PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN
THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

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INTELLIGENCE AND THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR
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HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS DIVISION

The Historical Collections Division (HCD) of CIA’s Information Management Services is responsible for executing the Agency’s Historical Review Program. This program seeks to identify and declassify collections of documents that detail the Agency’s analysis and activities relating to historically significant topics and events. HCD’s goals include increasing the usability and accessibility of historical collections. HCD also develops release events and partnerships to highlight each collection and make it available to the broadest audience possible.

The mission of HCD is to:

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- Broaden access to lessons-learned, presenting historical material that gives greater understanding to the scope and context of past actions.
- Improve current decision-making and analysis by facilitating reflection on the impacts and effects arising from past foreign policy decisions.
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- Demonstrate the CIA’s commitment to the Open Government Initiative and its three core values: Transparency, Participation, and Collaboration.

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE

The History Staff in the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence fosters understanding of the Agency’s history and its relationship to today’s intelligence challenges by communicating instructive historical insights to the CIA workforce, other US Government agencies, and the public. CIA historians research topics on all aspects of Agency activities and disseminate their knowledge through publications, courses, briefings, and Web-based products. They also work with other Intelligence Community historians on publication and education projects that highlight interagency approaches to intelligence issues. Lastly, the CIA History Staff conducts an ambitious program of oral history interviews that are invaluable for preserving institutional memories that are not captured in the documentary record.
The Richard Nixon Foundation is a privately supported, non-profit institution dedicated to educating the public about the life, legacy, and times of the Thirty-Seventh President. The Foundation supports exhibits and programs on the nine-acre Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Birthplace, a three-dimensional walk-through memoir featuring 22 high-tech galleries, movie and interactive video theaters, the spectacular First Lady’s Garden, the President’s faithfully restored 1910’s birthplace, the magnificent full-size replica of the White House East Room, the flower-ringed memorial sites of President and Mrs. Nixon, and Marine One, the President’s helicopter.

As a performing arts center for public affairs, the Foundation’s year-round programming features national policy conferences, study groups, town meetings, school editor forums, and a continual schedule of distinguished speakers and authors from government, politics, the media, and public affairs. The Presidential Library is home to more than 42 million pages of documentation and material from Richard Nixon’s life in politics, as well as a nationally recognized research center, giving students and scholars the opportunity to study Richard Nixon’s legacy and historic presidency.

The Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum is the presidential library and final resting place of Richard Milhous Nixon, the 37th President of the United States. Located in Yorba Linda, California, the library is one of twelve administered by the National Archives and Records Administration. From its original dedication in 1990 until becoming a federal facility on July 11, 2007, the library and museum was operated by the private Richard Nixon Foundation and was known as the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace. The 9-acre campus is located at 18001 Yorba Linda Boulevard in Yorba Linda, California and incorporates the National Historic Landmarked Richard Nixon Birthplace, where Nixon was born in 1913 and spent his childhood. The facility is now jointly operated between NARA and the Richard Nixon Foundation.

The original Library & Birthplace was officially dedicated on July 19, 1990. Former President Nixon and First Lady Pat Nixon were present, as were President George H. W. Bush, then the President of the United States, former President Gerald Ford, former President Ronald Reagan, and first ladies Barbara Bush, Betty Ford, and Nancy Reagan. A crowd of 50,000 gathered for the ceremony. At the dedication, Nixon said, “Nothing we have ever seen matches this moment—to be welcomed home again.”
PRESIDENT NIXON
AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN
THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Nixon and Secretary of
State Kissinger
To intelligence historians, the October 1973 War is almost synonymous with “intelligence failure.” On 6 October the armies of Egypt and Syria attacked Israel, catching the Israeli and US Intelligence Communities by surprise. A US multi-agency postmortem in December of that year, declassified in 2009, concluded that while the evidence of an Arab-initiated war had not been conclusive, the intelligence had been “plentiful, ominous, and often accurate.” The documents in this present collection attest that, for months before the war, the US Intelligence Community had received reports pointing to escalating Egyptian and Syrian hostilities. Contrary to conventional wisdom that analysts had not properly considered the evidence that war might be approaching, the archives show that the Intelligence Community received these reports—debated them and wrote about them. Analysts did consider that the Egyptian and Syrian military maneuvers might be more than just posturing. Analysts did entertain the idea that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat might initiate a conflict that he knew he would lose militarily. But ultimately, the analysts judged that there would be no attack. Or as the December postmortem put it, the conclusions “were—quite simply, obviously, and starkly—wrong.”

As the Intelligence Community investigated, so did outside scholars. No fewer than four books on the conflict were published in 1974. One scholar in 1975 remarked that he had cleared a space on his crowded bookshelf and labeled it “Kippur” in the anticipation of the coming literature. These early volumes attempted to recount the years of negotiation that preceded the war and the chronology of the war itself. The lack of warning was one of the themes, and remains so today. Edward R. F. Sheehan, in one of the early histories, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger (1976), wrote that “The October war was a surprise to Dr. Kissinger—and to Israel—though it should not have been…. He did not
ignore the evidence. Like the Israelis, and like the C.I.A., he misinterpreted it.” Passage of time and the release of once-classified materials have affirmed that statement. Yet even with some fine accounts of the war available at the time, points remained contested, and since then the war’s legacy has continued to be a subject of revision and reinterpretation.

Not all US Government documents have been released (though this collection helps with that somewhat) and most of the Israeli holdings are still unavailable to researchers. In fact, a book review in 2001 commented that “It is still too early to understand this event,” a statement all the more remarkable when we consider that it only referred to the war itself and not its place in history. Even now we are seeing books with the ambitious claim of writing the history of the so-called Arab Spring. No doubt as time passes, the current regional unrest and changes in leadership will be subject to the sort of reinterpretations (and recriminations?) that major events of Middle Eastern history have engendered. 2

Because much of the scholarship and many of the newly declassified documents in this collection attest to the intelligence failure, this article focuses on that topic. As intelligence historians know, intelligence failures can take different forms. A service or many services worldwide can be caught off guard by some major phenomenon or movement. The aforementioned Arab uprisings in the spring of 2011 serve as an example. An intelligence failure can be a tactical event, the planning and execution of which evaded collection efforts even when the intelligence services were well aware of the propensity for such attacks and when they had deployed intelligence resources to detect them. As some would have it, any terrorist attack anywhere is necessarily an intelligence failure. By any standard, the judgment as of 6 October was one.

Since then, various attempts have been made to understand why and how the Intelligence Community concluded what it did. Some of the most common are summarized here:

- **Over-reliance on Israel to know its own security posture.** The US Intelligence Community tended to assume not only that Israeli intelligence would be aware of any major attacks planned against its territory, but also that Israel would plead for US assistance to counter them. Neither was the case, and it was difficult for US analysts to break with Israel’s judgments about its own security.

- **Preconceived notions.** One of the most common themes in examinations of the October 1973 War strategic warning issue is the absence of dissent against some of the most deeply held truths. One such conventional wisdom was that the 1967 Six-Day War had proven Israeli military superiority and Arab military inferiority to such an extent that the Arabs would avoid war at all costs. Another was that Arabs were tactically and strategically ill-suited for modern warfare and would not be able to fool analysts well enough to launch a surprise attack.

- **A plausible interpretation of the same evidence.** It was a reasonable analytic conclusion, with precedence on its side, that Anwar Sadat’s aggressive rhetoric was a negotiating tactic to force Israel to a settled solution. Sadat had “cried wolf” at many points during the previous two years, threatening war if no peace agreement was reached with Israel. It was a reasonable interpretation of the same facts that the Arab military maneuvers near the Golan Heights and the Suez Canal were the same sort of readiness drills and exercises underway in years past.

- **Faith in diplomacy.** Since 1967, the United States had expected that diplomacy and uneasy stalemates would prevent the outbreak of another war. After 1971—a year Anwar Sadat warned was the “year of decisions” —had passed with no major decision, and after a series of negotiations had seemingly averted an Egyptian attack in May 1973, the United States expected that potential belligerents would yield.
• The “rational actor” fallacy. Western analysts tended to conclude (though not dismiss entirely) that neither Sadat nor Asad would initiate a war he expected to lose. A “rational actor” model can fail because what seems rational to the analyst—or generally rational in that analyst’s culture—may not be rational to the actor in question. To Sadat and Asad, for example, it may have been irrational to attack Israel on a purely military basis, but it may have been rational to do so to restore Arab prestige or to force other countries to intervene and press for a settlement more favorable to the Arab side than if there had been no attack.

• Organizational challenges within CIA. For the Agency at least, part of the intelligence failure may be attributable to major organizational and personnel changes that had occurred just before the war. The new Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby, had initiated a major reorganization of the Agency’s intelligence estimative process, which was still in disarray in early October. At the same time, several of CIA’s most knowledgeable Middle East analysts and managers had left for other accounts and had been replaced by persons newer to the issue.

The documents in this collection will, for the most part, underscore what has been publicly known and written about the war, with some new nuances, discussed below. That analysts believed no attack was coming is clear. On 4 October, an Intelligence Community memorandum stated: “We continue to believe that an outbreak of major Arab-Israeli hostilities remains unlikely for the immediate future.” A particularly embarrassing passage, having been published the day the war began, said “neither side appears to be bent on initiating hostilities.” And from the same document: “For Egypt, a military initiative makes little sense at this critical juncture,” and “For...the Syrian President, a military adventure now would be suicidal.” Some of CIA’s intelligence reports demonstrate the fallibility of human intelligence. According to a Syrian officer, there was a Syrian build-up in the Golan Heights, but it was defensive. 3
More interesting to the scholar are the documents that show the Intelligence Community grappling with reports that war might, in fact, be coming. In several, analysts considered signs that Egyptian and Syrian military maneuvers might be more than just exercises or gambits to prompt a settlement. Human intelligence reports from spring 1973 demonstrate that CIA sources had access to at least some of Syria’s plans to assault the Golan Heights. Other human intelligence that spring said of Egypt’s threats to attack: “Knowledgeable Egyptian observers... now believe Sadat is serious and that to consider that he is bluffing is unrealistic and naïve.” The source conceded that Sadat’s preference was for a diplomatic solution but said that he would resort to hostilities should diplomacy fail.

In May 1973, CIA issued a National Intelligence Estimate, “Possible Egyptian-Israeli Hostilities: Determinants and Implications,” declassified for this project, that draws on some of this reporting. The Estimate contained the following passages:

- “Sadat’s new campaign of threats to renew hostilities involved public and private statements…. are consistent with both preparations to fight Israel and with political/psychological efforts to stimulate diplomatic activity leading to settlement.”

- “The Egyptians believe deeply that progress toward solution of the Arab-Israeli problem on terms tolerable to Egypt can only come about through actions of the Great Powers…. If Sadat is once again disappointed, the temptation to resort to military action in order to force the US hand might prove irresistible.”

- “Sadat himself could be trapped by building up an atmosphere of crisis to the point where failure to act militarily would seem to him more dangerous to his own hold on power than attacking and taking the consequences.”

- “If Egypt does decide to initiate hostilities, it will do so in spite of the military consequences, rather than in hope of military gains.”

One of the more notable groups of documents is a series of CIA memorandum disseminations—CIA intelligence reports—that went to a highly restricted audience from late September and early October 1973 on the Syrian build-up on the border of the Golan Heights. Unlike the ones discussed above, they are from the days just before the war. One from mid-September, described the Syrian military movements to the Golan Heights area as preparations for war disguised as training exercises. It also said that senior Egyptian and Syrian military personnel had met and planned “a joint Egyptian/Syrian operation for which the movement of forces would occur under the guise of training.” Another, from late September, discusses not only the Syrian plans to attack but also the Syrian preparations for an Israeli counteroffensive once the war started. A third report, on 29 September, recounted:

...a Syrian plan for a massive assault upon Israel involving at least four Syrian divisions. The proposed assault was to be launched upon the Golan Heights along a broad front 80 kilometers wide, and was aimed at occupying the Golan Heights up to the pre-June 1967 borders…. All Syrian units are expected to be in position by the end of September. Infantry Divisions 5, 7, and 9 have completed their deployment in their allocated sectors. Brigade commanders have the operations order now, and are briefing battalion commanders at their headquarters in secrecy.

The five-page memorandum dissemination stated the plans of Syrian units at the Division level and, in some cases, at the Brigade level. These reports, and the other indications that hostilities might break out, were insufficient to shift the analytic line to the position that war was imminent.

The documents from the crisis-management period beginning on 6 October show representatives of the US intelligence agencies, State Department, and White House functioning as a nexus of intelligence and statecraft in the form of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), details of which are recounted in an accompanying article in this publication. The WSAG minutes from 6 October, which were released in redacted form in 2006, document the
conversation that can almost be imagined cinematically, as the participants discuss the policy implications of the events that have transpired over the course of the day:

Mr. Schlesinger: How about a joint position on a cease-fire?

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, but Israel won’t accept it until the Egyptians and Syrians are thrown out…. So our strategy is to go in with a ceasefire, status quo ante resolution. We will let the military situation go on until all parties want to grab the resolution.

Mr. Schlesinger: Even Israel?

Mr. Kissinger: If it is done with the concurrence of Israel, they can’t very well ask us to pull it back.

Mr. Colby: If the Israelis have moved far ahead, we will have a bargaining point.

Mr. Kissinger: Even if Israel wins, we will stick to the resolution. If we can force Israel out of their forward position, it will be a good point with the Arabs—if Israel gets beyond the ceasefire line.

Mr. Colby: Israel isn’t interested in territory this time. They’re interested in beating up the Arab forces.

Mr. Kissinger: This is a very critical period in our relations with the Soviets. If the Soviets get themselves into an anti-US or anti-Israel position, they can kiss [Most Favored Nation] and the other things goodbye (sic).”

The material on the period of the war itself attests to the range of issues, including tactical intelligence on the belligerents, US equities with Middle Eastern heads of state, the state of alert of other Middle Eastern militaries, the strategic interests of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Muslim opinion internationally, the strength of the US dollar in global financial markets, and the potential ramifications of a US energy shortage during the coming winter. Of course these documents do not settle every debate. Many were not declassified for this release due to continuing sensitivities. The
materials in the release do not reveal the foreign sources from which Agency and other Intelligence Community entities obtained their information. They do not recount all of the secrets of Secretary of State Kissinger’s meetings with foreign heads of state as he sought to de-escalate the crisis. They do not settle the issue of whether Israel activated or pretended to activate its nuclear arsenal. One document from as early as 19 October stands out, however, for speaking to an issue that would prove an important part of the war’s legacy. It states that the war had “greatly strengthened President Sadat’s political position in Egypt and in the Arab World generally,” and that Sadat had “a respect and popularity that he never knew before.” It would be this reputation for Sadat that would enable him in the ensuing search for a peace agreement between the Arabs and Israelis.

