


journal once more was helping prepare its readers for the future: Lance Haus's treatment of the challenges of analyzing terrorism, particularly his warning not to confuse activity with productivity, seems prescient.[14] Similarly, Bruce Reidel's description of the institutional devil's advocate used by the Israeli military presaged wider discussion of the concept years later, especially in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.[15] Writers for *Studies* in the 1980s also focused on the phenomenon of burgeoning broadcast media— witness the several articles on the value of collecting open source material through television.

Another trend during the decade was the growth in the number of humorous pieces—tongue-in-cheek articles, funny vignettes, amusing imagery, even some doggerel. One speculates that, after the travails of the 1970s, *Studies* served as a therapeutic outlet by becoming a vehicle for those who sought refuge in humor. The foundation for such pieces had been laid in the 1950s, beginning with an essay on the English language as a barrier to communication and a lead article on working with officials of another country that interspersed solid observations about the process with cross-cultural comments worthy of present-day humorist Bill Bryson. [16] Most of the light-hearted writing in *Studies*, however, appears in the post-Kent period. Of special note is the only article to have been reprinted twice after its initial publication: “Elegant Writing in the Clandestine Services,” by “Richard Puderbaugh,” who had good reason to stay anonymous.[17]



Humor, admittedly, is quite subjective, so one's favorites might not be another's. Nonetheless, hard-working readers who are world-weary and need some laughter are encouraged to seek refreshment in these refuges:

- Russ Bowen, "An Engineering Approach to Literature Appreciation" (Spring 1980): *By plotting the frequency distribution of the nominal or "best" ratings of the nearly 700 authors to whom the system has been applied, a bell-shaped curve results To an engineer this is suggestive of some kind of consistent mechanism at work. On the other hand, some may view this result as simply evidence of a degree of intolerance or snobbishness on my part.*
- Robert Sinclair, "The CIA Canoe Pool" (Spring 1984): *A clothes brush at the office helps, but there are still days when I must try to maintain my dignity with patches of dried mud on the lower third of my trousers. Or spider webs.*




- Linda Lovett, "POEEDGR" (Winter 1986): *Once upon my desk computer, as I read my "VM Tutor," Came a message from a userID I'd not seen before—While I nodded, nearly napping, this odd message came up, zapping All the input I'd been tapping, tapping in for hours before. . . .*
- Roger Girdwood, "Burn Bags" (Summer 1989): *Some people never go to the burn bag chute. But they never have a full burn bag in their workplace, either When you arrive at work one morning, you discover a trove of 25 burn bags in the place where you thought you had a popcorn popper. Fortunately, you can*

usually identify this culprit by making a careful analysis of his or her bag-stapling technique. Like fingerprints and snowflakes, no two staple jobs are alike.

- [And my personal favorite,] David Fichtner, “Taking Arms against a Sea of Enemies” (Summer 1992): *Hamlet has made no public protest over his uncle’s succession Embassy reporting, however, states that there is a subversive campaign underway attacking the fundamental legitimacy of the current [Danish] government.*

Toward a New Century



Consistent with the journal’s success in previous decades, *Studies* articles in recent years have reflected the times and helped prepare readers for changes ahead by challenging them to think in new ways. One prescient article in 1990 anticipated the effects the information revolution would have on intelligence analysis: “The future is now The DI will have to deal with three major challenges: the information age, the devaluation of intelligence, and a crisis of self-doubt”—a neat summation of the problems that the DI has faced over the past decade. Another fact of life in the Internet age was foreshadowed in Joseph Seanor’s ground breaking article in 1992 on computer hacking.[18]

Among the typically cogent, thoughtful pieces covering a wide array of

intelligence topics, some stand out and, in fact, make for chilling reading years later. Consider the opening line of Kevin Stroh's behind-the-scenes account of analysis on Iraq's nuclear weapons: "CIA's assessment of Iraq's prewar nuclear weapons program was an intelligence failure." Remember, this was written *in 1995*. Stroh's article is key to understanding how intelligence on the same subject went wrong more recently, for in 1991 the CIA's failure was its assessment that Baghdad had *not* gone as far as it really had.[19]

