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APPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL RELEASE PROGRAM JUNE 2017 IRONBARK Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25. D. C. 2 8 MAY 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT: "Preparation and Conduct of a Front Offensive Operation on a Maritime Axis in the Initial Period of a War", by Colonel- General G. Khetagurov 1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" "Voyennaya MYs1") published by the Minis*y of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander. 2. For convenience df reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material. 3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Request for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to:the originating office. Enclosure APPROVED FOR RELEASE 3 0 JUN 1992 Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plans) LetV I.3(a)(4) AR 70-14 (a)(4) ' 1.3(04} 1.3(a)(4) maw ? pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 1.3(a)(4) IIRONBARKI wommmworsommilmmir Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 Original: The Director of Central Intelligence cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for intelligence, Department of the Army The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence U. S. Air Force The Director, National Security Agency Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy.Commission National Indications Center -Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics. Intelligence Committee Deputy Director for Research Deputy Director for Intelligence Assistant Director for National RAtimates Assistant Director for Current Intelligence Assistant Director for Research and Reports Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence Director, National Photographic interpretation. Center 1.3(04) 1111111111101 1.30) pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 .3(0.0 IRaNBARK Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 11.1111?111111111111111111111 COUNTRY: ?/ USSR r SUBJECT 111MILITARY THOUGHT: "Preparation and Conduct of a Front Offensive Operation on a Maritime Axis in the Initial Period of a War", by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov DATE OF INFO : APPRAISAL OF CONTENT ? ? October 1961 Documentary SOURCE A reliable source (B). Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Preparation and Conduct of a Front Offensive Operation on a Maritime Axis in the Initial Period of a War", written by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov. This article appeared in the 1961 Fourth Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This jourhal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1961 Fourth Issue went to press on 20 October 1961. Headquarters Comment: The articles cited on page 2 were disseminated as (Gorbatov), MIUMMEMENUMEN (Gusakovkiy), (Babadzhanyan). The Yield Service Regulations cited on page 11 were disseminated as The Malykhin article cited on page 14 was disseminated as and the M. Ivanov article on page 19 as -1- 1.3(04) 1.3(04) 1.3(04) WU? 13(a)(4) Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 1.3(04) Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 Preparation and Conduct of a Front Offensive Operation on a Maritime Axis in the Initial Period of a War by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov The theoretical elaboration of the actual problems of preparation and conduct of front offensive operations on a maritime axis is not possible without thorough analysis of the general nature of the initial period of a nuclear/missile war. Without a clear-cut definition of the types of military operations to be conducted on the ground, in the air and on the sea, not taking into consideration the influence of the weapons of mass destruction on the utilization .of the types of armed forces in the first days of a .war, and many other factors of basic significance, it is impossible to carry out preparation of troops purposefully and understand the situation in which the initial operations of maritime fronts will be conducted. 1A(a)(4) As concerns the general nature of nuclear/missile war, we agree with the opinion given in the pages of the . Collection in the articles of Generals Gorbatov, Gusakovskiy and Babadzhanyan*. Th a strategic aspect of the initial period of a war will be determined above all by the nuclear/ missile strikes delivered by both sides for strategic purposes. .11-a6-..elaboration'of the theory andjhe. Implementation of such strikes,;in practice, are npt4a,;01.4,91)04.3:0.-fs. operational pi.epsrstiOn-and.* mission of the frOntrdt*OVelit .C5,4:.. be incorrect to be silent'aboui-this, because these stakes In particular will set the operational-strategic situation' . in theaters of military operations, and consequently, will also determine the nature of the tasks facing the maritime fronts. In the operationgl7strategic.s?ct_ivities_ofjhe missile troops, in our Opinion, it is essential to differentiate betWe'en two types of nuclear/missile strikes: intercontinental delivered by large-.unit-Or-fhe misii-e-troop of strategic designation, in the interests of the wax as a whole strikes carried outthe missile troops, long-range ? ssile-. carrying aviation, an by the forces of the missile-carrying (.1) fleet, bringing in, n some cases, the missile weapons of * Special Collection Of Articles of the JourharWilitary ssue , and an rst ssue respectively -111.11111111.1 ? pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C0001235 aillIMMUMMINMEMME Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 the fronts to assist in armed combat in a given theater of military operations. Apparently, the latter will be very closely tied in with the utilization of all types of armed forces. In actuality, they will be the basis of a strategic offensive on the TVD (theater of military operations - teatr voennykh deystviy). Therefore, the thox'oxighconsideration of all aspects of the concept according to which they are conducte44-their makeup, and.oftle:results expected, will be the foremost condition for the correct