

A New President, a Better CIA, and an Old War: Eisenhower and Intelligence Reporting on Korea, 1953

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The ongoing war in Korea, stalemated since the summer of 1951, proved the most immediate and nettlesome problem for President Eisenhower when he took office in January 1953.^a As a soldier, candidate, and president, Eisenhower had supported the decision to intervene in Korea as both the necessary and right thing to do as part of the larger policy of opposing worldwide communist expansion. He sympathized with President Harry Truman’s difficult situation, especially at the time of the Chinese intervention in November 1950, and during the controversies associated with the firing of Gen. Douglas MacArthur and the problems he faced in keeping the UN coalition together after the war bogged down. After observing events from afar, Eisenhower came to see Korea

as a “sorry mess” with no obvious way out.¹

During the 1952 presidential campaign, candidate Eisenhower hesitated to criticize the Truman administration’s prosecution of the war until pressed to do so by his campaign managers. As a result, Eisenhower’s rhetoric on the subject became more pointed as the election neared. The foreign policy of President Truman and Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson had “invited” the communist invasion, Eisenhower implied on several occasions after easily winning the Republican nomination in August 1952 over the isolationist wing of the party that had backed Senator Robert A. Taft. In Detroit on 14 October, he declared that the war was “a telling symbol of the foreign policy of our nation,” reflecting the “lack of imagination and firmness in the overall political direction which guides all security planning.” It was, he said, a calamity that befell the nation because of a lack of “leadership, wisdom, and courage.” Eisenhower stated that a solution to the Korean War demanded new leadership

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because the “old administration could not be expected to repair what it had failed to prevent.”² He pledged to find an “intelligent and honorable way to end the tragic toll of America’s casualties in Korea” and promised to go to Korea to find a way to end the war.³ Eisenhower defeated Democratic presidential candidate Adlai E. Stevenson by more than 5 million votes.

The president-elect acted quickly on his campaign pledge to go to Korea, reaching Seoul on 2 December. During the next two weeks, he met with military commanders, Generals Mark W. Clark and James Van Fleet, visited US and UN military units along the main line of resistance, and briefly consulted with South Korea’s troublesome president Syngman



Ike meets the press after his meeting on 17 December 1952 with Douglas MacArthur. Secretary of State Dulles looks on. Photo © Bettman/Corbis

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Rhee. He endorsed the stalemated truce talks at Panmunjom and politely listened to then-retired General MacArthur’s plans for a renewed UN offensive against Chinese armies that could involve atomic weapons and the ultimate unification of the peninsula by force.

Yet, seeking to end the war rather than expand it, the president-elect conceded the “unlikelihood of achieving ‘a positive and definite victory without possibly running the grave risk of enlarging the war.’” Eisenhower saw Korea as a costly distraction that kept his administration from formulating a more comprehensive national security policy. Effecting a truce, as opposed to a World War II–style total military victory, thus became the primary focus of his incoming administration. While the president-elect did not have a specific plan for ending the war in December 1952, he wanted to move ahead, unencumbered by the tactical problems presented by Korea.⁴

In both Eisenhower’s larger foreign policy focus and in the waning months of the Korean War, the Central Intelligence Agency played a larger role than it ever had before in its short life. Much had changed

since 1950, when the war broke out.

- First, the CIA was an entirely different organization. It was larger in terms of personnel and budget, and it had been thoroughly reorganized and reformed by Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Truman’s director of central intelligence during the last two years of his second term.

- Second, after January 1953, CIA served a president who clearly understood the Agency, a man who had become accustomed to the use of intelligence in tactical and strategic roles during a military career dating back to 1915.

- Third, by 1953 the CIA had become an integral part of government decision making structures in Washington and in the field, where its expertise in collection, analysis, and operations had gained increased respect. By the time Eisenhower took his oath of office, the Agency was beginning to fulfill the role mandated by the 1947 National Security Act as a centralized and well-connected organization for professional intelligence—a designation that had existed only in name before 1950.