Even more sobering is "The Coming Intelligence Failure," offered by Russ Travers of DIA in 1996:

*The year is 2001 As had been true of virtually all previous intelligence failures, collection was not the issue. The data were there, but we had failed to recognize correctly [their] significance and put [them] in context From the vantage point of 2001, intelligence failure is inevitable. Despite our best intentions, the system is sufficiently dysfunctional that intelligence failure is guaranteed.***[20]**

Prescience is rare, of course, and is seen exclusively in hindsight. For every good prediction in back issues that gives a shudder today upon rereading, there probably was at least one wrong (but one hopes well-meaning and well-reasoned) assessment, such as the bold prediction in 1985, just as Gorbachev was coming to power in the USSR, that the passing of the old Soviet leadership "will not herald an era of major reforms The USSR will not experience anything approaching a genuine systemic crisis before the year 2000." Ah, well, it happens to everyone. But it is also certain that Sherman Kent would point out that displaying prescience is not the point. The value of *Studies in Intelligence* is in its presentation of principles of the trade—things that worked and did not—and its postulation of what might reasonably be. To the degree that readers of *Studies* have their imaginations engaged and stimulated with speculative pieces, the journal has done its job.

The Way Ahead

More than 1,000 individuals, from junior officers to Directors of Central Intelligence, and even an unwitting Soviet intelligence officer or two, have contributed articles to *Studies* over the years. A review reveals that, while the journal has many beloved writers of multiple articles, most contributors had just one excellent article in them—indeed, most of the memorable articles, I venture to generalize, were the single offering of one

person who never wrote for *Studies* again (one hopes it was not because of the editing process). These included deputy directors of intelligence (Robert Amory, Ray Cline, Doug MacEachin), a future presidential adviser (William Bundy), a CIA inspector general (Fred Hitz), and a future Marine Corps commandant (P. X. Kelley). At the same time, *Studies* could not do without its serial contributors. The ten most prolific authors—Dino Brugioni, Jack Davis, Philip Edwards, Benjamin Fischer, Sherman Kent, Andrew Kopal, Henry Lowenhaupt, Donovan Pratt, Kevin Ruffner, Michael Warner—each wrote at least eight articles, and this listing does not include book reviews.

For the past 10 years or so—since about the time the *Studies* editorial board was opened to officers from the Intelligence Community at large—there has been an encouraging trend toward more submissions from outside the CIA, fully in keeping with the intent of Sherman Kent and the other founders of the journal. Much of this trend reflects the shift in civilian analytic and operational resources toward support of the military. Other developments will reinforce this tendency: the creation of the Director of National Intelligence and the demise of the DCI position; the widening of authorship of the *President's Daily Brief*; and the creation of national centers for counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and counterproliferation. Through interactions with CIA colleagues, more intelligence professionals are likely to become acquainted with *Studies in Intelligence*, come to appreciate what it offers, and wish to contribute their perspectives to it. The current interagency editorial board encourages all intelligence officers to participate in that valuable accumulation of professional knowledge that is the main mission of *Studies*.

Another development faced by *Studies in Intelligence*—and, frankly, one with which the journal is still coming to grips— is the expansion of its readership beyond the province of the intelligence professional. For most of its history, *Studies* has published for the knowledgeable intelligence practitioner. With every other issue now unclassified and posted on the CIA Web site, and with many of its previously classified articles now declassified, *Studies* must consider its public, uncleared readers.[21] Should the journal devote special attention to this new audience? How can it best serve this new readership— Should it publish more basic, “primer” pieces? Should it produce a glossary for readers who are not intelligence professionals? Just how much background knowledge is it safe to assume? Is there a danger that *Studies* might counterproductively be suspected of acting as a public advocate for the intelligence profession, for a particular intelligence policy, or for any of the agencies that compose