PART III

THE AFTERMATH

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Soviet Offensive Weapons in Cuba

1. The enclosed table includes a list of Soviet offensive missile weapons and associated equipment in Cuba.

2. Very little equipment has been observed at the three IRBM sites in Cuba. The only equipment identified, in addition to structures under construction, has been two possible fuel trucks and two possible oxidant trucks. If the IRBMs and other associated equipment in Cuba they are probably in an unlocated facility between the port of Mariel and the sites. A study of Soviet sea shipments to Cuba, however, indicates that it is unlikely that many IRBMs had reached Cuba prior to the institution of the Quarantine.

3. No nuclear weapon or missile nosecones have been identified in Cuba. There are, however, nuclear weapon storage bunkers under construction at each of the MRBM and IRBM sites. These buildings are about 35 feet in width and are about 80 feet in length at the MRBM sites and 112 feet in length at the IRBM sites. If nuclear weapons are in Cuba they are probably in an unlocated facility between the entry port of Mariel and the sites.

4. All IL-28 aircraft are at San Julian in western Cuba; three or four appear to be assembled. An additional 25 or 24 aircraft in crates have also been observed at this airfield. Each disassembled aircraft consists of 1 fuselage crate 60X8X10 feet; 2 wing crates 9X40X8 feet; and 2 engine crates 9X30X8 feet.

Enclosure: Table of Special Purpose Missile System Equipment
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Site Name and Number</th>
<th>Missiles and Missile Transports</th>
<th>Tracked Prime Movers for Transports</th>
<th>Director Vehicles</th>
<th>Fuel Tank Trailers</th>
<th>Oxidizer Tank Trailers</th>
<th>Tracked Prime Movers for Oxidizer Tank Trailers</th>
<th>Launch Stand</th>
<th>Power Stand</th>
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<td>Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile Sites</td>
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<td>Equipment at Logistical Support Points</td>
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<tr>
<td>Footnote:</td>
<td>1. There are numerous general purpose support equipment associated with MRBM/JBM units, such as trucks, vehicles etc.</td>
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<td>Implied numbers are those we estimate to be organic with Soviet MRBM/JBM units or represent the highest number observed.</td>
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Your Briefings of the NSC Executive Committee

1. On 23 October you gave a brief intelligence report saying that construction at the sites was continuing. Lundahl briefed on the most recent photographs. It was at this meeting that it was left to your discretion to consider the matter of disclosures of photos and you sent Lundahl and Cline to New York to assist Stevenson.

At an evening meeting that day you briefed on military developments within the WARSAW Pact countries, describing an increased level of Soviet military communications.

2. On 24 October you briefed on the continued rapid progress in the completion of the missile sites and of the fact that 22 Soviet missile ships were en route to Cuba.

3. On 25 October you told the Group there had been no change in the construction pace; you covered the Watch Committee report that Soviet armed forces were increasing state of readiness; you described the Soviet ships on route to Cuba carrying helicopters; you covered the departure of a Cuban plane from Canada to Havana; and also briefed on the turn-around of 15 of the 22 Soviet ships.

At an evening meeting you briefed in detail on the status of Soviet shipping.

4. On 26 October, which was attended by Stevenson, you covered the Watch Committee report which concluded that Soviet armed forces had completed measures for an alert but that there were no significant deployments. You continued construction at the missile bases, estimating that it had cost the Soviet less than one-half as much to put these in Cuba rather than build ICBM's in the USSR. You summarized the status of shipping and made the point that the blockade ships could carry Soviet arms. You reviewed briefly Castro's apprehensive reaction to the US quarantine. It seems to fear an uprising.
5. On 27 October you told the Group that three of the four MRBM sites at San Cristobal and two sites at Sagualagranda appeared fully operational and covered the latest Watch Committee report on Soviet military developments.

6. On 28 October you agreed to lend all appropriate support to the effort to brief General Rischke at the UN. You directed that Ray Cline participate in the draft reply to Khrushchev's letter. You asked that Cline insinuate your position that the removal of the missiles should not end by giving Castro a sanctuary.

7. On 29 October you covered the following:
   a. Construction continues;
   b. 
   c. 
   d. 
   e. The Watch Committee report was noted. There was no sign of change in Soviet military preparedness.
   f. You mentioned the point that press stories based on special intelligence must be prevented.