- Finally, in Allen Welsh Dulles, Eisenhower had a pragmatic

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and long-serving intelligence professional directing CIA, which he did through Eisenhower's two terms. A strong and charismatic leader with experience in diplomacy and policymaking, Dulles moved comfortably within military and government circles, becoming the Agency's most effective manager to date.⁵ Brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles helped end the turf wars stemming from bureaucratic rivalries or personal animosities that had plagued CIA relations with other government departments, especially the Acheson State Department.⁶ During Eisenhower's presidency, the chief executive, DCI, and secretary of state worked as a friendly and collegial team on matters dealing with Korea and the larger Cold War.

President Eisenhower thus enjoyed significant foreign policy and intelligence advantages that President Truman had lacked.

A New Organization

The Central Intelligence Agency grew tremendously after the outbreak of the Korean War. It did so because of the expected increase in demands on intelligence resulting from the outbreak of war and perceived increased aggres-

siveness of international communism. But the CIA also matured thanks to the diligent efforts of DCI Smith. Working from recommendations contained in the 1949 Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report on intelligence reform,⁷ Smith implemented far-reaching and lasting reorganizations, while also becoming a ceaseless CIA advocate. Immediately upon taking office in October 1950, Smith moved assertively to increase the Agency's size, budget, and influence, especially focusing on the Agency's relationships with the State Department and military services. During the next two years, the Agency trebled the number of employees and doubled the number of intelligence analysts. The CIA budget increased more than fivefold. By early 1953, the CIA nearly matched the size, budget, and capabilities of the wartime Office of Strategic Services.

In its relations with other departments, Smith emphasized the importance of the CIA as the government's preeminent intelligence organization as mandated in the National Security Act of 1947, insisting that the organization and its employees command the respect its work deserved and that it hold a secure place at the policymaker's table as one among equals. While the CIA's improved performance in Korea

assured this heightened regard, Smith made clear he did not want any of his deputies to go hat-in-hand to any department. Noted for his temperament and for his bluntness, the DCI would not allow CIA to take second place to either the State Department or military services. As one subordinate noted "Beetle...was a very even-tempered man. He was always in a rage." His Agency colleagues noted occasions when the irate DCI would hang up on phone calls not to his liking, or give orders to subordinates not to accede to demands for visits to other government departments. If those departments needed Agency input, their people could come to CIA offices and not the other way around.⁸

While Smith's reforming zeal affected all parts of the Agency, perhaps nowhere did it have as



Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, as General Eisenhower's chief of staff. Photo © Bettman/Corbis

much impact as on analytical offices. Working with CIA's William H. Jackson, Smith determined three major areas of improvement:

- the need to ensure consistent, systematic production of estimates;
- the need to strengthen the position of the DCI relative to the departmental intelligence components; and
- the need to delineate research and analysis functions.

Smith stated that the CIA's national intelligence estimates should command respect for their quality throughout the government. To make sure this came to pass, Smith established the Office of National Estimates (ONE) under the respected academic and former OSS Research and Analysis Branch veteran William Langer. ONE changed processes to ensure that Agency analytical products received thorough military and policy-making coordination. Langer made sure ONE focused on Korean reporting and global Chinese and Soviet activities and made sure policymakers heard one voice.⁹

Smith did not stop there. He formed the Office of Current Intelligence by amalgamating existing offices to include a new 24-hour watch service to handle "hot information." At the same time, he continued production of popular analytical products such as the *Daily*

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Summary, Daily Digest, Current Intelligence Bulletin, and Current Intelligence Review. The founding of a new Office of Research and Reports (ORR) containing seven analytical divisions soon followed. Finally, on 2 January 1952, Smith formed the Directorate of Intelligence to coordinate all six CIA analytical offices under veteran analyst Loftus Becker.^{a10} By the following year, Becker's directorate had 10 times the number of analysts CIA had in 1947.

