The Role of Intelligence and Political Leadership in Ending the Bosnian War
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BOSNIA, INTELLIGENCE, AND THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY

The Role of Intelligence and Political Leadership in Ending the Bosnian War

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William J. Clinton Presidential Library
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March 18, 1994
President Clinton addresses the Croat-Muslim federation accord signing ceremony. (Courtesy: William J. Clinton Presidential Library)
In 1989, as the Soviet Union crumbled and communism’s demise in Europe accelerated, the question of what political philosophy would replace it was being answered in different ways in different countries. The westernmost part of the former Soviet empire plainly preferred democracy; a cause championed for decades by immigrants to the United States from Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic states. In Russia, Yeltsin and other democrats were fighting a rear-guard action against Communists and ultra-nationalists. In Yugoslavia, as the nation struggled to reconcile the competing claims of its ethnic and religious constituencies, Serbian nationalism prevailed over democracy under the leadership of the country’s dominant political figure, Slobodan Milosevic.

In 1991, Yugoslavia’s westernmost provinces, Slovenia and Croatia, both predominately Catholic, declared independence from Yugoslavia. Fighting broke out between Serbia and Croatia, and spilled over into Bosnia, the most ethnically diverse province of Yugoslavia, where Muslims constituted about 45 percent of the population, Serbs were just over 30 percent, and Croatians about 17 percent. The so-called ethnic differences in Bosnia were really political and religious. Bosnia had been the meeting place of three imperial expansions: the Catholic Holy Roman Empire from the west, the Orthodox Christian movement from the east, and the Muslim Ottoman Empire from the south. In 1991, the Bosnians were governed by a coalition of national unity headed by the leading Muslim politician, Alija Izetbegovic, and including the militant Serbian nationalist leader Radovan Karadzic, a Sarajevo psychiatrist.

At first Izetbegovic wanted Bosnia to be an autonomous multi-ethnic, multi-religious province of Yugoslavia. When the international community recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent nations, Izetbegovic decided that the only way Bosnia could escape Serbian dominance was to seek independence, too. Karadzic and his allies, who were tied closely to Milosevic, had a very different agenda. They were supportive of Milosevic’s desire to turn as much of Yugoslavia as he could hold on to, including Bosnia, into a Greater Serbia. On March 1, 1992, a referendum was held on whether Bosnia should become an independent nation in which all citizens and groups would be treated equally. The result was an almost unanimous approval of independence, but only two-thirds of the electorate voted. Karadzic had ordered the Serbs to stay away from the polls and most of them did. By then, Serb paramilitary forces had begun killing unarmed Muslims, driving them from their homes.

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in Serb-dominated areas in hope of carving up Bosnia into ethnic enclaves, or “cantons,” by force. This cruel policy came to be known by a curiously antiseptic name: ethnic cleansing.

The European Community envoy, Lord Carrington, tried to get the parties to agree to peacefully divide the country into ethnic regions but failed because there was no way to do it without leaving large numbers of one group on land controlled by another; and because many Bosnians wanted to keep their country together; with the different groups living together in peace, as they had done successfully for most of the previous five hundred years.

In April 1992, the European Community recognized Bosnia as an independent state for the first time since the fifteenth century. Meanwhile, Serbian paramilitary forces continued to terrorize Muslim communities and kill civilians, all the while using media to convince local Serbs that it was they who were under attack from the Muslims and who had to defend themselves. On April 27, Milosevic announced a new state of Yugoslavia comprising Serbia and Montenegro. He then made a show of withdrawing his army from Bosnia, while leaving armaments, supplies, and Bosnian Serb soldiers under the leadership of his handpicked commander, Ratko Mladic. The fighting and killing raged throughout 1992, with European Community leaders struggling to contain it and the Bush administration, uncertain of what to do and unwilling to take on another problem in an election year, content to leave the matter in Europe’s hands.

To its credit, the Bush administration did urge the United Nations to impose economic sanctions on Serbia, a measure initially opposed by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the French, and the British, who said they wanted to give Milosevic a chance to stop the very violence he had incited. Finally, sanctions were imposed in late May, but with little effect, as supplies continued to reach the Serbs from friendly neighbors. The United Nations also continued to maintain the arms embargo against the Bosnian government that originally had been imposed against all Yugoslavia in late 1991. The problem with the embargo was that the Serbs had enough weapons and ammunition on hand to fight for years; making it virtually impossible for the Bosnians to defend themselves. Somehow they managed to hold out throughout 1992, acquiring some arms by capturing them from the Serb forces, or in small shipments from Croatia that managed to evade the NATO blockade of the Croatian coast.

In the summer of 1992, as television and print media finally brought the horror of a Serb-run detention camp in northern Bosnia home to Europeans and Americans, I spoke out in favor of NATO air strikes with U.S. involvement. Later, when it became clear that the Serbs were engaging in the systematic slaughter of Bosnian Muslims, especially targeting local leaders for extermination, I suggested lifting the arms embargo. Instead, the Europeans focused on ending the violence. British Prime Minister John Major attempted to get the Serbs to lift the siege of Bosnian towns and put their heavy weapons under UN supervision. At the same time, many private and government humanitarian missions were launched to provide food and medicine, and the United Nations sent in eight thousand troops to protect the aid convoys.

In late October, just before our election, Lord David Owen, the new European negotiator, and the UN negotiator, former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, put forward a proposal to turn Bosnia into a number of autonomous provinces that would be responsible for all government functions except defense and foreign affairs, which would be handled by a weak central government. The cantons were sufficiently numerous, with the dominant ethnic groups geographically divided in a way that Vance and Owen thought would make it impossible for the Serb-controlled areas to merge with Milosevic’s Yugoslavia to form a Greater Serbia. There were several problems with their plan, the two largest of which were that the sweeping powers of the canton governments made it clear that Muslims couldn’t safely return to their homes in Serb-controlled areas, and that vagueness of canton boundaries invited continued Serb aggression intended to expand their areas, as well as the ongoing, although less severe, conflict between Croats and Muslims.

By the time I became President, the arms embargo and European support for the Vance-Owen plan had weakened Muslim resistance to the Serbs, even as evidence of their slaughter of Muslim civilians and violations of human rights in detention camps continued to surface. In early February, I decided not to endorse the Vance-Owen plan. On the fifth, I met with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada and was pleased to hear him say he didn’t like it either. A few days later, we completed a Bosnian policy review, with Warren Christopher announcing that the United States would like to negotiate a new agreement and would be willing to help enforce it.
On February 23, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali agreed with me on an emergency plan to airdrop humanitarian supplies to the Bosnians. The next day, in my first meeting with John Major, he too supported the airdrops. The airdrops would help many people stay alive, but would do nothing to address the causes of the crisis.

By March, we seemed to be making progress. Economic sanctions had been strengthened and seemed to be hurting the Serbs, who were also concerned about the possibility of military action by NATO. But we were a long way from a unified policy. On the ninth, in my first meeting with French president François Mitterrand, he made it clear to me that, although he had sent five thousand French troops to Bosnia as part of a UN humanitarian force to deliver aid and contain the violence, he was more sympathetic to the Serbs than I was, and less willing to see a Muslim-led unified Bosnia.

On the twenty-sixth, I met with Helmut Kohl, who deplored what was happening and who, like me, had favored lifting the arms embargo. But we couldn’t budge the British and French, who felt lifting the embargo would only prolong the war and endanger the UN forces on the ground that included their troops but not ours. Izetbegovic was also in the White House to meet with Al Gore, whose national security aide, Leon Fuerth, was responsible for our success in making the embargo more effective. Both Kohl and I told Izetbegovic we were going to do our best to get the Europeans to take a stronger stand to support him. Five days later, we succeeded in getting the United Nations to extend a “no fly” zone over all Bosnia, to at least deprive the Serbs of the benefit of the monopoly on airpower. It was a good thing to do, but it didn’t slow the killing much.

In April, a team of U.S. military, diplomatic, and humanitarian aid personnel returned from Bosnia urging that we intervene militarily to stop the suffering. On the sixteenth, the United Nations accepted our recommendation for declaring a “safe area” around Srebrenica, a town in eastern Bosnia where Serb killing and ethnic cleansing had been especially outrageous.

At the end of our first one hundred days, we were nowhere near a satisfactory solution to the Bosnian crisis. The British and French rebuffed Warren Christopher’s overtures and reaffirmed their right to take the lead in dealing with the situation. The problem with their position, of course, was that if the Serbs could take the economic hit of the tough sanctions, they could continue their aggressive ethnic cleansing without fear or punishment. The Bosnian tragedy would drag on for more than two years, leaving more than 250,000 dead and 2.5 million driven from their homes, until NATO air attacks, aided by Serb military losses on the ground, led to an American diplomatic initiative that would bring the war to an end.
I stepped into what Dick Holbrooke called “the greatest collective security failure of the West since the 1930s.”

In his book, To End a War, Holbrooke ascribes the failure to five factors: (1) a misreading of Balkan history, holding that the ethnic strife was too ancient and ingrained to be prevented by outsiders; (2) the apparent loss of Yugoslavia’s strategic importance after the end of the Cold War; (3) the triumph of nationalism over democracy as the dominant ideology of post-Communist Yugoslavia; (4) the reluctance of the Bush administration to undertake another military commitment so soon after the 1991 Iraq war; and (5) the decision of the United States to turn the issue over to Europe instead of NATO, and the confused and passive European response.

To Holbrooke’s list I would add a sixth factor: some European leaders were not eager to have a Muslim state in the heart of the Balkans, fearing it might become a base for exporting extremism, a result that their neglect made more, not less, likely.

My own opinions were constrained by the dug-in positions I found when I took office. For example, I was reluctant to go along with Senator Dole in unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, for fear of weakening the United Nations (though we later did so in effect, by declining to enforce it.) I also didn’t want to divide the NATO alliance by unilaterally bombing Serb military positions, especially since there were European, but no American, soldiers on the ground with the UN mission. And I didn’t want to send American troops there, putting them in harm’s way under a UN mandate I thought was bound to fail. In May 1993, we were still a long way from a solution.

In early August, as the budget drama moved to its climax, Warren Christopher finally secured the agreement of the British and French to conduct NATO air strikes in Bosnia, but the strikes could occur only if both NATO and the UN approved them, the so-called dual key approach. I was afraid we could never turn both keys, because Russia had a veto on the Security Council and was closely tied to the Serbs. The dual key would prove to be a frustrating impediment to protecting the Bosnians, but it marked another step in the long, tortuous process of moving Europe and the UN to a more aggressive posture.

September was also the biggest foreign policy month of my presidency. On September 8, President Izetbegovic of Bosnia came to the White House. The threat of NATO air strikes had succeeded in restraining the Serbs and getting peace talks going again. Izetbegovic assured me that he was committed to a peaceful settlement as long as it was fair to the Bosnian Muslims. If one was reached, he wanted my commitment to send NATO forces, including
U.S. troops, to Bosnia to enforce it. I reaffirmed by intention to do so.

After Black Hawk Down, whenever I approved the deployment of forces, I knew much more about what the risks were, and made much clearer what operations had to be approved in Washington. The lessons of Somalia were not lost on the military planners who plotted our course in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and other trouble spots of the post-Cold War world, where America was often asked to step in to stop hideous violence, and too often expected to do it without the loss of lives to ourselves, our adversaries, or innocent bystanders. The challenge of dealing with complicated problems, like Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia inspired one of Tony Lake’s best lines: “Sometimes I really miss the Cold War.”

In the second week of February 1994, after the brutal shelling of the Sarajevo marketplace by Bosnian Serbs had killed dozens of innocent people, NATO finally voted, with the approval of the UN secretary-general, to bomb the Serbs if they didn’t move their heavy guns more than a dozen miles away from the city. It was long overdue, but still not a vote without risk for the Canadians, whose forces in Srebrenica were surrounded by the Serbs, or for the French, British, Spanish, and Dutch, who also had relatively small, and vulnerable, numbers of troops on the ground.