What this collection of documents cannot do—nor can any collection of documents on a discrete event—is place the issue in context. The Middle East had long been a conundrum for US policymakers who wanted to win the region’s proverbial hearts and minds for the Western side, but who struggled to do so given the US support for Israel. Almost from the outset, CIA had warned of the consequences in the Middle East should the United States back an Israeli state. On 28 November 1947, just five weeks after its creation, the Agency issued a major analytic piece that said that “[i]n the event that partition is imposed on Palestine, the resulting conflict will seriously disturb the social, economic, and political stability of the Arab world, and US commercial and strategic interests will be dangerously jeopardized.” The region was important to US policymakers for several other reasons: its vast energy resources, its placement on the land and sea transportation routes between East and West, the alignment of its leaders with the Great Powers, the emergence of Palestinian activity (which by 1972 had already prompted the United States and Israel to use the vocabulary of “the war on terror”), and the place of the war in the Middle East peace process. To CIA, an additional context of the October 1973 War is that it was one of a series of events that cost the Agency great regard in Washington—a tumultuous period in which revelations of
Agency improprieties and an intense climate of scrutiny brought, for several years, many of the Agency’s programs abroad to a halt.

Perhaps one of the keenest insights from this document collection is from the December 1973 postmortem, and one with which we can identify today: “[W]hat may seem so clear now did not, could not, seem so clear then.”

This seems a truth that would have a place in almost any retrospective, on the October War or otherwise. The intelligence business is a difficult one, especially if the standard is the accurate prediction of the future based on complex and sometimes illogical actors.

The case of the October 1973 War is often studied in an attempt to learn from our past. We hope that this collection can facilitate that worthwhile endeavor.

1 DCI Memorandum, prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff, “The Performance of the Intelligence Community before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: A Preliminary Post-Mortem Report,” 20 December 1973; quote on plentiful and ominous, i; quote on starkly wrong, 4.


The map illustrates the strategic positions and movements during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Key locations include Cairo, Port Said, Al Mansurah, and various other points along the Suez Canal and the eastern Mediterranean. The map highlights the Egyptian military presence and the Israeli counter-offensive, which resulted in a significant tactical advantage for Egypt. The map also marks the Suez Canal Zone and the surrounding Egyptian-held territory, providing a comprehensive view of the conflict's geographical context.
THE YOM KIPPUR WAR OF OCTOBER 1973

A thorough search of the material issued prior to 6 October [Egypt's and Syria's sudden attacks on Israel] has failed to turn up any official statement from any office or committed officer responsible for producing finished, analytical intelligence which contributed anything resembling a warning, qua warning. There was an intelligence failure in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East on 6 October 1973. . .The principal conclusions concerning the imminence of hostilities reached and reiterated by those responsible for intelligence analysis were—quite simply, obviously, and starkly—wrong.

Intelligence Community’s Postmortem, December 1973 1

Colby’s tenure as DCI began with a major intelligence failure. He had been Director less than a month when Egypt and Syria suddenly attacked Israel. Colby and the Intelligence Community did not alert policymakers that a renewed Arab-Israeli war was about to break out, nor did they forecast that the fighting might provoke a US-Soviet confrontation in the Middle East. Although Colby, CIA, and the Intelligence Community did lend the administration excellent crisis management support once the war was under way, their misreading of its outbreak heightened White House dissatisfaction with CIA and US intelligence, and did not get Colby off to a flying start as DCI.

That the sudden Egyptian-Syrian attacks had taken the intelligence and policymaking communities by surprise is beyond question. President Nixon, in his memoirs, recalled that, “as recently as the day before, the CIA had reported that the war in the Middle East was unlikely, dismissing as annual maneuvers the massive and unusual troop movement that had recently been taking place in Egypt.” 2 [less than one line not declassified] the Office of Current Intelligence — the principal CIA office passing tactical assessments of the crisis to the White House — agreed. He later remarked that he did
not recall anyone “anywhere in the Intelligence Community who definitely felt war would occur soon, or who markedly differed from the general consensus” that the early October crisis was simply another war scare such as they had seen repeatedly since May. ³

Colby’s recollection is similar: “It was obvious that the intelligence process had failed notably in this performance.” ⁴ Henry Kissinger also agreed: “October 6 was the culmination of a failure of political analysis on the part of its victims. . . . Clearly there was an intelligence failure, but misjudgment was not confined to the agencies [CIA and DIA].” In Kissinger’s view, every policymaker knew all the facts. The problem was that the US “definition of rationality did not take seriously the notion of [the Arabs] starting an unwinnable war to restore self-respect. There was no defense against our own preconceptions or those of our allies.” ⁵ Nor did the United States have a monopoly on poor intelligence performance. Israeli Lt. Gen. Haim Bar-Lev later stated that his country’s defense intelligence agency had erred: “The mistake lay in the evaluation of the intelligence data and not in the absence of accurate and reliable information.” ⁶

The Intelligence Community also failed to alert US decisionmakers to the related oil/financial crisis that ensued between October 1973 and January 1974, when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised oil prices by 400 percent. As the US Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) later stated, US intelligence analysis at the time was not as perceptive as public sources were on the possibility that the Saudis might use oil as a political weapon. By comparison, said this Congressional report, analysis within the Intelligence Community had tended to stress continuation of the status quo in Saudi policy toward the United States, examining the question of oil price levels within the context of a narrow supply and demand framework and displaying only limited integration of political and economic factors. The Agency’s response to these SSCI criticisms held that, because CIA’s analysts had not anticipated the Middle East war, they concluded that Saudi Arabia and the other Arab nations would not employ oil as a political weapon. ⁷

The Intelligence Community’s misreading of these questions had begun in the spring of 1973 with the production of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Possible Egyptian-Israeli Hostilities: Determinants and Implications. With no dissenting opinions, the USIB agencies had agreed that Sadat’s campaign of growing threats was one of psychological brinksmanship, undertaken chiefly in “hope of inspiring US pressure on Israel.” The situation could get out of hand, the Estimate concluded, but substantial Egyptian-Israeli hostilities appeared “unlikely in the next few weeks.” Sadat did not yet appear committed to an attack on the Israelis, and, since Egypt’s military capabilities were so limited, the participation of other even less impressive Arab forces—such as those of Syria—on a second front would “matter little in military terms.” Egyptian forces, according to the NIE, probably could conduct small commando raids into the Sinai Peninsula, but did not have the capability to seize and hold any portion of it in the face of Israeli opposition. The only implications for the United States foreseen by the Estimate were those that would attend “another mauling” of the Arabs by the Israelis. ⁸

Substantially similar views marked the assessments prepared by Colby and the Intelligence Community, right up to the Egyptian-Syrian attacks of 6 October. No NIEs or SNIEs (Special National Intelligence Estimates) were requested or undertaken between the National Intelligence Estimate of May and the end of September. This reflected the fairly relaxed view US intelligence had of the developing crisis. Finally, on 30 September, worried by evidence of unusual concentrations of Syrian tanks on the Golan Heights, Henry Kissinger (who had become Secretary of State just a week earlier), tasked CIA and State’s INR to give him their immediate assessments, at the same time requesting a coordinated NIE. ⁹

Although production of this NIE was overtaken by events within a week, Colby and INR each gave Kissinger quick evaluations. As events turned out, however, these analyses also left
much to be desired. INR held that evidence concerning the military buildups in Egypt and Syria was inconclusive: although the possibility could not be excluded they might attack Israel in the near future, the chances of such were deemed “dubious.” For the INR, CIA, and DIA assessments immediately before the Egyptian-Syrian attacks, CIA’s study concluded that Egyptian and Syrian military moves looked “very ominous,” but “the whole thrust of President Sadat’s activities since last spring has been in the direction of bringing moral, political, and economic force to bear on Israel in tacit acknowledgement of Arab unreadiness to make war.”

Following these rather calm immediate analyses of 30 September, CIA, INR, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) made similar judgments right up to—and even after—the 6 October Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel. On 5 October, CIA concluded that, although large military exercises were under way in Egypt, the Egyptians “do not appear to be preparing for a military offensive against Israel.” Indeed the military preparations thus far, said CIA, “do not indicate that any party intends to initiate hostilities.” And, on the very day the Arabs attacked Israel, CIA estimated that neither the Egyptians nor the Syrians appeared bent on initiating hostilities. For Egypt to attack now, said this CIA study, would make little sense: “Another round of hostilities would almost certainly destroy Sadat’s painstaking efforts to invigorate the economy and would run counter to his efforts to build a United Arab political front, particularly among the less militant, oil-rich states. For the Syrian president, a military adventure now would be suicidal.” And later on 6 October, even after news of the outbreak of war had reached CIA, its Watch Committee could find no hard evidence of a major, coordinated Egyptian-Syrian offensive across the Canal or in the Golan Heights area. Rather, the Watch Committee reported:

The weight of evidence indicates an action-reaction situation where a series of responses by each side to perceived threats created an increasingly dangerous potential for confrontation. . . . It is possible that the Egyptians or Syrians, particularly the latter, may have been preparing a raid or other small-scale action.
Clearly, CIA and the Intelligence Community did not cover themselves with glory. Even worse, Lawrence Eagleburger (then a senior assistant of Kissinger’s) claims that “Henry reading some fairly raw intelligence came to the conclusion that Sadat was going to start a war before the Intelligence Community itself did, but too late all the same time.”

A telling indicator that intelligence had not alerted policymakers to the imminent outbreak of war was the fact that, when the attack came, on Saturday, 6 October, Henry Kissinger was in New York at the UN, President Nixon was at Key Biscayne [less than one line not declassified]. In all, this warning failure marked an inauspicious start for DCI Colby in a situation of enormous consequence for US crisis management, Israeli security, world oil supplies, and the threat of added Soviet presence in the Middle East.

That intelligence performed so poorly was all the more remarkable since before the October War, Andrew Marshall and Kissinger’s NSCIC Working Group had drawn some constructive lessons from scrutinizing several previous crisis situations. Concluding that, in those cases intelligence analysts had received too little information on policy-level intelligence needs, the Working Group also found there had been too much current intelligence reporting and—contradicting Nixon and Kissinger’s own expressed preferences—too little analytical perspective on the given developing crises.

Moreover, Marshall had called those findings to Colby’s attention in May 1973, adding additional recommendations of his own. 14 In the event, however, the five months from May to October proved too short a period for Colby to achieve much in pushing the Intelligence Community toward such needed improvements. 17

There were a number of reasons why US intelligence did not do a better job in anticipating the Egyptian-Syrian attacks on Israel in October 1973. To an important degree, the Intelligence Community relied heavily on Israeli intelligence for data and judgments on the Middle East. Although the Israelis had previously been remarkably accurate, in this instance they were not. President Nixon was “stunned by the failure of Israeli intelligence. They were among the best in the world, and they too, had been caught off guard.” Henry Kissinger’s recollection is that “every Israeli (and American) analysis before October 1973 agreed that Egypt and Syria lacked the military capability to regain their territory by force of arms; hence there would be no war.” 19

There were many reasons why Israeli intelligence miscarried the coming attacks. In an earlier invasion false alarm in May 1973 when Israeli Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. David Elazar had predicted war, Israeli military intelligence leaders had disagreed. This judgment had heightened the intelligence officers’ credibility. In turn, these officers held stubbornly to certain questionable “lessons” learned from the 1967 war: that Egypt would not attack until its air force had neutralized Israel’s, and that Israel would have at least 48 hours’ warning before an invasion.

Since Secretary Kissinger had been prodding Israel toward peace negotiations its leaders did not want, they may have deliberately understated their degree of alarm about a surprise attack for fear that the White House would push them all the harder toward such negotiations. Such a thesis can be inferred from Kissinger’s own account: “The approaching [Middle East peace] diplomacy distorted the Israelis’ perspective as well. They acquired a vested interest in belittling Arab threats lest the United States use the danger of war as a pretext to press Israel for concessions.” 21

In addition, during the crucial week just before 6 October, Israeli attention had been distracted
by Palestinian terrorists’ attack on a train bearing Soviet Jewish emigres to Vienna (the “Schonau” affair), and by the subsequent negotiations for the release of those emigrants taken hostage. That crisis dominated the news in Israel, while Egyptian and Syrian matters were given back-page treatment. The terrorists in question were members of the Syrian controlled Sai’qa. It has never been established whether the timing of their terrorist attack was a coincidence or a deliberate act to divert Israeli watchfulness.

Moreover, the mastermind of the Egyptian-Syrian invasions of Israel, President Sadat, had done a brilliant job of misleading the Israelis—and American intelligence. As Kissinger later wrote, Sadat “paralyzed his opponents with their own preconceptions.” 22 By orchestrating a false war scare in May, and then repeating more “scare”s in the form of Egyptian and Syrian troop concentrations opposite Sinai and the Golan, Sadat lulled Israeli watchfulness. Hence Israeli and US intelligence judged the Arab military concentrations in the first week of October to be simply more of the same. And, whether or not the Sai’qa terrorist attack was also part of a larger Egyptian-Syrian deception plan, Sadat had created a certain aura of “progress” in Arab-Israeli deliberations at the United Nations, a development that found an expectant Henry Kissinger there when the attacks on Israel occurred.

Colby and US intelligence were further harmed by the fact that, by October 1973, the President’s personal political crisis was far advanced, and much regular governmental access to the White House had diminished. Nixon’s attentions were so distracted that he did not himself participate directly, later in October, in the momentous late-night decision in which Kissinger and a rump session of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG, discussed below) brought US armed forces to an advanced state of alert (DEFCON III) worldwide. In addition, the US intelligence and policymaking communities at the time were focusing on many issues other than Israeli-Arab tensions, such as the continuing Vietnam war, peace negotiations in Paris, SALT issues, and rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China.

By coincidence, CIA’s analytic capabilities in September-October 1973 were also in some disarray. Having disbanded the Office of National Estimates, Colby had begun to replace it with a system of individual National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), whose new procedures were not yet effective. A number of personnel changes had recently been made, and some of the most knowledgeable Middle East analysts had moved to other jobs. In CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence (OCI, the office principally responsible for serving up current intelligence analyses to the White House), the [less than one line not declassified] chief was new to that area and had just returned from a year away on sabbatical. His boss [name not declassified] happened to be on leave the week before 6 October. Also, most of CIA’s DI officers had not had firsthand experience in the field, or the opportunity to gain the up-close “feel” so necessary where available evidence is ambiguous. Furthermore, within the DI there was little integrated political-economic analysis as such: its political analysts and economists tended to work independently of each other, a separation that contributed to CIA’s failure to anticipate OPEC’s use of oil as a weapon. Finally, although some DO officers were more concerned about a possible Arab attack than were their DI colleagues, they could not get the analysts to sound a stronger alarm in their assessments for the White House. 23

Then, too, as we have seen, Kissinger was in possession of certain sensitive intelligence that he did not share with the DCI or the Intelligence Community. Colby later told him, candidly, that he could have done a better job as DCI had the White House not cut him off from certain privileged data. “I fully understand the need for secrecy in our government on these delicate subjects,” he wrote, “although it is clear that the back channel in many instances is becoming the main channel, causing lost and even counterproductive motion, aside from anguish, among many not in the circuit.” 24 Such crucially important back-channel information included earlier warnings Brezhnev had given Kissinger of the Arabs’ serious intent, as well as private dialogue between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, and various private messages from Sadat. 25
TOP: Israeli Tanks move through the Sinai

MIDDLE LEFT: Soviet-made T-55 Tank

MIDDLE RIGHT: Israeli M-4 Sherman Tank

BOTTOM LEFT: Israeli bridge over the Suez Canal
Last, and perhaps most important, accurate estimates of Arab intentions suffered from certain preconceptions strongly held by many of the Intelligence Community’s analysts. These officers tended to denigrate Arab capabilities and to assume that past patterns of Arab military conduct would continue. Some of these analysts were also guilty of mirror imaging, in estimating that it “wouldn’t make [American] sense” for Sadat to launch an attack that he knew probably not carry the day militarily but might advance the Arabs’ cause politically. “We had a bit of a mind set,” Colby conceded in 1975, a conclusion with which many other observers have agreed. Kissinger later characterized the situation similarly, adding that the Arab attack on Israel had demonstrated the dangers inherent in the tendency of most intelligence services to fit the facts into existing preconceptions and to make them consistent with what is anticipated. The House’s, later Pike, investigating committee also attributed part of the problem in October 1973 to analytical bias. In its view, one reason for the analysts’ optimism could be found in a 1971 CIA handbook, which stated that the Arab fighting man “lacks the necessary physical and cultural qualities for performing effective military services.” The Pike committee concluded that, because the Arabs were thought to be so clearly inferior, another attack would be irrational and, thus, out of the question. Finally, Robert Morris, a former NSC staffer, listed like reasons for the failure to anticipate the Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel: “The worst common flaw in the reading of the intelligence was an abiding cultural, perhaps racial, contempt in Washington and Jerusalem for the political posturing and fighting skills of the Arabs.”