After the meeting you talked with the President and Secretary Rusk emphasizing that Castro must remain in Cuba with a greater security and this is the situation we must be careful of.

8. On 30 October you told the Group available data does not indicate preparation for dismantling and noted continued construction of nuclear storage bunkers. Many of the missile directors had been removed and are no longer visible. You covered the shipping situation and pointed to the
danger of sabotage in Latin American countries urging that all Embassies and consulates be alerted. You also covered the Watch Committee Report which concluded that Soviet armed forces remain on alert and you reviewed briefly current developments in Laos, South Vietnam, and India, Soviet nuclear subs, and Soviet nuclear tests and you pointed out that our ability to analyze these tests had been impaired by DOD withdrawal of collection vehicles.

9. On 31 October you told the Group that there was continued evidence of construction and concealment but noted that evidence that some of the launchers had been moved from the MRBM sites might be construed as the first step at dismantling. You further pointed out that photos, compared with those taken on Saturday and ordered to cease were probably not issued until Sunday night or Monday morning. There was discussion of the "intelligence gap" and you reviewed the Cuban SNIE of 19 September, noting that it failed to fully appraise our reports available.

10. On 1 November you briefed on details concerning U Thant's mission to Havana. You pointed out that Cuba probably would engage in reconnaissance with anti aircraft fire since they had indicated that they had developed a pattern of reconnaissance. Evidence indicates Soviets in command and control of SAM system. You noted there had been no reconnaissance in Eastern Cuba since 23 October. Decision was made at this meeting to cover Lark, IL-28, and S.358 Julian and MRBM sites.

11. On 2 November you told the Group there was evidence that the Soviets were dismantling missiles, but the assembly of IL-28 bombers was continuing.

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

MEMORANDUM: Deployment and Withdrawal of Soviet Missiles and Other Significant Weapons in Cuba

**NOTE**

This memorandum assesses our evidence concerning the number of Soviet missiles deployed to and subsequently withdrawn from Cuba, the chances that Soviet missiles remain in Cuba, and the situation and outlook with respect to rates of withdrawal of IL-28s and other significant Soviet weapons in Cuba.

**CONCLUSION**

The Soviet claim to have delivered only 42 missiles to Cuba, and to have now withdrawn these, is consistent with our evidence. We cannot exclude the possibility that more actually arrived, and that some therefore remain, but we think that any such number would be small. Available evidence also warrants the conclusion that the Soviets are preparing to withdraw the IL-28s.

1. The Soviets almost certainly intended to deploy substantially more than the 42 missiles which they acknowledged and have withdrawn. We reach this conclusion from the following factors:

   a. Nine sites with four launchers each have been identified in Cuba. The Soviets normally provide two missiles for every IIM and IBM launcher and, since several of the launchers already had two, we believe that they intended to provide two each for the others, or a total of 72 for the 36 launchers identified. Of these, 48 would be IIMs, of which we identified 33, and the remainder would be IBMs, of which we have no evidence that any had reached Cuba by 22 October.

   b. The pattern of the nine identified sites strongly suggests that at least one more was planned to form a pair with the ninth. In addition, there is some evidence suggesting that the Soviets planned a third deployment area, in eastern Cuba, to follow upon those in the western and central parts of the country.
c. Among the Soviet ships which turned back from the Cuba run, upon announcement of the US quarantine, were five of the seven which we know to have been capable of carrying missiles. Thus, the buildup was still in progress on 22 October.

2. It remains to ask whether the Soviets did in fact succeed in bringing more than 42 missiles to Cuba. A review of our information from all sources, presented in detail in Annex A, leads us to believe that they probably did not. This estimate is based on the following factors:

a. Our analysis indicates the missiles were shipped in one piece—less only warheads—on the transporter in a package about 68 feet long as hold cargo.

b. Of the Soviet dry cargo ships involved in the Cuban arms buildup, only seven ships have hatches which would allow stowage of this missile package. We have reasonably good data on the size of these ships. Because of the time in port for both the loading and unloading, apparent Soviet loading practice in deliveries to Cuba, and the size of the ships, we believe the most probable load was six to seven missiles per ship. More would have required extensive shoring between decks and this does not appear to have occurred.

c. These ships made 13 voyages to Cuba during the July-October buildup. The information concerning six of the voyages indicates that they almost certainly must have carried strategic missiles. The other seven, because of their arrival times and evidence of non-missile cargoes, cannot be so identified, but one or more of them may have delivered missiles.

d. Reconstruction of the apparent timetable of the buildup, correlation of photography (both over Cuba and of a number of the ships en route) with all other sources, and analysis of reporting by ground observers all argue against our having wholly missed likely ships other than the seven identified, or other voyages than the thirteen.

