Special Edition: Intelligence Community Reform Since 9/11: The Progress of Intelligence Integration
This publication is prepared primarily for the use of US government officials. The format, coverage, and content are designed to meet their requirements. To that end, complete issues of *Studies in Intelligence* may remain classified and are not circulated to the public. These printed unclassified extracts from a classified issue are provided as a courtesy to subscribers with professional or academic interest in the field of intelligence.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in *Studies in Intelligence* are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.

*Studies in Intelligence* often contains material created by individuals other than US government employees and, accordingly, such works are appropriately attributed and protected by United States copyright law. Such items should not be reproduced or disseminated without the express permission of the copyright holder. Any potential liability associated with the unauthorized use of copyrighted material from *Studies in Intelligence* rests with the third party infringer.

Requests for subscriptions should be sent to:

Center for the Study of Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505  
ISSN 1527-0874

Owing to a redesign of cia.gov that was introduced in January 2021, URLs for *Studies in Intelligence* and other unclassified CSI products can now be found in the following locations:

For the homepage of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, go to:
https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/

Unclassified and declassified *Studies* articles from the journal’s inception in 1955 can be found in three locations.

- Articles from 1992 to the present can be found at https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/
- Articles from 1955 through 2004 can be found at https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/
- Requests for subscriptions should be sent to: Center for the Study of Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505

Cover image: Pentagon 9/11 Memorial. DoD photograph. Each of the 185 cantilevered benches in the memorial site has engraved on its end the name of a victim of the crash of American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon.
| **Mission** | The mission of *Studies in Intelligence* is to stimulate within the Intelligence Community the constructive discussion of important issues of the day, to expand knowledge of lessons learned from past experiences, to increase understanding of the history of the profession, and to provide readers with considered reviews of public media concerning intelligence.

The journal is administered by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, which includes the CIA's History Staff, CIA's Lessons Learned Program, and the CIA Museum. In addition, it houses the Emerging Trends Program, which seeks to identify the impact of future trends on the work of US intelligence. |
| **Contributions** | *Studies in Intelligence* welcomes articles, book reviews, and other communications. Hardcopy material or data discs (preferably in .doc or .rtf formats) may be mailed to:

Editor  
*Studies in Intelligence*  
Center for the Study of Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505 |
| **Awards** | The Sherman Kent Award of $3,500 is offered annually for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in *Studies*. The prize may be divided if two or more articles are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. An additional amount is available for other prizes.

Another monetary award is given in the name of Walter L. Pforzheimer to the graduate or undergraduate student who has written the best article on an intelligence-related subject.

Unless otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of *Studies*’ purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the awards. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the Studies Editorial Board are excluded from the competition.

The Editorial Board welcomes readers’ nominations for awards. |
Dedication

On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered the worst terrorist attack on its people and territory in its history. Those of us capable of watching the tragic scenes at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and Shanksville, PA, that day will always remember where we were that fateful morning. Since that day, we in the Intelligence Community have seen momentous change in our organizations and work.

In the early days of the war on terror that followed, our military and intelligence special operators moved silently and quickly in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban and send Usama bin Laden into hiding. Since then, we have learned how to better integrate our diverse intelligence organizations and cultures to conduct such operations and deepen our analysis to more effectively campaign against al-Qa’ida and other terrorist adversaries. Also importantly, these changes have promoted intelligence sharing with partners abroad. The changes have been unprecedented in our history. This special edition of Studies in Intelligence will outline many of those changes and improvements in the IC over the past 20 years.

We, the members of the Editorial Board of Studies in Intelligence, dedicate this work to those who gave their lives on that fateful day, and to those since then, in US military uniform, in intelligence operations, and as Allied and Afghan partners in the war against terror. They were our countrymen, teammates, family, and friends. They are memorialized at the World Trade Center site, the Pentagon, in Shanksville, and in countless other towns and cities across the United States and abroad.

We will never forget their courage and sacrifice.

—The Editorial Board of Studies in Intelligence

A memorial bench at the Pentagon 9/11 memorial dedicated to Lt. Jonas M. Panik, USNR. Lt. Panik, a Naval Intelligence Officer serving in the Intelligence Plot (center) of the headquarters of the Chief of Naval Operations. Lt. Panik was among a number of Naval intelligence colleagues who died that day. In addition, seven members of the Defense Intelligence Agency were killed.
EDITORIAL POLICY

Articles for Studies in Intelligence may be written on any historical, operational, doctrinal, or theoretical aspect of intelligence.

The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Editorial Board.

The criterion for publication is whether, in the opinion of the board, the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Peter Usowski (Chairman)
John Bennett
Dawn Eilenberger
Jennifer Ewbank
Steven Galpern
Brent Geary
Martin Kindl
Jason Manosevitz
John McLaughlin
Fran Moore
David L. Myrtle
LTG Theodore Nicholas (USA, Ret.)
Manolis Priniotakis
Brian Sirois
Tonya L. Tatum
Cindy Webb

Members are all active or former Intelligence Community officers.

EDITORS

Joseph W. Gartin (Managing Editor)
Andres Vaart (Production Editor)
that cross bureaucratic boundaries, like cyber security, malign foreign influence, and transnational challenges.

From a Historical Perspective

Impact of Intelligence Integration on CIA Analysis 25
Peter A. Clement

Change in all-source analysis community after 9/11 and passage of IRTPA would be driven by new DNI programs, like common analytic standards, and by internal developments, like better training programs. The most important factor might have been the creative friction that came from collaboration and competition, as CIA experienced adapting to changes in counterterrorism analysis and the President's Daily Briefing.

From a Former ODNI Ombudsperson Perspective

Safeguarding Objectivity in Intelligence Analysis 35
Barry Zulauf

Objectivity in intelligence analysis is a core responsibility up and down the chain, one baked into the IRTPA legislation and detailed in DNI Intelligence Community directives. When intelligence judgments collide with policy preferences, maintaining objectivity depends on formal processes and, sometimes, personal courage.

From a Historical Perspective in Public Literature

Selected Bibliography of Intelligence Integration Literature 41
Gary B. Keeley

Despite operating mostly in secret, the IC is the regular subject of criticism and advice about its performance and recommendations about its future. Since the creation of the DNI, dozens of scholars and former IC officials have weighed in alongside the IC’s usual skeptics on the need for further integration and innovation.

Intelligence in Public Media

Top Secret Canada: Understanding the Canadian Intelligence and National Security Community 47
Reviewed by Joseph W. Gartin

Ethel Rosenberg: An American Tragedy 49
Reviewed by J. E. Leonardson

Dead Doubles: The Extraordinary Worldwide Hunt for One of the Cold War's Most Notorious Spy Rings 53
Reviewed by Graham Alexander

Operation Dragon: Inside the Kremlin’s Secret War on America 55
Reviewed by Graham Alexander

The Grey Men: Pursuing the Stasi into the Present 57
Reviewed by J. E. Leonardson

The Light of Days. The Untold Story of Women Resistance Fighters in Hitler’s Ghettos 59
Reviewed by J. R. Seeger

Underground Asia – Global Revolutionaries and the Assault on Empire 63
Reviewed by J. R. Seeger

Chaos: Charles Manson, the CIA, and the Secret History of the Sixties 67
Reviewed by Leslie C.
Contributors

Graham Alexander is the penname of a CIA Directorate of Operations officer serving in the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

Robert Cardillo was deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and deputy director for DIA analysis (since 2006) when the article appearing here was written. He would become the first deputy DNI for Intelligence Integration under DNI James Clapper in 2010. In 2014 he became director of NGA, serving until 2019, when he retired from federal service.

Peter Clement has served as a CIA analyst and senior manager. He now serves as senior research scholar and adjunct professor at the Salzman Institute of War and Peace Studies in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University.

Jim Clapper was DNI from 2010 until 2017.

Leslie C. is a CIA Directorate of Operations officer.

Joseph Gartin recently became the managing editor of Studies in Intelligence. He retired from CIA as its chief learning officer.

Gary Keeley is a member of CIA’s History Staff.

J.E. Leonardson is the penname of a CIA Directorate of Analysis officer.

Jon Rosenwasser is the budget and policy director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, where he has served since 2013. He also oversees the ODNI. Rosenwasser previously served in the ODNI, NIC, and the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

J.R. Seeger is a retired CIA paramilitary officer.

Stephen B. Slick is a retired senior CIA officer. He is now director of the Intelligence Studies Project within the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, Austin.

Barry Zulauf was the IC ombudsperson for analytic objectivity during 2018–2021. He recently joined Harvard University’s Belfer Center as a Recanati-Kaplan intelligence fellow.
Anniversaries are a distinctly human phenomenon, an intersection of our ability to mark precisely the passage of time and the need to orient our place in the past, present, and future. For many intelligence professionals, the 20th anniversary of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, will evoke memories of loss, courage, disbelief, anger, and kindness that have scarcely faded with time. New Yorker writer David Remnick recalled on 9/11’s 10th anniversary, “We could hardly erase the vision of the wreckage of the two towers, the twisted steel and sheets of glass, the images of men and women leaping from ninety-odd stories up.”

The rawness of that day, and its immediate disorienting aftermath, will not be soothed by the images of chaos, sacrifice, and salvation at Kabul airport last month as the US ended its military presence in Afghanistan after nearly 20 years. It was a coda that was at once unimaginable and all too familiar. Afghanistan seems likely to become its own kind of marker of time, joining post-World War II, post-Watergate, post-Vietnam, post-Cold War, and post-9/11 as shorthand for the transition from one era to another.

Yet for many readers of Studies, inside and outside the Intelligence Community, 9/11 is an event to be learned, not remembered. As Stanford University professor and intelligence expert Dr. Amy Zegart recently observed:

At first, I struggled to find ways to take the emotion out of my teaching—to bring logical reasoning, historical perspective, and careful analysis to a moment that seemed to defy all of those things. Now I struggle to put the emotion back in, helping students who weren’t yet born when al-Qa’ida terrorists attacked our nation understand the visceral context and swirling uncertainties that intelligence officials and policymakers faced. b

When the Studies editorial board began to plan this edition, we too grappled with how to address the anniversary of an event that is both lived experience and learned history. We also considered that 9/11 has been covered extensively in these pages, in other intelligence-focused publications, and in popular media. Moreover, the anniversary will be commemorated in countless private and public moments. Ultimately, our debate was animated by the question that many consumers of intelligence eventually ask: What are you going to do about this?

Intelligence Integration

For the US Intelligence Community, in the immediate aftermath, doing something about 9/11 would take multiple forms: taking stock, to understand what had happened; striking back, to rob al-Qa’ida of its safehaven in Afghanistan; and detecting, deterring, and disrupting, to bolster our defenses against additional spectacular plots. As decisive and swift as these reactions would be, a fuller accounting of the intelligence, law enforcement, and policy failings that led up to 9/11 would come three years later in the 9/11 Commission report, amplified by the concurrent examination of the IC’s poor performance collecting on and assessing Iraq’s WMD programs.

The result was passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in late 2004.

Like 9/11, IRTPA would become its own kind of before and after for the IC and the customers it serves. IRTPA was surely the most sweeping reform since the modern IC was created by the National Security Act of 1947. For the first time, a director of national intelligence would have responsibility for integrating intelligence across the national security enterprise. For the first time, a DNI would work with the agencies to establish collection priorities, set common standards for intelligence analysis, build systems to share and coordinate intelligence, and make decisions about investments in people and technology. For the first time, a DNI would deliver intelligence to the president and represent the IC to Congress and the public.

Key Perspectives

In this edition, we explore how intelligence integration, driven by the events of 9/11, moved from concept to reality through the perspectives of participants like former DNI James Clapper. We reprise a highly influential 2010 Studies article by Robert Cardillo on the need for a new approach to IC integration. Then director of analysis at DIA, Cardillo would serve as DNI Clapper’s first deputy director of national intelligence for intelligence integration. Peter Clement looks at how intelligence integration changed the landscape for CIA’s analytic directorate, challenging some cherished notions about CIA’s role in the IC. Barry Zulauf takes up the topic of politicization to reflect on his role as the DNI’s ombudsperson for analytic objectivity, highlighting how common tradecraft standards adopted since IRTPA can help safeguard against real or perceived politicization of analysis.

Former senior NSC and CIA official Steve Slick takes stock of how integration looked from his perspectives in Washington and in the field, and he notes there is more work to be done. Jon Rosenwasser, staff member on the SSCI, provides insights from Capitol Hill’s vantage, and he too observes that further adaptation will be necessary as the IC faces evolving threats.

One thing is also certain: there will be plenty of observers offering opinions on what the IC should do, as CIA historian Gary Keeley documents in his survey of the voluminous literature on the IC since 9/11. Keeley’s article also makes it clear that intelligence integration is a process, not an end state. This will not be the last time we visit the topic in Studies, and we invite you to take up where this edition leaves off.

—Joseph W. Gartin
## Acronyms Used in this Issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Career Analyst Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Center, CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Directorate of Analysis (formerly Directorate of Intelligence), CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Deputies Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Director of Central Intelligence (concurrently head of CIA, 1947-2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCIA</td>
<td>Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (post-2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Directorate of Intelligence (since 2015 the Directorate of Analysis), CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAP</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Analysis Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDI (pre-2015)</td>
<td>Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDII</td>
<td>Deputy Director for Intelligence Integration, ODNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDNI</td>
<td>Deputy Director of National Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNI</td>
<td>Director of National Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOINT</td>
<td>Geospatial intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IARPA</td>
<td>Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Intelligence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICD</td>
<td>Intelligence Community Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICITE</td>
<td>IC Information Technology Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INR</td>
<td>Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRTPA</td>
<td>Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNI</td>
<td>Library of National Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIP</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCPC</td>
<td>National Counterproliferation Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCSC</td>
<td>National Counterintelligence and Security Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counterterrorism Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGA</td>
<td>National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIAB</td>
<td>National Intelligence Analysis Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIAPB</td>
<td>National Intelligence Analytic Production Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIB</td>
<td>National Intelligence Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>National Intelligence Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIE</td>
<td>National Intelligence Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIM</td>
<td>National Intelligence Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMA</td>
<td>National Imagery and Mapping Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIO</td>
<td>National Intelligence Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>National Intelligence Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODNI</td>
<td>Office of the Director of National Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Principals Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDB</td>
<td>President’s Daily Briefing (interchangeably President’s Daily Brief)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDDNI</td>
<td>Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEB</td>
<td>Product Evaluation Board, DIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RASER</td>
<td>Rapid Analytic Support and Expeditionary Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAT</td>
<td>Structured Analytic Technique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHARP</td>
<td>Summer Hard Problem Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSCI</td>
<td>Senate Select Committee on Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTIC</td>
<td>Terrorist Threat Integration Center (2003–2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDI</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence now USD(I&amp;S) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reflections on Integration in the Intelligence Community

Jim Clapper and Trey Brown

I was pleased that Studies in Intelligence asked me to provide some reflections on the state of integration in the Intelligence Community. Having lived a good bit of the history of the IC over the last 58 years, I agree that the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks is a most appropriate milestone to look back at our journey, consider where we are now, and look ahead. In doing so, I asked Trey Brown, my partner on my book Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence, to collaborate on this mini reprise.

I believe the position of director of national intelligence was created to serve as the full-time champion for intelligence integration. If someone were to generate one of those word bubble charts from speeches Trey wrote and I gave when I was DNI from 2010 to 2017, I’m certain the words “integration” and “integrate” would stand out prominently.

To make sure we’re all on the same terminology page, I dusted off my old (hard copy, to be sure) edition of Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th edition) just to review the formal definition of the verb “integrate” and found it to mean “to form, coordinate, or blend into a functioning or unified whole.” This is a formal, sterile academic rendering of the meaning of the term. It really doesn’t capture what integration represents for the IC. It omits the important dimension of time—that is, the historical evolution of integration, which continues yet today. Integration in the IC is, in other words, a work in progress, a continuing journey where the nirvana destination is never fully reached.

My instinctive approach to assessing the state of integration in the IC is to recall and compare now with what it was like when I first joined what we now think of as the IC, in 1963. I began my career in signals intelligence. I recall very vividly my first of two-year-long tours in Southeast...
The point [of integration] is that the IC needs to bring to bear a diverse set of tools to any problem or project . . . when we bring the specialized knowledge and skillsets from each component together to address the same problem, invariably higher confidence levels ensue.

Asia, in South Vietnam, 1965–66. Coincidentally, my tour and my dad’s overlapped for seven months, and we became roommates. He was a career Army SIGINT officer and was assigned as the deputy chief of the NSA presence in Vietnam. Back then, intelligence integration was not a term you’d ever hear, let alone a concept you might consider practicing. Based on my many after-hours discussions with him, I can attest that NSA and CIA might as well have been on different planets. There was little “integration,” coordination, or blending (to borrow from Webster). It simply didn’t happen, and no one seemed particularly concerned that it wasn’t.

Intelligence wasn’t the only endeavor so segmented. For convenience, and to avoid any operational conflicts, North Vietnam was divided into what were called air strike “route packages” (six, as I recall) and the Air Force and Navy avoided each other by either designating that certain route packages on given days would be reserved for one service or the other or by flying strike missions on alternate days. So, “silos” or “stovepipes,” as we later came to call them, were pretty much the standard protocol, whether in operations or intelligence.

Over time, of course, this all changed. For the military, the most famous milestone of this profound change was the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which mandated jointness among the military services. That’s not to suggest that joint things didn’t happen before this landmark legislation, but then it became the standard. Goldwater-Nichols did for the Department of Defense in 1986 what the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act would do for the IC in 2004. To be sure, coordinated, integrated intelligence activities occurred prior to this, but they didn’t become the standard until the legislation required it.

**Intelligence Integration Conceptually**

I’ve always been careful not to confuse integration with elimination of agency silos or stovepipes. Although these terms are often thought of pejoratively, they serve to delineate the specialized culture and unique tradecraft behind each discipline or “INT,” and through these silos, the agencies generate, advance, and advocate the respective tradecrafts that represent great strengths of the US intelligence enterprise. It requires certain unique skill sets to conduct SIGINT, HUMINT, GEOINT, etc., and integration shouldn’t equate to homogenization.

The point is that the IC needs to bring to bear a diverse set of tools to any problem or project, rather than a box full of different-sized hammers, and when we bring the specialized knowledge and skillsets from each component together to address the same problem, invariably higher confidence levels ensue. This makes for sounder decisionmaking by policymakers, commanders, and other users of intelligence.

The best example of what I’m talking about here is the takedown of Usama bin Laden in May of 2011, almost 10 years after the 9/11 attacks. While the CIA appropriately deserves the lion’s share of the credit for this achievement, it could not have happened without the crucial SIGINT and GEOINT contributions of NSA and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, respectively. The resulting operation will forever serve as a dramatic example of intelligence integration and, in turn, an equally dramatic integration of intelligence with special operations. It also demonstrated that the most compelling motivation for integration is the imperative of the mission. As DNI, I didn’t have to say or do much to promote integration for that operation.

Another dimension to intelligence integration, apart from the temporal one, is directional. By that I mean integration is both “horizontal” and “vertical.” We traditionally think of integration as being between and among the now 18 components of the IC. It is certainly that, but “vertical” integration is also important. As a result of the 9/11 attacks, the IC had to attend to integrating intelligence efforts with state, local, territorial, tribal, and private-sector entities as well. A great deal of progress has been made here, but there is still room for improvement. “Vertical” integration is simply less mature than the traditional “horizontal” form.

For that matter, integration can be within individual components. When I served as director of NIMA/NGA, the challenge was to blend the antecedent, and up-to-then separate (but very much related) fields of imagery and imagery intelligence on
one hand, with mapping, charting, and geodesy on the other. Similarly, I later saw DIA and then CIA form mission-oriented centers to integrate previously stovepiped activities. Such undertakings are daunting cultural challenges, which require constant and consistent leadership to keep everyone focused on the same vision. Most people are inherently reluctant to change, so patience and persistence by leadership in gaining buy-in by the working levels are crucial. We can’t simply announce such a change and expect it to happen by close of business next Friday. It simply doesn’t comport with the reality of human nature.

Integration and Foreign Partners

Yet another dimension of integration is with our expanding array of foreign partners. Accelerated and amplified by our mutual focus on countering terrorism, these associations have mushroomed, and while these relationships all can be mutually beneficial, they must be managed carefully and astutely. That means keeping an eye on the risk we take in trusting foreign partners, but perhaps more importantly, realizing the benefits of taking bold, reasoned risks.

As DNI, I saw—and often approved—intelligence-sharing exceptions that allowed virtually complete access by individual intelligence officers from the other Five Eyes nations who were working in US intelligence facilities. I think we should normalize this practice and make it uniform. Before leaving office, and often in the ensuing years, I have advocated what I realize some will regard as a radical change in our approach to the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. I believe we should give serious consideration to eliminating the NOFORN restriction (and the other four partners’ equivalents), to extend dual-citizenship privileges (and, to be sure, obligations) to Five Eyes partners whenever we are in each other’s intelligence footprint. This would maximize the benefits we gain from our relationships with our closest intelligence partners.

