CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY: REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: CONGO
• Keywords: KATANGA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000202784
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2011
• Case Number: F-2009-00914
• Publication Date: September 22, 1960

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CONFI~'ENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 68
OCR No. 4445/60
22 September 1960
APPROVED FOR RELEASE[] DATE:
11-02-2011
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONFIDENTIAL
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DOCUMENT NO.
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 SF ,SET
REPUBLIC'OF THE CONGO
Colonel Mobutu is strength- staffed by Congolese university
ening his position in the Leo- graduates and students, to admin-
poldville area. He has set up ister the Congo temporarily,
a technical commission, headed Although he has publicly announced
by Foreign Minister Bomboko and that the commission will serve
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PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 7 of 10
 during a three-month
political truce while
the Various political
factions seek an un-
derstanding, Mobutu
has privately stated
that a Kasavubu-Ileo
government will take
over at the end of
October. During the
interim, the commis-
sion will take orders
from President Kasavubu.
Mobutu controls
the troops in the Le-
opoldville area, but
their loyalty is large-
ly dependent on trib-
al allegiances. The
three assassination
attempts against the
colonel--at least one
of them put Mobutu in
grave personal dan-
AN~.GOL.A
Atlane,c
Ocean
Jobito F
22
ger--show the weak-
ness of his security system
and the real threat posed by
extremist action.
Premier Lumumba apparently
has been unable to marshal sig-
nificant support among the troops
and populace of the Leopoldville
area, and his influence is di-
minishing. He remains a very
real threat to any successor
government, however, particu-
larly as long as he retains the
backing of several influential
African states--Ghana, Guinea,
and the UAR.
The Guinean Embassy played
a major role in protecting Lu-
mumba from arrest by Mobutu's
troops, as did the Ghanaian
troops which ringed his offiF
REPUBLIC OF
Bukavu
THE CONGO'Kindu
,. Port Francqui
Luluabourg .Bakwanga
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND
cial residence. As a re-
sult, Mobutu has protested
to the UN Command and de-
manded the withdrawal of
Ghanaian and Guinean troops
from the Congo. The UN has
agreed to replace Ghana's
troops in the capital with
Sudanese.
Lumumba has so far been
frustrated in his effort to
reach the UN General Assembly
session in New York. The possi-
bility of success of such an
effort cannot be disregarded
despite Mobutu's police control
and intention to arrest Lumumba
if he tries to leave the country.
Developments in KatAnga
Province suggest that.the secession
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PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 8 of 10
 SE,ET
problem will..: become of 'major
importance for Colonel Mobutu
and play into the hands of Lu-
mumba. Katanga's strong espousal
of its separate identity and
strong-arm action against dis-
sident tribesmen will arouse
the indignation of many Congo-
lese--including moderate sup-
porters of Kasavubu--and strength-
en the conviction of leaders in
Ghana, Guinea, and other African
states that Lumumba is needed to
prevent a breakup of the Congo.
On 19 September Katan a
that his province would
no join any political associa-
tion with the other Congolese
provinces despite a recent agree-
ment signed between representa
tives of Katanga and the Ileo
"government" of the Congo. De-
siring to avoid the political
instability he foresees for Le-
opoldville for a least five
years, Katanga's President wants
nothing more than a loose eco-
nomic association with the Congo.
He expects that equally close
economic ties between Katanga
and other central African areas
will reduce the significance of
the political question in the
future.
The danger of war between
Congolese and Katangan forces is
considerably diminished at pres-
ent as a result of the UN-spon-
sored cease-fire under which
both sides have withdrawn their
troops from the border area.
However, tribal warfare in sev-
eral areas of central and north-
ern Katanga against the Tshombd
regime has caused a good many'
casualties. Furthermore, the ex-
cesses of Tshombd's forces dur-
ing their clean-up operations
have caused an official protest
by the UN Command and threaten
to involve it in serious con-
troversy with the Katanga gov-
ernment. In Kasai Province the
situation continues to smolder
as tribal warfare against
the troops of the central
government in behalf of seces-
sionist forces occurs in
scattered localities.
Bloc Moves
At the UN General Assembly
special session on the Congo
which ended on 20 September,
the USSR abandoned its efforts
to obtain endorsement of its
draft resolution which, in ef-
fect, would have censured Ham-
marskjold's actions in the Congo
and secured UN approval for Uni-
lateral aid to the Congolese
Government. The bloc opposed,
but abstained, on the Afro-Asian
resolution--passed overwhelming-
ly by the assembly--supporting
Hammarskjold and opposing any
military assistance to the Congo
outside UN channels.
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minis-
ter Zorin, in a statement to the
assembly, attributed the Congo
crisis to a "criminal coalition of
colonialists led by the US" which
utilized the UN Command and secre-
tary general for its own purposes.
He charged that the UN Command in
the Congo was preventing the "law-
ful" government from exercising
its functions and that Hammar-
skjold had abused Security Coun-
cil resolutions.
In the face of UN develop-
ments adverse to Lumumba, who
from the initial phases of the
Congo crisis had received Mos-
cow's diplomatic and propaganda
support as well as direct materi-
al aid, Soviet policy-makers ap-
parently decided to acquiesce
without risking a further loss
of Soviet prestige, particularly
with Khrushchev now at the UN.
On orders from Mobutu, the USSR
and Czechoslovakia closed their
embassies in Leopoldville on 17
September.
SFWET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 9 of 10
 SE EET
The Soviet Government's
statement on 18 September, not-
ing the "temporary" recall of
the Soviet Embassy staff from
the Congo, explained that as a
result of the "intrigues of the
colonialists and their agents
as well as the undisguised in-
terference of the UN Command in
the Congo's internal affairs,"
the legal Congolese Government
and parliament had been removed,
making it impossible for the
Soviet Embassy to function nor-
mally. The statement reaffirmed
the USSR's "invariable friend-
ship" toward the Congo Republic
and its continued support and
help to the Congolese people,
but made no specific reference
to Lumumba--indicating a more
cautious Soviet approach to Con-
golese internal developments.
Prague issued a similar state-
ment at the same time.
The hasty departure of Soviet
aircraft makes it unlikely
that all..bloc'.technicians have
been evacuated. An observer in
Khartoum saw one Soviet and
seven Czech diplomats and 124
bloc technicians--about half of
the number reported in the Congo
--aboard the planes.
Coinciding with the General
Assembly's approval of the reso-
lution sponsored by 16 African
and Asian countries, Soviet prop-
aganda voiced its first criti-
cism of the Afro-Asian position
in the Congo situation. Moscow
radio on 19 September said that
African and Asian representatives
"did not have enough courage to
condemn totally" the policy pur-
sued in Africa by the US, and
Hammarskjold's activities in
the Congo. Terming the resolu-
tion "incorrect" in having given
authority to the secretary gen-
eral to dispose of UN military
aid in the Congo at his own dis-
cretion, the Soviet broadcast
asserted that only the "social-
ist;- states" have consistently
upheld the interests of the Con-
golese people and resolutely de-
manded the immediate end of the
NATO powers' intervention in the
Congo Republic.
Congo events have received
brief coverage in the Soviet
press since Mobutu's coup. In
addition, the "indefinite
postponement" of a Moscow
public lecture on the Congo
scheduled for 21 September
suggests that the Kremlin is
having difficulty in explain-
ing recent Congolese develop-
ments to the Soviet people.
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