Thus, by 1953, tempered by war and reformed and reorganized, CIA was ready to provide the intelligence Eisenhower needed to direct the war and reshape the nation's foreign policies and defense strategies.¹¹ As President Eisenhower noted of DCI Smith on retirement that year,

Through his firmness and tact, perceptiveness and judgment, and withal, through his brilliant leadership in a position of

*highest responsibility, he assured the realization of that ideal of a coordinated intelligence effort which was set forth by the Congress in 1947, and brought to a new height of effectiveness the intelligence machinery of the United States Government. Through his well-grounded and clearly defined concept of intelligence, reinforced by his recognized integrity and high personal prestige, he won acceptance of the principle that policy decisions must be based on sound intelligence.*¹²

Smith's contributions allowed the CIA to emerge in 1953 "as an integral element in high-level US policymaking."¹³

A New, Connected Director

President Eisenhower's appointment of Allen Dulles as Smith's replacement in February 1953 proved to be astute. As one historian noted, "The force of Allen Dulles' leadership and his recognition throughout the government as the quintessential case officer accounted in large part for the enhancement and shift in the Agency's position." Yet "the reason for Dulles's influence extended well beyond his personal qualities and inclinations. The composi-

^a The new DI contained six overt offices: the Office of Collection and Dissemination, the Office of Scientific Intelligence, the Office of National Estimates, the Office of Research and Reports, the Office of Current Intelligence, and the Office of Intelligence Coordination. The addition of another group, the Office of Operations, completed the CIA's analytical overhaul in late February 1952.

President Eisenhower sought and received regular CIA analytical products. He also received in-person briefings in the White House from Agency officials.

tion of the United States government, international events, and senior policymaker's perceptions of the role the Agency could play in United States foreign policy converged to make Dulles' position in the government and that of the Agency unique."¹⁴ The regard the president had for the Agency stemmed in large measure from his high personal opinion of Allen Dulles as a career foreign service officer, lawyer, and intelligence professional. As presidential aide Andrew Goodpaster later recalled, "Eisenhower had a lot of respect for Allen Dulles growing out of Dulles's work during the war. The president thought he was very skilled at top-level intelligence—collecting it and analyzing it." Thus, under Dulles, "the CIA gained a reputation among United States government agencies as a young, vital institution serving the highest national purpose."¹⁵ For the first time in CIA's history, other government departments recognized that the Agency had a true intelligence professional at the helm.

A New President

Yet perhaps more than any other factor, the growing importance and status of the CIA after 1953 was due to the attitude, perceptiveness, and knowledge of Dwight D. Eisen-

hower. Unlike his predecessor, Eisenhower's experiences as SHAEF and NATO commander, and as JCS chair and US Army chief of staff, educated him in the value of tactical and strategic intelligence, an awareness he brought to the White House. He once stated

In war, nothing is more important to a commander than the facts concerning the strength, dispositions, and intentions of his opponent, and the proper interpretation of those facts. In peacetime, the necessary facts are of a different nature. They deal with conditions, resources, requirements, and attitudes prevailing in the world. They and their correct interpretation are essential to the development of policy to further our long-term national security and best interests.¹⁶

The president clearly recognized the importance of intelligence to inform his decisions. During the months remaining in the Korean War, President Eisenhower sought and received regular CIA analytical products.¹⁷ He also received in-person briefings in the White House from Agency officials, continuing a procedure begun

soon after he became the Republican presidential nominee. Indeed, prior to his December 1952 visit to Korea and after he became the president-elect, Eisenhower asked DCI Smith to deliver these pre-inaugural intelligence briefings, claiming "He was not comfortable relying exclusively on US Army information regarding what was going on in Korea."¹⁸

After he assumed office, the process changed as Eisenhower came to rely overwhelmingly on periodic high-level briefings and NIEs for intelligence to inform his decision making. Those at CIA observed that the new president actually avoided reading daily intelligence reports from any single government agency, preferring to see the finalized consensus of many analytical offices that had been polished at CIA. On the top end, DCI Dulles continued to provide most intelligence brief-



The Dulles brothers, Allen on the left (1948). Photo © Bettman/Corbis

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ings at the opening of the weekly NSC meetings that Eisenhower always presided over.

Unlike Truman, who infrequently attended NSC meetings, Eisenhower considered the group to be the backbone of his foreign and military decisionmaking team. Here, the DCI covered broad subjects of interest to the president cleared in advance with the NSC secretary and the president's special assistant for national security affairs. While Dulles was himself well-informed about political issues, he tended to defer to Agency subject-matter experts on scientific and military topics outside his normal purview.

