Preface

Controversy over the performance of the Central Intelligence Agency during the Cold War has raged since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union. From its origins in 1947, the Agency had, as one of its major missions, the responsibility of analyzing and explaining the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union to US policymakers. It was a daunting task. A tightly controlled society, the Soviet Union presented CIA analysts with major challenges as they struggled to make sense of its political, economic, military, and scientific developments. CIA was not always correct in its analysis but the Agency, over the decades, made a unique contribution in helping US policymakers understand America's major adversary. As a long time intelligence analyst, then Deputy Director for Intelligence, and finally Director of Central Intelligence, I spent much of my career watching and analyzing the Soviet Union. In my judgment, overall, the CIA performed admirably in meeting the challenges of assessing Soviet strengths and weaknesses. Others disagree.

I have always believed that the record of actual intelligence assessments represents the best defense of CIA's and the Intelligence Community's analytical performance vis-à-vis the USSR – the good, the bad and the ugly. Thus, as DCI, I began the systematic process of declassifying intelligence assessments from the Cold War, beginning with all National Intelligence Estimates on the USSR. My successors have continued this process. This latest compilation of key documents from CIA's files and the related declassification and release of a large amount of new material on CIA analysis of the USSR will further help scholars and the public assess for themselves CIA's analytical performance during the Cold War. Making these materials available to everyone is a major step in furthering the dialogue. Researchers may now judge the accuracy of CIA forecasts and with that judgment gain deeper insight into the impact of CIA analysis on US policymakers. As a strong believer in government openness, I applaud this effort and look forward to continuing declassification and release programs by the Agency.

Robert M. Gates,
former Director of Central Intelligence

Introduction-

The global contest between the United States and the Soviet Union. dominated international relations for some 46 years (1945-1991). The Cold War. onfrontation shaped the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet. Union, deeply affecting their societies and their foreign policies. They engaged in. costly arms race, built devastating nuclear arsenals, and confronted each other in. tense political and military face-off in a divided Europe and in the Third World. The Soviet-American rivalry ended with the collapse of the USSR and the. disintegration of the Soviet empire in 1991.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), along with other agencies in the. US Intelligence Community, helped American policymakers understand events in. he Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. CIA's major analytic component, the. Directorate of Intelligence (DI), focused much of its attention on Soviet. developments. It tried not only to discern Moscow's intentions, but also to gauge. he state of the Soviet economy, the USSR's technological base, the readiness and. plans of Soviet military forces, and the internal workings of the Kremlin

Measuring the degree to which US policymakers read, understood, and. ed upon the intelligence assessments they received from the Agency is a. difficult task. Each administration formed its foreign policy in different ways. The well-staffed, military-like national security process of the Eisenhower. dministration, for example, contrasted with the more informal process of the. Kennedy administration. On many issues, moreover, the Agency had to compete. for the attention of policymakers with the State Department's Bureau of. Intelligence and Research (INR), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the. military intelligence organizations, and a wide array of academics, businessmen,. d journalists.

ritical View of the Analysis-

Critics of the Agency have argued that CIA provided little accurate and. useful information to US policymakers regarding actual conditions within the. Soviet Union. Former Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), for example, in. his most recent book, *Secrecy: The American Experience*, contends that CIA. overestimated Soviet military strength and failed to predict the collapse of the. USSR in 1991. From the 1960s to the 1980s, he argues, American policymakers. were led—erroneously—by CIA and other US intelligence organizations to.

believe that Soviet military forces and the Soviet economy were fundamentally. strong and that the USSR was politically stable. This viewpoint dated at least. from the Gaither Report of 1957, which compared US and Soviet military. pabilities and portrayed the Soviet Union as a modern, vibrant, and powerful. industrial-military power.

Senator Moynihan further maintains that he and others noted as early as. 1975 that the Soviet emperor had no clothes, as well as "no shoes, butter, meat,. living space, heat, telephones, or toilet paper." His countervailing view at the. ime was that the Soviet Union was so weak economically, as well as so divided. ethnically, that it could not survive for long. Moynihan claims that by 1984 he. elieved, and so stated, that the Soviet Union was dying and that the Soviet idea. of Communism was a spent force. The economy was collapsing, rising ethnic. onsciousness was inciting virulent (and often violent) nationalism, and history. was moving rapidly away from the Communist model.

Nevertheless, according to the Senator, CIA and the rest of the US. Intelligence Community continued to overestimate Soviet strength and to portray. he USSR as a despotism that worked:.

> It was as though two chess grandmasters had pursued an interminable, and. highly sophisticated, strategy of feint and counter-feint, not noticing that. for the past 40 or 50 moves, one side not only had been in checkmate, but . . . had his queen, his rooks, his bishops, and knights all taken from the. oard. Only nuclear weapons, however, kept the game from being. ompletely boring. [1]

In essence, Senator Moynihan charges that CIA failed in one of its main. missions—to accurately assess the political, economic, and military state of the. Soviet Union

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[1] D niel P. Moy.iha.n, *Secrecy, The American Experience*, (New Haven: Yale Universi.y Press,. 1998). See also Gary Wills, "Honorable Man: The Gen.lem. From New York: Daniel Patrick. Moy. ih. ," *New York Review of Books*, Vol. XLVII, No. 18, Novem.er 16, 2000, p. 15. For. Se. re. ry of S. te George Shultz's . riticism of the Age. y . nd its intellige. e effor. see George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles S.ri. er's So. s,. 1993), pp. 864-869. See also Melvi. Goodm. , "The Politics of Getting I. Wrong," *Harper's agazine*, November 2000, pp. 74-80.

