Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
June 24, 2015
Document Release Date: 
July 26, 2011
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 1, 1961
PDF icon DOC_0001237688.pdf7.17 MB
(b)(1) (b)(3) ET CIA History Staff OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION VOLUME I AIR OPERATIONS, MARCH 1960 - APRIL 1961 (pages 303-506) DCI-8 September 1979 Copy I of 2 APPROVED FOR RELEASEL DATE: 25-Jul-2011 PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT DO NOT DESTROY Page Part IV Where Cuba Was Lost . . . . . . . . . 303 A. Over the Beach -- 17 April 1961 . 303 B. Day of Grace -- 18 April 1961 . . 338 C. Four for A Cause -- 19 April 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . 352 D. Bitter Recriminations: The Navy CAP, 19 April 1961 . . . . . . . 362 E. Jet Fighters -- the Last Hope . 390 F. Retrospective View of Air Operations . . . . . . . . . 395 Appendixes 1. US Government's Anti-Castro Program . . . . 406 2. Memorandum for Chief, JMARC from Lt. Col. George Gaines, Jr., sub: JMARC Tactical B-26 Capability . . . . . . . . . 418 3. Anti-Castro Propaganda Leaflets for Air Drop Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 420 4. Letter of Instruction for Garfield M. Thorsrud, 24 March 1961 . . . . . . . . . 425 5. Final Instructions for Air commander JMT I DE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429 6. Cable Traffic on Results of D-2 Air Strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432 7. D-Day Target List . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442 8. Logistics Support Plan for Operation Plan 60 AD-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445 Page 9. Possible Publicity About Flyers Killed at the Bay of Pigs . . . . . . . . . . . . 447 Source References Part I Initiation of Air Activity . . . . . 455 Part II Acquisition and Training of Air Crews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467 Part III Initiation of Combat Air - Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479 Part' IV Where Cuba Was Lost . . . . . . . . . 491 1. B-26 Take-Off and Arrival Times, 19 April 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380 2. Estimated Radar Intercept Ranges, USS Essex and Brigade B-26's . . . . . . . 385 Chain of Command, JMATE Air Operations Following page 22 2. Table of Organization, JMADD September 1960 . . . . . Following page 107 Maps Area of Air Activity, June 1960 - 19 April 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . Frontispiece Area of Combat Air Operations, 15-r9 April 1961 . . . . . . Following page 206 A. Over the Beach -- 17 April 1961 Even prior to the cancellation of the second strike, Sunday, 16 April 1961, had been full of surprises for the air operations people at JMTIDE. When the day started there were 11 priority targets scheduled for attack. By 2250Z, however, prior to the decision to cancel the second strike, the target list had been cut back to four specific targets -- the San Antonio Air Base, the Campo Libertad Air Base, and the naval bases at Batabano and Nueva Gerona (on the Isle of Pines). The Managua Military Base, where the large tank park had been observed, photographed, and scheduled for napalm attack, other airfields, and commo facilities were deleted from the target list. The number of B-26's then to be involved in the D-Day strikes had been cut back from 15 to 5 air- craft -- two each going to the two airfields and the fifth aircraft scheduled to hit the two naval bases. The armament in each case was to be "armament red" -- light bombs (260 lb.) rockets, and machine guns. 1/ One area of the air operation which did present a problem for D-Day planning and which has caused re- flective thinking among various JMATE participants in subsequent years was the question of time over target. At one point the operational messages coming from TIDE to BELL on 16 April indicated that of ten B-26's then scheduled for the D-Day attack (throughout the day the target list was being juggled) four of the aircraft had secondary missions to provide ground support from 1100 to 12002 -- an hour's time in addi- tion to attack time on the targets. An eleventh air- craft, a spare to be held in reserve until the initial strike force had been airborne for two hours, was to be over the beach at 1200A; and according to the cable, "Can loiter until 1430 hours." Additionally: Two aircraft assigned napalm (NBR 4) mission will make quick turn around and with 230 gal bomb bay tank installation plus reinstalled externals will have capability to loiter 3 1/2 hours over beach. Estimated time [arrival] over beach, these two A/C 18152. This leaves no air cover over beach, 1330Z to 1815Z, (4-45 hours). la/* * It would appear that the loiter time for the air- borne-spare should read "can loiter until 1330 hours,: not 'L430 hours." Otherwise the final sentence which specifies both hours (e.g., 13302 to 1815Z) and total time with no air cover (e.g., 4 hours and 45 minutes) is in error. TOPNECRET There is no doubt that if there had been more JMATE aircraft and more aircrews, constant air cover could have been possible. The real booger factor which both John F. and Robert Kennedy chose to ignore, how- ever, was that the denial and cancellation of additional B-26 strikes at Castro's airfields meant that attempts by the Brigade air force to provide.ground support for the invasion would be exposed to Castro's T-33's and Sea Furies. It was a no-win situation. * Another of the White House staff who, after stating that he had not participated in the Bay of Pigs discus- sions or planning, then proceeded to comment on the air operation was Theodore Sorensen. His naive description of the highly controversial affair stated: Thus, while the lack of ammunition led directly to disaster, Castro's control of the air had led directly to the lack of ammunition. The landing plan. had not ne- glected to provide for air control. There had been, on the contrary, unanimous agree- ment that the Castro Air Force had to be removed. But confusion persists to this day about the President "canceling the air cover" that U. S. jets were to have provided. Actually no U. S. Air Force jet participation had ever been planned, much less canceled. Nor was there any cancellation of any other combat air cover over the battle front. In- stead, the plan was to destroy Castro's air force on the ground before the battle began, and then to provide air support, with an -anti-Castro "Air Force" consisting of'some two dozen surplus planes flown by Cuban exiles. That plan failed. lb/ What Sorensen chose to ignore was that "that plan" (footnote continued on following-page) Following the stand-down of Brigade aircraft forced by the cancellation of the D-Day strike, Thorsrud and other air operations planners at JMTIDE immediately had to revise their plans for 17 April 1961. Beginning at 0830Z and running through 2230Z, 8 pairs of aircraft were launched on support missions over Cuba -- a total of 4 aircraft between 0830Z and 0845Z; 4 at 12002; 4 between 15002 and 1630Z, 2 at 1940Z and 2 between 22002 and 2230Z. As previously noted, even had there been no disruptions or interrup- tions, there was no way, with the limited number of aircrews and aircraft, that B-26's could have been on station over the beach throughout the whole time period. lc/ The Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria, how- ever, was ready and waiting for an attack by the in- vading force. They had been alerted by the 15 April strike, and there had been no stand down.* FAR's basic became a casualty to political expediency at the White House level. * That the Castro Air Force was ready was clearly indicated by the Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) issued by the air control center in Havana and received by the FAA on 17 April. The NOTAM read: For security reasons all flights over the Cuban territory and in the vicinity of Cuba cancelled immediately until further notice. (footnote continued on following page) - 306 - TOP 'CRET TOP.CRET problem on the morning of 17 April 1961 was the lack of ready aircraft. The evidence indicates that at daybreak at San Antonio de Los Banos there were avail- able three Sea Furies and two B-26 aircraft. One B-26 aircraft reportedly was an instructor model on which only 6 of the 8 guns were operational and the other a standard B-26 bomber model.* The first flight, which took off at 0530 Cuban time, consisted of two Sea Furies and one B-26. With roughly a 15-20 minute flight from San Antonio de Los Banos to Playa Giron the aircraft proceeded to put the Houston -- the troop and supply vessel for Red Beach at the north end of the Bay of Pigs -- out of action. In the attack on the Houston, Enrique Carrerras Rojas, flying one of the Sea Furies was aided by Gustavo The message was either picked up or forwarded to the JCS which, in turn, forwarded a note to Presi- dent Kennedy's military aide, Brig. Gen. C. V. Clifton. The JCS forwarding memo indicated that Operations/ Military Policy Matters, J3/J5 Directorates, was in the dark concerning reasons for the restriction, and said they planned to check with State re the air space restrictions. ld/ * Jacques Lagas one of the FAR pilots stated that both of the instructor model B-26's were lost in the 15 April strike. Bourzac, also in a Sea Fury, and Luis Alfonso Silva Tablada, in the B-26. Together their rockets forced the ship, which had been trying to flee south to the open sea, to ground on the west side of the Bahia de Cochinos at its northern end.* In addition to their rockets, the aircraft also machine gunned the two LCI's, the landing craft, and the other supply vessels that had brought the Brigade into the Bahia de Cochinos. The attack on the shipping was done at the direct command of Fidel Castro who had called the Commandant of San Antonio de Los Banos Air Base and insisted that FAR's initial air strikes be directed toward sinking the ships that had invaded Cuban waters. Following this initial mission against the Brigade fleet, the FAR pilots returned to San Antonio for refueling, rearming, and maintenance; another .flight was in the air by 0800 Cuban time. This flight marked the beginning of the end for the Brigade's air operations because the first of the three T-33's which * The Houston was left where it ran aground until the late 1970's. Verde OZivo (Havana, 17 April 1977, pp. 35-36) ran an article about the dismantling and cut- ting up of the vessel for scrap. The propeller, part of the stack, and some other items were being saved for museum pieces. were used by FAR between the 17th and 19th of April got into the air.* By 0900 the plane, piloted by Alberto Fernandez, had shot down the first of the B-26's that were to fall to the T-birds. This Brigade B-26 was piloted by Matias Farias, and it crash landed on the airstrip at Playa Giron, killing Eddy Gonzalez, the navigator. Farias survived the crash and eventually would be air lifted out by the only Brigade aircraft which successfully landed at the Playa Giron air strip -- use of which was basic to the air operations plans as revised to meet the demands of Secretary of State Dean Rusk. * Captain Alvaro Prendes Quintana of Castro's Air Force claimed that FAR had only two T-33's operable during the course of the invasion; but the photo in- telligence report prepared for this history indicates that there were three T-33's operating out of San Antonio de los Banos between 17-19 April 1961. The PI report also shows a fourth T-33 at the field, but it apparently did not change its position between 15 and 20 April. le/ Hugh Thomas, author of the most definitive his- tory of Cuba, unfortunately has erred a number of times in his story of the invasion, including, with reference to the air strike on D-Day, that Castro had "two T-33 jet trainers (quite forgotten by the U.S. planners)." lf/ The T-33's, of course, were the aircraft of greatest concern to the air operations planners at JMTIDE and to the pilots, Cuban and American, who would have to contend with them. Once his Sea Fury had been refueled, repaired, and rearmed, Carreras Rojas again appeared over Playa Giron, and this time with his rockets, he hit the Rio Escondido, which was deck loaded with, among other things, aviation gasoline. Within a very short time, the Rio went up with a bang, and down like a rock; and, to top his day off, during the course of the second sortie, Carreras also claimed to have dropped a Brigade B-26 into the sea. 2/* The question of the exact number of B-26's lost over the beach on 17 April, is still somewhat in doubt. The Cubans claimed that 5-6 were shot down, but the Agency records indicate that four actually were shot down and that four others made emergency landings -- two at Boca Chica and two at Grand Cayman Island. Of the 16 aircraft from JMTIDE which participated in the first day's air activities, between dawn and early evening only six may have been without damage; and even this appears doubtful. Of the four B-26's of the Brigade which were positively identified as shot down * Strangely enough, there were no casualties among the crew of the Rio Escondido. The survivors were taken aboard the LCI BZagar. during the first day's air operation, the only survivor in addition to Matias Farias was Dimitrio Perez, who was a navigator for Raul Vianello. Hit by a FAR T-33, probably piloted by Alvero Prendes Quintana, their plane became a flamer; but Perez managed to bail out. He was picked up at sea by a US destroyer where he not only posed as a defector from Castro's Cuba but stuck to this story until he received word that the Brigade invasion had collapsed. 3/* A third Brigade B-26, flown by Osvaldo Piedra and Jose A. Fernandez, blew up when attacked by a T-33 flown by Rafael del Pino Diaz; and both airmen were killed. 4/ Eddy Ferrer presented a particularly touching -- though somewhat suspect -- story of the loss of one of the Brigade B-26's which had been attacked over Cuba by both a T-33 flown by Rafael del Pino Diaz and a Sea * Not only did Perez stick to his story, but he played games in response to requested interrogation by the Navy regarding the status of the Cuban airfields sup- porting the T-33's and Sea Furies; additionally he also reported a heavy bombing (e.g., 4,500 lbs.. of bombs) on the Cienfuegos airfield! Fortunately, Perez's games did not result in the loss of any of his compatriots, but his failure to identify himself to the USN could have had tragic consequences. 3a/ Fury piloted by Douglas Rudd Mole. The T-33 attack was unsuccessful, but the Sea Fury apparently hit an engine on the B-26 before being forced to break off the attack by the intervention -- without firing -- of two unmarked jets from the US carrier Essex. As the Brigade B-26 struggled toward the Nicaraguan coast, Ferrer in a C-46 returning to TIDE from an air drop, picked up the dis- tress signals from the plane piloted by Jose A. Crespo and navigated by Lorenzo Perez Lorenzo. Ferrer wrote that for a matter of roughly two hours, he was in con- tact with the crippled aircraft trying to locate it to lead it to land. Unfortunately, he failed and the plane went into the sea. Neither Crespo nor Lorenzo were re- covered. The saving grace according to Ferrer was that Padre Carrero, the Chaplain for the Brigade Air Force, was aboard Ferrer's aircraft and was able to hear a last confession from the two B-26 fliers prior to the time that they plunged to their death. 5/* * There is no question that Crespo and Lorenzo were .lost following the attack on their B-26's by the FAR T-33 and Sea Fury. Beyond that, the author suspects that Ferrer has exercised considerable literary license in his version of the episode. He pictured his C-46 as laboring to get into the air and make the flight; the B-26 which was to escort him to Playa Giron was forced to abort; and, in violation of all procedures, (footnote continued on following page) Eddy Ferrer also touched on another of the tragic stories of air operations on 17 April 1961. Crispin Garcia and his navigator, Juan M. Gonzalez, had been scheduled to join another B-26 for one of the last missions over Blue Beach on 17 April. When the second aircraft had to abort very shortly after take off be- cause of mechanical difficulties, Garcia and Gonzalez continued alone. In maintaining the patrol of the beach area, by himself, Garcia ran low on fuel. Rather than return to Nicaragua, he put down at Boca Chica Naval Air Station (NAS) in Key West for refueling prior to returning to JMTIDE, and he was scheduled to leave the Florida base at 1740 hours Florida time -- 1640 hours Nicaragua time. 6/ He had flown into Boca Chica with aircraft #940, but for whatever reason, when Garcia was ready to depart Boca Chica, he took off in B-26 #933, which he took the priest aboard on a combat mission. More- over, the available records do not support Ferrer's claim that he -- or any of the other transport pilots -- flew a second mission on the 17th. The records do show that Ferrer was scheduled to land supplies at Playa Giron on Tuesday, 18 April, but that he was forced to abort because of the presence of Castro's fighters. 5a/ had put down in Boca Chica on 15 April following the D-2 strike at Campo Libertad. Apparently there were more problems with Garcia's aircraft than he realized at the time that he put down. The fact of the switch in aircraft was confirmed by a cable to Headquarters from JMWAVE which noted that aircraft #933 had departed on 18 April 1961 at 0248Z for TIDE. On 19 April at 0433Z, in an OPIM cable, TIDE advised Headquarters that B-26 #933 had not arrived, and asked for the location of the aircraft and the pilot, Garcia. At 1032Z on 19 April, TIDE went to Headquarters again, specifying that #933 had not arrived and recommended a check with Boca Chica to determine if it had actually departed. TIDE requested full details if the plane was still missing. On 21 April, at 0031Z, TIDE again went to Bell requesting information about the aircraft and the crew, and came up with the interesting suggestion that if Garcia and his navigator had re-defected, they were in possession of an aircraft which could approach TIDE with no trouble at all, and do serious damage. The follow up from Headquarters indicated that the whereabouts of the aircraft and the pilot were not known, but that there had been no indica- tion (apparently in COMINT) of a re-defection; and Headquarters noted that traces would be made. The case apparently was dropped at this point insofar as the Bay of Pigs operation was concerned. However, on 2 November 1961, cabled Headquarters: Armed B-26 with Cuban markings number FAR 933 found deep in jungles Jinotega Department, few miles from Bocay River. Remains of two men in aircraft. aid that he was about to depart for the crash site with General Somoza and if it turned out that the aircraft was in fact a Castro aircraft, Somoza was considering laying the case before the OAS. If not a Castro aircraft, ^ wanted instruc- tions regarding disposition of the remains. At this point Security Officer James Wright and another Agency employee were sent to Nicaragua to become involved in establishing the identity of the bodies.