The NSC briefing process served the president and the Agency well. Dulles enjoyed a venue in which he could provide CIA-gathered and analyzed intelligence to all major participants at one time and place. At the same time he received a good indication of what intelligence the president wanted and what operations he approved of or needed. According to Andrew Goodpaster,

Eisenhower expected Dulles to provide the latest intelligence on the crisis of the moment but, more important, to concentrate primarily on providing the intelligence background to whatever

larger or longer term planning issue was on the agenda.¹⁹

Eisenhower respected the NIEs and often asked the CIA to analyze issues of specific importance or interest to him. To these requests, the Agency gladly responded, and it continually updated its reporting with the most recent all source intelligence.²⁰

DCIs Smith and Dulles were aware of earlier criticisms, particularly from the Acheson State Department and MacArthur's Far East Command, that the CIA had failed in 1950 to warn the Truman administration of the Korean invasion and the subsequent Chinese intervention. With these in mind, both DCIs acted to strengthen analysis and reporting.²¹ Indeed, Eisenhower considered warning to be a primary CIA mission. DCI Dulles took the warning function very seriously as well, and he emphasized the need to get warning right and to get it quickly to policymakers and military commanders. "An intelligence service today," Dulles wrote,

has an additional responsibility, for it cannot wait for evidence of the likelihood of hostile acts against us or until after the decision to strike has been made by another power. Our government must be both forewarned

and forearmed. A close-knit, coordinated intelligence service, continually on the alert, able to report accurately and quickly on developments in almost any part of the globe, is the best insurance we can take against surprise. The fact that intelligence is alert, that there is a possibility of forewarning, could itself constitute one of the most effective deterrents to a potential enemy's appetite for attack.²²

Providing adequate strategic and tactical warning intelligence would remain a perennial intelligence problem throughout the Eisenhower administration, however, as it would in the years and decades beyond, but Dulles and his successors constantly sought ways to improve Agency processes and functions.

While he appreciated the CIA's capabilities and analytical products, Eisenhower also recognized Agency shortcomings. Eisenhower often noted he did not always receive the quality of intelligence or the successful covert operations he wanted or envisioned. With respect to analysis, he frequently expressed concern that Agency analysts overestimated numbers and capabilities—and thereby the threat.²³ Thus, while President Eisenhower trusted and respected the CIA for what it did and could do, he also recognized that there were limits to what the Agency could realistically accomplish.

By most accounts, Dulles and the CIA, at least during the final six months of the Korean War, did provide the president the type of intelligence he required and screened out the useless detail.

The president often reminisced about the type and quality of intelligence provided during his days as SHAEF commander during World War II, wanting

Dulles to serve him as General [Kenneth] Strong had served him during the war, to be in fact as well as in name his chief intelligence officer, the man who would give him an overview, to be sure the President got the information he needed to act, while screening him from petty detail.²⁴

By most accounts, Dulles and the CIA, at least during the final six months of the Korean War, did provide the president the type of intelligence he required and screened out the useless detail. Dulles never became a figure like General Strong had been for Eisenhower, nor did he fulfill the president's expectation that he become an effective manager of the entire US intelligence community as it emerged from the Korean War.

The CIA continued the high level of current and long-range intelligence reporting on Korea for President Eisenhower as it had done during the final two years of Harry S. Truman's time in office.²⁵ Perhaps most notably, the CIA provided ongoing

tactical military reporting to Eisenhower from the time of his nomination well into his early presidency, especially on Chinese military and diplomatic capabilities and intentions, culminating in a National Intelligence Estimate in April 1953.

This estimate, like the consistent reporting to date, informed the president that the military capabilities of the People's Republic of China in Korea and in general "had grown steadily" since mid-1951, in terms of the quantity and quality of men, materiel, organization, and logistics, especially in the air. Far from exhausted by the conflict, the Agency informed the president that the Chinese remained in a position to counter any US or UN intensification or expansion of the conflict, matching any escalation tit-for-tat promising an escalating stalemate and war without end.²⁶ Taken with other CIA military reporting, this NIE probably dashed any remaining hopes Eisenhower may have entertained based on the optimistic projections from his military commanders and South Korea's Syngman Rhee of a potential military victory, confirming his earlier impression that a negotiated armistice remained the only workable option for ending the conflict.