Soon afterward, the heavy weapons were removed or put under UN control. Senator Dole was still pushing for a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo, but for the moment I was willing to stick with it, because we had finally gotten a green light for the NATO air strikes, and because I didn’t want others to use our unilateral abandonment of the Bosnian embargo as an excuse to disregard the embargoes we supported in Haiti, Libya, and Iraq.

On February 28, NATO fighters shot down four Serb planes for violating the no-fly zone, the first military action in the forty-four-year history of the alliance. I hoped that the air strikes, along with our success in relieving the siege of Sarajevo, would convince the allies to take a strong posture toward Serb aggression in and around the embattled towns of Tuzla and Srebrenica as well.

On March 18 1994, Presidents Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia were at the White House to sign an agreement negotiated with the help of my special envoy, Charles Redman, that established a federation in the areas of Bosnia in which their population were in a majority, and set up a process to move toward a confederation of forces, I knew much more about what the risks were, and made much clearer what operations had to be approved in Washington. The lessons of Somalia were not lost on the military planners who plotted our course in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and other trouble spots of the post-Cold War world, where America was often asked to step in to stop hideous violence, and too often expected to do it without the loss of lives to ourselves, our adversaries, or innocent bystanders. The challenge of dealing with complicated problems, like Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia inspired one of Tony Lake’s best lines: “Sometimes I really miss the Cold War.”

By the fall of 1995, Dick Holbrooke had persuaded the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia to agree on a set of basic principles as a framework to settle the Bosnian conflict. Meanwhile, NATO air strikes and cruise missile attacks continued to pound Bosnian Serb positions, and Bosnian and Croatian military gains reduced the percentage of Bosnia controlled by the Serbs from 70 to 50 percent, close to what negotiated settlement would likely require.

On the morning of November 10, 1994, I announced that the United States would no longer enforce the arms embargo in Bosnia. The move had strong support in Congress and was necessary because the Serbs had resumed their aggression, with an assault on the town of Bihac; by late November, NATO was bombing Serb missile sites in the area.

On the morning of November 21, Warren Christopher called me from Dayton to say that the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia had reached a peace agreement to end the war in Bosnia. The agreement preserved Bosnia as a single state to be made up of two parts, the Bosnian Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic, with a joint resolution of the territorial disputes over which the war was begun. Sarajevo would remain the undivided capital city. The national government would have responsibility for foreign affairs, trade, immigration, citizenship, and monetary policy. Each of the federations would have its own police force. Refugees would be able to return home, and free movement throughout the country would be guaranteed. There would be international supervision of human rights and police training, and those charged with war crimes would be excluded from political life.

A strong international force, commanded by NATO, would supervise the separation of forces and keep the peace as the agreement was being implemented.

The Bosnian peace plan was hard-won and its particulars contained bitter pills for both sides, but it would end four bloody years that claimed more than 250,000 lives and caused more than two million people to flee their homes.

American leadership was decisive in pushing NATO to be more aggressive and in taking the final diplomatic initiative. Our efforts were immeasurably helped by Croatian and Bosnian military gains on the ground, and the brave and stubborn refusal of Izetbegovic and his comrades to give up in the face of Bosnian Serb aggression.

The final agreement was a tribute to the skills of Dick Holbrooke and his negotiating team; to Warren Christopher, who at critical points was decisive in keeping the Bosnians on board in closing the deal; to Tony Lake, who initially conceived and sold our peace initiative to our allies and who, with Holbrooke, pushed for the final talks to be held in the United States; to Sandy Berger, who chaired...
the deputies’ committee meetings, which kept people throughout the national security operation informed of what was going on without allowing too much interference; and to Madeleine Albright, who strongly supported our aggressive posture in the United Nations. The choice of Dayton and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base was inspired, and carefully chosen by the negotiating team; it was in the United States, but far enough away from Washington to discourage leaks, and the facilities permitted the kind of “proximity talks” that allowed Holbrooke and his team to hammer out the tough details.

On November 22, after twenty-one days of isolation in Dayton, Holbrooke and his team came to the White House to receive my congratulations and discuss our next steps. We still had a big selling job on the Hill and with the American people, who, according to the latest polls, were proud of the peace agreement but were still overwhelming opposed to sending U.S. troops to Bosnia. After Al Gore kicked off the meeting by saying that the military testimony to date had not been helpful, I told General Shalikashvili that I knew he supported our involvement in Bosnia but that many of his subordinates remained ambivalent. Al and I had orchestrated our comments to emphasize that it was time for everybody in the government, not just the military, to get with the program. They had the desired effect.

We already had strong support from some important members of Congress, especially Senators Lugar, Biden, and Lieberman. Others offered a more qualified endorsement, saying that they wanted a clear “exit strategy.” To add to their numbers, I began to invite members of Congress to the White House, while sending Christopher, Perry, Shalikashvili, and Holbrooke to the Hill. Our challenge was complicated by the ongoing debate over the budget; the government was open for the time being, but the Republicans were threatening to shut it down again on December 15.

On November 27, I took my case for U.S. involvement in Bosnia to the American people. Speaking from the Oval Office, I said that our diplomacy had produced the Dayton Accords and that our troops had been requested not to fight, but to help the parties implement the peace plan, which served our strategic interests and advanced our fundamental values.
Because twenty-five other nations had already agreed to participate in a force of sixty thousand, only a third of the troops would be Americans. I pledged that they would go in with a clear, limited, achievable mission and would be well-trained and heavily armed to minimize the risk of casualties. After the address I felt that I had made the strongest case I could for our responsibility to lead the forces of peace and freedom, and hoped that I had moved public opinion enough so that Congress would at least not try to stop me from sending in the troops.

In addition to the arguments made in my speech, standing up for the Bosnians had another important benefit to the United States: it would demonstrate to Muslims the world over that the United States cared about them, respected Islam, and would support them if they rejected terror and embraced the possibilities of peace and reconciliation.

On December 14, I flew to Paris for a day, for the official signing of the agreement ending the Bosnian war. I met with the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, and went to a lunch with them hosted by Jacques Chirac at the Élysée Palace. Slobodan Milosevic was sitting across from me, and we talked for a good while. He was intelligent, articulate, and cordial, but he had the coldest look in his eyes I had ever seen. He was also paranoid; telling me he was sure Rabin’s assassination was the result of betrayal by someone in his security service. Then he said that everyone knew that’s what had happened to President Kennedy, too, but that we Americans “have been successful in covering it up.” After spending time with him, I was no longer surprised by his support of the murderous outrages in Bosnia, and I had the feeling that I would be at odds with him again before long.
August 30, 1998

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright greets troops at Tuzla Air Force Base deployed in support of implementing the Bosnian peace settlement.

(Courtesy: Department of Defense)
Three factors ended the Bosnian War. The first was overreaching on the part of the Bosnian Serbs. For years, they had bet successfully on the fecklessness of the West, but they didn’t know when to fold their hands. The second was the changing military situation. In early August, Croatia launched an offensive to reclaim territory seized by ethnic Serbs. The offensive quickly succeeded, sending a message to the Bosnian Serbs that they weren’t invincible and could not, in a crisis, count on help from Serbian President Slobodan Milošević. The third factor was President Bill Clinton’s willingness to lead.

After the massacre at Srebrenica, the President’s frustration had boiled over, and National Security Advisor Tony Lake had asked for endgame papers focusing on the kind of post-conflict Bosnia we wanted to see. The papers were discussed at a key meeting in the White House Cabinet Room the same week as a presentation I delivered at the United Nations Security Council on Srebrenica. As we had been from the beginning, the President’s advisors were divided.

I argued that U.S. troops were going to be in Bosnia eventually, so it made sense to send them on our terms and timetable. Europe had failed to resolve the crisis and, in the process, had diminished both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations. Our reluctance to take charge had weakened our own claim to leadership. The Bosnian Serbs must be forced to agree on reasonable terms or face a rollback of their military gains. If a negotiated settlement were not forthcoming, we should urge withdrawal of the UN mission and train and equip the Bosnian military behind a shield of NATO airpower.

Recommending a similar approach, Tony proposed sending a high-level team to Europe to gain allied backing for the new hard line. Neither the State Department nor the Defense Department suggested doing anything different from what we had been doing, with the Pentagon recommending a “realistic” approach under which we would accept the reality of Serb military power and seek a permanent cease-fire based on the status quo.

Lake summed up: “Madeleine feels the stakes are so high, they affect the administration’s leadership at home and abroad, and that we have no choice but to accept a
considerable risk. The biggest fear of State and Defense is that we will become entangled in a quagmire. They favor a more limited approach.”

While Tony spoke, I couldn’t help looking at the President. Bill Clinton was a very good listener. His habit was to sit doodling or writing notes with his other fist clenched against his face or when he had a headache, with a cold can of Diet Coke pressed against his temple. At times, I thought he was disengaged, only to realize later that he hadn’t missed a thing. During my years as UN ambassador, I felt I got more respect from the President than I did from most members of the foreign policy team. Where others had presented my best arguments on the issues that mattered to me most, the President normally began his response to a presentation with a series of questions. This time it was obvious from the moment he started to speak that he had his mind made up. “I agree with Tony and Madeleine,” he said. “We should bust our ass to get a settlement within the next few months. We must commit to a unified Bosnia. And if we can’t get that at the bargaining table, we have to help the Bosnians on the battlefield.”

During the next days, Lake headed for Europe to explain the plans to our allies and Russia. Another team, led by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Dick Holbrooke, traveled to the Balkans to begin shuttle-style negotiations among the parties. The European response was favorable, and I felt encouraged, but talks in the region had barely begun when, on August 19, three members of Holbrooke’s negotiating team were killed in Bosnia in an accident on a treacherous mountain road. The dead were Ambassador Robert Frasure, Lieutenant Colonel Nelson Drew of the National Security Council, and Joseph Kruzel of the Department of Defense. I admired them all but knew Bob Frasure best. I was relieved that Holbrooke and my former liaison with the Joint Chiefs, General Wesley Clark, who were both in the ill-fated convoy, were safe. I will not forget the sadness of their homecoming, accompanying the bodies of our colleagues.

Our negotiators did not return to Europe until August 28. The Bosnian Serbs chose that moment to overreach again. At 11:10 A.M. on a sunny Monday morning, five mortar
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Shells came flying out of the hills around Sarajevo to land in the bustling Markale market, killing thirty-seven and wounding eighty-five. I conferred with UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Kofi Annan, who agreed that the joint UN-NATO understanding drafted after the Srebrenica massacre should be applied. On August 30, more than sixty aircraft, flying from bases in Italy and the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt in the Adriatic, pounded Bosnian Serb positions around Sarajevo. French and British artillery joined in. At the time, it was the largest NATO military action ever.

The psychological balance had changed. The Bosnian Serbs could no longer act with impunity, while NATO was no longer barred from using its power. American diplomatic leadership was fully engaged. Belgrade was desperate for sanctions relief, while Milošević received explicit authority to negotiate on behalf of the Pale Serbs.

On September 8, the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia agreed that Bosnia would continue as a single state, but with Bosniak-Croat and Serb entities sharing territory on roughly a 51-49 percent basis. By the end of the month, our negotiating team had gained an agreement on general principles, including the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign and democratic state.

On October 5, the parties agreed to a countrywide ceasefire. At the start of November, they were scheduled to arrive in Dayton, Ohio, for talks that would lead to a final settlement. As the countdown entered its final days, Milošević demanded that sanctions against Belgrade be suspended as soon as negotiations began, and lifted entirely when an agreement was signed. Our position had always been to suspend sanctions only when agreement was reached and lift them only after implementation.