* * JMWAVE which had been requested to provide the identities of the crew which flew aircraft 933 out of Boca Chica was unable to penetrate the alias identification under which the mission crews had operated. TOP S ET The additional cable traffic which followed concerned the status of the deceased vis a vis both the Government of Nicaragua (GON) and also the families. The GON, represented by General Somoza, preferred that the bodies quietly be buried in Nicaragua and nothing more to be said of the matter. In discussions with Jose Miro Cardona, he also indicated that his prefer- ence was for a quiet burial, inasmuch as the Cuban families probably had already given up on the possibility of their family members still being alive, and that if, it were revealed that the bodies had been found in the crash, he could forsee all kinds of difficulties, in- cluding resurrection of discussions of the April invasion. The following paragraphs taken from an 8 November cable, after Jim Wright and Jake Durnin had visited the crash site indicates what had happened to Garcia and Gonzales: Plane apparently crashed approximately midnight 17 or 18 April 61. Directional gyro indicated impact possibly on heading 155. Plane hit side of 1,000 foot steep incline in almost impenetrably dense jungle. From almost totally demolished condition, estimate A/C in high speed dive. Wreckage strewn over path about 200 yards down 45 degree incline on heading 210. From position of fuel selector, possibly on TOP SECRET one engine. Added to crash damage, locals have scavenged many pieces of airframe and equipment. To complete destruction, party obliterated few remaining identifiable markings and insignia. Of crew, found only three shoes, parts of parachutes, and one sheath knife scab- bard,, bearing bugle tooled in leather. Local who buried remains, states bodies headless, limbless, barely recognizable as human remains. No clothing or identity papers except few items investigating party will return to Headquarters. Re- mains are buried at crash site. Deterio- ration, animals, and insects have all con- tributed to total destruction any identi- fiable remnants. Have arranged through have Catholic missionary in area o appropriate religious rites. Have photographed entire crash site. Will hand carry film on return. Unless otherwise directed, plan leave 8 November via PAA flight 506.* * Trying to establish the identity of the second man in the cockpit with Capt. Crispin Garcia proved to be something of a task. The Mission Review Summary pre- pared by Gar Thorsrud identified the second man as "Nabel" -- a name which did not appear on any of the membership rolls of the Cuban Brigade, or among the lists of air trainees, pilots, or navigators; nor were any of the heirs to those killed in the course of Project JMATE identified with anyone named Nabel. Similarly, the cable traffic concerning this episode, failed to make any mention of the name of the co-pilot with Crispin Garcia. By processes of elimination of those killed in action against Air Force Registers for the Brigade, pilots and crewmen, it was established that the second man in the cockpit was Juan M. Gonzalez; and this was subsequently confirmed by Eduardo Ferrer's book,`Operacion Puma. References for this episode are listed in Source 7. FAR made additional claims of downed aircraft as a result of the fighting above the beach on 17 April, but these claimed kills, in fact, turned out to be credits for the four aircraft which made emergency landings at Grand Cayman and Boca Chica. The record should also show that Lady Luck was riding with the FAR pilots on 17 April. Alvaro Prendes Quintana, for example, reported that shortly before D-Day he had been on infantry detail in the Escanbray for three months and that prior to 17 April 1961 he had done no recent flying until he took off in a T-33. Gustavo Bourzac, who was flying one of the Sea Furies with Enrique Carreras Rojas in attacking the Houston, noted that this was the first time that he had ever fired the machine guns on an aircraft., Douglas Rudd Mole had been stationed at the Mariel base, but hadn't flown for five months. He was recalled after the strike on 15 April, and was transferred to San Antonio to fly a Sea Fury. FAR did not escape completely unscathed on D- Day. Capt. Silva Tablada with a crew of three aboard a B-26, was shot down by anti-aircraft fire from the vessels in the Playa Giron area; and the plane crashed into the sea with no survivors. Carlos Ulloa, a Nicaraguan, flying for Castro's Cuba went into the ocean in his Sea Fury; and there are two claimants to responsibility for this -- those who were aboard the Brigade ships at Playa Giron claimed that it was their machine gun fire which caught the Sea Fury, but there are others who say it was a C-46 returning from a paradrop that so skillfully evaded the Sea Fury by dropping close to the ocean that the Sea Fury overshot, misjudged, and crashed into the sea. These however, were the only combat losses suffered by Castro's Air Force.* The bad luck of the Brigade Air Force didn't end, however, with the close of daylight on 17 April. It continued through the night of the 17th, and through the early morning of the 18th. Of six air- craft scheduled to bomb the airfields at San Antonio * The pertinent references of the discussion of Air Operations on 17 April 1961 are listed in Source 8. It might also be noted that Raul Curbelo Morales, who was Chief of the Revolutionary Air Force, claimed that on 17 April, three enemy planes were destroyed and two were damaged and "we don't think they reached their base." Curbelo was partially correct. One of the damaged aircraft did go down at sea, but there were four other damaged aircraft which made success- ful emergency landings -- #933 was subsequently lost, but this was not a direct result of the air combat. and Libertad, five did not drop any ordnance; and the one which did drop some ordnance in the San Antonio area missed the target5for haze and blackouts had obscured the San Antonio field from the sight of God, man, and the Brigade Air Force.* In fact, following the D-2 airfield strike, the only other airfield hit by a Brigade aircraft was Cienfuegos; and this was hit only as an alternative target.** * One of these B-26's put down at the Naval Air Station at Boca Chica, Florida on 18 April at 0049 hours local time because the crew was exhausted. Alvarez Cortina, the pilot, and Salvador Miralles, the navigator, were on their second mission from Puerto Cabezas to Cuba in less than 24 hours, having already participated in the early morning action on D-Day. 9/ ** It was not until the author's request for a photo interpretation study in connection with this history that the bomb damage to the Cienfuegos Airfield turned up. 10/ Grayston Lynch in his after action report on operation PLUTO for the Taylor Committee indicated that the ordnance was dropped on Cienfuegos during the afternoon of 17 April. According to Lynch, one of the two B-26's which were flying cover for the beach had a loosened wing tank; and when his gas re- serve went down, the pilot requested permission to drop his ordnance on Cienfuegos, and Lynch reported that, "This permission was given, and he departed. Results unknown." 11/ The inference is that Lynch gave per- mission for the attack on Cienfuegos, but this is doubtful. Cienfuegos undoubtedly was the designated alternative target for the'B-26 piloted by Antonio Soto, and in addition, Lynch could not communicate (footnote continued on following page)- TONSECR ET In addition to the air combat operations, as reported by flight personnel, there are some other aspects of the air operation on D-Day that require comment. Less than an hour after the message that the D-Day air strike had been cancelled, there was a strange "Emergency" cable from Headquarters to TIDE (at 0702Z) stating: 1. Change to operation plan dictated by unserviceability of landing beach air- strip. 2. Maximum effort being made to make this serviceable. 3. Upon receipt of information strip serviceable, strategic air attacks will be resumed. This may be received as early as mid-day 17 April. 13/ Originated in DPD by Stan Beerli, the message was signed off on by Jake Esterline; and it appears to have advanced a rationale which would be more satisfactory to TIDE officers than the fact of cancellation of the strike for political reasons. directly with the B-26's. The mission is reflected in Gar Thorsrud's mission summary report. Antonio Soto was listed as the pilot and his navigator as Eduardo(?) Rodriguez. In addition to dropping bombs, according to Thorsrud's report, they also strafed the airfield with rockets; and then, either because of damage or the shortage of fuel, were forced to land at Grand Cayman. 12/ TOP SERET The Playa Giron airstrip was, in fact, serviceable. The only difficulty as has already been pointed out, concerned an unidentifiable strip across the width of the runway that appeared on the photography; and this turned out to be simply a dark strip of repaving. Thorsrud, himself, in a, subsequent cable, some 10 hours after the message just reported, stated that the airstrip appeared serviceable at the beachhead. 14/* In addition specific plans were made for the loading and unloading of a motor grader aboard the Lake Charles for clearing the airstrip. 15/ The next message concerning the Playa Giron air- strip was sent by George Gaines on 17 April 1961 at 1720Z (1220 Cuba time). In view of the fact that the Houston and, particularly, the Rio Escondido.had been sunk, nothing was said about using the strip to launch * As early as 1 April 1961 Thorsrud had requested that personnel needed for operating the air strip at Playa Giron be flown in by C-46, with the C-46 crew first over- flying the air strip to make sure it was serviceable; but Headquarters insisted that "personnel must be physically on the strip to determine condition strip." 14a/ The Thorsrud message referred to in the text had been preceded by about two and a half hours (at 1433Z) by an-OPIM message from the BZagar to Headquarters for TIDE reading: "Pass to tactical air command: Airstrip. Playa Giron ready to be used." 14b/ strategic strikes. Gaines, however, made a rather challenging comment. After noting that any Brigade B-26's forced to land in Grand Cayman "must be con- sidered total loss," he went on to suggest that "air- craft should use [Playa Giron airstrip] as emergency alternative." 16/* Could he really have believed that an aircraft would have survived on that airstrip with FAR controlling the air? Giving an Air Situation Report as of 1930Z on 17 April, Gar Thorsrud made the following interesting observation: Twelve sorties conducted with no air- craft shot down. Most aircraft returning with majority ordnance. Time consumed by covering ships and beachhead, due urgency their request. Pilots all state little or no ground targets. Most recent report stated 5 ships together about 30 miles off shore. Observed one ship sunk. Probably by T-33 or Sea Fury hitting ammo stores. 18/ Although there is a discrepancy between Thorsrud's * The photo intelligence report that was prepared for this history shows the Rio Escondido burning at 0930 Cuban time, and within a matter of minutes, the ship exploded. 17/ See Figures 35-36 for photos of the airstrip at Playa Giron. flown without loss at the time of the above situation report and his Mission Summary report, the major over- sight was that the B-26 piloted by Farias had already been shot down, crash landing on the Playa Giron air strip. What seems incredible considering the hazards faced was that any of the aircraft would have returned with their ordnance intact. It was perhaps for this reason -- the lack of initiative for independent action -- that led to Thorsrud's continued appeal for per- mission to use the contract US crews which were avail- able to him at the JMTIDE base, and to push for author- ization for strikes to be flown by these crews on the night of the 17th against the Cuban air bases. But, even as he was making these requests, his cable ended with the fateful comment that: Info just received and not confirmed [that] T-33 shot down one of our B-26's Red Beach. 19/ In addition to the B-26's which were flying beach support, there were also missions of C-46's carrying paratroops to the blocking positions that had been established for the infantry Brigade. The initial drop was carried out in five C-46's, and the first report based on a debriefing of the C-46 crews was like that from the crews of all aircraft engaged in drop operations (whether bombing or personnel) that their drops were right on target. It was also re- ported that: Two men only injured when static line cable broke on one C-46. Both returned TIDE with aircraft. 20/ Unfortunately, it was found later that the paratroops for drop zone #1 had missed the zone and had lost most of their equipment -- and were themselves an ineffec- tive force and soon out of the action. Contrary to Gray Lynch's promise to Eddy Ferrer that Brigade aircraft would be protected by "blond, blue-eyed, non-Spanish speaking 'Cubans,' flying the latest model, jet fighters," the transports found no such help over the beach on 17 April. 20a/ As mentioned earlier, it was one of the C-46's returning from the troop drop which, when attacked by a Castro Sea Fury, jinked its way down to sea level; but the Sea Fury, either overshooting its target, or being shot out of the air by the anti-aircraft fire from the Brigade ships, crashed into the sea for one of the two combat air losses suffered by Castro's forces. In addition to the C-46's used for troop drops, one C-54 also was used. It was the crew of this C-54 which reported that the airstrip at Playa Giron was usable; and it was this information that Thorsrud had cabled back to Headquarters. 21/ There is one other air operation which may have occurred on the afternoon of 17 April, and although it cannot be verified, it has been reported by both pro and anti-Castro Cuban forces. In the story which has already been told of the death of Crespo and Lorenzo Perez Lorenzo as they attempted to return to the TIDE base, the pro-Castro version of the story is that the B-26's of Crespo and Piedra were spotted between the beach at Playa Larga and the Central Australia Military Headquarters by FAR pilots Alvaro Prendes and Rafael del Pino in T-33's and Douglas Rudd in a Sea Fury. As the Brigade aircraft were attacking a convoy moving down the road toward Playa Larga (Red Beach), with napalm, rockets, and machine guns, they were then driven off by Castro's fighters. 22/ Eddy Ferrer's version is that the Brigade planes were attacking a column of roughly 70 vehicles, con- sisting of jeeps, trucks, and automobiles which was carrying the members of the 339th Battalion from the Castro Headquarters at the Central (Sugar Mill) Australia down to the area of Playa Larga. Ferrer, too, says that the attack launched by the two Brigade B-26's consisted of napalm, rockets, and machine guns; and he paints a scene of carnage with some 500 casual- ties -- implying, in fact, that the 500 were killed. 23/ All that Thorsrud's Mission Summary Report shows in the way of operations over the Red Beach (Playa Larga) area on 17 April is the morning action where six trucks were knocked out, but not by either of the B-26 crews which were mentioned by Ferrer. The possibility that there was at least some sort of air strike which caught the 339th Battalion on the road down to Playa Larga is further substantiated in the most authoritative Cuban work on the Bay of Pigs, Playa Giron Derrota del Imperialismo.* One of the wounded Battalion members who specified that he had been wounded in an air attack; and in fact, he suffered three .50 caliber slugs which caused the removal of one of his arms. 24/ There is little likelihood, In-four volumes. Havana: Ediciones R, 1961-1962. TOP z CRET however, that the degree of damage from the attack was as severe as specified by Ferrer. A more important question regarding the reported attack on the 339th Battalion, concerns the use of na- palm on that Monday afternoon (17 April 1961). It has already been noted that the debates over the possible use of napalm had been going on at least since the last part of 1960, but even though there was training in the use and rigging of make-shift napalm bombs at MADD, the official authorization for the use of napalm was not granted until Tuesday, 18 April. It is also known, how- ever that at 0206Z on 17 April -- after the D-Day strike had already been officially cancelled -- Thorsrud had two napalm equipped B-26's which he planned to use to hit Castro's tanks at Managua. Because they were also equipped with long range tanks, Thorsrud recommended that after hitting Managua they could then provide beach support. 25/ The possibility does exist that these two aircraft were flown by Brigade pilots and that napalm was employed, against the rules, on Monday, 17 April 1961.* The message of the 18th, authorizing * This probably was without Thorsrud's permission for he has subsequently stated in a discussion about the use of napalm that the rules were strictly followed. 26/ the use of napalm set very specific limits: This message authority to use napalm on military targets to protect beachhead area (repeat beachhead area) only. Utmost caution mandatory to avoid friendly troops. 27/ Among the survivors of the operations at the Bay of Pigs on 17 April 1961, Grayston Lynch, one of the two Americans who helped mark the beach for the Brigade landing, probably had the closest and longest continuing look at the operations of the Sea Furies, T-33's, and B-26's of Castro's FAR. After marking the beach, Lynch returned to the LCI, Blagar, which was. -under attack by FAR aircraft off and on until late afternoon of the 17th. Among his other responsibilities, Lynch also was in charge of the guns aboard the LCI. There were eleven .50 caliber machine guns and two 75mm recoilless rifles among other armament; and al- though he had an American crew -- some of whom were supposed to be members of gun crews -- the "Yankees" were merchant seamen and they all disappeared when the firing started. According to Lynch, the Cubans and he operated all the guns aboard the vessel; and there is little question that Lynch was thoroughly disenchanted with the merchant crews that had been put aboard the ship in lieu of trained military personnel. When push came to shove, Lynch said that he found two Americans hiding in the walk-in ice box aboard the Blagar. 28/ As for the aircraft overhead, Lynch had problems not only with Castro's aircraft, but the Brigade B-26's also made life difficult for him. Of the Brigade air- craft on D-Day, Lynch said: We sent a message very early on the first morning down there -- a Monday morning, just after daylight -- to Puerto Cabezas and told them to tell those planes to stay away from us, because we couldn't tell them from the Castro planes. We ended up shooting at two or three of them. We hit some of them there because when they came at us ... it was a silhouette, that was all you could see. Now, there were blue rings painted around those planes [actually a blue stripe around the wings, exterior of the motors], [but] I saw [only] one aircraft all day long where I actually saw the blue rings, and that was after he passed over me. They were impos- sible to see when they were coming at you. Our planes were a little nosey, and they wanted to take a look at the action. They wanted to take a look at the ships, and they would come from over the water straight at us ... fly directly above it at the same altitude that the Castro planes did ... The only type of rings that would have helped there, would have been this brilliant international orange that the Air Force uses, or something of that nature. 29/ Of the Castro aircraft, Lynch was even more ex- press-ive: We were under almost constant attack there. I would say absolutely constant, with one bird coming right after the other. Usually a single plane. You just can't unload [supplies] and man anti- aircraft guns at the same time. So while we were under attack, all unloading activities ceased. Then it took some time after the planes had departed be- fore we could get the people back, get them back into unloading -- so we weren't getting anywhere ... At the beginning of that [Monday] morning, they [FAR] were pretty sloppy and haphazard, but the one thing which was worrying me badly was the fact that they kept improving as the morning wore on ... They were getting bolder, they were getting closer, and they were now using rockets. That's what hit the Rio Escondido. That was a lucky hit for them, but there was a clear danger as far as I was concerned that we could lose both of those ships -- the AtZantico and the Caribe -- in the same manner that we lost the Rio Escondido. By a rocket setting them on fire ... If we stayed where we were, we stood a very good chance of losing both ships. I wasn't worried about B-26's or the Sea Furies. I was worried about the T-33's because we had no defense against them. I'll explain to you why ... The Sea Fury and the B-26 always came to us directly from the shortest route from Havana, from the NW. We could see them at great dis- stance. They came straight at us, usually one at a time, sometimes two. They would be at about 5,000 feet. They would get directly above the ships, and they would circle; and then they would dive or. us. They gave us all the opportunity in the world to get ready for them, and we were able to bring very effective fire on them. The T-33's were a different breed of cats. They came inland, got to the east of us, up into the sun, and the sun at that time of the year, down there, was a monstrous ball, looking to the east. You just didn't even look in that direc- tion. They came out of that sun. We had no radar to detect them, no warning. The first warning we had that the T-33's are at you was when we heard the rockets. Then he made one pass -- very fast -- at you. By the time that you realized that he was there, he was out of range. He would disappear over to the west and would go inland again -- get back in the sun -- and make another attack. About 10 minutes apart or 5 minutes apart. You would never, ever be prepared for it. You couldn't see it coming out of that sun, and they were so fast that I actually shot at only one of them all day long. My tracers were missing him by a good hundred yards. It was pathetic. 