Angeles.60 The aim of this introductory course was to provide a quick but intensive survey of the various kinds of work done by OSS. Having been created by SI, it was heavier on the intelligence than paramilitary side. Subjects such as agent undercover techniques, intelligence objectives and reporting, sabotage, small arms, demolitions, unarmed defense, as well as the basic elements of counterespionage and black propaganda were crammed into only two or, at most, three weeks.61 At the same time, the basic SO paramilitary course (the A-4 Course) was also taught at various times not only in Area A but at Areas B, D, F, and on Catalina Island.62

During the big buildup between the summer of 1943 and the fall of 1944, the training camps had operated at a breakneck pace as OSS activities in the field expanded along with the US military effort, first in Europe and then in the Far East. Increased demands were imposed on Schools and Training Branch, which numbered some 50 men and women at headquarters and nearly 500 male instructors at stateside training facilities.63

The number of OSS training camps in the United States increased to 16 in the last 12 months of the war as the original training areas and assessment stations in Maryland and Virginia were augmented by a communications school, designated Area M, at Camp McDowell, near Naperville, Illinois, and eight relatively new training facilities in southern California. The most prominent of these “W” areas was on Santa Catalina Island, as the focus of war effort shifted to the defeat of Japan.64

When Phillip Allen, head of West Coast schools, arrived from S&T headquarters, he was able to institute a well-coordinated program there. His success was due in part because, except for the Maritime Unit, which already had its own school there, the other operational branches did not have training facilities there, and this enabled Allen largely to start afresh. His training program began with the new basic, unified, two-week E Course. This was followed by an advanced course in SI, SO, or MO, or a combination of them.65

In the summer of 1944, Allen was able to obtain as instructors seasoned veterans who had real experience and information on current conditions in the war zones and who could provide practical advice to their students. Training concluded with extremely demanding field problems, as some of the students—Korean Americans, Japanese Americans, and some Korean prisoners of war—were preparing for infiltration into Japanese occupied Korea or Japan itself.66

Advanced SI students, accompanied by radio operators, had to infiltrate northern Mexico and obtain and relay important information. Advanced SO men...
were sent on survival problems, dispatched into desolate areas with only a minimum of food, forced to live on fish they could catch or game they could shoot. Subsequently they were tested on preparing effective plans to sabotage military facilities in San Pedro harbor and the Orange County coast. Lt. Hugh Tovar, SI, a Harvard ROTC graduate, was one of those OSS trainees in the interior of rugged, windswept Santa Catalina Island in 1945. "They gave me a carbine with one bullet and told me to survive on my own out there for several days," he recalled. He did and went on afterward to China and Indochina. In its praise of the West Coast training program, S&T concluded at the end of the war, that it was probably the most efficient that was given by Schools and Training, since it combined the best features of the training that had been given in the East and eliminated some of the weaknesses that experience had brought to light.

**Evaluations of OSS Training**

OSS direct action training had its strengths and weaknesses; the latter, as even the Schools and Training Branch acknowledged, had been particularly evident in the early stages of its evolution. Until combat veterans began to return in the fall of 1944, few of the stateside instructors had any operational experience. There were numerous criticisms. Some students later complained that there had not been enough instruction in how to organize and work with indigenous populations, especially non-European, native populations. Nor was there enough training on how to handle resistance groups, particularly those with diverse factions and conflicting political agendas. Some veterans grumbled about undue emphasis on "cloak and dagger creepiness" instead of practical training that "should be more matter-of-fact." Others carped that too much of the stateside instruction had been "a little bit of this and a little bit of that in case it might come in handy some day."

One of the most frustrating experiences was being held stateside after graduation as a result of the scarcity of transportation or other difficulties. Another significant criticism was that in the early training program, it had often been unclear to instructors or recruits the particular assignment for which the individual student was being prepared. Subsequently, S&T attempted to link instructors with the relevant branch desk officer so that an individual's training might be made more relevant.