A Vigorous Rejo-nder-

Former CIA officials and some outside scholars have disputed the claims. y Senator Moynihan and other critics and defended the Agency's analytical. record. In their view, CIA—and the US Intelligence Community as a whole—. urately tracked and foreshadowed key trends and developments, including the. decline and ultimate collapse of the Soviet empire. They argue that, throughout. he 1980s, CIA warned of the weakening Soviet economy and later of the. impending failure of Mikhail Gorbachev.[2] According to Bruce Berkowitz, for. example, the CIA "was right on the mark" in its analysis. He concludes that the. Agency performed well in anticipating the Soviet collapse.[3]

Recent Retrospective Conferences-

CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) has sponsored several. public conferences in recent years to examine the record of the Intelligence. Community's analysis of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The first such. gathering, "Estimating Soviet Military Power, 1950-1984," was co-sponsored. with the John F. Kennedy School of Government and held at Harvard University. in December 1994. The CIA declassified and released a series of National. Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) for the conference and published them in a 1996. volume *Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950-1983*.[4]

A second conference, "Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War. Years, 1946-1950," took place at CIA Headquarters in Virginia in October 1997. in conjunction with CIA's 50th anniversary. For this event, the Agency.

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[2]See Ri. hard Kerr, "CIA's Record S. ds Up to Scru.i. y," *New York Times*, October 24, 1991,. p.A4; Robert.Gates, "The CIA and the Coll. pse of the Sovie. Unio. : Hi. or Miss?" Speech to the. Foreign.Poli. y Asso.i. io. , New York, May 20, 1992; and Kirs.e. Lu. dberg, "The CIA and the. Fall of the Soviet Empire: The Politics of Getting I. Righ.," Harv. rd Case S.udy C16-94-12510,. Harv.rd Un.iversi.y. Douglas J. MacEachi. , former Director of the DI's Office of Sovie. A. alysis. (SOVA), and Bruce Berkowi.z, former CIA an. lys., both reach simil. r conclusio. s. See Dougl.s. MacEachi. , *CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record Versus the Charges*, (Washi. g.o. ,. DC: Cen.er for the S.udy of I. elligence, CIA, 1996) and Bruce Berkowitz and Jeffrey T. Richelso. , "The CIA Vi. di. ed: The Sovie. Coll. pse Was Predi. ed," *The National Interest*, (No. 41, Fall 1995).

[3]Berkowitz, *ibid*

[4]See Donald P. S.eury, ed., *Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950-1983* (Washi. gton, DC: Ce. ter for the S.udy of I. elligence, CIA, 1994).

declassified and released some of the current intelligence items that had been sent. o President Truman on the Soviet threat in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia [5]

CSI co-sponsored two conferences in 1999. The first, "On the Front Lines. of the Cold War, 1946-1961," was held in September in Berlin and was co-. sponsored and hosted by the Allied Museum of Berlin. CSI compiled and edited a. volume of operational and analytical documents ranging from NIEs to assorted. Station cables for the conference.[6] In November 1999, CSI and the George Bush. School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University co-. sponsored a conference, "At Cold War's End." At this event, held at the Bush. School, the focus was on the Intelligence Community's National Intelligence. Estimates on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the final crisis of the. Soviet Bloc from 1989 through 1991. Panelists paid particular attention to the. question of how effective US intelligence was in tracking the collapse of. Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As was the case with the. earlier conferences, CIA released a compendium of newly declassified NIEs and. other assessments.[7]

nalysis During 1947-1991: A Multidisciplinary Review-

Continuing its quest to build as complete and accurate a public record of. he Agency's analytical role as possible during the Cold War, CSI will co-sponsor. other retrospective conference with the Center of International Studies at. Princeton University in March 2001. The conference will examine the Agency's. lytic record and performance from the early Cold War years through the. ollapse of the Soviet Union, making use of a large body of recently declassified. CIA analytical documents.[8] Scholars at the conference also will draw upon the. sizable collection of previously released documents on Soviet economics, political. developments, military programs, scientific and technological progress, published. etween 1947 and 1991.

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[5]See Woodrow J. Kuhns, ed., *Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years, 1946-1950* (Washi. g.on, DC: Ce. ter for the S.udy of I. elligence, CIA, 1997).

[6]See Donald S.eury, ed., *On the Front Lines of the Cold War: Documents on the Intelligence War in Berlin, 1946-1961* (Washi. gton, DC: Ce. ter for the S.udy of I. elligence, CIA, 1999).

[7]See Benjami. Fis. her, ed., *At Cold War's End: US Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-1991* (W. shing.on, DC: Center for the Study of Intellige. e, CIA, 1999).

[8]"Analysis" i. . his . ontext is defined . s p. pers refle. ting in-depth or lo. g-term rese. r. h . nd, i. m. y cases, also con. i. i. g conclusio. s, es.im. es, and forecas.s.