30/ Speculating on what might have been, had the situation been different, Lynch noted: Those guns were not put aboard [the Blagar] until we got down there.[Puerto Cabezas]. The reason why they were not armed more than that was the fact -- we go back again to the air -- that we weren't supposed to have anti-aircraft guns up there because we were not sup- posed to be hit by enemy planes. If they had not cancelled those air raids, we would not have been hit by enemy planes ... The only aircraft that we were really interested in -- the only aircraft that would have really mattered down there -- was the T-33. If they had TOPECR ET destroyed those T-33's, they could have left the Sea Furies and others untouched, and we would have got by. Those aircraft would eventually have been shot out of the air, by ships, by ground fire -- be- cause we did shoot down one Sea Fury and two B-26's ... But if there had been no T-33's, the Sea Furies and the B-26's would have given us a hard time. But eventually, by attrition, we would have gotten all of them ... Even our own aircraft could have taken care of them. They [the B-26's] never pushed an attack -- except one time, when we shot this one down. He pushed it, and made a mistake. He found out that going straight in was not the way to do it. We shot him down, and he, in fact, hit the water and bounced over the top of our ship -- cleared it by about 20 feet! With the small amount of anti- aircraft we did have -- 50 calibers -- if there had been no T-33's there, we would never have left the bay. We would have stayed there, because we could take care of that ... [The T-33's] were going after us, but they weren't hitting us, but it was the potential of those planes that I was pointing out. It was a fact that we could not stop them. We couldn't hit them at all. In other words, as far as the T-33's were concerned, we were absolutely defenseless. Now the others, fine; we could take care of them ... First, they were slower; and secondly, their method of attack. You see, they didn't get up in the sun and dive on us like the T-33's did. They came at us in the open, and we always had plenty of -time ... [With] just the two vessels that we had there -- the big ships, the TO SECRET 2 LCI's and the 2 LCU's -- we had over forty .50 calibers firing on them. 31/* On 17 April 1961, almost immediately upon re- ceipt of the news that the Houston and the Rio Escon- dido had been sunk, plans began to be made for a re- supply air drop as well as possible re-supply by water, for the forces on the beach. Because of sheer cowardice -- there is no other explanation possible -- on the part of the crews of the Atlantico and the Caribe, resupply by sea proved to be impossible. Consequently such resupply efforts as were attempted were exclusively by air drop. Drops were planned for the night of 17 April for both Playa Larga and Playa Giron. At Playa Larga, the instructions called for the drops to be made parallel to the coast; and over the town area at Playa Giron, the supplies were to be dropped on the airstrip. 33/ It was also planned that on 18 April (Tuesday) a C-46 would attempt to land with supplies at the airstrip at Playa Giron. * Whose B-26's were in the air at any given time was confusing not only to Lynch, but also confused Castro's FAR pilots and his ground troops. Jacques Lagas, one of the FAR pilots noted that on numerous occasions, be- ginning with the 15th of April, Brigade aircraft were mistaken for FAR aircraft; and he said that by 18 April,, the troops on both sides fired on any B-26 that was within range. 32/ Another interesting aspect of air operations on 17 April that was revealed in the subsequent re- ports of FAR pilots was the great dissatisfaction with the armament of their planes, particularly the B-26's and the T-33's. Many of the FAR pilots, as well as other observers from Castro's ground forces, reported armament on the Brigade B-26's that never existed and attacks by US jet aircraft that never took place. Enrique Carreras Rojas, one of Castro's pilots who participated heavily in the initial action, re- ported that a Brigade B-26 opened fire on him with its tail guns -- which were non-existent -- and other of the FAR pilots were also spooked by the Brigade B-26's. Jacques Lagas complained that he was going to have to go in combat in his B-26, against another B-26 that had three times the armament of his aircraft. Lagas was apparently under the assumption that the Brigade B-26's had both the tail and the dorsal turrets and was unaware of the fact that the mounting was eight nose guns. Cedrick Belfridge, a British novelist, critic, and newspaper man who had been deported from the United States during the McCarthy period, perhaps hit the jackpot in identifying, not only the B-26's of the Brigade, but also claiming that B-29's and F-86's were shooting up Cuba. 34/ The air action on D-Day also presented an inter- national relations problem because of the number of B-26's that had made emergency landings on Grand Cayman. the way to get the crews and/or the aircraft out of Grand Cayman. The exact number of B-26's that were forced to land at Grand Cayman was probably three, although in the earlier reporting a claim was made that there were five B-26's down on the airstrip.* It was suggested to that he might emphasize that unless the aircraft were removed, the possibility was that Cuba and other nations might believe that Grand Cayman was being used as the launch base in the * In an Oral History interview with the author, James A. Cunningham, Jr., the Administrative Officer for DPD at the time of Project JMATE, suggested that one of the reasons so many emergency landings were recorded was because the B-26 was a marginal aircraft for the job intended. Cunningham emphasized that only through the exercise of extreme fuel discipline could the air- craft cro from Puerto Cabezas to Cuba, perform a combat mission, and get back to Nicaragua. It was a discipline that most of the Cuban pilots had not mastered. 34a/ TOPCR ET effort against Castro. That such pressure was actually applied is doubtful; and, in any event all of the downed crews and aircraft were recovered from Grand Cayman without any great difficulty. 35/* One final disquieting note to conclude the story of 17 April 1961 concerns the return of Allen Dulles from his speechmaking in Puerto Rico.** Dick Drain, C/OPS/WH4 had been directed to meet Mr. Dulles at Friendship Airport on the night of 17 April and brief him on the Cuban situation. Drain did so in the course of returning Dulles to his home, and Drain re- ported that Dulles asked few questions. Moreover Dulles seemed to be. more interested in the than in the problems of the increasingly tenuous air support that was available for the anti-Castro effort then being made in Cuba. 36a/ * As a matter of fact a Southern Air Transport C-46 was scheduled to land at Grand Cayman at 04002 on 17 April 1961 to pick up the two crews that had been forced to land there following the D-2 strike. 36/ ** See footnote p. 272. B. Day of Grace -- 18 April 1961 As previously mentioned, the attempts on the night of 17-18 April to destroy the remainder of Castro's Air Force at San Antonio de los Banos failed because of extremely poor weather conditions. Jacques Lagas, the FAR pilot from Chile, reported a rather comic opera situation at San Antonio when one of the Brigade B-26's apparently passed rather close to the field. Lagas said that there was practically a panic on the ground; and that when the aircraft disappeared, various of the Castro heroes were pointing to bullet holes here and there claiming that these were fired by the Brigade aircraft. According to Lagas, however, there had been a fusillade of .45's, Garands, 12.7mm machine guns, and FAL automatic rifles by the FAR pilots who shot in every direction, including into their own compound. 37/ From that note of comic re- lief, attention can now be focused on events of 18 April, the only reasonably successful day experienced by the Brigade Air Force -- success being measured as no aircraft or crews lost. With the troops on the beach in need of ammuni- tion resupply and the naval vessels unable to come in close enough to off-load for fear of attacks by the T-33's and Sea Furies, air drops offered the only hope for getting materiel to the ground troops. Be- tween the evening of 17 April and dark on 18 April, between five and nine transport aircraft were loaded with tank ammunition, mortar shells, small arms ammuni- tion, machine gun ammunition, heavy weapons ammuni- tion, hand grenades, and other supplies and rigged for airdrop at Playa Giron and Playa Larga. It was sub- sequently reported that on the night of 17/18 April, seven C-54 loads were rigged and launched from TIDE. Three loads were kicked out at Blue Beach and one at Red Beach, with three aircraft failing to complete the mission because of the return of daylight and the enemy air activity. Each of these aircraft carried approximately 12,000 lbs. of ammunition so that 48,000 lbs. was actually airdropped for the forces on the beach. A C-46 carrying 8,000-10,000 lbs. of ammuni- tion also dropped its load at the Playa Giron airfield on the morning of 18 April; but a second C-46 which was scheduled either to land at the Playa Giron air- strip or make a drop failed to do either because of the presence of enemy aircraft. Like the C-54's which had not unloaded, the C-46 carried its cargo back to the base at TIDE. 38/* Even as the supply drops for 18 April were being completed, additional resupply missions were * This information from DPD was submitted to the Taylor Committee on 26 May 1961, but it shows some discrepancies from that of Gar Thorsrud, who was actually in charge of air operations at TIDE. Thors- rud's summary of operations agrees that three C-54's made successful drops at Blue Beach, with a fourth C-54 being turned back because of enemy aircraft. Thorsrud's report also shows that a C-46 aborted be- cause of the presence of enemy aircraft, but there is no indication of additional C-54's that were.loaded and failed to drop, nor of an additional C-46 such as mentioned in the DPD summary. There is, however, some internal contradiction within Thorsrud's own reporting, for he showed that one of the C.-54's (Mission 54-31) which made a successful drop -- the plane being piloted by Cereceda, according to the Ops-Summary -- had dropped at Red Beach; but in his later summarization of the total air supply activity, he also showed this mission as one of the three successful drops at Blue Beach. Possibly the plan called for Cereceda to make drops to both Red and Blue beaches. 39/ Eddie Ferrer, in one of the relatively few in- stances in an otherwise apparently accurate story of the air activity, got carried away in telling the story of his own role on the 18th. He tells a suspenseful tale of being picked as one of the three chief pilots for C-54's which were to participate in the resupply effort, and he goes on at some length indicating the problems of choosing his crew and the hazards of making a successful drop at the Playa Giron area. 40/ In fact, it appears that Ferrer drew the more hazardous assign- ment of landing a C-46 on the Playa Giron airstrip with supplies. The mission was aborted because of reports of enemy air activity. 41/ scheduled to begin on the night of 18-19 and to con- tinue through Wednesday, 19 April. The C-46 which had been scheduled to land at Playa Giron on the 18th was being rescheduled to try and land at the air strip on the 19th with ammunition, medical supplies, and food. The C-54's were being scheduled for the night drops on 18-19, and all aircraft were warned to fly low, close to sea level. The C-54's were instructed to have an observer in the astrodome at low level to observe potential incoming attacks from Castro's fighter aircraft. After outlining the airdrop sched- ule, Headquarters closed one message with the optimistic note that "The other side is hurt, so hang on" -- at TIDE they knew better. There was a brief interval of optimism at TIDE during the afternoon of the 18th when the expectation was that US Navy A4D's, flying off of the Essex would provide air cover for the B-26's; and, in addition, four P-51's, supposedly equipped for long range flight, acquired from President Somoza of Nicaragua would be made available to escort Brigade aircraft over Cuba. As will be noted later., the P-51's never were employed in a combat role; and the question of Navy air cover, even late on 18 April, was an off-again-on-again proposition with a cable to TIDE from Headquarters on 18 April, at 2006Z, stating: Possibly Navy activities may be re- stricted. Therefore, hold C-54 until after dark. Launch C-46 with warning exercise max precaution.* Plans were being made on the 18th for a resupply airdrop on the night of 19-20 April by the USAF. Such missions would free Brigade C-46's which might land at Playa Giron during the night of 18-19 for the purpose of evacuating wounded to TIDE. At TIDE the Cuban air crews would be relieved, and American air crews would take the C-46's with their wounded up to Boca Chica Naval Air Station in Key West. Neither the C-46 evacuation flights nor the airdrop of some 60-90,000 lbs. from three C-130's took place. As Jim Cunningham of DPD pointed.out: General Cabell also had asked me about why we had been unable to load and dis- patch the four C-130 aircraft from Kelly Air Force Base on 18 April. I told him that there had not been time to rig the approximately 90,000 pounds of cargo in the time allotted with the insufficient * The subject of US Navy air support is discussed separately in Section D of this Chapter. TOP CRET number of riggers on hand. I did advise him that and six PDO's/riggers had flown from Missoula, Montana, to in a chartered airplane, and had the beach not been lost the afternoon of the 19th, the C-130's would have been ready to go that night. 42/* The anticipated support from the US Air Force and the freeing of the Brigade transport aircraft, also interjected another desperate measure into the planning that was going on at Headquarters, for late on the 18th of April, the following message went to TIDE from Headquarters: Authority now granted for use cargo aircraft to deliver improvised napalm bombs to isolated air strips. Targets should be in order San Julian Air Base, Santiago Air Base, San Antonio Air Base, Managua, Nueva Gerona Air Base. Caution crews to avoid residential areas. 44/** * In addition to the C-130's which were scheduled to make the direct airdrops on the strip at Playa Giron, there were three Air Force C-124's which were scheduled to land at Managua on 19 April and take off for TIDE after dark to off-load resupplies for the beach. 43/ ** The reader may recall that during the late stages of the training period at both JMADD and JMTIDE, exper- iments were being conducted with homemade napalm bombs being pushed out of C-54's and C--46's -- not with a great deal of success. This was an exceedingly strange priority listing of targets. San Antonio was the principal field of operations for Castro's fighters from 17-20 April 1961. The author finds no rationale for placing San Julian as the primary target. On the Headquarters priority list at 0418Z on 18 April, San (footnote continued on following page) TOP-S T By this time the ban on napalm, which according to both Col. Hawkins and Gen. Cabell had been an Agency decision because its use "would cause concern and public outcry," had gone by the board in favor of anything that might reverse the situation in Cuba in favor of the Brigade forces. 46/ In addition to the anticipated air transport support from the USAF on the 18th, this also was the best day for the Brigade B-26's -- there were no air- craft losses suffered that day and an effective strike was made against a Castro column which was moving south from Playa Larga to Playa Giron. It also was quite fortuitous that no Brigade B-26's were lost, for according to Castro eight FAR pilots had flown 20 sorties that day. Apparently FAR operated two T-birds, two B-26's, and two Sea Furies out of the San Antonio de los Banos airfield. 47/ For this reason, TIDE con- tinued to request restrikes at San Antonio following the failure of the mission early in the morning of 17-18 April. Not only was Thorsrud's request for Julian was placed ninth on a list of ten priority targets. 45/ It was principally a helicopter base, but there is no evidence of helicopter activity until 20 April. restrike granted, but in addition he was also given permission on the 18th to use American contract crews for beachhead support. This would relieve the Cuban crews of the necessity for undertaking both the beach- head missions during the day and the attempted strikes on the airfields during the late night and early morning hours. There was, however, a warning issued to Thorsrud concerning the Americans. It read as follows: American contract crews can (repeat can) be used B-26 strikes beachhead area and approaches only. Emphasize beachhead area only. Cannot attach sufficient importance to fact that American crews must not fall into hands enemy. In event this happens despite all precautions, crews must state hired mercenaries, fighting communism, etc.; US will deny any knowledge. 48/ Apparently within a matter of minutes, following the clearances to use the American contract crews, Head- quarters cabled to TIDE the following: Immediately upon receipt this message, launch fifty percent B-26 strike[.] Air- craft armed your discretion destroy tanks and vehicles on approaches beachhead. Con- serve Cuban crews for max effort night attacks target One [San Antonio airfield]. US Navy Air Cap over beachhead area will provide fighter cover your aircraft. 49/ Of this mission, Connie Seigrist who was one of the two US participants and the flight leader recalled:- 345 - TOP CRET TONSECRET I asked Gar if I could take a flight of B-26's and support the ground troops at the Bay of Pigs. I just could not feel right in letting them down. Gar said, "O.K." [Doug] Price also wanted to go. Gar said also there had to be a Cuban B-26 and crew to go along with each American pilot and B-26. Price and I each flew a B-26 with a Cuban observer. My observer was a Cuban Air Security Chief.* Four other B-26's were flown with Cuban volunteers. The flight was to seek and search targets in support of our ground troops. We were sure Castro should have a convoy headed to the Bay of Pigs as he had four days to organize one.** This is the basic reason that we were not interested in airfields -- but to help our troops. We did not encounter Castro aircraft on this mission, but they arrived over target one. minute after our departure from target. It has been a long time, but I would estimate at least eight light tanks and 15 to 20 trucks with troops advancing on our troops, only a couple of miles from contact. We bombed, strafed, rocketed, and napalmed all our stores in about five or six minutes and left the convoy badly messed up. We never learned our exact damage. 