and purposeful planning of the front operation on a maritime axis. It should be assumed that, under the conditions of the Western Theater of Military Operations, the attainment of the basicstrategic goals will depend on the destruCtion of the iia411 mTI?i;ound and air groupings of the enemy in the internal areas of the European continent,'Wherea large part of the most important military-economic and administrative-politidal centers of ZATI) are located.. However, as experience of many exercises shows, it is only possible to attain these goals by means of simultaneous destruction of the troop groupings.operating on maritime axes, most of which lead to important industrial areas. A series of political centers, large cities, centers of communication, military-naval bases and ports, and considerable stocks of materiel means in the :areas_ofthe bases, are located on the maritime axes. The.most, ' important routes, that connect the armed forceS'of_,NATO with their main military-economic base and reserVeS:acrOsS . the. ocean, pass through ,them r The significance Of maritime axes increei3eSjieinbr,;: because our probable enemies have .a powerful'naval21:1-eet,_ supplied with the latest combat equipment. FOr it is not accidental that in a TVD the situation will to a large extent, on the degree to which it was pipsfiflal.e to disrupt the enemy's plan on the sea and in.:the CoeSial zone; to hamper his utilization of missile and air bases located in maritime areas; prevent strikes by carrier large units, missile-carrying vessels and submarines; disrupt naval communication route i; and isolate the enemy troops located in the theater from the flow of adclitional forces and means from other continents. In the fulfilment of these missions, an important role can be played by front formations operating on maritime axes. 1.3(a)(4) ? Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 1.3(a)(4) In coordination with the missile troops and the means of the fleet they will protect the strategic flank of the armed forces on the scale of the entire theater of military operations, to execute the deep envelopment of the basic groupings of the enemy, disrupting the forming up of his reserves in the maritime areas, and their transfer and forward movement to the main axis. The end result of the offensive operations carried out by the maritime fronts will be that more favorable condition:Mir-be created for the rapid destruction of the most important enemy ground troop groupings and for the establishment of active operations by our fleet on the broad ocean. * The Anglo-American command, not without reiSon, supposes that the naval fleet, in comparison with the other types of armed forces, will suffer relatively smaller:lOSSes,during the first days of a war and will retain its :cavakilitY, for immediate operations. This should be remembered'constantly. The NATO command will apparently use the strike forces of the fleet primarily to deliver strikes against groupings of troops and important operational-strategic objectives on the land sectors of the theater of military operations, where the fate of the war will be decided. The force and depth of the fire effect of the fleet in a case of this, kind can be very significant. By using carrier Strike large units, missile-carrying surface vessels, _and Submarines, the fleet is able to deliver Strikes not onlyag4inStabaStal against thousands of kilometers from the coast. _ In this respect the NATO exercise carried out in., October 1960 was quite characteristic, durInhh,I? the first 27 hours of military* operations,.24Ualear . strikes were de14eled bY'the:means.of oneCir4e7rT.Strike large unit, including 69-according to theplaiiksa the high command, 96-for the counteratomic offenSii/4-1474o prevent the deployment of ground troops,'anc116T-StrikeS to prevent the deployment of naval forces.- A total of more than nine-tenths of all the nuclear weapons were used to destroy ground targets removed up to 500 to 600 km from the coast. Hence it becomes evident that under modern conditions the basis of an enemy nuclear grouping on a maritime axis may consist not only of the missile weapons of the ground 1111.1111111111 4.."" " 1.3(0(4) 1.3(0(4) pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 troops but basically of the weapons of the fleet. That is why the situation on the sea, to a greater degree than before, will influence the development of front offensive operations, and its influence will spread over a considerable zone, having widened the area boundaries of the maritime axes. Of course, not all the maritime axes will be equal in importance. Their role will be determined in accordance with operational capacity, the composition of enemy forces, the presence of important operational .objectives, and other factors. However, in all conditions, by dint of a11 the above-mentioned circumstances, in the initial period of a war, an extremely tense struggle will ensue within the borders of the maritime axes in order to fulfil extremely vital and complex operational-strategic missions.' As shown by the experience of exercises, the basic principles of conducting an offensive on an ordinary axis are retained in an offensive operation of a maritime front. However, the special conditions for developing combat operations also present special requirements for conducting operations: the need to take into consideration all aspects of the situation at sea; determining the concept of the operation according to the nature of the adjoining naval theater, the location of naval bases, ports and other coastal installations. The scope of the operation is influenced by the depth of the continental part of the TVD and the balance .of the forces in the naval theater. _ .; ? -e '-?-lk.,-;?