The Production of Intelligence Analysis-

CIA's analytic work began in a small Central Reports Staff (CRS) created. in 1946 as part of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), a forerunner of the. Central Intelligence Agency, which was established in September 1947. The CIG. inherited some operational elements from the Strategic Services Unit, an. organization husbanded by the War Department that had kept intact key personnel. d facilities from the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS) after it was. disbanded in September 1945. The analytic elements of OSS's Research and. Analysis Branch, however, had been transferred to the State Department, where. hey were allowed to be dispersed over the next few years. Thus, while CIA. eventually acquired some analysts who had been in OSS, it did not inherit a. functioning analytic organization or infrastructure.

CRS quickly became an important intelligence link to the White House. President Harry Truman wanted to ensure that all relevant information available to. he US Government on any given national security issue was correlated and. evaluated centrally and a daily summary provided to him. He was determined that. he country would never again suffer a devastating surprise attack as it had at. Pearl Harbor.[9] With presidential backing, CRS quickly grew into the Office of. Reports and Estimates (ORE), which Truman's foreign policy advisers apparently. hoped would produce national intelligence estimates by drawing on information. vailable in the established intelligence agencies, the military services, and the. State Department. The President himself, however, preferred the daily. intelligence summary that ORE prepared for him over more formal estimates.

The mission of CIA's analysts expanded swiftly. In addition to the. estimates and current intelligence tasks, they were asked to take on wide-ranging. sic research work on such topics as economics, transportation and geography. In many regards, their work and their organizational structure naturally fell within. ormal academic disciplines and thus it seemed logical to sort it in this fashion Also, bureaucratic opportunism played a role. The State Department and military. services held that political and military analysis were rightfully theirs and should. ot be tasked to CIA. At the same time, they left scientific and, increasingly,. economic subjects for the Agency's analysts.

Meanwhile, a debate over whether CIA had the right to "produce" (as. opposed to "correlate" information supplied by others) analysis gradually was.

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[9]Kuhns, *op. cit*, p. 3.

resolved in favor of CIA because the work was not being done elsewhere. CIA. lso inherited from the wartime Manhattan Project the function of providing. intelligence on foreign atomic energy matters. To do nuclear-related scientific. d technical work, some CIA analysts were given special clearances, and this led. in part to the founding of CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence in 1948. In. ddition, some CIA analysts were given COMINT clearances for the purposes of. producing current intelligence, and thus another important and growing source of. information was created. In all of these developments, analysis on the USSR was. he dominant task occupying CIA analysts.

Criticism of ORE's work grew in the late 1940s. More than one. policymaker and intelligence officer complained that ORE was not producing the. kind of "national" estimates many had hoped for. After the Korean War broke out. in June 1950, a new Director of Central Intelligence with greater status in. Washington than his predecessors, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, was. rought in to improve CIA's performance. Within days of taking office in. October 1950, he abolished ORE and replaced it with the Office of National. Estimates (ONE), responsible for the production of national estimates; the Office. of Research and Reports (ORR), responsible for doing basic research; and the. Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), responsible for the production of daily. urrent intelligence.

The bulk of the CIA's analysis thus fell to ORR, which concentrated on. economic analysis throughout the 1950s. Aiding this effort was the recruitment of. Max Millikan, an economist from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to. head ORR. Millikan initiated an extensive recruitment program, hiring. economists who formed the core group of CIA's economic analysts for the next. decade. In addition, CIA reached a landmark agreement with the Department of. State in 1951 that gave ORR responsibility for economic research and analysis on. he Soviet Union and its East European satellites. ORR soon developed models of. he Soviet economy that, with modifications over the ensuing decades, provided. US policymakers with invaluable insights into the USSR's massive but. umbersome economy.

The 1950s and 1960s also saw a rapid expansion in the DI's production of. finished intelligence on Soviet strategic capabilities. Contributing to this. expansion was the development of modern overhead photographic. reconnaissance, beginning with the U-2 aircraft and growing in sophistication. with the CORONA satellite program and follow-on systems. These programs. generated information in great quantities and caused a "collection revolution,". reating a need for new analytical techniques. The small DI photo-analysis office.

established in 1952 eventually grew into the National Photographic Interpretation. Center (NPIC) in 1961.[10]

Military analysis underwent a revolution as a result of the new imagery. Innovative approaches were undertaken within ORR under the auspices of the. Office of National Estimates, and the increased data derived from expanded. ollection, as well as new analytical techniques, were instrumental in settling the. "bomber" and "missile" gap debates in the 1950s and early 1960s. The Agency's. performance in these and other issues raised the stature of its analysis of Soviet. military intentions and capabilities. At the same time, the Office of Scientific. Intelligence expanded to work on missile and other technical weapons issues as. well as on atomic energy issues.

In the early 1960s, DCI John McCone recognized the new prominence of. echnological collection by forming the Directorate of Science and Technology. (DS&T). It included both analytic elements and collection organizations, and the. synergy between the two was noteworthy. Space and offensive weapons systems. joined a new foreign missiles and space center that monitored Soviet missile. developments. Defensive weapons systems, naval systems, and nuclear matters. remained in OSI until 1973, when a new Office of Weapons Intelligence was. formed that brought all the weapons-related issues together. In 1976, OWI and. OSI were joined in a new Office of Scientific & Weapons Research, which in turn. was moved to the DI, where its successors remain today.