50/*** * According to Eduardo Ferrer (Operation Puma, p. 208) Gustavo Villodo was Seigrist's right seat companion; and Alberto Perez Sordo rode with Price. ** Mr. Seigrist had placed the initial strike at Castro's airfields on D-3, rather than D-2. *** Beigrist indicated that the Cuban Air Force Com- mander and the Director of Flight Operations (DFO) for the Brigade had prohibited the Cuban pilots from (footnote continued on following page) TO CRET The Mission Summary for the raid which Seigrist led on the afternoon of the 18th, indicated that there were as many as 15-20 tanks and 20 trucks in the con- voy coming down the coastal road; and the report stated that each of the six B-26's made several passes inflicting heavy damage to the trucks and to the tanks. The more detailed Mission Summary of 20 April shows that 9,000 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition, 8 napalm bombs, 50 rockets, and 20 fragmentation bombs (presumably 260 lb. frags) were expended against this convoy. The report in this later Mission Summary was that the target was "partially destroyed" -- partially destroyed were 1-4 tanks and several trucks. 51/ Col. Jack Hawkins, on the other hand, in his Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Govern- ment of Cuba made the following comments about the air flying any more -- except as volunteers -- as early as Tuesday, 17 April. He also said that after the mission of 18 April described above, even the Cubans who had volunteered for the mission were threatened by the other pilots who were following the directions of the DFO. Ferrer, however, indicates that it was not until Wednesday, 19 April, after the loss of the American crews that the standdown of the Cubans was ordered by Luis Cosme (Operacion Puma, page 215). strike on the afternoon of 18 April: In the afternoon, a highly successful attack was launched by six aircraft (two flown by Americans) against a 20 mile long truck and tank column approaching Blue Beach from the west. Several tanks and about twenty large troop-laden lorries were destroyed by napalm, bombs, rockets, and machine gun fire. (It'is noteworthy that an enemy report intercepted on this date indicated that he had already suffered 1,800 casualties, mostly from air attack). 52/* On at least two occasions, Castro, himself, and the other members of Castro's armed forces claimed that the strike against the convoy on the afternoon of 18 April was made by US Sabre jets, rather than by B-26's. As pointed out earlier, in the course of combat, those under attack reported seeing many different types of aircraft -- none of which actually appeared in the course of the air operations. Castro and others admit that there were many casualties among personnel in the convoy, but no"detailed figures have ever been surfaced on the number killed and wounded. 54/** * The author has been unable to recover this frequently referenced "intercept." Hawkins also claimed that during the night, this convoy was reattacked by six B-26's, but this can neither be confirmed nor is it believed. In view of the limited activity of the Brigade B-26's -- including the strike in question -- the 1,800 casualty figure is believed an exaggeration. 53/ ** There were no Sabre jets aboard the Essex, but there were A4-D's that did fly the Navy CAP. As already noted four P-51's had been acquired from the Nicaraguan Air Force for possible use as B-26 escorts. During the course of 18 April, what had been initially regarded as a 50 minute job to sterilize and paint the aircraft dragged on through the day; and the mission of the P-51's was to be expanded to escort the C-46's from Puerto Cabezas to the airstrip at Playa Giron. The plan was to deliver avgas in drums ,to the Playa Giron airstrip, and fly both support and tactical missions from that strip. Before the end of the day, it had become apparent that use of the P-51's was going to be more of a problem than had been anticipated. Buck Persons, one of the transport pilots, who, according to his story, had P-51 experience during the course of WWII was tapped to train four or five Cubans who were to fly the P-51's -- pilots who presumably had had some fighter training experience. Persons painted a dim picture of the qualifications of the five Cubans who were assigned to learn the ropes of the P-51. Strongly suggesting that they were somewhat less than enthusiastic candidates for the task at hand, Persons did not plan to be in the forefront of the P-51 flight if it took off for Cuba. 55/ Eddie Ferrer also had some comments to make about the possibilities of using the P-51 Mustangs which had been acquired from the Government of Nica- ragua. Like Persons, Ferrer pointed out that it was really after the fact by the time they got.around to trying to get the P-51 program organized and the planes into the air. Ferrer noted that Capt. Antonio Boscaro, one of the Cuban pilots who had been assigned to the P-51's, took one up for the first time and immediately realized that it was going to be a one way trip from JMTIDE to the airstrip at Playa Giron because of the limited fuel capacity of these particular aircraft_* Furthermore, according to Capt. Boscaro, the naviga- tion equipment was inadequate for the flight that was being contemplated; but where Persons suggested that the potential P-51 pilots were less than enthusiastic about joining their comrades in combat in Cuba, Ferrer says that Capt. Boscaro volunteered to follow a B-26 mother plane to Cuba where he would either land at the Playa Giron airstrip -- which, of course, was * When President Somoza authorized use of the P-51's he cautioned that they could not make the round trip to Cuba without refueling. 55a/ what Thorsrud had anticipated -- or, if his fuel supply fell short and he couldn't reach the landing strip, then the Cuban Captain allowed as how he would bail out and head for the Brigade, fighting on the ground. What he would do if he ran out of fuel over the ocean was not spelled out. In any event, despite Somoza's best effort to insure the success of the Brigade air operation, his P-5l's never got into com- bat over Cuba. 56/ As 18 April drew to a close, it was planned to continue the air activity through the night with B-26's recycling over the San Antonio airfield at approximately 2 hour intervals, making passes from various headings toward all the parking areas for the T-33's and Sea Furies that were still operable. The C-54's and C-46's were to be loaded and dispatched as fast as possible, and Thorsrud planned to use American pilots to back up Cuban crews on the transport runs to Cuba from TIDE. Additionally, it was anticipated that both the B-26 aircraft and their crews, which were still down in Grand Cayman, would be returned to the TIDE base before the morning of 19 April. 57/ C. Four for A Cause -- 19 April 1961 In an attempt to meet the needs of the Brigade on the beach on 19 April, two C-46's were scheduled to make air drops in the Playa Giron area -- one drop to be on the airstrip and the other in the city area; and a C-54 was supposed to make a drop over Blue Beach itself. It was reported that all three missions either aborted or were recalled because of the presence of Castro aircraft in the target areas; but examination of the cable traffic and other available information indicates that the aircraft did not abort, but for one reason or another all of the drops went astray. Mes- sages indicated that the attempted drops at the air- strip had been blown away and that the C-54 drops at the beach had gone into the sea. The only successful resupply mission on 19 April resulted from appeals by the ground force commander, Jose Perez San Roman ("Pepe" San Roman), for a C-46 to land at the Playa Giron air field with supplies and to evacuate Brigade wounded. A C-46 flown by Manuel Navarro, with Jose E. Pellon and Robert H. Hofbuck as co-pilot and navigator respectively, put down at the airstrip and discharged 8,500 lbs. of TOP SET assorted ammunition, medicines, radio gear, and other items needed by the Brigade.* Although he talked to the Brigade medical doctor, Dr. Juan Sordo, and was told that the Brigade wounded could be brought from a hospital to the aircraft in an hour or two, Navarro made the difficult decision to fly the C-46 out of Cuba before the FAR fighters destroyed it on the ground. The only person to be evacuated was Matias Farias, the B-26 pilot who had survived the shoot down and crash landing at the Playa Giron airstrip on D-Day. 59/ In addition to outlining the program for resupply of the Brigade, Gar Thorsrud also forwarded to Head- quarters the plans for tactical air operations in support of the Brigade ground forces on 19 April. The B-26's were going to go out in pairs every two hours to work-over the roads leading into the beach- head area, and a C-54 was being loaded with 55 gallon drums of napalm in an attempt to provide additional, attack capability on the roadways. Thorsrud also in- formed Headquarters that American crews were going to * Hofbuck is the alias for a North American contract navigator whose participation in this episode has not yet been made public. 58/ be employed on all missions because the Cuban crews were nearly exhausted: Five or six stalwarts remain among Cuban B-26 crews that we can count on. They are Ponzoa, Herrera, Zuniga, Rene Garcia, Soto, and Varilla. Others nearly finished. May fly, but would abort or make quick pass in target area. Cuban C-46 and C-54 crews holding up well. C-54 napalm run not launched, no spotting charges for igniters. 59a/* The Chief of TIDE'S air operations also expressed great concern about the need for effective USN air cover. On the 18th, according to Thorsrud, the B-26's were not being met by Navy air until they reached the 12 mile limit -- either inbound or outbound. Addition- ally: Beach reports enemy aircraft made passes on beach while Navy aircraft remained at high altitude. If this procedure used in the morning [19 April] Headquarters can expect to lose some American crews. 60/ The first of the B-26's to take off from Puerto Cabezas for Cuba on 19 April was flown by Gonzalo * A few hours after sending this message, Thorsrud's concern was borne out when he reported: Cuban crews depleted and either refuse to fly or are exhausted. Two Cuban crews have just aborted on take-off. 59b/ Herrera, one of the truly dedicated pilots of the Brigade Air Force. The record indicates that Herrera departed between 0600Z-0700Z, putting him over the target area about 09302-10002 (0430-0500 Havana/Wash- ington). Between 08452 and 09002 four or five B-26's flown by US pilots headed for Cuba, and these were followed at 1045Z by two or three additional US piloted B-26's.* The Americans who piloted the B-26's were Billy J. Goodwin, Dalton H. Livingston, Thomas W. Ray, Riley W. Shamburger, and Joseph L. Shannon of the Alabama Air National Guard; and Doug Price and Connie Seigrist of the Agency's Far East proprietary, CAT. Two additional Americans from the Alabama ANG, Leo * The question concerning the exact number of US piloted B-26's on 19 April arises from a difference between the Mission Summary Report prepared for the Taylor Committee'in April 1961 and Thorsrud's revi- sion of that Mission Summary Report in 1968 when he reviewed Person's book, Bay of Pigs. The question was whether Doug Price flew as a co-pilot with Connie Seigrist -- as indicated in the early summary -- or flew a B-26 himself as indicated by the later report. Based on the need for B-26 pilots and the fact that non-pilot personnel -- Wade Gray, a navigator, and Leo Baker, a radio operator -- were riding the second seats, it is presumed that Price -- who had flown a B-26 during the attack on the Castro convoy on the 18th -- was piloting an aircraft not riding as a co- pilot. 61/ Moreover, it seems probable that if Price had been flying with him on 19 April, Seigrist would have remembered this and so specified in his corre- spondence with the author. F. Baker and Wade C. Gray flew as observers for Ray and Shamburger, respectively. 62/ All of these American airmen were volunteers, and all recognized the risk posed by the FAR T-33's and Sea Furies.* Of the B-26's that flew on 19 April, Herrera engaged a Castro convoy heading for Playa Giron from Playa Larga. Ferrer claimed that Herrera destroyed three tanks, three armored trucks, killed 83 and wounded 14, and left the convoy in a shambles -- and Herrera's B-26 with 37 bullet holes in it.63/ The validity of the number of killed and wounded is open to question, and if Thorsrud's Mission Summary for the Taylor Committee were the only other evidence available, the claims for Herrera would be in consider- able doubt since the summary shows only that'Herrera "encountered considerable opposition from.AAA and air- craft." 64/ A message from TIDE on the 19th, however, stated that in an attack on a car-truck convoy, some 7-8 miles northwest of Playa Giron (presumably on the coast road), a single B-26 had partially destroyed * In addition to those listed, the following members of the Alabama Air National Guard flew as B-26 crew members on 19 April 1961: Eldon Cross, Charles Hayden, Carl Sudano, and James Vaughn. Neither Cross nor Sudano had been recruited for overflights. 62a/ the convoy with two napalm bombs, eight rockets, and 2,160 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition. The plane had also decommissioned a tank 4 miles west of Playa Giron. In all probability this was Herrera's work. 65/* Of the nine Americans who took off for the at- tacks against Cuba on 19 April 1961, four were killed in action when two B-26's were shot down. The cable * To the author's knowledge, the number of killed and wounded in any given strike except for that on D minus 2 has never been revealed by Castro. Despite the fact that Ferrer also reported that "Don Gordon" (e.g., Doug Price) and Herrera were both involved in strikes on convoys, an assortment of gremlins apparently limited Price's ordnance to seven of his eight rockets -- neither napalm nor machine guns functioned. In fact, both Ferrer and Persons tell that Price landed with one armed rocket hanging half loose after it had failed to discharge properly. 66/ In addition, there is considerable confusion regarding Price's actual time of departure, but it is more probable -- certainly in view of the plan to fly the B-26's in pairs -- that it was about the same time as Herrera's rather than at 1030Z, as Thorsrud indicated in the revision of his Mission Summary (the 1968 review of Persons's book).. Also according to Seigrist, all of the 1030Z flight was recalled before reaching the target: I don't recall how many B-26's de- parted in flight with me later in the morning [of 19 April 19611 to support our troops, but we were recalled just before we were arriving on target. I do not recall how we received the mes- sage nor who sent it. 67/ Price, as noted, had expended his rockets on targets; and it does not appear that he could have been with this later group. traffic detailed the loss of Riley Shamburger and Wade Gray as follows: 1. Regret report Riley W. Sibbets [Riley Shamburger] shot down by enemy T-33's on dawn attack east Blue Beach. At time Sibbets flying wing for Joe Safranek [Joe Shannon]. 2. T-33's attacked [out] of sun. (No Navy air cover witnessed at anytime.) Riley called Joe advising, "We've been jumped." Both took evasive action, turn- ing into the attacks. Joe observed T-33 almost flying wing with Riley and slid- ing out on overshoot of his final pass. White smoke trailing from Riley's air- craft. He last reported on fire, was observed headed for the ocean, dropped external tanks, and ditched about 3 miles off shore, 20 miles east Blue Beach. Long plume in the water and then a larger splash. Slim possibility may have survived. Have asked Navy (BAYY) for air-sea rescue, but do not have faith they will effect rescue, PBY en- route with orders not proceed in beyond 12 mile limit on pickup unless Navy provides cover. 68/ The information on the shoot down on Shamburger and Gray had been picked up by two of the Brigade B-26's -- probably Herrera and Price -- which had been in the beach area from 101OZ-11302 and were en route back to TIDE. The time of Shamburger's loss was given as 1150Z. The FLASH message from TIDE to BELL further reported: No, repeat no, Navy aircraft in area at that time. In light of above incident, TIDE cannot repeat not provide air support Brigade until effective air cover can be provided. 69/ Thomas "Pete" Ray and Leo Baker had been flying in the northwest sector of the combat area and had made at least one strafing pass at the Central Austra- lia sugar mill -- the Cuban command center for the area -- when they were hit by ground fire. What occurred then is still subject to speculation. The initial messages from TIDE to Headquarters on the shoot down stated that Havana reported that an Ameri- can -- reported variously as "Berliss," "Berles," and "Berllins" -- had been "captured"; and TIDE first speculated that he had parachuted from the disabled B-26. 70/* The Chief of the Cuban Armed Forces Medi- cal Corps, Major Oscar Fernandez Mel, however, was at the Australia sugar mill on 19 April 1961 when the B-26 was hit; and he reported that the plane made a crash landing in a cleared cane field. Major Fernandez Mel stated that one charred body was found and that two others in the plane jumped out, but were later * Headquarters quickly cabled'TIDE to "Pls send names of US pilots who went down. Who was with Berliss [Baker]?" 70a/ 'found in an orange grove about 4 or 5 kilometers from the place where the plane crashed." 71/ Con- sidering that Havana radio so quickly reported on the identification of Baker, it seems clear that he, rather than Ray, died in the crash. That there was a third person in the B-26 with Ray and Baker can only be attributed to the imagina- tion of excited ground observers, and there seems no reason to doubt that the pilot of the B-26, Pete Ray, survived the crash landing and attempted to escape. According to Cubans who were involved in the search for the survivor of the crash, he was armed with a pistol, hand grenades, and a knife; and he was killed in a gun fight when resisting capture. One Cuban re- port of 23 April 1961, also stated that no identifica- tion was found on the flyer killed in the gun fight; and to the author's knowledge the Government of Cuba has never publicly acknowledged Ray's identity. 72/* * Some of those who were involved in the air operations believed that both Ray and Baker were murdered in cold blood by the Cuban militiamen. Both Gar Thorsrud and Sid Stembridge reported seeing a picture taken from a Havana newspaper which showed two bodies, believed to be Ray and Baker, which showed single bullet holes in their` foreheads and no other apparent bodily injuries. This would suggest, of course, that the two had been (footnote continued on following page) 360 - TOP RET In addition to the Americans and Bonzalo Herrera, Eddy Ferrer's book claimed that Mario Zuniga, another murdered. Persons also gives some credence to this theory, too, even though his version of the story has Ray being found in the plane and Baker jumping out pistol in hand and fighting to his death. 73/ The author of this history does not subscribe to the murder theory, but believes that the story as told in the text above is probably an accurate reflection of what happened. Peter H. Wyden wrote the Director of Central Intel- ligence that during his 1978 visit to Cuba he "was informed that Cuban authorities are still holding, in a morgue, the body of one of the four Alabama Air National Guard pilots who were killed on a combat mission for the CIA on the morning of April 19[, 1961]." 73a/ In the true spirit of an American patriot, Mr. Wyden, who was writing a book on the Bay of Pigs and had long bedeviled the Agency for access to its files, also wrote: "I would be willing to make all the above and other information available in re- turn for reasonable cooperation with my own research needs." 