Schools and Training Branch had its own complaints, mainly that the operational branches would seldom cooperate. They declined to keep the training branch informed of their plans, and they refused to share their secret after-action reports from overseas. At the same time, they expected S&T's training camps to handle truckloads of trainees even if these new stu-
“Training is not spectacular work. It means doing a sound teaching job, adjusting sights to fit circumstances, and keeping right on doing it.”

students suddenly arrived without warning. “Someone recently likened Schools and Training to an island of ignorance with darkness on both sides of it,” Colonel Robinson bemoaned in late 1943.

We are trying to run a group of schools without knowing anything about the number of students we must train, the type of missions our students will have, or what happens to them after they get to their eventual destinations.73

Despite the gripes, many members of OSS direct action units attributed much of their success to their training. Most commonly, combat veterans cited physical conditioning, specific skills, the building of confidence in themselves and the organization, as well as their sense of the importance of their mission. “The experience at Area B-2 was a great morale builder and when we departed in mid-December [1943], we were in top physical condition,” wrote Sgt. Robert R. Kehoe, SO, a decorated Jedburgh team radio operator in France.74 Maj. Jerry Sage, also SO, credited the training with helping him organize and lead escapes from German prisoner-of-war camps.75 Lt. Joseph Lazarsky, SO, who left Area B to become a successful guerrilla leader in Burma, recalled that “the training in weaponry and demolitions was effective. So was building self-confidence and the ability to get things done.” He used the same training methods to prepare indigenous agents in the Far East. “It was very effective,” he said.76

Sgt. Caesar J. Civitella, an Italian OG who fought in France and Italy, also believed the training was very effective; in addition, he was impressed by the use of “peer review.” He and the other enlisted men were questioned anonymously during training at Area F about their respect for others in their OG section, as a result of which one of the officers was reassigned.77 When OSS Greek OGs left the United States in December 1943, following training at Areas F, A, and B, they were in high spirits, dressed smartly in their trim, new Eisenhower jackets and paratrooper jump boots, and singing in both English and Greek. Their communications officer said later, “We looked good, acted good, and the biggest thing, we felt good. Officers from other outfits would ask me, ‘Who are you guys?’ Security told us to say that we [were] truck drivers; they knew that wasn’t the case.”78

John Singlaub reflected on that training after retiring as a major general in command of US troops in Korea.

These were individual skills that are perhaps useful but are most important for training the state of mind or attitude, developing an aggressiveness and confidence in one’s ability to use weapons. One of the most important aspects of the training was that it gave you complete confidence….an ability to concentrate on your mission, and not worry about your personal safety. That’s really a great psychological advantage I used that later in training my units when I was a battalion commander and later, a Battle Group commander.79

By the end of the war, the OSS’s program of selection, evaluation, and training, and equally if not more important its successes overseas showed the importance of obtaining the right individuals and giving them the skills, equipment, and confidence to do the job.80

“Training is not spectacular work,” S&T Branch admitted in a report at the end of the war. “It means doing a sound teaching job, adjusting sights to fit circumstances, and keeping right on doing it.”81 Operating like the OSS itself which was created in haste and without American precedent and which was propelled by a drive for speed, production, and results, OSS training sometimes appeared confused and indeci-
The effectiveness of OSS training was confirmed by the adoption of much of its curriculum by its successors, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Army Special Forces. The CIA picked it up almost 100 percent,” explained Joseph Lazarusky, an OSS veteran whose subsequent 25-year career with the Agency included being chief of station in several Far Eastern countries. “They took the manuals, instructional materials, and put that right into the Agency. You know, the COI and the OSS started it from scratch. The Agency would have been foolish not to have adopted their training. The training in weaponry and demolitions was effective. So was building self-confidence and the ability to get things done.”