Another element aiding CIA's analysis of the USSR in this period was the. vailability of information supplied by human sources such as Colonel Oleg. Penkovsky. This information provided the Agency with unique insights into. Soviet capabilities and planning, especially regarding Soviet strategic forces.[11]

The trend in functional specialization continued in the DI in the 1960s. In. 1967, DCI Richard Helms created the Office of Strategic Research (OSR), which. ombined the units in ORR and OCI that engaged in military research. Thus, the. military analysts at CIA, who were predominately concerned with the USSR,. finally had an office of their own. Prior to this, most of the DI's military analyses. were in the form of contributions to NIEs. Simultaneously, an Office of. Economic Research (OER) was established. The workload of CIA's economists. expanded considerably during the 1960s. Among the causes of this growth were.

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[10]NPIC rem.in.ed in.the DI u. til 1973, whe. it was transferred to the CIA's Directorate of S.ien. e. d Tech. ology. I. became part.of the Natio. l Imagery and Mappi. g Agency (NIMA) i. 1996.

[11]William M. Le. ry, ed., *The Central Intelligence Agency* (Tuscaloosa, AL: Universi.y of Al. m. Press, 1984), p. 70.

(1) the USSR's increasing use of foreign trade and assistance as instruments of its. foreign policy, (2) concern in Washington that the Soviet Union would try to. penetrate the emerging countries in the Third World economically, (3) the. growing economic competitiveness of Japan and Western Europe, and (4) the. gradual breakdown of the international monetary order that had been established. Bretton Woods in 1944.

The Office of Current Intelligence also took on a more prominent role in. he 1960s when it created a new publication for President John F. Kennedy—the. President's Intelligence Checklist—now called the President's Daily Brief. The. President took an instant liking to the publication, significantly boosting OCI's. prestige within the DI.[12]

OCI had in fact been the "political analysis" office in the DI since its. inception in 1951, but a small group of political analysts in OCI had been freed. from current intelligence duties in the wake of Stalin's death in 1953 to study. high-level Soviet politics. The group grew into a Senior Research Staff (SRS). hat was subordinated directly under the Deputy Director for Intelligence. It. focused on lengthy, detailed studies of Soviet and Chinese affairs, Sino-Soviet. relations, and international communism. During the 1950s and 1960s, the DI's. lysis of Soviet political affairs was done by OCI, SRS, and the ONE staff.

In 1973, ONE (both its board and its staff) were abolished, as was SRS. A. ewly created group of National Intelligence Officers (organized by substantive. expertise) took over the function of producing NIEs—the organization became the. National Intelligence Council at the end of the 1970s. Most of ONE and SRS. were combined into a new Office of Political Research (OPR), paralleling OSR. d OER and coexisting with OCI. In 1976 a single Office of Regional and. Political Analysis (later renamed Office of Political Analysis) replaced both OPR. d OCI.

In 1981 the DI went through a large reorganization to pull together. lysts from the political, economic , and military disciplines working on the. same countries into regional offices. Thus, OSR, OER, and OPA were abolished. d a series of geographic offices, including an Office of Soviet Analysis (SOVA). was created. The new SOVA was headed initially by the director of OSR, with. he chief Soviet economist in OER as his deputy.

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[12] The *PresMent's DMly BrMf* con.i. ues .o be produced today as a premier produ. of CIA's. I. tellige. e Dire. or. e.

With this reorganization (which remains the basis of the Directorate's. urrent structure), the DI's structure for analyzing the USSR returned to a model. first pioneered by the OSS's Research and Analysis Branch in World War II. R&A had originally been organized like a college faculty, with separate offices for. the various academic disciplines. In 1943, however, this structure was swept. way and replaced with one designed to mirror the regional theaters of OSS global. operations.[13]

The Document Selection Process-

The body of DI documents on the Soviet Union published during the Cold. War years, but not yet declassified, is far too large to have been reviewed for. declassification and released for this conference. Therefore, the goal of the. Agency was to assemble a collection of documents large enough and sufficiently. diverse to ensure that (1) most, if not all, of the major developments and analytic. issues that occurred during the period were represented, and (2) the tenor and. substance of the DI's analysis was adequately captured.[14]

A threefold approach was taken in the document selection:.

- First, reports reflecting in-depth or long-term research that generally contain. lytic judgments, estimates, and forecasts were selected for review and. release. A few memoranda or other special products, but virtually no current. intelligence, were included
- Second, using a listing of subject titles for reports published by the DI, the. documents were selected for their substantive content. This selection was. undertaken without regard to the quality of the analysis the documents. provided. In no instance was any document excluded from the collection, nor. was any information redacted to conceal analytic judgments that were. subsequently proven wrong. No documents were withheld or redacted in a. fashion to conceal differences between CIA's analysis and that of another US.

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[13]I. was a traum. i. experience for the economis.s i. parti. ular (who declared they would not.serve. with politic. l s. ie. tists or histori. ns), . nd . histori. of the period stated .ha. R&A . hief William. Langer (of H. rvard University) "ought to h. ve . ee. de. or. ted for his . our. ge in . ssaulting .he. disciplinary for.ific. ions…" B. rry M. K. z, *Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942-1945*, (C.mbridge, MA: Harv.rd Un.versi.y Press, 1989),. p.102. I. 1981, there was less .raum. , al.hough the new offi.e was promptly moved ou. of the. CIA Headquarters compou. d for three years.

[14]The docume. s, as released, have been.sen. .o the Natio. l Archives and Records Admi. is.ratio. (NARA).