73b/ This offer was in the same tenor as one Mr. Wyden made to the author of this history on 30 December 1975, when he (Wyden) telephoned to inquire about this author's failure to respond to a Wyden letter of 6 December 1975 requesting assistance in his research efforts. When told that his proposal for a meeting was of no interest to this writer, Wyden then "tried to butter me up by tell- ing me of a considerable amount of 'interesting' material he'was acquiring through his interviews and, after indi- cating some consideration of the 'ethics' of the problem, said he would be willing to make the material available to me. I told him that I was completely uninterested in anything he could offer." 73c/ In his recent book, Bay of Pigs, Wyden wrote that an official of the Cuban Foreign Ministry told him that the body in the morgue was Baker's. 73d/ On 5 September 1979, however, it was reported that the FBI had identified the body as that of Ray on the basis of fingerprints which had been sent to Washington by "Cuban officials." 73e/ Wyden's book-also carries the photos (following p. 160) of the bodies of Ray and Baker, and it has a much more detailed story of the Ray-Baker crash as told by Dr. Oscar Fernandez Mel than the physician/soldier gave at the time of the (footnote continued on following page) of the truly dedicated Cuban pilots with the Brigade, also flew a B-26 on 19 April. Ferrer listed Manuel Villafana, the Brigade's Air Chief, as Zuniga's co- pilot. Ferrer apparently confused the missions for the Mission Summary Report shows that Zuniga -- who had flown the B-26 deception plane on D minus 2 and had been over the beach on the 17th -- and Villafana flew in the strike against the Castro convoy on the afternoon of the 18th. 74/ D. Bitter Recriminations: The Navy CAP, 19 April 1961 The loss of four American fliers on 19 April 1961 precipitated an immediate and on-going controversy trial of the Brigade members. The author of this his- tory finds the enlarged version too hard to swallow, especially when the story is told that Ray, having pulled the pin on a grenade, was then machine gunned down from two yards distance by a Cuba militia man -- and no mention is made of the grenade exploding or wounding others. 73e/ Details of the litigation surrounding verifica- tion of the deaths of the four ANG flyers are omitted from this history, but extensive records are available in the files of Air Branch, SOG Details of the posthumous awarding of the Distinguished Intelligence Cross -- the Agency's highest award for valor -- are closely held by the Office of Personnel and the General Counsel's office of CIA; but some of the planning for possible publicity on the awards is given in Appendix 9. between the Navy and the Agency which has not been resolved to this day. Whether it can be resolved at this point will be left to the reader's judgment. Review and reconstruction of the messages, memoranda, and other pertinent information indicate that USN planning for Operation BUMPY ROAD (the Navy's identi- fication of CIA's anti-Castro program) had begun on 25 March 1961 with authorization from the JCS. On 1 April, Rules of Engagement had been issued for surface shipping and air patrols; and on 17 April, the USN Task Group got its first orders to provide Early Warning (EW) for the Brigade ships from Castro aircraft. 74a/ It was also on 17 April 1961 that a Memorandum for Record from Captain J. Scapa (USN), the Agency liaison officer with the JCS, set forth the Rules of Engagement drafted by General Cabell for the United States Navy. These were-spelled out as follows: 1. Carrier shall operate no closer than 50 miles to Cuban territory. 2. Aircraft shall operate no closer than 15 miles to Cuban territory. 3. Not more than 4 aircraft on station at one time. 4. U.S. aircraft shall attack, if un- friendly aircraft makes aggressive move by opening bomb bay doors when headed toward ship to be protected, or starts a strafing run on it. Attacks will not be made by U.S. aircraft under any other condition. 5. No hot pursuit inside the 15 mile line from Cuban territory. 6. U.S. aircraft shall not come up close to unfriendly aircraft, except when attacking it. 7. If unfriendly aircraft is shot down, every effort shall be made to hide the fact that such action has taken place. 75/ It has been noted, that beginning on the 17th of April, Navy aircraft were in evidence, within the terms of the rules of engagement, and did, on at least one occasion, assist Brigade B-26 pilot Jose Crespo to escape in his crippled B-26 when it was under attack by a Sea Fury. There also are other reports of high- cover being flown on both the 17th and the 18th beyond the 12 mile limit, but the USN jets made no effort to deter the FAR aircraft, particularly on the 18th, in their attacks against the invasion troops in the Playa Larga and Playa Giron areas. With the losses the Brigade aircraft suffered on the 17th, the call from TIDE was almost immediate for support from aircraft aboard the carrier Essex -- the flagship of Task Group 81.8 standing in international waters off Cuba. Before noon on 18 April, both Gar Thorsrud and McGeorge Bundy were urging their respective chiefs to authorize direct action by Navy aircraft from the Essex. Thorsrud's contention to Headquarters was that since the USN was already accused of being in- volved in the anti-Castro operation, they should be turned loose on Combat Air Patrol to protect the Brigade aircraft. 75a/ At the White House level Mr. Bundy prepared a Memorandum for the President reading as follows: I think you will find at noon [on 18 April] that the situation in Cuba is not a bit good. The Cuban armed forces are stronger, the popular response is weaker, and our tactical position is feebler than we had hoped. Tanks have done in one beachhead, and the position is precarious at the others. The CIA will press hard for further air help -- this time by Navy cover to B-26s attacking the tanks. But I think we can expect other pleas in rapid cre- scendo, because we are up against a formidable enemy, who is reacting with military know-how and vigor. The immediate request I would grant (because it cannot easily be proven a- gainst us and because men are in need), but the real question is whether to re- open the possibility of further inter- vention and support or to accept the high probability that our people, at best, will go into the mountains in de- feat. In my own judgment the right course now is to eliminate the Castro air force, by neutrally-painted U.S. planes if nec- essary, and then let the battle go its way. 75b/ Neither of the requests for closer air support from the Navy was acted on immediately; and when author- ization for assistance from the carrier task force was granted, it was minimal. It was not until the very early hours of 19 April (Schlesinger says shortly after 1:00 a.m. Washington time) that the President, during a meeting with his high level advisers, authorized one hour of air cover for the Brigade B-26's by six unmarked jets from the Essex.* Among the other caveats, the Navy aircraft would neither seek air combat nor attack ground targets. 75c/ Once this decision was made known, a FLASH PRECEDENCE message went from Headquarters (at 0804Z on 19 April) to the Air Commander TIDE stating: * In addition to himself and the President, Schlesinger wrote that the other attendees at the meeting were the Vice-President, McGeorge Bundy, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Walt Rostow, General Lemnitzer, Admiral Burke, and Mr. Bissell as the lone CIA representative. Here, again, one might wonder whether the presence of the DCI would have led to a more realistic role for the USN CAP than emerged from this meeting. 1. Positive aggressive Navy air sup- port and cover granted for one hour, 1130Z and 1230Z, 19 April. 2. All enemy forces on approaches leading into Playa Giron airfield should be attacked. 3. Supply aircraft will also receive escort for this period. 4. Main purpose is hope to catch enemy aircraft in area. 5. Follow-on air strikes as indicated, in your message TIDE 879 desired. 6. Please advise plan. 7. Essential make best use opportunity this one hour period. 8. Small boat will be resupplying beach, avoid attack. 76/* But even as this announcement of authorization for one hour combat air patrol was being flashed to TIDE, TIDE was sending an EMERGENCY message through * Chief, JMATE told the Taylor Committee that there was a stipulation included in the grant of permission for the CAP requiring an American -- and apparently recommending Colonel Frank Egan -- to go into the Blue Beach area and assess the situation during the hour of air cover. Esterline indicated that he was "enraged" at this and refused to order Egan to go. Instead he put the matter up to Lynch and Robertson; and although both volunteered, nothing came of it because the cata- maran which was to be used for the run-in-run-out to the beach had been lost. 76a/ There was no follow-up concerning the rationale for this survey in either the Taylor Committee or Inspector General investigations of the BOP operation. Headquarters at 08.15Z (0215 Nicaragua time or 0315 Washington time) to the Commanding Officer of the carrier Essex reading as follows: B-26's flying continual sorties for close support beachhead. Imperative con- tinual air CAP be provided at repeat at Blue Beach not repeat not at the 12 mile limit. Your pilots should stand by 121.5 [megacycles]. Also C-46's air landing at airfield. Will be sitting ducks without your help ... These are American boys. Respectfully, Air Commander, TIDE. 77/ Within half an hour (03348 Washington time) after the message was sent to Gar Thorsrud confirming the one hour CAP for 19 April, JCS sent a FLASH message to Carrier Task Group (CTG) 81.8, Exclusive to Admiral Dennison, Commander of the Task Group, and to Rear Admiral Clark, Commanding Officer of the Essex. This message read as follows: 1. TG-81.8 to furnish air cover of 6 unmarked aircraft over CEF [Cuban Ex- peditionary Force] forces, during period 0630 to 0730 local time, 19 April, to defend CEF against air attack from Castro forces. Do not seek air combat but defend CEF forces from air attack. Do not attack ground targets. Pilots carry as little identification as practicable. If neces- sary to ditch, ditch at sea. 2. CEF transport aircraft, to include C-46, C-54, and possibly C-130 types are -scheduled to air drop supplies to CEF forces in beachhead from 190630R[OMEO] to 190730R. Friendly B-26's are scheduled to attack Castro tanks and forces in vicinity of beachhead, during same period. 78/* The message to the Task Group went on, then, to make the following interesting comment: CEF very short of supplies and are being requested by other Agencies to break out from beach as soon as practicable either as organized force or in small bands of guerrillas. If this is not possible it may become necessary to evacuate CEF forces as last resort. Should this be necessary, will probably use CEF ships but have Phibron 2 in position about 30 miles from beach by 191300R prepared to conduct evacuation from Blue Beach or other designated beach at 191700R using unmarked amphibious craft with crews in dungarees so that they will not be easily identified on beach. If evacuation by US ships ordered, furnish air cover to pro- tect landing craft and keep amphibious shipping not less than 5 miles from beach so as not to indicate US ships are in- volved. 80/ At 1128Z (0628R) on the 19th a FLASH message to TIDE from the Task Force (via Headquarters) reported that the Essex aircraft had been launched; and then went on to say: Because Essex embroiled activity sup- port you, do not anticipate formal reply present time [to TIDE cable 887]. They * Eduardo Ferrer claimed that the message said that two, rather than six, jets from the Essex would fly cover for the B-26's. 79/ advise their aircraft unable operate 121.5. Am monitoring a11 TAGBAR freqs in event we able assist air-sea rescue. Mallard not yet aboard. 81/* The almost unbelievable aspect of this last Task Force message was the reference to the inabil- ity of the Task Force aircraft to operate on 121.5 megacycles. That this was not discovered until the third day of USN operations off Cuba and then not reported until three hours after the request specifying this frequency be used, would seem to indicate a degree of carelessness not generally associated with the operation of a United States * Marine Col. Frank J. Mallard was to be the Agency liaison aboard the Essex during the course of the air operations in support of the Brigade activity. According to his testimony before the Taylor Commit- tee on 28 April 1961, Mallard said that he and a radio operator boarded the Essex on 14 April, and this is supported by a message from the Task Force noting that on 14 April Mallard was "welcomed aboard and will remain Essex." 81a/ The author has been un- successful in attempts to determine where Mallard might have been if he was no longer aboard. Gar Thorsrud was extremely critical of Mallard claiming that despite many messages he sent to Mallard the responses usually said in effect that the Navy was acting on orders from Washington. 82/ The TAGBAR net referred to in the above cable referred to the communications network operating among the vessels in the Brigade fleet, the beach, and Headquarters. aircraft carrier.* At 11442 (0644R), a quarter of an hour after the message regarding the inability of its aircraft to monitor the Brigade air force's radio frequency, the Task Force sent another FLASH message through Headquarters for TIDE's attention: We will be changing our position to about 50 miles west of yesterday's loca- tion. No objection friendlies flying near us going in. No objection flying out, provided do not fly directly over us, and that distinct pattern made when approaching to signify friendly. Other- wise, you in danger, as we on alert. 83/** Shortly after 0900 Cuban time -- at 1414Z -- following the shoot down of Shamburger's B-26, TIDE sent the following EMERGENCY message to the Carrier Task Force: 1. Aircraft shot down by enemy be- tween 10302-12002 [0530-0700R]. Where is your aggressive air support? 2. Downed pilot (American) is at 2201N/8050W. Urgently request you ef- fect rescue. 84/ * Gar Thorsrud informed the author that the 121.5 megacycle "guard channel" could not have been reached if the A4D's of the Essex were on the 243.0 m.c. UHF channel. ** The degree of alertness on the part of the CAP would-seem subject to question for at 1405Z on 19 April Headquarters sent the following message for the Essex: "Report from the Barracuda [e.g., the Barbara J] that your air cover forced two CEF [Brigade] aircraft to retire to southwest." 83a/ - 371 - TOP RET There then followed the series of previously noted cables from TIDE describing the shoot down of Riley Shamburger and Wade Gray, with the nub of the matter contained in Thorsrud's FLASH message of 1626Z to Headquarters: Today's American crews dispatched as last resort, confidant of Navy cover, per Headquarter's guidance. Will not send any more B-26's from this base under pres- ent conditions. 85/ Headquarters, however, didn't seem to be getting the message (or was on another frequency) for at 1638Z the following message went to TIDE: 1. Complete Navy protection has been granted for the maximum number of B-26 strikes, upon receipt this message until darkness tonight. Request you mount the maximum number sorties for this period. 2. Entire B-26 force is to concentrate upon support beachhead. Friendly Task Force at Blue Beach throughout afternoon. 86/ Then, forwarded through Headquarters to TIDE, there was another message from the Navy CTG which could only have confirmed the fears previously expressed by the TIDE Air Commander that his request that the Navy conduct a thorough search for Shamburger and Gray would come to naught. The CTG message read: 1. Air recco will search for downed pilot. However instructions here prohibit TOP S'6,RET pick up unless further from shore than position in ref. 2. Must understand Navy must be authorized by higher Headquarters. Every- one willing here, but must obey orders received. 87/ As previously noted, Thorsrud had anticipated difficulty in getting support for the attempted air/ sea rescue and had ordered TIDE's PBY to search the area. 88/ Unlike the US Navy, the PBY crewed by American contracts, ignored Thorsrud's orders about staying 12 miles off shore and went in as close as one mile to the Cuban shore. They flew as low as 200 feet in their search pattern from one mile to six miles off the coast. Unfortunately, all they spotted was what was believed to be one of the wing tanks from Shamburger's plane. As Thorsrud put it, Above search conducted without benefit of Navy air cover. Sighted destroyer 5 miles off shore, and 5 miles west. Wish make matter of record this heroic effort entire PBY crew. 89/* * Each of the seven men making up the PBY crew earned a bonus of $1,450 for the PBY flights of 15, 17-19 April 1961, of a total of roughly $20,000 in bonuses paid contract air crews for flights during the period 15-19 April 1961. The PBY crew earned a total of ,$10,1-50. The seven PBY crewmen were Don Teeters, Philip Gibbony, Philip Ingoglia, John S. Lewis, Joel (footnote continued on following page) Shortly after noon Washington time (1707Z), Thorsrud indicated that air support for the beach- head was "completely out of our hands. This morning's effort extended us to the limit." He went on to suggest: To save what is left of beachhead, suggest C-130's air land for evac at Blue Beach airfield covered by Air Force or Navy aircraft. No other course open. 92/ There is no indication that any serious consider- ation was given to the possibility of air evacuation off the Playa Giron air strip, but in a meeting in the DCI's office on the morning of 19 April, evacua- tion by sea -- which apparently had received some consideration during the President's very early morn- ing meeting -- was discussed by the DCI, McGeorge F. Kilgore, Harry P. Rahm, and Joe N. Skipper. Kilgore, Skipper, and Rahm had not been recruited for overflight operations. 90/ The Navy apparently had made some concessions to reality for at 19012 on the 19th a message from CTG 81.8 reported that: Air Search area ref failed locate pilot but saw artillery impacting one half mile off beach. Two DD's now headed to three mile limit Blue Beach and have been given -authority to return any fire, pick up sur- vivors. 91/ Bundy, General Cabell, Mr. Bissell, Hawkins, Drain, Esterline, Scapa, Gaines, and Beerli. During the course of this discussion, Bundy apparently called the President to request the use of Navy aircraft to engage ground targets and FAR planes; but the President refused to go beyond the hour exemption that had been granted for the morning sorties. 93/* Before three o'clock in the afternoon, Washing- ton time, on 19 April, a message went from Headquarters to Puerto Cabezas saying: Stand down all air activity pending further advise [sic]. Prepare deploy air- craft, personnel, and material [sic]. Destination and/or further instructions will be provided ASAP. Gaines. 94/ * This heretofore unpublicized reference to a last minute appeal to President Kennedy through McGeorge Bundy, was discovered among the personal notes of the Chief of Operations for WH/4. This probably was the last opportunity that the United States had to become involved in the anti-Castro operation while there was still a gray area available for such an operation. According to one generally reliable source, the assignment of six USN jets was considerably less than what Richard Bissell and Arleigh Burke had attempted to get from JFK on the night of 18/19 April. Hugh Thomas quotes Bissell as saying that when it was apparent that the Brigade was about to go down the drain that he (Bissell) wanted USN air intervention -- even full scale US intervention -- to defeat Castro. 93a/ TOPQRET The further instructions to TIDE were for C-54 drops of survival gear into the area on the west side of the Bahia de Cochinos in the hope that the materiel would be recovered by Brigade members who fled into the swamps to escape capture. Insofar as it is known, however, none of the materiel that was air dropped was recovered. 