3. We can in this way account for at least 36 missiles—six on each of six voyages. The Soviet claim of 42 is consistent with our evidence, but we
cannot rule out a somewhat higher number, primarily because of the possibility that two or more of the seven other voyages delivered missiles. The analysis of these thirteen voyages in Annex B inclines us to accept a figure not much higher than the 36 we can account for.

4. Sources inside Cuba have provided numerous reports in recent weeks claiming that strategic missiles have been retained in Cuba and concealed from aerial reconnaissance. Most of these sources are untested, and some of their reports are manifestly erroneous. Checks by other methods, including photographic intelligence, have failed to produce clear confirmation of any of these reports, but we are not able to disprove some of them.* Specifically, at Mayari Arriba—about 40 miles northwest of Guantanamo—we have identified both from photography and ground sources a Soviet installation which may be missile-associated. We have not, however, identified any equipment which can be associated with strategic missiles.

5. Since the foregoing evidence is not fully conclusive, we must also consider whether the Soviets would wish to secrete strategic missiles in Cuba. It is doubtful, in our view, that they would do so for strictly military reasons. In the first place, our shipping analysis leaves little room for a number of remaining missiles large enough to be strategically significant at some later date. Such missiles could not participate in an all-out Soviet surprise attack without great risk that preparations would be detected by the US and the entire strategic plan compromised. Neither could the Soviets count on being able to use them in a retaliatory second strike.

6. In contemplating concealment, the Soviets would be aware of great risk. They would foresee that, if the US found out, a second Cuban crisis would ensue which would be unlikely to leave the Castro regime intact. Such a renewed crisis would find the Soviets in an even more disadvantageous position than before to protect their interests or avoid humiliation.

* A summary review of these reports, including the identification of certain areas which remain suspicious, is presented in Annex C.
Jet Bombers

7. We have confidence in our estimate, based on repeated high- and low-altitude photography over Cuba and photography of deck cargo en route to Cuba, that no more than 42 IL-28s were delivered before the quarantine began. Photography of 25 November indicates that 20 IL-28 fuselage crates remained unopened at San Julian air base and some of the remaining 13 which had previously been partially or fully assembled were being dismantled. Photography indicates that the other nine crates, located at Holguin airfield, were still unopened on 25 November and had been removed to an undetermined location on 27 November.

8. The Soviets could easily ship out all these aircraft by mid-December. Shipping suitable for this purpose is continually available, and almost any four of the Soviet dry-cargo vessels in the Cuban trade could carry the entire number. Those still in crates could be moved to ports in a day or two, and the remainder could be disassembled and moved to ports by the agreed date.

Other Soviet Forces

9. Other Soviet weapon systems in Cuba include surface-to-air missiles, coastal defense missiles, Komar missile boats, and fighter aircraft. In addition, the equipment for four armored combat groups (including possibly 6-10,000 men) remains on the island. We have no evidence of any preparations in Cuba to withdraw these elements. At least four months and on the order of 100 voyages by Soviet ships were required to move these forces to Cuba, and their removal would require an equally large effort. The SA-2 system and the armored combat groups are the bulkiest of these elements, and might require several months for return to the USSR.
February 4, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is the report of your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board based on our review of the intelligence coverage, assessment, and reporting by U.S. intelligence agencies concerning the Soviet military build-up in Cuba during the months preceding October 22, 1962.

Inasmuch as the most urgent recommendations growing out of our review of the Cuba situation have already been submitted to you in the Board's interim report dated December 28, 1962, we are not submitting further recommendations at this time. When the Board next meets we will complete consideration of the comments which have now been received from the Director of Central Intelligence and the U.S. intelligence agencies with respect to the recommendations of our interim report. At that time I anticipate that the Board may wish to present to you additional recommendations on important aspects of your intelligence program.

In undertaking its review, the Board requested and received a comprehensive report by the intelligence community. This report, addressed to the Board, is available in the Board's office.