Holbrooke warned that Milošević might refuse to show up at Dayton if he didn’t get his way and argued strongly that we give in. At a Principals Committee meeting on October 27, I argued that sanctions relief was too valuable a tool to fritter away: we would need all our leverage to get Milošević to meet his commitments. I knew this was the President’s position too, because weeks earlier, during a special session of the UN General Assembly, I had found him alone and talked with him about it. I said there were proposals circulating at the UN to lift sanctions before an agreement. He was incredulous and said “No way”—or rather something more colorful. We decided to hold firm.

I was in Chicago when I got a call from Holbrooke. He knew I opposed lifting sanctions. While diplomacy may be practiced between diplomats of different countries, the rules are different between diplomats of the same country. We had a most undiplomatic conversation. As Holbrooke predicted, Milošević then threatened not to come to Dayton. As the rest of us expected, he came anyway.

After three weeks of contentious talks, featuring a tireless negotiating effort by Holbrooke and essential deal-closing by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the Dayton Accords were initialed at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base on November 21, 1995. It was Thanksgiving weekend. The war in Bosnia was over.

To me, the outcome vindicated several principles. It showed that the limited use of force—even airpower alone—could make a decisive difference. It showed the importance of allied unity and of American leadership. It showed the possibilities of this new era, in that Russian forces would end up side by side with NATO troops in implementing the accords. And it showed the importance of standing up to the likes of Milošević and Ratko Mладић, the Bosnian Serb military leader.

In 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain revealed the thinking behind the Munich Agreement, which gave Adolf Hitler a green light to take over Czechoslovakia. “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is,” he said, “that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing.” A year later Chamberlain’s own nation was at war, in part, because he had done nothing to help that “faraway country” and its little-known people. America and its allies may be proud that, belatedly or not, we did come to the aid of the people of Bosnia—to their benefit, and ours.
View of Grbavica, a neighborhood of Sarajevo, approximately 4 months after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords that officially ended the war in Bosnia. (Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons)
Established on June 12, 1992, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Interagency Balkan Task Force (BTF) was the United States Government’s first truly joint, multiagency intelligence task force. James O. Carson, the first BTF chief, made the initial organizational decisions over a two-month period in the summer of 1992, while simultaneously remaining a division chief within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Office of European Analysis (EURA). I replaced Carson as BTF chief in August 1992, and headed the task force for about a year through the final months of the Bush Administration and into the start of the Clinton Presidency. This essay recounts the BTF’s first year to offer guidance for organizing and managing future intelligence task forces. It also ponders broader implications for intelligence crisis support to policymakers, particularly when an incoming administration welcomes help in understanding the issues and policy options.

THE BALKANS CRISIS

United States intelligence clearly predicted the crisis which gripped U.S. policymakers in the summer of 1992. With Josip B. Tito’s death on May 4, 1980, and the Cold War’s end later that decade, the glue that had connected Yugoslavia for nearly four decades suddenly vanished. By mid-1990, U.S. intelligence judged that Yugoslavia would probably dissolve into civil war within two years. The breakup began with Slovenia. Opportunistic nationalists throughout Yugoslavia soon fanned old communal grievances, frustrating any possibility of a democratic solution.1 Serbian leaders wanted to keep Yugoslavia intact under their domination, but Slovenes and Croats desired their own independent republics. Slovenia had the key advantages of few ethnic minorities, a remote location on the northwest edge of Yugoslavia, and established trade with Western Europe. Slovene-Serb fighting broke out in June 1991 shortly after a Slovenian referendum in 1990—voting for independence—went into effect. But ten days later the Serbian-led forces withdrew, allowing Slovenia to go free. The fighting in Croatia and Bosnia would be far worse. The Yugoslav Army (JNA2) disintegrated along nationalist lines, and Croatia blockaded some Serbian units inside

1 It is technically wrong to describe the fissures in the former Yugoslavia as ethnic, thus I have used the adjectives nationalist or communal here. Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, among others, are all ethnically the same—Southern Slavs—although regionalism, religion, language differences, and other factors distinguish one group from another. Even the Muslims in Bosnia are mostly descendants of Serbs who, under Ottoman rule, converted to Islam for personal advantage.

2 Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija—the Yugoslav Army.

“Why is it that every time something happens, we have to reorganize to handle it?”

– Douglas J. MacEachin,
CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence
their Croatian barracks. The JNA intervened in the Krajina region of Croatia where many Serbs lived, ostensibly to separate the belligerents, while the increasingly Serb-dominated JNA turned over occupied areas to the Croatian Serbs, and brutally shelled and seized the city of Vukovar. Former Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, acting as a United Nations special envoy, negotiated a ceasefire in Croatia in November 1991, policed by the U.N., but a three-way fight loomed in Bosnia where Serbs, Croats, and Muslims were more thoroughly mixed than in any other Yugoslav republic. Bosnian Serbs, armed by the JNA and irregular fighters infiltrating from Serbia, soon began creating autonomous areas cleansed of non-Serbs.

With the Cold War at an end, U.S. policymakers pressed for human rights, democracy, and economic reform, but many in Washington saw the resolution to the conflict as a European Community (EC) responsibility. The EC after all had deployed monitors on the ground in Croatia and Bosnia, and helped achieve the ceasefire in Croatia. In Bosnia, José P. Cutileiro offered an EC formula for partitioning the republic into three communally-based entities under a common government, but the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims could not agree on the distribution of population, land, and economic resources. The United Nations imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia in September 1991 which mainly hurt the Muslims against the better armed Serbs and Croats. Economic sanctions against Serbia also had little effect. The EC recognized Slovenia and Croatia, then Bosnia, and withdrew its ambassadors from Belgrade, to little effect. In time, Cyrus Vance and former British Foreign Secretary David Owen, negotiating on behalf of the United Nations, devised a new map partitioning Bosnia into ten provinces, but again the parties could not agree on the division of resources. Official Washington gradually accepted the need for U.S. leadership, along with a ceasefire and armed peacekeepers. To support Washington’s reluctant but growing involvement in the Balkans in 1992, the Intelligence Community ramped up its collection and analytic capabilities.

### THE BALKANS TASK FORCE

DCI Robert M. Gates created the BTF in June 1992, ordering his deputy, Admiral William O. Studeman, to oversee the effort. As the Intelligence Community’s representative to the National Security Council Deputies Committee where Bush Administration officials made important decisions on the Balkans, he was perfectly positioned to oversee intelligence support on the crisis. Moreover, because he was a senior naval officer who previously headed Naval Intelligence (1985-1988) and the National Security Agency (1988-1992), he wanted a genuine interagency effort. In this, he was supported by the new Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, who was reorganizing military intelligence at the Pentagon and advocating a stronger DIA role in national policy, crisis management, and military analysis. Both men wanted to avoid repeats of recent criticisms that U.S. intelligence had not fully supported military operations during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War.

The BTF’s small front office, located next to the CIA’s 24/7 Operations Center, supervised three branches of political, military, and economic analysts. Since the space could not house the whole task force, the front office was separate from the branches: analysts remained in their home office spaces—an arrangement dubbed a virtual task force. Few actually worked in the BTF front office. CIA provided a senior intelligence service level analytic manager to serve as chief, while DIA provided a deputy chief (initially an Air Force colonel, later a Navy captain). EURA assigned to the task force analysts already covering the Balkans, and the Office of Global Intelligence (OGI) selected a group to handle humanitarian and later sanctions-related issues. While workable, this arrangement was not challenge-free. Since analysts did not move to a separate task force location, EURA and OGI managers continued to task analysts with other duties. Until resolved, BTF analysts saw themselves obeying two chains of command. Tasks assigned to the economic group had to be cleared with OGI managers, and BTF analytic products had to pass through EURA’s management review. Meanwhile, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) declined to participate in the BTF, citing a lack of personnel. Furthermore, DIA analysts also remained in their pre-BTF workspaces, where they continued to serve their home agency’s priorities at
the expense of the BTF. Over time, the BTF corrected much inefficiency and eliminated unnecessary layers of review. Since the BTF was a DCI Interagency Task Force, it became general thinking that the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence were its immediate supervisors, rather than others at lower positions.

**COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AND DATABASES**

A key BTF function was collection management. Standing formal collection requirements could not keep up with the fast pace of crisis support, so informal ad hoc tasking became vital. Given the competition for collection resources among satellite imagery, signals, and human intelligence, as well as the complex and dynamic situation on the ground, it was imperative that the Intelligence Community have well-coordinated priorities and an efficient, non-competitive tasking process. NSA and two CIA components provided personnel to expedite these collection requirements. These collection managers attended BTF morning meetings and frequently cut the lag time between levying requirements and receiving responses from days to hours. As a result, the key tasking agencies began speaking with one voice on standing problem sets, collection packages, ad hoc, and daily requirements.

With the splintering of the former Yugoslav Army, a second major task force priority was developing a reliable Order of Battle (OB) on the belligerents. An OB database tracks the organizational structure, manning levels, and major equipment items of a foreign military force. But, in many areas not in the forefront of U.S. concern, maintenance of OB files is a low priority. In the 1992 Balkans, the OB problem was acute. As the Yugoslav Army disintegrated, elements reformed as Serbian, Croatian, or Muslim units, while other units became sinisterly useful and deniable irregular hired guns. An accurate baseline for these forces would be essential as the United States later considered airstrikes against Serbian heavy weapons, or monitored units withdrawing from regions in compliance with ceasefire agreements. Initially, DIA took the lead in creating a Balkans OB. Over the years, responsibility for maintaining foreign OB had bounced among CIA, DIA, and the Military Commands without a clear resolution acceptable to all. A lesson, I believe, is that regardless of how OB responsibilities are assigned within the defense and intelligence communities, military analysts must develop and maintain their own data on the forces they are responsible for assessing.

A third early BTF imperative was the need for training. Although BTF personnel were seasoned analysts and collection managers, the situation they now faced had changed. There had not been an armed conflict in Europe for nearly fifty years, so the military branch and intelligence collectors covering Europe required experience with shooting wars. It took time to refocus collectors to report the raw information needed, and time to train analysts to discern the purposes behind military deployments, strategic movements,
and tactical battlefield operations. Political analysts had to adjust their models to accommodate for rivalries among Bosnia’s Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, as well as friction points within each group. Furthermore, because BTF analysts were organized by discipline—political, military, and economic—they tended to be expert in one dimension of the crisis. Initially, the BTF often had to send several analysts to give a comprehensive briefing to a policymaker. In short order, however, briefing senior administration and congressional officials became a strong suit of the BTF’s performance.

Without a previous interagency taskforce to provide precedent, the BTF established and evolved policies on the fly. The BTF rotated analysts to provide direct support to senior policymakers. Task force members wrote daily for the President’s Daily Brief, produced a version for the more broadly distributed National Intelligence Daily, and turned out electronically disseminated situation reports every eight to twelve hours for its most concerned customers. The BTF also wrote typescript memoranda ranging from one to fifty pages long in response to formal and informal tasks. The fast-paced situation meant it was not practical to produce longer research papers or National Intelligence Estimates. This amounted to an overwhelming workload digesting the “fire hose” of incoming raw intelligence, and producing a large volume of written products and oral briefings on an unrelenting schedule. BTF analysts kept informed on the day’s major news, but carefully avoided wasting time duplicating accurate media reports (they were responsible for correcting mistaken reports or improving understanding with additional analysis). Everyone learned new skills on the job and found efficiencies to manage the unrelenting workload.

**THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION TAKES OFFICE**

When Bill Clinton won the presidential election in November 1992, the BTF acquired a new set of customers. At times, it was like serving three governments in one. John E. McLaughlin, Director of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis, was briefing President-Elect Clinton in Little Rock. Although McLaughlin was not a BTF member, he was receiving all BTF products and would contact the task force regularly to see what more it could explain or add. The Clinton Transition Team began a policy review of the Balkans issue. Meanwhile, in December 1992, Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger publicly warned Serbia and the Bosnian-Serbs to cease hostilities. The Bush Administration was becoming more directly engaged in the Balkans since the European Community and United Nations had not ended the fighting, but any major policy shift would be deferred until President Clinton took office.