THE PERFORMANCE OF INTELLIGENCE AFTER THE OCTOBER WAR’S OUTBREAK

Deficient though they had been in sounding the alarm beforehand, DCI Colby and the Intelligence Community did render the policymakers excellent support once the Egyptian-Syrian attacks had begun, which helped the White House’s crisis management of subsequent diplomacy, cease-fires, and the diplomatic showdown with the USSR. This support applied throughout the course of the war, as this Middle East crisis escalated to US-Soviet confrontation.

Colby set up special working groups that kept the White House abreast of fast-breaking events and provided Kissinger numerous short-term outlook studies and think pieces. Meanwhile, on a Community wide basis, Colby’s working groups integrated a rather large amount of special, compartmented intelligence, which gave Kissinger many particulars concerning battlefield developments and the various armies’ logistic situations. They also provided him prompt cartographic support, essential to the negotiations that eventually reduced the Middle East crisis fever.

Of particular service to US policymakers were the technical services performed by CIA specialists. These experts clarified complicated geographic boundaries in the Sinai, furnished detailed data on certain cities where the cease-fires under negotiation were designed to give the local disputants equal portions of land, and pointed out the differences between actual and claimed battlefield tank losses. In all, the intelligence particulars furnished by Colby’s working groups enabled Secretary of State Kissinger to call certain bluffs or attempted deceptions on the part of the Arab and Israeli disputants and thus strengthened his negotiating leverage as the mediator of the crisis.

Though surrounded by many other demands at the time, Colby personally played an active role in lending crisis management support to the Secretary of State. Meeting daily with Kissinger’s Washington Special Action Group, the DCI not only was the best prepared source of intelligence details, but also the official to whom Kissinger turned for ordering specific intelligence needs concerning collection, clarification, and analysis. Within CIA, Colby held daily informal meetings on the crisis with the DDI, the DDO, and the nascent NIO officers, where they discussed the day’s all-source take and shared their evaluations. These meetings kept the assessments sent to the White House as current and accurate as possible, ensured the personal input of the DCI, and prepared Colby
for his many meetings with Kissinger and other top policymakers during the crisis. Colby also commissioned the candid postmortem report on the performance of US intelligence before the outbreak of the war.

THE DEFCON III AFFAIR

The war crisis reached its apex, as far as US security interests were concerned, on the night of 24-25 October, in the now famous White House decision—made without President Nixon present—to bring US military forces to a higher alert status (DEFCON III) worldwide.

From an intelligence point of view, a number of developments had occurred by 24 October to justify top US policymakers careful scrutiny of the broader US-Soviet situation. A crisis had developed as the tide of the war definitely turned in Israel’s favor. Cease-fires unraveled, Israeli forces threatened to annihilate Egypt’s 3rd Army in the Sinai, and Moscow became suspicious that, despite Washington’s assurances, the United States would not or could not restrain the Israelis. [14 lines not declassified]

Atop these alarming reports came an extremely tough note to President Nixon from Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev threatening to dispatch Soviet troops to the Middle East unilaterally. Kissinger, Defense Secretary Schlesinger, JCS Chairman Admiral Moorer, White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig, General Brent Scowcroft (Kissinger’s NSC deputy), and DCI Colby were the officers who participated in the rump session of the WSAG during the night of 24-25 October that resulted in the remarkable decision for a Defense Condition III (DEFCON III) alert. While they met, Nixon remained upstairs in the White House, although Kissinger conferred with him by phone before the group’s decision.

Many questioned, then and later, whether the decision for DEFCON III was based on legitimate alarms or whether it was an overreaction. There has also been speculation that the decision may have been politically motivated, at least in part, by the needs of a Watergate-beleaguered White House. Colby considered that the DEFCON III decision had been justified.
and four days after that WSAG meeting, so
informed Secretary Kissinger. In his memoirs
Colby explicitly supported Kissinger’s decision
for the DEFCON III alert. Writing in 1978, Colby
believed that Kissinger had not overreacted,
insasmuch as Defense Condition III was the low-
est level of US military alert, and the Strategic
Air Command and a good portion of the Pacific
Command were already at that level. Ray
Cline’s view of Kissinger’s role in the DEFCON
III affair is less generous. “I have always looked
on this as a kind of shell game, a superficial
exercise,” he later stated. “That is, Kissinger
knew what he wanted to do all along, had
already decided to do it.” In Cline’s view,
Kissinger only summoned Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger and the others to give the decision
the semblance of official action. “I’ve heard that
President Nixon was upstairs drunk that night.”
Cline observed, “I don’t know that that’s a fact,
but it is clear and we didn’t know it at the time—
how far Nixon was out of things in those days.”

In retrospect, Colby held that the October
Middle East War afforded a number of intel-
ligence lessons. In his view, the experience
demonstrated that the Intelligence Community’s
collection machinery could be superb when
focused as it had been in the latter days of the
crisis, but that the real challenge for the future
would be to make the analytic process function
with the same degree of excellence. To accom-
plish this, Colby believed that more automatic
challenge or variations to the consensus must
be built into the analytical process. In addition,
Colby pointed out, US intelligence before the
war had suffered from a dearth of independent
coverage and [less than one line not declassi-
ﬁ ed] The intelligence provided the White House
had been too much a CIA product. In the future,
he concluded, the White House must more fully
share privileged data with the DCI, while the
full analytical weight of the entire Intelligence
Community must be brought more directly to
bear on policymaking considerations.

Colby subsequently made some progress in
correcting these weaknesses. He stimulated
more competitive analysis and greater analytic
contribution by agencies of the Community
other than the CIA. He also encourag
advances in coverage by special technical
systems, as well as the acquisition of [less than
one line not declassified] He broadened the
responsibilities of the Intelligence Community’s
watch function, to prevent a repeat of the situation
that existed at the time of the October War’s
outbreak— when the National Indications Center
had had no explicit requirement to warn, only
to watch, and the USIB’s Watch Committee had
“degenerated into participation only by action
officers rather than serious analysts or high offi-
cials.” Colby also set in motion new initiatives
that led ultimately to the creation of a Special
Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning.

Colby was not successful, however, in changing
Henry Kissinger’s proclivity for keeping sensitive
information to himself. Despite the excellent

1 Emphasis in the original. This postmortem was prepared at the
request of Colby, made shortly after the sudden Egyptian-Syrian
attacks on Israel had taken US intelligence by surprise. The
postmortem’s text is given in Attachment to USIB-D-IS/21124,

2 Nixon, Memoirs, p. 920.

3 [Name not declassified] interview by Harold P. Ford, summary
notes, Washington, DC, 2 April 1987 (hereafter cited as [Name not
declassified] interview by Ford, 2 April 1987)

4 Colby, Honorable Men, p. 366.

5 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 459 and 465.

6 Lt. Gen. Haim Bar-Lev, as cited in CIA Warning Staff Study, The DCI’s
PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Duty and Authority to Warn, 24 December 1985, (hereafter cited as DCI’s Duty and Authority to Warn), p. 7, CIA History Staff records, job 90BO0336R, box 2, folder 16, CIA Archives and Records Center

7 US Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Collection, Production and Quality; US Intelligence Analysis and the Oil Issue, 1973-1974: Staff Report, 95th Cong., 1st sess., December 1977 (hereafter cited as SSCI, Intelligence Analysis and the Oil Issue), passim.

8 NIE 30-73, “Possible Egyptian-Israeli Hostilities: Determinants and Implications,” 17 May 1973, passim.

9 Kissinger often had no more regard for CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO) officers than he did for Directorate of Intelligence (DI) or Office of National Estimates analyses. For example, in an earlier Middle East war scare of May 1973, Kissinger telephoned and told a CIA officer that he wanted only the judgments of the DI, not those of “those DI bastards.” George Lauder, interview by Harold P. Ford, summary notes, Washington, DC, 3 March 1987 (hereafter cited as Lauder interview by Ford, 1987)

10 For the INR, CIA, DIA assessments immediately before the Egyptian-Syrian attacks, see Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 462-467; Nixon materials, box 129, NSC files/HAK files; Sunday Times (London) Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War (New York: Doubleday, 1974), p. 104; CIA postmortem: US Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike committee): Hearings on US Intelligence Agencies and Activities: The Performance of the Intelligence Community, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 11, 12, 18, 25, 30 September and 7, 30, 31 October 1975 (hereafter cited as Pike committee, Hearings, Intelligence Agencies and Activities), p. 637. During the months before the war, there had been a certain division of judgment within the State Department, so that some of its intelligence assessments were occasionally more alarmist than the above INR judgments. For example, shortly after the earlier NIE in May 1973, Ray S. Cline, INR’s Director, had given Secretary of State William Rogers a special memorandum that held the resumption of Arab-Israeli hostilities “will become a better than even bet” by autumn (Pike committee report, as cited in CIA: The Pike Report [Nottingham, England: Spokesman Brooks, 1977], pp. 141-142. Although the House of Representatives voted not to publish the Pike committee’s report (as discussed in chapter II, below), a leaked version of the “Report” appeared in the New York Village Voice, and then was published in England- with an introduction by Phillip Agee- as CIA: the Pike Report). Cline has also claimed that at the last minute, on 5 October, he prepared a private assessment for Kissinger that held that hostilities probably were imminent, but could not get this alert through to the Secretary before Egypt and Syria attacked Israel the next day (Cline interview by Ford, 31 March 1988). In any case, frictions with Kissinger, (discussed in chapter 2), led Cline to resign from State a few days later.

11 (London) Sunday Times Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War. See also CIA postmortem: Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 464.


15 Jeanne W. Davis, Staff Secretary, National Security Council, Memorandum for the Attorney General, the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Studies of Intelligence Crisis Support,” 23 May 1973, CIA History Staff records, job 90BO0336R, box 1, folder 15, CIA Archives and Records Center; NSCIC Working Group, Memorandum for National Security Council Intelligence Committee, “NSCIC Working Group Summary of Findings Regarding Intelligence Support in Crisis Situations and Recommended Actions,” 9 May 1973. CIA History Staff records, job 90BO0336R, box 1, folder 15, CIA Archives and Records Center.

16 Andrew Marshall, National Security Council, Memorandum for William Colby, DCI, subject not given, 22 May 1973 with two attachments: Marshall, Memorandum for Colby, “Areas for Discussion,” 21 May 1973., Marshall, Memorandum for the Record, “Additional Insights From the Three Crisis Studies,” 21 May 1973; all three memorandums filed in CIA History Staff records, job 90BO0336R, box 2, folder 16, CIA Archives and Records Center. Those findings and recommendations held that US intelligence should place more emphasis on preparing personality studies of key foreign leaders; meeting the needs of top level US consumers; presenting conflicting estimative judgments; treating and communicating estimative uncertainties; improving intelligence personnel management and management training; rigorously evaluating the Community’s performance and product; preparing serious contingency planning before the possible crises; and developing broader, “less sheltered” views of world politics.

17 The Community’s performance in 1973 concerning possible Arab attacks on Israel contrasted sharply with the excellent alerts Helms’s CIA had earlier given the White House in the runup to the Six Day War in 1967. Helms considered that performance to have been “the finest, across-the-board execution of our mission at every level that I have seen in my twenty years with the Central Intelligence Agency” (Richard Helms, DCI, Memorandum for CIA’s Deputy Directors, 14 June 1967, CIA History Staff records, job 90BO0336R, box 1, CIA Archives and Records Center). As a result of that performance Helms became a regular member of President Johnson’s Tuesday luncheons, that inner circle where LBJ and his closest advisers attacked the country’s principal questions of national security. Although Helms had a good deal less access to Nixon than he had to Johnson, he still fared better than Colby ever did.

18 Nixon, Memoirs, p. 920.

19 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 459.

20 William Colby, DCI, Memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, “Critique of Middle East Crisis,” 27 October 1973, CIA History Staff records, job 90BO0336R, box 1, folder 15, CIA Archives
and Records Center (hereafter cited as Colby Memorandum for Kissinger, "Critique of Middle East Crisis," 27 October 1973). [13 lines not declassified] Syrian intentions was in fact produced by the CI Staff, not the NE Division. Rocca holds that this report evidently made no dent on the US Intelligence Community’s analysis and just “got lost somewhere in the shuffle” (Raymond Rocca, interview by Harold P. Ford, summary notes, Washington, DC, 19 August 1987 [hereafter cited as Rocca interview by Ford, 19 August 1987]. Although the report in question was apparently an excellent one, it did not pinpoint just when the attacks might come. In any event, this was just one of many DO reports at the time, others of which subsequently proved to be wrong.

21 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 461.

22 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 460.

23 [Name not declassified] DI officer, interview by Harold P. Ford, summary notes, Washington, DC, 2 April 1987 (hereafter cited as [Redacted text here] interview by Ford, 2 April 1987); [Redacted text here] ex-DI officer, interview by Harold P. Ford, summary notes, Washington, DC, 16 March 1987 (hereafter cited as [redacted text here] interview by Ford, 16 March 1987); Lauderdale interview by Ford, 1987; [Name not declassified] ex-Intelligence Community Staff officer, interview by Harold P. Ford, summary notes, Washington, DC, 31 March 1987 (hereafter cited as [Name not declassified] interview by Ford, 31 March 1987). DIA’s analyses were also harmed at the time because certain senior DIA estimators tended to accept Israeli evaluations uncritically and to override more cautionary judgments being made by some of DIA’s more junior analysts (several CIA officers, but especially [Redacted text here] interview by Ford, 31 March 1987).