-1Z.Oi;4C411/41kreW4 t. ? - -'Under such conditi9ndis:fi%rst .Of all operational missions dc'd64Pliblied by the front troops is widened. In particular, the need arises to seize straits, islands and peninsulas, to _organize combat operations with the goal of capturing 'ports and military-nair-alsbases, to aid the fleet in the destruction of carrier strike large units, and to destroy coastal missile weapons of the enemy. The fulfilment of these missions requires special organization of control, joint utilization of the various types' of armed forces, application of distinctive methods of operations of the troops, organization of landing operations, and, mainly -- close operational and, to a certain degree, tactical cooperation between the ground troops and the . naval fleet. 011111111k 1.3(a)(4) -5- ? 1.3(a)(4) pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 The nature of the cooperation will depend on the general conditions for conducting war at sea. For example, it is known that the decisive role in naval operations is passing to the submarine fleet, to missile-carrying vessels, and to missile-carrying aviation, operating in dispersed formations and delivering strikes from great distances with nuclear/missile warheads and homing (samonavodyashchiysya) torpedoes. Of course, under such conditions there is no :need to "attach" the fleet to the flanks of the ground troops. However it is completely apparent that together with the utilization of its basic forces on the open seas and oceans, on the sea communication routes of the enemy, as before, the direct goorteration of thejleet _ matitime_front will have great significance 1,i3;::.deN.ielciPing the offensive in the entire deptria?the theiterThe flem.iably cover the maritime flank of the front, to protect it from strikes from the sea, prevent the commitment of additional forces of the enemy fleet through straits into internal bodies of water, ensure the disruption of his sea transport, etc. Undoubtedly, the participation of the forces of the fleet will be essential in the neutralization by fire of enemy installations located on land, moreover, not only in the coastal zone, but also. at a considerable distance from the sea. We are convinced that the reduction of the fOrce.s. of the fleet, the:cOntractionifjt0,missionsial in closed seas, thiyplace thea max1tine frit in1iemeiy 'difficult position. In sucii'k'CSe;-ttie major advantage's. Any possibility of carrying out landing operations or sea assist the frontWill :be almost completely eliminated. The wiping out of :enemy' groupings pressed up against the sea will be made more difficult. The front must be constantly aware Of. 11:: possible enemy ,intrusion from the sea, because it. may be obliged to commit considerable forces to cover the maritime flank, and to organize along the coast a powerful system of . dritilanding and antiair defense,,radio counter- measures, and intelligence, .which will undoubtedly influence the tempo of development of the operation into the depth. Therefore, in our opinion, the fleet of a closed sea, even in modern times, must be strong enough. Its qualititiVe composition is another matter. We do not MOM ???." 1.30)(4) -6- 1111111111111111111111.11111111111111M 1:3(a)(4) pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 AMEMENIMMEMEMMINM Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 1.3(04) 111111111111111111111111111 attempt to make any recommendations on this score, but consider that the conclusions made on this subject in the article of Admiral V. Kasatonov deserve serious attention .4 The mission of securing the maritime flank will have to be fulfilled by means of a broad maneuver of nuclear/missile strikes in combination with the swift movement of troops by air and the creation of operational barriers (including the placement of nuclear, mines) on the threatened axes. The pivotal element of the system of cover of a maritime flank, obviously, must be the mobile coastal missile units of the fleet, armed with short-range Cruise missilestems and reinforced as necessary by motorized rifle subUn06:,-- as well as by air obstacle detachments -(vcodushnyy.,Otryad zagrazhdeniya) and separate antiaircraft misSile(ZURW? units. ? ? The most important condition for ensuring the stability of the maritime flank is maximum exertion in combat not. only with the ground enemy, but also with the sea enemy, striving to inflict destruction on the carrier strike large units before they reach the line of launch of the carrier aviation, and also the disruption of landing operations being prepared, at the moment the landing force embarks on the ships or during their sea passage. The framework framework of the operation and the actione.o v;the ? .front troops_will_be greatlyAnTluenced,not.:04 ' openmaritime location of inlets, islands, and the nature of the'OjAira444.1i objectives located in the Coastal zone. In-many'.407S these factors may greatly influence the choice:of;thefOrm .of operational maneuver, the utilization of nuclear/missile weapons, and the assigning of missions, to thejr.OtOPCith the purpose of splitting up and liquidating enemy groupings pressed up against the sea. Inasmuch as the ultimate goal of in most cases, will be related to the the front operation, completion of the the Journal "Military *Special C ollection of Articles of Thought", Second Issue, 1960 -7- MEM 13(a)(4) I.3(a)(4). pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 _Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 14044) destruction of the maritime groupings of the enemy, the capture of harbor areas, supply bases, and the movement of troops to the coast, it is expedient to plan and conduct an offensive on a maritime axis in the entire depth of the theater of military operations --under the conditions of the Western TVD, to 1000 to 1200 km. Here it is extremely important, utilizing the results of strategic nuclear/ missile strikes, to reach the Atlantic coast on the 9th or 10th day of the war, i.e., before the main reserves of the enemy begin to arrive from the American continent. The arrival of strike groupings on the coast during this time period will be realistic withjIdegliate-effectiveness of massed strategic nuclear:*erikes agaiWt#e eneiyr-- ? the preservation of the forces of the front and their immediate transition to vigorous operatioiis very beginning of t4p.