In Annex E to our report we list the principal sources of information considered in our review. We express our deep appreciation of the cooperation and assistance which was freely and promptly given.

While the Board had the benefit of helpful background information, the Board's observations and conclusions are wholly its own.

Respectfully,

FOR THE BOARD

[Signature]

James R. Killian, Jr.
Chairman

Enclosure
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has completed a review of actions which were taken by the foreign intelligence agencies of our Government to discharge their responsibility for intelligence coverage, assessment and reporting on the Soviet military build-up in Cuba during the months preceding your report to the Nation on October 22, 1962, concerning the USSR's establishment of offensive missile sites in Cuba.

In the course of our review we sought to determine whether there were lessons to be learned from an objective appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the U. S. Foreign Intelligence effort as disclosed by the Cuban experience. We directed particular attention to those areas of the intelligence process which are concerned with such matters as (1) the acquisition of intelligence, (2) the analysis of intelligence, and (3) the production and dissemination of intelligence reports and estimates in support of national policy formulation and operational requirements.

In our reconstruction of intelligence coverage of Soviet activities on the island of Cuba, it is noted that two principal, consecutive phases were involved. The first phase covered the period prior to October 14, 1962. The second phase consisted of a much briefer period beginning on October 14 and culminating with the President's announcement on October 22 concerning measures for meeting the Soviet offensive threat in Cuba. The event, of course, which provided a demarcation of these two phases was the acquisition on October 14 of U-2 photographic evidence that the Soviet Union had taken steps to establish a strategic nuclear missile complex in Cuba.

THE POST-OCTOBER 14 PHASE

We note that the definitive photographic evidence obtained as a result of the October 14 and subsequent overflights of Cuba was promptly processed and submitted to the President in time for
The early action before the Soviet ICBM and ICMB systems became fully operational, beginning with the President's initial receipt of this critical intelligence, there was an effective performance on the part of the U. S. Intelligence Community in providing the President and his top policy makers promptly with the substantial intelligence necessary to enable our Government to respond effectively to the offensive missile threat in Cuba.

We also note that in addition to photographic surveillance other factors contributed substantially to the intelligence success achieved during this period. They were (1) the skillful analysis of the data produced by photographic interpreters, and (2) the use of intelligence previously obtained concerning strategic missile and air defense installations within the Soviet union in determining the nature and extent of similar capabilities in Cuba.

In pointing to the high performance which was achieved by our foreign intelligence agencies during the post-October 14 period, we recognize that it would be difficult for the intelligence community to operate with the same intensity and efficiency under the same conditions. Thus one of our major problems remains the achievement of very high performance between crises.

THE PRE-OCTOBER 14 PHASE

As to the pre-October 14 period, we conclude that our foreign intelligence effort should have been more effective in (1) obtaining adequate and timely intelligence as to the nature and scope of the Soviet military build-up as it developed over a period of months, and (2) exploiting the available intelligence as a basis for evaluating Soviet and Cuban plans and intentions.

In view of the fact that the Soviet move came dangerously close to success in an area less than ninety miles from our shores, the absence of useful early warning of the enemy's intention must be stressed. We did not find that during this period there was within the Intelligence Community the factual sense of urgency or alarm which might well have eliminated a crisis before.

Intelligence Acquisition

In the intelligence collection area, the most significant deficiencies involved (1) Intelligence collection, and (2) aerial photographic surveillance.
Clandestine agent coverage within Cuba was inadequate. Although the limited agent assets of the Central Intelligence Agency and of Army Intelligence did produce some valuable reports on developments in Cuba, we believe that the absence of more effective clandestine agent coverage, as an essential adjunct to other intelligence collection operations, contributed substantially to the inability of our government to recognize at an earlier date the danger of the Soviet move in Cuba. It would appear that over the years there has been a lack of foresight in the long-term planning for the installation of these agents.

We find also that full use was not made of aerial photographic surveillance, particularly during September and October when the influx of Soviet military personnel and armaments had reached major proportions. We recognize that in September inclement weather delayed some of the scheduled U-2 missions. However, we note that from September 8 to September 16 U-2 missions over Cuba were suspended apparently because of the loss of a Chinese Nationalist U-2 over the China mainland on September 8. We also note with concern that during the period of increasing emergency, as pointed up by intelligence indicators, there was not a corresponding intensification of the scheduling of U-2 missions over the island.