I realize there are some legal impediments to doing this but I also believe they can be overcome. I recognize this would also require a significant cultural change for all of the member nations, particularly for US intelligence organizations, but the payoff in efficiency, flexibility, productivity, and trust is worth the investment and far outweighs the risk of compromise.

Tools for IC Integration

That covers intelligence integration to partners outside the US Intelligence Community. To promote integration within the IC, I found four tools to be most useful. First and foremost was the lever of money.

To promote integration within the IC, I found four tools to be most useful. First and foremost was the lever of money. professionals. With our multiple combat zones since 9/11, thousands of civilian IC employees have deployed—many, multiple times—and have been profoundly influenced by their experiences. There is no substitute for experiencing the same hazards, risks, and privations as military members do in a combat setting. The mission imperative forges integration among intelligence elements, and in turn with the military forces they are supporting. I saw this happen time and again both institutionally and personally among the workforce.

I became director of what was then called the National Imagery and Mapping Agency two days after 9/11. Our driving mission imperative suddenly became Afghanistan. As part of what was a dramatic shift in priority, energy, and resources, we began deploying NIMA civilian employees to what became a combat zone. When these employees returned home, I’d frequently have them give brief accounts of their experiences during our daily agencywide videoteleconference “stand-ups.” I will always remember the emotional testimonies that many of these long-serving employees shared with their colleagues. They saw the professional value of deployments, and the impact of intelligence integration, because they had had an intensely personal experience demonstrating its operational merit.

The third such tool for promoting integration is technology. Pushing for a consistent, interoperable IT architecture is another force for integration and coordination. During my time as DNI, we emphasized what we called ICITE, the IC Information
If the COVID pandemic has shown us anything, it is the need to be able to operate securely and cooperatively on a broadly decentralized basis.

Technology Enterprise. This, too, proved to be a challenge, since for various reasons both substantive and emotional, people and organizations resist such commonality of function. But I believe it is the right thing to do; it affords opportunities for significant cost reductions and greater efficiencies. It promotes both more sharing and enhanced security.

Finally, the fourth tool for promoting integration in the IC is the personnel rewards system. If leaders wish to promote change in behavior, then the desired behavior must be recognized and rewarded publicly and consistently. During my time as DNI, I saw countless examples of integrated intelligence teams, big and small, which did great things for the country and the IC. To reward and encourage this, we created and sustained an awards system to recognize regularly and publicly integration, collaboration, and coordination.

All this notwithstanding, barriers remain to integration in the IC. The causes range from institutional insecurity or protective instincts; security concerns—both real and contrived; and practical considerations such as physical separation and commuting distances. If the COVID pandemic has shown us anything, it is the need to be able to operate securely and cooperatively on a broadly decentralized basis.

The author: James Clapper was DNI from 2010 until 2017.
We need to focus more on cultural change—less observable and less measurable—but infinitely more important than [who] is in charge of overseas intelligence operations.

Many recent commentaries on the state of Intelligence Community (IC) reform have focused on the provisions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) and the organizational issues associated with the creation of the Office of Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Government organizations in particular gravitate to these kinds of observable developments and demonstrations of authority as measures of success or the lack thereof.¹ I believe we need to focus more on cultural change—less observable and less measurable—but infinitely more important than whether the Central Intelligence Agency or the DNI is in charge of overseas intelligence operations. From my perspective, we have achieved significant cultural change since 2004.

There are many ways to define culture. One of the most useful essentially focuses on how we do business. Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Edgar Schein, a well-known scholar of organizational culture, defines it as

“A pattern of basic assumptions—invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration—that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”

¹ See, for example, Patrick Neary, “Intelligence Reform, 2001–2009: Requiescat in Pace?” Studies in Intelligence 53 no. 3 (March 2010).

Culture change often results from a crisis—the so-called burning platform—exemplified by our intelligence failures early in the decade.

before we can begin to achieve cultural change.

Culture change often results from a crisis—the so-called burning platform—exemplified by our intelligence failures early in the decade and the corresponding investigative commissions. Under DNI leadership, the IC has implemented several game-changing initiatives to address two major problems: the quality of the analytic process (identified in the WMD Commission Report) and information sharing (identified in the 9/11 Commission Report). Analytic quality has been largely a top-down process driven by policy changes, especially IC Directive 203, “Analytic Standards,” of 2007. Information sharing has changed through a combination of demographics, technology, and customer requirements, with policy catching up only recently. Great progress has been achieved, but we need to continue pressing on both of these issues to institutionalize changes to the point they become basic assumptions—in other words, part of the analytic culture.

Schein notes that culture can also evolve if driven by leadership with vision and persistence. He suggests that leaders identify a new problem or problems that an organization must address and over time develop the processes and patterns that work against that problem. In that vein, I would challenge the Community to focus now on where we need to be in five to 10 years and begin to drive the cultural changes required to survive and thrive. IC leaders must reinforce the enhanced expectations of our analysts and hold the chain of command responsible.

We are at the pinnacle of our resource growth. Even with our currently healthy top line, in reality, our resources are shrinking as customer requirements continue to expand. I expect that we have as many analysts as we will get in the next 10 years—and I believe we’ve got to leverage this pool of talent more effectively if we aim to avoid strategic surprise.

Analytic Quality

Since I joined the analytic ranks of the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1983, the Community has certainly evolved. However, prior to the current round of IC reform, I don’t think we changed the fundamental analytic culture. We learned our skills from mentors—most training was on the job—in a guildlike mentality that emphasized, to different degrees in different agencies, our uniqueness. I exaggerate for effect, but the worst-case view was that we thought we had better information than anyone else, and we didn’t feel the need to explain ourselves to our customers or even to each other. Sure, there were intelligence surprises and shortfalls, but nothing that forced us to fundamentally reexamine our tradecraft—in other words, our culture. And while 9/11 was a spectacular failure in terms of the impact on our country, there was plenty of blame to go around. It was the national intelligence estimate on Iraq’s WMD capabilities that provided the real shock to the analytic system—and shook our cultural foundations. At the highest levels of our trade, we produced a document that was fundamentally wrong. We had to change.

From my perspective, one of the most significant accomplishments in IC reform was the promulgation of ICD 203. ICD 203 codified good analytic tradecraft—much discussed but seldom formally documented in the 50-year history of the IC. Coupled with ICD 206, “Sourcing Requirements for Disseminated Analytic Products,” analysts are now forced to “show their work.” Doing so injects rigor into our processes and products and holds analysts and managers accountable for results.

It has not been a seamless transition. We have struggled with integrating the standards while maintaining the clarity and flow of our written products. But I think that everyone supports the basic premise. More than any other element of the ODNI’s analytic transformation effort, it has forced a change in the analytic culture—because it has redefined our business process.

ICD 203 mandates regular review of intelligence products for compliance with the standards. Regular self-examination should be a vital part of intelligence analysis, whether it is a formal lessons-learned process or grading against the analytic standards. DIA’s Product Evaluation Board (PEB) has been in operation for more than two years, providing feedback to analysts and managers as well as providing invaluable experience for board members to deepen their own appreciation of the standards. According to DIA’s PEB data, as well as data from the ODNI evaluators, our performance against most of the analytic standards has steadily
improved. My sense is that analysts and managers are still not entirely comfortable with this process, but over time this feedback will become the norm and part of the culture. And a key attribute of that culture needs to be a continual self-assessment and self-correction.

There has been some criticism that the standards drive analysts away from “making the call” because of the emphasis on evidence. My experience tells me this is not the case—the standards simply force us to be clearer about the evidence we have and the evidence we lack. There are plenty of ways analysts can communicate uncertainties when the evidence is lacking. Alternative analysis is one approach, and we need to become more sophisticated in employing alternative analysis in a way that will add value to our customers. Overall, given the potential for the IC to take less analytic risk in the post-WMD environment, I believe analysts are stepping out to make clear, crisp, relevant calls—and the process supports and encourages that. I do believe we must be quicker and clearer—as opposed to later and homogenized—and not be afraid to reveal analytic seams in the IC on key issues.

We’re still working through the second- and third-order effects of ICD 203. One of the most contentious issues during my tenure in DIA has been the analytic review process. Analysts believe their products take too long to get through the system—and there is some truth to that. Analytic managers believe they are providing much needed improvements to ensure products are meeting standards—with often differing interpretation of standards. We have developed general guidance to streamline the review process, based largely on an article written by former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Martin Petersen in this publication several years ago, with modifications to incorporate the analytic standards.a

This is still a work in progress, and I’m not delusional in thinking that we have discovered the solution that will make everyone happy. I suspect this conflict is as old as the IC—it also exists in journalism and similar professions. But if we can sustain open dialog along the way, the end result will be better analysis.

Training is an integral component of any cultural change and has been particularly important in light of the large numbers of entry-level analysts joining the Community since 9/11. DIA has developed and shared a comprehensive entry-level analytic training program, which has continuously evolved and been improved based on feedback. Course work builds fundamental skills in data gathering, critical thinking, analytic methodologies, analytic standards, IC collaboration (incorporating the Intelligence Community 101 Course), and communications skills. We have also built and continue to tweak midlevel training to deepen those skill areas and prepare analysts for leadership positions. As we build senior-level expert training, I am particularly interested in emphasizing the leadership aspects of senior intelligence analysts and senior intelligence officers, because they play significant roles in shaping and retaining our analytic workforce as they teach the culture to our new members.

Information Sharing

The track record is mixed, but I am optimistic that ICD 501 of 2009, “Information Sharing,” ultimately will have the same impact on our culture as did ICD 203. Progress thus far has been driven to a certain extent by the workforce, by technology, and by the customer, but with business processes now in place, we are poised to make huge strides.

Our workforce is forcing us to change. Almost a quarter of the DIA Directorate for Analysis workforce is 30 years old or younger. Whether we believe in generalizations about the generations or not, we have to acknowledge that those who have grown up with the internet are used to having information available at their fingertips, collaborating online, and networking as a way of life. We baby boomers in leadership have been able to keep up with them, though barely, with technology that leverages these strengths.

A-Space is a virtual work environment that provides IC analysts a common platform for research and analysis and connecting with colleagues. DIA agreed to be the IC executive agent for A-Space in 2007, and it has been gaining capabilities and adherents ever since. A-Space includes HCS/G/ORCON intelligence, for the first time visible to all users on the system rather than by-name

---
A-Space was open to other users and renamed I-Space in 2013.

A slightly different approach is being used in the Library of National Intelligence (LNI), where you can see the “card catalog” entry for all products but not necessarily access them without the right credentials. As outlined in ICD 501, analysts have the “responsibility to discover” and “responsibility to request” access to products that are relevant to their mission. We have to watch closely to see if this business process works as advertised. If analysts are rewarded for being entrepreneurial—the process works “well enough to be considered valid”—over time we will develop a culture characterized by intellectual curiosity. If they are thwarted or if the process is cumbersome and time-consuming, we will be reinforcing a culture in which analysts rely on what is easily found on their desktop.

Customers have forced us to share more information. Since 2004, the IC has deployed significant numbers of analysts forward to Iraq and Afghanistan—developing into what I call the expeditionary analytic workforce. Greater operational engagement is occurring—we’re leveraging information from the battlefield at the national level and allowing the staff on the battlefield to leverage national capability like never before. Stakes are higher and timelines are reduced.

This type of interaction has become the new, highly demanding norm. In Afghanistan, driven by the International Security Assistance Force’s counteringinsurgency strategy, we are pushing beyond the traditional boundaries of the IC—aggressively seeking access to critical information from other US government agencies such as the US Agency for International Development and sharing broadly and routinely with our allies. Of note, we have built on our theater experience with allies to create the first-ever multinational intelligence fusion center in Washington in the DIA Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force. This fusion center can be a laboratory for building the new processes and ultimately culture of information sharing. Our new expeditionary culture is changing not only how we do business, but for whom we do it, as we must engage the broader US government and international partners to address challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Lagging somewhat behind technology, demographics, and mission imperatives was the formal implementation guidance for information sharing. DNI McConnell signed ICD 501 as one of his last official acts, and DIA initiated the first official ICD 501 “case” in 2009. We have worked through many of these issues—mostly to DIA’s satisfaction. If we continue to work the system and get results, without compromising sources and methods, which is the driving force in the old culture, we will ultimately institutionalize the change.

Positioning for the Future

While I’m more than satisfied with our progress to date, we must begin to position ourselves for the future. I believe we need to start planning now for the inevitable decline in budgets and resources. Analysts are a finite resource; we need to make the best use of their time and natural talents—first, making each analyst even more effective, and second, making our Community more effective—by creating processes and a culture that enable IC analysts to successfully address the most important challenges facing our nation.

Analysts currently spend a lot of time doing work that is somewhat ancillary to analysis. Data gathering is one challenge. Between open-source resources, message-handling systems, Intellipedia, Intelink, A-Space, LNI, and discrete dissemination mechanisms for sensitive intelligence, analysts could spend all day, for many days, seeking data. Once gathered, data can be cumbersome to array and analyze in ways that help make sense.

Moreover, as an unintended consequence of ICDs 206 and 501, analysts are spending a considerable amount of time on the mechanics of sourcing and metadata tagging their products, which is not the best use of their time. We need to support them with better tools so they can spend more time on the actual analysis as opposed to the front- and back-end of the process.

However, better tools will enable us to produce more products—they won’t necessarily drive analysts to do more analysis. DIA and the larger defense intelligence enterprise are very product- and task-driven cultures. We have many customers with a multitude of requirements, and we pride ourselves on our responsiveness. We almost never say no.

Making analysts more efficient, without creating other measures, will
simply enable analysts to respond to more tasks. They won’t necessarily be more effective against our long-term intelligence challenges. As we all know too well, what the customers ask about today may not be what they need to know about tomorrow. If we aren’t performing analysis on strategic long-term issues that may result in a crisis 10 years from now, we aren’t doing our jobs. But because no one is asking and tasking, we don’t do as much as we should.

The balance between current and strategic analysis has been an issue for as long as I’ve been an analytic manager, but given the prevailing forces of our customers and our culture, it is likely to worsen without significant management attention. We initiated defense intelligence strategic research plans in 2009, and we are continuing to develop and refine the plans and the business processes associated with them. Only through senior-level attention to results—tasking the organization to solve the problem—will we sustain focus on long-term analysis.

**Sharing the Burden**

Even in the best of worlds, DIA could not do it alone, which brings me to my second point. We need to do a better job of burden sharing to make ourselves more effective as a community.

We still work in a free-for-all environment: agencies are writing on what they want to write. We are still competing against one another on many issues, the proverbial kids’ soccer game. While competitive analysis is good to some degree, we cannot afford to compete in everything. With ever-expanding requirements and likely declining resources, we need to think now about how to task organize ourselves better.

During the last major downsizing of the IC in the 1990s, we created the DoD Intelligence Production System, now the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP). We squeezed out some duplication among the services by creating the Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Centers and distributed coverage of foreign weapons systems among the service intelligence centers.

DIAP is not perfect by any means. However, there is an effective business process in place to task across organizations. Something that was revolutionary when it was introduced now is ingrained in the defense intelligence community culture. It is simply assumed that an intelligence requirement on submarines will be routed to the Office of Naval Intelligence and that a requirement on tanks will be routed to the National Ground Intelligence Center and that they have the right expertise and will respond appropriately. There is a level of trust that we need to build in the larger IC.

One of my earliest discussions with my leadership team was over our mission statement. We got hung up on the question: Is DIA defense intelligence or intelligence for defense? Our current charter says that “DIA shall satisfy military and military-related intelligence requirements.” My view is that we are operating as “intelligence for defense” when we should be operating as “defense intelligence” and deferring to other IC organizations with greater capability on many issues. Threat finance and sociocultural analysis are examples of mission areas in which we are engaging with few resources and to little effect, but we are unable to realign more dollars or people from traditional missions such as military capabilities without creating unacceptable risk.

Yet every time I’ve suggested that we rely more on other organizations for certain topics, my analysts and managers express a lack of confidence that those organizations will be as responsive as required when a flag officer or senior political appointee needs an answer. I cannot speak for other organizations, but I suspect there is a well-founded fear that the DoD behemoth would quickly take over all available bandwidth if allowed to task at will. But nothing will

---

Even in the best of worlds, DIA could not do it alone, which brings me to my second point. We need to do a better job of burden sharing to make ourselves more effective as a community.

---

*From the Studies Archive*

---

a. In January 2013, Intelligence Today ceased operation after congressional budget cuts.
And the newest generation of analysts . . . knows no other way. With this foundation of collaboration and engagement, I cannot be more excited about the prospects for IC leadership . . . over the next decade

work if there is no process, much less confidence that the process will work as advertised. We need to develop a process that addresses both of these fears and to demonstrate that it will work before we can begin to build a true Community culture.

Envisioning the Future

In many respects it took 20 years for the results of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act to change the culture of the US military. Joint duty is not just mandatory for promotion to flag rank, it is seen as desirable for any military career. Officers without regard to service affiliation are now fully integrated in combatant command structures up to the highest levels. It used to be assumed that an Army or Marine officer would be in charge of the US Central Command—it is, for the most part, aligned for land warfare. And the US Strategic Command would always be run by an Air Force general or a Navy admiral—who else would know how to launch nuclear missiles? It wasn’t until the past decade that this paradigm was broken (General Cartwright at USSTRATCOM in 2004, Admiral Fallon at USCENTCOM in 2007). Thus, what these changes really challenge is our culture, which is the hardest to achieve but offers the greatest payback.

What might the IC analytic community look like in 2025, 20 years after passage of the IRTPA? I would expect that on the individual level, analysts will be active and adept at seeking out information from all sources—IC, other government agencies, allies, and open sources. They will routinely ask for, and usually receive, access to highly classified intelligence that relates to their subject area. They will be able to ingest and filter enormous quantities of data with advanced tools, and perform multiple structured techniques to array, evaluate, and display information. They will seamlessly apply the analytic standards as part of their thought process and routinely incorporate feedback, evaluations, and lessons learned into their work. They will be practiced at developing products (whether written, oral, or multimedia) that clearly communicate assumptions, evidence, and assessments to our customers and will easily tailor products to different audiences and classification levels.

At the organizational level, the National Intelligence Analysis and Production Board (NIAPB)\(^a\) will have assigned each member specific topic areas on which that member is expected to maintain the IC’s knowledge base. These organizations will have developed deep, specialized expertise in the areas assigned. Our analysts will be fully networked and they will know whom to call for expertise on a specific issue, and we will be able to route requirements, regardless of customer, to the appropriate organization. The NIAPB and the National Intelligence Council will have identified long-term strategic research requirements, assigned responsibility for them to specific organizations, and will regularly assess progress, identify shortfalls, develop mitigation strategies, and reevaluate the need.

In Sum

Just as was true for Goldwater-Nichols and DoD, the DNI is challenging the IC culture at its core. Where it was once insular and guarded, the analytic environment is much more interconnected and open. This attitude and acceptance are not uniform across the board to be sure, but real change has begun. And the newest generation of analysts brought on during this last decade knows no other way. With this foundation of collaboration and engagement, I cannot be more excited about the prospects for IC leadership as this generation moves into the senior ranks over the next decade.

We have had a very successful track record thus far in changing the way we do business. I commend the ODNI staff, the analytic leadership of all IC organizations, and the analysts themselves for redefining our trade craft and our culture. But IC reform is a continuous process. I challenge all of us to consider the next phase, identify the problems we must solve, and create the new processes that will take us into the future.

It is the responsibility of IC leaders to set the conditions that will allow the newest, talented generation of analysts to help our customers succeed. The raw materials are in place, much of the structural foundation is there, and we’re engaged with our customers like never before. Our challenge is to realize this potential.

\(^a\) Now the National Intelligence Analysis Board (NIAB).
On a Path Toward Intelligence Integration

Stephen B. Slick

I appreciate the invitation from Studies in Intelligence to contribute to this assessment of the ongoing project to improve US intelligence through strong central leadership and closer integration. The original design of a federated community of specialized intelligence agencies housed within larger cabinet departments was regularly studied, frequently criticized, but never seriously reconsidered during the modern IC’s first half-century of existence. My generation of intelligence officers, those serving on September 11, 2001, experienced fundamental change compelled by outside forces and implemented during a national emergency. Each officer will have a unique view of these changes. My perspectives are those of a staff officer at CIA and the NSC while new institutions were being designed, a field manager charged with representing both CIA and the IC in an allied capital, and now as an annuitant and teacher observing the IC from the outside while helping prepare a next generation of intelligence leaders.

Progress along this path has been uneven, but US intelligence is immeasurably more unified and effective than it was when I entered on duty during the final throes of the Cold War. Office of the DNI—centerpieces of the post-9/11 intelligence reforms—confront a set of near-term challenges that will shape in large measure historical judgments on the impact and wisdom of this round of change.

Why Now?