*kif4t. deny theTeneiriy-:**oeSe'_to our territory; the serious weakening of tWebeMY, fleet, after which it will not be able to give effective support to its troops on the continent and the latter will not be reinforced at this time from bases across the ocean. On a maritime axis the missile weapons, ground troops, aviation., and naval fleet can be utilized in various ways. However, in all cases, it is extremely important to prevent the enemy from deploying forces on the ground and at sea, and to start vigorous offensive operatio0 . as, soon as. possible. As experience Of exercises shoigle.marit*m0 front is extremely interested in_hay0,nikalLeAriti)46:0-*, / weapons of the-:fieet'fliiiailWdobijeratiOgArth'A'eUSe vigorously, 'xrdfensivelY, 'and that sue-cediiive-Strikes' delivered against the enem-y at sea and it ViSeti. , On the whole, joint operations of a front, and a fleet must, in our opinion, be examined as:a single operation conducted under a joint command with the purpose of _ simultaneously destroying the enemy on the ground axes and in the adjoining areas of the naval theater. Moreover, it is expedient to have the fleet of a closed sea, before it captures the straits area and exits its main forces into the ocean, under the direct operational subordination of the front. In the future, most often it will be utilized independently, but in this case it is essential that the commander of the front be able to assign missions to the fleet for supporting the offensive and to coordinate the 1111111111111111 ,1.3(a)(4) ? pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 ? Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 operations of the forces on the ground and at sea. The unified plan of the offensive operation, conducted jointly with the fleet, must determine the methods for destroying missile, ground, and air groupings and groupings of the naval forces of the enemy. In accordance with the plan, the system of the front operation provides for the delivery of a series of successive joint massed nuclear/ missile strikes by the means of the front and fleet;' the conduct of a swift offensive by small operational groupings of the ground troops on isolated axes toward vitally ithportant..areas.and installations of operational significance on.the coast; the systematic landing.of.:tactical air and combined amphibious landings; fire support:fdr.the ground troop:offensiye by the weapons of. missile:units,: aviationaiii;OW-fleet; the 'organizatioalq,'OMbat:i4th the naval fokOtiCof the enemy .that :are hal'assi440,:front troops; screening the maritime flank and thel'riaYal::: communication routes, and finally, the disruption of enemy sea transport. Joint, massed nuclear/missile strikes are planned jointly by the commanders and staffs of the front and the fleet. As a rule, it is advisable to conduct a. large part .of the strikes on behalf of the front from the Calculation. of the use of their results by, the ground troops. Moreover, the means of the fleet can be:brought in to destroy the most important coastal installations, airfields, and groupings of theenemy However, sometimes 04:0:;1:Vo 4,t4,-,0 will r 613 h (030it t stAkes-Ori'beha47i5fAhe'flein such-i:b.4707*.71:_ aviation an&miSpile weapons of the front willbe:Utilized, for 'example?forr:'4he annihilation of enemy .navallbaSes,-for destroying. his coastal defense units, for "supporting the penetrationpf.:;_04.Saile7carryinkaviation of:;:thefleetand for facilitating he breation'of-a favorable !Atuation at sea. The basis of ground troop operations is made up of swift, deep strikes on separate axes with the simultaneous delivery of enveloping strikes from areas distant from the sea against important maritime objectives. It is possible to create 3. to 5 independent tank strike groupings in the front, consisting of 2 or 3 divisions each, and also a grouping of forces for utilization as a combined amphibious landing. In a number of cases, one of these groupings will advance right along the coast. The main forces, because 011111111111 1.3(8)(4) 13(a) pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 ' 1.3(a)(4) of the indentations in the coastline and the difficulty of forcing numerous rivers in the estuary sectors. will, as a rule, operate at a certain distance from the sea. The maneuver to the sea is possible with limited forces, because the action of the troops in a solid front along the entire coast is not expedient at the present time. In the coastal zone it is only necessary to capture the most important areas (ports, supply bases, and main road . junctions), first breaking up the enemy groupings covering them, pressing them up against the sea and destroying them piecemeal. The basic objectives in the other areas should be suppressed or destroyed by nuclear/missile .strikes, creating zones with high radioactive contamination. ? It is expedient to combinesystematically.the _ . v,. envelopment of enemy maritime groupings from.the'groiind with the sudden 'landing, ()It the flank and in the reirofjhe-: ? enemy, of combined (naval, air, and tank) landing fordes. Some consider that in a modern war amphibious landing forces, because of their great vulnerability lose their significance. But this conclusion is correct only if it is based on the old principles of organizing amphibious landing operations. Obviously, the dispersed formation of the landing detachments during the sea passage, and the higher tempo of the landing, will make their viability no lower than the viability of regular troop groupings.. It should not be forgotten that the utiljzati?npf ,nuclear_weapons,will_grepyga014itate,t4,0044.,..0f; the iiltil4n4ing -clef " pe-rmit. " ;iMiteefordes and in-i-Shorttime4?to fulfil missions to a great-a-61)th and with decisive goals. Therefore we propose that Csmbin0 lEgA4i.n0 (if the fleet gets fast landing craft for their landing) can and niutb?d widely in the initial operations Of a futureykar4itThey, will permit the holding down of eneMyFee67:on'il: front, will make it difficult to utilize missile.WeaPons: deployed in'-the maritime areas, will permit more rapid . transfer?of ground troop efforts into the depth andWill eliminate the need to pull in forces of the front from