25 Quandt, interview by Ford, 4 May 1987.

26 Colby statement made at a news conference that, as discussed in chapter 11, Colby called to explain why the Pike committee should not include certain sensitive (communications intelligence) data in the report it was preparing at the time. At this unique news conference, held in CIA’s auditorium, journalists raised a number of questions concerning the performance of US intelligence two years earlier in the Middle East war.

27 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 40.

28 CIA: The Pike Report, p. 142


30 Harold Saunders, former NSC Staff officer, interview by Harold P. Ford, summary notes, Washington, DC, 4 May 1987 (hereafter cited as Saunders interview by Ford, 4 May 1987); Quandt interview by Ford, 4 May 1987; see also Top Secret documentation in “Nixon materials, box 123, NSC files/HAK office files; boxes 209 and 265, NSC files/Agency files; and boxes 664 and 665, NSC files/country files/ME.

31 Ibid.

32 DCI Morning Meeting Notes of 19, 23, 29 October, and 2 November 1973. CIA History Staff record, job 90B00336R, box 1, CIA Archives and Records Center.

33 Intelligence Community postmortem. Henry Kissinger sent Colby a “Dear Bill” note, 25 February 1974, thanking him for this postmortem. Kissinger called that study “an outstanding analysis of the Intelligence Community’s reaction and performance during a major world crisis. It was both dispassionately candid and broad in coverage and should prove to be a valuable management tool throughout the Community” (Nixon materials, box 210, NSC files/Agency files/CIA. Vol. VII).

34 [one line not declassified] The 5 November issue of Aviation Week stated flatly that the Soviets had sent two brigades of nuclear-armed SCUD missiles to Egypt and that the US Government had satellite pictures to prove it. [one line not declassified] A parallel study conducted within the NSC carried an even more alarmist tone (separate intelligence, Nixon materials, box 132 NSC files/ HAK office files). [six lines not declassified]

35 Among the skeptics at the time was Australia’s Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, who, when asked at a press club luncheon (8 November) whether US bases in Australia had been put on more than normal alert, answered: “I don’t know if they were put on alert. I wasn’t told. I believe the announcement was for domestic American consumption.” His remarks were noted, with anger, in the White House (see Top Secret documentation in Nixon materials, box 2, White House special files/staff and office files). This DEFCON III nighttime episode took place just a few days after Mr. Nixon’s Halloween Massacre: the departure of Messrs. Cox, Richardson, and Ruckelshaus. One interpretation of the time was that the Washington Special Action Group’s decision had been made at least in part to undercut any thought in the Kremlin that the White House was too paralyzed by Watergate to take decisive action on a crisis situation abroad.


37 Colby, Honorable Men, p. 367.

38 Cline, interview by Ford, 31 March 1988.


40 The DCI’s Duty and Authority to Warn, p. 12. CIA History Staff records, job 90B00336R, box 2, folder 16, CIA Archives and Records Center.
Fighting on the Golan Heights
By about 0600 hours on the morning of 6 October 1973, the first indications started coming in that hostilities were about to break out in the Middle East. At that point, the Middle East Task Force (METF) was stood up and immediately began to coordinate the CIA’s and the Intelligence Community’s response to the crisis. A veteran manager in CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence—the Agency’s analytic unit—was tasked with “organizing, staffing and monitoring operations of an around-the-clock task force.” Within two hours (by 1430), the METF was fully staffed and a work schedule put together.

One of METF’s primary responsibilities was to support the DCI and other high-level officials at meetings of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), an operational subgroup under the National Security Council that served as the main policymaking body throughout the crisis. The METF’s first order of business on 6 October: to prepare a special preliminary assessment for the DCI’s use at the WSAG meeting scheduled for 0900 that morning. At the same time, a Special Watch Committee meeting on the Middle East was scheduled to meet and Richard Lehman, both the Chief of the Interagency Watch Committee and the Director of CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence (OCI)—the principal CIA office passing tactical assessments of the crisis to the White House—asked the METF for updates on the crisis every half hour while the meeting was in progress.

The METF’s primary product during the crisis was the Middle East Situation Report, or SITREP, published up to four times per day during the height of the fighting. The first SITREP was sent to the typist at 0900 that day (Saturday, 6 October). There would be a total of 125 SITREPs published during the crisis, with the last disseminated on 19 November 1973. The SITREPs were used at every WSAG meeting, serving as the main intelligence update for the principals and
their staffs. Another function of the METF was to coordinate the large number of taskings levied on the Agency during the crisis, making sure that all taskings were delegated to the proper offices and analysts, and then tracked to make sure the assignment was completed on time.

SATURDAY, 6 OCTOBER

On the first day of fighting, the DCI returned from the WSAG meeting at 1040 and immediately called for a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) to be ready for a second WSAG meeting already scheduled later that day at 1400 (or whenever Secretary of State Kissinger returned from New York). Drafting assignments were parceled out to senior analysts from the key DI Offices involved in the crisis—OCI, the Office of Economic Research (OER), and the Office of Strategic Research (OSR)—and the SNIE, entitled Arab-Israeli Hostilities and Their Implications, was completed in time for the meeting, which did not start until 1500.

The DCI was a regular visitor to the Task Force, often to pass along what was said at the latest WSAG meeting downtown, or to pass along taskings that came up that day. At the end of a very long first day of the crisis, for example, DCI Colby stopped by at 2110 to thank the members for their work and to let them know that the next WSAG meeting was scheduled for 1900 the next evening. He requested that talking points be prepared by 1600 for him to use to brief the WSAG. He said that he (and others) was especially interested in the following:

- Soviet intentions and movements (particularly military movements);
- How long it might take the Israelis to push the Egyptians back across the Suez Canal;
- Whether the Israelis will engage in air attacks on Cairo;
- How far will the Israelis go in the Golan Heights—will they just knock out men and materiel, or go all the way to Damascus?
SUNDAY, 7 OCTOBER

By the next day, an OSR military analyst had written up a response to the questions and it was attached to the DCI briefing notes as an annex (see SITREP Number 8, as of 1700 EDT, 10/7/73). Sam Hoskinson (acting National Intelligence Officer, or NIO, for the Middle East) later reported that Colby was “ecstatic” over the annex to his briefing.

The taskings were coming in to the Task Force hot and heavy in the early days of the fighting. On the evening of 7 October, the DCI called in to say he wanted answers on the following issues by 0900 the following morning (8 October):

• The Agency’s best judgment on a detailed, day-by-day military scenario for the next three to four days, i.e., how will the battle unfold, in as much detail as possible.

• How many Egyptian troops and how much equipment, by type, did they get across the canal? How did they get them over and where are they going?

• How many bridges did the Egyptians put up across the Canal? What is their status and how many are still in place?

• Soviet advisors: how many are there in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, and what role are they playing?

• As precisely as possible, what are the losses (people and equipment) on all sides, Israeli and Arab?

A joint CIA-DIA paper (Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Next Several Days, 10/8/73) was prepared and disseminated the next day.

MONDAY, 8 OCTOBER

The Task Force got some positive feedback on 8 October when DCI Colby related how Secretary of State Kissinger, in that morning’s WSAG meeting, had held up a copy of the latest SITREP and said, “Have you all seen this?” When everyone nodded they had, he said, “Then we can dispense with the briefing.” By this time, two days into the crisis, the White House was operating from SITREP to SITREP, keeping Kissinger and Scowcroft briefed on the crisis. By this time, two days into the crisis, the White House was operating from SITREP to SITREP, keeping Kissinger and Scowcroft briefed on the crisis.

At 2235 on 8 October, the DCI called the METF requesting that the next morning’s SITREP include an annex paragraph or two addressing the question: To what extent can the Arabs and Israelis sustain the military effort in view of their supplies and logistics? (see Annex: Estimated Logistic Situation and Capabilities of the Middle East Combatants, in SITREP Number 14, 10/9/73). He indicated that he fully recognized the difficulties involved in responding to this and did not expect a definitive answer. He was simply curious whether the forward Egyptian and Syrian forces could be supplied and how much ammunition did they likely have with them during the initial attack.

WEDNESDAY, 10 OCTOBER

The DCI on 10 October requested a new assessment/estimate paper on how the war is likely to go, adopting the technique of having three different analysts take three different scenarios for the war and advocating them. Drafts were to be finished that evening, with revisions to be done the next day. It was noted in the METF Log that DCI Colby was scheduled to brief Congress the next morning (11 Oct) and that his briefer would use the lead section of that morning’s SITREP and then would update the rest of the briefing from the 11 October morning SITREP.

FRIDAY, 12 OCTOBER

On 12 October, Assistant Secretary of State Sisco requested through State channels that all SITREPs include maps, with all places named in the SITREP indicated on the maps. The DI’s Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence (OBGI), the main provider of maps for DI products, was already closely involved in the work.
of the Task Force. Analysts of the Office of Strategic Research (OSR), who produced the action portions of the SITREPs, took responsibility for providing all place names to OBOI as soon as possible in the drafting process to implement this directive.

SATURDAY, 13 OCTOBER

The WSAG met at 1045 and the DCI dropped by the Ops Center after the WSAG meeting to let the METF know he would be briefing at the next scheduled WSAG meeting, which was to gather the next morning (Sunday) at 0900. Specific items of interest to Colby were the following:

• Where are the Israelis going to go?

• What are Soviet intentions?

• Are reports of an Egyptian airborne move true and, if so, what effect could it have?

The DCI also requested that information on stocks of consumables (fuel, ammunition, etc.) for both the Arabs and Israelis—at the start of hostilities and the current situation—be included as soon as possible in a SITREP annex. The Office of Economic Research (OER) provided a package of reports on oil shortages in combatant countries to be passed on to the DCI.

SUNDAY, 14 OCTOBER

After the morning WSAG meeting, DCI Colby came by the Task Force to request briefing notes for the next meeting, scheduled for either 0900 or 1100 the following morning. He requested a SITREP annex answering the following questions:

• How long can or will the battle on the Syrian front go on (2 days, 5, 10)?

• Will Israel press on all the way to Damascus, broaden the front to destroy Arab forces, or stabilize it?

• Assuming Israel can stabilize the Syrian front, how long will it take them to shift their main effort to the Sinai front? An annex covering the last question was published in SITREP No. 39 Annex II, as of 1130 EDT, 15 Oct 1973.

The DCI also asked for a memo on reactions of the Japanese and Europeans to a general shut-off or cutback in Arab oil (OER with OCI support was tasked with this) and a memo on the impact of a stand-down of the Soviet airlift and of any US airlift. In addition to the morning WSAG, an NSC meeting had been scheduled for 1600.

MONDAY, 15 OCTOBER

Word came from the DCI and Sam Hoskinson that the immediate focus of the Task Force in the next few days should be in gauging Arab and Soviet reactions to US resupply of Israel.

• OCI was tasked with a memo (due by 0800 on 16 October) on observed and probable Soviet reactions for the DCI to use as backup (and can also be used as an annex).

• CIA (and the Task Force) was to observe and analyze Arab oil developments, particularly in reaction to US resupply efforts. Hoskinson will levy a specific requirement on OER.

• OCI will write a memo documenting CIA’s assessment of when the Soviets knew about the impending hostilities, by 0800 Tuesday, for the DCI.

In addition to above items of interest, the DCI requested that the Task Force keep him abreast of significant reports on the situation so that he will be knowledgeable about any report that a WSAG attendee might mention during a meeting. Hoskinson suggested the Task Force start keeping a Cable summary list and giving it to the DCI every morning and before each of the meetings he attended. One “good writer” from each shift should summarize, in three sentences, all interesting (quotable, remarkable, pungent) reports that come in, and the list of summaries is then delivered to Hoskinson every morning at 0800. Subjects to focus on are Arab and Soviet reactions to US Airlift; Oil developments; and significant (or unusual) battlefield developments. This operation was to be handled by the DI’s Central Reference Services.
TUESDAY/WEDNESDAY, 17-18 OCTOBER

Light days, with no meetings scheduled and little reporting. CIA and DIA analysts were scheduled to meet with DCI Colby at 1400 on 18 October to discuss progress of the war. During the day on 18 October, word came from DCI Colby that the “losses” needed a new baseline, as nearly everybody thought CIA’s tank and personnel loss numbers were too high. OSR was tasked with putting it together; if possible, by the end of the day, so it could be used at the WSAG meeting scheduled for the morning of 19 October. D/OCI Lehman asked that an OER oil analyst be available each morning at 0830 to “pump him up” for the DCI Morning Meeting.

THURSDAY, 19 OCTOBER

A WSAG meeting is scheduled for 0930 on 20 October and the DCI is slated to brief the House Armed Services Committee on Tuesday, 24 October. At the WSAG held this morning, the CIA provided its updated losses table and late-breaking information of the hostages being held in Beirut. As a result of today’s meeting, OER and OCI have been charged with preparing a paper assessing the effect of oil cutbacks on Japan and Europe. In the afternoon, the TF spent two hours briefing Senator Jackson and his staff on the military situation and the Soviet role. At 2000, Sam Hoskinson dropped in to say the DCI met in the evening with Kissinger and (Defense Secretary) Schlesinger. Hoskinson said the fear in Washington now is that the Egyptian front is about to collapse. DCI Colby came in twenty minutes later to say the WSAG for the next morning was cancelled, but all charts and other material that had been tasked should still be prepared and delivered to the DCI’s office as scheduled. In addition, the evening SITREP is to be sent to the White House, to the attention of Scowcroft for Kissinger (who was leaving Saturday morning on a trip to Moscow). According to the DCI, senior policymakers are most interested in Soviet reactions to today’s events, and this should be reflected in all SITREPs over next day or two.

FRIDAY, 20 OCTOBER

The cancelation of the morning WSAG meeting brought little respite in the burdens placed on the Task Force. DDI Proctor came in early to announce that the DCI had decided that it would be useful to support Kissinger on his trip to Moscow with a cable telling him what would be the best cease-fire lines to draw based on the terrain, social, and political considerations. DDI Proctor came in early to announce that the DCI had decided that it would be useful to support Kissinger on his trip to Moscow with a cable telling him what would be the best cease-fire lines to draw based on the terrain, social, and political considerations.

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SATURDAY, 21 OCTOBER

Sam Hoskinson was delighted with SITREP map on the Egyptian front. He thought it was just what the DCI wanted. Richard Lehman and General Walters (DDCI) dropped by about noon. Walters told the Task Force that he believes the Egyptians have had it and that they should break in the next couple of days. OBGI finished a graphic depiction of proposed cease-fire lines between Israel and the two Arab countries. Lehman praised the members of the Task Force and was concerned about how much longer they could keep up the furious, round-the-clock pace. The DCI called at 1810 to say he had just received a call from General Scowcroft at the White House. Scowcroft told him that the US and USSR had agreed to sponsor jointly a resolution in the UN Security Council that would call for a cease-fire in place. DCI Colby told the Task
Force that he wanted to tell them the news first before it is announced to the public. He also wanted to express his personal appreciation to the members of the Task Force because he believed they were of great help to Dr. Kissinger in reaching this agreement with the Soviets. He said he understood how hard members of the Task Force and those who supported it worked over the past two weeks.