OSS’s direct action operations behind enemy lines in World War II were impressive, as acknowledged by a number of Allied and Axis commanders, among them Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, who declared in May 1945 after the defeat of Hitler’s regime, that the value of the OSS “has been so great that there should be no thought of its elimination.” It was eliminated, of course, in October 1945 by President Harry S Truman. But recognition of its value contributed to the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency two years later.

The CIA relied in part upon the OSS model to evaluate recruits and to train them with skills, self-confidence, and adaptability. In 1951, the Agency even tried to obtain Prince William Forest Park, site of OSS’s first training camps, from the National Park Service as a training facility. It was only after that effort failed that the CIA established its own secret, paramilitary training facility on 10,000 acres of pine forests and swamps in southern Virginia. The demanding OSS-style training continues there to the present day.
Notes


6. “Military Record of Garland H. Williams, Major, Infantry,” attached to William J. Donovan to Secretary of War, 2 March 1942, [subject: promotion of Williams to lieutenant colonel], OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 92, Box 32, Folder 33, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. Williams's superior in charge of SO was Lt. Col. Millard Preston Goodfellow, a newspaper publisher from New York City.

7. David Stafford, Camp X (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1987), 81–82; Anthony Moore, British Liaison, “Notes on Co-Operations between SOE and OSS,” January 1945, 1–2; OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 158, Folder 1722, National Archives II. Camp X's official designation was Special Training School No. 103.


9. Maj. Garland H. Williams, “Training,” 5–6; an eight-page, typed memorandum, undated [but January or February 1942 before Williams was promoted to lieutenant colonel in March], located in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 161, Folder 1754, National Archives II.


11. John J. Dempsey, Acting Secretary of the Interior to Secretary of War, 16 May 1942, and “Special Use Permit Authorizing Use of Land in the Catoctin Recreational Demonstration Area, Maryland, by the War Department for National Defense Purposes” and a similar Special Use Permit for Chopawamsic, 16 May 1942, with identical provisions, 16 May 1942 both in National Park Service Records (RG 79), Central Classified File, National Archives II; see also Chambers, OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II, 100–103.
Notes (cont.)

12. Chambers, OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II, 107–79. Figures on total capacity are compiled from figures on each sub-camp in each OSS training area on layout maps prepared by the Visual Presentation Branch in November 1943, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 85, Box 13, Folder 249, National Archives II. On the absence of women trainees in the parks, Elizabeth P. (“Betty”) M. McIntosh, former MO officer, telephone interview with the author, 12 March 2005, and the fact that none of the nearly 50 male OSS veterans of the two national parks, whom the author interviewed, remembered ever seeing any OSS women, or any women at all, at those forested training areas, except for one evening at the end of the war when a group of WAVES was bused to Area C for a dance.


16. OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 161–62. Many of these OSS films are located in the Visual Branch of National Archives II; copies of shooting scripts and narration are in the records of various OSS branches, for example, “Gutter Fighting,” OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 133, Box 151, Folder 1258; “Short Range Intelligence,” Entry 146, Box 220, Folder 3054, National Archives II.


19. R.P. Tenney to J.R. Hayden, June 8, 1942, Subject: Area B, in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 158, Folder 1721, National Archives II.

20. “Area ‘B’ Training Course,” one-page, typed schedule for instruction 16 May to 13 June 1942, attached to J.R. Brown to J.R. Hayden, 14 June 1942, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 161, Folder 1754; Kenneth H. Baker to Col. Edward Buxton, 13 March 1943, subject: Curriculum of Basic Training Course, reprinted as Exhibit A, 169–71 in Appendix II to Part One of History of the Schools and Training Office, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 158, Folder 1721. For a later example, see Operational Groups Field Manual—Strategic Services (Provisional), Strategic Services Field Manual No. 6, April 1944, Section IV, Training, 10–13, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 140, Folder 1465. On the reference to this type of training as “A-4,” see L.B. Shallcross, deputy, Staff Training Branch/TRD, [Central Intelligence Agency], to John O’Gara, chief, Staff Training Branch, 1 February 1951, subject: Information on OSS Schools and Training Sites, p. 4, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 161, Box 7, Folder 76, National Archives II.