the main axes to capture coastal objectives. In planning a front offensive operation being conducted on a:maritime axis, special attention should be given to 1.3(a)(4) -10- pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 1-3(460 Approved for -Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 the correct assignment of the missions. The recommendations of the existing Field Service Regulations (Corps-Division) concerning this, in our opinion, are outdated. In keeping with the requirement of the Minister of Defense to carry out an offensive with an average speed of up to 100:-km per 24-hour period, the 40.0.,Jgf-the-tas.k41 of the formsutionAL and largR ITAIgi, in comparison with the norms given in the Regulations, should be sharply increased. In our opinion, it is expedient to coordinate the immediate tasks of the troops with the range of fire of the missile weapons which are correspondingly. available to the division, army and front. For example, for the tank divisloa the immediate task can now be assigned for a ftpth of 25 119Ig_hol.t.he follow-up task for 69. km,, and the task of, the day for 109-kM or more. A combified-arms (tank) ann57;.,c,011,4uq.4ng an offensive on a maritime axis, usually will:gek' immediate task to a depth of up to 200 to 250 km, and fulfilment is calculated to take 2 to 3 calendar days Tasks for groupings conducting an offensive along the coast should be assigned, and the method of operation,.' should be pointed out, in the greatest detail, especially if they have to capture a strait zone in order to achieve maximum coordination of their efforts with the utilization of the forces and means of the naval fleet. The great depth of the tasks and the necessity of . continuous development of the offensive of the, p,aritilipat? fleet requirei: constant concern regarding the preservation ? iof.,thecombat effectiveness of the strike_groppiiltOZ4fthe tr?ops,, - - At the moment it is hard to count on the.abilito the motorized rifle division to conduct continuoij operations for more than two, and a tank divisiOnfOrMOre. than three to four, calendar days. Under su6115400j0nO'i_ great skill is necessary to prevent the premature weakening of troop efforts. The commanders of the front:and-ih armies must take the most energetic steps for ihe'cont: maintenance of the most important strike groupings at the minimum necessary combat strength. This pertains especially to the troops operating apart from the main forces, on islands, or those being used for amphibious landings The maintenance of their combat effectiveness, obviously may be attained not only by committing to combat the reserves. coming up from the zone of interior, but first of all by having friendly large units that have lost their combat MOW ? 1.3(a)(4) pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 1.3(a)(4) Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 effectiveness, put back into service quickly. For this the time limits for bringing a division to full strength must be drastically reduced: for a motorized rifle division, up to three, and for a tank division, up to four, calendar days. The restoration of troop combat effectiveness must be executed according according to the unified plan of the front in accordance with the actual concept of the operation. Moreover, in some cases it is expedient to give the salvaged materiel and, personnel of the large units taken out of Combat to the other troops in the first echelon, and:stoutilize the staffs that have been relieved of control temporarily. In other casesp'itjs *posElible to create -from*a division a composite detachm.entrregimen,_ 'designated for the continuation of combat7a4iorls;and to conduct the remaining units to the rear ai.ea-to.':bking them up to strength as fast as possible by centralized maneuver of the stock of rehabilitated vehicles in routine maintenance and the bringing up Of personnel brought in by aircraft from the depth of the country. * * * The conduct of the first front offensive operation on the maritime axes demands all-round training of troops, great combat efficiency and deep insight in the work of all the organs of control,' the ability of_the'co*itn4ere and staffs , to resolve iC01010i0flicl.74ems 1-pkAo:oihyl4;,_ arise for the troops, in it:'Sfibit:petiod-15-miTSP *mobility in operations is necessary during 16e. period w1 the forces are brought to increased combitTieidineSs]dn4 at the moment the troops are :Withdrawn from und.**i*clear/ missile strike being preparedlak:the enemy. In short periods of time the location of=the anti- aircraft missile troops, radiotechnical equipment, land missile units of the front and army must be completely changed, aviation has to be dispersed; control points have to be moved, pontoon-bridge cover of the most important crossings must 'be organized; the dispersal of materiel reserves is carried out, etc. At the same time, in coordination with the fleet, screening measures should be carried out for antiair and antilanding screening of the 12(04) -12- p pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 1.3(a)(4) Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 maritime flank, and also aerial reconnaissance of the enemy should be organized in the direction of the sea. Subsequently, every 10 to 12 hours it is necessary to move not less than half, and after a 24-hour period, all,units and fire deans, without exception,to new areas, taking into consideration that in the maritime zone the enemy reconnaissance may be most active. In our opinion, the dispersal of the rear services will present the greatest difficulty because of the lack of time and transport. Therefore, so as not to take on too much work, it is expedient to plan therfUlfilment of this, task in certain phases: the first - in 2 or3 hours, the second - in 15 hours and the third - 1 to 1.5 calenda daysiist,of.all, missile warheads and supplies of aircraft fuW0tored'in the open at airfieldshOUld,be dispersed. Then 'beginsthe dispersal of the other types of ammunition and fuel, i.e.,. to unload part of them on the ground and keep the rest in the motor vehicle transport of divisions, armies, districts (groups of forces), on ships at sea and at railroad freight relays (zheleznodorozhnaya "letuchka") at small stations and runs.