**MONDAY, 22 OCTOBER**

The DCI requested that an Annex be prepared for the 2230 SITREP summarizing reactions to the UN cease-fire resolution. The Annex should lead with reactions of the combatants in the War, reactions from other Arab states, China, European states, and important Third World countries. Lehman said that the DCI wanted a final summary that would estimate how each country was likely to go in the future on the cease-fire question. The Annex was to be given to Dr. Kissinger when he returned the next day (Tuesday). Lehman announced that the Task Force should be manned as usual on Tuesday morning, but that if a cease-fire begins to take effect during the day, the number of personnel may be scaled down.

Lehman called early in the morning to say that the DCI had ordered up a paper on the capabilities of the IC to monitor a cease-fire. Analysts from OCI and OSR were called in to work on the paper (along with reps from the DS&T). A paper on the limitations of photography in monitoring a cease-fire was completed by the end of the day and was typed up during the night to be held for the DCI in the morning.

**TUESDAY, 23 OCTOBER**

The 1700 WSAG meeting was canceled, after all briefing materials were prepared. The meeting was rescheduled for Wednesday at 1000 and the materials will be held until then. DDI Proctor arrived to pass along a memorandum from the DCI relaying President Nixon’s and Dr. Kissinger’s praise and thanks for the work done by the Task Force to date (see memo from DCI Colby to Middle East Task Force, 17 October).
WEDNESDAY, 24 OCTOBER

The DCI called from the White House to inquire about reports of fighting on the East Bank of the Suez Canal. Available reporting was provided to Situation Room for passage to Colby. Reporting nature and origin of continuing fighting in southern Suez area is made difficult by lack of reliable sources. Lehman passed on to the DCI the memo prepared the previous night (De Facto Middle East Cease-Fire Lines and Alleged Violations). Colby used the memo in his discussion with SecDef Schlesinger. A senior OCI analyst is drafting a memo on post-cease-fire probabilities in response to a tasking from this morning’s WSAG (memo is needed for Friday’s WSAG).

During the evening of 24 October, a routine night shift was “enlivened” by a number of phone calls from DCI Colby concerning Soviet activities in the Middle East. OSR analysts working the night shift were able to answer the Director’s questions.

THURSDAY, 25 OCTOBER

OSR was tasked this morning to prepare a memo to recapitulate indicators to look for in identifying Soviet intentions to intervene in the Middle East. Analysts worked all day (in consultation with DIA) to complete the paper.

Following the WSAG, DCI Colby requested a memo be prepared on any evidence of Israeli subterfuge since the cease-fire in the southern sector of the Suez Canal. There is widespread impression among WSAG members that the Israeli military was seeking to consolidate its gains around the Suez and the Egyptian Third Army while blaming the Egyptians for continued hostilities. The memo is to confirm or correct that impression.

FRIDAY, 26 OCTOBER

As of today, the 2230 SITREP is discontinued. More cutbacks expected on Monday. At 1600, a crash request came in from Ambassador Scali (at the United Nations) for an assessment of hostilities and whether Egypt had a serious case for complaint about cease-fire violations. METF members prepared a draft, checked its judgmental portions with Lehman and Hoskinson, and had it delivered to the Ambassador in New York. TF members then briefed the assessment to DCI Colby, who passed it along orally to General Scowcroft at the White House, for Kissinger.

SUNDAY, 28 OCTOBER

OBGI is in the final stages of drafting the memo on possible cease-fire or settlement lines, which is due by 1600 on Sunday. OCI and OSR analysts went over the text and cleared it as is. Final memo was reproduced and collated in 25 copies for delivery to DDI Proctor at 0600 the next morning.

WEDNESDAY, 31 OCTOBER

Analysts and cartographers from OCI and OBGI worked through the day on Jordan-West Bank settlement proposals memo, which was delivered by the end of the day to Hoskinson for transmittal to Hal Saunders at NSC. Word came down that SITREPS would be required throughout Secretary Kissinger’s trip, which means the METF will continue at least two more weekends. The METF will also have to produce an abbreviated cable version to match Kissinger’s schedule.

The METF started to wind down in November as the focus shifted to monitoring the cease-fire and getting an agreement signed between Israel and Egypt. SITREPS continued on a reduced schedule into November and the TF continued to operate, although on a reduced schedule. President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger recognized the outstanding work of the TF at the end of the 17 October WSAG meeting, when the President called the principals to the Cabinet Room to express his appreciation for the excellent work which had been done in this crisis period. Secretary Kissinger also conveyed his appreciation, saying that the teamwork and effectiveness in this crisis was the best of any he had experienced. Despite the fact that the CIA had been criticized for getting it wrong in the months prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the work of the Agency during the crisis was seen as excellent, largely because of the work of the Middle East Task Force.
OCTOBER 07
Syrian forces capture most of the southern portion of the Golan Heights. Syrians have 3 infantry and 1 armored division on Golan Heights.

Egyptians move 400-500 tanks east of the Suez Canal.

Israeli Defense Forces report that Israeli aircraft destroy 9 of the 11 pontoon bridges.

Egypt demands that the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization withdraw all observers from posts along the canal. There are 18 posts in total, 9 on the Egyptian side, 9 on the Israeli side.

OCTOBER 06
At around 1400 local, Egyptians and Syrians launch simultaneous attacks along the Suez Canal and Golan Heights.

Israeli Defense Forces begin to mobilize its forces at 1200 local.

Egyptians bridge the Suez Canal at 2 locations and were still putting forces across the canal at 1915 local.

OCTOBER 03
Moscow gives orders to evacuate dependents in Egypt.

OCTOBER 02

SEPTEMBER 28
Two Arabs seize three Jews and an Austrian official from a train carrying Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel. The hostages were taken to Vienna airport and later released after the Austrian government agreed to close transit facilities for Jewish emigrants.

SEPTEMBER 13
Israel reportedly shoots down 13 Syrian jets in an air battle over the Mediterranean near Latakia.

SEPTEMBER 1973
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OCTOBER 08
Israel launches its first counterattack against Syria. 450 sorties were flown by the Israeli Air Force, and an estimated 300,000 soldiers were scheduled to be fully mobilized by noon this day.

Israel regains most of the territory it lost to Syria in the Golan Heights.

Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov in Cairo announces that Moscow would deliver whatever was necessary for the resupply of Egyptian forces.

Israel launches an air raid on Damascus; the attack struck the Soviet cultural mission in Damascus.

Egyptians are contained to a narrow area along the east bank of the Suez Canal.

The Syrian army re-occupies Qunaytirah, a regional capital in the Southern Golan captured by the Israelis in the 1967 war.

OCTOBER 10
Washington authorizes an airlift of military supplies to Israel after the Soviet Union sends additional arms to Egypt. Israel recaptures most of the territory in southern Golan.

OCTOBER 12
Heavy fighting on the Golan Heights dies down with Israeli forces about 12 miles beyond the cease-fire line, however the forces are unable to achieve a decisive breakthrough on the road to Damascus.

OCTOBER 13
Jordan announces that its troops were fighting on the Syrian front.

OCTOBER 14
In one of the largest tank battles ever fought, Israelis report over 200 Egyptian tanks destroyed and over 400 enemy troops captured. Egyptians announce 150 Israeli tanks and 24 aircraft destroyed.
OCTOBER 15
Single Jordanian brigade is known to be in Syria, confirming Jordan’s entry in the conflict.

OCTOBER 15-16
Between sunset and sunrise, Israeli forces successfully crossed the canal into Egypt proper.

OCTOBER 15-17
Heavy fighting at ‘Chinese Farm.’ “So severe was the fighting and so great the losses, the Israelis were still clearing the wreckage three weeks after the cease-fire.”

OCTOBER 16
Israeli General Sharon establishes beachhead on Western Bank of the Suez.

All of the major pipeline terminals in the eastern Mediterranean are closed, resulting in a loss of 2 million barrels of crude oil a day to Western Europe.

State Department announces U.S. resupply efforts to Israel.

President Nixon hosts Arab foreign ministers from Algeria, Kuwait, Morocco, and Kuwait in Washington.

Tank battles continue and are characterized by Israeli General Michael Herzog as “the biggest armored clash in our military history.”

OCTOBER 17
OAPEC announces decision to cut oil production by not less than 5% until Arab military and political demands are met.

State Department announces U.S. resupply efforts to Israel.

President Nixon hosts Arab foreign ministers from Algeria, Kuwait, Morocco, and Kuwait in Washington.

Tank battles continue and are characterized by Israeli General Michael Herzog as “the biggest armored clash in our military history.”

OCTOBER 19
President Nixon formally requests from Congress $2.2 billion in aid for Israel.

OCTOBER 20
Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal announces an embargo of oil to the United States.

OCTOBER 20-21
Israeli forces reach within 10 miles of Damascus. Israeli forces encircle Egypt’s Third Army.

OCTOBER 22
Israel overtakes Syrian positions on Mt. Hermon.

The United Nations Security Council calls for a cease-fire.
**OCTOBER 23**
Fighting continues despite cease-fire. The UN Security Council restates the cease-fire and calls for the dispatch of UN observers to the region.

**OCTOBER 24**
Fighting continues between Israel and Egypt. As a result, the Soviet Union threatens to send troops to support the Egyptians. The US puts its nuclear forces on alert (DEFCON III).

**OCTOBER 28**
Israeli and Egyptian military leaders meet at Kilometer 101 to implement a cease-fire. It is the first meeting between military representatives of the two countries in 25 years.

Israel agrees to permit delivery of non-military supplies to Egypt’s 3rd Army.

**OCTOBER 29**
The United Nations reaches Egyptian 3rd Army.

**OCTOBER 30**
Moshe Dayan announces agreement for POW exchange and to allow Egyptian 3rd Army to evacuate its wounded.

**NOVEMBER 5**
Arab oil producers announce a 25% cut in total oil production and threaten to cut an additional 5% a month until Israel withdraws from territory it captured in the 1967 war.

**NOVEMBER 9**
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visits the Middle East.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger announces cease-fire plan; Egypt shoots down Israeli aircraft.

**NOVEMBER 11**
Israelis and Egyptians sign a cease-fire agreement at Kilometer 101.

**NOVEMBER 15-16**
POWs are repatriated.
PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR
COLLECTION HIGHLIGHTS
Israeli Thinking on a Peace Settlement with the Arabs. 1 December 1972. 31 pages. “Most Israelis, however, do not believe 1) that the Arabs are ready or really willing to make formal peace with Israel and 2) that even if willing, the Arab states would be able to swallow Israel’s considerable requirements for what Tel Aviv calls a ‘real peace.’”

The CIA Draft on Israeli Thinking on a Peace Settlement with the Arabs. 4 December 1972. 1 page. “The CIA draft…is a competent but unexciting piece of work…. Having just read the paper, I cannot now think of anything I learned in it, and I am far from being an expert on Israel…. Perhaps it is asking too much of an analyst, but I would like to see a bit more speculation and construction of some alternative courses of action that the Israelis might take.”

Comments on the Egyptian Government Message of 1 February 1973. 1 February 1973. 3 pages. “Egyptian Presidential Advisor Hafiz Ismail’s message…reflects more clearly…on the subject of secret US-Egyptian talks the paranoia and cynicism of the Egyptian leadership regarding the sincerity and good intentions of the US Government with respect to the terms of a ‘just’ settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Egyptians find themselves torn between their hopes and their fears as they approach the hard, cold reality of negotiations on the basic problem that is eroding their political viability.”

Cable to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Washington, from Amb. Richard Helms, Tehran. Subject: Persian Gulf. 31 March 1973. 23 pages. An assessment of the stability of the Gulf countries, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, based on the travels of an officer, “whose full-time activity will be devoted to travel plus day-to-day analysis of developments in the region…. This officer has just completed his first trip through the Gulf area at my behest. We have discussed his findings and have reached agreement on the assessment which follows. We have also made certain minor suggestions for action, ones that can readily be passed along through the NSC machinery.”

Cable to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Washington, from Amb. Richard Helms, Tehran. Subject: Egyptian Plea for US Mediation. 6 April 1973. “According to Shah Zayyat said quote Egypt will accept the Rogers plan unquote. When Shah queried foreign minister as to why he was so concerned about settlement, Zayyat asserted that Sadat is in precarious domestic situation and that new leaders might take over Egyptian army at almost any time. Asked by Shah who these leaders might be, Zayyat hemmed and hawed, finally said quote Muslim Brotherhood unquote. Shah interpreted this to mean radical elements but admits Zayyat did not specifically say so. Nevertheless Shah was struck with Zayyat’s pleading tone.”

Israeian on Lebanon: USSR Sees Terror as Hampering Peaceful Mideast Settlement and PRC Charges ‘Superpowers’ Aid Israeli with Weapons, Manpower. 18 April 1973. 5 pages. “Our current assessment of the Egyptian-Israeli military situation remains that we do not believe that an outbreak of fighting along the Suez Canal imminent. For some time, Sadat has followed a two-track approach of talking tough as a tactic to buttress his negotiating position and to keep up his image in the Arab world, while at the same time remaining prepared to search for a negotiated settlement. He may have begun to take his own talk more seriously, but we do not think he is at the point of decision on a military move against Israel.”

Egyptian Strategy (Intelligence Précis). Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger. Subject: Information Items. 1 May 1973. 1 page. “Egyptian strategy during the recent UN Security Council debate on Israel’s Beirut raid provides one more indication of President Sadat’s intentions. Egyptian Foreign Minister Zayyat initially took a very hard line that would have forced us to veto the proposed resolution. At the last moment, however, the Egyptian tactics shifted…perhaps also as a signal to us that a full-scale confrontation was not desired at this point…. The Egyptian strategy suggests that President Sadat may want to see pressure on the US build steadily over a sustained period rather than to provide a confrontation prematurely…. Some military
preparations have already begun, but as yet no one here sees a pattern of planning for a specific operation at a specific time. Although it does not now appear that Sadat has made a final decision on his future strategy, he is clearly engaged in an effort to convince others that he has a realistic military option."

Memorandum for Mr. Henry A. Kissinger from the Director of Central Intelligence, James R. Schlesinger. Subject: Soviet Anti-US Campaign in the Middle East. 2 May 1973. 3 pages. “Although the Soviets have long maintained an overt policy against terrorism, we now believe they are covertly inciting hostility against US interests and personnel in the Arab world… We are unable to determine the extent to which these Soviet covert activities have high level approval in the Kremlin. On the surface at least, their timing would seem opportune in view of the forthcoming summit talks….”

President’s Thursday Briefing. 2 May 1973. 2 pages. “Lebanese army elements and Fedayeen clashed at refugee camp sites at the rim of Beirut yesterday….The current clashes have followed renewed Lebanese army efforts…to crack down on the Fedayeen in the wake [of] tensions following the recent Israeli raid against Beirut…. The question at this time remains whether the Fedayeen will choose to provoke full-scale confrontation….”

Assessment of Indications of Hostilities between the Arab States and Israel. 5 May 1973. 7 pages. Includes cover memo from Director of Central Intelligence James R. Schlesinger to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger. “The pattern of Arab activity does not suggest that an outbreak of hostilities is likely before the UN debate on the Middle East in late May, and we doubt that Sadat will decide to try a major operation within the next six weeks. The moves that the Arabs have made, taken collectively, have the objective at this time of bringing maximum psychological pressure on the US and Israel. There is a danger that these moves will in the future develop some momentum of their own.”