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Notes (cont.)


25. Former SO member Edgar Prichard, "Address to Historical Prince William, Inc., 16 January 1991, p. 1, typescript, plus a newspaper clipping of the speech, both located in the park archives of Prince William Forest Park, Triangle, Virginia. Prichard trained first at Area B, where he went through Fairbairn's pistol house, and then at Area A before being sent to North Africa. Edgar Prichard, Personnel File, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 224, Box 620, National Archives II.


27. Alex Flaster, Chicago-based documentary filmmaker, email to the author, 24 February 2006; see also Nicholas Dawidoff, The Catcher was a Spy: The Mysterious Life of Moe Berg (New York: Pantheon, 1994).

28. “Bang-bang boys,” a sobriquet reported in “History of Schools and Training, OSS,” p. 25, a 55-page-typescript history, undated, but attached to a memorandum by Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, stating “Received this date from W[illiam]. J. Morgan [psychologist and a former OSS Jedburgh] the following report: History of Schools and Training, OSS, Part I thru Part VI,” OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder 13, National Archives II.

29. OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 76–77, 241–42; for the precise locations of all OSS training sites in the USA, see L.B. Shallcross, deputy, Staff Training Branch/TRD, [Central Intelligence Agency], to J ohn O'Gara, chief, Staff Training Branch, 1 February 1951, subject: Information on OSS Schools and Training Sites, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 161, Box 7, Folder 76, National Archives II.


32. The OSS Operational Groups (OGs) were created as 13 May 1943 as a separate tactical combat units under JCS Directive 155/7/D, 4 April 1943, Article 7, relating to Operational Nuclei for Guerrilla Warfare. William J. Donovan, Special Order No. 21, issued 13 May 1943, effective, 4 May 1943; and Col. Ellery C. Huntington, J r., C.O. Operational Groups, to Lt. Cmdr. R. Davis Halliwell, Chief of S.O., 22 June 1943, subject: Operational Groups, OSS—Organization and Functions, both in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 140, Folder 1460, National Archives II.


34. Office of Strategic Services, OG: Operational Group Command, December 1944, p. 6. I am indebted to Caesar J. Civitella, former Italian OG and Army Special Forces, for providing me with a copy of this booklet.
35. Some personnel in all of the operational branches received part of their training at Area F, particularly OSS women. Elizabeth McIntosh, in MO, for example, “learned how to handle weapons and throw grenades out on the golf course” before leaving for the Far East. Elizabeth McIntosh quoted in Russell Miller, Behind the Lines: The Oral History of Special Operations [SOE and SO] in World War II (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002), 59–60; and Elizabeth McIntosh, telephone interview with the author, 12 March 2005. There is, as of this writing, no overall history of the Operational Groups. A start has been made with a special OG section in OSS Society Newsletter, Winter 2007, 5–8; the OSS OG website www.ossog.org; and Troy J. Sacquetty, “The OSS: A Primer on the Special Operations Branches and Detachments of the Office of Strategic Services,” Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History, 3:4 (2007): esp. 40–41, 58–50.


37. “Close Combat,” typed lecture, December 1943, included in “Syllabus of Lectures,” February 1944, in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 158, Folder 1717, National Archives II.

38. Ellsworth (“Al”) Johnson, French OG, and later with the Chinese OGs, telephone interview with the author, 27 J une 2008.

39. “Operational Groups Training, Preliminary Course F and Final Course B,” December 1943, in Appendix IV, Part Three of the History [of Schools and Training Branch], typescript in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 158, Folder 1723, National Archives II.