(peregon). It is advisable in the beginning to leave materiel maintained in underground storage areas-in place, because its destruction with the first strike is unlikely. The development of the first front offensive operation on a maritime axis,will,usuallybejied inwith_themoying 12'1Y4PffOrce0-40;104f0:1P.P.WAOrY2..4A0R90,010.,A40-1: with the initiii#W44:144#.04.144-04ti**Z044 the ConcentratiOn7oltiOaps with their b'eing:brpugh:0)Ut: to a line 200 to 300 km from the border and_theeploident of troops withthe,immediate creation of operational groupings During concentration 'the_large:Unit6 andfunitsnjnibst cases, will Iave:to.bel3rought.outin extremely dispersed formations, in a brCad zone and over a large number' Of . routes, utilizing all types of transport. In the process of deploying,the troops ilst move out to the 'tOcis designated to them mainly under their own power, in a specific grouping and in full readiness to go into battle precipitately. The maximum increase of the speeds of march in order to approach the enemy attains great significance here because this will sharply reduce troop losses. -13- 1-3(aX4) MUM 1.3(a)(4) Approved for Release: 2017/06/16_C00012350'" 1.3(a)(4) Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 It should be expected that on a maritime axis the enemy, using the capabilities of his fleet, will apply the maximum efforts to disrupt the moving out of our troops. For this purpose, on a number of lines and at large water barriers he can create "nuclear fire barriers", extensive ? zones of radioactive contamination, and also destroy permanent bridges over rivers such as The Western Bug, Vistula, and Oder. As shown by the experience of many exercises for the timely creation of strike groupings it is essential that, under such circumstances, the troops moving out from the depth not be dependent on bridge crossings. In tank divisions, to be exact, for each tank regiment it is expedient to have a company of tracked, self-propelled , ferries, to switch the motorized infantry to amphibious armored troop carriers; and in the combat-engineer battalion of the division, to have a landing-crossing company instead of one of the combat-engineer companies. 13(a)(4) 1? Besides, on the estuary sectors of the most important rivers that intersect the maritime axes, already inF-peacetime, we Inv:at_ carry out advance preparation of components for the construction of underwater bridge crossings, and mainly, for setting up 3 or 4 underground tunnel crossings for through railroad and motor vehicle traffic. With this purpose in mind, golonl-General F. Malykhin,proposesthe. construction of duplicate bridges ..(mosty7dubler)",:.*?AloW0er, su60.468:,are:,:ii.O,JeSS vpineriblgithanTAhe'r..balicC-000,ings, while'tthe-destruction'of tunnels' entails great difficulties.: One of the special features of moving the troops?out will be the utilization of seati-ansport The use of, sea transport may Play an important Closed seas, and, also when land communication routes of the maritime 'front are disrupted. Unfortunately, because of the?lack?of transport ships and the inability to concentrate them in advance at loading points, the movement of large units of ground and missile troops at full strength by sea is .improbable in the first operation:? The transport of materiel, combat equipment, and replacements may be carried out on quite large scales. ecial Collection of Arti les of the,Journal "Military. T oug econ ssue, ..e -T14- MEM ? ' 1.3(a)(4) 1.3(a)(4) pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 imairaw 'am) The capture of the straits zone will be a very important mission of a maritime front in the operation of the initial period of a war. This will permit the fleet to exit swiftly into the open sea, to put into effect operations on enemy sea communication routes, and mainly, to assure more effective support of the advancing groupings of the ground troops over the entire depth of the theater. The capture of the straits zone must be predecled by Powerful nuclear/missile suppression of the enemy system of defense in the maritime zone, on islands and peninsulas,. and also the weakening of the enemy fleet by striketh again'ethis, vessels at bases and on the sea. It is 'alsotOMportant, to prevent the planned withdrawal of enemy troops from land axes, for which it is necessary, in th0:40riestji0Ssible time, to break through to the approaches of ith?traits, at least with separate tank large units. The basic method for capturing the straits zone will be a determined offensive by the tank grouping of the combined- arms army combined with the landing of joint air and amphibious landings in the areas.that ensure control oirer the straits. It is expedient to carry out the special landing operation taking into account the simultaneous capture of all islands and peninsulas in the zone of the straits. However, with a shortage of forces it is possible to use the method of their subsequent capture. , ?_ Experience shows that for the successfihxdu a landing operation it is necessary to increaSe maximum the rate of embarkation, of the sea pasqage, an_ especially the debarkation, of troops on thejiihOie',_eiist!re effective fire support for the landing troonbLthe means of the front or army missile units, aviaioriild'Vegs0114 of the fleet, and also their constant reinfb$006t-Wthe forces and weapons subsequently delivered by air In our opinion, the basis of a combined landing, when landing at considerable distances, must consist mainly of an amphibious landing, and in closed seas over limited distances (up to 25-30 km)--of a tank landing with individual means of flotation (type RSTU). It is true that at the preseht time the execution of a tank landing entails great difficulties because amphibious tanks, and even mor& so 11111111111111111 -15- ? ' 1.3(a)(4) 1.3(a)(4) pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 T-54 and T-55 tanks, do not have navigational instruments, are