Soviet Policy in the Middle East. 8 May 1973. 12 pages. “There are serious problems for the Soviet in either war or peace in the area. War would require the choice of becoming directly involved and risking confrontation with the US, or staying out and seeing Israeli military superiority, which Moscow clearly recognizes, lead to another defeat for the Arabs. Peace would weaken a major reason for the Soviet presence, and the Arabs might give credit for its achievement to the US.”

DCI WSAG Briefing. Lebanon and the Middle East: The Prospects. 14 May 1973. 11 pages. Talking points prepared for the DCI for the WSAG meeting. Topics include President Fransiyah’s options in the conflict, the growing pressure for President Sadat to avoid hostilities, Egyptian military capabilities if Egypt opens hostilities, and how Israeli officials are responding to Egyptian threats to armed conflict.

Views (Redacted) on the Probability that Egyptian President Sadat Seriously is Considering Launching Hostilities against Israel. CIA Intelligence Report. 14 May 1973. 3 pages. “Knowledgeable Egyptian observers, contrary to views expressed for some time in the past that Egyptian President Sadat was bluffing in his threats to launch an offensive against Israel, now believe that Sadat is serious and that to consider that he is bluffing is unrealistic and naïve. This change in opinion is based on positive indications throughout the country that Sadat is making an all-out effort to complete all preparations both in the military and civilian efforts to reach the “appropriate” level of military preparedness.”

Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger from Harold H. Saunders and Richard T. Kennedy. Subject: WSAG Meeting on Lebanon and the Middle East Hostilities—Tuesday, May 15. 14 May 1973. 29 pages. “The purposes of this meeting are: 1) to discuss in the context of general US contingency planning whether and how we should answer the Lebanese question about what the US would do if Syria intervenes in the present confrontation with the Fedayeen and 2) to assure that contingency planning on the possibility of a resumption of general hostilities in the Middle East is being actively updated….”

The papers in this book are as follows: Tab I: Talking
Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger from Harold H. Saunders. Subject: WSAF Meeting on Med East Tensions. 15 May 1973. 8 pages. “Probability is low that Sadat intends to renew hostilities as he realizes the severe consequences. Moreover, Sadat doesn’t really want to break the deadlock by force. He wants instead to bolster his own position (which renewal of fighting would defeat).”

Possible Egyptian-Israeli Hostilities: Determinants and Implications. National Intelligence Estimate. NIE 30-73. 17 May 1973. 10 pages. “Believing that perpetuation of the current situation is intolerable for himself and for Egypt, Sadat is pressing ahead with his campaign of threats in the hope of inspiring US pressure on Israel. This could, over time, get out of control. But substantial Egyptian-Israel hostilities appear unlikely in the next few weeks. The danger probably will rise if Middle East debates in the UN Security Council (early June) and the Nixon-Brezhnev summit (late June) pass without any results Sadat considers useful. The US and the USSR have some, but limited, leverage in the situation.”

President’s Monday Briefing. Israeli Reaction to F-4s to Saudi Arabia. 26 May 1973. 1 page. “Foreign Minister Eban…has informed the State Department that Israel is ‘all out’ against these sales…. We can anticipate that the Israelis will argue that we will seem to be yielding to Arab oil pressures and will thereby encourage Arab feeling that such pressure offers an alternative to negotiating with Israel; that pending Israeli arms requests must be dealt with immediately; and that Israeli willingness to cooperate with the Administration on most-favored-nation treatment for the Soviet Union might be reconsidered.”

Memorandum to the Acting Secretary from INR, Ray S. Cline. Growing Risk of Egyptian Resumption of Hostilities with Israel. 31 May 1973. 5 pages. “A recent National Intelligence Estimate 30-73…concludes that ‘substantial Egyptian-Israel hostilities appear unlikely in the next few weeks’…. INR is inclined to state the case on the risk of hostilities for a political purpose with a little more urgency. If the UN debate of next week produces no convincing movement in the Israeli-Egyptian impasse, our view is that the resumption of hostilities by autumn will become a better than even bet, and that there is even a slight chance that Cairo may precipitate events before or during the June 18 Nixon-Brezhnev summit.”

President’s Wednesday Briefing. Inter-Arab Military Movements. 16 May 1973. 1 page. “The current assessment of these moves is as follows:
1) They do not threaten Israel’s superiority…. At a minimum, however, CIA believes they could make it more difficult for Israel to prevent some air attacks…. There is inconclusive evidence on the issue of whether President Sadat has decided to resume hostilities. The latest official Israeli estimate is that the probability is low and that his maneuvers are to support his and the Arab political position.”
The Status of Soviet Relations with Egypt and the Palestinians. Intelligence Memorandum. June 1973. 6 pages. “The Soviets have tried but failed to convince the Palestinians to unify because it is more effective, to reject terrorism because it is counterproductive, or to discard their hopes of liquidating Israel because it is unrealistic. Meanwhile, Egyptian bitterness over repeated Soviet refusals to supply the type of military and diplomatic support it wants lingers on, as does disenchantment in Moscow over the lack of gratitude exhibited by its number-one aid recipient.”

Problems in the Persian Gulf. National Intelligence Estimate. NIE 30-1-73. 7 June 1973. 30 pages. “The already great importance of the Persian Gulf region as a source of oil for the industrial world is certain to grow.... This paper assesses local pressure for change, the interests and actions of forces from outside the Gulf, the aims and policies of the USSR, the consequences of the large Gulf states’ efforts to fill the vacancy left by the end of the British protectorate, and likely developments over the next few years flowing from the interaction of these elements. Finally, it assesses the implications for the US.”

Cable to Henry A. Kissinger, White House, from Ambassador Helms, Tehran. 7 July 1973. 8 pages. “As Soviet arms pour into Syria and Iraq, Hussein has learned from his intelligence service that an attack for purpose of retaking Golan Heights was originally planned for June, has obviously slipped, but could occur at any time from now on. Jordanians have copy of actual military plan which has been coordinated with Egyptians.... It has also been coordinated with Iraq in the process of secret military talks between the two countries.... Of course, forego- ing may be exaggerated, attack may never come, Syria may content herself with pressuring Lebanon on Fedayeen issue and leave Golan Heights alone.... These thoughts are passed along to help keep the President and you up-to-date on the mood whereabouts. It is easy to be a Cassandra. On the other hand it is equally easy to be lulled by up-beat reports and promises of action. One must clearly pay attention to the concerns of experienced leaders like the Shah and Hussein who see the Arab countries quote taking a turn for the worse everywhere unquote.... My point is that it behooves us to be more responsive to events in the area.... and to be quicker and more flexible in our response. An examination of just what American policy is achieving in the Arab part of the Gulf area might be interesting....”

Syria’s Middle East Role. National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum. 24 August 1973. 4 pages. “Syria is no longer the erratic, coup-prone cockpit of inter-Arab politics that it was in the 1950s and the early 1960s. Multiple upheavals have helped to produce, and to mask, a thoroughgoing revolution in national institutions and attitudes. The new pattern that has developed in the past decade appears to have a number of durable elements.”

Demographic Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Dispute. Intelligence Memorandum. 24 August 1973. 18 pages. “Since the 1967 war a new problem has arisen; i.e., the demographic threat posed by Arabs living inside the cease-fire lines. The threat stems from Israel’s control of about 1.5 million Arabs, those in occupied territories and in pre-war Israel itself, and from the almost inexorable intertwining of the two areas. In the future, the Arab population is apt to grow more rapidly than the Jewish population.... In absence of a peace settlement with the Arabs, a kind of territorial imperative operates in Tel Aviv. This being so, Jewish control inside the cease-fire lines will come to depend more and more on either denying the Arabs political rights or goading them into leaving.”


“Turning more precisely to these two studies, my overall judgment is that the NIAM on Syria is quite well done, provides just about the amount of detail needed for background, gives some sense of political dynamics, but is overly cautious in speculating about future directions in Syrian policy. By contrast, I found the study on Iraq to be virtually worthless, containing little useful information, no sense of how the political system functions, and an excessive amount of concern with issues that are not necessarily central to Iraqi political life.”


“This memorandum will address the questions of a) what the reconciliation does to, or for, Sadat’s negotiating base, and b) how it will affect the Palestinians. Neither question can be considered in isolation from the other; the Palestinians’ situation, and Sadat’s attitude toward them, are major elements in the strength or weakness of his negotiating position. Even more important for Sadat’s negotiating position, of course, are the Israeli perception of what has occurred and Tel Aviv’s response. So far, this last has been negative.”


“Egypt is currently reorienting its approach to both domestic and international issues and enunciating a new ‘philosophy’ for President Sadat’s government. Basic Egyptian goals remain the same: domestically, to alleviate the severe economic difficulties that plague the country and cause chronic discontent; internationally, to regain Egyptian territory from Israeli occupation. But Sadat is experimenting seriously with new or newly resurrected means to these ends…. Much of his effort will be fruitless. Many of his moves evoke a sense of déjà vu…. But a new set of circumstances both at home and abroad surrounds this latest effort, gives it a new impetus and seriousness of purpose, and offers it some hope of success.”

Completed Deployment of Syrian Units for Assault Upon Israel. CIA Intelligence Report. 29 September 1973. 5 pages. “Previous reports (redaction) have described details of a Syrian plan for a massive assault upon Israel involving at least four Syrian divisions…. All Syrian Army units are expected to be in position by the end of September.”

Syrian Military Intentions. Memorandum to the Secretary from INR, Ray S. Cline. 30 September 1973. 2 pages. “There are reports that Syria is preparing for an attack on Israel, but conclusive evidence is lacking. In our view, the political climate in the Arab states argues against a major Syrian military move against Israel at this time. The possibility of a more limited Syrian strike—perhaps one designed to retaliate for the pounding the Syrian Air Force took from the Israelis on September 13—cannot, of course, be excluded. On September 26, during a visit to Israeli positions on the Golan Heights, Defense Minister Dayan stated, according to a Jerusalem broadcast, that Syria had massed hundreds of tanks and artillery pieces just beyond the Israeli lines in the area.”

CIA Assessment of Purported Syrian Military Preparations. Memorandum for the Secretary of State. 30 September 1973. 2 pages. “A unilateral Syrian attack for the purpose of retaking and holding the Golan Heights has no hope of success. The defeat and destruction of the forces earmarked for the operation would cripple the Syrian Army, and would have profound consequences for the cautious and pragmatic President Asad.”

Syrian Military Movements toward Syrian-Israeli Cease-fire Line. CIA Intelligence Report. 1 October 1973. 5 pages. “On 22 September 1973, larger numbers of Syrian armored and artillery units were observed moving in the direction of the Israeli-Syrian cease-fire line. The Syrian armor was positively identified as Soviet T-62 tanks…. The Syrian public generally believes that the Syrian army may be getting ready to launch some sort of attack against Israeli positions in the Golan Heights in reprisal for the loss of 13 Syrian aircraft in the early September air battle.”
Judgment (Redaction) that Syrian Military Preparations are Defensive in Nature. CIA Intelligence Report. 3 October 1973. 3 pages. “In his opinion, recently reported Syrian preparation on their front lines with Israel are defensive as opposed to offensive in nature…. The Syrian officer expressed serious fears of an Israeli attack into Syria…. But because of Syrian fears of an Israeli attack, this year the Syrians are sending their units to the front line, secretly if possible, and to tactically appropriate defensive positions. In other words, the Syrian officer stated, we are “massing” because of our fears.”

Combined Watch Report of the United States Intelligence Board. 4 October 1973. 1 page. “We continue to believe that an outbreak of major Arab-Israeli hostilities remains unlikely for the immediate future, although the risk of localized fighting has increased slightly as the result of the buildup of Syrian forces in the vicinity of the Golan Heights. Egyptian exercise activity under way since late September may also contribute to the possibility of incidents.”

Israel-Egypt-Syria. Central Intelligence Bulletin. 6 October 1973. 3 pages. “Both the Israelis and the Arabs are becoming increasingly concerned about the military activities of the other, although neither side appears to be bent on initiating hostilities…. Exercise and alert activities in Egypt are continuing, but elements of the air force and navy appear to be conducting normal training activity…. A build-up of tanks and artillery along the Suez Canal, this cannot be confirmed…. For Egypt, a military initiative makes little sense at this critical juncture of President Sadat’s reorientation of domestic and foreign policies…. For the normally cautious Syrian President, a military adventure now would be suicidal.”

Initiation of Middle East Hostilities. Memorandum from CIA Middle East Task Force. 6 October 1973. 1000 EDT. 1 page. “The earliest confirmed military activity (redacted) so far was a high-speed Israeli serial reconnaissance mission at 0654Z (0254 EDT, 0854 Cairo time) along the Suez Canal. The flight terminated at 0732Z…. The Egyptian naval command center at Alexandria ordered a ‘first state of readiness’ at 1351 (1151Z).”

Arab-Israeli Hostilities and their Implications. Special National Intelligence Estimate. SNIE 35/36-73. 6 October 1973. 32 pages. “Heavy fighting is almost certain to be short in duration—no more than a week. Neither side is logistically prepared for lengthy hostilities. The Israelis have the strength to blunt the Syrian offensive capability within a few days and, as quickly, to push the Egyptians back across the canal. Fighting on lesser scale, say an artillery duel across the canal, however, could be more prolonged.”

Soviet Policies in the Event of Imminent Egyptian Collapse. Intelligence Memorandum. 6 October 1973. 8 pages. “For purposes of this paper, it is assumed that Egyptian forces face imminent and perhaps catastrophic defeat and that the ability of the Egyptian state to survive the defeat (and further Israeli military actions) is questionable. Soviet military options in the circumstances described are severely limited. Neither time nor resources will allow Moscow to influence decisively the course of the battle now being waged on both sides of the Suez.”

Washington Special Actions Group Meeting. Subject: Middle East. Summary of Conclusions. 7:22 pm-8:27 pm. 6 October 1973. 16 pages. “Mr. Kissinger: ‘Yes, but Israel won’t accept it until the Egyptians and Syrians are thrown out. We’ll have the situation where a Security Council resolution will be used against the victim. This will teach aggressors that they can launch an attack, then call for a Security Council resolution for a ceasefire and, if it is not accepted, call for its use against the victim. This makes the UN a completely cynical exercise. The Israelis will go to an all-out attack, get a ceasefire resolution drafted, grab as much territory as they can, then accept the ceasefire. If the Arabs were not demented, they will realize that in the long term, and I mean by Wednesday—If we can go in with a ceasefire resolution which Israel can accept, then we could use it against Israel if necessary. And the Soviets won’t get the credit for stopping the fighting.’”
Situation Report. Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger from Brent Scowcroft. 7 October 1973. 8 a.m. 2 pages. “Fighting continued through the night on both fronts with the main new element being a broadened Israeli effort to stem Syrian and Egyptian gains early this morning; the Israelis also appear to be in an all-out counter-offensive however and the latest Defense attaché report from Israel (attached) indicates that, in fact, the Israelis are experiencing difficulties.”