The Balkans soon became one of the new administration’s top national security concerns. Before they took office, the Transition Team requested dozens of backgrounders for their policy review. The BTF received its tasking in December in the form of a National Security Directive listing fifty questions. Answering these questions was a major effort and added to an already overflowing plate. I staffed out most questions, wrote some responses myself, gathered the drafts, and came in on Christmas Day for a final edit. The next day the document went to the NSC and Transition Team. I later saw a record listing all the NSC taskings, the date issued, and date the transition team received the response. Most papers were still outstanding, and the BTF’s submission was by far the fastest turn-around of the handful of documents already submitted. Under Secretary of Defense Walter B. Slocombe, while holding a copy of the BTF backgrounder, complimented DCI James Woolsey and me that the BTF could produce such “marvelous” reports so quickly.

**A NEW ADMINISTRATION SHIFTS DECISION-MAKING TO HIGHEST LEVELS**

While the Bush Administration had made policy decisions in the NSC Deputies Committee, decisions would be elevated to the Principals Committee (PC) under President Clinton. The new administration’s first two PC meetings, and the first NSC meeting attended by the president, were devoted entirely to Bosnia. I accompanied DCI Woolsey to the first PC meeting on January 28, 1993 with a briefcase of materials which might be of help. The meeting was a wide-ranging open discussion. One shared concern was the Bosnian-Serbs holding Muslims in detention camps (the principals did not yet know all three sides in the conflict operated camps). A BTF map of all known camps came in handy, with National Security Advisor Anthony Lake immediately grasping that freeing all those prisoners would be a monumental undertaking. As the PC members ran out of further suggestions, Lake asked NSC Senior Director for European Affairs Jenonne R. Walker to work these ideas into a plan the committee could consider at its next meeting in three days’ time. Over the weekend, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Niles, General Barry R. McCaffrey, and I met with Walker in her office. After a hour discussion, she had what she needed and offered to do the draft herself.

These senior officials needed time to absorb the complexities in the Balkans and the BTF played a vital role in providing that information. The task force widened its focus, stepped back from the detailed daily updates to include more context and background, and began to address areas of confusion or disagreement. Two of the most important early BTF contributions were addressing 1) the question of whether the basis of the Bosnian war was centuries of communal violence and hatreds or manufactured propaganda and political opportunism (it was both), and 2) whether the Muslims were the innocent and injured party or did all parties share varying degrees of guilt for
the conflict (they all did). In a fast-changing crisis, it is particularly important that intelligence be responsive to policymakers and proactive in drawing attention to new developments or analytic insights. The BTF had to take notice of this new “assignment” as it got to know the new policymakers and fine-tune its products and briefings to meet their needs.

The second PC meeting held a few days later was an orderly discussion that followed Tony Lake’s careful agenda. The key presentation came at the end, however, when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin L. Powell briefed U.S. military options in Bosnia. As a colonel showed a map, General Powell explained that his staff had examined three sets of options—light, medium, and heavy—but, to save time for the busy PC members, he would simply brief the heavy option. The map showed airfields that U.S. forces might use, plus a number of carrier battle groups. Targets blanketed Serbia and Serbian-occupied areas in Bosnia. General Powell talked as the PC members studied the map. Finally, someone asked how many civilian casualties to expect, and the extremely high answer appalled the committee. On this somber note, the meeting ended. The PC was clearly reluctant to recommend military intervention in Bosnia until it had exhausted all other options. They were also against any scheme to partition Bosnia since the ethnic communities were hopelessly intermingled, and partitioning would only finish what ethnic cleansing had begun.
As the meeting broke up, Lake told the others that there had been leaks from the first PC meeting. Future meetings, therefore, would not include back-benchers. I attended no more PC meetings and the DCI did not share with me what they discussed. As a result, the PC limited input from some of the best-informed government experts. I received a call from an angry agency head right after a PC meeting saying that the PC had been promised a report the caller and I knew was beyond anything that could be done with the available data. On another occasion, the DCI felt embarrassed when he was the only one in the room who had not seen a field report which appeared to be vital intelligence. The others had misread the report, which said nothing of importance, and the DCI had the responsible agency publish a retraction.

**ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND HUMANITARIAN AID**

Two areas where the BTF did some of its finest work were in fine-tuning the “sanctions regime” against Serbia and supporting the humanitarian airlift into Bosnia. The United Nations Security Council established economic sanctions against Serbia in May 1992, but compliance was spotty. Policymakers needed analysis of the Serbian economy highlighting ways to exert maximum pressure on the regime without causing undue suffering for the Serbian people. They also required methods of convincing Serbia’s neighbors to comply with the sanctions regime at the expense of lucrative trading relationships, and strategies for stopping smugglers who could easily bypass monitors by simply driving trucks over the many open fields into and out of Serbia. The BTF analysts prepared a detailed assessment of Serbian economic vulnerabilities. When the Vice President’s National Security Advisor Leon S. Fuerth became the Administration’s point person on sanctions, he met regularly with the BTF economics team. The task force next prepared an assessment of how the sanctions would impact each of Serbia’s neighbors, thus giving the administration vital arguments and inducements when negotiating with those states to join the sanctions regime.

Meanwhile, in Bosnia, fighting and ethnic cleansing created a growing refugee nightmare. The U.S. Air Force began airlifting blankets and food into Sarajevo in April 1992. As summer wore on, the BTF began looking ahead to the coming winter when the needed quantities and mix of aid materials would have to change. The BTF estimates of non-combat deaths during the coming winter in Bosnia ranged up to 100,000 depending upon weather and combat conditions. It would be difficult and dangerous to move supplies through the snow-clogged mountains amid continued fighting unless the supplies were already stockpiled. The analysts examined various scenarios. Everyone needed food; refugees needed shelter and fuel to stay warm; and undernourished civilians huddling together needed medicine for wounds and diseases. The supplies needed would
depend upon whether the winter temperatures and snowfall were mild, average, or harsh, and whether combat, with resulting civilian casualties and damage to homes and other buildings, was at a low, medium, or a high level of intensity. Analysts estimated the refugee population and used U.S. Army planning factors to fill in a chart showing nine possible scenarios for the coming winter. The BTF put this chart on a single sheet of paper for quick presentation to busy policymakers, and BTF analysts attended the next Deputies Committee (DC) meeting. After a ten-minute presentation, the DC discussed the chart and decided to double the size of the airlift and change the mix of supplies. Although that winter was mild, and the fighting did slacken, the supplies stockpiled before the snows began closing roads, undoubtedly saved many lives.

LESSONS LEARNED: HOW TO BUILD A HOUSE DURING A STORM—SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE TASK FORCE

I rotated off the BTF in May 1993 to be replaced by Gene Wicklund, a CIA division chief. While most CIA task forces are temporary—they are disbanded as soon as the crisis ends or are absorbed into the permanent Agency structure—the BTF became the longest running task force in Agency history. Deputy Director for Central Intelligence Studeman laid out a vision for the BTF, and his authority got the task force much needed resources, but innumerable details had been left to Jim Carson and me to work out.

We had to do this on the run while covering a fast-moving crisis. Analytic resources and procedures adequate for routine coverage often fall short when a crisis erupts. I served on three task forces covering military conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Europe during my CIA career, but not one had a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to guide in reorganizing and expanding for crisis support. No single template will suit all situations, but a checklist of task force size, structure, mix of analytic and collection disciplines, space and office equipment, product formats, levels of review, distribution lists, and essential skill sets and training would help a new operation get up and running quickly. An agreed-to interagency contingency plan might be a bridge too far, but at least CIA could develop a Task Force SOP, maintain it in the Directorate of Intelligence front office, and review it after every task force to add successful innovations as well as warnings about initiatives best not repeated. Such an officially approved document would help a newly appointed task force chief gain quick acceptance of his or her legitimate requests for personnel, facilities, and authority, without facing what I did: building a new house in the middle of a storm.
January 22, 1997
President Clinton, Hillary Rodham Clinton and Chelsea Clinton greet troops at Tuzla Air Force Base in Bosnia. (Courtesy: William J. Clinton Presidential Library)
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Interagency Balkan Task Force (BTF) was already considered an analytic success when I became its fourth chief on 25 January 1994. Thirty months earlier, the worst armed conflict in Europe since World War II had broken out among the republics of Yugoslavia as the main ethnic groups sought to establish their own ethnic-dominated areas. Some of the fiercest aspects of the growing conflict occurred in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats declared their independence from Serb-dominated Yugoslavia in 1992. While the better armed Bosnian Serbs fought to establish their independence and inclusion in a Belgrade-led “greater Serbia,” at the expense of the Muslims and Croats, the United States and Europeans initially viewed the Balkan wars as a European problem. The Europeans, however, did not take a strong stand opposing the rapidly escalating violence, but instead restricted themselves—in the words of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the principal U.S. architect of the final peace settlement—“to dispatching United Nations peacekeepers to a country where there was no peace to keep and withholding from them the means and authority to stop the fighting.”

In 1991, during the George H.W. Bush Administration, I was a back-bencher at a White House meeting on the emerging Yugoslav crisis. I recall then-Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger—himself a former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia—warning that although there was currently no political support for U.S. involvement in the Balkans, circumstances ultimately would force the U.S. to intervene. When General John Shalikashvili was nominated to be Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), he came to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Headquarters for a series of background briefings. One of the agenda items was the Balkans and I was the briefer. In a crowded conference room, I began by telling him that the Balkans would be the “biggest problem he would confront during his time as SACEUR.” He immediately interrupted and said he could not conceive this to be the case since U.S. officials had made clear that the U.S. would not be involved militarily in the Balkans. I responded that the Europeans would not be able to manage the crisis despite their good intentions; the consequences of the fighting would spill over into Europe; and that U.S. influence in Europe and the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ultimately would be at risk if the U.S. did not intervene.

1 A. Norman Schindler served as chief of the DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force from 1994 to 1996.
United States involvement in the conflict began to change just twelve days after I became Chief of the BTF. A Serb mortar exploded in a crowded marketplace in downtown Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, killing scores of people and provoking international outrage. The United Nations and NATO responded by declaring a 20-kilometer heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo, enforced by NATO aircraft. United States led to U.S.-sponsored peace engagement continued to increase slowly until mid-1995 when, faced with growing Bosnian Serb atrocities, the Clinton Administration launched an all-out diplomatic effort to end the war. America’s renewed leadership led to U.S.-sponsored peace talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995, where the various parties successfully negotiated a permanent settlement to the Bosnian War.

Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995, where the various parties successfully negotiated a permanent settlement to the Bosnian War. During this period—between my assuming control of the BTF and the Dayton Accords negotiations—the BTF supported policymakers with timely intelligence on the rapidly unfolding crisis; information that proved valuable to understanding the situation on the ground and achieving the Dayton Peace Agreement.

Benefits of Candid Assessments, Few Barriers, and Streamlined Collaboration

There were multiple reasons for the BTF’s success. Since the Chief of the BTF reported directly to the DCI, Task Force members could present candid and timely views on the Balkan situation without going through multiple layers of review. We made personnel decisions—including dispatching BTF representatives to others parts of the Balkan intelligence and policy communities—that almost certainly would have met with resistance had it not been for the strong support of CIA leadership (which during my tenure as BTF chief included DCI James Woolsey, John Deutch, and George Tenet, and periods when Vice Admiral William Studeman and George Tenet served as Acting DCI.) The same was true for the leadership of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and National Security Agency (NSA), who consistently provided the BTF with motivated officers able to streamline their own bureaucracies to get the job done.