In early 1953, despite the not-too-closely-held secret that the United States considered using atomic weapons to end the war, especially the recently developed tactical atomic cannon, it was the death of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in March that finally spurred the PRC to return to armistice negotiations in earnest as CIA reporting implied.²⁷ Noting that President Eisenhower also sought an exit from Korea—and was prepared to negotiate a settlement with the communist powers much along the lines of his predecessor—the Agency's analytical offices focused their reporting on issues that had stalled the truce talks since mid-1951, namely the POW repatriation issue that remained of overriding importance to China. By late spring, the Agency reported to the president that this one issue was "the sole remaining obstacle to a Korean Armistice."²⁸ Noting this sticking point, President Eisenhower urged his negotiators to work toward a compromise.

While POW repatriation remained the sole outstanding issue between the major combatant powers, the issue of the continued opposition of South Korean President Rhee to any armistice agreement that left the peninsula divided, remained a problem for President Eisenhower until the second week of July 1953. Through the spring, Agency analysts reported on the back-and-forth talks and negotiations between US and UN negotiators and the recalcitrant South Korean pres-

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ident, stating that in spite of Rhee's attempts to sabotage the armistice negotiations, he would nonetheless have no alternative but to accept that the war would end where it had begun—at the 38th parallel. With US guarantees of military and economic aid programs, Rhee allowed the armistice to go forward.²⁹

Once the 27 July 1953 armistice took effect, CIA continued reporting to the president on Soviet and Chinese reactions to the agreement and conditions on the peninsula, as well as the on-going and often publicly expressed disappointment of Syngman Rhee that the war had concluded before reunification of north and south under his control. In particular, with the warning mission in mind, Agency analysts kept the president up-to-date on the prospects for renewed fighting and on-going communist involvement in Korea for years after the end of the conflict.³⁰

By late 1953, however, the Eisenhower administration had moved on to larger Cold War issues, as did the Central Intelligence Agency—gradually increasing both the number of employees and the size of its budget to meet new threats and increased demands.

In the final analysis, while the Central Intelligence Agency

grew enormously to meet the demands of the conflict, and changed forever as a result, the Korean War did not become “a defining experience” or an issue that played “an inordinate role” in President Eisenhower’s foreign and defense policies, as historian Allan Millett has written. Indeed, in a larger sense, “the war liberated national security policy from the unrealistic economic shackles imposed by the Truman administration” and allowed Eisenhower to reshape the nation’s military and foreign policies to more closely fit what he viewed as a “proper national security policy.” “The Korean War slid into a secondary issue behind ‘security with solvency,’” Eisenhower’s “long-term plans for rational force-structuring, stable budgeting below current levels, and an NSC-centered decision-making architecture.” Security with solvency became “the New Look” defense policy of the Eisenhower administration with issuance of NSC 162/2 in October 1953, appearing three months following the July 1953 Korean armistice.³¹ The Cold War would soon expand well beyond the Korean armistice line for both the Eisenhower administration and the Central Intelligence Agency.