Cable to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, White House, from Amb. Helms, Tehran. 7 October 1973. 2136Z. 3 pages. “Prime Minister Hoveyda, at Shah’s instruction, summoned me at 2315 local to read me cable to Shah from President Sadat…. Cable requests Shah to inform President Nixon that Egypt until now… has been ready to accept peace under certain conditions…. Sadat wants President Nixon to know that if Israel will evacuate all the territories occupied since June 5, 1967, Egypt will be ready to negotiate sincerely to place these territories under the control of the United Nations, or under the control of the four big powers, or under some other international control to be agreed. As for Sharm Al Sheik, Egypt is prepared to accept international supervision of freedom of navigation through Gulf of Aqaba after Israeli withdrawal….Since Sadat offer set forth above struck me as somewhat improbable, I asked Hoveyda and his bilingual assistant to translate the cable for me three times.”

Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Next Several Days. Paper prepared jointly by CIA and DIA. 8 October 1973. 15 pages. “The immediate objective of the Israelis has been to contain the attacking Arab forces while mobilizing their reserves. At the time the Syrians and the Egyptians launched their offensives, the Israelis were only a few hours into mobilization…. The outlook for the next few days is one of heavy fighting on all fronts. With the full weight of their forces behind them, the Israelis should now be able to turn the situation around on the Golan Heights by nightfall Tuesday. Pressing the offensive against the Syrians might take another day or two.”

Intelligence Estimate. Memorandum to Henry Kissinger from Brent Scowcroft. 8 October 1973. 2 pages. “CIA and Defense have prepared an estimate...of how they see the current situation evolving over the short-term future. In short, they envisage heavy fighting over the next 2-3 days as the Israelis turn the tide on both fronts, followed possibly by several days of mopping-up operations.”

UN: The Middle East. 8 October 1973. 2 pages. “There appears little chance for UN action on Middle East hostilities until ground positions are solidified. The Security Council has thus far been unable to issue any cease-fire call—either in formal resolution or in an appeal from its president—for lack of agreement on where cease-fire lines should be drawn. Any proposal calling for a return to the positions of October 6 would be countered by a Soviet and non-aligned proposal for cease-fire at the pre-June lines—either proposal would likely be vetoed.”

Highlights of the Middle East Situation. DCI Congressional Briefing. 10 October 1973. 9 pages. “The Egyptians have established their force firmly on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, forcing an Israeli admission that their ground forces have been unable to push them back. In the Golan Heights, despite heavy fighting, the Israelis have been unable to push the Syrians back beyond the 1967 cease-fire line, and they admit that they have not broken the Syrian army. The ground is still contested however, and no clear-cut advantage is evident for either side.”

Noon Notes. Memorandum for the Secretary from the Situation Room. 11 October 1973. 4 pages. “Israeli ground forces with strong air support continue to make some progress against Syrian forces in the Golan Heights area…. The Egyptians may be planning an amphibious attack on the Sinai coast south of Suez City to link up with armored units advancing from the north…. King Hussein’s desire to make a contribution to protecting the Syrian Army’s flank is reflected in the redeployment of the 3rd Armored Division along his northern border…. Large elements of the Iraqi Army are reported to be deploying from their home garrisons to unknown destinations.”
Reactions to Resupply of Israel by the US. 14 October 1973. 12 pages. "Most of the Arab states are already committed, by public and private statement, to action hostile to US interests if the US undertakes to resupply Israel. The Arab oil producers in particular consider themselves committed to some form of ‘coordinated’ action against US interests…. The Arab oil producers are currently discussing this possibility…. The intensity of the reactions could vary, depending on the visibility and magnitude of the resupply process, and on what kind of equipment is involved. The F-4 Phantom specifically has become in Arab eyes a symbol of technological superiority of the Israeli military; visible resupply of this aircraft would produce a maximum reaction."

DCI Briefing for 15 October WSAG Meeting. 15 October 1973. 8 pages. "Both sides admit that there was a major battle in the Sinai yesterday, but the results appear inconclusive. In addition, the Israelis claim to have made a naval attack last night on the Egyptian port of Ras Gharib—an alleged commando staging area—in the southern Gulf of Suez. This was no doubt an effort to forestall any Egyptian landings in the southern Sinai."

Moscow and the Coming of the Middle East War. 16 October 1973. 13 pages. "The weight of evidence strongly suggests that Moscow knew in late September that Egypt and Syria were considering the initiation of hostilities. By 3 October, and probably only on that day, however, the Soviets apparently concluded that hostilities were imminent…. By 5 October the Soviet leaders probably expected war to break out at any time, but they may not have learned of the precise time of attack until immediately before it occurred. There is no evidence that Moscow was involved in the planning of the Egyptian-Syrian attack or that it encouraged it. Instead, during the months prior to the outbreak of the war, Moscow was concerned about its deteriorating position in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt."

Memorandum of Conversation with Arab Ministers. 17 October 1973. 11:10 a.m. in the President’s Oval Office. 18 October 1973. 15 pages. The President then addressed the issue of a peace settlement, saying that new conditions now exist in the Middle East in which the United States can use its influence to get negotiations off dead center, leading to a just and equitable peace. He stressed that the principles governing a settlement should be those of Resolution 242, to which the United States is fully committed. The implementation of these principles will require talk and negotiations. Neither side can afford to take an all-or-nothing stance."

Moscow and the Middle East. 19 October 1973. 6 pages. "Kosygin’s just-completed trip to Cairo is a mark of the high-stakes Moscow has in the Middle East war. It is not merely a matter of whether US or Soviet clients come out ahead on the battlefield…. The Soviets must consider what impact the war and their reaction to it will have on détente. Furthermore, they must consider not only how the US administration will feel about détente when the war is over, but how the US public and Congress will feel about it."

The Middle East War, Brezhnev’s Position, and Détente. Memo. 19 October 1973. 10 pages. "The outbreak of war in the Middle East poses problems to the USSR so serious and immediate that the Soviet leaders probably are taking their current decisions in a fully collective fashion."

The Arab Oil Cutback and Higher Prices: Implications and Reactions. 19 October 1973. 19 pages. "Clearly such a production cutback, if it persisted for a number of months, would require some belt tightening. But the analysis shows that by moderate belt tightening and drawing down existing stocks of petroleum, we can avoid a serious crisis this winter."

The Middle East War. Weekly Review. 19 October 1973. 10 pages. "The continued strong showing of Arab military forces has, at least for now, greatly strengthened President Sadat’s political position in Egypt and the Arab world generally. The fact that he launched a war marked by successes rather than immediate defeat has gained him respect and popularity that he never knew before. Even some of his former critics now acknowledge that he is a worth leader. The Egyptians have not yet suffered much from the fighting, and this has contributed to their new confidence and pride in themselves and their leader."
Memorandum for USIB Principals on Post Mortem on Arab-Israeli Conflict. 23 October 1973. 11 pages. “One of the promises we have made to the NSCIC was to undertake just such a study of an on-going crisis because of the inability experienced in previous efforts to reconstruct the actual chain of events, reports and actions by all players in the crisis. I believe this effort can be especially fruitful since a prime critic of intelligence community crisis response—Henry Kissinger—is giving us high marks. Thus we need not be defensive and should be able to produce a very objective critique. The warning aspect left a good deal to be desired and I think that is recognized in all agencies at this juncture.”

Memorandum to DDI from Director of Current Intelligence, Richard Lehman. 24 October 1973. 3 pages. “Obviously, our performance since the opening of hostilities has been excellent and I see little need for much attention here. The post-mortem should therefore concentrate on the two basic questions. Why did we fail to predict the Syrian and Egyptian attack? How accurate was our assessment of the relative military strengths of Israel and the Arabs? The problem will be to make a post-mortem honest. DDI and DIA (redaction) are exposed as being fully on the record against an attack. The collectors (redaction) in particular are taking their traditional position that the producers were given all the information and paid no attention to it. The story is a good deal more complicated than that, and such an attitude does not help to get at the truth.”

De Facto Middle East Cease-Fire Lines and Alleged Violations. 24 October 1973. 2 pages. “Due to the mobile tactics which the relatively small Israeli armored forces on the west bank employed, much of the ground may not actually have been occupied, and the tactical situation could be extremely fluid. In addition, the Israelis had seized territory around Shallufa during the day, and fighting was still heavy near the cease-fire deadline.”

Prospects For (A) US Relations with the Arab States Following a Cease-Fire (B) Meaningful Negotiations Between Arab States and Israel. Memo. 25 October 1973. 7 pages. “An effective cease-fire of and by itself will not work a significant improvement in US-Arab relations, even though it temporarily alleviates some of the difficulties of those Arab states in which there remains a significant motivation for preserving special relations with the US.”

Message for the President from President Sadat. 27 October 1973. 2 pages. “Up until now—1730 Cairo local time—the Egyptian party is being held by Israeli troops at a distance of 15 kilometers from the site of the rendezvous and prevented from proceeding under the pretext that these Israeli troops have received no orders to let them proceed. On the other hand, elements of the International Force are since noon today stopped outside the city of Suez prevented from entering the city.”

Arms Supply Considerations for the Middle East. 30 October 1973. 24 pages. “The recent conflict probably has caused a reevaluation by the Israelis as to the quantities and mix of military hardware they will need to remain the dominant power in the area. A greater compatibility with Arab military equipment holdings, particularly aircraft and tanks, as well as the standardization of new weapons will spearhead Israel’s resupply efforts.”

Soviet Nuclear Weapons in Egypt? 30 October 1973. 7 pages. “Confirmation of Scud-associated equipment at two different locations in Egypt adds seriousness to the evidence that Moscow introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East. The Scud equipment…includes a transporter-erector-launcher unique to the Scud missile in an area near the Tura caves some 10 miles south of Cairo, and two resupply vehicles at Cairo international airport, one of which is carrying a probably canvas-covered missile.”

The Cost to the USSR of the Arab-Israeli Wars. 30 October 1973. 7 pages. “Preliminary analysis on the cost to the USSR of the recent Arab-Israeli war indicates that it will run about $1 billion if Moscow replaces all the Arab war losses. This is over twice the estimated cost of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Arab equipment losses are estimated to be at least 444 aircraft, 1,774 tanks, 13 guided missile patrol boats and 2 other small naval craft.”
Possible Cease-Fire Lines in the Sinai and the Golan Heights, and a Discussion of the Jerusalem Situation. 30 October 1973. 17 pages. “This paper presents alternative cease-fire lines for Arab and Israeli forces in the Sinai and the Golan Heights, discusses the situation in Jerusalem, and briefly comments on the Allon Plan. In selecting the positions and configurations of the lines, consideration has been given to pertinent terrain, economic, and sociological factors as well as to the current military and political situation. Together the proposed cease-fire lines provide a possible basis for a phased withdrawal. Each line would pose problems of major proportions for US policy; these are not discussed in the paper.”

Proposals for Resolving the Status of Jordan’s West Bank. November 1973. 21 pages. “This paper presents background information on the Israel-occupied West Bank of Jordan and outlines some of the many proposals that have been put forward for the resolution of its problems. Some new proposals are also presented. Implementation of any of these plans, old or new, would pose delicate questions for US policy—none of which is treated in the paper.”

Israel: Economic Impact of the War. November 1973. 9 pages. “Israel has emerged from a month of war and uneasy cease-fire in excellent financial and economic condition…. In the longer term, the economic situation will be critically dependent on the political and military settlement, the amount and terms of arms purchases, the duration of the mobilization, and finally the expectations and will of the Israeli people.”

Soviet Troops in the Middle East. Cable for Secretary Kissinger from Brent Scowcroft. 6 November 1973. 3 pages. “At the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East, the Soviets had approximately 80 military advisors in Egypt, about 1400 in Syria and an estimated 550 in Iraq. In addition there were an unknown number of Soviet civilian technicians in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Since the outbreak of hostilities, indications of changes in Soviet personnel in Egypt, Syria and Iraq have been noted as follows....”

Status of Implementation of Six-Point Egyptian-Israeli Ceasefire Accord. CIA Intelligence Report. 12 November 1973. 4 pages. “The six-point Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire agreement was signed on 11 November 1973 at a triangular table in a tent at Kilometer 101 on the Cairo-Suez road, with General Silasvuo of the United Nations, General Yariv of Israel and Major General Muhammad al-Gamazi of Egypt seated at the three sides of the table.... Very few Egyptian military personnel were in evidence of the signing, and these few appeared very subdued. On the other hand, Israeli military personnel, who were present in large numbers, exuded an air of confidence verging on cockiness, with much rib-elbowing, joking and bantering. U.N. troops attempted to separate the Egyptian and Israeli sides but this effort quickly broke down and in the intermingling that ensued, small instances of civility were observable such as Egyptian and Israeli officers lighting cigarettes for each other.

Financial Aid to Egypt and Syria. 23 November 1973. 3 pages. “The other Arab states have made financial commitments of at least $2 billion in war aid to Egypt and Syria since the outset of hostilities on 6 October.... The full extent of such aid is not known, although conceivably it could amount to as much as $3 billion.”

Using Oil as a Weapon: Implications and Prospects for the Arab Oil Producing States. National Intelligence Estimate. NIE 1-73. 23 November 1973. 26 pages. “The Arabs have finally used oil as a political weapon—declaring an embargo against the US (and a few others) and instituting major production cuts to drive their point home.....Total production has been cut 25 percent, and the Arab producers threaten to go on cutting five percent a month until Israel withdraws from all territory captured in 1967 and the rights of the Palestinians are restored. Until then; friendly countries may buy Arab oil at the pre-October quantities; unfriendly countries get no Arab oil; neutral countries will have to divide up what is left.”

Financial Aid to Egypt and Syria. 23 November 1973. 3 pages. “A short narrative and table on Egyptian and Syrian financial aid from other
Arab countries….The other Arab states have made financial commitments of at least $2 billion in war aid to Egypt and Syria since the outset of hostilities on 6 October as indicated in the accompanying table. The full extent of such aid is not known, although conceivably it could amount to as much as $3 billion…. According to press accounts, some Arab money has been used to pay for Soviet arms.”

Saudi Arabian Financial Aid to Other Arab Countries, Prior to and Since the 6 October Hostilities. 27 November 1973. 1 page. “Prior to recent hostilities, Saudi Arabia provided at least $150 million annually in aid to other Arab countries. Most of this aid stemmed from Saudi commitments immediately after the June 1967 war of about $100 million annually to Egypt and about $40 million annually to Jordan.”

Egyptian-Israeli Negotiations at Kilometer 101. Central Intelligence Report. 28 November 1973. 9 pages. “Egypt is still hopeful that the ‘disengagement’ talks with the Israelis will lead to an effective interim agreement. Israel has stated a willingness to withdraw all Israeli troops to a line east of the Sinai Mountain passes but in return continues to insist that Egypt unilaterally reduce the armor of Egyptian forces left in the Sinai. Egypt believes that any reductions should be mutual.”

Syria’s Rulers and Their Political Environment. 7 December 1973. 11 pages. “Syria’s leaders are soldiers, socialists, and from the provinces rather than the big cities. They are also relatively young, mostly in their early forties…. The army has been the principal agent of political change in Syria…ruling directly or in association with political groups for most of that time.”