As the U.S. Government’s first truly interagency analytic task force, the BTF showed the benefits of collaboration between agencies and across CIA components. The BTF brought together the Balkan political and military analysts, initially assigned to different divisions within the CIA Directorate of Intelligence, with economic, sanctions, and humanitarian analysts in other Agency components. The BTF had two Deputy Chiefs—a senior member of the
Over time, the BTF’s expertise, its interagency nature, its integration of personnel in key organizations, and its access to global secure communications, made it an important intelligence hub on the Balkans.

The BTF was able to synchronize the Defense and Intelligence Community’s collection priorities with ever-changing policymaker and warfighter concerns.

Five days a week, at 9:30 AM, the National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for European Affairs chaired a secure interagency videoconference attended by representatives from the State Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Vice President, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and BTF to discuss Balkan issues. This meeting was in preparation for upcoming NSC Principals and Deputy Committee policy reviews. Usually I or my deputy started these meetings by summarizing the latest developments in the Balkans. The other agencies represented on the BTF back-benched, which afforded their agencies an opportunity they normally would not have had to learn on a daily basis what topics were of greatest interest to policymakers and adjust their collection accordingly. I or my deputy also usually attended the NSC Principals and Deputies meetings as the “plus-one” for the DCI or deputy DCI. While respecting the sensitivity of those meetings, we briefed BTF members on key points, which allowed for adjustments in collection postures to obtain the information policymakers and warfighters most needed.

Over time, the BTF’s expertise, its interagency nature, its integration of personnel in key organizations, and its access to global secure communications, made it an important intelligence hub on the Balkans. Its analysts started directly supporting key U.S. Government officials working the crisis in 1992. These analysts were responsible for providing these personnel with the most current intelligence on the Balkans, and could report directly to the BTF. The Task Force eventually developed unique information sharing arrangements, which greatly augmented the Task Force’s capabilities and value.

Creating High Value and Lasting Impact for Policymakers Without Jeopardizing Interagency Alliances

There are many examples of the BTF’s value to the policymaking process. My first “crisis” as the BTF Chief stemmed from a disagreement between BTF and JCS assessments over the number of Serb heavy weapons inside the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone. The military said the number was about 100 based on the instances of prohibited arms actually observed inside the zone. The BTF assessed the number in the “hundreds” based on the Yugoslav order of battle in the area. Although the BTF view eventually prevailed, this episode illustrated the complexity of the situation on the ground and the need for competing intelligence assessments in order to inform policy.

In another example, I received a call from the NSC Senior Director for European Affairs early one evening, shortly after the establishment of the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone, asking whether the BTF could confirm a news report that the Serbs were shelling Sarajevo. The enormous implications were clear. If the Serbs were doing this, it would constitute grounds for conducting airstrikes. Everyone in the BTF Front Office could hear the conversation, and representatives from various agencies began querying their home offices. One representative got back to me shortly with convincing evidence indicating the report was inaccurate. I relayed the information to the NSC who soon halted discussions about military action. If the BTF had not existed, the originating agency of that information might not have known its significance and probably would not have even disseminated it within a useful timeframe.

In another example, a few hours before a 1994 Principals Committee Meeting, the BTF received information of a possible threat to U.S. forces along the Macedonia-Serbian border. The BTF had information that the Serbs believed—based on mistaken data—that U.S. troops intended to violate their territory; something the U.S. had no intention of doing. Local U.S. forces knew of this threat, but it was unclear whether they had forwarded the warning to officials in Washington. Director of Central Intelligence Woolsey was able to highlight this concern at the meeting so that corrective action could be taken.

This latter example illustrates one of the BTF’s key challenges: because it had access to data from so many sources, it had to be judicious in using that information particularly when it had not been formally disseminated. Revealing certain material could have caused interagency tension, undermined trust in the BTF, and lost us access. Other information was preliminary and uncorroborated,
and for the BTF to disclose it at an interagency meeting could have undermined the BTF’s credibility. One of the BFT Chief’s main jobs was to evaluate and properly use the information the Task Force received.

With the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995, the policy community was very interested in knowing about possible threats to U.S. forces deploying to the Balkans as part of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). For many Congressional briefings, I appeared alongside DIA Director, Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes. There were subtle differences in the BTF and DIA views. The military, possibly because it did not favor becoming involved on the ground in Bosnia, highlighted the threats U.S. forces would face and the mission’s overall difficulty. The BTF, on the other hand, assessed the threat to U.S. forces as low. Isolated incidents of violence due to the prevalence of weapons in that part of the world were a concern, but direct attacks were unlikely. The Serbs were largely satisfied with the Dayton Accords and had no interest in renewed fighting. The Bosnian Muslims were the least satisfied with the Dayton Accords, but also had no incentive to threaten U.S. forces.

During the Bosnian war, mujahedin and Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and intelligence personnel entered Bosnia to arm and fight on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims. Although some people quietly looked favorably on the mujahedin and Iranians for supporting the underdog Bosnian Muslims at a time when the U.N. arms embargo prevented the U.S. from supporting them, the BTF was steadily warning of the long-term consequences of this growing influence. The Dayton Accords required the Bosnian Muslims to expel the Iranians and mujahedin in exchange for international support, and a main BTF task became monitoring compliance with that requirement. Monitoring compliance, however, was not black and white. In the case of the mujahedin, some left and others integrated into Bosnian society. The Bosnian Muslims were prepared to rein in the mujahedin, out of concern that their association with “Islamic extremists” could jeopardize Western support and their ability to develop a cooperative relationship with the Bosnian Croats. The Iranians, however, were another matter. Tehran wanted to maintain influence in Bosnia, and many senior Bosnian Muslim leaders were reluctant to break ties, given that the Iranians had been there for them when the West had not.

The NSC Principals Committee eventually decided to support sending a multinational delegation to Sarajevo to discuss the issue with the Bosnian Muslims, and the BTF provided the U.S. representatives with the most current intelligence on the situation. Within a few weeks of the delegation’s return, the BTF saw positive indications that the Bosnian Muslims were taking the warnings seriously. Overall, the BTF assessed that the Bosnian Muslims officially were in compliance with the requirement to remove the mujahedin and Iranians from Bosnia, but the evidence to support that assessment,
particularly with regard to the Iranians, was frequently contradictory. It often boiled down to what constituted the Bosnian Muslims’ “official” position, as opposed to what individual officials might be doing. I believe the policy community accepted the BTF’s judgment because they recognized we were objective and forthcoming.

AVOIDING PESSIMISM FOLLOWING A HARD-WON RESOLUTION

When the Dayton Accords were signed, many estimated the warring parties would implement the provisions within a year and that U.S. forces could return home at that time. The BTF produced weekly matrices of the extent to which the various parties were complying with the provisions of the Dayton Accords. By October 1996, these matrices showed the warring parties had successfully completed all the military provisions of the accords, including territorial exchanges and the collection of weapons in cantonment sites. They had made little progress, however, on other key provisions, including full freedom of movement, the return of refugees and displaced persons, turning over indicted war criminals, and implementing the arms control provisions (issues that could not be resolved by the end of 1996).

I was struck by the pessimism evident at senior policy meetings at a time when I was beginning to believe, for the first time, that Bosnia might be “saved” as a multiethnic entity, even though many of my colleagues almost certainly did not share my view. On 27 October 1996, I sent my personal views to DCI Deutch in a memorandum titled “Some Reason for Optimism” about Bosnia. I wrote that I was “struck by the pessimism of senior policymakers in assessing what has not been achieved during the last year, particularly on the civilian side. By contrast, I think it is absolutely amazing how much has been achieved.” The memorandum identified key trends working in favor of maintaining Bosnian unity, including the split between the Serbian and Bosnian Serb leaderships and the fact that Serbia’s continuing economic decline would make it an increasingly unattractive option for the Bosnian Serbs.

The memorandum advocated flexibility in implementing the Dayton Accords provisions: no side was fully compliant and efforts to force freedom of movement and the return of displaced persons, would almost certainly result in renewed fighting—an outcome none of the parties desired. I concluded by noting that as an intelligence analyst I was reluctant to be seen as an optimist, which I had always defined jokingly as a “poorly informed pessimist.” Director of Central Intelligence Deutch circulated the memorandum to senior policymakers, and I was told it influenced the decision to extend the U.S. military presence in Bosnia. At a subsequent Principals Committee meeting, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake approached me and said “don’t worry, I’ll never think of you as an optimist.”
SEPTEMBER 25, 1991
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 713 imposing an arms embargo on the former Yugoslav states.

OCTOBER 19, 1990
National Intelligence Estimate 15-90, Yugoslavia Transformed, predicts Yugoslavia will dissolve within two years, noting there is little the United States or its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav unity.

JUNE 12, 1992
CIA establishes the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Interagency Balkan Task Force to coordinate intelligence on the growing Yugoslav crisis.

MAY 6, 1993
U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 824, declaring six Muslim enclaves in Bosnia (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde) “safe areas” under U.N. protection.

APRIL 6, 1992
The European Union and U.S. recognize Bosnia’s independence. Fighting soon breaks out between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serb forces.

JANUARY 2, 1993
Former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and former British Foreign Secretary David Owen propose the Vance-Owen plan, dividing Yugoslavia into 10 semi-autonomous provinces based on ethnic, geographical, historical, and economic factors.

JANUARY 20, 1993
Bill Clinton sworn in as 42nd President of the United States. The new Clinton Administration begins an immediate review of U.S. Balkan policy.

APRIL 7, 1992
U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 749 authorizing deployment of a U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to monitor a ceasefire and promote stability in the former Yugoslavia.

SEPTEMBER 20, 1993
Presidents Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman, and Alija Izetbegovic meet onboard the British aircraft carrier HMS Invincible in the Adriatic. Under the Invincible Plan, 49 percent of Bosnia would go the Serbs, 33 percent to the Muslims, and 17.5 percent to the Croats with a figure-head central government.

MARCH 5, 1993
U.S. aircraft begin airdrops of humanitarian aid over eastern Bosnia.

MARCH 1992
Bosnia declares itself an independent nation.

MAY 25, 1993

APRIL 7, 1992
First meeting of the Clinton Administration’s National Security Council (NSC) Principals Committee. Balkan policy is the topic.

JANUARY 28, 1993
FEBRUARY 1, 1993
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 770, authorizing “all necessary measures” to facilitate delivery of relief supplies to the former Yugoslavia, and Resolution 771, demanding access to detention camps.
The Role of Intelligence and Political Leadership in Ending the Bosnian War

The Dayton Peace Accords signed in Paris, ending the four year conflict in Bosnia.

**APRIL 26, 1994**
The Contact Group, composed of U.S., British, French, German, and Russian representatives, meet for the first time in Sarajevo in an effort to bring warring parties back to the negotiations.

**FEBRUARY 23, 1995**
The DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force assessment, Balkans: The Next Three Months, concludes “Balkan leaders are pursuing irreconcilable demands that make even the beginning of a meaningful peace process in the next three months unlikely.”

**MARCH 18, 1994**
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Bosnian Croat leader Kresimir Zubak sign the Croat-Muslim Federation Accord in Washington, DC.

**MARCH 9, 1995**
The New York Times cites CIA report, which assesses that ethnic Serbs have conducted 90 percent of the acts of “ethnic cleansing.”

**MAY 25, 1995**
NATO launches airstrikes on Bosnian Serb positions for noncompliance with ultimatum issued the previous day requiring Serbs to return four big guns taken from U.N. depot. The Bosnian Serbs retaliate by shelling U.N. “safe areas” and taking U.N. troops hostage.

**JUNE 2, 1995**
Bosnian Serbs shoot down U.S. F-16 patrolling the “No-Fly Zone” over Banja Luka. The pilot is rescued six days later.

**JULY 11, 1995**
Bosnian Serbs, under the command of General Ratko Mladic, capture the U.N. “safe area” of Srebrenica and massacre about 8,000 Muslim males the following week. The “safe area” of Zepa falls two weeks later.