Why ask this question on the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks and not on another date linked to the work of the 9/11 Commission, the IRTPA, or the actual stand-up of the ODNI? For me, September 11, 2001, is the right benchmark because everything changed that morning for US intelligence. In the weeks and months after the attacks, IC agencies shared information without hesitation, coordinated a blizzard of collection, analytic, and policy-support tasks, and accepted direction from a single leader who was linked inextricably to an engaged commander and chief. The most tangible symbol of this unitary intelligence response was the “Five O’Clock Meeting” chaired by Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet and attended initially by officers from across CIA and the IC but eventually included senior liaison officers from DoD, military commands, and the FBI. Each afternoon, energized by a shared sense of national vulnerability and an impatient leader, the IC developed a shared assessment of the threat environment, cleared obstacles to
Although the impetus was tragic and the scope of integration limited to counterterrorism, DCI George Tenet had demonstrated the power of a unified IC harnessed to an empowered central leader. That IC reform was a simple act of political expedience is not true.

The 9/11 Commission’s delivery of its report to the White House in the last days of July 2004 was not accidental. This entrepreneurial panel drafted and marketed a superb history of al-Qa’ida and the 9/11 attacks. It also endorsed a small number of government reforms to prevent a recurrence of documented shortcomings. Organized advocacy by victims’ families, a Congress anxious to legislate in response to a national trauma, and the wholesale adoption of the report by President Bush’s presumptive Democratic challenger combined to accelerate the administration’s endorsement of key commission recommendations: creation of a National Counterterrorism Center to fuse terror threat reports, compulsory information sharing, and establishment of a new leadership post empowered with authority over the IC’s budget and personnel.

Policy Choices, Not Politics

The harshest critique of the post-9/11 intelligence reforms is that the new structures created were products of an overheated political process and succeeded only in adding a layer of inefficient bureaucracy between IC collectors and analysts and the policy customers they serve. While the ODNI must take pains to ensure that every action it directs in the course of setting priorities, allocating resources, and enforcing common standards does not overburden operations being conducted by the agencies, the claim of command and military planning process from an expansive DNI role in “strategic operational planning” that the 9/11 Commission envisioned for NCTC. By the end of August 2004, President Bush signed executive orders that established NCTC, compelled information sharing, created a board to safeguard Americans’ civil liberties, and strengthened the DCI’s authority to lead a unified IC pending congressional action to split the roles of CIA director and IC head. The draft intelligence bill conveyed to the Congress was the product of an interagency process that was intense, divisive, and often acrimonious but untainted by partisan political considerations.

Notwithstanding the administration’s lobbying, advocacy by the former 9/11 commissioners, and broad bipartisan support on the Hill, Congress failed to pass an intelligence reform bill before the 2004 presidential election. Indeed, there is no indication that fine distinctions between the candidates’ positions on how to reform our intelligence agencies played any role in the election’s outcome. Any political pressure was removed by his reelection, but President Bush nonetheless made passage of the IRTPA his legislative priority during the lame-duck congressional session.

Late in his second term, President Bush returned to intelligence reform and agreed to a request from DNI Mike McConnell to revise Executive Order 12333 (which enumerates the powers and responsibilities of the IC) to expand the DNI’s role in “hiring and firing” IC agency heads, shaping major DoD acquisitions, and

---
a. NCTC built on the short-lived Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which was created in early 2003 at the direction of President George W. Bush. It was absorbed into NCTC in October 2004.
strengthening the DNI’s hand in foreseeable future disputes with cabinet secretaries who host IC agencies.

Integration in the Foreign Field

It would not be unfair to claim that the prospects for successful intelligence integration improve with increased distance from Washington, DC. Important models for interagency intelligence support to warfighters—and equally valuable personal relationships between commanders and their intelligence counterparts—were developed in the Balkans during the 1990s. Less than a decade later sophisticated intelligence fusion centers were deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan to inform time-sensitive counterterrorism and force-protection missions. Our IC has learned how to integrate its diverse collection and analytic capabilities in support of deployed US forces.

The promise of similarly integrated intelligence work exists in our clandestine and embassy-based platforms around the world. Notwithstanding the appeal of operational freedom in a borderless cyberspace, US intelligence continues to gain essential information, insights, and influence from overseas operations. Some of these activities are undertaken by a single agency but operational success increasingly depends on closely coordinated actions by two or more IC agencies. That sort of tactical interagency coordination occurs routinely in the foreign field.

Perhaps the least understood and appreciated resource available to US intelligence is the network of relationships IC agencies maintain with their foreign counterparts. These relationships are nurtured on a day-to-day basis by liaison officers and operational managers assigned to foreign capitals, most often as part of the US embassy staff. In the capitals of major US allies, our IC is nearly replicated locally by liaison officers who represent their sponsoring agency and engage daily with host-country counterparts and US IC colleagues. The physical proximity, common mission, and shared daily experiences (including hardships) of a foreign field assignment promote open communication and strong IC teamwork. Resistance to intelligence integration in the field can most often be traced back to desk-bound officers at an agency’s headquarters who instinctively defend vague “institutional prerogatives,” or a foreign liaison partner who derives prestige and influence inside their own government from an exclusive relationship with a US counterpart.

The IRTPA and EO 12333 describe a policy-setting role for the DNI in foreign relationships and a more operational role for CIA in managing them through its network of overseas stations and bases. In 2009, a disagreement between the DNI and CIA director over the DNI’s prerogative to designate a “DNI Representative” to a foreign government who was not also the CIA’s local chief of station was referred to the White House for adjudication. A clumsy, and leaky, process resulted in a regrettable setback for the DNI and

---

a. See Stephen B. Slick, “Modernizing the IC ‘Charter’: The 2008 Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities” in Studies Intelligence 58, no. 2 (June 2014).

---
What comes next? Will the DNI wield hard-won budgetary, personnel, and contracting authorities to reshape the IC to address new threats? Or, will each of the IC’s 18 agencies adapt to new priorities consistent with its parochial or departmental interests?

Testing the Limits of Integration

Champions of a “strong center” and closer intelligence integration will watch closely as IC leaders grapple with a series of near-term challenges: 1) setting and enforcing new priorities; 2) defining a role in collection and analysis of domestic intelligence; 3) clarifying lead responsibility for advising the president and supporting the policymaking process; and 4) leading the response to a generational shift in digital technology.

New Priorities

The principal focus of our national security establishment is shifting from combating terrorism to countering threats posed by peer states such as an ascendent China and a declining Russia. The simple tasks of describing the shift and elevating new topics to the top of the IC’s warning brief have been completed. What comes next? Will the DNI wield hard-won budgetary, personnel, and contracting authorities to reshape the IC to address new threats? Or, will each of the IC’s 18 agencies adapt to new priorities consistent with its parochial or departmental interests? Is ODNI mature enough to make and enforce data-driven resource trades between collection disciplines (and the agencies that “own” them) or will the IC engage fundamentally different state intelligence targets with the tools developed over two decades of counterterrorism work?

The Foreign-Domestic Divide

Indeed, even the residual security threat posed by terrorism has not remained static. While foreign terror groups continue to pose a threat to US interests, focus has shifted to violent domestic groups and disaffected Americans. The FBI has been energetic in warning of the dangers they pose to public order and democratic governance. In its report, the 9/11 Commission documented strained relations between the FBI and CIA, along with an exaggerated legal “wall” that separated the law enforcement and intelligence communities, as factors that contributed to al-Qa’ida’s successful attacks. Consequently, the DNI—a community leader with no responsibility for CIA’s foreign operations - - was charged with “bridging the foreign-domestic divide” and leading a seamless effort to protect the US domestically while also safeguarding civil liberties. As the domestic terrorism problem grows, the DNI and IC should clarify how intelligence on domestic targets is being collected, shared, fused, and acted upon to prevent attacks. It would be a mistake for ODNI to reflexively defer to the FBI and the law enforcement community on intelligence regarding domestic extremism and not to play an active role in setting priorities, enforcing standards, and appropriately exploiting the full IC’s capabilities against a new target.

“Principal Adviser” or Advisers?

The IRTPA assigned to the DNI the former DCI’s role as the principal adviser to the president and NSC on intelligence matters. This was universally understood to mean the DNI would lead the president’s daily briefing process and also assume the DCI’s role as statutory adviser to the NSC and intelligence representative to the principals committee, deputies committee, and subordinate interagency policy coordination groups. This arrangement prevailed briefly in the mid-2000s, but ultimately the CIA’s director and senior officers were included by invitation (and later orders) in NSC, PC, and DC meetings.

Because of CIA’s central role combating foreign terrorism, its global covert action responsibilities, and the quality of its experts, it is unsurprising that presidents would seek CIA’s advice and counsel. However, it is not clear why the practice has developed that two separate intelligence organizations participate in routine interagency policy meetings. In contrast, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff provides coordinated military advice to the president, the NSC, and the interagency policy process without the routine participation of the service chiefs. There is certainly an amicable arrangement that would reinforce the
DNI’s status as the president’s adviser while also ensuring the CIA’s deep reservoir of expertise and worldwide presence are available to support the policymaking process.

Any changes to practice in this area cannot be directed from outside. The president is entitled to organize the national security team as he or she chooses. The president would, though, advance the cause of intelligence integration by unequivocally affirming that the DNI is the principal adviser on intelligence matters.

**A Digital Arms Race**

The revolution in digital technology is changing our everyday lives and transforming the practice of intelligence. Officers, teams, agencies, and communities are all struggling to seize the opportunities and minimize the national security risks posed by proliferating digital technologies. The ODNI should be at the forefront in developing a community-wide strategy and ensuring necessary coordination of the technology that is being developed, adapted, or stolen by IC agencies. Central to this challenge is the recognition that exploiting open-source and publicly available information will set the future boundaries of state-sponsored intelligence work.

Exquisite, expensive, and risky intelligence operations should only be undertaken to collect information that we know is not otherwise available. But, we are not yet able to determine fully what is available publicly or how to gauge its trustworthiness at scale. Restructuring and prioritizing the IC’s open-source mission is an overdue first step in this process. The margins that separate US IC technical operations from those of our rivals are shrinking.

In this consequential race, and future such intelligence challenges, our IC’s performance will be improved with strong central leadership and deliberately integrated actions.

---

The author: Stephen B. Slick is a retired CIA senior officer. He is presently the director of the Intelligence Studies Project within the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas in Austin.
The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

From Capitol Hill

Intelligence Integration: A Congressional Oversight Perspective

Interview with Jon Rosenwasser

In the aftermath of 9/11, what do you think were the most important issues that the ODNI was created to address? What issues were not covered in IRTPA?

In creating the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the IRTPA principally addressed three failures. The first was the Intelligence Community’s poor operational integration and collaboration evident on 9/11, particularly between its foreign and domestic components, and its poor collaboration with the law enforcement communities. In the months prior to 9/11 there were troubling indicators everywhere. The systems was “blinking red,” as then-Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet recalled, but the IC was unable to integrate disparate intelligence threads into a coordinated, persuasive presentation of intelligence adequate to cause policymakers to implement more aggressive counterterrorism policies. Central to this critique was that the IC suffered from a “failure of imagination” to envision low-probability/high-consequence events (like terrorists hijacking commercial airplanes and flying them into iconic buildings). The creation of the ODNI as an institution, separate from CIA, was meant to foster greater functional integration across the IC, while the creation of an intelligence division in FBI was meant to strengthen connective tissue with the law enforcement community.

The IRTPA was also a result of the disastrous consequences of the IC’s errors assessing Iraq’s WMD program. To many, it seemed as if the IC had fallen prey to the politicization of intelligence—the most damning accusation to level at the analytic community—to hew to the view that Saddam Hussein was harboring an active WMD program. IRTPA’s codification of standards for analytic integrity and creation of an IC analytic ombudsperson were designed to address these issues.

The third failure was one of organizational design in the counterterrorism community. The government needed a more robust and stable bridge between agencies focused on events abroad (principally the IC) and those focused on events at home.

The government needed a more robust and stable bridge between agencies focused on events abroad (principally the IC) and those focused on events at home.
The IRTPA was noteworthy for what it did not do. It did not create a US version of Britain’s MI5 to deal with domestic intelligence matters. It also did not create a Department of Intelligence, instead reaffirming the confederated nature of the US intelligence system.

The IRTPA was noteworthy for what it did not do. It did not create a US version of Britain’s MI5 to deal with domestic intelligence matters. It also did not create a Department of Intelligence, instead reaffirming the confederated nature of the US intelligence system, with IC elements tethered to departments and their statutory missions (with the noteworthy exception of CIA and now ODNI). Finally, it did not fundamentally change the collection authorities outlined in Executive Order (EO) 12333. The IRTPA left the basic authorities of the IC intact.

After the passage of IRTPA, what were the DNI’s relative strengths and weakness in terms of the authorities, resources, and tools needed to advance intelligence integration? How did these evolve over time?

The ODNI has proved to be remarkably resilient and adept, despite its congenital constraints. The IRTPA specified that the DNI was the principal intelligence adviser to the president and the NSC; had the exclusive authority to develop, determine, and implement the National Intelligence Program (NIP) budget (now separated from the Military Intelligence Program [MIP] that supports DoD’s tactical intelligence requirements, which remained under DoD’s control); and was head of the IC. In addition, the IRTPA codified the DNI’s roles over the IC in a number of different areas, including maintaining analytic integrity and standards, leading the science and technology enterprise, overseeing foreign intelligence relationships, setting personnel policy, setting priorities for collection and analysis, and managing standard headquarters functions, like budgets and information technology.

In addition, the IRTPA created two mission centers—NCTC and NCPC; created an Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA, modeled on DoD’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Activity); and absorbed the National Counterintelligence Executive (now the National Counterintelligence and Security Center). In all of these areas, the ODNI has taken up the mantle of leading the Community: from managing the PDB to overseeing the budget and programmatic process for the NIP. IC elements have generally sought the DNI’s leadership for issues that affect the Community at large.

There was an important unanticipated role that the DNI would play—serving as a political heat shield for the IC and the White House when politically thorny intelligence matters surfaced. Reauthorization of sections 215 and 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; public scrutiny of the CIA’s rendition, detention, and interrogation program; and Edward Snowden’s unauthorized disclosures were but three cases in which the DNI assumed a prominent public role—while allowing other IC elements to remain in the background. The DNI became the public face of intelligence on behalf of the administration, absorbing political attention that would have otherwise been trained on the operational activities of the NSA and CIA.

The DNI’s formal authorities in the IRTPA appeared clear on the surface, but they were circumscribed by those in Congress, CIA, and Defense who wanted to limit the DNI’s power. Under section 1018 of the IRTPA, no departmental authorities were abrogated, meaning that the DNI lacked authority, direction, and control across the IC except within ODNI. As such, the Washington national security ecosystem was only partially affected by ODNI’s creation.

Most notably, the CIA retained significant access to the White House, partly the result of its long heritage in leading the Oval Office presentations of the PDB, regular presence at NSC meetings, and its role in covert action (a uniquely presidential foreign policy tool). And, DoD through its newly created undersecretary for intelligence (USDI, now undersecretary of defense for intelligence and security) exercised greater control over the defense intelligence enterprise—NSA, DIA, NGA, the NRO, intelligence components of the military services, and other specialized capabilities.

Second, ODNI was constrained by the capacity of its workforce. It was able to attract significant talent at the top levels of the organization with storied figures like Michael Hayden, Tom Fingar, and Mary Margaret Graham joining the leadership. But in the early years, ODNI had difficulties recruiting quality staff officers from the IC, given hostility toward the ODNI and uncertainty over whether the organization would endure. As such, the ODNI resorted to hiring
methods any new organization in Washington might employ: targeting personnel with limited experience, offering promotions to make the uncertain career move attractive, and hiring a large quotient of contractors. The ODNI had sprawling functions and authorities but wound up with a workforce only partially equipped to fulfill them.

Over time, the ODNI generally found an equilibrium. It made peace among rivals. It integrated the PDB under its own auspices, with CIA as the executive agent, and it broadened IC participation to include analysis from agencies other than CIA. As DNI, Dennis Blair tested the proposition of not necessarily selecting CIA station chiefs as the DNI’s representatives, but the White House under President Obama rejected that notion, ensuring CIA’s principal role in foreign liaison relationships.

Internally, the ODNI settled a few sources of instability. After initially being located at CIA headquarters and then DIA, ODNI principally moved into a campus in McLean, Virginia, known as Liberty Crossing. It adopted a durable model to maintain the balance between ODNI cadre (permanent staff) and those on joint duty from the rest of the IC, complemented by contractors, who provided expertise, continuity, and capacity.

The ODNI developed a reasonable division of labor with DoD, establishing “lanes in the road” between the NIP (under the DNI’s control) and the MIP (under the secretary of defense’s control) and dual-hatted the USDI as a Deputy DNI for Defense Intelligence to formalize DoD’s consultative role.

\[
\text{Over time, the ODNI generally found an equilibrium. It made peace among rivals. It integrated the PDB under its own auspices, with CIA as the executive agent, and it broadened IC participation to include analysis from agencies other than CIA.}
\]

One source of instability that has remained is in leadership. While Jim Clapper endured for six years as DNI, others have had far briefer tenures. The particularly tumultuous tenures of Acting DNI Ric Grenell and DNI John Ratcliffe during 2019–20, in which the objectivity of the organization’s leadership was called into question, represented a nadir in the ODNI’s credibility. Avril Haines, the first cabinet-level official of the Biden administration to be confirmed—appears to have stabilized the ODNI’s role in the IC and its accountability to Congress and the public.

\[
\text{How did the oversight committees’ roles change with IRTPA?}
\]

For Congress, a primary benefit of the IRTPA was modest centralization in its oversight target, much in the same way that the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 allowed the armed services committees to focus their oversight on the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The DNI is a weaker figure than either the secretary or the chairman, and the IC is not a department, so the intelligence committees still oversaw CIA, NSA, and other IC elements directly, but now they could use the DNI to address issues that spanned multiple IC elements or extended to the policymaker community.

Although this was not an explicit goal, the creation of ODNI has also generally had the impact of allowing the congressional intelligence committees to delegate basic oversight of the IC’s elements to ODNI, while it focused on strategic issues facing the IC and their consequences for policy. This question can be looked at by differentiating between the committees’ roles as customers of intelligence and overseers of intelligence.

As customers of intelligence, the congressional intelligence committees generally welcomed the creation of the DNI. Under the pre-IRTPA DCI construct, while the committees theoretically could have benefited from competing sources of intelligence, in practice they normally defaulted to CIA because the DCI construct favored the CIA. The existence instead of a DNI has, almost paradoxically, generally afforded the committees with greater access to competing perspectives and assessments from across the IC, enriching its understanding of the global environment.

As overseers of intelligence, the committees have similarly lifted the committees’ gaze. Before the advent of the DNI, when the committees had a question that spanned multiple IC elements, they needed to canvas each of them separately, standardize the inputs they received, and draw their own conclusions. With the ODNI in place, the committees could rely on ODNI frequently for that entire data collection and analysis effort to the ODNI. The committees no longer need be mired in the details of each IC element’s activities and can reserve energy for strategic

\[
\text{From Capitol Hill}
\]

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 65, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2021) 19
Successful intelligence integration generally means that when IC agencies present analysis and findings to policymakers and Congress, they have already consulted and coordinated within the IC, which committees previously often had to do themselves.

assessments. The confederated nature of the IC allows the committees to still address concerns at individual agencies, but generally now the questions they pursue are fewer and more focused.

Initially, what were some of the more successful steps the DNI took to advance intelligence integration?

The DNI initially drove integration on five fronts:

• The first was in 2008 to update EO 12333, the foundational presidential directive on intelligence authorities. The document had been written in 1981 and needed to be updated to reflect changes in the threats, departmental authoritiesties, and the creation of the DNI. The DNI championed this effort at the end of the Bush administra-tion and successfully stewarded a rewrite of this complex executive order for the NSC.

• The second was the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative in 2008, which served as an important foundation to focus government-wide efforts to advance cybersecurity. Cybersecurity had been recognized as a growing area of national vulnerability that needed coherence and rigor, but lacked conceptual or programmatic coherence. The DNI integrated the views of the FBI, NSA, CIA, and others in a manner that would previously have been quite difficult and helped galva-

• Third, the DNI played a central role in personnel vetting reform, leading updates to adjudicative and investigative guidelines that stood at the heart of how the government grants access to classified information, i.e., security clearances. A 2008 executive order would ultimately name the DNI as the government’s Security Executive Agent, which was statutorily codified in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020.

• Fourth, the ODNI tackled several thorny Community-wide policies and shared services. It codified a joint duty policy to facilitate personnel moving across the IC, managed controlled access programs to ensure their security, and set standards for data’s accessibility and discoverability. It also created a classified information technology backbone, known as the IC IT Enterprise (ICITE), and managed the National Intelligence Priorities Framework to help agencies prioritize their analysis and collection efforts.