With regard to proposals for aerial photographic surveillance of Cuba, we make the following additional observations:

(1) The President granted authorization for all U-2 flights which were recommended to him by his policy advisers on the Special Group having responsibility for such matters.

(2) The Special Group approved, in one instance with modifications, all U-2 overflights recommended to it. (We surmise that on its own the Special Group could have initiated overflight recommendations.)

(3) Until October 3, when the Defense Intelligence Agency urged that suspicious areas of Cuba be covered by U-2 photographic missions, it appears that there was a failure on the part of the intelligence community as a whole to propose to the Special Group U-2 reconnaissance missions on a scale commensurate with the nature and intensity of the Soviet activity in Cuba. The need for more frequent and extensive aerial photographic surveillance during the summer and fall was even more pressing in view of the inadequacy of clandestine agent resources and the limited effectiveness of
other collection methods such as legal traveler, third country diplomat, refugee interrogation, and signals intelligence coverage.

(4) Although we were unable to establish the existence of a policy which prevented overflying areas of Cuba where surface-to-air missile installations were present, the Central Intelligence Agency and others believed that such a restriction did in fact prevail. We note in this regard that in the December 13 report of the Director of Central Intelligence it is stated that although the density of records makes it impossible to determine whether or not there was such a restriction, it is nevertheless clear that operational elements were under the impression that such an injunction was in effect.

(5) Apparently the Special Group was not made fully aware of the delaying effects on the acquisition of aerial intelligence which could and did result from changes in a CIA proposal for the conduct of a U-2 mission. On September 10 the CIA proposed that the Special Group approve and recommend the scheduling of a U-2 flight to provide extensive peripheral coverage of Cuba as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space. The Secretary of State objected to this combining of an actual overflight with the overflying of international waters. He felt that the long peripheral flight would draw attention, and if the aircraft were to fall into enemy hands after an overflight of Cuba, this would put the United States in a poor position to stand on its rights to overfly international waters. Accordingly, the Secretary of State proposed that the September flights be broken into four separate missions, two of them peripheral and two directly over Cuba, and the CIA made plans to do so. However, CIA made it an operational practice not to overfly if there was more than 25 per cent overcast, and the Director of Central Intelligence points out in his December 26 report that the poor weather in September plus the necessity for flying four separate missions instead of one resulted in prolonging the time required to get the desired coverage of Cuba. In fact, the next successful U-2 mission was not flown until September 26.

We feel that under these circumstances the Special Group should have been informed of the factors operating to delay the four-flight coverage, and given an opportunity to reconsider the advisability of a mission over the critical target areas urgently requiring surveillance. We also feel that the Special Group should be possessed of a mechanism which would automatically pick up such omissions of reporting.
(6) It appears that within the Special Group further consideration should have been given to proposals by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence in August and September for low-level photographic reconnaissance of certain targets in Cuba. When the Special Group took up the matter on September 14, note was taken that the Secretary of Defense did not wish the low-level operations to be considered until results of U-2 coverage of the same area became available. Granting the obvious appropriateness of the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, we must point out that when the U-2 flights were delayed there should have been immediate re-examination of the proposal for low-level flights. (No low-level reconnaissance missions were flown over Cuba until October 23.)

Intelligence Analysis

We find the need for improvement of the processes used in making national intelligence estimates and the processes used in making current intelligence analyses, and also in the techniques for relating these two functions.

The President and policy-advisory officials were ill served by the Special National Intelligence Estimate issued by the intelligence community on September 19, on "The Military Buildup in Cuba." This estimate concluded that the establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba would be inconsistent with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as the community then assessed it. This mistaken judgment, made at the very time when the Soviets were installing MIRV's and ICBMs in Cuba, we attribute to (1) the lack of adequate intelligence coverage of Cuba, (2) the rigors with which the view was held that the Soviet Union would not assume the risks entailed in establishing nuclear striking forces on Cuban soil, and (3) the absence of an imaginative appraisal of the intelligence indicators which, although limited in number, were contained in reports disseminated by our intelligence agencies. (We reach this conclusion even though we recognize the absence at the time of any conclusive photographic intelligence.)