Government agency or any other organization, or because release might. somehow embarrass the Agency

- Third, the conference authors reviewed the documents chosen in the second. step above to determine whether there were any substantive historical gaps in. he collection. In some instances, National Intelligence Estimates were used. o fill these gaps.

Concerted efforts were made to release as many documents as possible and to. declassify as much information as possible in the documents that were included in. he collection

A number of complicating factors came into play in reviewing the. documents. Some of the records could not be released in full without. ompromising still-sensitive intelligence sources and methods or harming current. government-to-government relations. In these instances, we tried wherever. possible to release the Summary, Conclusions, or Key Judgments of the paper, but. he detailed supporting analysis was withheld. Some documents could not be. released at all because they would have had to be so heavily redacted as to be. meaningless or seriously distorted.

loser Look at the Newly Released Materials-

About 860 DI finished intelligence documents, encompassing some 19,000. pages (see table), are being released for the first time in conjunction with this. onference. About 50 percent of these documents analyze economic topics; more. han 20 percent assess political issues; about 20 percent deal with military matters;. d less than 10 percent are assessments of scientific and technical subjects.

The large proportion of economic documents, especially from the earlier. period, is partially accounted for by the fact that the DI devoted the lion's share of. its analytic resources to economic assessments during the 1950s. Moreover, much. of CIA's military and technical analysis on the USSR ultimately appeared in print. in the form of contributions to National Intelligence Estimates rather than as. separate publications. In addition, scientific intelligence items are limited because. many of the reports cite still-sensitive intelligence collection methods and. specialized analytical techniques which, if divulged, could damage current. security interests. Therefore, a significant amount of the work of the Office of. Scientific Intelligence, the Office of Weapons Intelligence, and the Office of. Scientific & Weapons Research was eliminated from review. As in the case of.

military analysis, moreover, CIA's scientific and technical analysis often found. expression in National Intelligence Estimates.

The newly released documents are fairly evenly distributed over the time. period. There are, however, a few more documents from the early years because. he analysis produced in recent periods contains more still-sensitive information. hat cannot yet be declassified and released. The new release also includes 12. recently declassified NIEs on the Soviet Union to fill gaps in coverage when it. was not possible to include DI finished intelligence reports that could be. declassified.

Large and Comprehensive Collection-

Complementing the newly declassified DI documents released for the. onference are several collections of DI intelligence documents previously. released to the public:.

1) In 1996, the Agency began to declassify DI analyses on the former Soviet. Union. Since then, more than 1,600 reports containing approximately 51,350. pages of analysis on the former USSR produced by the Office of Research and. Reports and successor entities between 1953 and 1991 have been released to. he National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). This initiative. was undertaken as part of the Agency's voluntary Historical Review Program. s well as under the 25-year mandatory program.[15]
2) Approximately 475 DI documents on the former Soviet Union have been. reviewed and released by the Agency under the Freedom of Information Act. (FOIA) or as part of the mandatory review program under Executive Order. 12958.
3) Finally, 40 documents, about 1,500 pages, originally distributed by the Agency. s unclassified publications were made available to the conference as a. onvenience because most are now out-of-prin

Many National Intelligence Estimates on the former Soviet Union, the. DCI's most authoritative written judgments, also have been previously. declassified and released to NARA. The NIEs were produced by the National. Intelligence Council (and its predecessor organizations) and reflect the views of. he entire intelligence community. Their text generally reflects the Agency's.

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[15]A descrip.io. of the CIA's volu. ary his.orical review program and a lis.i. g of the docume. s. released to NARA can.be fou. d on.CIA's.Electronic Document Release Center (also known as the FOIA) Web site at h. p://www.foi .u. i .gov.

alytic position on the issues, and, when it does not, the Agency's position is. stated in a dissent. Since 1992, nearly 550 NIEs (of approximately 800) and other. interagency intelligence issuances on the USSR, comprising over 13,000 pages,. have been released to NARA.

In all, over 3,500 DI finished intelligence documents, National Intelligence. Estimates, and miscellaneous DI documents on the USSR are now available for. he conference, and for future scholarship. We believe this collection provides a. representative and unbiased sample of the DI's economic, political, military, and. scientific and technical analysis over the period in question. Many DI analytical. products still remain classified, however, and thus there is much more still to be. learned about the Agency's analysis of the former Soviet Union during the Cold. War.

The Selection of Sample Documents for the Volume-

The documents included in this volume were selected by five authors who. wrote papers for the conference. Each author was given a list of the documents. ssembled for the conference. From that list, they selected the reports they wanted. s research materials for their review and assessment of the DI's analytic record. etween 1947 and 1991.

In reviewing the documents to prepare their conference papers, the authors. were asked to identify particularly noteworthy reports or key documents for. publication in this volume. In most cases, only the redacted versions of the. Summaries or Key Judgments are included because of space constraints. As noted. earlier, however, the declassified documents in their entirety, as well as the. documents declassified for the conference, will be available at NARA and on the. CIA Electronic Document Release Center (or FOIA Web site) at http://www.foia.ucia.gov. In addition, compact discs containing the documents. will be provided to conference participants.

Each section in the volume contains a brief explanation of the authors'. reasons for including the summaries or key judgments of particular documents in. he volume. The documents follow.