40. www.ossog.org/personnel.htm. Accessed January 31, 2010. Donovan did not use a comparable ethnic model in the Far East. OSS Detachment 101 in Burma was composed of a couple of hundred Americans who organized, supplied, and directed 10,000 Kachin tribesmen in Burma. Donovan created 10 Chinese OGs, called “Commandos” in 1945, but they were composed of 1,500 recruits from the Chinese Nationalist Army led by 200 Americans, veterans of European OGs or of Detachment 101. For SO teams against Japanese-occupied countries in the Far East, Donovan utilized Japanese Americans, Chinese Americans, Korean Americans, and Thai students in America. He also used Korean nationalists and Korean soldiers captured from the Japanese army. Troy J. Sacquetty is writing the definitive history of Detachment 101.


44. Donald W. MacKinnon, “OSS Assessment Program,” Studies in Intelligence 23, no. 3 (1979): 21–34. The technique was described after the war in OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for

45. See, for example, Maj. Garland H. Williams, COI, to Joseph Green, supervising customs agent, Seattle, Washington, 12 January 1942, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 92, Box 32, Folder 33, National Archives II.


47. Unidentified OSS recruiter, quoted in Miller, Behind the Lines, 57.

48. For uniformed personnel, OSS drew mainly from the Army, but it also obtained recruits from the Army Air Forces, Marines, Navy, and Coast Guard. Accounts of several of the Marine officers in the OSS, such as the highly decorated Maj. Peter J. Ortiz, are included in Robert E. Mattingly, Herringbone Cloak—GI Dagger: Marines of the OSS (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps, 1989).

49. OSS, Special Operations Field Manual—Strategic Services (Provisional), 23 February 1944, p. 5, copy in William E. Colby Papers, Box 14, Folder 7, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.


51. OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 242–43. Perhaps a majority of the SOs and OGs received their parachute training overseas, many at British SOE schools in Britain, Palestine, and India but others at OSS jump schools set up by Lucius O. Rucker in Algeria and China.


53. The total number of personnel in the OSS remains subject to different estimates. The traditional figure of 13,000 at peak strength in December 1944 (with 5,500 in the United States and 7,500 overseas) is given in Office of Strategic Services, War Report of the O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services), 2 vols. (New York: Walker and Co., 1976, the declassified component of a typescript completed in 1947), vol. 1, 116 (on COI, see p. 26). A contemporary breakdown of the 12, 974 personnel in December 1944, with Intelligence Branches comprising 26.8 per cent (3,477 persons) and Operations, including Special Operations, Operational Groups, and the Maritime Unit, comprising 23.7 per cent (3,075 persons) in December 1944 was reported Louis M. Ream, deputy director, administrative services [OSS] to Charles S. Cheston [second assistant director of OSS], memorandum, [no subject heading] 29 January 1945, 2–3, CIA Records (RG 263), Thomas Troy Files, Box 6, Folder 46, National Archives, II. In August 2008, the personnel files of the OSS were declassified. They included nearly 24,000 individuals, but this figure may exaggerate the core strength of the OSS, because some individuals served only briefly with the OSS on loan from the Army Air Corps or other organizations. William H. Cunliffe, archivist of OSS Records at the National Archives, interview with the author, 13 January 2009. The true size of the OSS may never be known because of the organization’s secrecy; because many individuals, foreign and American, were assigned briefly and temporarily; and in part because many of the foreign nationals working secretly for the OSS may not have been included.
Notes (cont.)

54. Chambers, OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II, 63–69. Williams was pushed out in August 1942 and left OSS to help the Army build its paratrooper training program. After six months, Baker was reassigned in late June 1943 and wound up serving as liaison between OSS in Algiers and the U.S. Seventh Army in southern France in late 1944. At the end of the war, Schools and Training Branch, noting that Williams had been sacrificed, praised him as having been “a year and a half ahead of his time.” OSS, Schools and Training Branch, typescript history of the branch prepared in August 1945, parts of which were declassified 40 years later and published as William L. Cassidy, editor, History of the Schools and Training Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (San Francisco: Kingfisher Press, 1983); the quotation is on p. 35.