The Estimate of September 19 pointed away from the likelihood of the establishment of Soviet nuclear missile systems in Cuba. An important cautionary statement appeared in a discussion paragraph, namely, that the contingency of such a development should be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy. This cautionary statement, however, was not carried forward into the conclusions of the Estimate.
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We believe that since this statement was of momentous significance and was in direct contradiction to the Estimate's principal finding, it should have been highlighted so us to alert policy makers and intensify the intelligence collection efforts of the agencies involved.

Turning to another important aspect of the intelligence assessment function, we find that in the analysis of intelligence indicators and in the production of current intelligence reports, the intelligence community failed to get across to key Government officials the most accurate possible picture of what the Soviets might be up to in Cuba, during the months preceding October 14. The importance of this conclusion is not diminished by the fact that hindsight is easier to apply than foresight in determining the significance of particular indicators included in the mass of reports available for intelligence analysis.

We believe that the near-total intelligence surprise experienced by the United States with respect to the introduction and deployment of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba resulted in large part from a malfunction of the analytic process by which intelligence indicators are assessed and reported. This malfunction diminished the effectiveness of policy advisers, national intelligence estimators, and civilian and military officers having command responsibilities.

We believe that the manner in which intelligence indicators were handled in the Cuba situation may well be the most serious flaw in our intelligence system, and one which, if uncorrected, could lead to the gravest consequences. In this instance, the major consequences were the following:

(1) Our Government was not provided with the degree of early warning of hostile intentions and capabilities which should have been derived from the indicators contained in the incoming intelligence.

(2) Neither you nor your principal policy advisers were provided at appropriate intervals with meaningful, cumulative assessments of the available intelligence indicators. Had the intelligence community systematically prepared and periodically presented compilations of accumulated indicators, this would have permitted appropriate policy-level consideration of developments in Cuba and of alternative courses of action as required. The practice followed in the Cuba situation of providing White House
staff members with some of the raw indicator reports was not an acceptable substitute for professional analytical reporting on a developing crisis situation. While raw intelligence reports were used effectively in targeting the October 14 U-2 mission which led to the discovery of offensive missiles in Cuba, the significance of the important indicators involved was not communicated to the President.

(3) Despite the intelligence indicators which were accumulating even before the U-2 discovery on October 14, the intelligence community did not produce for the benefit of policy-level consumers a revision of its erroneous National Intelligence Estimate of September 19.

We believe a further and exhaustive examination, not limited to Cuba, should be made by the intelligence community of the complex analytic process employed throughout the community in the assessment of intelligence indicators. We base this belief on the nature of the indicator-type data which our review discloses was available during the period from May to October 1962.

Thirty five examples of such available indicators are set forth in Annex A to this report. In cataloging such examples we appreciate fully that we have the benefit of a perspective which was not then possessed by the intelligence community. We are also aware that the illustrations listed are but a small number taken from the great volume of reports which were received and which included some demonstrably erroneous information. We urge that the annexed illustrations be read not only for their individual content but also for the purpose of noting the cumulative significance of the information being received. These indicators were acquired from a variety of intelligence sources, such as refugees, clandestine agents, and friendly foreign diplomats. They dealt with various aspects of the Soviet military build-up in Cuba, including the introduction of high-ranking Soviet military personalities who were specialists in the fields of military construction, engineering, electronics, jet pilot training, surface-to-air missile defenses, and Soviet long-range air and strategic striking forces; the assignment to Cuba of Soviet specialists in rocketry and atomic arms; the statements made by persons highly placed in the Castro regime concerning expectations that a nuclear delivery capability would be established in Cuba; the sightings by ground observers of offensive missiles being deployed under strict Soviet control.
end under conditions of great secrecy; and the introduction on a progressively increasing scale of Soviet troops, arms, and military equipment and materiel in large volume and, in a number of instances, under strict security conditions. (On the latter subject we note from other materials which we have reviewed that the number of Soviet ships arriving in Cuba increased from an average of 50 a month in the first seven months of 1962 to a peak of 57 arrivals in September.)

Intelligence Reporting

Our review of the intelligence reporting process reveals that limitations which were placed on the publication and dissemination of reports and information concerning the situation in Cuba were either misinterpreted or misapplied. This inhibited the flow of significant data.