Gerald K. Haines, CIA Chief Historian.
Robert E. Leggett, Office of Information Management, CIA.

Declassif-ed and Released DI and- Intelligence Community Documents- on the Soviet Union-		
	Number of-Documents-	**Number-of Pages-**
Documents Produced by CIA's Directorate of Intelligence-		
Newly Reviewed for the Princeton Conference.	859.	19,160.
Previously released to NARA by CIA's Historical Review. Program.	1,152.	36,720.
Released to NARA by CIA's 25-Year Program.	481.	14,629.
FOIA and Mandatory Releases.	473.	9,300.
Released Previously by CIA in Unclassified Form.	40.	1,505.
TOTAL-	**3,005-**	**81,315-**
National Intelligence Estimates-		
Newly Reviewed for the Princeton Conference.	12.	285.
Previously Released to NARA by CIA's Historical Review. Program.	546.	13,710.
TOTAL-	**558-**	**13,710-**
GRAND TOTAL-	**3,563-**	**95,025-**

As m. dated by E.O. 12958.

Editors and Contributors to this Volume

Editors

Gerald K. Haines

Dr. Haines has an extensive background in US intelligence matters and on thef Intelligence Community. He earned his doctorate in US diplomatic history at thef University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1973. In the fall of 1974 he joined the Nationalf Archives as a foreign policy specialist. In 1981 he moved to the National Securityf Agency (NSA) as a staf historian. In 1989 he joined the CIA History Staf and becamef Deputy Chief in 1994. In 1995 he was asked to establish a new history of ice at thef National Reconnaissance Of ice (NRO). In 1997 he returned to CIA's Center for thef Study of Intelligence (CSI) to head the CIA History Staf and become the Agency's Ch Historian.f

Robert E. Leggett

Dr. Leggett currently is a senior project manager in CIA's Of ice of Informationf Management (OIM), where among his other duties, he had overall responsibility for thef declassification review and release of documents for this conference. He came to OIMf with broad experience in the Intelligence Community. He previously served as the Ch of the Community Coordination Group in the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI)f and before that in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) as Deputy National Intelligencef Of icer for Global and Multilateral Issues. Dr. Leggett served much of his career inf CIA's Directorate of Intelligence with OSR, OER, and the Of ice of Soviet Analysisf (SOVA) where he was a specialist on the Soviet economy. His academic work on thef Soviet economy has appeared in scholarly journals, several books, and in Compendiumsf on the Soviet Economy published by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. Hef also served on CIA's National Intelligence Daily Staf , Of ice of Congressional Af airs,f as a Group Chief in the DCI Center for Security Evaluation, and in the Intelligencef Community's Crime and Narcotics Center.f

Contributors to this Volume

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James Noren is a retired CIA economic analyst and the co-author of *Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates, 1950-1990* (College Station, Texas: Texas A&Mf University Press, 1998).f

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Origins of CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991

Origins of CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union
Author's Comments: Donald Steury

Berlin, the political flashpoint of the early Cold War, was a catalyst for the development of a strategic analysis capability in CIA. The end of World War II found the Allies in an increasingly tenuous quadripartite occupation of the city, which was complicated by its position deep inside the Russian occupation zone. As the wartime alliance fragmented, the continued Western presence in Berlin assumed a growing importance to the stability of the Western alliance: first, as a concrete symbol of the American commitment to defend Western Europe; and, second, as a vital strategic intelligence base from which to monitor the growing Soviet military presence in Germany and Eastern Europe.

The continued division of the city offered no such advantage to the Soviet Bloc. Inevitably, the Kremlin came to regard the Western garrisons in Berlin as a more-or-less permanent challenge to the legitimacy of Soviet rule in Germany and Eastern Europe. Consequently, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin initiated a series of provocations and military demonstrations early in 1948 in an apparent effort to force the Western Allies out of Berlin. By March, the US Military Governor in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, was sufficiently alarmed to warn Washington of "a subtle change in Soviet attitude which…gives me a feeling that (war) may come with dramatic suddenness."[1]

Clay apparently had intended only to warn the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of the need for caution in Central Europe, but the telegram caused considerable alarm in Washington. At the behest of JCS Chairman General Omar N. Bradley, the supervisory Intelligence Advisory Committee ordered CIA to chair an ad hoc committee to examine the likelihood of war.[2] The result was a series of three estimates (documents 1, 2, and 3) that examined and dismissed the possibility of a planned Soviet assault on Western Europe in 1948-1949, despite the escalating Soviet saber-rattling over Berlin. Although the estimates were brief, each reflected a relatively sophisticated and broadly-based understanding of Soviet national power. The analysis contained therein went beyond the military dimensions of the problem to analyze the political and economic implications of the issue. Together, the documents indicated a need for an independent analytical capability in Washington.

A fourth estimate, ORE 58-48 (document 4) provided a comprehensive assessment of the Soviet Union's potential to wage war. A highly controversial estimate at the time, this document nonetheless further validated ORE's role as a source of overarching analyses.

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[1] William R. Harris, "The March Crisis of 1948, Act I," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 1966, p.7 (National Archives and Record Administration [NARA] Records Group 263).
[2] *Ibid.*, p.10.

The Berlin crisis sharply demonstrated the need for regular review of Moscow's war potential. With the reorganization of CIA in 1950-1951, this responsibility was formally given to the newly created Board of National Estimates (see SE-16, document 5).