not sufficiently seaworthy, and require a considerable amount of time for demagnetization. But these deficiencies can be remedied. .3(a)(4) It is expedient to execute tactical and, even more so. amphibious landings over a broad front in several (at least 4-5) points at the highest possible speed, avoiding the gradual buildup of forces on the shore. For this, simultaneously with the start of the amphibious landing, it is necessary to disembark a helicopter landing force at a distance of 3 to 5 km, and an airborne landing force 25 to, 30 km, from the shore. With the support of the 'missile units of the front and the fleet, the subunits that have landed must develop the offensive swiftly on the designated axes, or they will be wiped out. In the course of an offensive operation on a maritime front, the main efforts must be concentrated on the destruction of Ate means of nuclear attack, and also the ground and air groupings of the enemy, with missile/nuclear and chemical strikes, operations of the aviation, and of missile-carrying vessels. Together with this it is necessary to organize the swift movement of tank troops to the siting areas of enemy missile weapons. . . In the initial operation of. a .maritime front,i combat with the groupings of enemy grOunforce*.wiIi"*St:Oten take the form::4J:144-ge:.Meeti4g.W440*iii.OigthattWOW.47e- arise Vari-6-404Feiv,IiiriarU*PPt Success achieved in these engagements M:Uisi_15041-UZ64:- decisively. Enemy forceS that were able to survive niUSA be split up, pressed back to the Coast, forced into zones of radioactive contamination ifia, by blockade from the sea, be destroyed with joint strikes by nuclear weapons, aviation, and the fleet. For the decisive destruction of,enemy maritime groupings, the high tempos of troop offensives will have special significance. In the maritime zone, the achievement of this, in the light of the complexity of the military-geographic conditions, entails great difficulties. But nevertheless, even here, it is completely realistic to bring up the question -16- pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 MEM 13(04) 1.31019 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 I .3(04) of speeds of up to 100 km per 24-hour period. This requires a further increase in the effectiveness of nuclear-fire support and the use of more expedient methods of operation of the ground troops, including increasing of the speed of the attack, reducing the time for deploying large units, the decisive utilization of intervals and gaps in the combat formations of the enemy. It is known that in the past the average speed of a tank attack was approximately 8 to 12 km/hour. This was conditioned by the possibilities of conducting aimed fire from the old type tanks, and also by the need to maintain constant fire coordination between the. NPP (close infantry support-nePosredstvennaya podderzhka pekhoty) tanks and .the infantry following them. At the present'tiMethi#2, method of operation becomes unacceptable, The'attiOlcShould not be *carried out on a solid front but on axes, wherein the speed of the attack should attain up to 15 to 18 km/hour, because only in this way is it possible to avoid the destruction of troops at the lines of deployment by nuclear weapons and the fire of guided missiles of the enemy antitank means. In practice the possibility of conducting an attack at a speed of 15 to 18 km/hour is predetermined by the presence.of two-plane stabilizing devices for tank armament and the feasibility of operations of the motorized infantry when precipitately breaking through the hastily assumed ,defense,inarmored:personnel_carriers.withc4441ismOUntin_g.,, In any case, as showby the experience24*AYPYOWO" - exercisesh J0,20.471 t 4t WISkapi Northern Group of For? it is now possible toensure fairly high effectiveness of destroying targets when Moving. For example, at the autumn divisional tactical exercises ? of 1960, at an attaCk-speed of up to 18 kM/houi_theta.nk. battalions,'the first echelon/r:8ucCe4tti1.32y fulfilled all firp tasks, having ensured the destruction of 83 to 92 percent Ofthe gun and 81 to 86 percent of the machine gun targets. The decisive utilization of gaps and breaches in the combat formations of the enemy may play a big role in increasing the speed of the offensive. However, such a method of operations cannot be stereotyped. The strike groupings or large units that have entered the breach may often find themselves in a "pocket" (v "meshke") and will IIIIIIIIIP .3(04) -17- 1.3(04, pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 103(a)(4) be subjected to a mass enemy nuclear strike. Therefore, the offensive in the gaps of combat formations should be conducted in more dispersed formations, and mainly - with maximum speed. The correct organization of fire support,and mainly constant coordination of the missile weapons of the front and fleet at their full range, attain primary significance. In particular, we consider that the fleet, using its high maneuverability, must give effective fire support to the strike groupings of the maritime front, not only the ones advancing along the coast, but also those operating at a distance from the sea. In our opinion, the basis of such support must consist of destroying the missile weapons :_ of the enemy fleet with the forces of the navy, and also to destroy important ground objectives and.reserves with nuclear warheads from great_distances, in the entire depth of the maritime axes. The complex nature of modern offensive operations requires fundamental improvement of the entire system of troop control of a Maritime front. The principle of simultaneous direction of the combat operations of troops on the ground, in the air:, and at sea from great distances, by technical means, electronic-computing and .automatic devices, should be incorporated in the basis of control. It is also necessary to increase sharply the operational .,efficiency ..of the of commanders and,,qtaffs and to ,asspre,..V;tp.':p9SP1_1443,:_ril9t.:,.,pi3O.1,:iinmediti:tizi.!::,0;:iii it.00t9 the lightest changes ofthiperational . . and naval situation. Unfortunately, the existing system of control, as has been pointed out in print several times, does. not fulfil the indicated requirements in many ways. Even before complex automatic systems of control are created, it is necessary to carry out a reorganization of the control points, put in order the collection, processing, and routing of operations and intelligence information at the operational and tactical levels, work out the system of "flash (tranzitnaya) information", create calculating-analytical and computing centers in the staffs, and ensure the quick assignment of tasks, and monitoring of the results of the strikes inflicted. MON -18- 1.3(a)(4) 1-3(a)(4) pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII In the light of what has been said, let us examine the proposals given by Major-General M. Ivanov in his article.