One such limitation was imposed by the Director of Central Intelligence in May 1962. Because of the Director’s reservations concerning estimates on Cuban order of battle, he instructed CIA analysts to check out with the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) any report that was susceptible of photographic verification. The purpose was to establish by all available means the authenticity of refugee and agent reports. However, according to the Director of Central Intelligence, it operated as a limitation on publication because the instruction was interpreted by CIA analysts as a restriction against publishing anything that could not be verified by the NPIC. One consequence was that during the pre-October 14 period as information became available on the offensive build-up in Cuba, it was not published by the CIA even in the President’s Intelligence Checklist.

On August 31 another limitation was imposed. The President placed limitations on the publication of reports on weapons which might be offensive, pending receipt of further information concerning a suspected missile installation at Banes. On October 9 these instructions were reiterated by the President who emphasized the importance of maintaining the tightest possible control of all information relating to offensive weapons.

The President made clear that he wished to impose no limitation whatever on the collection and analysis of intelligence relating to offensive weapons and he emphasized that he wanted all such information collected, analyzed, and promptly reported to officials having a real need to know. However, the United
States Intelligence Board interpreted the Presidential instructions as an injunction not to print any information on offensive weapons in Cuba in any intelligence publication. Although the Director of Central Intelligence exempted CIA's Presidential Intelligence Checklist from this injunction, the Checklist issues prepared subsequent to the President's instructions failed to include information from any of the refugee or agent reports on the sightings of offensive missiles in Cuba.

The President's directive restricting the publication of intelligence on offensive weapons was clearly wise, necessary, and essential to the national interest. The misinterpretations of this directive endangered the necessary flow of information and serve as a warning that in future situations requiring such restrictions attention must be given to establishing secure channels for transmission of vital information to officials having a clear need to know.

Emergency Planning

The Cuba experience points up the need for advance planning to ensure that our human and material intelligence resources are sufficient, and are adequately organized, to meet the demands of an emergency such as that which confronted our Government in this instance.

When the President found it necessary to restrict the publication of information on offensive missiles in Cuba and to confine such information to designated categories of recipients, the intelligence community did not have in readiness a plan to meet the reporting requirements of such an emergency. As a result, significant information did not reach some elements of the Government, both in Washington and the military commands, and in some instances important intelligence was not brought to the attention of the President and some other high officials. Two examples of the consequences which followed were (1) officials who checked in normal places concerning such matters as the October 10 speech of Senator Keating were told that there was no evidence of offensive weapons, although in fact raw intelligence had already led to the targeting of the San Cristobal area where offensive missile installations were subsequently found through U-2 photography on October 14, and (2) for a brief period the limitation on publication operated in such fashion as to preclude the Defense Intelligence Agency from disseminating outside-the-Washington area intelligence publications on the developing Cuba situation. As a consequence, it was necessary to call in certain military commanders from the field.

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111. (Continued)

and give them oral briefings on the subject. The restriction
served to hamper the commanders in their planning for possible
military action involving Cuba.

We note next that when U-2 overflights of Cuba began on
an accelerated basis on October 14, no more than a 10-day supply
of photographic film was on hand in the entire country to meet
the demands resulting from the sudden step-up of aerial recon-
naissance operations. Moreover, in the absence of a central
processing facility for developing photographic film in quantity,
der under appropriate security safeguards, it was necessary to make
use of film laboratories at scattered locations considerably
removed from Washington.

* * *

Throughout our review, we have been mindful of public
charges to the effect that during the period of the Soviet
military build-up in Cuba, the U. S. intelligence process was
in some manner manipulated for partisan political purposes. We
find no evidence whatsoeever to support such charges.

James R. Killian, Jr., Chairman
President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board

William O. Baker, Member
Clark Clifford
James Doolittle
Gordon Gray
Edwin H. Land
William L. Langer
Robert D. Murphy
Frank Pace, Jr.

Reverse Blank
28 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
The White House

I am returning the report of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board dated February 4th commenting on the intelligence community's actions in connection with the Cuban crisis. I will not attempt to comment on the specifics of the report. It is my understanding that the Board will make recommendations to you for corrective measures which they feel should be taken within the intelligence community. When these recommendations are received, I would hope for an opportunity to comment upon them as I did on the recommendations contained in their interim report of December 28th.