**JULY 17, 1995**
Following the fall of the U.N. “safe areas” of Srebrenica and Zepa, the NSC proposes the Bosnian Endgame Strategy, an all out diplomatic effort to make peace by year’s end.

**JANUARY 1, 1995**
Four month ceasefire between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims brokered by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter goes into effect.

**FEBRUARY 28, 1994**
In NATO’s first combat mission, U.S. aircraft shoot down four Bosnian Serb airplanes violating the “No-Fly Zone” over Bosnia.

**MAY 25, 1995**
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**JULY 27, 1995**
President Clinton addresses the nation on implementing the Dayton Peace Accords.

**NOVEMBER 27, 1995**
The foreign ministers of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia meeting in New York at the invitation of the U.S. announce agreement on central government for Bosnia.

**SEPTEMBER 26, 1995**
The Contact Group, composed of U.S., British, French, German, and Russian representatives, meet for the first time in Sarajevo in an effort to bring warring parties back to the negotiations.

**JANUARY 1, 1995**
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In NATO’s first combat mission, U.S. aircraft shoot down four Bosnian Serb airplanes violating the “No-Fly Zone” over Bosnia.
31  JANUARY 15, 1992
Implications of U.S. Posture on Recognition of
Former Yugoslav Republics

33  JUNE 12, 1992
Establishment of the Interagency Balkan Task Force

34  JANUARY 29, 1993
Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia

37  MAY 28, 1995
General Rupert Smith, Commander of UNPROFOR,
on UNPROFOR’s status

39  JUNE 5, 1995
Conversation with David Owen on U.S. F-16 Pilot
shoot down, Hostages, and Bosnian Recognition

42  JULY 17, 1995
Bosnia Endgame Strategy

45  SEPTEMBER 4, 1995
Ambassador Holbrooke cable on the status of
peace talks in Belgrade

49  SEPTEMBER 27, 1995
Cease-Fires in the Balkans: A Historical Overview

51  DECEMBER 2, 1995
Letter to President Clinton from President Karadzic
Implications of US Posture on Recognition of Former Yugoslav Republics

The EC this morning agreed to recognize collectively Slovenia and Croatia. It delayed action indefinitely on Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, although it concluded that Macedonia meets the EC criteria for recognition.

Continued Non-Recognition

We believe that withholding US recognition from breakaway republics would have little impact in Yugoslavia but would raise new questions in Western Europe about our engagement on the continent.

-- An argument can be made that non-recognition gives Washington credibility as a neutral arbiter—and unique leverage in Serbia. We believe this goes too far, but non-recognition probably would give US officials greater access to Serbian and Army leaders than they otherwise would have.

-- We believe, however, that Serbian leaders would view it primarily as a means of playing Washington off against the Europeans. Belgrade almost certainly does not trust our neutrality—Serbian leaders remember that we have publicly blamed Serbia and the federal Army for the fighting, as well as our complaints about human rights violations in Serbia.

-- It would reinforce the inclination of Slovenia and Croatia to focus on sorting out their relationships with the European states, which are their main economic partners.

This memorandum was prepared by Office of European Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, East European Division, EURA.
Non-recognition, however, would likely have an impact outside Yugoslavia.

Some Europeans—especially in France and Germany—would see it as evidence supporting their suspicion that Washington’s engagement in Europe is lessening.

US policymakers almost certainly would have to deal soon with European initiatives to invite Slovenia and Croatia into international bodies such as the UN and CSCE. The momentum of events could leave us isolated if we try to maintain the status quo.

US Grants Recognition

A US decision to recognize some or all of the breakaway republics at this point probably also would have little impact in Yugoslavia.

The Serbs, as well as the Croats and Slovenes, probably would view US recognition as a simple acceptance of the new realities.

It would, however, put us in step with the Europeans and enhance our chances of influencing their future actions.

It also might help counter the view that the United States is less focused on European problems these days.

Recognition and UN Peacekeeping

European moves toward recognition may have contributed to recent progress toward a peacekeeping operation.

They increased Serbia’s isolation and, along with the military impasse and domestic war-weariness, may have helped inspire President Milosevic’s new flexibility.

They also gave Croatian President Tudjman a victory he can use to justify, in his ongoing struggle with hardliners, his support for negotiations.

We do not believe that US recognition—or non-recognition—will affect the UN peace initiative one way or the other.

The success of the UN plan is likely to depend on other factors, particularly Milosevic’s ability to bring extremist Serbs in the military and the enclaves into line.
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Establishment of Interagency Balkan Task Force

1. The situation in Yugoslavia has deteriorated markedly in the last several weeks. Some form of outside military intervention in the region is increasingly likely, and the United States will play a facilitating role, including intelligence support. In order to ensure the most efficient use of Community resources, I am establishing an interagency task force to manage all-source US intelligence support.

2. The mission of the Balkan Task Force will be three fold:
   - To centralize and coordinate development and implementation of a collection strategy and tasking.
   - To centralize and coordinate the Community’s sanctions monitoring effort in support of UN Security Council Resolution 747.
   - To coordinate general military intelligence support to US policy and contingency planning and tactical intelligence support.

3. I have appointed Mr. James O. Carson of CIA’s Office of European Analysis as Task Force Chief. Mr. Carson’s Deputy will be designated by DIA. The Task Force will be headquartered at CIA (see Attachment), with a military analytic element at DIA. It will be staffed largely by CIA and DIA, with some NSA support. Assistance from other agencies may be required.

4. A meeting of NFIB Representatives to discuss the mission, organization, and operation of the Balkan Task Force will be held on Monday, 15 June, 1400-1530, in Room 6G00, CIA Headquarters. Please provide names and clearances of attendees no later than 1600, 12 June, to Mr. Carson’s secretary.

W. O. Studeman
Admiral, U. S. Navy

Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, 28 January 1993

1. This initial organizational session aimed to: determine baseline USG policy as inherited from the Bush Administration or articulated during the Clinton campaign, establish necessary interagency working groups, and identify policy options. Tony Lake sternly admonished the group against leaks (as appeared in today’s Post, attached). DCI-Designate Woolsey directed me to prepare minutes of the meeting for you and him only.

2. Establishing Baseline Policy. General Powell and Ambassador Wisner, highlighting the London Accords and then-Secretary Eagleburger’s Christmas demarche, helped to define positions of the Bush Administration: to deliver humanitarian assistance (using air power if necessary), support UN/EC mediation (but not necessarily the Vance-Owen proposals), refuse to accept borders changed by force or to legitimize ethnic cleansing, condemn war crimes, seek No-Fly enforcement, and arm the Bosnian Muslims (which the Allies refused to do).

   Sandy Berger noted that President Clinton during the campaign called for: enforcing No-Fly, being more aggressive about delivering relief assistance, and considering lifting the arms ban on Bosnia.

3. Getting Organized. NSC Senior Director for Europe Jenonne Walker will chair an interagency group to identify and evaluate policy options. The group will prepare a close-hold paper, with Jenonne retaining the sole working copy. (I will attend the first session today at 11 AM.) The effort aims at a Principals Committee meeting as early as mid-week.

   Tony Lake also suggested a working group on tightening sanctions (a group already exists under State’s chair). Running out of time, Lake hurriedly asked Secretary Christopher to prepare recommendations on three
SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, 28 January 1993

immediate challenges: gaining renewal of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia, handling the Macedonian application for UN membership, and averting a pullout or drawdown of UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

4. Policy Options. Lake wants to frame policy options according to three (somewhat vaguely defined) phases of escalating pressures on Serbia:

--- Category 1: Actions doable soon without upsetting key partners (the UK, France, and Russia). Ideas include: increasing humanitarian donations and considering airdrops of supplies, demanding access to all detention camps, and immediate release of all female prisoners.

--- Category 2: Initiatives probably doable with Allied cooperation but with difficulty and cost. Suggestions include: increasing use of Ploce port and repairing the rail line to Sarajevo, tightening sanctions (especially on oil and financial transfers) and compensating Serbia’s neighbors (especially Macedonia), seizing Serbian ships that violate sanctions, broadcasting into Serbia (using RFE or DOD assets), developing militar-to-military ties, raising the profile on war crimes, cutting Serbian telecommunications links, and putting more monitors into Kosovo (plus Macedonia and Albania).

--- Category 3: Actions involving the threat or application of strong military force. Possibilities include: enforcing No-Fly (by hitting air targets or airfields), lifting the arms embargo in Bosnia (at least for light weapons), "unleashing" UNPROFOR, protecting relief convoys with airpower, sequestering all heavy weapons, demilitarizing Sarajevo (thereafter inserting 20,000 US/UK troops to protect it).

5. Lake wants to defer until spring any action that might jeopardize the relief effort. All agreed with Mr. Woolsey not to diplomatically isolate Serbia.
SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, 28 January 1993

6. Persuasive Force, Option 3. Toward the conclusion of the meeting, General Powell briefed on the most forceful of three contingency plans already developed for US military action in the former Yugoslavia. The plan would attack counter-military, -industrial, and -regime targets in Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro. The first round of targets would include Banja Luka and Zaluzani airports, naval facilities in Montenegro, artillery around Sarajevo, facilities associated with Bosnian Serb headquarters at Pale, and some military or industrial facilities in northern Serbia. Several Italian airbases and two carriers would be required. Follow-on attacks could hit tactical targets. Friendly losses would be low, but civilian casualties would be high; large refugee flows would result. The public outcry would be great, key Allies might not participate, and "the Russians would go nuts," according to General Powell.

Daniel W. Wagner
Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

Attachment:
Washington Post Article
28 January 1993
SECRET

WE HAD A SHORT MEETING WITH GENERAL SMITH ON MAY 28. THERE WAS NOTHING NEW. HE REITERATED THAT THE MACHINE IS ESSENTIALLY BROKEN, AND THE BLEAK ALTERNATIVE IS TO "MAKE WAR" OR TO BECOME UNSUSTAINABLY WEAK. TO REFINE THE MANDATE AND CONFIGURATION OF UNPROFOR IS TO AVOID THE ESSENTIAL "ONE THOUSAND DOLLAR QUESTION." IN FACT, A RECONFIGURATION OR REDEPLOYMENT SIMPLY "PRETENDS THAT WE ARE MAKING WAR" WHEN WE ARE NOT.

REDEFINITION OF THE MANDATE IS TO CONTINUE THE "NON WAR MODE." THERE IS NO REAL MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN WAR AND THE ABANDONMENT OF THE UNPROFOR MISSION. THE STARK DECISION REMAINS "WE EITHER FIGHT OR WE DON'T."

WE ASKED WHETHER UNPROFOR HAD ANY MATERIAL NEEDS, BUT SMITH REPLIED THAT HE WOULD FIRST NEED TO KNOW WHAT HE EXPECTED TO DO, BEFORE HE ANSWERS THAT QUESTION.
5. COMMENT: SMITH HAS BEEN MAKING HIS CASE TO THE UN AND OTHERS THAT UNPROFOR IS ESSENTIALLY FINISHED. TO ATTEMPT TO WALK SOME MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN WAR AND WITHDRAWAL IS A DELUSION. END COMMENT. MENZIES

#0205

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. O-2013-04186 Doc No. C05323111 Date: 03/19/2013
The Role of Intelligence and Political Leadership in Ending the Bosnian War

Subject: Conversation with David Owen -- F-16 Pilot, Hostages, and the Bosnia Recognition Package

1. Secret - Entire Text.

2. The Charge and I met late this evening with David Owen who has just come from a farewell dinner with Milošević. Owen passed along information on three points, on behalf of Milošević in my view.

3. F-16 Pilot. Milošević had been in touch earlier in the day with the BSA General in Command in Banja Luka who reported that the Bosnian Serbs believe the pilot is alive and on the run somewhere in Bosnian Serb territory. The General reported that a used parachute had been found along with some personal equipment nearby which seemed to have been abandoned to lighten a load. BSA troops are searching for the pilot and will treat him properly if they find him. The General expressed
CONCERN, HOWEVER, THAT HE MIGHT BE FOUND FIRST BY SERB CIVILIANS AND DEALT WITH HARSHLY.