Endnotes

1. Allan R. Millett, "Eisenhower and the Korean War: Cautionary Tale and Hopeful Precedent," in Dennis E. Showalter, ed., *Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the Twenty-first Century* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2005), 42–44.
2. Quotations from Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 78. Critics in the Truman administration stated during the 1952 campaign, and Eisenhower acknowledged, that while Ike was US Army chief of staff and interim chairman of the JCS he signed the 1947 memo to the secretary of war declaring Korea of little strategic value to the United States. He also presided over the decisions leading to the US force withdrawal in June 1949. Later, after 1950, Eisenhower admitted that leaving troops in Korea would have had a deterrent effect and would have prevented the Korean War. See Joseph C. Goulden, *Korea: The Untold Story of the War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), 25.
3. Quotation from Millett, "Eisenhower and the Korean War," 47. For the campaign and Korea, see Goulden, *Korea*, 606–13.
4. For quotation, see Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 317–18. Douglas MacArthur shared his plan for ending the war with Eisenhower in mid-December 1952. The plan included bombing Chinese air bases and installations in Manchuria, the probable use of atomic weapons in North Korea and China, and the creation of a radioactive cobalt belt along the Yalu River to prevent further cross-border incursions.
5. Ludwell Lee Montague noted, "Bedell Smith had reservations about Allen Dulles," who supposedly "rubbed him the wrong way." Yet the outgoing DCI respected "Dulles's general ability and his particular mastery of the tradecraft of clandestine operations," see Ludwell Lee Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950–February 1953* (University Park: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1992), 264.
6. Dulles had served as the OSS representative in Switzerland from 1942 until 1945 and was an adviser to DCIs since the CIA's founding. Smith and William H. Jackson convinced him to join the Agency fulltime, which he did as deputy director plans in January 1951. He retired in November 1961. See, William M. Leary, ed., *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1992), 50. Dulles wrote several books on intelligence, although no formal memoirs, see Allen W. Dulles, *The Secret Surrender* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), describing his World War II activities, *The Craft of Intelligence* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977), and *Great True Spy Stories*, 1968 reprint, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1987).
7. Commissioned by the National Security Council in 1948, the report undertaken by William H. Jackson, Allen W. Dulles, and Matthias Correa, subsequently known as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, surveyed the entire US intelligence establishment, but it focused on the CIA as the largest single

entity. It enumerated many problems at the CIA and suggested changes—most made by Smith. See, Leary, ed., *The Central Intelligence Agency*, 29–30.

8. For quotation, made by future DDI Ray Cline, see Goulden, *Korea*, 164. As Agency analyst Ludwell Montague later noted, “Bedell Smith had no close relationship with Dean Acheson, the secretary of state, although they met regularly at the NSC. Smith’s inability to establish such a relationship may have rankled. On one occasion, James Webb [the under secretary] called Smith by telephone to say that Acheson had taken exception to something that Smith had said at the NSC that morning. Plainly, Webb meant to be helpful, but Bedell Smith responded, in his most emphatic style, that if the secretary of state had anything to say to him, he could make his own phone call — and with that...hung up.... Smith’s sensitivity on this score is further illustrated by his instruction to Frank Wisner, the DDP, not to accept any summons to the State Department,” see Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith*, 236–37.

9. For examples of these new, coordinated national and special estimates, see: NIE-12, *Consequences of the Early Employment of Nationalist Chinese Forces in Korea*, 27 December 1950 [C02911975], SE-8, *Possible Communist Objectives in Proposing a Cease Fire in Korea*, 6 July 1951 [C02994430], NIE-32, *Effects of Operations in Korea on the Internal Situation in Communist China*, 10 July 1951 [C0291772], or SE-9, *Probable Immediate Developments in the Far East Following a Failure in the Cease Fire in Korea*, 6 August 1951 [C02935808], HCD release 2010, available at <http://www.foia.cia.gov/Korean-War.asp>.

10. See Leary, *Central Intelligence Agency*, 28–37.

11. *Ibid.*, 35.

12. Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith*, 261.

13. Quotation from Leary, *Central Intelligence Agency*, 54.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Goodpaster quoted in John L. Helgerson, *Getting to Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952–1992* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1993), 40. Goodpaster recalls, “Eisenhower would read enough of the Intelligence Community estimates to get the point and the highlights and ‘felt the formal estimates and papers were the genuine [unpoliticized] view.’” Also, see quotation in Leary, *Central Intelligence Agency*, 56.

16. See Scott A. Koch and Brian D. Fila, *Our First Line of Defense: Presidential Reflections on Intelligence*. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), 19.

17. See, for example, *Current Intelligence Bulletin*, 22 January 1953 [C02900513], *Current Intelligence Bulletin*, 27 January 1953 [C02900514], and *Current Intelligence Bulletin*, 14 February 1953 [C02050118], HCD release 2010, available at <http://www.foia.cia.gov/KoreanWar.asp>.

18. See Helgerson, *Getting to Know the President*, 34–36.

19. Examples of Dulles’s NSC briefings survive in the State Department *Foreign Relations of the United States* series and in the holdings of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. These officials were James Lay—NSC Secretary—and Robert Cutler, special advisor to the president for national security affairs. See also Helgerson, *Getting to Know the President*, 38–39.