• Finally, pursuant to the IRTPA, the ODNI absorbed the National Counterintelligence Executive (now the NCSC), in recognition of counterintelligence’s national importance and consequence as a part of the bigger IC. CI had long been fragmented among FBI, DoD, and the IC, leading to strategic vulnerabilities from adversarial states with aggressive intelligence capabilities. The IRTPA brought CI under the broader intelligence umbrella, integrating the two interrelated functions and allowing the ODNI to more effectively advocate for CI in interagency decisionmaking venues.

An important mission area where the ODNI has begun to integrate intelligence efforts is the space domain. As the threats have become more abundant and space capabilities more affordable, the need for interagency coordination has grown. The DNI has effectively aligned the requirements, capabilities, operations, and budgets of the IC with those of DoD.

From an oversight point of view, what are the key measures or indicators in determining successful intelligence integration? How do the committees acquire and track this information?

Successful intelligence integration generally means that when IC agencies present analysis and findings to policymakers and Congress, they have already consulted and coordinated within the IC, which committees previously often had to do themselves. Simply asking the question, “Have you consulted with other elements in this work?” is one way to achieve integration. The committees do not keep track of the answers, instead relying on a general sense as to the extent of IC integration.

Can you comment on the respective roles of the NIMs and the NIOs and the relationships between these two types of IC leaders. How effective have the NIMs and NIOs been in carrying out the DNI’s goals?
Since the creation of the NIC in the 1970s, the NIOs have been the government’s leading intelligence officials on a range of regional and functional topics. They were the leading briefers at interagency meetings and presented the IC’s coordinated view in national intelligence estimates, intelligence community assessments, and other products. But they never fulfilled the ambition of reviewing, evaluating, and advocating for the Community’s broader posture against their mission areas—the adequacy of the various kinds of collected intelligence, the robustness of the workforce, counterintelligence risks and opportunities, and the appropriate level of resources, etc.

ICD 900 on mission management gave the DNI authority in certain areas, which were used to empower NCTC for the counterterrorism mission and NCPC for the counterproliferation mission.

The principal conceptual innovation for the IC under DNI Jim Clapper was creation of National Intelligence Managers to fulfill that ambition across the rest of the IC’s missions. The NIOs in his judgment were analysts and neither postured nor inclined to fulfill the broader mission management function. In his view, the NIMs would be the leaders of their mission areas, supported by an NIO, a National Intelligence Collection Officer, and a National Counterintelligence Officer. The NIM would then serve as the one-stop for customers and oversight.

The reality has been a mixed picture. The “voice of the mission” is now far louder and clearer in ODNI decisionmaking forums about resource investments and collection priorities. When tradeoffs need to be made, the mission impact is now far more readily available and heard. That is a welcome contribution to quality ODNI decision making.

However, the authority and effectiveness of the various NIMs have been uneven. The IC has historically not cultivated such cross-trained senior officers, unlike the military, which systematically prepares officers to lead at the next level of command. The IC trains, develops, and promotes analysts, collectors, and and other specialists within each professional sub-discipline, although they may get exposed to multiple topics during their careers. As such, the NIMs have varied in acumen and ability.

In interagency deliberations and before Congress, which official—the NIM or the NIO—represents the IC (or serves as the “plus one” for the DNI) is not consistent, undermining building durable and predictable relationships. And for purposes of oversight, the number of officials has now doubled, leading to confusion and fractured accountability. When a committee wants the IC-wide perspective, does it enlist the NIM or the NIO? The answer, “it depends,” neither breeds confidence nor repeatability. Given that swirl at ODNI, interagency partners and congressional oversight committees look to other IC elements who have more coherent representation and are fierce advocates for their capabilities, most notably CIA which has regional and functional mission centers.

As the head of the IC, how has the DNI promoted a more collaborative working relationship among the IC agency leaders?

The DNI-led governance mechanisms have provided credible venues through which the IC’s leaders gather, discuss, and address issues they collectively experience. Despite the lapse in the regular usage of these venues during the last part of the Trump administration, they remain the principal forum for the IC’s leadership. The DNI’s multiple subordinate bodies—e.g., the National Intelligence Analysis Board, National Intelligence Collection Board, IC Requirements Council, IC Chief Financial Officer Council, IC Chief Human Capital Officer Council—provide additional opportunities for collaboration. Each seems to provide an indispensable glue for their communities of interest to enable shared work.

Overall, looking across the ODNI’s 16 years, to what extent has the DNI succeeded in advancing intelligence integration? Where has it fallen short?


From Capitol Hill

Intelligence integration is inevitably shaped by the times in which it operates, much as the military’s jointness has been influenced by actual warfighting experience.

The ODNI has significantly advanced intelligence integration since its creation in 2005. Intelligence’s multiple facets and capabilities are more tightly woven than ever before because of ODNI efforts on personnel policy, IT, and governance. It has fallen short in fully executing its authorities, including over budgets and personnel, and in representation of the IC to Congress. This is for three reasons.

- The first is that the ODNI has suffered from an enduring perception that it is too large (although a review of its many statutory functions justifies much of its size) and a steady stream of efforts to limit its growth and influence.
- Second, stakeholders—other IC elements, congressional committees, Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council—did not all immediately embrace ODNI and needed to learn how to work with it.
- Third, CIA tended to have equal, if not at times greater, access to the White House resulting form its seven decades of experience supporting presidents, its responsibility for executing covert action (a function with a distinct presidential imprimatur), and a tremendously expert staff (especially in contrast to the early ODNI staff cadre). Areas where the ODNI still has room to grow in advancing intelligence integration include more analytically based resource decision making, workforce management and development, and commonality in security protocols.

The DNI’s shortfalls are less attributable to ODNI’s acumen than a reflection on what our political leaders want from centralized management for the IC. The DNI’s role over the IC is first and foremost derivative of what a president wants of it, and for the most part, presidents have not wanted to change the status quo. A more integrated intelligence enterprise under DNI leadership may mean that the IC will be more effective, but also more powerful, with incumbent risks of abuse and malfeasance.

Since 1947, the IC has operated as a confederated enterprise in part to keep it structurally weak and check the power of the IC. The transgressions that surfaced in Church and Pike investigations in the 1970s affirmed that lesson. Even though a Department of Intelligence was debated, creation of far stronger centralized management of intelligence was rejected during development of the IRTPA. Instead, our political leaders have opted for an intelligence system fragmented across the government, control by multiple federal departments with intrusive oversight exercised by multiple congressional committees.

What do you think the next decade will bring for intelligence integration?

The pursuit of intelligence integration is inevitably shaped by the times in which it operates, much as the military’s jointness has been influenced by actual warfighting experience.

Whereas the last 20 years has been defined by battling terrorism sponsored by al-Qa‘ida and then ISIS in the Middle East and globally, the purposes and practices by which the IC will integrate will likely change over the next decade. These changes are likely to be driven by the evolution of the terrorist threat, the return of great-power competition with China and Russia, the rise of racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism, changes in adversary behavior, the evolution of transnational issues (such as health, the environment, finance, crime, drugs), and the rise of authoritarian or illiberal governments.

We can expect an increasing focus on such matters as cybersecurity, space protection and resilience, counterintelligence (to include foreign malign influence and disinformation), civil liberties and privacy, and transnational issues (health, crime, finance, etc.) as the focus on counter-terrorism continues to ebb. Areas like these inherently sit at the seams of government and business and government and society, and across level of governance (local, state, national, and international). Many of these areas do not center on classified information, pushing the IC to increasingly engage in public. Stitching these seams is only partly achieved by statute, government regulation, and government organization; it will equally be achieved through the more indirect methods of technology and people.

That last point bears specific amplification. Since World War II, intelligence has been predominantly a matter for government, conducted by a career workforce in secure facilities.
That traditional model is changing in two ways. First, the workforce increasingly operates asynchronously (people do not need to work at the same time); remotely (people are working increasingly from great distance from one another); and discontinuously (people move in and out of government). Second, a significant portion of the IC workforce is made up of contractors with different incentives and interests than staff officers. Finally, the IC workforce culture is in flux with different perspectives on gender, race, career advancement and mobility, time, and even the role of government than previous generations held. Integrating across these emerging perspectives is not unique to intelligence, but may deserves special attention because of intelligence’s unique operational requirements.

The author: Jon Rosenwasser is the budget and policy director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, where he has served since 2013. He also oversees the ODNI. Rosenwasser previously served in the ODNI, NIC, and the Center for the Study of Intelligence. The views presented here are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Committee, Chairman Mark Warner, or Vice Chairman Marco Rubio.
Impact of Intelligence Integration on CIA Analysis

Peter A. Clement

This article looks at the impact of 9/11 on all-source intelligence analysis, informed by my vantage point as a senior manager in CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (Directorate of Analysis) during 2005–13. I focus on two key phases, beginning in 2001 with the creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and the subsequent establishment in 2004 of the National Counterterrorism Center. The second phase focuses more broadly on the impact since the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2005.

Integrating Analysis: 2001–2004

Many readers will recall that in the Mid-Atlantic Region September 11, 2001, began as a beautiful day. Blue skies, billowy clouds, and lots of sunshine—perfect for our office picnic. Around 8:45 I popped in to say good morning to my colleague in an adjoining office; he was watching CNN and remarked “Peter, looks like someone flew a plane into the World Trade Center building.” We both speculated that some inexperienced Piper Cub aircraft pilot may have gone badly astray. Some 15 minutes later, we understood how wrong we were. Soon, hundreds of my work colleagues were evacuating CIA Headquarters, concerned that CIA could be a target.

In literally one hour of that fateful morning, I felt as though I had been transported to an alternative universe. My world, our world, would never be the same, though the sheer magnitude of change was beyond anyone’s comprehension. By late 2004, the outlines of a blueprint for change of the US Intelligence Community and CIA were taking shape, but the lines of this new architecture would require much more time to come into sharper relief.

Intelligence integration within the then comparatively small CIA Counterterrorism Center was quite advanced before 9/11, in the view of some of my former colleagues. Centers like CTC, the Counterintelligence Center, and the Counternarcotics Center (now...
Before 9/11, senior CTC management had integrated operations and analysis to advance both missions—necessitating significant information-sharing that advanced both analytic and targeting work. The Crime and Narcotics Center prefigured the direction CIA would eventually take under Director John Brennan when he reorganized CIA and established regional and functional mission centers, but they were not the norm.

Before 9/11, senior CTC management had integrated operations and analysis to advance both missions—necessitating significant information-sharing that advanced both analytic and targeting work. This kind of joint work greatly expanded within days after 9/11, as hundreds of analysts and operations officers were directed to CTC. As one senior manager stated, “I decided to err in doing too much in transferring analysts to CTC.” One immediate consequence: many DI and DO officers would quickly see firsthand the benefits and challenges of sharing sensitive intelligence information.

Another variant of intelligence integration took root when DCI George Tenet created the CIA Red Cell the day after 9/11. This small cell, principally comprising analysts from the DI, focused initially on terrorist threats, but its portfolio later grew to cover most regional and functional issues. Over the years, some IC analysts have done rotational tours in the Red Cell. It continues to this day, playing an important role of challenging assumptions, offering alternative perspectives, and conjuring out-of-the-box scenarios.

Outside of CIA, a significant tremor in the IC’s tectonic plates could be felt in May 2002, when CIA sent a senior analytic manager and some two dozen analysts to the FBI to set up an Office of Intelligence. In a May 29 announcement, FBI Director Mueller didn’t explain exactly how this office would function, given the regulatory firewalls between FBI and CIA; he did acknowledge that both agencies “have a lot to learn from each other in ways that we have not worked in the past,” and consequently the new office “would be handled by an . . . experienced CIA intelligence officer.”

Even bigger change was afoot, however, as Congress debated throughout the summer of 2002 what intelligence reforms were required to better position the US against future attacks. Toward the end of his January 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush instructed “the leaders of the FBI, CIA, Homeland Security, and DoD to develop a Terrorist Threat Integration Center to merge and analyze all threat information in a single location.” This major move was largely overshadowed by the speech’s focus on the looming conflict with Iraq, but it would have a lasting impact.

George Tenet, then the dual-hatted director of the IC and CIA, noted that the secrecy behind the high-level planning to create the TTIC “made the bureaucratic players even more paranoid. I had to calm the jangled nerves of my senior deputies, who feared that the loss of people to TTIC would render their own organizations ineffective.” Tenet’s observations about his senior deputies’ concerns were well-grounded. One senior CIA manager with wry understatement described the internal reaction as “less than receptivity.”

Many elements within the IC had CT portfolios, usually to support their specific missions, but launch of TTIC on May 1, 2003 would fundamentally alter the landscape. These changes accelerated as TTIC soon morphed into the full-bodied National Counterterrorism Center in August 2004.

With the creation of TTIC, CTC had to greatly expand its information-sharing circle to a new center filled with many non-CIA officers. TTIC’s first director, John Brennan, has described how his new start-up TTIC faced significant “ingrained bureaucratic resistance,” especially from CIA and FBI, who worried about disclosure of their most sensitive sources or ongoing investigations. Nonetheless, Brennan was able to assemble a strong inter-IC team of senior managers who believed in intelligence integration and pushed hard to meet the mission assigned it by the President.

Two big issues were at the heart of a contentious TTIC-CIA relationship: resources and turf.

Resources: The People Challenge

Standing up any new organization—including within the IC—is a vexing challenge. Of course, resource issues like funding and physical office space are always issues, but the hard part always involves people. Predictably, when IC officers are asked to take—or are directed to take—a new assignment, they likely will ask: “Is this simply a rotational tour? Or a permanent reassignment? Who is my new boss? Who writes my

From a Historical Perspective
From a Historical Perspective

performance reviews? How will this affect my career?”

During one memorable, not-so-collegial, meeting, I was the “plus one” to help negotiate a compromise on this thorny staffing issue. What I observed resembled something like hand-to-hand combat in a losing bureaucratic war to minimize regular NCTC calls for more CIA analysts. NCTC needed many analysts, but in its early years it did not yet have its own permanent career service; it was primarily staffed by IC officers on temporary assignment to NCTC.

In the end, CIA agreed to send a set number of newly hired CIA analysts directly to NCTC for their initial two-year tours. Those analysts would then return to CIA to pursue their careers. This compromise—hard fought and grudgingly accepted—was gradually mitigated after NCTC created its own a career service. Of course, a narrowly focused career service created other issues, but the move did reduce the need to borrow people from CIA and other IC elements.

Exacerbating the people challenge was the argument of who in the IC had primary responsibility for the CT mission. CIA, which was lending officers to NCTC, believed it had the lead. One senior manager who served at both CIA and NCTC noted, “The people [at CIA] who since 2001 had labored incredibly hard, 24/7, to respond to the attack, overthrow the Taliban, target al-Qaeda leadership, who took such pride in what they were doing, what they had accomplished, and were suddenly being told ‘you need to share,’ and they simply didn’t want to. They saw the NCTC as a punishment, not a bureaucratic reordering . . . one result was that some in CIA’s CTC were vehemently opposed to cooperating with NCTC . . . being sent to NCTC was considered career-ending.”

Turf: Who Writes for the President?

From the analysts’ perspective, the central problem was substantive turf: Who had responsibility for writing on CT issues, especially in the President’s Daily Briefing and other senior-level publications? In a few cases, managers and analysts devised ways to collaborate—a matrixed joint cell on weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear technologies was set up, for example. A former IC colleague who lived through this challenging transition period summed it up as well as anyone: “Over time, the relationship became more civil, and productive; while some of the rancor disappeared, there were many in CIA who would never forgive NCTC for being a constant reminder of the many mistakes that led to 9/11, no matter that blame was spread widely and we were trying to learn, not point fingers.”

Another critical element of this conflict was information-sharing. Brennan described how the daunting physical and technical aspect of this sharing—requiring him to toggle between a half-dozen computers under his desk—paled in comparison to procuring approval for TTIC access to the databases of other agencies, particularly CIA’s and FBI’s. In the end, only the threat of raising the problem with President Bush led to a resolution.11

Over time, rotational assignments of many senior CIA managers, branch chiefs, and analysts to NCTC would ameliorate these tensions. These officers quickly experienced that timeless and sage observation: where you stand depends on where you sit. One NCTC manager smartly encouraged CIA analysts to volunteer for a rotational tour by describing exactly what NCTC analysts did and the kinds of unique information and access they enjoyed with other parts of the US government. His bottom line: a tour at NCTC can make you a better-informed and connected CT analyst.

Another former NSA colleague cited a perfect example of a metric for success: “The first time an NSA in-degree at CIA’s CTC called me at my NSA office and yelled at me about NSA not sharing (as a CIA officer would have), I knew we were making progress.”12 In short, there is nothing that alters one’s perspective like putting people in positions where they become “the other.”

Shock to the System

The creation of TTIC and NCTC moved some of the IC’s tectonic plates, but passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act in December 2004 firmly repositioned them. Coming in the wake of high-profile failings and subsequent investigations by the 9/11 and WMD
The transition from a CIA-led PDB process to one managed by ODNI had its bumps, but overall, I believe it went quite smoothly.

For CIA analysts, however, the most important change was captured in two short passages of the 236-page IRTPA: The DNI shall “act as the principal adviser to the President, to the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security.” The DNI would be responsible for providing national intelligence to the president, the heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch, to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders, to the Senate and House of Representatives, and to other persons as the DNI deemed appropriate.

Summed up in a DI “bottom-line up front” writing style, those passages would read: “The DNI is the president’s principal adviser on intelligence issues and that the DNI owns the PDB.

My job is to make sure we [the DI] become the DNI’s best friend.

So, let me get this straight. For years, analysts have complained about the burden and responsibility of producing the PDB each day. Now you are complaining that others might be taking on some of that burden?

My recollection may be a bit fogged by time, but I recall that a deafening silence followed his response.

The transition from a CIA-led PDB process to one managed by ODNI had its bumps, but overall, I believe it went quite smoothly. Early on, Kringen met with his counterparts from State/INR, DIA, and NSA to discuss how best to effect this transition. One former senior CIA manager noted the “organizational agility” of CIA and its IC partners in transitioning to an ODNI PDB. Several on-the-ground realities help explain why this transition in stewardship was not the trauma feared by some DI analysts—and why the percentage of PDB articles authored by non-CIA analysts usually hovered around 10 percent.

Most importantly, the PDB had to be produced each day, irrespective of new management or organizational differences. There was no time-out to set up a new process, let alone stand up an entirely new production team. In the early months of ODNI, CIA PDB staff largely ran the machine as usual, until the ODNI PDB staff was set up. The ODNI PDB staff, which managed coordination and oversaw the PDB briefers, had been led by senior CIA officers with deputies from other IC agencies. This has provided connectivity to CIA while facilitating IC engagement in the process. Logistics also were an important factor: the ODNI PDB staff set up shop across the hall from CIA’s PDB production staff and contiguous to the PDB briefers’ offices.

CIA’s nearly 50 years of experience in running the PDB’s production machinery ensured that CIA would continue to be a major force on the PDB. Muscle memory remained critical, as the production of PDB articles was—and is—a complex process with many moving parts. Indeed, it was this complexity that had long inspired DI analysts’ complaints about the work of conceptualizing, drafting, coordinating, editing, reviewing, pre-briefing,

---

a. Formally, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.
and so on. With the stand-up of the DNI, the PDB added more layers with ODNI review, including by the DNI or a senior deputy.

Well-intentioned ODNI calls to make the PDB a more IC product initially had little resonance with key IC players. Analysts at DIA, INR, and other agencies or departments had to meet the requirements of their bosses, who determined their promotions and careers. CIA analysts, on the other hand, for many years had viewed their main customers as the president and senior policymakers who received the PDB.

Several former IC colleagues believe the new IC PDB coordination process made for a more rigorous substantive review (a view I share), although they also agreed it sometimes made for longer days and more headaches. Senior ODNI PDB reviewers had to ensure all agencies had fully considered and coordinated on all PDB items. At times this could be stymied by classification or something as simple as differing schedules.

Over time, hundreds of IC analysts have written for the PDB, encouraged by the intrinsic reward of writing for—and sometimes briefing—the president, the opportunity to collaborate on multiagency analysis and modest but gratifying recognition, such as annual DNI awards for frequent PDB authors.

Toward a Community Culture
As worrisome as loss of the PDB seemed to some, a bigger challenge faced CIA’s analytic directorate: how best to best reconcile its ongoing efforts to improve its analytic tradecraft with ODNI’s initiatives for improving analysis and, more broadly, to instill a sense of shared identity and build a new IC-wide analytic culture.

To advance their vision of a more integrated community of analysts who could work more effectively to improve IC analysis, ODNI leaders launched myriad new innovative programs and training.

To advance their vision of a more integrated community of analysts who could work more effectively to improve IC analysis, ODNI leaders launched myriad new innovative programs and training, including: the Analysis 101 course for all new IC analysts, Intellipedia, Rapid Analytic Support and Expeditionary Response (RASER) program, the Summer Hard Problem program (SHARP), Analytic Space (A-Space, now I-Space), and the IC Olympics.15

In concept, a shared analytic ethos was a legitimate goal. Based on my own experiences as an analyst, I knew that regular interaction with my counterparts across the IC was valuable. Through hundreds of PDB coordination conversations with IC counterparts, countless NIE coordination sessions, joint briefings at the NSC and Congress, I had met and developed friendships with fellow Russia analysts across the IC. Through this shared work, I felt I had become a better analyst and, in turn, produced better analysis.