4. HOSTAGES. OWEN SAID THAT INTELLIGENCE CHIEF STANISIC IS IN PALE TRYING TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF A SECOND GROUP OF UN HOSTAGES. MILOSEVIC SAID THE PALE SERBS MAY GIVE UP EIGHTY OR NINETY; HE WANTS AT LEAST A HUNDRED. OWEN (PRESUMABLY ECHOING MILOSEVIC'S VIEWS) SAID THE NEGOTIATION WILL GET TOUGH WHEN THE NUMBERS GET DOWN TO FIFTY OR SO. KARADZIC CAN BE EXPECTED TO HOLD ON TO A CERTAIN NUMBER AS PROTECTION AGAINST AIRSTRIKES AND AS LEVERAGE VIS A VIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UN AND THE CONTACT GROUP. [OWEN REMARKED THAT MILOSEVIC WAS CLEARLY UNHAPPY ABOUT THE FACT THAT THE GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER WAS IN PALE, POTENTIALLY HORNING IN ON HIS POSSIBLE HOSTAGE RELEASE GLORY.]

5. BOSNIA RECOGNITION PACKAGE. [OWEN SAID THAT, DESPITE OUR DIFFERENCES OF OPINION LAST WEEK, MILOSEVIC REALLY IS INTERESTED IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON THE PACKAGE. (OWEN SAID THAT PERSONALLY HE THOUGHT IT WAS THE ONLY WAY OUT OF THE BOSNIA MESS.) OWEN SAID THAT FOR MILOSEVIC THE KEY OUTSTANDING ISSUE IS THE SANCTIONS REIMPOSITION FORMULA.]

I TOLD HIM IT IS A TOUGH ISSUE. WE HAVE OUR REQUIREMENTS AS WELL, NOTABLY A CREDIBLE SANCTIONS REIMPOSITION FORMULA THAT CAN BE DEFENDED IN WASHINGTON AND ELSEWHERE. OWEN URGED ME TO PUSH AHEAD ON THE ISSUE AND PREDICTED THAT BOSNIA IS LIKELY TO BE A LIVELY TOPIC AT HALIFAX.
HOWEVER, HE AND I HAVE HAD A FAIRLY AMICABLE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP DATING BACK TO SOUTHERN AFRICA DAYS IN THE 1980'S, AND I AM FAIRLY CONFIDENT THAT THE POINTS ABOVE ARE FACTUALLY ACCURATE AND WERE PASSED ALONG WITH MILOSEVIC'S APPROVAL. PERINA

END OF MESSAGE
Summary: With the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, we need to make an all-out effort in the coming weeks to restabilize the situation on the ground, restore UNPROFOR's credibility in Sarajevo, Central Bosnia and Gorazde (see separate paper), and press for a realistic diplomatic settlement this year. If this effort fails, we should let UNPROFOR collapse this year and help the Bosnians obtain the military capabilities needed to level the playing field. This would be underpinned during a one-year transition period by air strikes to protect Sarajevo and the other safe areas, reinforced if possible by an UNPROFOR successor force based on a coalition of the willing. Following the transition, the Bosnians would be on their own.

Restabilization post-Srebrenica and Zepa: We have little time to devise and implement steps to strengthen UNPROFOR and halt the pattern of increasingly aggressive Serb behavior. If we do not change the status quo, the Serbs will move on Gorazde and renew the strangulation of Sarajevo, and the French will likely decide to withdraw -- leading to UNPROFOR's collapse and a protracted NATO withdrawal operation in circumstances that will represent a defeat for the UN and the Alliance. It will also guarantee passage of unilateral lift by the Congress in a manner that will damage relations with our allies and make it impossible to sustain a Presidential veto.

Our priority is to shore up UNPROFOR in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia by reducing its vulnerability, using the RRF to open secure routes to Sarajevo, and making more aggressive use of NATO air power (under a single key) to halt Serb artillery attacks on the exclusion zones. We should also support efforts to deter a Serb attack on Gorazde, recognizing that a U.S. contribution to this effort may be needed to prevent a French decision to pull out. In order for this strategy to succeed, we need to persuade the Bosnian Government that it is in its interest to keep UNPROFOR even if this means writing off Srebrenica and Zepa and concentrating UNPROFOR's efforts in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia. We would also need to be sure, before embarking on steps to protect Gorazde, that Bosnian forces will defend the enclave, since even a reinforced UNPROFOR presence is not capable of doing this on its own.

Pressing for a political settlement this year: The best way of avoiding an UNPROFOR withdrawal and the new challenges of a post-withdrawal strategy would be to make an all-out effort at obtaining a political settlement this year. The strengthened UNPROFOR and more aggressive use of NATO air power described above will restore some of the leverage we have lost over the past year vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs. But we will also need to offer some new inducements to break the logjam surrounding "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan. The loss of Srebrenica and Zepa may open the way to more realistic territorial solutions and we will need to have a heart-to-heart discussion with the Bosnians aimed at eliciting greater flexibility on the map, constitutional arrangements, and possibly the Bosnian Serbs' right to secede from the Union after an initial period. We will also need to sweeten our offers to Milosevic in order to encourage him to put real pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. At Annex I is a more detailed gameplan for an early diplomatic breakthrough.

Supporting Bosnia's Survival post-UNPROFOR: If the last-ditch effort to obtain a settlement fails and/or we fail to restabilize the situation on the ground, we will need to face up to the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal (including how to mitigate the risks of OPLAN 40104 and secure Congressional support) and implementing a post-withdrawal strategy. Indeed, it would be preferable to face these issues this year rather than having to implement a messy and protracted NATO withdrawal operation in the middle of the election campaign, when the parties will have an
even greater incentive to embarrass us or try to draw us into the conflict. We should begin consulting with our key Allies now on our post-withdrawal strategy in order to bolster their resolve to strengthen UNPROFOR in the short term, and to force them to face up to their responsibility to help support Bosnia’s survival if withdrawal must occur.

**Leveling the playing field:** Our post-withdrawal strategy should have as its goal providing the Bosnians with sufficient military capability to survive the immediate Serb onslaught, consolidate their authority over Sarajevo and Central Bosnia and, within a short period of time, to begin to regain territory allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. This would make the ultimate resolution of the conflict the result of a balance of power on the ground rather than dependent on the actions of the international community.

- Our preferred approach would be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally through passage of a UNSC resolution, perhaps part of the same resolution terminating UNPROFOR’s mandate and authorizing withdrawal. Our allies have indicated they will go along with lift after UNPROFOR withdrawal. To secure a Russian abstention, we would, at a minimum, need to make the lift applicable to all republics of the former Yugoslavia (including Serbia-Montenegro), and we might also need to accept substantial sanctions relief for Belgrade as well.

**Additional Support during the Transition:** Although the Bosnians are stronger now than when we first pushed lift-and-strike in 1993, until they acquire and assimilate new arms, they will still need additional support to survive the Serbs’ preemptive offensives. At a minimum, we will need to help the Bosnians ensure the survival of Sarajevo as the linchpin of a future Bosnian state.

Therefore, for a one-year transition period, we would:

- Press our NATO Allies to continue enforcing the no-fly zone, to deprive the Serbs of air superiority (this would, of course, require preemptive SEAD); as a fallback, we would enforce the NFZ through a coalition of the willing.
- Conduct aggressive air strikes against a broad range of Bosnian Serb military targets to protect Sarajevo (and possibly the other remaining safe areas) against Serb artillery attacks. This would preferably be done through NATO or, if our allies refused to renew the NATO mandate post-UNPROFOR, through a U.S.-led coalition of the willing. The air strikes would be based on new UNSC authority (since existing authority under 836 and 844 is tied to UNPROFOR) or, as a fallback, on a Bosnian Government request for collective self-defense. Forward air controllers would be provided by members of the UNPROFOR successor force, if available (see below), since we would want to avoid assigning this function to the Bosnian Government. We would limit the commitment to Sarajevo and possibly the other safe areas to avoid becoming full-scale combatants; in any case, Bosnian ground forces, with HVO cooperation, can hold their own in Central Bosnia.
Support the deployment of a successor force to UNPROFOR to reinforce the Bosnians’ hold on Sarajevo and the other safe areas, and to continue to promote stability in Federation-controlled areas of Central Bosnia. Such a force would be a coalition of the willing composed of those UNPROFOR contributors willing to remain plus new forces from Islamic countries (except states like Iran – the Bosnians would have to agree to rule that out). If possible, the force would be deployed under a Chapter VII UN mandate with the explicit mission of supporting Bosnia against Serb aggression. Otherwise, the force would deploy at the request of the Bosnian Government, invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter. (The humiliating prospect of Islamic countries taking the place of European countries in solving a European problem could prompt some of our Allies to stay and participate in the successor force.)

We would set a time limit of one year (end of 1996) on the NFZ and air strike commitments, making clear to the Bosnians that once the playing field is leveled, they are on their own. The mandate of the successor force could extend beyond a year if the coalition members were willing. In addition to providing arms and training to reinforce the Bosnians’ ground force capabilities, we would ensure they obtained effective air defenses to counter Serb air capabilities when the NFZ lapsed.

Keeping Belgrade Out: Leveling the playing field becomes a much more formidable challenge if Belgrade intervenes on a large scale to support the Bosnian Serbs. We would offer substantial sanctions relief to induce Milosevic to stay out, fully seal the border, and accept a much larger international monitoring force. We could also encourage Milosevic by brokering a mutually favorable deal with Tudjman over the Krajina and Sector East (see below). We would at the same time warn Milosevic that, if we detect Serbian military support, we will use air power against Serbian forces operating inside Bosnia and against the Drina bridges and other supply routes, and that we do not rule out strikes against military targets inside Serbia.

Regional containment strategy: As we moved to arm the Bosnians, we would need to take a range of steps to prevent a widening of the conflict to other parts of the region, to include:

- Reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia to deter Serbian border encroachments and a new crackdown in Kosovo, together with a reaffirmation of our warnings to Milosevic regarding air strikes against Serbia in the event he provokes armed conflict in Kosovo;
- Strengthening UNCRO and providing increased economic assistance to Croatia to discourage Tudjman from launching a full-scale war in Krajina in the near term (while at the same time encouraging continued low-level attrition operations that could help limit Krajina Serb support to the Bosnian Serbs);
- Possibly going even further to broker a Belgrade-Zagreb deal whereby Milosevic would abandon the Krajina (Sectors North and South) to Tudjman in return for a piece of Sector East and assurances regarding Bosnian Serb confederation with the FRY following a settlement; and
- Possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces along Hungary’s and Albania’s borders with the FR Yugoslavia.

We would, at the same time, intensify our efforts to sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat military cooperation. And we would make clear that we stand ready to broker a political settlement and assist in its implementation, although at this stage we would jettison the Contact Group approach and devise a new basis for the negotiations.
SECRET

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Robert Homme, Senior Reviewer
STRATEGY. WE RECOGNIZE - AND INDEED I WILL CONTINUE TO ASSERT PUBLICLY - THAT THE BOMBING HAS NOT DESIGNED FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT HAS, RATHER, A NECESSARY RESPONSE TO THE OUTRAGEOUS ATTACK IN SARAJEVO. BUT ITS VALUE IN BOTH BELGRADE AND SARAJEVO IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR.

4. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION FOR A LINEBACKER-TYPE CAMPAIGN. INDEED, THERE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY COME A TIME WHEN, FROM A POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC POINT OF VIEW, SUSPENDING THE BOMBING WILL BE MORE USEFUL THAN CONTINUING IT. BUT THAT TIME IS DEFINITELY NOT TODAY.