20. See Scott A. Koch, ed. *Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950–1959* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA History Staff, 1993), for a sampling of the variety of topics dealt with in the 1950s. As of 1996, the CIA had declassified 108 NIEs and SNIEs from the Eisenhower era. For specific titles and subjects, see Center for the Study of Intelligence, *Declassified National Intelligence Estimates on the Soviet Union and International Communism, 1946–1984* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), and Donald P. Steury, ed., *Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950–1983* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA History Staff, 1996), xiii–xiv.

21. Note W. B. Smith's creation of a current intelligence 24-hour watch office, *supra*.

22. Dulles, *Craft of Intelligence*, 50–51.

23. On Eisenhower and intelligence analysis, see Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*; Vol. 2 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 455–56—citing White House Memorandum for the Record, 3/7/58 (NSC 4/25/58) and CIA report in “Staff Notes,” 6/9/58 from Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

24. Quotation from Stephen E. Ambrose with Richard H. Immerman, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981), 242, citing Immerman interview of Gordon Gray.

25. Note the *Current Intelligence Bulletins* in the HCD release. These consisted of periodic military, political, and diplomatic reports from around the world, especially areas of current or imminent crisis. They remained a favorite of President Eisenhower, much as Truman had enjoyed the earlier *Daily Summary*.

26. See NIE-80, Communist Capabilities and Probable Course of Action in Korea, 3 April 1953 [C01087874], HCD release 2010.

27. See Kathryn Weathersby, “The Korean War Revisited.” *Wilson Quarterly* 23 (Summer 1996): 95. Weathersby's research in Soviet archives reveals that Stalin approved Kim Il-sung's invasion, largely supplied the PRC and North Koreans with the arms and materiel needed to prosecute the war, insisted that both remain engaged long after prospects for a Communist victory had disappeared, and refused to allow either to pursue a negotiated settlement in order to keep the United States distracted. “Immediately after Stalin's death,” Weathersby writes, “his uncertain successors, concerned about the precariousness of their own rule...decided to bring the war to an end.” Soviet domination of the PRC and DPRNK soured relations within the Communist Bloc for years to come and furthered cleavages resulting in the Sino-Soviet split of 1961. See also, *idem*, “New Evidence on the Korean War: Deceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the Allegations of Bacteriological Weapons Use in Korea,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, No. 11: 179.

28. See, for example, *Current Intelligence Bulletin*, SC No. 06612, 31 March 1953, 3, speaking of Chinese willingness to move truce talks forward [C02026922], and quotation in OCI, “Points of Agreement Between the UN Command and the Communists,” 4 June 1953 [C02924075], HCD release 2010.

29. See, OCI No. 4482, “Rhee Continues His Inflexible Truce Stand,” 13 June 1953 [C02924085], OCI No. 4490, “Rhee Rejects Eisenhower's 6 June Pro-

posal,” 17 June 1953 [C02924091], OCI, SC No. 07732, “The Release of North Korean Prisoners of War,” 18 June 1953 [C02924093], OCI No. 4493, “Rhee Says South Korean Troops Will Not Cooperate With Armistice,” 19 June 1953 [C02924067], and NSC Briefing, “Current Communist Position on a Korean Armistice,” 1 July 1953 [C02930632], HCD release 2010.

30. For example, see *Current Intelligence Bulletin*, SC No. 07896, 29 July 1953, p. 3 [C02020586], NSC 167, “US Courses of Action in Korea in the Absence of an Acceptable Political Settlement - A Report to the National Security Council by the NSC Planning Board,” 22 October 1953 [C00236169], OCI, SC-09773, “Indications of Communist Intentions in Korea,” 24 October 1953 [C02061440], OCI, No. 1500, “Rhee Again Demands American Commitment to Renew Hostilities in Korea,” 9 December 1953 [C03149906], and SNIE 100-2-54, “Probable Reactions of Communist China, the USSR, and the Free World to Certain US Courses of Action in Korea,” 8 March 1954 [C054822847], HCS release 2010.

31. Millett, “Eisenhower and the Korean War,” 41, 47. See NSC 162/2 “Basic National Security Policy,” 30 October 1953.