When I appeared before the Board on November 7th, December 9th, and December 28th, I stated that there was an understandable reluctance or timidity in programming U-2 overflights over Cuba after we had discovered the presence of surface-to-air missile installations. This caution was understandable not only because of the extremely severe criticism of "U-2 Incidents" dating back to the Powers' incident on May 1, 1960, but also because of the more recent loss of a Chinat U-2 and a U-2 intrusion over Sakhalin in early September. This same attitude apparently dictated the Secretary of State's action in revising a CIA-proposed flight at the Special Group meeting held in Mr. Bundy's office on September 10th. It was, I believe, the same attitude that caused the Special Group in considering my request on October 4th for extensive Cuban reconnaissance to ask JCS, and CIA to study all alternative means of conducting aerial reconnaissance and to report back on October 9th. In retrospect, it might be contended that there was a failure to exercise sufficient urgency in proposing U-2 reconnaissance missions; however, I am inclined to believe that anyone reaching such a conclusion must first carefully weigh the serious considerations that enter into a decision to overfly denied territory.

I further advised the Board that I felt the analysts, both in the intelligence community and elsewhere in Government, including the
State Department, were so convinced that the Soviets would not accept the inevitable confrontation resulting from placement of offensive missiles in Cuba, that they were inclined to dismiss such evidence as there was to the contrary. This, I find, is one of the difficulties of dealing with the imponderables of what the other fellow will or will not do. With particular reference to the Cuban situation, it should be noted that for two years the intelligence community had been saturated with reports of "missiles in Cuba," all of which proved to be incorrect prior to those which we received on or about September 20th. Nevertheless, one can now readily conclude that greater emphasis should have been placed by the estimators on certain of the "Intelligence Indicators" attached as Annex A to the Board report. About 3,500 agent and refugee reports were analyzed in the preparation of my report to the Killian Board and of this number, only eight in retrospect were considered as reasonably valid indicators of the deployment of offensive missiles to Cuba.

I continue to feel that the intelligence community performed well. I have examined this performance personally and in depth, and incidentally with a critical eye. As you know, my own views differed from those of the community. I believe that the conclusions reached from my study made for the Board at your request reflect a more reasonable judgment of the performance of the intelligence community in the six months' period prior to the October crisis. A copy of these conclusions is attached.

John A. McCone
Director

Attachment
JAMmmfbd (28 Feb 63)
Orig - Addressee
1 - DCI White House
1 - DCI Chrono
1 - IG
1 - WE
CONCLUSIONS

1. Although the intelligence community's inquiry into its actions during the Cuban crisis revealed certain areas where shortcomings existed and where improvements should be made in various areas of intelligence collection and processing, the intelligence community operated extensively and well in connection with Cuba. Every major weapons system introduced into Cuba by the Soviets was detected, identified, and reported (with respect to numbers, location and operational characteristics) before any one of these systems attained an operational capability.

2. A relatively short period of time ensued between the introduction of strategic weapons into Cuba, particularly strategic missiles, and the commencement of the flow, although meager, of tangible reports of their presence; detection of their possible presence and targeting of the suspect areas of their location was accomplished in a compressed time frame; and the intelligence cycle did move with extraordinary rapidity through the stages of collection, analysis, targeting for verification, and positive identification.

3. The very substantial effort directed toward Cuba was originated by an earlier concern with the situation in Cuba and the effort, already well under way, contributed to the detection and analysis of the Soviet build-up.

4. Information was disseminated and used.

5. Aerial photography was very effective and our best means of establishing hard intelligence.

6. The procedures adopted in September delayed photographic intelligence, but this delay was not critical, because photography obtained prior to about 17 October would not have been sufficient to warrant action of a type which would require support from Western Hemisphere NATO allies.
7. Agent reports helped materially; however, none giving significant information on offensive missiles reached the intelligence community or policy-makers until after mid-September. When received, they were used in directing aerial photography.

8. Some restrictions were placed on dissemination of information, but there is no indication that these restrictions necessarily affected analytical work or actions by policy-makers.

9. The 19 September estimate, while indicating the improbability that the Soviet Union would place MRBM's and IRBM's in Cuba, did state that "this contingency must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy"; the estimators in preparing the 19 September estimate gave great weight to the philosophical argument concerning Soviet intentions and thus did not fully weigh the many indicators.

10. The estimate of 19 October on probable Soviet reactions was correct.