5. OF COURSE, IF MLADIC GIVES US EVERYTHING JANVIER REQUESTS TODAY WE MAY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO STOP. BUT ANYTHING SHORT OF FULL-REPEAT, FULL-COMPLIANCE SHOULD BE REJECTED. AND THAT IS THE MOST LIKELY COURSE PALE WILL TAKE TODAY - OFFERING ABOUT SEVENTY-FIVE PERCENT OF THE JANVIER DEMANDS AND TRYING TO PROLONG THE PAUSE.

6. WHY DO WE TAKE SUCH A POSITION? FIRST, SARAJEVO. THIS IS FAIRLY OBVIOUS. THE FLEXIBILITY WE NEED FROM SARAJEVO ON VARIOUS ISSUES REQUIRES MORE THAN VERBAL PRESSURE. BOMBING HELPS US; ITS ABSENCE STIFFENS THEIR FRACIOUS POLITICAL PROCESS. THIS IS NOT THEORY; WE HAVE HAD AMPLE ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE OF IT.

7. BELGRADE IS MORE COMPLICATED, BUT THE CONCLUSION IS THE SAME. MILOSEVIC RAISES THE BOMBING FREQUENTLY AS AN HINDERNIS TO PROGRESS AND SOMETHING THAT COULD MAKE PALE MORE INTRANSIGENT. AT THE SAME TIME, HE HAS YET TO INVEST THIS ISSUE WITH THE SAME DEGREE OF EMOTION OR HIGH RHETORIC THAT HARKS HIS COMMENTS ON, SAY, KARADZIC'S CRAZINESS, SANCTIONS RELIEF, OR THE FUTURE BALKAN ECONOMIC ZONE. HIS HIGHLY THEATRICAL (AND FREQUENT) TRIPS UPSTAIRS TO TELEPHONE MLADIC - AND LAST NIGHT, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OUR PRESENCE, (HE SAID) KARADZIC - ARE NOT SIMPLY THEATRE; HIS FRUSTRATION WITH MLADIC IS GROWING VISIBLY AND HE NOW FREELY ADMITS THAT THE GENERAL, WHOM I BELIEVE HE'S SCARED OF, IS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO HIS GOALS AS WELL AS OURS. (HE FLIRTED WITH THE IDEA OF OUR MEETING MLADIC FACE-TO-FACE TODAY TO MAKE CLEAR THE U.S.
WHITEx HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

POSITION, BUT EVEN BEFORE IT BECAME APPARENT THAT
MLADIC WOULD NOT COME TO BELGRADE YET, WE HAD MADE
CLEAR THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO BECOME AN
INTERMEDIARY IN THE JANVIER-MLADIC CHANNEL.)

8. MOST IMPORTANTLY, MILOSEVIC HAS NOT YET LINKED
THE BOMBING TO ANY OTHER ISSUE - GENEVA, SANCTIONS,
THE MAP, ETC. HE MAY DO SO LATER, BUT NOT YET. I
SUSPECT THAT HE AT LEAST HALF HOPES THE BOMBING WILL
WEAKEN BOTH KARADJIC AND MLADIC AND STRENGTHEN HIS
HAND AGAINST THE BOSNIAN SERBS. (REVEALINGLY, HE
HAS NEVER EXPRESSED EVEN THE SMALLEST CONCERN FOR
THE PEOPLE WHO MIGHT BE KILLED OR WOUNDED IN THESE
ATTACKS.)

9. IF WE READ HIS BODY LANGUAGE HERE CORRECTLY, THE
BOMBING - IN ITS CURRENT PHASE, AT LEAST - WILL GAIN
SECRT SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 007875

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY,
SECRETARY FERRY, TONY LAKE, AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT,
GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI

FROM PICK HOLBROOKE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, SR, BK
SUBJECT: BELGRADE TALKS

US MORE ON THE MAP ISSUES THAN WE ORIGINALLY
SUSPECTED - BECAUSE MILOSEVIC DOESN'T CARE AS MUCH
AS WE THOUGHT ABOUT THE MAP. IT WILL BE LESS LIKELY
TO GAIN MUCH ON THE POLITICAL ISSUES, PRECISELY
BECAUSE HE DOES CARE ABOUT THEM MORE - THEY SET THE
STAGE FOR HIS LONG TERM GOAL, WHICH HE HAS NOW
DEFERRED FOR A FUTURE DATE, BUT WHICH HAS NOT
CHANGED.

10. IN CONCLUSION, BOMBING THIS WEEK WHILE WE GO TO
GENEVA WILL BE A PLUS IN THE TALKS THEMSELVES, IN
STRENGTHENING OUR OVERALL IMAGE IN EUROPE, WITH
SARAJEVO, AND IN PARTIALLY RESTORING SOME OF THE
EVENTS OF RECENT YEARS. IT WILL GIVE US A BETTER
CHANCE FOR PROGRESS, AND PERHAPS - IF THE UN AND
NATO CAN BE MANAGED CORRECTLY - A FUTURE BARGAINING

SECRET

SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

CHIP.

11. THIS RECOMMENDATION SHOULD NOT BE READ AS A CALL FOR A SUSTAINED AND PROLONGED CAMPAIGN. WE ARE NOT SARAJEVO’S AIR FORCE AND THIS IS NOT "ROLLING THUNDER." WE WOULD RESERVE ANY JUDGEMENT ON THE LARGER ISSUES.

NILES
BT
#7875

NNNN
<MSGID> M1838697

SECRET
Cease-Fires in the Balkans: A Historical Overview

The previous country-wide cease-fires that have lasted the longest have done so either because the warring parties had some mutual interest in temporarily reducing the level of violence or because weather would have limited fighting in any event. The presence of peacekeeping forces probably has influenced somewhat the longevity of cease-fires, but has not been decisive.

UN forces in Bosnia are adequate to monitor implementation of an in-place cease-fire as long as they enjoy complete freedom of movement. They are not sufficient, however, to deter any of the warring parties from deciding to abandon the peace process.

Some incentive for both sides to comply with a cease-fire—possibly including a desire to build up forces prior to renewed fighting—has been the key factor in cease-fire maintenance. The "successful" cease-fires to date have codified a willingness to cease offensive actions when none of the factions would benefit by them:

☐ The interposition of UN forces between government forces and Krajina Serbs in Croatia in 1991 limited fighting, but the conflict had more or less stalemated by the time a lasting cease-fire was finally worked out. Moreover, both Croats and Krajina Serbs initially chose to interpret the UN's mandate as working in their favor, and each had an incentive to halt the fighting. UNPROFOR then increasingly served to maintain an armistice line rather than to observe a cease-fire. Croatia used the cease-fire to build up its forces until it had gained a significant military advantage, whereupon the "cease-fire" collapsed abruptly with Zagreb's seizure of three of the four UN sectors this year.

☐ The Croat-Muslim cease-fire which led to the establishment of the Federation in 1994 has successfully held to this day, although the Croat-Muslim relationship remains uneasy. Both Croats and Muslims had good reason to halt the bloody interethnic fighting which plagued central Bosnia in 1992 and 1993, and the cease-fire allowed both Bosnian Croats and Muslims to confront a common Serb adversary jointly.
The longest-lasting Bosnian cease-fire, from 1 January to 1 May of this year, was in effect during the winter, when poor weather effectively limited any side’s ability to conduct ground operations. During that period, the Bosnian Serbs largely settled into a defensive posture, while the Bosnian Army used the cease-fire to train, equip, and re-organize its forces before resuming offensive operations later in the spring. The presence of even relatively large numbers of UN peacekeepers has not deterred determined Balkan combatants from mounting attacks:

- When Croatia attacked into UN Sector West in May and into UN Sectors North and South in August, the presence of large numbers of UN peacekeepers was not an effective deterrent or brake on operations. Croatian Army forces were simply directed to bypass any UN positions which had not already been occupied and to continue their advance.

- The Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) overran the Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas in July, despite the presence of UN peacekeepers in both towns and small-scale NATO airstrikes immediately prior to the fall of Srebrenica.

Conversely, a small number of observers may be able to patrol a confrontation line, if they are allowed freedom of movement and there is some reason for the combatants to respect that confrontation line or demilitarized zone.

- A minor UN presence—about eight personnel—backed up by a credible threat of NATO airstrikes has so far prevented any Bosnian Serb offensive against Gorazde since the British and Ukrainian peacekeepers departed in late August.

If the negotiating parties entered into a cease-fire agreement in good faith, the UN could monitor compliance relatively quickly using existing peacekeepers and military observers. Large numbers of outside forces would not be needed immediately so long as observers already in the country enjoyed freedom of movement and the terms of the peace agreement—such as demilitarized zones, limitations on training and maneuvers, and on-site inspections of heavy weapons at declared sites—were designed to simplify verification of compliance.

Greater problems may arise with the transition from the current UNPROFOR to a Peace Implementation Force, as some UNPROFOR elements withdraw, some remain and assume new mandates, and other new implementation forces enter the country.
TO: MR BILL CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A.

FROM: DR RADOVAN KARADZIC, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA

Dear Mr President,

I want to inform you that the Republic of Srpska accepts the Dayton Agreement and that it will assist in its implementation. As you are no doubt aware, however, the Dayton Agreement has, in the case of the city of Sarajevo, already proved dangerously destabilizing. At the stroke of a pen, 150,000 Serbs now living in the wider region of Sarajevo have found themselves facing the prospect of life under the Muslim regime. Needless to say, they do not face this prospect with equanimity. During the war they have repulsed thirty-four Muslim offensives in Sarajevo. If they were to leave, they would be leaving behind the graves of those who have died for Serb Sarajevo, and not just their properties and land. But the problem is even more complex. If the Serbs of Sarajevo were to abandon their homes, the Republic of Srpska would not be in a position to accommodate or employ them.

Accordingly, the Dayton Agreement, as it pertains to Serb Sarajevo, cannot be implemented in the circumstances. Passions are running high, and the Republic of Srpska authorities would be unable to control the behaviour of soldiers and civilians. If nothing is changed, either of two developments is likely: either all Serbs of Sarajevo will leave amid scenes of great chaos, or they will all stay on to fight against Muslim authorities.

We suggest, therefore, that a separate document be adopted for Sarajevo, whereby there would be an interim period of five years.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Robert Homme, Senior Reviewer
during which Serb Sarajevo would have its own police force, local authority and laws - all this, of course, in the context of IFOR presence, and with the aim of preventing any access by the Muslim authorities. Another solution would be to reduce this period to three years, but with an immediate commitment by the international community to start the construction of a new town for the 150,000 Serbs of Sarajevo, that is, some 45,000 - 50,000 apartments. After three years, the Serbs of Sarajevo would move out in an orderly and humane manner, leaving behind their very considerable housing properties to the Federation.

I assure you that we want the Serbs of Sarajevo to stay where they are. But the reality is that they will either leave, and in doing so cause great chaos, or they will stay and create a Beirut out of Sarajevo - with the inevitable consequence of long-term instability. I urge you to consider this matter and the proposed solutions, bearing in mind that a solution must be found before the Paris Conference.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Dr. Radovan Karadzic
President, Republic of Srpska

2 December 1995
1. Initial organizational session aimed to adopt policy as inherited from the Bush Administration; during the Clinton campaign, establish new working groups, and identify policy options. DNIs established the group against leaks (as appeared hacked). DCI-Designate Woolsey directed me to keep the meeting for you and him only.

2. Establishing Baseline Policy. General Powell, highlighting the London Accords and then-Secretary Eagleburger’s Christmas demarche, helped to define policy. To deliver humanitarian assistance, Bush Administration: to deliver humanitarian assistance (if not power if necessary), support UN/EC mediation (but not Vance-Owen proposals), refuse to accept borders change, legitimate ethnic cleansing, condemn war crimes, seek enforcement, and so forth. 

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