94a/ The recriminations against the United States Navy by JMATE principals, particularly those involved with the planning and conduct of Air Operations, linger to the present day. In the messages from the field to Headquarters between 17-19 April, there were. repeated complaints about the failure of the Navy CAP -- even within the limits specified prior to 19 April -- to get down on the deck where they might have been more useful in terms of protecting the Agency B-26's. The real sore point, however, concerns the failure of the Navy CAP to be in the air when the Brigade B-26's were nearing their CIP on the morning of the 19th, even if the planes from TIDE were earlier than scheduled.* * CIP - Coast in Point. In his testimony about the Bay of Pigs invasion before the Taylor Committee, Admiral Clark, the Com- manding Officer of the carrier Essex stated that his orders were for a CAP from 0630R-0730R, and that he had ordered the CAP to be on station one half hour early [0600R] in the event that the CEF aircraft made the trip quick- er than they had anticipated. However, they came over our ship one hour early, and consequently we launched our aircraft immediately. We arrived over the beach area 40 minutes before 0630R [e.g., 0550R]. However, by that time, the CEF aircraft had already made their strikes and left. 95/* Gar Thorsrud, who was Chief of Air Operations at TIDE has had relatively little to say about the time problem. In his testimony to General Taylor, in re- sponse to the question of whether there was some con- fusion as to the time the Navy Air CAP was to be pro vided, Thorsrud's terse answer was: There was no confusion of the time. I received a message that Navy air CAP would be provided. 96/ * On this critical question of timing, the author wonders why, if the Navy CAP was launched and over the beach at the time specified by Admiral Clark, the message transmitted from the Task Force to TIDE via Headquarters at 1128Z (see p. 369-370) made no mention of the Brigade B-26's having been in the area. If the message at 11282 represented the approximate time of launch of the Essex's CAP, then Admiral Clark's time sequence in the above testimony was grossly in error. In an earlier discussion of Thorsrud's Mission Summary Report of 26 April 1961 for the Taylor Com- mittee, it was noted that TIDE launched either four or five B-26's between 0845Z and 09002. Estimating the minimum time of arrival over the target for these aircraft to be two and a half hours, one of the air- craft could have been over the target area as early as 0430R, two at 0615R, and two at 0630R.* The first arrival clearly was outside of the time assigned for USN protection. The other four would have been well within the time (0550R) that Admiral Clark testified his CAP was "over the beach area." In any event, the two B-26's which were lost clearly were within the specified period (0630R-0730R) period when the CAP was scheduled to provide protection.** The question of the number of aircraft concerns the approximate time of departure for Joe Shannon's B-26. In the Mission Summary for the Taylor Committee * See Table 1 on p . 380. ** The two and a half hour flight time from Puerto Cabezas to Cuba probably errs on the side of a higher average airspeed (230 mph) than was operationally feasible (e.g., 190-200 mph). TOP-"'SECRET prepared in 1961, launch time was given as 1030Z; but when Thorsrud reviewed Persons's 1968 book, The Bay of Pigs, Shannon's launch time appeared as 0900Z. Based on the messages that TIDE sent to Headquarters on 19 April reporting the shoot down of Riley Sham- burger and Wade Gray by a T-33, Shannon must have launched at 0900, too, inasmuch as Shamburger was his wing man when he was killed. The time of departure from TIDE and the approximate time of arrival over Cuba for the B-26 aircraft on 19 April, are listed in Table 1. 97/* Col. Stanely Beerli, the. Acting Chief of DPD throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation, and Jake Esterline, Chief of WH/4, the overall Project Chief for JMATE, were most bitter in their recollec- tion of the miss between the Navy air CAP and the Brigade B-26's on 19 April. In discussing the ques- tion of the air CAP, Beerli was most positive as to who was at fault: You're damn right I was involved ... I was there ... down at the task force * Table 1 follows on p. 380. Also see discussion pp. 354-358 of this volume. TOP`S.R ET B-26 TAKE-OFF AND ARRIVAL TIMES, 19 APRIL 1961* Mission Surmary, 1968 Revision of 26 April 1961 Mission Sturmaty of 26 April 1961 Pilots/Crew Take-off Estimated Take-off Estimated time minimum arrival time minimum arrival time over time over target target (575 s.m./230 (575 s.m./230 mph) mph) Herrera 0700 0930 0700 0930 (0430) (0430) Livingston 0845 1115 0845 1115 0615 0615 Goodwin 0845 1115 0845 1115 (0615) (0615) Ray/Baker 0900 1130 0855 1125 (0630) (0625) Shamburger/Gray 0900 1130 0900 1130 (0630) (0630) Shannon 1030(0900?) 1300(1130?) 0900 1130 (0800) (0730?1 (0630) Seigrist 1030 1300 1030 1300 (recalled) (0800) Price 0700(?) 0930 1030 1300 (0800) * ZEBRA (Z) time except times in parenthesis are Eastern Standard Time (e.g., Havana and Washington, D. C.) TOP NECRET Headquarters. Bissell was there, Arleigh Burke was there. ... Bissell had obtained the clearance for that [air CAP] support, and there was some discussion as to what the Navy would do and what they would provide -- jets, etc. It was decided that we could launch our strike. The Navy would give us air cover for one hour. O.K. and then the question is what time do you want it? Bissell turned to me and said, "Stan, what time do you want it?" What we want to do is get it in there as soon as possible, given that support. What we finally wanted to do was get the B-26's in there to help knock out anything that Castro was put- ting down the road ... Castro was coming down the road with tanks and everything else. It was a perfect target for B-26's I blame him [Admiral Arleigh Burke] for this because it was a time mixup. I kind of felt afterwards in my own mind -- but I had no way to cross check it -- is that maybe they never even flew the damn things because in my opinion he [Burke] was not enthusiastic about giving us support. I kind of got the feeling that he wanted to keep his hands off as much as possible. There was a lot of damned professional jealousy in that thing [the BOP operation] -- in the military at higher levels -- because the Agency was running it; and I have no qualms about saying that. How are you ever going to prove that? ... But you can kind of tell by their reluctant tone. Anyway, he was there, and he said, "Well, what time do you want it?" I said, "Six," and then I said afterwards ... I thought ... you know there are a lot of six o'clocks around in different places in the world, and I said, "Six o'clock Zebra time." I forget if it was six o'clock, but I remember telling him what time we wanted ... a specific time in Zebra time, and that's the time our air troops arrived ... Anyway, I converted it to Zebra time ... I think it went back ... it was either three or four hours difference [e.g., the difference between Romeo time and Zebra time is five hours], and I gave it to him in Zebra time ... I re- member that specifically, so that it would work out locally for that time -- 6:30 to 7:30. I remember as he started out the door -- I remember him going out -- and I said, "Remember, Zebra time." But he was kind of in a -- might have been in a kind of a preoccupied mood. It wasn't typewritten down on a piece of paper and given to him -- maybe that's it. He went back and said, "Be there at 6:30 to 7:30;" and they just weren't there. And that is where the damn thing went ... But I blame him for that tieup, because our people were there, at the time it was specified. I just think there was ... the foul up. Not getting that "Z" time back to the Navy. 98/* * At another point during the course of the author's oral interview with Col. Beerli-, he stated: On Wednesday, on the 19th, the Americans were shot down, and that is when I mention- ed that Arleigh Burke was the guy that left with the word on the time ... I re-checked with our people who were there with us twice to be sure that we had the same time ... so when he said, "Z", well, we said "Z" time, -- we were on a common basis, so there, to me it was clear ... it spelled out ... there was a goof on their [USN] part on Wednesday. 99/ (footnote continued on following page) Col. Beerli's strong feelings about the failure of the Navy to get the time period for the CAP correct are obviously subjective, but there is less speculative evidence which adds credence to Agency's contention that the Navy clearly was at fault on 19 April 1961 -- regardless of whether the B-26's arrived an hour earlier than scheduled.* As noted previously (see p. 377), Admiral Clark implied that the Essex was unaware of the approaching Brigade B-26's until they flew past the carrier. Clark further told the Taylor Committee that by the time he launched his CAP and Beerli's suspicion that the six USN jets may never have flown on 19 April once the B-26's had passed is unwarranted, but it is interesting to note that Hugh Thomas also claimed "the Essex jets never set off at all." 99a/ * The question of time zones between Cuba and Wash- ington and Cuba and Nicaragua might have presented problems for the US Navy even if the Bay of Pigs operation were being planned as late as 1970! The author found that the 1970 edition of the US Naval Oceanographic Office's "Standard Time Zone Chart of the World" (21st ed., Oct. 1968: Revised 6/1/70) erroneously showed a one hour time difference be- tween Washington and Cuba and a two hour time dif- ference between Cuba and Nicaragua. (Washington and Cuba are in the same time zone, and Nicaragua is one hour behind Cuban time.) The same error also appeared on the National Geographic's map of "The World" (December 1970 ed.). got them over Cuba, the B-26's had "made their strikes and left." 100/ At no time did any of the USN per- sonnel testifying before the Taylor Committee (in- cluding Admiral Burke of the Committee) indicate that the incoming B-26's had been picked up by radar on the Essex or on the radar of the escorting destroyers. Estimates based on the intercept ranges for the radars installed on the Essex (as of November 1960-June 1961) indicate that B-26's flying at a speed of 230 mph between altitudes of 500' and 5,000', could have been intercepted between 45 and 113 statute miles. This would have provided the carrier with an advance warn- ing of roughly 12-30 minutes. 101/ fee Table 2.*) Although it cannot be determined accurately at what height any of the Brigade's B-26's actually were flying, Gar Thorsrud is of the opinion that they probably would have been cruising at 8,000'-10,000' for the early part of the trip, dropping down to 2,000' when approximately 15 miles off the target - by which time they would have been well past the Essex. It would appear reasonable to suggest that * Table 2 follows on p. 385. TABLE 2 ESTIMATED RADAR INTERCEPT RANGES, USS ESSEX AND BRIGADE B-26's, 19 APRIL 1961 Height of Aircraft (Feet) Intercept Range (Statute miles)* Time Required B-26's to reach ESSEX** (Minutes) 100 28 7 200 32 8 500 45 12 1,500 68 18 2,000 76 20 3,000 90 23 5,000 113 30 10,000 154 40 * Source: Department of the Navy, Sea Systems Command, 24 April 1979 (SEA 62X/EFW, Ser 81). U. ** Estimated average speed 230 mph. the carrier's intercept should have been made at approximately 100 miles, or 25 minutes' warning time of the approaching aircraft. 102/ Equally difficult to understand is Admiral Clark's statement that by the time his jets were launched and to the target area; the B-26's had made their strikes and departed.. As noted earlier in this discussion, based on the take-off times out of TIDE as many as five B-26's -- those flown by Ray, Shamburger, Shannon, Goodwin, and Livingston -- could have been in the air at the time that the Essex planes arrived. Herrera -- and possibly Price -- in the first two B-26's to arrive in the target area, might have been in and out prior to the arrival of the carrier jets; but according to Buck Persons, Doug Price was intercepted by one of the USN jets as he was en route back to TIDE. Even though he had no radio contact with the jet pilot, Price was able to direct the Navy aircraft back toward the beach where Joe Shannon still faced possible attack by the T-33's which had just downed his wing man, Shamburger. 103/ This would seem to raise some question about the credibility of Admiral Clark's comments to the Taylor Committee. Stan Beerli also has criticized the failure of the Navy radar to pick up the B-26's, and in addition, he felt very strongly that if the Navy had been serious about its obligation to support Project JMATE, they would have had reconnaissance aircraft up well before the B-26's appeared. Even if the recce aircraft had failed to catch the incoming B-26's, Beerli's conten- tion was that the carrier's radar surely should have spotted them.* 104/ Captain Lionel Krisel (USNR, Ret.), who, for a number of years has been working intermittently on a history of naval operations (including the Bay of Pigs operation) at the instigation of Admiral Arleigh Burke, has claimed that the carrier did have a recon- naissance aircraft up and that the Essex CAP got off within a few minutes of a radar pick-up. In context, Krisel's comments implied that-the carrier's radar and not the recce aircraft picked up the incoming B-26's. 105/ If Krisel's version is correct and the * The April 1979 estimate by the Navy of the capability of the radar gear carried by the Essex between November 1960 and June 1961 certainly confirms Beerli's belief that the radar capability was there. (See Table 2, p. 385.) This makes even more incredible Admiral Clark's contention that the Essex was first aware of the B-26's when they overflew the carrier! Essex, even with a radar warning alert, could not get its jet aircraft launched in time to catch any of the Brigade B-26's before they completed their strikes, the question of the efficiency of US carrier operations would appear to have been one of a number of significant questions ignored by the Taylor Committee Investigation.* There also were other problems with reference to the CAP from the Essex that were indicative of consider- ably less than top performance. Thorsrud, as reported previously, had urged the Navy aircraft to operate at lower altitudes if they were to be of any use for pro- tecting the Brigade aircraft. 105c/ Based on Captain Kr?isel's claims that in his discussions with some of the Essex's pilots who flew the CAP he was told that they had no orders to fire, it would have made no difference at what height the A-4D's operated.**105d/ * In his discussions with Stan Beerli, Captain Krisel apparently did not indicate that there was any radar pickup of the B-26's. 105a/ In one of his conversations with the author of this history, Krisel stated that the A-4D's from the Essex did not carry radar and had to be vectored by the carrier to any aircraft which they could not.sight visually. 105b/ ** The author told Krises that this was an unbelievable story- since the purpose of the CAP was to "defend CEF against air attack from Castro forces.. Do not seek air combat but defend CEF forces from air attack." Krisel- reported that the pilots claimed that the Rules of En- gagement must have been changed, and the pilots were either unaware of the change or were not briefed. - 388 - RET TOP The concern of the Agency air operations people, of course, was the fact that four Americans were lost in the shoot down of two B-26's. While it is true that on 19 April only one B-26 was lost to Castro's aircraft -- Shamburger and Gray's plane -- the point is that had the Navy CAP functioned as had been in- tended for one hour, the remaining fighter aircraft in Castro's Air Force might have been eliminated. Although Pete Ray and Leo Baker were lost to anti- aircraft fire, the possibility must be considered that that situation, too, might have been altered had the CAP been in place. In addition to finding cause to fault the Navy's performance, it should be remembered that by D-Day military considerations had gone by the board in favor of political expediency as determined at the White House. On 22 April 1961 when President Kennedy was asked by ex-President Eisenhower about the role of Navy air: He [JFK] said that in the first instance they were so anxious to keep the United States hand concealed that they accorded no such support, and when they finally did get word of its need it was too late. The situation was complicated by the fact that all communications went out. I understood that the communications equipment was on the ship that sank, but this is hard to believe because each unit carries some light communications equipment, including the ability to send radiograms to a dis- tance of some fifty to a hundred miles. 105e/ If President Kennedy was unaware that the effort against Castro was in trouble from the opening of air operations on D-Day when the first B-26's went down, then he truly listened to the wrong advisers. As already noted-Mc- George Bundy was well aware of the air problem. What JFK failed to do was to authorize US intervention -- particularly Navy air -- when there was still time to salvage some, if not all, of the Brigade. By the time such action became necessary, the hand of the United States had already been exposed. E. Jet Fighters -- the Last Hope With the failure of the USN air CAP, the only other way in which the domination of Castro's Sea Furies and T-33's might have been negated would have been to let jet aircraft -- T-33's -- be flown by American contract pilots to protect the Brigade B-26's. The reader may recall that when the air operations program was being formulated consideration had been given to the need for fighter cover to protect the B-26's; but as George Gaines had pointed out, those who planned the operational strikes anticipated that anything that could get in the air with a gun would be knocked out on the ground. Although Gaines indicated that it was not until after cancellation of the D-Day strike that the need for fighter escort really came up for discussion, this is not quite true. On 12 April 1961, two of the Alabama Air National Guard pilots, James Harrison and Ulay Littleton, were at Birmingham with authorization from Gen. Reid Doster, the Commander of the Alabama Air National Guard and the B-26 Tactical Air Chief at TIDE, to pick up a T-33 and deliver it to Miami. 106/ Following the disaster suffered by the B-26's on 17 April, a call came from the field for jet air- craft cover -- first, from the Navy, and then for T-33's to be assigned to the Brigade. On 18 April, shortly after 1600 hours Washington time, Headquarters notified Eglin Air Force Base that four T-33's would be arriving from Luke Air Force Base in Arizona in a fighter-trainer configuration with a possible arrival at Eglin of late evening 18 April, weather conditions permitting. The message to Eglin, also indicated that high USAF levels had ordered the Air Proving Ground Command (APGC) to provide all the support that would be required for the jet operation -- maintenance personnel, ground power equipment, and whatever was needed to get the T-33's ready to move to TIDE. Even at this late date, Headquarters continued to express great concern over plausible denial -- ordering the painting out of identifying insignia on the aircraft which might be involved in operations against Cuba. Once again the blue stripe was to be painted around the wing and also around the fuselage, immediately forward of the vertical stabilizer. As a last resort, however, Headquarters did suggest that silver over- painting of identifying marks would be permitted. The cable notifying Eglin of the imminent arrival of the four T-33's also indicated that the duration of their stay at Eglin would be short, because it was anticipated that Avon Park would be opened up by "higher authority" as a contingency strike base from which the T-33's would operate against Cuba. 107/* * Avon Park, the site of a former USAF operation, is located midway between Vero Beach and Brandenton in SoutYL Central Florida. As early as 1 April 1961, how- ever, when the contingency base idea was being considered, the operational plan was concerned only with the B-26 aircraft. 