57. On Donovan’s order extending S&T’s authority to training facilities overseas, see OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 242–43; and for the relationship with the operational branches, see also “History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS,” 44–50, attached to W[illiam] J. Morgan to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder, 13, National Archives II. A number of OSS units were excluded from S&T’s jurisdiction over training at least until late 1944. These included highly specialized technical units like the Communications Branch, the Maritime Unit, X-2, and the Services Branch (reproduction, budget and procedures, procurement and supply), although some of them drew on S&T for supplies and school administration. By 1944 a number of them such as Research and Analysis Branch also sent their personnel for the OSS Basic Course, particularly when they were being dispatched overseas. History of Schools and Training Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, 68–69.

58. Minutes of the [Eighth Meeting] of the [SI Advisory] Training Committee, 14 June 1944, p. 2, and Minutes of the 11th Meeting of the [SI Advisory] Training Committee, 6 July 1944, “a joint meeting of representatives of S.I., S.O., M.O., X-2 and personnel of S & T to discuss the [operating branches’] proposed changes in training,” OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 146, Box 229, Folder 3239, National Archives II.


60. Col. H.L. Robinson, Schools and Training Branch Order No. 1, issued 21 July 1944, effective 17 July 1944, OSS Basic Course, OSS Records (RG 226), Directors Office Files, Microfilm No. 1642, Roll 102, Frames 1120–21; R. Boulton, vice chairman, S.I. Training Advisory Committee, to chief, S.I., 17 July 1944, subject: OSS Basic Two Weeks Course, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 146, Box 229, Folder 3239; R. Boulton, S.I., for the Training Representatives of S.I., X-2, SO and MO Branches, to Col. H. L. Robinson [Schools and Training], 7 July 1944, subject: Meeting with Schools and Training Personnel, 6 July 1944; Training Board Meeting, 7 July 1944, “Notes on Discussion Regarding Area ’E’ S.I., X-2, Basic Course Changes,” OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 146, Box 229, Folder 3239, all in National Archives II.

61. “Excerpts from History of Schools and Training, OSS,” p. 4, attached to L.B. Shallcross, Deputy, Staff Training Branch/TRD [CIA] to John O’Gara, 1 February 1951, subject: Information on OSS Schools and Training Sites, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 161, Box 7, Folder 76, National Archives II.

62. Ibid.

63. History of Schools and Training Branch, Office of Strategic Services 157–58.

64. Camp McDowell had been an old CCC camp taken over by the US Army Signal Corps, which allowed OSS to use part of the facility. The West Coast OSS facilities were variously located at Camp Pendleton Marine
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Notes (cont.)

Corps Base (near San Diego), San Clemente, Newport Beach, and at several remote coves on Santa Catalina Island off Los Angeles. L. B. Shallcross, memorandum for John O’Gara, 1 February 1951, subject: “Information on OSS Schools and Training Sites,” OSS Record (RG 226), Entry 161, Box 7, Folder 76, National Archives II. The Catalina Boys School on Toyon Cove, Santa Catalina Island, was leased by OSS in December 1943; training began there in June 1944; William Sanford White, Santa Catalina Island Goes to War: World War II, 1941-1945 (Avalon, Calif.: White Limited Editions, 2002), 61-71.

65. In the one year of operation of the West Coast schools, nearly 1,000 trainees were given the Basic OSS Course, approximately 250 given Advanced SO training, 200 Advanced SI, and 100 Advanced MO. “History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS,” 31-32, 52, attached to W[illiam] J . Morgan to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder, 13, National Archives II.

66. Thomas N. Moon and Carl Eifler, The Deadliest Colonel (New York: Vantage, 1975), 48-49, 215-33, 323; Chambers, OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II, 460-65; Robert E. Carter, OG and instructor on Catalina Island, telephone interview with the author, 28 August 2008. With the Japanese surrender, the program for preparing infiltrators into Japan to aid the planned U.S. invasion was terminated.