While the DI understood the value of, and supported, such innovative ODNI programs as Intellipedia, the A-Space and other programs and training, including the Library of National Intelligence, in a few cases—Analysis 101 and RASER, for example—we voiced concerns that led some in ODNI to view us as resisters. As one senior ODNI manager noted in May 2007, its “community-led approach has met with resistance at individual organizations; they want their analysts to adopt the local cultures before they learn the global culture.”16

This perceived resistance only reinforced the view among some IC counterparts of CIA’s arrogance, insecurity, and insularity. DDI John Kringen was not surprised, as he told DI officers more than once: “Only when you have served in another agency can you see just how much we are disliked in parts of the IC.” Having served at NGA for more than two years, Kringen knew this first hand. Awareness of this reality made it even harder to resist some new ODNI initiatives.

Analysis 101
The DI’s pushback on the Analysis 101 course warrants a closer look, as it exemplifies the “where you stand depends on where you sit” conundrum. Early on, a key element of the ODNI vision of an IC community of analysts was the building of a shared analytic foundation through the introduction of a four-week course for all new IC analysts. As one senior ODNI official put it: “The goal is to have new hires adopt a common way of thinking about analysis before they are captured by any individual culture.”17

The challenge for CIA was that in 2000 it had launched its own rigorous course for all new DI analyst hires known as the Career Analyst Program. This multweek course (the length has varied somewhat and is now 19 weeks) took new analysts offline at a time when DI office directors were clamoring for more analysts...
To carry an ever-expanding workload after 9/11. For context, the DI (like other IC components) had suffered major personnel losses in the post–Cold War era, and it was only after 9/11 that hiring ramped up again, initially to bolster our CT capabilities. By 2005, a few hundred new analysts were entering the workforce annually. Taking those new analysts offline another month for an ODNI course that we judged was redundant to CAP was hard to justify. Consequently, the DI agreed to only a token participation.

Meanwhile, Back at CIA
To appreciate more fully how ODNI and CIA analytic managers came to be out of sync on some issues—despite a shared goal of improving analysis—it is important to see exactly what was going on in CIA’s analytic directorate. While ODNI was conceptualizing and later launching its new initiatives to build a better, more integrated analytic culture during 2005–2007, CIA’s DI was well into its own variant of culture change, which had begun in 2003, largely because of our failing to correctly assess Iraq’s WMD programs. The DI made it a top priority to conduct a major internal review of the Iraq case because it was essential to learn, firsthand, how we went wrong—and to propose ways to ensure that similar problems in the analysis process would be averted in the future.

This DI effort began in earnest in the summer of 2003 under DDI Jami Miscik with the creation of the WMD Review Group and a high-profile analytic stand-down intended to take a fresh look at the DI’s approach to key intelligence topics.

WMD Review Group
Comprising about 10 fulltime officers (and another 10 parttime or short-tour officers), the group was tasked with examining all the intelligence on Iraqi WMD from the mid-1980s through 2003. They constructed a massive timeline to identify key inflection points in the analytic line as well as other issues that affected the analysis, such as sourcing and information technology problems.

The group’s findings would reach a wide audience. Shared with the WMD Commission, they helped inform the commission’s investigation and recommendations. The group’s work also was critical in helping DCI Tenet answer many questions from Congress, policymakers, and the media about what went wrong. Finally, the results were shared with the DI workforce, policymakers, congressional committees, ODNI leadership, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and many IC agencies.

Analytic Stand-Down
Another of Miscik’s key effort was declaration of a stand-down in our analysis. Of course, day-to-day production continued, but the DI used this period to revisit its analytic lines, assumptions, and tradecraft on key intelligence topics. Managers and analysts involved in these reviews then briefed their findings to the entire DI workforce in several large sessions at CIA Headquarters.

Miscik’s successor, John Kringen, arrived in January 2005. He built on these actions, investing significant resources, time, and energy to try to ensure that lessons learned about analytic tradecraft were translated into new processes and procedures at all levels of the DI. Key follow-on measures included:

- Publication of a structured analytic technique (SAT) handbook detailing tools like testing assumptions, devising strong hypotheses, and red teaming.
- Launch of a mandatory two-day course for the entire DI cadre that covered the use of these SATs in a discussion of analytic tradecraft.
- Incorporation of the Iraq WMD case study and the use of SATs into DI training programs like CAP.
- Creation of tradecraft cells to apply these lessons, tools, and techniques into daily analytic work.

Analytic Intelligence Integration: How and Where It Happens
The creation of the ODNI and its authorities gave real impetus to institutional and procedural changes aimed at deepening intelligence integration among the IC’s analyst cadre. From my vantage point and firsthand experiences, several processes,
activities, and programs helped forge closer IC collaboration and integration during these early years of the ODNI. The common theme in these activities is people-to-people interaction—usually constructive and collegial—that builds the working relationships critical to deep intelligence integration.

The most obvious example of regular daily interaction is the coordination and review process among IC analysts and managers at many levels—from authors to editors to senior reviewers—helping them to become more familiar with and gain understanding of each other. Such analytic engagement and collaboration occurred in many venues.

Beyond expanding participation in the PDB process, supporting the White House Deputies and Principals Committee meeting process has furthered intelligence integration. President Bush’s Chief of Staff Andy Card asked inaugural DNI John Negroponte to bring the DCIA to PDB briefing sessions, which then carried over to the PC and DC meetings.23

This “two seats” procedure at these high-level policy deliberations continued under President Obama and preserved the opportunity for senior-level IC collaboration. The ODNI and CIA representatives usually consulted beforehand to discuss the division of labor and afterward how to respond to taskings. This had the effect of broadening opportunities for the IC. Before the creation of the ODNI, the NIC had primarily relied on CIA analysts for such support.

**Joint Duty**

In response to the IRTPA, ODNI created a joint duty requirement that all officers seeking promotion to senior executive level spend one year in more than one IC element. This is one of the most effective means of developing senior IC analysts and managers with broader IC perspective and advancing the intelligence integration process. Having senior officers from one’s home agency often facilitated access to and knowledge of other key counterparts—as I discovered in multiple dealings with CIA officers serving at State, DIA, FBI, Treasury, and DoD.

**Presidential Transition**

The handoff of this important task from CIA to ODNI during the 2008–2009 transition from Bush to Obama went quite smoothly, considering this was the first time ODNI managed the process.

**National Intelligence Council**

The NIC had long been an IC integrated entity, responsible for production of national intelligence estimates and other coordinated IC products. National intelligence officers and deputy NIOs lead IC analysis on regional and functional issues and provide valuable opportunities for analytic collaboration and information sharing among top IC analysts. With the creation of the ODNI, more non-CIA officers joined the NIC.24 A good number of outside experts from academia and the think-tank world also have served as NIOs, providing other channels for IC analysts to engage top experts in their fields.

**National Intelligence Managers**

Charged with integrating IC collection and analysis, the NIMs gain unique insights into the collection world and work with analytic counterparts to focus and drive collection on specific topics. Created by DNI James Clapper, and staffed by officers from across the IC, NIMs

The handoff of [the presidential transition process] from CIA to ODNI during the 2008–2009 transition from Bush to Obama went quite smoothly, considering this was the first time ODNI managed the process.
provide another means of integrating collection and analysis.

**National Intelligence Board**

Chaired by the DNI or PDDNI, and managed by the NIC chairperson, these meetings bring together analytic managers of all the IC elements to finalize the coordination of NIEs. Quite apart from the substantive exchange and the identification of analytic differences, these gatherings are an important venue for fostering and expanding IC-wide relationships among senior managers. I attended many NIBs chaired by DNI Clapper and NIC Chair Chris Kojm; both conducted a very collegial process—one that proved extremely valuable for advancing the kinds of collaboration and relationship-building central to effective intelligence integration.

**Senior IC Forums**

In the early years of the ODNI, the DDNI for Analysis convened monthly meetings of the National Intelligence Analytic Production Board (NIAPB, now the National Intelligence Analysis Board). This board comprises the heads of analysis of all the IC entities and proved to be a highly valuable activity. Apart from developing relationships with analytic manager counterparts, these meetings provided a venue to discuss common problems and issues, share best practices, and essentially, create a shared community of interest. Such relationships also helped facilitate consultancies on rotational assignments and problem-solving on resource or turf issues.  

**Closing Thoughts**

In my conversations with former IC colleagues, the most cited challenge in navigating the post-9/11 landscape has been culture change. This vast subject is well beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say that the establishment of TTIC/NCTC and the ODNI were especially difficult because they required changes in deeply rooted CIA cultures. I can vividly recall serious discussions with CIA analysts about whether the creation of the ODNI meant that CIA was no longer “Central”—and whether we could even call ourselves the Central Intelligence Agency anymore.

Culture change often entails the redefinition of a long-established identity. The degree of resistance faced by the change-agents seems to correlate closely with the magnitude of that identity shift. Effecting a psychological shift in one’s core identity takes time, patience, and the right kind of leadership.

In the case of CIA’s analytic directorate, the advent of the ODNI did lead the DI to adjust its culture and become more open, engaged, and collaborative with IC partners. Culture has retained its core elements: an ethos of service to policymakers and, more broadly, to the national security of the US; a strong “can-do” attitude that responds to the many taskings and requests from a range of US policymakers in the executive and legislative branches; and an unwavering commitment to provide objective analysis—even if it is unwelcome.

Success in the analytic mission will depend, in part, on how well we nurture and sustain a learning culture that draws upon the lessons of past successes and failures and that reviews the basis of key assumptions, and considers alternative views—much like the Red Cell. Improving analysis is a never-ending quest; in my view, intelligence failures can never be eliminated. They can, however, be reduced. Effectively drawing on the expertise of the IC’s many talented officers is essential to that quest.

While working to navigate the challenges of large culture change in the decade after 9/11, I could not know that even larger culture changes loomed closer to home inside the walls at Langley: then-DCIA John Brennan’s massive restructuring of CIA in 2015, the single biggest institutional change in CIA since DCI Walter Bedell Smith’s organizational changes to CIA in the early 1950s. Brennan’s mission-center construct forced the integration of four very different CIA cultures (for analysis, operations, support, and science and technology) and added the new Directorate for Digital Innovation (DDI) to the mix. My post-9/11 experiences convinced me of the value and necessity of this ambitious restructuring, but I also
knew that such major cultural change also would engender serious tensions and even resistance, especially in the start-up years. As the deputy director of the new Europe-Eurasia Mission Center, I had a ringside seat at this amalgamation of some deeply rooted cultures. But that is another integration story.

**Endnotes**

1. Not every intelligence integration effort resolves conflict. CIA’s rendition, detention, and interrogation program after 9/11 engendered strong support and strong criticism, both within and outside the CIA. A review by CIA’s inspector general in 2004 cited objections from senior program managers “as well as analysts, interrogators, and medical officers.” The IG report and the declassified report in 2014 by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence attest to a highly acrimonious debate about the efficacy and ethics of that program.
2. David Priess, *The President’s Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence Briefings to America’s Presidents from Kennedy to Obama* (Public Affairs, 2016), 224.
7. Peter Clement interview with former senior CIA manager.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 146–47.
11. Clement interview with former senior IC manager.
12. Clement interview with former senior CIA manager.
13. Ibid., 2.
14. Many references to CIA’s WMD Review Group can be found in its *Report to the President of the United States* (US Printing Office, 2005). See page 199 for a discussion of the group’s creation.
17. The SAT handbook can be found at: https://cia.gov/resources/csi/books-monographs/a-tradecraft-primer/.
22. Note: This kind of IC collaboration among senior managers was occurring in limited ways before 9/11. In the 1980s, for example, I recall a senior office director for the USSR convening monthly meetings of a Russia executive board, which included IC collection managers as well as analytic managers, to discuss substantive issues, collection priorities, and strategies. As DDCI and then DCI, George Tenet created IC-wide Hard Target Boards for each of the “hard target” adversaries, such as Russia, China, and Iran. These boards included the heads of major regional offices at the major IC entities to discuss ongoing work and resource issues, but the primary focus was on devising ideas for driving (and funding) collection on the most difficult intelligence problems.
From a Former ODNI Ombudsperson’s Perspective

Safeguarding Objectivity in Intelligence Analysis

Barry Zulauf

Analytic objectivity is a core ethic for intelligence professionals, something that analysts and managers of analysis are all expected to uphold. It is fundamental to the very idea of speaking truth to power. As DNI Avril Haines said earlier this year, “I want analysis that is not politicized or policy biased... I want you to know that I’m not going to be in any way retaliating against you if you don’t tell me what I want to hear.”

In today’s highly partisan environment, however, we have seen that the Intelligence Community is not immune to either external influence or internal disputes over policy preferences. That is where the statutory responsibilities of the ombudsperson for analytic objectivity are brought to bear: ensuring a venue for adjudicating potential cases of politicization in analysis.

I was appointed as the Intelligence Community analytic ombudsperson in 2018, a direct appointment by the DNI under the authority of the IRTPA. I was responsible for looking into real or perceived violations of the analytic standards codified in sections 1017 and 1019 of that law. By the time this article appears, I will be at Harvard University’s Belfer Center as a Recanati-Kaplan intelligence fellow. Because I will be stepping away from my duties for a while, I wanted to share some insights about my former role and how it has contributed to greater intelligence integration.

Within the IRTPA, three sections are relevant for our discussion:

• Section 1017 calls on the DNI to ensure that elements of the Intelligence Community conduct alternative analysis.

• Section 1019 requires the DNI to ensure that finished intelligence products are timely, objective, independent of political considerations, based upon all sources of available intelligence, and employ the standards of proper analytic tradecraft.

• Section 1020 calls on the DNI to appoint an individual who shall be available to analysts within the ODNI to counsel, conduct arbitration, offer recommendations, and, as appropriate, initiate inquiries into real or perceived problems of analytic tradecraft or politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objectivity in intelligence analysis.

b. Director of National Intelligence Confirmation Hearing, C-SPAN.org, January 19, 2021.

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.
The analytic integrity standards reflected in the IRTPA are rooted in the well-documented shortcomings of collection and analysis on al-Qa’ida’s plans to attack the United States on September 11, 2001 and on the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. The analytic integrity standards reflected in the IRTPA are rooted in the well-documented shortcomings of collection and analysis on al-Qa’ida’s plans to attack the United States on September 11, 2001, and on the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. We need not reprise them here; it suffices for our purposes to say that in both cases the analytic community relied on faulty or inadequate intelligence, did not consider alternatives or challenge assumptions, and was subtly influenced by prevailing mindsets about the threats posed by terrorism and Iraq’s WMD programs.

Writing for Studies in September 2010, Robert Cardillo, then serving as director of analysis at DIA and later as DDNI/II, observed:

Culture change often results from a crisis—the so-called burning platform—exemplified by our intelligence failures early in the decade and the corresponding investigative commissions. Under DNI leadership, the IC has implemented several game-changing initiatives to address two major problems: the quality of the analytic process (identified in the WMD Commission Report) and information sharing (identified in the 9/11 Commission Report).

Safeguarding Analytic Integrity and Objectivity

We took this detailed look at IRTPA to remind ourselves that analytic integrity and standards are not only good ideas—they are that—but they are also required under statute. The wording of the law by itself, however, is probably an insufficient guide for intelligence professionals on a day-to-day basis, so these standards were eventually articulated in ICD 203, most recently updated in 2015. You might have your own copy or one of the lanyard cards like the one I always wear around my neck. The question is, do we all pay attention to them?

ICD 203 directs that IC analysis should be guided by five analytic standards:

- **Objective.** Analysts must perform their functions with objectivity and with awareness of their own assumptions and reasoning.

- **Independent of political consideration.** Analytic assessments must not be distorted by, nor shaped for, advocacy of a particular audience, agenda, or policy viewpoint.

- **Timely.** Analysis must be disseminated in time for it to be actionable by customers.

- **All source.** Analysis should be based on all available sources of intelligence information.

- **Apply tradecraft.** Analysis should reflect tradecraft standards for accuracy, logic, argumentation, analysis of alternatives, confidence, probability, and presentation.

These standards are covered fairly extensively in analytic tradecraft training courses, reinforced in messaging by agency leadership teams, and emphasized in multi-layered editorial review processes. Quality evaluation programs at DIA, CIA, and ODNI, among others, help organizations track performance over time. On balance, our surveys and evaluations show politicization is rare. But what happens when analytic objectivity is compromised?

Politization, not Just Partisan

Let me address here what it means, in practical terms, for analytic objectivity to be compromised by politicization, and what an analytic ombudsperson is expected to do about it. I am speaking specifically of an attempt, successful or not, of politically appointed leadership to change analytic conclusions that were put forward by intelligence professionals. Or, managers attempting, successfully or not, to direct intelligence professionals to produce intelligence only in order to fit a predetermined conclusion or policy that would be preferred by customers. Or, analysts modifying their own analysis either to support or oppose a particular policy or partisan preference.

---


Let’s take a hypothetical example of an agency in which the senior-most leader, appointed by the president, was accused of attempting to distort analytic conclusions, suppress alternative analysis, and change analytic conclusions to suit the policy preferences of the political customers of that agency. This is a fictionalized scenario, but one very typical of the matters my deputy and I handled. There was also a range of other activities involving a broader category of unprofessional behavior: irregular tasking to avoid accountability, directing intelligence analysis toward particular conclusions, and changing of conclusions in order to meet policy preferences. All these actions can create an atmosphere in which analysts are demoralized, distrustful of leadership, and feel they cannot operate as part of the integrated intelligence enterprise because of leadership interference.

What makes this activity politicization and suppression of objective analysis? While agency leadership should edit intelligence products for tradecraft and substantive reasons (and all analysis is a corporate product), it is not acceptable when analysis is changed to suit a particular policy position or a senior customer’s political preferences.

Politicization is not necessarily about partisan politics. When analysis is changed to support a policy preference, this is politicization as much as shaping intelligence explicitly to support one political party over another.

Organizations, including IC agencies, have many levers of power that could be used to persuade or compel analysts to produce intelligence that leans a particular way: favorable or unfavorable assignments, travel opportunities, and performance evaluations, for example. Analysts might have to deal with those levers of power if they risk bringing instances of politicization to the attention of either their own management or to analytic ombudsmen. That is a lot to ask of analysts, but it is exactly what is needed.

Doing the Right Thing

Every intelligence professional has the ethical responsibility to stand up to politicization and the potential consequences. That brings to the forefront an issue that we don’t talk about much: the element of moral courage. When faced with politicization, what can analysts do? What should we expect our leaders to do when they are made aware? When do we need analytic ombudspeople to help broker a solution?

Moral courage comes into play when analysts notice their objectivity being suppressed or politicization going on. They are professionally responsible to first bring it to the attention of leaders. The analysts might not have enough power or they might be concerned for their careers. For lower ranking individuals, demonstrating that kind of moral courage is often difficult.

This is what analytical ombudsmen are for: to help protect individuals and create an environment where concerns can be aired. Analytic ombudsmen tend to be more experienced officers who can go to senior leaders, evaluate complaints, and inform senior leaders they have been in violation of tradecraft standards. I have been in the IC for 35 years and, as the IC analytic ombudsperson, I had the seniority and the backing of the DNI to be able to do that. I saw it as my responsibility to support any analyst bringing forward a violation of tradecraft standards, and I believe the DNI would, too.

My recent experience authoring the Analytic Ombudsman’s Report on Politicization of Intelligence on Election Interference illustrates how far we can and should be willing to go in support of analytic objectivity.

The Zulauf Report

In late 2020, in response to IC complaints about analysis of threats to US elections from China and Russia, I reviewed the IC’s published analysis, interviewed working-level analysts and senior leaders alike, and compared public statements by IC officials to the written record. As I wrote in my memo to the acting
chairman and vice chairman of the SSCI:

Looking back over the past year, it is evident that what began as mischaracterization of IC analytic assessments by ODNI officials escalated into an ongoing widespread perception in the workforce about politicization and loss of analytic objectivity throughout the community on the topics of Russian and Chinese election influence and interference. Politicization need not be overt to be felt. This report documents the reality of both attempts to politicize and perception of politicization of intelligence.a

Our review found that “pressures from our political leaders have sometimes placed demands on us that have translated into what might seem like bias or a loss of objectivity, rather than attempts to politicize intelligence by our leaders or analysts,” but we also documented incidents where individuals, or groups of individuals, taking willful actions that—whatever their motivations—that of politicizing intelligence, hindering objective analysis, or injecting bias.