107a/ TO ET Although the initial plan for use of the Avon Park Air Force Base in Project JMATE was as an emer- gency base in the event that President Somoza ordered the Nicaragua base to close down, by the time that the USAF and DOD decided to make the base available to the Agency, there no longer was any need for use of the field as the strike base for T-33 operations. George Gaines, in trying to recall the planned air operations for the T-33's thought that the T-33's were to be armed at Avon Park, take off and fly their strikes against Cuba, and then continue on to JMTIDE for any subsequent operations; but this appears unlikely in view of the distances involved, particularly following a combat operation. Billy Campbell, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the T-33's would use the base at Avon Park, not only as a launch site,-but also as a return base for rearming and continued strike action against Cuba. In neither event -- the procurement of the T-33's or the acquisition of the Avon Park Air Force Base -- did the DOD or the USAF exert any particular effort or indicate any particular concern about the anti- Castro effort being conducted in support of US policy. To the contrary, Stanley Beerli, C. F. Welch (Chief, Materiel Staff, DPD), Gar Thorsrud, and George Gaines all indicated difficulties with USAF representatives in terms of support for JMATE. Although not as vehement as Stan Beerli in his criticism, Gaines did note the following: It took too long for the decision- making process [in the Air Force and DOD] after we asked for the air cover. We needed jets -- any kind of jets -- to keep the T-33's off the B-26's; and once we made that request, the decision making process ... the staffing ... the risks that had to be weighed ... took too long. The beachhead was lost before we could get it implemented -- except for the Essex fiasco ... I think that normal time was used when the situation called for an emer- gency reaction, and I don't think that the normal military forces were aware of the urgency of the situation. They saw no great reason at that time ... now of course, we can all look back ... but at that time they.saw no great reason for not knocking off at 5 or 5:30 and going home and taking it up tomorrow morning ... But [Col.] John Van Dyne was sympathetic to our cause and was trying to get the Air Staff moving, unfortunately they didn't view it as urgently as we did. 108/* * One interesting sidelight on the acquisition of jet aircraft that might be mentioned here, is that in the course of the author's discussion with Gar Thorsrud, Thorsrud mentioned that he thought that the possibility' (footnote continued on following page) Connie Seigrist, the most experienced of all of the American pilots who participated in the JMTIDE op- eration, pointed out that it would have made little difference if the T-33's had arrived. That by the time they got around to completing the negotiations for them, it was too late, or as Seigrist put it: We had lost by then. The Cuban Direc- tor of Flight Operations had refused to let his pilots fly anymore missions. But they could volunteer, which some did. After a mission with Price and I [on the after- noon of 18 April] ... those Cuban volunteers [who flew with us on the afternoon of 18 April] were threatened by the others who were following the Cuban DFO's decision to stop flying. Anyway, to have flown the T-33's at this time, would have been futile, regardless. 110/ F. Retrospective View of Air Operations The question of "what if" looms largest, perhaps, about the conduct of air operations at the Bay of Pigs of acquiring.F86H aircraft from the Puerto Rican Air National Guard might have been' introduced at the time by the Bay of Pigs; however, he was uncertain as to whether it had been at the time of the Bay of Pigs, or whether it was during the missile crisis. This, of course, would have been a far superior aircraft to either the AT-33's which were being sent in from Luke Air Force Base or the T-33 models that were being flown by FAR. Thorsrud's recall proved to be excel- lent. In the cable traffic of 19 April from TIDE to BELL, one of the pieces of information that TIDE passed* on to Headquarters was that Air National Guard F-86H aircraft were based in Puerto Rico. 109/ than about any other aspect of the project. What if: There had been more B-26's and crews? There had been the recommended D-Day strike as initially planned? The American contract pilots had been used in B-26's from the beginning of the air operations? There had been no D-2 air strike to alert Castro? The Navy CAP had gone as planned? T-33's had been available to the US pilots? It goes on ad infinitum, but one might look at the statement that Fidel Castro himself made less than a week after the surrender of the Brigade when in his TV speech he said that: Our pilots acted with extraordinary bravery. Moreover, if the fight had lasted five days longer, not one pilot would have been alive. Why? Because they were falling -- fighting against superior force, a larger number of planes. They killed the enemy, but they also were falling. 111/ Castro also was surprised that the Brigade Air Force, flying out of Nicaragua, was able (at least on D-Day) to keep so\many planes in action over his country. 112/* * David L. Phillips, propaganda chief for JMATE and later Chief, WH Division, told the author that Maurice Halperin, the first American to talk to Castro after the Bay of Pigs, said that Castro told him that "lack of air support" was the principal weakness of the invasion force. 113/ TOP SrISZET It should be emphasized with regard to the air operations, however, that at the time of the Taylor Committee investigation -- except for the cancella- tion of the D-Day strike -- most of the critical questions concerning air operations, were either touched on so lightly, or so cavalierly disregarded, as to make a mockery of the Committee's work. Whether this was the result of the Committee's political orientation, rather than its inability, shall be a moot point in this volume.* Whatever else may be said about the air opera- tion, one thing that is certain is that following the cancellation of the D-Day strike, the Cubans and Americans who flew the B-26's, C-46's, and C-54's to Cuba from 17-19 April 1961 -- "getting their ass shot off by superior aircraft" as Gar Thorsrud put it -- were brave men. So too, were the handful of pilots from Castro's FAR who, by any standards, were poorly trained, badly equipped, and fully conscious of the * Considering the great interest which Congress has displayed in recent years in investigating the Agency, perhaps if a committee could be persuaded to study the work of the Taylor Committee on the Bay of Pigs, the Agency's image might be less tarnished. risk that they took in even leaving the ground. So significant did Castro regard FAR's contribution to the defeat of the invasion that the seven pursuit pilots and the one bomber pilot who survived were proclaimed Heroes of the Revolution. The 17th of April was officially designated as a "Dia de la Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria." 114/* The unanswerable "iffy" questions notwithstand- ing, the reflective views of some of the CIA principals concerning the air operations for the Bay of Pigs provided useful considerations for concluding this volume.. George Gaines, the Headquarters Chief for JMATE Air Operations, Gar Thorsrud, the Chief of Air Operations at the strike base at JMTIDE, and Billy * Jacques Lagas indicated that of the eight pilots, six were Cubans, one was a Nicaraguan, and one, him- self, a Chilean. Lagas, incidentally departed the Castro fold by 1964. Following his return to Chile -- e pu is e is boo Memorzas e un Capitan RebeZde in which he severely criticized FAR, not for its lack of bravery, but basically for its communist orientation. Lagas claimed that even at the time of the Bay of Pigs, communism was becoming all pervasive and making for gross inefficiency in FAR operations. In fact, in a 1967 Havana publica- tion concerning air operations over the Bay of Pigs, Lagas-'s story was carefully omitted from among those by other of the FAR pilots. 115/ Campbell, the Chief of Air Operations at the JMADD training base are all of the opinion that there were adequate numbers of aircraft and crews to do the job the way it had originally been planned. This opinion was expressed by both Gaines and Thorsrud at the time of the Taylor Committee investigation in may and June of 1961 -- it was an opinion firmly restated by both Gaines and Thorsrud in February of 1976. Also, each of the three flyers, in his own way, was particularly critical of the fact that operational planning was being modified on the basis of decisions that were being made by individuals who were ignorant of the full impact that their decisions would have on the operation itself. There was also criticism that decisions concerning changes in the operational air plan were not being adequately protested by those who should have known better ---specifically General Cabell, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, who was an experienced USAF officer. 116/ The most extensive criticism concerning the failure of the air operations, however, has come from Stanley Beerli, who was the Acting Chief of DPD, the Agency's air arm, and from Richard Bissell, who was the Deputy Director for Plans. In hindsight, Bissell has been particularly hard on himself for his own failure to insist that there should have been a much larger force of B-26's and trained B-26 crews than was initially planned -- the 17 planes and crews were insufficient to conduct operations of the type that were-laid on in the anti-Castro program. As noted earlier, Bissell concluded that simple arithmetic should have indicated to him that this number of planes and crews would have required perfect and ideal conditions of operations to conduct the missions that had been scheduled. While he willingly admits his own failure, in terms of the estimate of numbers of aircraft, Bissell does not entirely excuse either Beerli or Jack Hawkins (who was in charge of the over- all PM action) for not being alert to the problem of the numbers of aircraft. 117/ But like Beerli, Bissell is most severe in his criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their failures to properly evaluate the critical role that the Brigade Air Force would play in the success or failure of the anti-Castro project. On this subject, it is believed worth reporting in some detail, the comments that Bissell has made. He pointed out for example that not only was the Brigade Air Force to destroy Castro's Air Force on the ground, but: We were also counting on it very heavily as, in effect, the artillery of the ground forces. No one ever thought that the [Cuban] Brigade could hold Castro's armies off unless you had favorable terrain, which we did, and unless you could call in very strong air support. It's been clear to me, ever since that this was a serious miscalculation, and I think that I should have foreseen this, and I think that others should have foreseen it. It is for this reason, among others, that I have always been unwilling to say that if the President hadn't called off that air strike, the operation would surely have been a success. I am about 90 percent certain that the Joint Chiefs never commented on this inadequacy. In need, I don't remember the Joint Chiefs ever making this simple analysis . I think that the communication in the last two months before the operation, and during it was excellent I think the Chiefs had the [communications] mechanism as a result of Kennedy's action ...This had not been the case previously. But with that Review Committee under General Gray, they had the means of keeping them- selves continuously informed, and yet, just as a comment on government proce- dures, they were able to do so without any improper interference with the activ- ity of the people who had the line respon- sibility. I also feel that they had every opportunity to state specific objections, `because they could either make any objec- tions or comments directly to us through Gen. Gray or, if they'd wished to do so, face to face; or the Chairman could have made any objections that he thought it important to make directly to the Presi- dent, and the whole circle of the Presi- dent's advisors. 118/ Bissell also was extremely critical of the Joint Chiefs for their failure to emphasize the absolute essentiality of air cover to an amphibious operation, noting as follows: There was one interesting and alarming occasion at one of the sequence of policy meetings in the White House. Before the meeting started, those of us who were to participate in it were talking outside the Cabinet Room, which was still occupied by a preceding meeting. I was told, I think it was by Gen. Gray (the Chairman of this Joint Chief's Review Committee), who shared, I may say, our view on the essentiality of air cover, something of a discussion that had taken place the preceding day in the meeting of the Joint Chiefs. In that discussion, two of the three Chiefs present had said they weren't at all sure the oper- ation really had to have air cover, that it had a good chance of success without air cover. I relayed this view to the military director of the operation [Col. Jack Hawkins], who was also there in the group; he had heard something of the same thing. and was, again, absolutely horrified. He said if the Commandant of the Marine Corps had been at that particular meeting of the Joint Chiefs, he felt sure there would have been a rather different tone taken. Let me make clear, in none of those meetings did [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer or Arleigh Burke, who was Acting Chief when Lemnitzer was away, nor did the Chairman of the JCS Review Group, General Gray, say to the President, "We don't believe that air cover is absolutely vital for this opera- tion." As to General Gray, I don't think he believed any such thing, and of course, the Joint Chiefs, I'm sure would have all agreed that effective air cover enhanced the chances of success. Nevertheless, I don't exclude the possibility that the President became aware, one way or another, that the Chiefs placed less emphasis on pre- invasion air strikes to knock out the Castro Air Force, than did those in charge of planning the operation. And, I may say, that, as a civilian, with no military experience, I was put in a very odd posi- tion to know that at the level of the Chiefs themselves there was a real question about the doctrine that the Colonel report- ing to me regarded as so essential ... With hindsight, I think one is not justified in saying that given adequate air cover the operation would surely have been a success. I've never thought that one could be at all certain of that. I do think you could pretty well say, how- ever, that without air cover it didn't have a chance. The representatives of the Chiefs there [in meetings with the President] didn't take this position strongly. You see, a great many of the policy questions that kept arising in those planning meetings with the President had to do with whether "you really have to have these air strikes?" I'm sure that in advance of the event, both he [JFK] and Secretary Rusk were more worried about the effect on world opinion of the air operations than they were about the landing itself. 119/ Stan Beerli's severe castigation of the US Navy over the matter of the combat air patrol on the 19th of April has been reported, but in addition, Beerli also had some strong opinions about the JCS failure to support the need for absolute control of the air, and he stated: There was a great deal, in my opinion, of reservation on the whole part of the JCS on this operation. If you asked me if I felt personally that they had given it their wholehearted support and enthusi- astic desire to see it succeed, I would have said, "No." In fact, I felt that there was a lot of negative feeling in the Defense Department. That they hoped that the whole damned thing would back- fire in CIA's face. I couldn't prove it to you. But, in talking to officers ... even like Fletch Prouty ... there was always that uppity tone ... "well, you non-experts are in something that we should be in, and you are going to have trouble." I think a lot of the senior military officers felt that by not getting too involved, they couldn't be blamed. This is a real frank talk, but I feel that is exactly the case. They gave it the minimum of scrutiny and therefore hoped that they'd have the minimum amount of having to step up and say, "We were part of it." They did ... just what was necessary and nothing more. So I feel that they did not provide ... if you said a real hard look ... as if it was one of their own operations ... but they didn't do that at any time. 120/ Although there is no gainsaying that the CIA was in charge of the Bay of Pigs operation, the records cited in this volume demonstrate that in its attempts to meet its obligations in support of the official, authorized policy of the US Government -- to bring about the outster of Fidel Castro -- the Agency was not well served by the Kennedy White House, Secretary of State Rusk, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the US Navy. The changes, modifications, distortions, and lack of firm positive guidance related to air opera- tions -- the key to the success or failure of US policy vis-a-vis Castro -- make clear that the collapse of the beachhead at Playa Giron was a shared responsi- bility. When President Kennedy proclaimed his sole responsibility for the operation, there was more truth to his statement than he really believed or than his apologists will accept. TOZ'ECRET US GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-CASTRO PROGRAM This document is our basic policy paper. It was approved by the President at a meeting in the White House on 17 March 1960. 16 March 1960 A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME 1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U. S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U. S. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U. S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U. S. to act in a crisis. 2. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of action: a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba. It is hoped that within one month a political entity can be formed in the shape of a council or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact. The council will be encouraged to adopt as its slogan "Restore the 408 - RAK Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan, and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnet for the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities; and provide cover for other compartmented CIA controlled operations. (Tab A) b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island. The target date for its completion is two months, This will be supple- mented by broadcasting from U. S. commercial facilities paid for by private Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of written material inside the country. (Tab B) c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be respon- sive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition. Such a network must have effective communication and be selectively manned to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization can probably be created within 60 days. Its role will be to provide hard intelligence, to arrange for the illegal infiltration and exfiltration of individuals, to assist in the internal distribution of illegal propaganda, and to plan and organize for the defection of key individuals and groups as directed. d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on the Island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after care- ful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U. S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country. 