69. “The natives being trained as operatives must be treated with friendliness and respect. There is no other way,” said an instructor in Ceylon. Ray F. Kauffman, SO Ceylon, quoted in Deane W. Starrett, Chief, Training Materials and Research Section [of the CIA] to Col. [E.B.] Whisner, Deputy Chief, TRS, 16 May 1949, subject: wartime recommendations for the training of personnel in OSS, p. 17, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 161, Box 2, Folder 32, National Archives II.

70. Maj. [Albert] Peter Dewey quoted in Deane W. Starrett, Chief, Training Materials and Research Section [of the CIA] to Col. [E.B.] Whisner, Deputy Chief, TRS, 16 May 1949, subject: wartime recommendations for the training of personnel in OSS, p. 16, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 161, Box 2, Folder 32, National Archives II. After serving in France and returning briefly to the United States, Dewey was sent to French Indochina, where he was mistaken for a French officer and killed by the Viet Minh in an ambush in Saigon in September 1945.


72. Ibid., 13-14

73. Lt. Col. H.L. Robinson, Executive, Schools and Training Branch, October 1943, “Schools and Training,” p. 12, a 14-page typed report, included in Appendix IV, Part Three of the History [of Schools and Training Branch], OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 158, Folder 1723, National Archives II.


Notes (cont.)

77. Caesar J. Civitella, OG, comment at a session on "Historians' Views" at a conference on "Irregular Warfare and the OSS Model," a symposium sponsored by the Joint Special Operations University and the OSS Society, Tampa, Florida, 3 November 2009 and telephone interview with the author, 26 May 2010.

78. Theodore Russell, interview in O'Donnell, Operatives, Spies and Saboteurs, 110–11. The "Eisenhower jacket" adopted in 1943 was a short, waist-length jacket, popularized by General Dwight D. Eisenhower.


80. In the field, equipment sometimes proved problematic. The suitcase-sized portable transmitter/receivers, for example, were wonderful instruments in operation, but they often broke in the initial parachute drop. Another problem was the uncertainty resulting from OSS not having an air carrier of its own, although a squadron of black-painted B-24 bomber/transports, "the Carpetbaggers," was assigned to OSS by the Army Air Forces in connection with the invasion of France in 1944.

81. "History of Schools and Training, OSS, Part I: Chronology and Administration, June 1942 – October 1945," p. 53, typescript, n.d. [apparently written in 1947], copy delivered by W.J. Morgan, who had been with OSS Schools and Training Branch during World War II, to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder 12, National Archives II.


83. "OSS Training Branch, Chapter VI (History)," p. 1, typescript n.d. [1946–1947?], recommendations for "the Training Section of a secret intelligence agency in time of war," OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder 14, National Archives II.


86. Joseph Lazarsky, telephone interview with the author, 11 February 2007. William J. Morgan, SO, a Yale-educated psychologist, later served as CIA's deputy chief of training, 1947–49, and chief of the Psychological Assessment Staff, 1949–52, Smith, OSS, 19. William R. ("Ray") Peers, who as a young lieutenant had trained at Area B in spring 1942 before leaving for the jungles of Burma as one of the early lead-
ers of Detachment 101, later served in Taiwan as chief of a CIA program for training Chinese agents to be infiltrated into mainland China, 1949–51, Smith, OSS, 265n.

87. Opposition led by local civic leaders including the editor of the Washington Star and the influential Representative Howard W. Smith (D-Va.), a senior member of the House Rules Committee, whose district included Prince William Forest Park, blocked the CIA’s bid to take over the park and establish a training camp there. Susan Carey Strickland, Prince William Forest Park: An Administrative History (Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, 1986), 100, n. 110; Chambers, OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II, 514, 548–53.

88. On comparatively recent OSS-style paramilitary training by the CIA, see, for example, Valerie Plame Wilson, Fair Game (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 1–2, 11–27, 315–316.
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