Want I want to convey here is the human dimension of trying to ensure analytic objectivity and avoiding politicization of intelligence. What did it mean for me, both personally and professionally? What did it mean for the people involved with the report? The individual analysts who brought the issue to my attention did so at some risk to themselves because they were pointing to real or perceived actions by their managers to suppress certain analytic conclusions or to otherwise politicize intelligence. All the analysts who spoke with me first asked their managers for help, and almost all of them told me that they got no satisfaction. Accordingly, they approached their agency analytic ombudspersons—all agencies are supposed to have them. The ombudspersons from three agencies, in turn, came to me. We all agreed that tradecraft had been violated, and that it happened as part of a large-scale pattern with traces leading to the top of the ODNI.

Just as the analysts put themselves at some risk in coming forward, I was now in a risky situation. My then deputy, Christie Rapetti, and I had to carry out the inquiry, gathering documentary evidence, interviewing analysts, managers, and high officials. The inquiry showed that powerful agency leaders and IC leaders were involved, including the officials for whom I worked.

I had to consider on the one hand that my ethical duty as ombudsperson was to shine a light on the politicization. On the other hand, I had to consider what doing so could mean for me personally and professionally. I got advice from attorneys, from former analytic ombudspersons, from senior leaders who were not involved in the politicization. They all told me that it was my clear duty to see the inquiry through to the end, wherever it led. I owed that to the analysts who had come forward.

Finally, I convinced myself that if I didn’t do it, somebody else would have to. And some time in the future it would all come out anyway, so I had better have my name attached to a clear statement of what was wrong and needed to be fixed.

Politicization is not just something theoretical in our textbooks and lectures. It is real. It undermines the national security of the United States. It is the exact opposite of what we are supposed to do as intelligence officers. What we aim for is a healthy challenge culture, where we can question our work and the work of our colleagues. Minority views and alternative analysis are not suppressed. That is how we produce unbiased analysis objectively based on the facts. We do not shade the analysis based on our own personal opinions, policy preferences, or politics.

All of us involved in the process felt pressure from the tenor of public discourse, from a political process in which intelligence had been turned into a weapon, and from elected leaders and their staff who wanted loyalty more than objectivity. The politicization report brought this out into the open.

Where To Go From Here

What made it possible for the ombudsperson process to come out in the positive way that it did? A few intelligence professionals showed the

---
a. Barry Zulauf, Letter to Acting Chairman Mark and Vice Chairman Warner, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Reference 2020-3029, January 6, 2021.
required moral courage when it mattered the most. The analysts showed moral courage to come forward. They tried with their own management and got nowhere. Analytic ombudspeople in the agencies showed moral courage by supporting the analysts’ message. We must have the moral courage to tell bosses what they do not want to hear. That is what we are paid to do, whether the boss likes it or not. We must be prepared to take the consequences.

Christie Rapetti and I sat across from then DNI John Ratcliffe and informed him that, in our view, he and other IC leaders had violated statute and IC directives. Of course, I had the documentation to back it up and was able to prove it to him. I had a resignation letter typed out and signed in my pocket. If he tried to fire me I was going to beat him to the punch.

That was not the reception we got. Although he thought he would face a lot of criticism from Congress, DNI Ratcliffe made sure that the report went out without any changes.

After DNI Haines was sworn in, she told me she accepted the report’s findings and wanted to make the necessary fixes. She went on record in her confirmation testimony and statements to the workforce how she will back analysts when they make tell truth to power.

As a community, how do we turn words into action? This episode offers the IC an opportunity for our leaders to own the mistakes, to take steps to correct what went wrong, and move forward.

• We are developing a senior-level seminar on analytic objectivity for the whole IC.
• We are doubling down with webinars and workforce messages on the importance of alternative analysis and challenge culture.

As an intelligence fellow at the Belfer Center, I will spend the coming year writing, speaking, and organizing conferences on objectivity. I hope you can participate with me and help the IC live up to its ethical obligations and legal responsibilities to provide objective analysis. As President Biden said to the IC workforce on July 27, 2021:

You serve the American people no matter which political party holds power in Congress or the White House. It’s so vital, so vital that you are and should be totally free of any political pressure or partisan interference."

The author: Barry Zulauf was the IC ombudsperson for analytic objectivity during 2018–2021. He recently joined Harvard University’s Belfer Center as a Recanati-Kaplan intelligence fellow.

---

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.
For intelligence practitioners and scholars, making sense of this ever-growing library is daunting. What follows is a selection from the extensive literature on intelligence integration over the past two decades.

Phases of Intelligence Integration

There are three general phases in the literature of intelligence integration, although the lines between them are blurry because they reflect an interplay of events over time (like Iraq’s descent into civil war after the US invasion, the successes and missteps of US counterterrorism capabilities, or the long hunt for Usama bin Ladin), formal evaluations that offer retrospective looks and forward-looking recommendations (like the 9/11 and WMD Commissions), and executive or legislative actions with long-lasting effects (like IRTPA). These phases include:

- **Early reactions to 9/11**, including the US military response in Afghanistan and the preparations for and eventual invasion of Iraq. This shaped the commentary through the mid-2000s. Much of this initial phase played out in traditional print publications authored by familiar names, rather than argued on the internet (Twitter, for example, did not exist until July 2006).

- **The implementation period**, roughly the decade beginning in the mid-2000s through the mid-2010s. This reflects the impact of the 9/11 and WMD Commission findings and recommendations, passage of IRTPA in December 2004, and the stand-up of the ODNI in 2005, which saw a growing body of commentary and advice from current or former policymakers, intelligence officers, and outside experts. Many identified problems, with or without offering solutions, but most demanded change.

- **The post-reform era**, reflecting progress toward intelligence integration led by a maturing ODNI structure, but also unauthorized disclosures of US intelligence collection activities; criticism of CIA detention and interrogation programs; the emergence of new threats, like Russia’s meddling in the 2016 US presidential election; and the rapid development of new technologies, like artificial intelligence and machine learning.

**Early Reactions.**

From 2001 through about 2007, much of the external commentary focused on potential correctives to the structural and cultural impediments that contributed to the IC’s poor performance before 9/11 and in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, as documented elsewhere in this edition. Some observers, like former Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council Gregory Treverton [**Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information** (Cambridge University Press, 2001)] and Arthur Hulnick [**Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century** (Praeger, 1999)] were calling for reforms even before 9/11, but the floodgates opened wide in its aftermath.

Significant contemporaneous or retrospective assessments—many by knowledgeable observers or practitioners like Roger George, Rob Johnston, Richard Posner, and Amy Zegart—during this period include:

- Rob Johnston, *Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community* (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005)
- Melanie Gutjahr, *The Intelligence Archipelago: The Community’s Struggle to Reform in the Global-

---

For both relevance and accessibility, I focus on English-language publications, particularly from US imprints. I have excluded the many memoirs by former White House, defense, intelligence, and foreign policy leaders, which offer a complementary if often highly personal perspective on intelligence integration since 2001.

---

ized Era (Joint Military Intelligence College, 2005)


- Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (eds.), Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness (University of Texas Press, 2007)

- Roger George, “Building a Global Intelligence Paradigm,” Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 3 (September 2007)


- Amy Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of

9/11 (Princeton University Press, 2007)

Recommendations for reform echoed ideas that had long been debated inside the IC, and indeed the focus of many external blue-ribbon panels beginning in 1945.

Implementing Intelligence Reform.

With the establishment of the ODNI in 2005, many authors focused on analytic culture and IC leadership as challenging aspects of intelligence reform. Sometimes critics linked analytic failings to organizational shortcomings, while others treated them as separate challenges. Calls came from many quarters (mirroring discussions that were occurring inside the agencies) for increased analytic rigor, including more frequent use of structured analytic techniques and a closer review of analytic papers. Some suggested adopting a lessons-learned protocol and adjustments to the intelligence cycle. Day-to-day work practices (such as the need for more open-source information) were questioned, too.

Key publications include:

- Ronald A. Marks, Spying in America in the Post 9/11 World: Domestic Threat and the Need for Change (Praeger, 2010)

---
a. A worthwhile companion to Preventing Surprise Attacks is the review by the late Stanley Moskowitz, who wrote Posner “brings a fresh and welcome perspective to hoary intelligence issues, drawing on mathematics, economics, and organizational theory.” Studies in Intelligence 50, no. 3 (September 2006).
The maturation of intelligence integration under a DNI-led IC has occurred in parallel with rapid advancements in information technology

• David Omand, *Securing the State* (Columbia/Hurst & Co., 2010)


• Mark Phythian, *Understanding the Intelligence Cycle* (Routledge, 2013)

*Postreform Realities*

The maturation of intelligence integration under a DNI-led IC has occurred in parallel with rapid advancements in information technology: big data, ubiquitous technical surveillance, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and social media, among other advances. Collectively they have increased the IC’s capabilities, raised concerns in some quarters about privacy and government overreach, and intensified calls for further adaptation.

A number of important works, many by intelligence veterans, some by investigative reporters, have explored those themes:


• Anthony Olcott, *Open Source Intelligence in a Networked World* (Continuum, 2012)


• Brent Durbin, *The CIA and the Politics of US Intelligence Reform* (Cambridge University Press, 2017)


**Conclusion**

Intelligence officers accept the truism that their successes are secret, their failures are public. Over the IC’s seven-plus decades, real and perceived intelligence failures have animated public debates over intelligence reform much more so than its many achievements. Whether intelligence integration as we presently envision it will enable the IC to navigate the challenges ahead must be left to historians of the future, who will have access to more of the record than is available now. In the meantime, intelligence professionals will vigorously apply themselves to integration initiatives to ensure that reliable intelligence is available to their customers, wherever they might be. Reform has always been woven tightly into the fabric of US intelligence.
Books Reviewed in *Studies 65, no. 3* (September 2021)

Reviews can be found on the Internet at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/

Hayden Peake’s Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf will return in the December issue.

---

**Top Secret Canada: Understanding the Canadian Intelligence and National Security Community**
Reviewed by Joseph W. Gartin

**Ethel Rosenberg: An American Tragedy**
Reviewed by J. E. Leonardson

**Dead Doubles: The Extraordinary Worldwide Hunt for One of the Cold War’s Most Notorious Spy Rings**
Reviewed by Graham Alexander

**Operation Dragon: Inside the Kremlin’s Secret War on America**
Reviewed by Graham Alexander

**The Grey Men: Pursuing the Stasi into the Present**
Reviewed by J. E. Leonardson

**The Light of Days. The Untold Story of Women Resistance Fighters in Hitler’s Ghettos**
Reviewed by J. R. Seeger

**Underground Asia – Global Revolutionaries and the Assault on Empire**
Reviewed by J. R. Seeger

**Chaos: Charles Manson, the CIA, and the Secret History of the Sixties**
Reviewed by Leslie C.

★ ★ ★
For many US intelligence officers, the workings of the Canadian intelligence system are at once familiar and foreign. Despite the depth and breadth of ties between Canadian and US agencies since the mid-20th century, not to mention proximity and at least one (mostly) common language, important differences abound. How has the Canadian intelligence community evolved, especially since 2001, and under what authorities? What is the Privy Council Office and how does it differ from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)? What are the responsibilities of the national intelligence and security adviser? How are responsibilities divided between the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE)? How does parliament oversee intelligence activities, who protects the border, and what is the intelligence role of Public Safety Canada? Where do the Canadian armed forces fit in?

To answer these and many other questions, the Institute of Public Administration of Canada has sponsored the preparation of *Top Secret Canada: Understanding the Canadian Intelligence and National Security Community*. The institute is the country’s largest professional organization focused on promoting good government at the local, provincial, and federal levels. The work’s three editors have approached the topic organizationally rather than thematically, which makes the book a more readily usable reference; most of the 15 chapters focus on key offices and departments, from the PMO (29) to the, at least superficially familiar, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and finally to oversight and the Canadian IC’s relationship with the media.

That *Top Secret Canada* is the first comprehensive look at the Canadian IC is remarkable in itself, compared to warehouses of books written on US spy agencies. As Carvin et al. note, the “lack of literature on Canadian intelligence and national security is puzzling. Although Canada is often described as a ‘middle power,’ when it comes to intelligence, the story is more complicated.” (3) After all, Canada is a Five Eyes member, the “most elite intelligence-sharing arrangement in the world,” (3) with bilateral and multilateral security obligations. For example, the signals intelligence agency CSE was founded in 1946 and, like our National Security Agency, has grown to have responsibilities for signals collection and for information technology security. (73)

And yet the capabilities and ambitions of the Canadian IC remain modest. Some of these limitations are down to small scale (Canada’s population is about a 12th of the US population), reliance on British and then US capabilities, and what might be thought of as Canada’s cultural identity in the 21st century: an emphasis on privacy and human rights, misgivings about federal powers, and skepticism about the use of force. Like the US IC, the Canadian IC has ridden a roller coaster of fluctuating budgets and public attitudes, from post–Cold War slump (often referred to as the “decade of darkness” under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien) (204) to post-9/11 investments in programs to prevent terrorism, violent extremism, cyber attacks, and most recently malign foreign influence.

*Top Secret Canada* explores how the growth of the intelligence apparatus since 9/11 led to concerns over government infringements on free speech and privacy (including for financial transactions [115]), as in other democracies, but also to innovations like the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, aimed at anti-radicalization efforts. (181) Post-9/11 investments likewise revived Canada’s defense intelligence function (known today by the unwieldy acronym CFINTCOM), which editor Thomas Juneau characterizes as having been “insular, operationally focused, dominated by the military, and beset by internal problems.” (214–15) Plus-ups in one area often mean cuts in others, however, and Global Affairs Canada—the entity responsible for diplomatic, consular, and international trade issues—is grappling with mission creep and difficulty recruiting, developing, and retaining staff in a competitive economy. (228)
Carvin et al. keep the focus on Canada, but threaded throughout are connections to the US IC. Some highlight areas of cooperation, but *Top Secret Canada* also captures some of the sources of friction. Trafficking of drugs (north to south) and guns (south to north) (159) are long-standing challenges for the Canada Border Services Agency; in the post-9/11 environment, the need to cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism butted up against civil liberties protections, while under the Trump administration disagreements emerged over how to handle asylum seekers. (158)

The closing chapters on the media and oversight offer other lessons on similarities and differences. Contributor and journalist Alex Boutilier acknowledges the tension between the free press and intelligence services, but he cites 2018 polling to argue that trust in Canadian intelligence agencies is high, as is confidence in the media to report fairly and accurately. Boutilier notes trust in both directions is essential. “The security and intelligence community needs the public’s confidence for their findings and threat assessments to be taken serious—not dismissed as politically motivated hit jobs or nefarious ‘deep state’ puppet mastery.” (280) Such an argument seems likely to resonate with many US readers.

Ottawa’s approach to oversight and review of intelligence activities will be less familiar, however. There is no prominent role for Parliament akin to the congressional oversight in the United States that grew out of Watergate; “until very recently, oversight in Canada was almost entirely a function of the executive branch.” (258) Review bodies like the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), created in 1984 along with CSIS, have struggled to keep pace with changes in the pace and scope of intelligence activities. Contributor Leah West cites the SIRC’s annual report in 2012 that warned that “preventing and investigating threats to national security in the globalized digital age demanded swift information-sharing between Canadian agencies and their foreign partners.” (259) Similarly, she observes, “Review of the RCMP’s national security mandate had been, in practice, almost non-existent.” (261)

*Top Secret Canada* is a thorough and serious treatment of Canada’s multifaceted intelligence community and a significant contribution to the intelligence literature. It deserves a spot on the bookshelf of every scholar focused on Canadian defense and national security issues as well as the broader field of intelligence.

The reviewer: Joseph Gartin had been a career CIA intelligence analyst and senior manager. He led the CIA’s Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis. He retired as CIA’s chief learning officer. He recently became this journal’s managing editor.
Intelligence in Public Media

Ethel Rosenberg: An American Tragedy

Reviewed by J. E. Leonardson

It’s not every day that a book on espionage manages to quote Sylvia Plath, but then Ethel Rosenberg is not your average subject for a spy biography. Almost 70 years after her execution, she remains enigmatic. Two especially intriguing questions—who was the real Ethel Rosenberg, not the Ethel of myth and caricature, and why did she choose to die rather than confess and save herself?—still hover over the history of the case and are the issues that Anne Sebba addresses in her new biography of Ethel. It is an interesting work, but it still fails to rescue Ethel’s historical reputation.

Sebba begins with a bleak portrait of Ethel’s early life. Born Ethel Greenglass in 1915 to immigrant Jewish parents, she grew up in poverty on Manhattan’s Lower East Side. Ethel was an intelligent girl who did well in school and showed promise as a singer and actress. Her mother, Tessie, however, believed Ethel was destined for marriage and motherhood and thus saw no value in her daughter’s academic performance. Instead, Tessie belittled Ethel’s accomplishments and reserved her affections for Ethel’s brothers, especially David, the baby of the family. With no chance for further education, Ethel went straight from high school to clerical work. She continued acting in neighborhood productions and gradually became involved in labor organizing and left-wing politics, to which she lent her theatrical talents. For the most part, however, Ethel was going nowhere until December 1936, when she met Julius Rosenberg.

At first glance, Julius was quite a catch. A student in electrical engineering at City College of New York, he seemed to have a bright future, shared Ethel’s leftist politics and, unlike her family, treated her with respect and affection. Ethel, in return became passionately devoted to Julius and her world came to revolve around him; she gave up her dreams of acting and singing and instead made Julius and his political activism the “the prism through which she viewed her life.”

Unfortunately, Julius turned out to be a poor choice of husband. At the start of their marriage, the couple lived on the brink of poverty but, while World War II raged, Julius worked in relatively well-paid defense industrial and government jobs. Suspicions that he was a communist—accurate, as it happened—limited his prospects, however, and eventually caused him to be fired. After the war, he and David Greenglass opened a small machine shop. Almost from the start, it teetered on the brink of failure, and Julius and Ethel barely scraped by. In fact, Julius’s only professional success was as a spy. Recruiting friends from City College, in 1941 he had formed a ring stealing defense technologies and then—after David was drafted in 1943 and a year later sent to Los Alamos—atomic secrets for the Soviets. At the end of the war, even this success came to an end as the Soviets, rightly fearing the FBI was starting to uncover their spies, “deactivated” him. (Ethel, it is important to note, was aware of and approved Julius’s spying but played at most a minor role in the ring’s work.)

Ethel had plenty of difficulties beyond money and Julius’s foundering careers. The couple had their first son, Michael, in 1943. He proved to be a difficult baby and young child, and Ethel was desperately unsure of herself as a mother. She worked hard at motherhood—Ethel “identified as a mother and homemaker, and being a good one really mattered to her,” says Sebba—reading parenting books and magazines and, ultimately, seeking help from a child therapist and a psychiatrist. The couple’s second son, Robert, arrived in 1947 and was a much easier baby, but tight budgets and Ethel’s continuing difficulties with Michael left her further and further from the mainstream postwar culture that emphasized women’s roles as wives to prosperous husbands and competent mothers to their children.

Ethel’s world collapsed completely in 1950. The FBI had been closing in and came for David on June 5th. He quickly confessed and the Bureau arrested Julius the next day. Agents came for Ethel in August. During the summer, Tessie and the family turned against Ethel, friends and neighbors began to avoid her, and money ran short. Just as bad, her attempt to present herself to the media as a good wife and homemaker turned into a public relations disaster. Inviting reporters to the family’s

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
apartment a few days after Julius’s arrest, Ethel tried to play the “role of an unassuming housewife . . . [but ] did not convince” and instead left the impression of an unemotional “Communist wife, not telling the truth, who had allowed the family unit to be destroyed.” Ethel’s image never recovered from the debacle. With her plain looks, dowdy clothes, and refusal to confess not even for the sake of not orphaning her sons, she was easily branded as someone who rejected midcentury American values and gender roles, and who therefore, must have been guilty of betraying her country. On top of this, to save himself David committed perjury by testifying that Ethel had been an active participant in the spy ring. Even before she faced the might of the Justice Department, FBI, and a blatantly biased judge—while she was defended by small-time lawyers who were in far over their heads—Sebba tells us, Ethel never had a chance.

Still, Ethel could have saved herself. Until the moment she was put into the electric chair in June 1953, the government would have spared her life had she confessed (Julius received the same offer). Sebba says this was simply unacceptable to Ethel. Not only did she believe that she and Julius had done nothing wrong and therefore had nothing to confess, but Ethel had additional reasons to refuse. In particular, Ethel had a “determination to make something valuable of her life according to her own moral standards,” which in her case meant following the communist party line “uncritically, unquestionably and aggressively.” To have confessed would have been a betrayal of these beliefs. Reinforcing this was the same perfectionism that drove Ethel to do well in school, try to make a career as a singer, and then seek to improve herself as a mother. At the end, it translated into a determination to show “dignity, confidence, and courage” in the face of death.

Sebba is best on these aspects of Ethel’s personality. She gives us Ethel as a victim and outsider, a woman doomed because of the betrayals of those around her as well as misogyny and her failure to conform to the cultural expectations of the day. These are aspects of Ethel’s life that seldom have been discussed and, it must be said, Sebba arouses a certain amount of sympathy for her.