Throughout much of the 1950s, CIA's analysis of the Soviet Union continued to be hampered by the lack of solid intelligence on Soviet military developments. Until the first remote sensors (such as the U-2 and the CORONA reconnaissance satellites) were deployed, CIA's analysis often was based on fragmentary sources at best. An essential component of the reorganization of CIA's analysis was the comprehensive review of the available intelligence on the Soviet Union completed in 1953 (document 6).

Analyzing Soviet Politics and Foreign Policy

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Analyzing Soviet Politics and Foreign Policy
Author's Comments: Douglas Garthoff

The documents in this section were selected to reflect different kinds of products, including analytic memoranda as well as research studies, assessments, and estimates. Unfortunately absent is any product by analysts at the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, who produced some of the finest analysis on Soviet politics and policies.

In the wake of Stalin's death in 1953, CIA sought to understand Nikita Khrushchev's rise to power and the USSR's less rigid policies. NIE 11-4-54, the first of the comprehensive annual Soviet estimates supporting the regularized NSC policy process of the Eisenhower era, was safely wary: the USSR was being conciliatory "for the time being" but remained expansionist. In 1956, a Senior Research Staff on International Communism report found much to discuss regarding the startling 20th congress of the ruling Communist Party. In late 1961, Board of National Estimates chairman Sherman Kent covered the highlights of CIA's views on Soviet matters—including the critical issue of Sino-Soviet differences—in an analytic memorandum prepared for a new Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone.

The next two documents are broad estimates of Soviet policy that captured CIA's view of the period of Brezhnev's ascendancy as East-West "détente" began to flower. NIE 11-69 was done as President Richard Nixon was taking office, and NIE 11-72 as he was about to depart for his summit meeting in Moscow at which the initial SALT accords were signed.

As America began to view détente more skeptically by the mid-1970s, CIA expended much analytic effort trying to divine Soviet intentions. One CIA study of Soviet perceptions from this period depicted a more confident and powerful USSR conflicted between simultaneous desires for stability and for change. Another political analysis written in 1978 looked at the problems that the election of a Polish pope might cause for the USSR.

With new and disturbing Soviet actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere influencing American thinking, and with the advent of the Reagan administration, a different tone entered CIA's analysis of Soviet policy. One estimate selected from the early 1980s took up concerns about Soviet support for international terrorism (a particular concern of new Director of Central Intelligence William Casey). The last two documents of CIA political analyses in this volume were efforts to interpret what Mikhail Gorbachev and his policies meant for the United States. The first was an estimate done just before President Reagan's meeting in Reykjavik with the Soviet leader, and the other tried to foresee how Gorbachev's policy initiatives would affect the Soviet system and Soviet foreign policy. They demonstrate a timeless theme of CIA's analysis of the USSR: the struggle to understand and depict change in a country whose leaders could not themselves foresee the consequences of their decisions.

CIA's Analysis of Soviet Science and Technology



CIA's Analysis of Soviet Science and Technology
Author's Comments: Clarence Smith

By the 1950s it was clear that the USSR possessed both nuclear weapons and long-range delivery methods. But key questions remained for US policymakers. How advanced and how effective were these capabilities? Could they be used against the continental United States and its Allies on the USSR's periphery? The answers were fundamental to the US strategic deterrent position.

Technical intelligence was the primary tool used to address these questions because the USSR, Eastern Europe, and China were "denied areas" that presented difficult challenges to traditional human and military reconnaissance collection. These countries were repressive police states that severely restricted internal movement and foreign contacts; they also had effective air defenses. This meant traditional espionage and reconnaissance methods were too limited to provide the access or the information needed by the West to monitor Soviet Bloc weapons and remote test sites. To counter this, the CIA and the Intelligence Community (IC) invented innovative collection approaches using remote sensors. A lack of "hard" intelligence was the key driver in developing US satellite imaging and signals intelligence collection systems. In addition to the actual technical collection, it was necessary to develop ways of deriving analytical results from the raw products of these new collection sources. The IC's challenge was not only to create new collection methods but to derive useful information from the data.

The CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence, and later the Directorate of Science & Technology (DS&T), led technical intelligence collection and analysis activities. Those who had been involved in analyzing activities such as the Berlin Tunnel taps of Soviet military headquarters in East Germany, formed the original nucleus. Also included were analytical components dealing with science, technology, and weapons. These analysts had to answer key questions about Soviet strategic weapons: How many weapons did the USSR have? What were their capabilities? Where were they located?

The intelligence reports and estimates selected for this volume from the early 1950s through the mid-1980s reflect the impact of advancements in technical collection and analysis. NIE 11-5-59, "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles," reflects a basic agreement within the Intelligence Community on Soviet capabilities. By October 1964 (NIE 11-8-64), however, there were debates within the IC about Soviet ICBM capabilities and the number of deployed sites. These disagreements were primarily the result of the fact that, while the United States now had more data, there were now more opportunities for different interpretations of the information. Similarly, in the defensive missile area, IC analysts disagreed over Soviet ABM capabilities. NIE 11-3-65 addresses the beginning of the SAM upgrade issue. These strategic offensive and defensive missile concerns stayed in the forefront of the challenges facing IC analysts well into the 1970s. The selected documents reflect these issues.