Brezhnev’s Political Position in the Wake of the Middle East War. 10 December 1973. 3 pages. “Brezhnev seems to have weathered the Middle East Crisis well. In fact, public signs suggest that his political position has reached a new peak.”

The Performance of the Intelligence Community before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: A Preliminary Post-Mortem Report. December 1973. 32 pages. “There was an intelligence failure in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East on 6 October. Those elements of the Intelligence Community responsible for the production of finished intelligence did not perceive the growing possibility of an Arab attack and thus did not warn of its imminence. The information provided by those parts of the Community responsible for intelligence collection was sufficient to prompt such a warning. Such information (derived from both human and technical sources) was not conclusive but was plentiful, ominous, and often accurate.”

The World Oil Crisis: Economic and Political Ramifications for Producers and Consumers. National Intelligence Estimate. NIE 1-1-73. 5 December 1973. 16 pages. “The Arab oil producers will be flexible and selective in exercising their options, but they will insist on progress. We judge that the Arabs will maintain a squeeze on oil supplies until there is real progress on the negotiations, which includes substantial Israeli withdrawals from occupied territory…. The Middle East crisis has aggravated existing problems between the US and its allies across a broad spectrum. During negotiations and so long as the oil crunch is on, it will be difficult to enhance a sense of shared common interests among the US and its allies.”

The USSR and the Arab Oil Weapon. International Oil Developments. 7 December 1973. 2 pages. “The oil weapon is purely Arab strategy. Although in the past the Soviet press has encouraged such action, all available evidence indicates that the USSR had no hand in the planning and implementation of the Arab oil supply cutbacks.”

Syria: Asad’s Position on the Eve of Negotiations. 15 December 1973. 2 pages. “As the Geneva peace talks approach, President Asad’s hold on power appears to be fairly firm. The war has bolstered his popularity at home, and he can probably count on the backing of key supporters, in many cases hand-picked, in the
armed forces, the security apparatus, and the Syrian Baath Party. Equally important to him is the continuing loyalty of an elite 10,000-man special security force commanded by his brother.”

The Impact of the 24 October US Alert on the Soviet Leadership. 20 December 1973. 16 pages. “Brezhnev and his colleagues appear to have reacted with greater concern and annoyance to President Nixon’s statements of 26 October, which focused public attention on the Soviet threat of unilateral intervention and the US alert, than they did to the alert itself. The implication of a Soviet back down almost certainly was the trigger.”

The Performance of the Intelligence Community before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: A Preliminary Post-Mortem Report. 20 December 1973. 11 pages. “There was an intelligence failure in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East on 6 October. Those elements of the Intelligence Community responsible for the production of finished intelligence did not perceive the growing possibility of an Arab attack and thus did not warn of its imminence. The information provided by those parts of the Community responsible for intelligence collection was sufficient to prompt such a warning. Such information ...was not conclusive but was plentiful, ominous, and often accurate.... Still, there is no gainsaying the judgment that, whatever the rationale, the principal conclusions concerning the imminence of hostilities reached and reiterated by those responsible for intelligence analysis were—quite simply, obviously, and starkly—wrong.”

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Overview and Analysis of the Conflict. Intelligence Report. September 1975. 123 pages. “Key findings: Strategy. The Arabs had different goals and, consequently, different strategies. The Syrians wanted to liberate the Golan Heights and attempted to do so in one stroke. The Egyptians’ main goal was to achieve a political effect, and they therefore planned for a limited offensive. The Israelis, because of overconfidence and because they failed to recognize that their occupation of the Suez Canal’s east bank deprived them of advance warning of an Egyptian attack, did not react to mounting evidence of Arab intentions.”
# PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

30 JANUARY 2013 · 1:30–6:00 PM  
RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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<td>Richard Kovar (Former CIA Analyst)</td>
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<td>Role of Intelligence in the 1973 War, An Intelligence Analyst Perspective</td>
<td>Martha Neff Kessler (Former CIA Analyst)</td>
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<td>4:15–4:30</td>
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<td>Peter Clement (Chair) Deputy Director for Intelligence for Analytic Programs, CIA</td>
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<td>William Quandt (Professor of Politics, University of Virginia; former NSC Senior Staffer)</td>
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<td>Intelligence and the 1973 War, A Policy Perspective</td>
<td>Greg Treverton (Director, RAND Center for Global Risk and Security)</td>
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<td>Emile Nakhleh (University of New Mexico)</td>
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<td>5:45–6:00</td>
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53
Brent Scowcroft (invited)
Advisor to the President For National Security under Ford and Bush

Brent Scowcroft a leading expert on international policy, Brent Scowcroft served as the National Security Advisor to both Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush. From 1982 to 1989, he was Vice Chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., an international consulting firm. In this capacity, he advised and assisted a wide range of U.S. and foreign corporate leaders on global joint venture opportunities, strategic planning, and risk assessment.

His prior extraordinary twenty-nine-year military career began with graduation from West Point and concluded at the rank of Lieutenant General following service as the Deputy National Security Advisor. His Air Force service included Professor of Russian History at West Point; Assistant Air Attaché in Belgrade, Yugoslavia; Head of the Political Science Department at the Air Force Academy; Air Force Long Range Plans; Office of the Secretary of Defense International Security Assistance; Special Assistant to the Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Military Assistant to President Nixon.

Out of uniform, he continued in a public policy capacity by serving on the President’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management and the President’s Special Review Board, also known as the Tower Commission. In recent years, General Scowcroft has served as a co-chair for both the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future and the National Academies of Science’s Committee on Science, Security, and Prosperity. He formerly served as the Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and was a member of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

General Scowcroft currently serves on numerous corporate and nonprofit boards. He has been recognized as a Distinguished Graduate of West Point, and earned his masters and doctorate in international relations from Columbia University.

William Quandt
Professor of Politics, University of Virginia; former NSC Senior Staffer

William B. Quandt is the Edward R. Stettinius, Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia. He has been a member of the Department of Politics since 1994, and from 2000 to 2003 has also served as Vice Provost for International Affairs for the University. He teaches courses on the Middle East and American Foreign Policy. Prior to this appointment, he was a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, where he conducted research on the Middle East, American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, and energy policy.

Before going to Brookings in 1979, Dr. Quandt served as a staff member on the National Security Council (1972-1974, 1977-1979). He was actively involved in the negotiations that led to the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Dr. Quandt was also an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, worked at the Rand Corporation in the Department of Social Science from 1968-1972, and taught at UCLA and MIT.
Charles E. Allen  
Former Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, DHS

Charles E. Allen became a principal at the Chertoff Group after a distinguished career in the intelligence community. Mr. Allen spent more than 40 years at the CIA, and as the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection in 1998, he revolutionized the way the various national intelligence agencies coordinate and target their activities. In the same vein, he chaired the National Intelligence Collection Board, which united all intelligence agencies under common collection strategies. He also served as CIA’s National Intelligence Officer for Warning, Director of the National Warning Staff, National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism, and Deputy Chief for Intelligence of CIA’s Counterterrorism Center. He also directed the DCI Hostage Location Task Force, which focused on locating American hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon.

During his tenure at the Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Allen served as Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis (2007-2009) and Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis and Chief of Intelligence (2005-2007). At DHS, Charles E. Allen developed the department’s intelligence architecture, integrated its intelligence activities and ensured that they were continuously aligned with the department’s evolving priorities. He also accelerated and expanded the department’s processes for sharing intelligence with state and local security and law enforcement officials.

Andrew M. Liepman  
Former Principal Deputy Director, National Counterterrorism Center

Andrew Liepman is the former Principal Deputy Director at the National Counterterrorism Center, a position he held from June 2011 to May 2012. Mr. Liepman previously served at the Deputy Director for Intelligence at NCTC from July 2006 until June 2011.

Mr. Liepman has had a distinguished career in the Intelligence Community since he joined the CIA as an imagery analyst in 1982, spending much of his career on Middle Eastern issues. Before coming to NCTC, he served as deputy director of the CIA’s counterterrorism center. In that capacity, he assisted in running one of the CIA’s highest priority, most complex, and largest units. Mr. Liepman handled much of the policy coordination, congressional interaction, and interagency relationships in his capacity as Deputy. He also led the Agency’s Office of Iraq Analysis for two years, and held a series of other high-level positions in the Directorate of Intelligence. He also worked in a variety of assignments outside the CIA, including time at the Department of State, the Nonproliferation Center, and the National Intelligence Council.
Emile Nakhleh became a scholar in residence and then a senior analyst at the CIA, after twenty-six years of teaching at Mount Saint Mary’s University. His duties at the CIA, especially after 9/11, included briefing policymakers in the executive branch and members of Congress. He held a variety of key positions during his fifteen years of service at the CIA, including Director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program in the Directorate of Intelligence and Chief of the Regional Analysis Unit in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Dr. Nakhleh was a founding member of the Senior Analytic Service and chaired the first Senior Analytic Service Council. He was awarded several senior intelligence commendation medals, including the Intelligence Commendation Medal (1997), the William Langer Award (2004), the Director’s Medal (2004), and the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal (2006).

Since retiring from the CIA in 2006, Dr. Nakhleh has been consulting with various US government agencies and departments on national security issues, particularly Islamic radicalization, terrorism, and the Arab states of the Middle East. His research has focused on political Islam in the Middle East and the rest of the Muslim world as well as on political and educational reform, regime stability, and governance in the greater Middle East. He has published frequently in the Financial Times.

Martha Neff Kessler was an intelligence officer with the CIA from 1970 to 2000, working on the Middle East, South Asia, and terrorism. She held positions throughout the Directorate of Intelligence and served three times on the National Intelligence Council as the Director of CIA’s point person on the Middle East. For six years, she headed the Arab-Israeli Division and was liaison with US peace negotiators throughout the Madrid peace process. She was a fellow at the National Defense University’s War College where she published Syria: A Fragile Mosaic of Power. Martha was a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution where she contributed to the Middle Foreign Policy Journal. During her career, she was awarded the CIA’s Medal of Distinguished Service and the National Intelligence Community’s Medal of Achievement. She received numerous Outstanding Performance Awards during crises in Lebanon, the Gulf War, and the Iraq war and was also honored for her authorship of National Intelligence Estimates on the rise of religious extremism.

Ms. Kessler is currently serving as Ombudsman for the Department of Homeland Security’s Intelligence and Analysis Directorate. She also consults on Middle East and foreign intelligence issues and teaches courses on Islam, analytic techniques, and writing and briefing key US policymakers. After 9/11, she was called back into service with the CIA and spent another 10 years there, retiring for a second time in 2010. Over the past decade, Ms. Kessler has done special projects for the Director of National Intelligence and the FBI. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the board of the Middle East Policy Council.
Greg Treverton
Director, RAND Center for
Global Risk and Security

Greg Treverton is a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and director of the RAND Center for Global Risk and Security. He has had several leadership positions at RAND, including as director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center, associate dean of the Pardee RAND Graduate School, and director of the Intelligence Policy Center. Dr. Treverton’s recent work at RAND has examined terrorism, intelligence, and law enforcement, with a special interest in new forms of public–private partnership.

Before joining RAND in 1995 he served as vice chair of the National Intelligence Council, overseeing the writing of America’s National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). He has been Senior Fellow and Director of the Europe-America project and of the project on America’s Task in a Changed World at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He taught public management and foreign policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, and he has been an adjunct professor at Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs. He was Director of Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. He served earlier in the government, during the Carter Administration handling Europe on the National Security Council and on the Hill working for the first Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the Church committee) in 1975-76. His latest books are *Intelligence for an Era of Terror*, Cambridge University Press, 2009; *Film Piracy, Organized Crime and Terrorism*, (with others) RAND, 2009; and *Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options*, RAND, 2008.

Richard D. Kovar
Former CIA analyst and
Chief of the Middle East Task Force

Dick Kovar began his long career at the Central Intelligence Agency in 1951 as an editor for the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, serving in Okinawa, Tokyo, Saigon, and West Africa, and on the headquarters staff of the FBIS Daily Report and Wire Service. He moved to the O/DDI in 1963 and served as assistant to four CIA Deputy Directors for Intelligence; during the 1960s he was the DDI’s special assistant on the Vietnam War. For several years he compiled and edited a comprehensive interagency weekly report on Vietnam for Cabinet-level recipients and oversaw the production of seminal reports for Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; later he testified for the defense in the *Westmoreland v. CBS et al.* trial and edited four books and wrote several book reviews on intelligence aspects of the war. During the early 1970s he was chief of CIA’s Arab-Israel analysis branch and headed analytical task forces during the Syrian-Palestinian attack on Jordan in 1970 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Following a brief assignment as chief of the OCI Latin America division, he served as deputy chief of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, a reorganized current analysis office, before becoming editor of the professional journal *Studies in Intelligence* and, as a rehired annuitant, chief editor of the National Intelligence Daily and an editor and briefer for the President’s Daily Brief.

Peter Clement
Deputy Director for Intelligence
for Analytic Programs, CIA

Peter Clement was appointed Deputy Director for Intelligence for Analytic Programs at the Central Intelligence Agency in January 2005. He joined the agency in 1977 and spent much of his first 25 years focused on the Soviet Union—in analytic and management positions, including Director of the Office of Russian-Eurasian Analysis and as CIA’s Russia Issue Manager from 1997-2003.

Mr. Clement later was a PDB briefer for then Vice President Cheney and NSC Adviser Rice, and subsequently served as the DCI’s Representative to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations before assuming his current duties. Mr. Clement has been a member of the Council on Foreign Relations since 2001. He taught Russian history and politics for over ten years as an adjunct professor at DC area universities, and has published journal articles and book chapters on Russian foreign policy, Central Asia, and the Cuban missile crisis.
The Historical Collections and Information Review Divisions of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Information Management Services have reviewed, redacted, and released a body of documents highlighting what the Central Intelligence Agency provided the Nixon Administration during the 1973 Arab-Israeli crisis and war. The accompanying DVD contains more than 400 documents, some 200 of which are either being made available to the public for the first time or are being re-released with new material.

The material is organized into the following categories.

- **Document Collection**—Features intelligence assessments, National Intelligence Estimates, high-level memos, DCI talking points, and other reporting. To help put this material in perspective, we have also included non-CIA documents from the archives of the Nixon and Ford Libraries, including minutes from relevant Washington Special Action Group meetings on the 1973 War.

- **Multimedia Files**—Includes a photo slideshow and an interactive timeline featuring material from the Nixon Library’s AV archives and other sources.

- **Background Material**—Includes several assessments and overview articles on President Nixon’s use of intelligence and the Arab-Israeli crisis written by historians, leading experts, and student essayists from Claremont McKenna College.

This DVD will work on most computers and the documents are in .PDF format.

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The Historical Review Program, part of the CIA Information Management Services, identifies, collects, and produces historically relevant collections of declassified documents.

These collections, centered on a theme or event, are joined with supporting analysis, essays, video, audio, and photographs, and showcased in a booklet plus DVD, and made available to historians, scholars, and the public.

All of our Historical Collections are available on the CIA Library Publication page located at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/ or contact us at HistoricalCollections@CIA.gov.