When women’s history meets intelligence history, however, Ethel Rosenberg becomes muddled. An English journalist and author of biographies of women as varied as Jennie Churchill, Wallis Simpson, and Mother Theresa, Sebba clearly is not familiar with the complexities of espionage cases and spies’ motivations. She relies mostly on secondary sources and provides only superficial accounts and analyses of key points, leaving readers with little context. Sebba’s account of the spy ring and its activities, for example, is fragmented and her understanding of New York’s Jewish immigrant culture seems based on reading Irving Howe and little else—describing matzoh as a “traditional Jewish flatbread” suggests a lack of familiarity with Ethel’s milieu and the forces that propelled her toward communism. Sebba appears also to have only a cursory understanding of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) and its subordination to Soviet policy and espionage; her only comment on the Rosenbergs’ decision to remain loyal to the party in August 1939 when Germany and the USSR agreed to a nonaggression pact—a traumatic event for party members, especially Jewish communists—was that the couple simply accepted the “absurd line that the [pact] was an act of self-protection by Stalin.”

Moreover, while Sebba acknowledges that Ethel was complicit in Julius’s espionage, she tries to get her off the hook by arguing that Ethel believed the couple was “morally correct, on the right side of history” and, therefore, that they could never confess or, even in the minutes after Julius’s death, that she could not betray his memory by admitting to what they had done. “Was that a crime,” asks Sebba, “let alone a crime punishable by death?” The answer is: yes, it is a crime to be a party to your spouse’s espionage, even if it does not merit execution. Just ask Rosario Ames.

This is where, in my view, Ethel Rosenberg falls apart. Ambition, perfectionism, and a determination to make her death meaningful suggest an Ethel who sought to take charge of her destiny. But along the way Sebba shows us an Ethel whose support for Stalin and communism had veered into unthinking fanaticism, and remained so even as the CPUSA abandoned her and Julius. The first view gives us an active, thinking Ethel, the second takes away her agency and leaves her passive and, again, a victim. Sebba tries to resolve the contradiction by claiming that “by 1950 Communism was merely one aspect of Ethel’s ambiguous, many-sided life and it was not her principal focus.” Perhaps so, but by the eve of her execution three years later the question of whether to die for communism likely was uppermost in Ethel’s mind, and it appears that she accepted martyrdom for the cause. That the cause was
squalid and Ethel’s sacrifice was for a lie are points that Sebba dances around rather than confront. Given this, it’s hard to see exactly what is the “American tragedy” of the subtitle.

This is the difficulty for Sebba, and anyone else, who tries to make Ethel Rosenberg into a noble figure. As useful as it is to demonstrate that she was a multidimensional person who was as much sinned against as sinner, the truth remains that Ethel had choices and made her decisions. That she went along with Julius and his espionage, and then followed him to the bitter end, was her doing and no one else’s.

The reviewer: J. E. Leonardson is the penname of a CIA Directorate of Analysis officer.
English novelist Trevor Barnes has moved into the nonfiction realm with *Dead Doubles*, his account of how British and US intelligence compromised the Soviet Union’s Portland spy ring in the early 1960s. The title itself refers to the Soviet practice of using the birth certificates of deceased persons from Western countries to manufacture fake identities for illegals, or rather, Soviet intelligence handlers working abroad bereft of diplomatic immunity or any formal links to their home country. Barnes recounts the story of how MI5 used lead information in 1960 from Michael Goleniewski, the CIA’s penetration of Polish intelligence, to initiate surveillance against Harry Houghton and Ethel Gee, a middle-aged couple living in Portland, England. The two worked there at the sensitive Underwater Defense Establishment. Surveillance operations against the pair yielded additional information linking them to Soviet illegals Konon Molody, Morris Cohen, and his wife, Lona. All five were arrested in January 1961 after Goleniewski’s sudden defection. The British later sent all the illegals back to Moscow in exchange for British nationals imprisoned there.

*Dead Doubles* excels in framing the Portland network’s destruction within the wider context of the Cold War, the British diplomatic relationship with the United States, and the British government’s efforts to address the resulting blowback, compounded by the arrest of George Blake in 1961. Throughout the first parts of the book, Barnes sets his crosshairs on British intelligence and its efforts to identify, investigate, and eventually arrest the participants in the Portland ring. He does well afterwards to examine the fallout and how this affected individual parts of the British government. Spy scandals in democracies, the book reminds us, are never self-contained events exempt from resultant popular outcry, bureaucratic wrangling, and diplomatic turbulence. The most effective passages in the book focus on MI5’s cooperation with CIA on the Goleniewski lead and, subsequently, their collective efforts to examine the backgrounds of Molody and the Cohens, all of whom had lived in the United States for extended periods. Barnes recounts in appropriate detail the testimonies delivered as part of the so-called Romer Inquiry, a British government–sponsored lessons learned–style inquiry on the ring and how it had successfully operated for several years undetected on British soil. He credibly explains in these sections how the ring effectively delivered some 17,000 pages of documents that included code books, secret orders, and papers on sensitive submarine technology because of poor security practices in the Admiralty and British failure to act earlier on several circumstantial clues suggesting that both Houghton and the Cohens should have been suspected.

Ultimately for this reviewer, the book is a missed opportunity inasmuch as Barnes might have increased its value as an espionage study by telling the story more coherently, undertaking a more detailed analysis of poor Soviet tradecraft, and more closely examining related but less explored intelligence themes. First, other books have examined the Portland case at some length, and the seasoned intelligence scholar might credibly wonder what new ground Barnes intended to cover with his volume. The author makes no mention of earlier work in an introductory section, which instead treats the reader to a thriller-style account of how MI5 surreptitiously removed and examined Molody’s safe deposit box inside a London bank.

This event, which transpired relatively late in the bigger story, points to another frustrating aspect of the book: its organization. Barnes admits several times throughout that the continued classification of files related to the case in British, US, and Russian archives makes an authoritative account impossible. Instead, he has chosen a novelistic account that feels jarring instead of suspenseful, as transitions—even from paragraph to paragraph—often feel random. In addition, the book begins by reviewing MI5’s role in the operation and then hops awkwardly between players in and out of chronological order. A late chapter on the Cohens, for example, discusses their return to Moscow in 1969 as part of an exchange,...
while the very next chapter reviews their background and recruitment by Soviet intelligence. Barnes could, and should, have shifted the narrative order to create genuine suspense and to make this the kind of book he seems to have wanted.

Barnes omits in-depth discussion of what the case says about Soviet intelligence, a peculiar animal whose contradictions beg closer examination and explanation. The book details the extraordinary lengths to which the KGB and its predecessor organizations went to establish fake identities and legends for their illegals. One especially memorable passage mentions how Molody had his teeth drilled with a prearranged pattern in order to identify him to a dentist in Canada working for the Soviets. A separate meeting in Paris with a contact required a visual parole that required Molody to scratch behind his left ear with a bandaged finger.

The Soviets also used painstakingly developed sophisticated communications equipment with radio bursts designed to elude even the most vigilant British detection equipment. In contrast, the Soviets appeared blind to basic mistakes in tradecraft. The Cohens, for their part, were used as couriers in the United States for numerous high-value assets, including both Ted Hall and William Weisband. They fell under FBI suspicion even before moving to London because of their links to Rudolph Abel. As students of the genre know, this habit by 1950 succeeded in compromising nearly all of the Soviets’ painfully built networks in the United States. The Portland case suggests the KGB continued to employ it, however, perhaps for lack of a credible alternative.

Equally glaring, Dead Doubles would have benefited enormously by treating several themes with the same insight as the contextual ones listed above. Barnes at no point passes critical judgment of Molody, despite the illegal’s atrocious performance. Molody had allowed British intelligence to observe his meetings with Houghton and Gee on several occasions because of poorly chosen sites and apparent unfamiliarity with the idea of an initial contact point. The British were not even aware of Molody’s role until they surveilled Houghton and Gee meeting him in public spaces and restaurants in 1960, where they exchanged packages and talked conspiratorially—all the while ignorant of the MI5 surveillance in their immediate vicinity. MI5 then rolled to the Cohens because Molody parked his vehicle near their house and visited on numerous occasions, going so far as to overnight with them.

Separately, Barnes recounts how in the presence of MI5 personnel Molody encouraged the Cohens to reveal their activities to the British after their arrest in exchange for a reduced sentence. The Cohens refused and later joined Molody back in Moscow following an exchange. Molody died at the age of 48, within a year of the Cohen’s return, after receiving injections from the KGB that he complained were giving him headaches and in circumstances consistent with poisoning. Barnes reveals this information but is silent on what it suggests may have happened.

Finally, Barnes leaves unexplored the subject of Soviet–East European intelligence cooperation, itself a fascinating topic. Barnes indicates intriguingly that following Goleniewski’s defection and the implosion of the Portland network, the Soviets blamed their Polish counterparts for poor security and resolved to change their practices when dealing with satellite services, in particular with the Poles, whom they realized were inherently anti-Russian. Had Barnes treated this subject at greater length, he might have cast a well-known case in a fresh, thought-provoking framework. Doing so could have helped Dead Doubles resolve the book’s uneasy balance between a spy thriller and rote retelling.

The reviewer: Graham Alexander is the pen name of a CIA Directorate of Operations officer currently assigned to the Center for the Study of Intelligence.
“For fifty-six years, most of the world has believed that President John F. Kennedy was murdered by America. . . . This is a lie, set off fifty-six years ago by the KGB’s worldwide disinformation campaign called ‘Operation Dragon.’” (127) Thus arrives perhaps Operation Dragon’s most widely trumpeted claim well over halfway through a brief polemic written by recently deceased Romanian defector Ion Mihail Pacepa and former CIA Director James Woolsey. Operation Dragon builds in this sense on Pacepa’s 2007 book Programmed to Kill: Lee Harvey Oswald, the Kennedy Assassination and the KGB in its attempt to summon often highly circumstantial evidence in support of a Nikita Khrushchev sponsored, KGB plot. Not content to stop there, the authors also borrow heavily from Pacepa’s other work while traipsing through a plethora of real, but sometimes highly dubious, examples of Russian and Soviet perfidy. The book suffers throughout from this pattern of speculative, deductive reasoning, one that summons data useful for the construction of a KGB assassination narrative at the expense of a more balanced, thoughtful assessment of the facts.

Contrary to press reports and even the book jacket’s claims, Operation Dragon is not a book especially focused on the Kennedy assassination. It is instead a near-relentless screed designed to illustrate the unsurpassed evil and treachery of Russia and the Soviet Union. This version of the assassination fits inside the book because it is perfectly in sync with the authors’ thesis. Arguments consistent with this view range far and wide across the historical spectrum in a confused, seemingly random litany. In one early passage, readers are treated to details, in order of appearance, on: the 2007 Romanian film The Death of Mr. Lazarescu, Felix Dzerzhinsky’s support for Stalin after Lenin’s death, and Tsar Alexander II’s role in anti-Semitic pogroms. (18–21) Later, the book jumps from details on Ceausescu’s purges of the Politburo after Pacepa’s 1978 defection in one paragraph straight into a treatment of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia (118).

The confused rush of ideas extends even beyond the writing style. For example, the author’s discussion of of Oswald is sandwiched between standalone chapters on Mikhail Gorbachev’s use of glasnost to swindle the West and Soviet sponsorship of Yasser Arafat on both sides of the author’s discussion of Oswald. Factual errors arise with regrettable frequency. Operation Dragon claims, for example, that Stalin had Imre Nagy kidnapped and “hanged as a Jewish spy” (26), that the Kennedy assassination transpired on 20 November 1963, (82) and that the Soviets were “encouraged by the pact with Hitler” already in February 1939 and therefore decided to make public their plans to use bacteriological and chemical weapons. (173) Pacepa and Woolsey also advance highly questionable, conspiracy theory–style arguments unrelated to the assassination by suggesting, for example, that Ceausescu’s fall was the product of a Russian intelligence operation (101) or even that the Russians sponsored the 9/11 attacks. (119)

Pacepa and Woolsey craft their most coherent, though frustratingly disingenuous, argument when discussing the Kennedy assassination. Namely, they marshal circumstantial facts for their thesis while ignoring contrary details or dismissing them as disinformation. Numerous details long part of conspiracy literature are highlighted, Oswald’s two-month stint as a Marine at the U2 base in Atsugi, Japan; his use of firearms while living in Minsk; and his 1962 return to the United States with his Russian bride, Marina. The authors lean heavily on Oswald’s widely known relationship with Russian exile George de Mohrenschildt and his September 1963 travel to the Soviet embassy in Mexico City to suggest that he maintained an illicit relationship with Soviet intelligence. They claim that Oswald’s writings and documents contain hidden messages and thus prove he was actually a KGB trained assassin sent to the United States on a mission personally from Khrushchev because of the latter’s fury over the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis. Oswald’s communications with the Soviet embassy in Washington and his refusal to allow Marina to learn English are even
cited as evidence that he planned to return to Soviet Union after the assassination.

Stated generously, such claims fare poorly upon cross examination. To cite just one example, President Kennedy did not decide to visit Dallas until November 1963, and the Secret Service did not finalize the president’s route through Dallas until eight days before the trip. Any change in these plans would have prevented the KGB’s supposed master marksman from taking the shot from the Dallas Book Depository, where he had obtained a job through a chance series of events in October 1963—before Kennedy scheduled his trip. The book completely ignores Oswald’s mercurial personality, his overt affiliation with left-wing causes, and his meager savings. Perhaps most incredibly, it spends a significant amount of time attempting to explain why, after the assassination, Soviet and Cuban surprise and eagerness to disassociate themselves were merely part of an elaborate ruse to transmit disinformation back through compromised FBI sources (144–52). With welcome recognition that intelligence assets are difficult to control or predict, Pacepa and Woolsey do allow that the KGB changed its mind and attempted to stop Oswald after sending him to the United States. Alas, it is the one time in Operation Dragon where they admit that even Russian intelligence sometimes faces limitations in its designs to control the world.

The reviewer: Graham Alexander is the pen name of a CIA Directorate of Operations officer currently assigned to the Center for the Study of Intelligence.
The Grey Men: Pursuing the Stasi into the Present

Reviewed by J. E. Leonardson

The Grey Men: Pursuing the Stasi into the Present, retired FBI agent Ralph Hope’s account of the death and afterlife of the Stasi, East Germany’s internal security service,\(^a\) brings to mind what William Faulkner famously wrote: “The past is never dead. In fact, it’s not even past.”

In looking at the Stasi’s life after death, Hope has written several books in one. The first is a description of how the Stasi’s 91,000 officers protected the East German state by creating an all-pervasive network of informers among the country’s 16 million people to identify even the slightest whiff of dissent—real, potential, or imagined—and then crushing it pitilessly with arrests, torture, long prison sentences, and the destruction of individual and family lives. The second is an account of how the Stasi, seeing the handwriting on the wall in the late 1980s, prepared for the East German collapse by shifting enormous amounts of hard currency, perhaps billions of dollars, out of the country. This money, as Hope shows, helped finance the smooth transition of Stasi officers into respectable positions in reunited Germany.\(^b\) Last, Hope lays out how the Stasi officers have escaped any accountability for their deeds. Only one Stasi officer went to prison for his crimes and former Stasi officers receive German government pensions. Former senior officers live comfortably and often are active in organizations that seek to rewrite history by glorifying the East German regime, denying the Stasi did anything wrong, and denigrating their victims.

Through all of this, Hope portrays unified Germany as morally bankrupt. In his telling, German politicians and officials do not want to talk about the past out of fear that their pre-1990 moral compromises (or worse) will come to light. Moreover, while the full list of Stasi officers is available on the internet outside Germany, German privacy laws criminalize the revelation of a former officer’s past, with the result that they pop up in all kinds of places. In 1990, according to Hope, the “director of the Committee for the Dissolution of the Stasi had a personal assistant who had been an MiS officer . . . Fifty percent of his personnel were later found to have been Stasi employees.” The problems did not go away when the confusion of unification ended, however. “In 2009, two members of the security detail for Chancellor Angela Merkel were identified as former MiS officers . . . . One of them had worked with wiretaps for the Stasi for ten years . . . [and in] the ensuing investigation it was determined that fifty-eight former officers remained employed at the state prosecutor’s office.” Perhaps even worse, former officers and informers worked for years in the Stasi Archives, which Hope says explains why files mysteriously went missing.

If Hope wants to make his readers angry about Germany’s injustices and rank hypocrisy, he certainly succeeds. The problem with The Grey Men, however, is that it otherwise is hard to say what the book adds up to. Hope tells so many stories of suffering, criminality, and cover-ups that he begins to repeat himself—how many times does he need to make the comparison between the Stasi and the Gestapo, or talk about the effects of the privacy laws?—and the book loses focus. Many readers will only skim the second half or turn to other accounts of life in the bloc’s secret police states, such as Stasiland or My Life as a Spy.\(^c\)

That’s a shame, because those readers will miss Hope’s best point. Toward the end of The Grey Men, Hope says that the reason to remember what the Stasi was, what it did, and the suffering it caused is the same as remembering what the Nazis did—to ensure that it does not happen again. He is absolutely right about this, and while The Grey Men is a good starting point, it is far from the definitive work.

---

\(^a\) The Stasi’s official name was Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit (MfS, or Ministry for State Security).
\(^b\) The KGB did this, too. See Catherine Bolton, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West (William Collins, 2020).
\(^c\) Anna Funder, Stasiland: Stories from Behind the Berlin Wall (Granta, 2003) and Katherine Verdery, My Life as a Spy (Duke University Press, 2018).

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Resistance to tyranny does not always involve violence or revolt. In such a brutal and pitiless environment, even the collection and distribution of extra food and essential supplies was an act of defiance. Small acts of kindness such as the sharing of their meagre rations took on great significance and strengthened the determination of the persecuted to endure their suffering and survive.  

Historians live for a moment of discovery. It might be the discovery in a national archive, long buried in time. It might be a diary or a set of photographs in an attic. No matter the circumstance, the hope is that the moment will lead down a trail that takes them and, eventually, their readers to a long-forgotten time or place. Judy Batalion’s book, The Light of Days, begins with just such a discovery in the British Library. It was a simple enough quest, at first. She opens the book with a single sentence of her original plan. “I had been searching for strong Jewish women.”

Instead, what she found was a book written in Yiddish titled Freuen in di Ghettos (Women in the Ghettos) edited by Leib Spizman and published in New York City in 1946 by a small publishing house called Pioneer Women’s Organization. It recorded a series of memories of women who were members of the Jewish resistance in the ghettos of Nazi-occupied Poland. These women served in every possible job in the resistance from fighter to courier to propagandist to supporter (what unconventional-warfare experts would call “the auxiliary” providing supplies, support, and safe locations for the resistance). Women in the Ghettos described the lives and, often, the deaths of 175 different Polish women who fought the Nazis.

After that moment in the British Library, it took Batalion a dozen years and travels across the globe to turn her discovery into a book. Batalion selected a more manageable number of women in the list, including women who survived, or whose families survived, the Holocaust. In her book, she describes in detail the horrors these women faced and their intrepidity as they fought back against impossible odds as the Nazis put into effect their genocidal plans. These women were convinced they were facing certain death. In response to that belief, they chose resistance.

From the very start of World War II, Poland was caught in a vice with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union carving up parts of the country. When the Nazis invaded in 1939, the Polish Army fought using World War I technology against a modern German war machine. The German blending of armor, airpower and psychological operations resulted in the collapse of the Polish military and government and the wholesale displacement of the Polish population.

A small portion of the Polish Army and Air Force escaped to either the USSR or Great Britain. The rest of the population was left to their German occupiers. A nascent Polish resistance retreated into the forests and survived a hand-to-mouth existence until the end of the war. Moreover, those resistance groups were caught between two hostile forces: the Nazi occupation force and a Soviet Red Army that was nominally allied to the Germans until Operation Barbarossa in June 1941. Even after the Soviets entered the war, the Soviets were unwilling to support a Polish resistance that was not communist.

Before the war, Jewish communities faced prejudice from their Polish Catholic neighbors, but they were integrated into the economy and their children attended Polish schools and universities. Suddenly, that came to an end when the Germans isolated the Jews into ghettos in the major cities guarded by collaborating Polish police and, ironically, by collaborators within the Jewish community itself. Batalion’s book takes the reader through the horrific transition from initial isolation of the Jewish communities into ghettos through the starvation program during 1940–41 and then deportation of Jews to the extermination camps. The story of the Holocaust has been told many times, but when it is told through the eyes of the
people who lived through it, it is not hard to understand at first why the Jewish community decided to cooperate. The evil of the Nazi plan for the extermination of the entire population of the Jews was simply impossible to imagine. That said, there were some in the Jewish community who knew from the beginning that resistance was the only path to survival.