* The idea of creating centers (command, operations- intelligence, nuclear/missile, and VVS and PVO control), as elements of the command post (KP) and the forward command post (PKP) of the front, was already worked out in the Northern Group of Forces in 1959, and was carried out in practice in three front operational command-staff exercises locally which were described in the Information Bulletin SM. No. 1 (Northern Group of Forces - Severnaya Uruppa Voysk) in the beginning of 1960. The recommendations of. General M. Ivanov resemble this system in form, but in subs#4? distort its meaning and are proposal " to unite all the directorates and departments, all services and staffs of the arms of troops which areT concerned with the direction of troops4nt0iiii4edeontrol centers" in practice means the elimination:Of:stiff which is unrealistic and wrong.. NO:dentekS7dan.4CSsinue the full volume of the functions of staffs'idireCtOrtes and departments. In our-opinion, it is Impossible to. replace the staffs with any kind of centers, either now or in the future. Centers should be created, not as replacements, but based on the staffs, as their organic elements, as combat teams called in to performtasks of immediate direction of an engagement and the utilization of the means of the front. 1.3(04) It is also impossible to agree with .theprOppsal- to create a main command-planning center whereas , General Ivanov maintains, "the entire planning of thi operation" must "take place". The operatiOnil7ttlanhing will be carried out, not by the center,. but by the staff of the front and all the directorates of the arms of troops. Therefore a command center is necessaiy,''iandno a ebmmand-planning center, as the working areacifth'erOilt troop commander for simultaneous unified direction of all means of combat, where, in the decisive moments of the'T' Operation, the chiefs of the missile troops and PVO troops, the commander of the air army and a representative of the. fleet may be located, connected to their operating apparatus by selector and television communications. * Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1961. -19- MM. ' 1.3(04) 1.3(a)(4) 'amil"miumiwalir-i-3proved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 inumminii3(a)(4) Finally, it is necessary to note that the centers justfly themselves only in the event they are prdperly equipped. For example, in the command center created in the Northern Group of Forces there are electkified registers (tablo) of the readiness of missile weapons and nuclear warheads, of fighter aviation and antiaircraft means; a signal-code device for transmitting commands, and also a screen of the operational situation and radiation situation and of the situation at seat the air and PV0 situation and the situation of the control of missile troop fire. In a semialltomatic manner the screen gives the data about the situation of friendly and enemy troops. Moreover these screens are not used for obSOrVation, as General.M,Oyanov recommends, but for making specific decisions based an' them and for giving orders to the troops. ,The 'principle of organizing and equipping the command center is shown on the diagram. One of the most important questions of control is the organization of coordination with the naval fl-:et.:; Under the conditions of the Western TVD, this coordination, in our opinion, must be organized mainly on behalf of the , troops of the maritime front. Moreover, the joint operations of the fleet and front for the nuclear-fire Suppression of the enemy on land and at sea, the conduct of joint, massed nuclear/missile strikes, support of the amphibious landings, and also all questions of intelligenoS,:10.Vglkaaio countermeasures, and operational camouflage MUittbe:,coordinated with specia?00roUgliheSEr--- - ? _ - A strict method of Mutual exchange Of::operatiOAS:and intelligence information-mustjpe established between the staff of the front of of_ the_fle,tAn_orrly system for directing oOratio ensure-the fasteSt1S64611516-ieSolution OfallinatterS:. - concerning joint operations of the ground troops and the naval fleet during their simultaneous fulfilment of overall operational tasks. ? 1.3(a)(4) -20- p pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 C pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 C00012350 Fundamental Scheme of the Organisation and Equiiiing of the Command Center 9 9 99 ET - of the readiness EE No. 2 - of the control' EE No. 1 - of the operational, of missile artillery and of missile troop fire .- radioactivity situation and of nuclear marheads the 'situation at sea To artillery Co center 0 4 E E.15 1 0 Chief of missile 0 eel t troops and artillery ray Tocome center of combat unit Naval representation TKO - Signal - coda device ?1(1 - Selector ooMmunications - Television souipsent - to commo canter (!) rrant (distrint) troop com,ander oreenewooneeneenowononee ew e ? eau - to radio.suitchboard EE Wo. 3 - of the Air and FVO situation Cage of PVC troopu ET - combat readi- ness of fighter aviation, anti- aircraft guided missiles and anti- aircraft asesunitioi Air Army Commander H43110-4, remote copying device for the semiautomatic entering of the situation 9- Plane table operators (planshetist). Er- Islectrified register &C.. Electrified screen