Assessing Soviet Economic Performance

Assessing Soviet Economic Performance
Author's Comments: James Noren

The CIA documents excerpted in this section illustrate the range of CIA's coverage of economic intelligence that supported US policymakers during the Cold War. The first document, "Long-Run Soviet Economic Growth," used an innovative analytical approach to address a much-debated question in the 1950s-1960s. Soviet agriculture, the Achilles' heel of Soviet economic development, was also an ongoing focus of CIA analysis. "The New Lands Program in the USSR" suggests the depth of research devoted to this subject. It was arguably the most important initiative of the 1950s.

CIA work on Soviet military spending was necessary to research on the Soviet Gross National Product (GNP). US defense planners enthusiastically read such material, asking for disaggregated estimates like those in the third document, "Soviet Military Expenditures by Major Missions, 1958-65." Monitoring Soviet crop prospects also attracted intense interest, especially after the USSR began to buy grain after poor harvests. "The Soviet Grain Deficit" is a typical report intended for the Washington audience. Searching for the causes of the slide in economic productivity, CIA tried to find alternative relations between output and inputs of labor and capital in the USSR. "Investment and Growth in the USSR" identifies one plausible source of the problem. CIA analysts also raised questions about the impact of technology transfer on Soviet capabilities during the Cold War. "Soviet Economic and Technological Benefits from Détente" is an example of the many papers issued in response to this question.

As a warning of the Soviet Union's impending descent into economic stagnation, "Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects," issued in 1977, was a paper of first importance. Reprinted by the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, it set out the reasons why the Soviet economy was in trouble and why its future was so grim. In addition, CIA singled out problems in Soviet oil production as a major factor in the outlook for the economy. See the selection, "The Impending Soviet Oil Crisis." The next document "Organization and Management in the Soviet Economy: The Ceaseless Search for Panaceas," represents CIA's consistently negative appraisal of Soviet attempts at economic reform, one prong of Moscow's efforts to jump-start the Soviet economy.

CIA's involvement in heated policy issues was evident in the Reagan administration's determination to stop the Siberia-to-Western Europe gas pipeline. The Agency's unwelcome evaluation of the chances for success were set out in "Outlook for Siberia-to-Western Europe Natural Gas Pipeline," a paper typical of the numerous assessments of various proposed sanctions and embargoes. The final selection, "Gorbachev: Steering the USSR in the 1990s," described the impasse Gorbachev's economic policies reached by 1987, considered the options open to him, and concluded that he could be deposed because of failure to deliver on his promises.

Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities



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Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities
Author's Comments: Raymond Garthoff

The documents in this volume dealing with CIA's analysis of military affairs during the Cold War were selected with several considerations in mind. First, they provide illustrative examples of analyses of Soviet intentions and military doctrine, as well as of military forces and capabilities. Second, they include materials on strategic forces and theater or general purpose forces for nuclear and non-nuclear warfare. For reasons of space, however, some subjects regrettably are not covered, such as Soviet naval forces and civil defense. Third, they provide a balance, including CIA Directorate of Intelligence analyses on current Soviet military affairs (and "post-mortems" on past analyses and estimates), as well as CIA-drafted National Intelligence Estimates forecasting future developments.

Finally, the documents selected highlight new materials, omitting many relevant documents released earlier and published in previous collections. As a result, less attention is given to the 1960s and 1970s, and to the early period of concern over possible Soviet initiation of war in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the "missile gap" of the late 1950s, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the "Team B" competitive analysis on strategic estimates in the late 1970s, and the end game of the Cold War in the late 1980s.

civil defense efforts will improve protection for the leaders and essential work force, but not for the general population or for military or economic facilities. Soviet capabilities against ballistic missile-launching submarines will remain poor

We project that, despite the widespread Western deployment of counterforce weapons in the 1980s, the Soviets will maintain the capability to destroy most of the US population and industry in a retaliatory strike. Conversely, despite their own growing counterforce and defensive capabilities, they will not in the 1980s be able to prevent a devastating retaliatory strike by remaining Western ICBMs and air- and submarine-launched weapons

Programs for theater nuclear weaponry will further erode NATO's nuclear advantage in Europe unless NATO takes action to offset them. The Soviets have programs under way to improve the accuracy and flexibility of nuclear delivery systems at all ranges. These include the introduction of new tactical aircraft and short-range ballistic missiles, the continuing deployment of nuclear-capable artillery, and further improvements in the number and quality of weapons on long-range theater nuclear delivery vehicles (missile launchers and aircraft) based in the USSR

Our baseline projection includes improvements in Soviet Ground Forces. They will continue to emphasize the central role of armor; by the end of the decade most major Soviet units (and some units of their allies) will have tanks with advanced armor that provides good protection against current NATO weapons. The introduction of new artillery and air defense systems, as well as organizational changes that involve the addition of combat units and weapons, will increase the capabilities of Soviet divisions to respond to rapidly changing battlefield conditions. New fixed-wing ground attack aircraft and helicopters, with increased ranges and payloads and improved munitions, will increase the vulnerability of NATO's installations and forces and improve Soviet capabilities for close support of ground operations

With these new systems, we expect Soviet theater forces to keep pace with NATO's modernization programs. The East European forces of the Warsaw Pact will improve less rapidly, however, because economic constraints will limit the amount of modern Soviet equipment they can afford to acquire and maintain