FOIA
RECOMMENDATION IN REGARD TO DETECTING THE POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF A SURPRISE INTERCONTINENTAL NUCLEAR BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACK AGAINST THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES
Document Type:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0002987366
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
September 22, 2017
Document Release Date:
October 4, 2017
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
SC-2017-00012
Publication Date:
May 14, 1956
File:
| Attachment | Size |
|---|---|
 DOC_0002987366.pdf | 231.87 KB |
Body:
MEMCRANDUM FOR:
THROUGH
ATTENTION
FROM
SUBJECT
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re
14 May 1956
Guided Missile Intelligence Committee
Col. John White, CIA Representative to GMIC
E. W. Proctor, ORR Guided Missile Coordinator
Chief, Services Division, ORR 44'
Chief, Transportation Branch, Services Division, ORR
EO 13526 3.5(c)
, CIA.
Recommendation in Regard to Detecting the Possible
Development and Execution of a Surprise Intercontinental
Nuclear Ballistic Missile Attack Against the Continental
United States
Summary
1. Intelligence of possible significance to the Soviet develop-
ment of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the threat
of a possible future ballistic missile attack upon the continental
United States is possibly being inadvertently overlooked by the intelligence
community. This conclusion has been reached as the result of attempting
to do research into the significance of recent Soviet railroad
developments in northern Siberia. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
rs 70reC'
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EO 13526 3.3(
b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 135263.
2. Resolution of the problem will require a comprehensive research
program to be carried on by an "Ad Hoc Working Group" having available the
combined talents of those with scientific, economic, geographic,
military, and strategic knowledge. The designated mission of such a
group would be to make a complete analysis of all pertinent data per-
taining to the possible planning, development, and execution of a
decisive Soviet intercontinental nuclear ballistic missile surprise
attack upon the continental United States within the next five years.
The Group would determine the major Soviet objectives and isolate the
major criteria relating to the accomplishment of such objectives. A
specific but selective list of indicators would then be codified in
conjunction with specialists in all related fields on the basis of
the determined criteria and then sanitized, if necessary, and passed on
to the analysts. The analytical process from which the indicators
were determined would serve as a complete frame of reference into which
suspect intelligence might then be fitted for interpretation. Unless
the new criteria necessary to evaluate information concerning a possible
Soviet surprise attack by the use of this new weapon are determined and
passed on to analysts, either in the form of criteria or sanitized
indicators, then information which might prove to be of vital significance
to such an attack may be overlooked. A more detailed discussion of the
problem and the recommendation for its solution follows.
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(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
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??W"
Justifications
15. If the Soviets are further advanced in the development of the
long-range missile than is indicated by present estimates, the system,
if effectively developed and applied, may well bring to light intelligence
already available within the community, the significance of which has
not yet been apparent.
16. Outside of an extensive research program on the part of the
group assigned this responsibility, the program would not involve a
basic change in the intelligence process, nor an increase in the
intelligence burden. The system would provide the community with a new
analytical tool to be used to measure the growth of an inevitable threat.
17. It is conceivable that conclusive information on such a Soviet
program could be gained by observing activities of a less sensitive
Soviet security classification than those directly connected with a
long-range guided missile program providing of course, that such infor-
mation would be fitted into a meaningful frame of reference.
18. Such a system would most certainly prove useful to present U.S.
disarmament efforts in regard to setting up an inspection system which
would detect all possible means of concealing a possible surprise attack.
19. U.S. operational planning efforts might benefit from the work
of such a group, particularly if the group had access to the most
current scientific, strategic and industrial thinking in the nation.
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1
21. The greatest value of such a research effort and the primary
reason for developing such a system, however, is to bring to bear on the
ICBM problem the efforts of analysts already screening intelligence data
for other purposes.
Recommendations
22. It is therefore recommended that this problem be resolved by
formation of a special "Ad Hoc Working Group" composed of scientific,
crrF-.F.
Or
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)>25Yrs
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economic and strategic personnel.
23. The designated mission of such a group would be to make a
complete anaysis of all pertinent domestic and foreign data in order
to determine the most probable courses of action to be taken by the
Soviets in developing a decisive intercontinental ballistic missile
attack capability upon the continental United States. The group
would determine the major Soviet objectives, which would have to be
accomplished to develop such a capability and isolate the major
criteria controlling the accomplishment of such objectives. A specific
but selective list of indicators, would then be codified in conjunction
with specialists in all related fields on the basis of the determined
criteria, and then sanitized, if necessary. Once determined the
indicators would be incorporated into the present worldwide indication
network. The analytical process from which the indicators were
determined would then serve as a complete frame of reference into
which suspect intelligence might then be fitted for interpretation.
I
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EO 13526 3.5(c)
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
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, EO 13526 3.5(c)
4? EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
EO 13526 3.5(c)
EO 13526 3.5(c)
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
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