Operational security is one of the keys to any clandestine organization but most especially a clandestine resistance organization living under occupation. The early Jewish resistance movement in the ghettos had an advantage because the groups described in Batalion’s book began as clandestine socialist and communist movements hiding from the Polish government long before 1939. Once the first of the Nazi pogroms began in the Warsaw Ghetto in the spring and summer of 1942, these same movements went further underground and became the Jewish Fighting Organization, known by the acronym ZOB for the Polish Zydowska Organizacja Bojowa. From a small group in the Warsaw Ghetto, the ZOB expanded to the other major cities that held Jewish ghettos. The ZOB maintained a degree of connectivity among the various ghetto resistance groups using female couriers who could travel under false Polish documents that identified them as Polish Catholics. Most of the resources they used in their efforts were obtained through guile and direct attacks on Nazis and their Polish collaborators.

From the beginning the ZOB had few allies. Batalion describes the other resistance organizations as follows:

The Home Army (known in Poland as the Armia Krajowa or AK) was affiliated with the predominantly right-wing government in exile in London. The Home Army had an antisemitic leadership, even though many individual members were liberals who helped the Jews…. The People’s Army, on the other hand, was affiliated with the Communist Group (PPR), and, at the time, was the weaker of the two factions. The leadership of the People’s Army (Armia Ludowa, or AL) cooperated with the Soviets, and was more willing to collaborate with Jewish ghettos and forest fighters—frankly, with anyone who want to topple the Nazis. But they lacked resources.

The US and UK efforts to support resistance organizations in occupied Western Europe could not reach the Poles because of the long distance from Allied airfields. Small groups of Jews escaped the ghettos and moved into the forest. They became the focal point of Jewish armed resistance conducting small raids, sabotage, and even attacking some of the concentration camps. While the story of the armed Jewish resistance in the forests in Eastern Europe is better known through books and film, throughout more than five years of German occupation, pockets of the Polish Jewish community inside the cities conducted resistance operations and those pockets of resistance included nearly 200 women.

Initially these small attacks took place in the forests and in the cities on the Nazi occupation. That changed completely during the Warsaw Ghetto uprising from January to May 1943, when Jewish resistance forces attacked their Nazi occupiers in the city using small arms, Molotov cocktails, and homemade bombs. The uprising ended when the Nazis destroyed the entire Warsaw Ghetto. Batalion focuses considerable attention to the Warsaw Ghetto uprising as seen through the eyes of her women characters. In a few dozen pages, she describes military resistance in a city in ways that most historians either can’t or won’t describe. It is a brutal war of attrition, killings at close range, escapes through sewers, and gatherings in basements and in gutted buildings to fight another day. As with most of the vignettes in this book, it is not for anyone unprepared for detailed descriptions of the extreme violence.

This book is by no means the only one that describes the Jewish resistance to the Holocaust. And it is not the only book that focuses on women in the resistance forces in Europe. What makes the book important is Batalion’s in-depth research into the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the women members of the ZOB. Batalion used dozens of diaries and previously published research into Jewish resistance in Poland as well as interviews with

---

a. For additional information on the Polish resistance and the obstacles—geographic and political—to Western Allied support to the resistance, see Jonathan Walker, Poland Alone: Britain, SOE, and the Collapse of the Polish Resistance, 1944 (The History Press, 2011).
b. See Roland, The Jewish Resistance; Patrick Henry, ed., (Catholic University Press, 2014); and Nechama Tec, Defiance: The Bielski Partisans (Oxford University Press, 1993); Tec’s book was made into a film in 2008 starring Daniel Craig and Liv Schreiber.
Holocaust survivors and their relatives to create a series of tales of incredible bravery in the face of near certain death. Readers familiar with the efforts of the Special Operations Executive and the Office of Strategic Services already know that any operator, man, or woman, caught by the Nazis faced death. The difference in this case is that the men and women of the OSS and SOE were taught to disappear into the population of normal citizenry. In the case of these Jewish women, “disappearing” into the crowd first meant escaping the ghetto guards and then assuming an entirely different culture and language and sometimes engaging in anti-Semitic discussions on the streets and trains of Poland to accomplish their mission. One mistake meant immediate denunciation and certain death by torture or in the gas chambers of the camps in Poland.

This book is a series of stories offered in chronological order and describing in detail the courageous efforts of Jewish women in the ghettos of Poland. It is not about grand strategy, and Batalion makes no effort to explain the larger context of Poland, the resistance or even the larger organizational structure of the ZOB or other Jewish Resistance organizations. Instead, it is a heartfelt effort to ensure the names of these women are not lost in archives in Israel, the United States, or the United Kingdom. Few survived the war. Fewer still survived the arrival of the Red Army “liberators.” And even those who made it to Israel after the war were rarely acknowledged except, perhaps, by their family or their kibbutz. Batalion makes sure that their sacrifices are not forgotten.

The reviewer: J. R. Seeger is a retired CIA paramilitary officer and frequent contributor.
On July 1, 1909, the Indian National Association held an informal gathering in Jehangir Hall of the Imperial Institute in South Kensington, London. Luminaries from the government and the academic world mixed with Indian students, both scholarship students and sons of wealthy Indians. At 11 p.m., a young student named Madan Lal Dhingra walked up to Sir William Curzon Wyllie of the Indian Office. Earlier in the evening, Wyllie had discussions with other well-dressed Indian students as he mingled with the crowd. He likely expected the young man walking up to him to be just another student interested in another discussion. Instead, Dhingra walked up to Wyllie and shot him four times.

An Indian Parsi physician from Shanghai unsuccessfully attempted to save Wyllie’s life, and Dhingra killed him as well. Before he could kill himself, Dhingra was apprehended by bystanders and held until the police arrived. When the police searched his apartment in Bayswater, they found a Russian artist’s painting of The Suppression of the Indian Revolt depicting the execution of Indians from the 1857 mutiny, a picture of Lord Curzon annotated with “heathen dog,” and multiple loose pistol cartridges. During his trial, Dhingra offered no defense other than a formal statement in which he appealed to Indian sympathizers in America and Germany. The statement included the following: “A nation held down by foreign bayonets is in a perpetual state of war.” (119–21)

Over the past 20 years, the intelligence and special operations communities of the United States and our NATO allies have spanned the globe as they hunted members of an international terrorist network. Just like Dhingra, these terrorists believed in change through the barrel of a gun or through the timer of a bomb. It is easy to imagine that this type of terrorist network could only exist in our interconnected 21st century world of the internet and global air travel. Members of the same Intelligence Community who served during the Cold War could compare the terrorist challenge to the challenges posed by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. After the demise of the USSR, the files of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact security services revealed the profound connection between communist security organizations and regional terrorist organizations and Third World insurgencies. Again, these connections, these networks were a creation of a post-World War II world and seemed an inevitable creation of the end of European colonialism. In Underground Asia, Tim Harper argues that these types of transnational conspiracies existed long before the Cold War.

Underground Asia focuses on the anticolonial movements in India, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, and French Indochina from 1905 to 1927. Harper addresses many of the early 20th century Asian revolutionaries and how political doctrines such as anarchism, socialism, and communism affected their actions. He argues the rise of the modern industrial nation-states and the rise of political philosophies hostile to these modern industrial nation-states captured the imagination of Asians living under colonial rule. It was these same Asians who served as the founding members of the successful independence movements throughout Asia in the second half of the 20th century.

Harper describes the early 20th century as a time of movement: of men from the various European colonies in Asia to Japan, Europe, the United Kingdom, and North America and of ideas from Europe to Asia. The men traveled by ship in search of jobs or advanced education and met fellow travelers in small enclaves of workers and student, probably best described as ghettos. The ideas traveled by books, journals, and lectures. During informal meetings, the expatriate Asians shared ideas on what had to be accomplished to end colonial rule in their respective homelands. Some of these travelers returned to their homelands to start small-scale resistance efforts. Some remained as exiles for the rest of their lives writing articles and books hostile to colonial governments. Other exiled revolutionaries managed safe havens for their colleagues when they needed to escape the police. And some of these men committed themselves to violent revolution.
Harper makes it clear from the beginning that he is not interested in creating a standard history of these revolutionary conspiracies or the events associated with unrest in the Asian colonies of Britain, France, and Holland. In the foreword, he states,

_This book offers, quite deliberately and literally, an eccentric view of Asian history. It traces the insurgent geography of what I call “underground Asia.” I try to describe the terrain revolutionaries carved out of themselves, and how certain milieus generated new ideas and strategies for action. It tells of lives that were lived at the interstices of empires and struggles that did not see the nation-state as its sole end or as the natural ordering of a future world._ (xxviii)

Following through on that premise, Harper writes of individual actions of revolutionaries from the turn of the 20th century until 1927. The book provides insights previously unavailable to general readers: the motivations for Asian revolutionaries in that period detailed in their own letters and diaries as well as from revolutionary ideologues whose names have long disappeared into the vault of history. Previous works on the subject addressed the larger, strategic context of the anticolonial movements or the role of outside influence from German, Japanese, or Soviet agent provocateurs. In contrast, Harper has excavated personal diaries, autobiographies of Asian revolutionaries, and revolutionary journals and newspapers to craft a vivid description of their lives.

One thread Harper follows in the book is the importance of European powers in sustaining the most effective of these organizations. At first, support came from the Imperial Germany. Prior to and during the First World War, Germany was determined to undermine the English, French, and the Dutch colonial empires. The German operation was managed by a senior “orientalist” named Max Von Oppenheim and was international in scope. Harper is not the first to write on the subject. Donald M. McKale’s _War by Revolution_, Jules Stewart’s _The Kaiser’s Mission to Kabul_, and Lionel Gossman’s _The Passion of Max Von Oppenheim_ are just three works that provide even greater detail in the level of German involvement in Asia.

Harper details how the German effort reached North America. The German consulate in San Francisco funded an effort on the part of Indian exiles who organized under the Ghadar Party. The level of commitment was exceptional. Not only did the Germans support the California-based party, but they also funded the purchase of a small freighter and over 10,000 firearms. The project was designed to deliver both arms and Indian revolutionaries to Asia. Only through a series of misadventures did this clandestine effort fail when US Customs agents captured the ship in August of 1915. British officers, especially the tenacious David Petrie from the Indian Criminal Investigation Department, hunted the revolutionaries around the globe. These investigators provided detailed information to both the Bureau of Investigation (the Department of Justice predecessor to the FBI) and the New York Police Department against other members of the conspiracy as well as outlining for California authorities the nature of the Ghadar conspiracy.

By mid-1917, US authorities had arrested some of these Indian revolutionaries, and in late 1917, the federal court in San Francisco opened conspiracy investigations on 105 Indians. Only 37 were eventually arraigned, the rest had escaped capture. At the time, this case was the largest single foreign conspiracy trial ever conducted by the US government. By the time the trial began, the United States had declared war on Germany, and the defendants faced a hypersensitized US public as a result of the German-sponsored Black Tom bombing in New York harbor and the Zimmerman Telegram revealing German offers to assist the Mexican government in recovering much of the US Southwest. Twenty-nine of the 37 were convicted, one was acquitted, and one was certified insane. Two of the accused died in the courthouse when one of them killed another and was then shot by a US marshall. The remaining three escaped custody and were never found.

By 1918, revolutionaries in Asia could choose between two different allies ready to work against the British, the French, and the Dutch. The German effort continued until the end of the war while, by early 1918, the newly established Bolshevik government in Moscow began fomenting the international communist revolution. For Asian anarchists and socialists, the appeal of joining an international communist movement drew revolutionaries from virtually every political doctrine and away from their alliances with Germany. Just like their counterparts

---

in Berlin, the Bolsheviks in Moscow were less interested in the needs of their Asian “comrades” than they were in undermining the Western colonial powers. The Communist International dispatched funds that helped publish revolutionary tracts. It provided safehaven in Moscow and the Soviet secret service, the Cheka, helped train these revolutionaries in skills necessary to survive in a hostile political environment. Again, Harper’s description of Soviet support to Asian revolutionaries is not the first in print. Peter Hopkirk’s Setting the East Ablaze covered in detail Bolshevik support to revolutionaries throughout Asia over two decades ago.

While this is an important book for anyone interested in 20th century Asian history or European colonial history, it is not an easy read. The book is filled with eccentric details of dozens of revolutionaries, their friends, their wives, and their families. It is probably best understood as a series of biographies of Asian revolutionaries in the early 20th century. Some like Mao and Ho Chi Minh are well known, while others are absolutely lost in time. Harper does not make any effort to separate the key historical figures from the simply interesting (or eccentric) ones and at times the book can seem to be a jumble of biographic information dancing across the globe. Harper’s writing style is very academic. His dense prose often turns a single paragraph into a disquisition running more than a page long. Finally, Harper assumes the reader already understands the “standard” histories of the colonial independence movements in India, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam. That means, it may be hard for the uninitiated to follow where some of the revolutionaries fit into the post–World War II stories of postcolonial Asia.

In the last six pages of the book, Harper offers a cursory conclusion to his work. He writes,

For many years, the memory of the global underground dissolved into national stories. In this sense it remained a lost country: a history of revolutionary failure, or of something that did not happen. But, as it re-emerges, the view from the underground shifts our understanding of larger events in significant ways. . . .

Seen from the underground, time is loosened further, and the history of what later became known as the “global Cold War” takes on a longer duration, with its beginnings in the Bolshevik panic across empires in the 1920s, or even back in the earlier struggle against international anarchism. This protracted conflict is a window on the experience of human movement in the twentieth century. (653–54)

Returning to his warning in the foreword that he is going to offer an eccentric view of Asian history, Harper makes a detailed case for clues from the early 20th century revealing some of the Asian mysteries of today. For this reason alone, Underground Asia belongs on the bookshelf of any professional interested in our current focus on the region.

The reviewer: J. R. Seeger is a retired CIA paramilitary officer.

---

Chaos: Charles Manson, the CIA, and the Secret History of the Sixties

Reviewed by Leslie C.

Authors, or their agents and publishers, seem unable to resist using the word “secret” to modify that apparently pedestrian word “history.” Its use promises something the finished work invariably fails to deliver, implying as it does access to the eldritch or the gnostic, when the reality is often more mundane. Such a force is at work in Tom O’Neill’s Chaos: Charles Manson, the CIA, and the Secret History of the Sixties.

The book has its origins in a magazine article O’Neill was commissioned to write marking the 30th anniversary of the Tate-LaBianca murders. Charles Manson, a semi-literate drifter and purported cult leader, and members of his “Family” were convicted of the killings. The episode transfixed the American public and suggested the forces unleashed by the social tides of the sixties, not least the anti-war and youth movements, had dark if not violent undertones. O’Neill never finished his article. The threads he uncovered while doing his research led him instead on a 20-year odyssey that crossed the line into obsession, as he switched editors and publishers, borrowed money from relatives, and did anything else required to unearth the truth about Manson.

Chaos is a monument to O’Neill’s determination to get the story and a narrative of his efforts to track down reluctant witnesses, obtain forgotten or buried documentary evidence, and pull the pieces into a coherent picture. Chaos is not—at least not in the way its title suggests—a “secret history of the sixties.” With its fascinating allusions to a host of Southern California characters from Cass Elliott to the Beach Boys, it is more Once Upon A Time In Hollywood than Manchurian Candidate. This review will not summarize O’Neill’s theories, though it will touch on them insofar as they are germane to the primary question for this audience, which is, of course, what did Charles Manson have to do with the CIA? But first, some housekeeping.

Over the course of August 8–10, 1969, Manson’s followers, at his urging, murdered eight people during two home invasions: six at the home of actress Sharon Tate and the director Roman Polanski, and two at the home of Leno and Rosemary LaBianca. Manson believed the killings would trigger a race war, and his followers—using the victims’ blood—left behind graffiti meant to suggest the Black Panther Party was responsible. A four-month investigation, spurred by the jailhouse confession of a member of the “Family,” resulted in the arrest of Manson and his accomplices. Vincent Bugliosi, the Los Angeles district attorney who tried the case and secured the convictions, wrote a book about the crimes. Titled Helter Skelter—after a Beatles song Manson used a code word for the race war—it went on to become the best-selling “true crime” book in the history of American publishing.

All of this is straightforward. However, O’Neill’s research uncovered a litany of problems and unanswered questions about the conduct of the investigation that might, had they been brought to light sooner, have justified a re-trial, according to one of Bugliosi’s associates in the DA’s office. In O’Neill’s telling, Bugliosi emerges as a villain who seized his chance to profit in the wake of a terrible crime and who spent the subsequent decades consciously foiling any effort to question the methods or outcome of the investigation. O’Neill’s scrupulous catalogue of the myriad omissions in Bugliosi’s case certainly paints an unflattering picture of the entire process and of many of those involved.

Manson’s responsibility for these crimes in not in question. O’Neill’s interest is in the motivations and actions of many secondary players, together with the grip Manson continues to hold on the American imagination. Most people were horrified—yet fascinated—by the brutality of the killings, though others saw them in a different light. The leftist radical Bernardine Dohrn of the Weather Underground infamously elevated Manson to a revolutionary hero. New Left chronicler Todd Gitlin was more reasonable, and closer to the mark, when he observed that “For the mass media, the acidhead Charles Manson was readymade as the monster lurking in the heart of every longhair, the rough beast slouching to Beverly Hills to be...
born for the new millennium.” O’Neill reaches a similar conclusion, which brings us to the main point, which is the CIA’s alleged role.

If, as Gitlin suggests, Manson embodied for most Americans the darkness hard wired in the counterculture, then how did the US government benefit? O’Neill delves into the FBI’s COINTELPRO and CIA’s CHAOS, domestic surveillance programs designed to infiltrate, discredit, and neutralize civil rights, student, and anti-war organizations that first Lyndon Johnson and then Richard Nixon regarded as subversive. These programs, which in the case of CIA violated its charter, were ultimately exposed and triggered congressional hearings in the mid-1970s, in which the Intelligence Community was held to account. And this is where O’Neill ultimately falls short. Despite what his title implies, he cannot document any compelling link between these programs and Manson. This was not for lack of effort. Extensive research and a slew of FOIA requests did not produce a smoking gun or much beyond the shadowy, ill-explained presence around these events of Reeve Whitson, an alleged “intelligence operative.” O’Neill also examines the CIA program MKULTRA, which may have gotten him closer to his goal—but not much. Conceived by Richard Helms and authorized by Allen Dulles in 1953, MKULTRA studied mind control, one possible path to which was hallucinogenic drugs.

The standard histories of the subject indicate that the CIA, through MKULTRA, spent considerable effort to understand the use and effects of LSD and other substances, and contracted with a number of researchers to that end. One was Dr. Louis Jolyon West, who is the closest O’Neill gets to tying Manson to the CIA. West, purportedly at the behest of the agency, opened an office in San Francisco, the purpose of which was “studying the hippies in their native habitat”, Haight Ashbury. Manson had, at the same time, been a denizen of the Haight before moving the “Family” to Los Angeles, and he liberally dosed his followers with LSD, which was one of his tools for bending them to his will. Indeed, defense attorneys unsuccessfully attempted to use this as a mitigating factor during the trial.

While O’Neill not unreasonably asks how a barely educated criminal like Manson could use sophisticated methods to control his “Family,” he cannot link Manson to Dr. West. There is no evidence the two ever met, or that Manson was—in what O’Neill admits is the most “far-out” theory—the product of “an MKULTRA effort to create assassins who would kill on command.” (430) His own conclusions about CHAOS—which are less relevant to his theory of the case than MKULTRA—are dubious. He describes a program that kept tabs on 300,000 people, sharing intelligence with FBI, the Department of Justice, and the White House, but he then claims it was so well-hidden within CIA that “even those at the top of its counterintelligence division were clueless.” (233). And yet, when the program was exposed and Director William Colby admitted its existence, James Angleton, the long-time head of counterintelligence and presumably no stranger to such efforts, was the official who resigned.

O’Neill also makes the occasional odd statement. One example will illustrate the point. In untangling the web of connections surrounding the Manson case, O’Neill links one figure to former Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis E. LeMay, who, he writes, “tried to organize a coup against Kennedy among the Joint Chiefs of Staff” during the Cuban Missile Crisis (83). This was news, as the standard Cold War history fails to mention it, as does LeMay’s biographer. LeMay did forcefully advocate for military action against the missile sites—and he was famously satirized in Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove—but a coup? Presumably if his advocacy had reached even the level of significant insubordination Kennedy would have removed him. There was, after all, precedent for doing so.

O’Neill’s narrative is never uninteresting. His research has raised legitimate questions about the investigation and prosecution of these notorious crimes, and the actions of a number of people, from the district attorney’s office to the sheriff’s department; from the associates and relatives of the victims to the perpetrators. However compelling his determination to follow every last thread, O’Neill has not written a “secret history” of the 1960s, unless the secrets are those certain individuals wished to keep for their own reasons. The author cannot definitively tie Manson to MKULTRA or CHAOS; he can only imply it on circumstantial evidence. At least, in the end, he has the grace to acknowledge it.

The reviewer: Leslie C. is a CIA operations officer.