3. Leadership: It is important to avoid distracting and devisive rivalry among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role in the 4 opposition. Accordingly, every effort will be made to have an eminent, non-ambitious, politically uncontentious chairman selected. The emergence of a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of the various personalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract, control, and lead the several forces. As the possibility of an overthrow of Castro becomes more imminent, the senior leader must be selected, U. S. support focused upon him, and his build up undertaken. 4. Cover: All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of the opposition council will, of course, be explained as activities of that entity (insofar as the actions become publicly known at all). The CIA will, however, have to have direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and, to protect these, will make use of a carefully screened group of U. S. businessmen with a stated interest in Cuban affairs and desire to support the opposition. They ~nd channel for guidance and support to the directorate of the opposition under controlled- conditions. CIA personnel will be documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to support the opposition. $100, 000 has already been pledged from U. S. sources. At an appropriate time a bond issue will be floated by the council (as an obligation on a future Cuban government) to raise an additional $2, 000, 000. 5. Budget: It is anticipated that approximately $4,400, 000 of CIA funds will be required for the above program. On the assumption that it will not 411 - ET reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 months from now, the estimated requirements for FY-1960 funds is $900, 000 with the balance of $3, 500, 000 required in FY-1961. The distribution of costs between fiscal years could, of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C) 6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5. from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies. THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION 1. CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups (the Montecristi, Autentico Party and-the National Democratic Front). These all meet the fundamental criteria conditional to acceptance, i.e. they are for the revolution as originally conceived--many being former 26th of July members--and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo. They are anti-Castro because of his failure to live up to the original 26th of July platform and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist domination and possible ultimate enslavement. These groups, therefore, fit perfectly the planned opposition slogan of "Restore the Revolution". 2. An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within 30 days from representatives of these groups augmented possibly by representatives of other groups. It is probably premature to have a fixed platform for the Council but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable points. Two of the CIA group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The following points are suggested as a few possibilities: a. The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject to strong Sino-Soviet influence. b. Cuba is entitled to an honest, democratic government based on free elections. There is no hope of this as long as Castro throttles the rights of legitimate political parties and the freedom of expression. 2 c. A realistic agrarian reform program providing for individual ownership of the land must be put into effect. d. Individual freedoms must be restored and collectivism in commerce and education must be eliminated. e. Sino-Soviet influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated. A special research group of Cubans with American support is planned to refine and expand these planks and to produce propaganda materials based on the above platform for use by and on behalf of the opposition Council. 1. Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun. Private opposition broadcasts (i. e. purchase of commercial time by private individuals) have occurred in Miami (medium wave) and arrangements have been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts (short wave) and Florida (broadcast band), nd have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts CIA has furnished support to these efforts through encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast material. 2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one "gray" U. S. -controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U. S. and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as the operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional facility might be installed on a U. S. base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be made of a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting from Florida. 415 - 3. Newspapers are also being supported and further support is planned for the future. Avance, a leading Cuban daily (Zayas' paper), has been confiscated as has El Mundo, another Cuban daily. Diario de. la Marina, one of the hemisphere's outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana, is having difficulty and may have to close soon. Arrangements have already been made to print Avance weekly in the U. S. for introduction into Cuba clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on a regular basis. As other leading newspapers are expropriated, publication of "exile" editions will be considered. 4. Inside Cuba, a' CIA-controlled action group is producing and distributing anti-Castro and anti-Communist publications regularly. CIA is in contact with groups outside Cuba who will be assisted in producing similar materials for clandestine introduction into Cuba. 5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin America. They will be followed by others of equal calibre. The mission of these men will be to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro. Controlled Western Hemisphere assets (press, radio, television) will support this mission as will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American travel. FINANCIAL ANNEX I. Political Action FY-1960 FY-1961 Support of Opposition Elements and other Group Activities 150, 000 800, 000 II. Propaganda Radio Operations and Programming (including establishment of trans- mitters) 400,000 700,000 Press and Publications 100,000 500, 000 III. Paramilitary In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air Support Material and Training 200, 000 1,300,000 IV. Intelligence Collection 50 000 200 000 , , Totals * 900, 000 3,500,000 *These figures are based on the assumption that major action will not occur until FY-1961. If by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action program should be accelerated, additional funds will be required. 417 - StU N APPENDIX 2 SE ET COPY JMC - 0800 8 September 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, JMARC ATTENTION J. D. ESTERLINE SUBJECT JMARC Tactical B-26 Capability 1. In reply to your request of 2 September, the following chart-extracts of capability for the B-26B aircraft are submitted: B-26 Empty 22,362 lbs. Fuel (Int. 900 gal. plus 2 pylons of 460 gal. _ 1360 gal.) Load Eight nose guns 12 ea. 5" rockets 8 ea. 250 lb. bombs 8,160 lbs. 5,000 lbs. T. 0. Weight Approx.35,000 lbs. T. 0. Roll 3,450 ft. Landing Roll (35,000 lbs. over\50' obstacle) 4,500 ft. TAS (5,000 ft.) 210 K. Radius of Action 750 NM Time over Target 20 Min. Reserve over Base 260 Gal. Maximum T. 0. Weight 39,921 lbs. 2. We can finish further details if you so desire. Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee 1 - JMC/Ops , --l - JMC/Chrono GEORGE GAINES, JR. Lt. Colonel, USAF Chief, JMCLEAR - 419 - APPENDIX 3 SALVOCO OUCTO L A TODOS LOS CO1:MPANE4"OS PATR:IOTAS - Para unirse a las Fuerzas de Liber c.cicr , deben ser seguidas con toda pre- cision y exactitud las instrucciones siguientes: 1. - En el momento de apro ximarse a nuestros puestos de 4 vigilancia, usted vo a ser interrogado por nuestros cen- 7 tinelas. Siga las instrucciones que los centinelas le den s EXACTAMENTE. q 2. - Cuando le ordene acercarse, hagalo con ambas manos f;- levantadas sobre su cabeza. Lleve esta hoja sueita en ,, su mano derecha. Avance muy despacio. Si tiene un z arma, Ilevela colgando de su cinto o de su hombro, DE , 3 NINGUN MODO LA LLEVE EN SUS MANOS. y 3. - Si forma parte de un grupo, no se acerquen juntos a iimenos de 50 metros del centinela. A partir de esta dis- ;. tancia, debe avanzar uno a uno. 17 4. - Para su major segurid:id, uno de los que Forman el grupo iy debe Ilevar y ondear una bandera blanca en un palo largo ,7 que sea facilmente visible a una considerable distancia. zt 5. - No debe tratar de penetrar en nuestras Iineas en las horas ;,r de oscuridad. Tampoco debe tratar de unirsenos en el x;- curso de una batalla, a no ser que forma parte de las z3 fuerzas enemigas y des&' rendirse. L,( 6. - Una vez dentro de nuestras !Ir cos debe obedecer togas las ordenes rapida y correctamente. Para evitar las z4 traiciones sera necesario registrarlo y retirarle sus armas. xJ Cuando sea bien sabido que usted es un verdadero -zi patriota, usted, sera uno de los nuestros. GUARDE ESTA HOJ A. S SU PASAPORTE 0 SALVOCON- DUCTO A LA LIBERTAD. 3yCONSEJO REVOLUCIONARIO ;3 (SAFE CONDUCT PASS GIVES INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO SURRENDER. WARNS AGAINST CARRYING ARMS IN HANDS OR CROSSING LINES DURING-NIGHT.) 1 (Y { - (PROPAGANDA SHEET TO ACCOMPANY ARMS DROP. SAYS TIME TO FIGHT COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP IS NEAR. BE READY TO USE ARMS, AND DO NOT LET THEM FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS.) (FISH SYMBOL OF RESISTENCE. SHEETS WERE PERFORATED SO SINGLE COPIES COULD BE USED.) (TEN PESO NOTE WITH MESSAGE PRINTED ON BACK: PEASANTS! YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO HAVE YOUR OWN PIEC1 OF LAND. FIGHT FOR IT AGAINST INRA,) APPENDIX 4 LETTER OF INSTRUCTION FOR GARFIELD M. THORSRUD 24 March 1961 APPENDIX 4 MEMORANDUM FOR: Gar M. TEEGEN ~:..J.l cc?..___;a ? :. c:::._.::; :;'cx to C:., :1 c^i or o ai ._...'~ l,'t~~)~:a; "1 :~ el-?. ?{_i iF} for ~' y y: . e (".?.L a .. n, C, C, - f it J* absc2ICC. r:U'i?:.ii ~:il'! f, j,!j'-h..iJ/Air in your J. ... U La. V a. Your .^:t i:?: ?.i^, Jt i,.?.1t of a ......_:~; 1' of You lr'.I1 (::'ter and ;o1 in your , tr a Of a..'.1?.a .,. Y our be as and status o- rl:it. l~. .. c 'i .J i.%'~.? .., .'i?1 %4 l.:_';e ._l?... .. J? t1a w-c", i i1r Giicri-i.]ce Cl y our . ! L v=on. 1d C`i)r:... 1J.'G'C s U } 1' ... !r _ d _r i 7 its 1 a~: .. ...t _LiV r.4.v 1j1 ;():IL a:'.J~C F!):t 1 (_Ll Of (!"! r ec i'v os you nay recd ie f:'ei. you will !!: ~Te a "'chi Ly over :11 : _ --+ you +"a ~..a :~ the ti lYr` p t{n :__." u'Z air c~)c i !. c IJ )_,lrL. it of perf. JoI__.el ..._~. :er _ rJ1 L,-1 the .ji?J'i:~ rrojcct. You will utilize 4',.-I -ds so as C to ensure T_.eest 11.-:c of "~_ of t?`.?`.? e in t!-10 i c(.Y..- lIil]. i-,?.J of th.rri C1~?11~._L_.(. .r:J`, l:J ..~?..J11-.. ~: ilV A J'L.p1..,.J~air mi ssiontiie the . A yl_~I...?.13 ..: J~ ~~~_~:; .. J..?T ~. ~^-. Y?,. .1C'e'1~X1:,17_l~%y i:1L i ~, a ` 1 ^i stiC s porl`. ter advised o n_a daily .:~` eLus of sf a. d~_ L ~r(, cr~,~~, ^r~J J. any Ci_'.~r itC ors C' 1iC'till`~yC11t capability a,Lo ~ c=.r_)li s.l L_]e a I~ .siC 1_-ro 's ,you rc in overnl i. cli -_?Ce of the entire air mission and have cverall T :j:onciUi l i ?j cs, you f rc a l-o ~r 1'?i 1 ttle, authority r eLjuired to ?.ccc::p1_ish 1~'~?: e i _ ?C:.~?liiiliLies. 1i ioth Jr:~r'~ is d aj::'i'TSi=, there will be a Chief of for 1;are 1:L iccn with hosIr country and roll- tic al it will he responsibility ~?o ensure the' personnel r L'.cai `'}}]Cd to you CCiI1fG2'':1 to the policies and C.irecti `J%J established by the C.-Lief of ..nee ;17itil '. hcn: you will be wor'.-in,. ? :,- of Co --.red You will be responsible to Chief, a1:OLE , who in turn is i7,_-1?Cn Jible to CLef, S 11~. iT' I Li 1',f* zi of ,y: TN. All air oPCra. ti oil:, ? and C,; _ ? _ ta). i~fl s YOU will :;e ;;._... e'er -our cc_.,..>.__~ ''_.^"`?~ for duty a.. ss_ ' and support of ci':C:LI S a de nec i +' y for acco:: nlis ent of the mission. C?:tions a. The C:.ief of base at X'A.;,D and J fl IDE is responsible for roil 'ins, you tu'^.;,,n, d timely co;:.~_-~rtjct~tions to accomplish your opera- tion In ti e event the co.:. ,inicatjons system provided is not for cyi:r tiona1 riec%c s, you will inform Chief, .Th R, indicating b. Affairs of pri nary ir: portaace or great urgency w~ii ch in your Jud :':-at s'?.ould be brought at once to the attention of Chief, J??1CLEt.R will be transr:.itted "Personal Attention of Chief, v ? - E .end/or Chief, Ti CLE/ R". 6. Travel Personnel assigned to the air operations unit r:^ust depart JI-PI JE only with your si ecific knowledge and, approval. 7. Security You are specifically charged with the operational security of rcr?a t . nd crews in accordance with establ shed procedures. An air c =^,u?ity specialist will be assigned to you to assist in the discharge of this responsibility. Security of aircraft and crews is not to be confused with physical security of the installation on which you n nay operate which is the responsibility of the Chief of Base. 8. special Instructions a. Per Diem: Per diem of $18.00 per day will apply with deductions of 10% for quarters and 45% for three meals at such time that quarters and meals are available. b. Overtime: Overtime for contract personnel under your super- vision will be in accordance with terms of the contract. Effective 1 Feb- ruary 1961, overtime policy for staff employees permits 60 hours m xirm overtime for any four week pay period through GS-10. No overtime is allowed for GS-11 or above, except as identified by approved production positions. e. Premium Peyi Premium pay applies at the rate of $965 per annum for GS-11 through GS-15 effective 8 January 1961. d. Differential: Differential of 25% may be applied after the 1-2nd day of duty. e. Clothing Allowance: Clothing allowance may be made in view of the nature of the assignment provided appropriate clothing is not otherwise available. Distribution: Orig - Address ee-.i-,-/ 1 - AC/DPD 1 - ASST CH/DPD 1 - J;C AIR- 1 - J14C/C'nrono -3 FINAL INSTRUCTION FOR AIR COMMANDER JMTIDE 5 April 1961 >APPENN'DDI 5 rTNsM ITTAL SLIAOATE 5 Apr 61 ROOM NO. BUILDING A/DDP/A Attached are DPD final instructions to the Air Commander at TIDE. These instructions have been hand- carried to Chief /JM-ATE /Air at TIDE. 6W8 f;I~ SWB AC/DPD ROOM NO. BUILDING NSION :T%07 FORM I FEB 55.241 REPLACES FORM 36-S WHICH MAY BE USED. TO s Air Commander.-(Attn: TEEGEN) Project JI4.GLOVv n?& - Uivs This Directive is being dispatched to reaffirms a responsibility and restate the policy in reforence to target assignment to D-26 Aircraft Commanders. I cannot overemphasize the importance of insuring that cach mission cozrsrnander knows exactly what preroga- tives he may exorcise in relation to attacking targets. No repeat no targets other than specifically cleared by Headquarters may be attacked. This does not include those tactical close support targets assigned by the Brigade Commander; however, the brigade Commander will be limited to those targets that directly affect the movement of his operation. Reconnaissance routes are defined as those military targets of opportunity along highways or roads over which enemy military support may travel to the task force landing area. Headquarters clearance for this typo mission is not required. Aircraft Commanders will be instructed to attack only clearly recognizable military targets when on this type mission. You may wonder why I have gone into such detail on this matter. A wrong?pr careless n-iove by any Aircraft Commander could jeopardize the entire operation. Innocent victims or non-tactical target destruction can bring world reaction and/or intervention against this effort. Every effort must be expended to insure this contingency is kept to the minimum. Mission flimsies (Aircraft Commander instructions) shouli be specific and thoroughly understood. - All questions should be answered prior-to execution. If there is doubt in your mind on your interpretation of this Directive, contact me immediately. I have complete confidence) in your leadership and can only wish you Godspeed in your task. CABLE TRAFFIC ON RESULTS OF D-2 AIR STRIKE (15 APRIL 1961) : Jrtt tut l APR 15 1?106z 61 : C/DPD 1-2 :. DC 1 3, D/CC 1 4, COP 5-6, CO? 7, AC?/A 8, CPO 9-1 , EWjs NCY C/SELL 13-20, C/VM 21, 0/CC 22-23, SELL s/C 24 'ERG GLO!?t I?'FC CPIM PIM1 XOLA CITE TIDE 3 A T ZRDITCH J:''1ZIP "XDA+iN ZRPERUSAL ARXA-82 A. NT-26-1 (FURY FOXTROT). 3. TIDE 1.5/ 1412Z. S:"OXE CAUSED BY 30:x3 DA!AGE 0;2 TARGET O3LI 31-ITERATED .ACCURATE SS.ENT. CONE IP'1ED 1 POSSIBLE 2 T-33S. AAA SURPRISED BUT FIRED ;:SLY P.=TER FIRST PASS. D. BELIEVE 75 PERCENT EFFECTIVE. \END OF W$SAGE t BELL C/CPO. 1-2 Dc l 3, D/DC i 13, ' 5-6, COP 7, ADOP/A 8, c/r 1 /D 9-12 C/BELL 13-20, C/\H 21, D/OC 22-23, BELL s/c 24 APR 15 1639z 61 EMERGENCY IN 3573 ..RG GLO'.'i INr0 0?I"' RI:'':'f -n.,~{.'';~"~~.:~.~i r~a i..~~*'~-r.~~F Ma;+: ~'/:?:.Y:.r`..~..,, ~_.,~..~ "E. s. 15 APR 61 , BELL 4 = JW I OE 'DH : C/CPD 2 J = Oct 3, 0/CGI $, COP 5-6, COP 7, AD0?/A 8, C/FJ/D C/ Z LL 13-20, C/1M 21, 0/a 22-23, BELL s/c 24 IN 3576 1ERG GLOW INFO OPI'" RI'1~S XCLA TIDE 6~3 Y 3 A T ZRDITC!'. J`:ZIP QXDAdN ZRPERJSAL "3oARY,A-S? A. SOT-26-1 (FURY ECHO) B. T1DE 1514157. C. 75 PERCENT CF AT IELD DESTROYED. T-33 ON ALERT EXPLODED. .::RATIONS BLDG DESTROYED. D. HZA'JY AAA APPEARED RISH T . AAA ALERT IN PITS. EN O( MESSAGE = BZLL Dc l 3, 0/'OC f 4, DGP 5-6, COP 7, AUOP A 8, C/Ft/D 12, C/BELL 13-20, CM 21, D/OC 22-23, BELL S/C213 ZRG SLOW INFO OPIM RIM1 KOLA CITE TIDE 610 Y B A T ZRDITCH JMZIP '?KDAWN ZRPERUSAL PARKA-?2 A. NT-26-3 (FURY BRAVO) 3. iT_DE 15140OZ ,APR- 15 i 644Z 61 EMU~GENCY IN 3577 C. TARGET COMPLETELY DESTROYED. CONSIDERABLE SMOKE AMD FIRE. 'PEP.ATIONS BLDG DESTROYED. 5 AAA POSITICNS DESTROYED. INTENSIVE .XI.-;A'IGE AIRCRAFT AND GROUND. AIRCRAFT REPEATEDLY EXCHANGED' FIRE TH AAA POSITIONS UNTIL AAA CEASED. AIRCRAFT RETURNED BASE WITH 1LIMEROUS HOLES, COIPLETE. HYDRAULIC FAILURE AND I HUNG ROCKET. NEVER LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. D. AAA VERY HEAVY AND ON ALERT. TOT TO EARLY AIR TOO CLEAR. END OF MESSAGE- C/DPO 1-2 DC1 3, D/ , DDP COP c L-.; 17, i3Z LL 18 rte- 5/c -IX Col TILL. 621 r: A T JMZIP CKDAWN .:. v1-4 ::ISSiC:: REPORT J: G SOP ND.? 7 A. ATD 15074 12 :'OT 1510552 C. ATA: 1514V 2 I N 3628 D. O:'D:.A::CE ~;:PE:2DED: IC 260 L3 -PA'-S? 7 6" R3CA TS, 1500 RDS . A# CnL ?ESJi.TS: : C: PARTIALLY DESTROYED. F . U$A T DEST~' OY ED : DUE TO HAZ NUMDER AIRCRAFT DESTROYED UNKNOWN. b U. INTERCEPTIONS: NONE H. AAA: TI::E: 1056Z 2. LOCATION: 5 POSITIONS AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. 1. VISUAL 03StRt,TATION: 1. TROOPS: NONE 2. AIRCRAFT; NONE 3. SHIP NOS -- 3. ?S~~.KS: - 437 - AF 15 21522 6l ADOP/A 8, C/BELL 4_-16 OPERATIONAL t DIATE :O;iLD NOT SEE INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT ON BOliB RUNS. IF AIRCRAFT WERE B r':r~T:?::.:+TS AS SHO4N ON PHOTO, THEY WERE DESTROYED. A GREAT DEAL BLACK SMOKE WAS OBSERVED ON R`VETP:ENTS AFTER BOMB RUN. PILOT ;LS0 MADE 2 STRAFING RUNS DESTROYING AT LEAST 3 AIRCRAFT CONE WAS 7-33)0 .5-O CAL AA WAS NOT EFFECTIVE BUT HEAVY ONE GUN PASS THRU ENT OF FIELD EITHER DESTROYED OR DAMAGED TWO AIRCRAFT. PILOT ;E IEVEZ ?S TO 80 PERCENT OF ALL AIRCRAFT ON FIELD WERE DESTROYED. END CF MESSAGE aT:I CLOD' `ITE TIDE 617 3 Y E A T JIIZI? Q:;DAL't: ISSIO! REPORT JiIC SO? I:!R 7 -T-2S-2 ATD: 15/07332 ..TOT: 15/13527. -5-. 15/14157 HE ~.:jLTS WHAT II:TC:.PTIOS'z: ''LGATIL'Z AAA: TI:?::t I'Qi;r LOCPA roo I'/,1 . ' VISUAL OESVATIOi': ;:C-;:E SHI?::`_ IIDI3E T':cO?SS 1:0I'E AIRCc ATT:... !101'7" .1 V-12MIX S 0. : . _ S. I;,n r - I ACCO LIS*.LE i1 SsI }- i.., ?..,.-}a*....., ,".. -." a f.. ML. .-'"x v~f tom`... ...l-. 1. _ X.vt _ e-?. ti 1:"si-ibN=~+ . ~'.i.SIB. 13 F .'_. Al DYED, tI i t T;tIS P aR ICULAt1 A1f,2C::AT. r CTTZi.SI'~L'.: ` L...... 3 .J' A E5- -L ..:t I .. i'f I Q .'`' .'~ . . CO ?C:.?V: 11AS. JCt?lt ?? /11..11..Ii% ''A.) ? ;' :'...?N V~:.:'T;:I''C ~:""'It'v~ ; Uc::S dt: ^.UVWAY AS i IRS: PASS T.. lt. AGO;; ; C? 7.Z S^,;T-: P.771-ER TUO PASSES AAA STILL CAFE. CS:J OF AIRFIELD). 1'.P?f:G^C:( 71:11' 77, OI.? ..~..i I? ~" c: ';c s I:i?t _ m EP'T fl . I1;T LL I i i^ 0 JAS ACCU;;ATE, ?A:: T ICULARLY T: . l . " ' E 03SCU ED AI:? CRA: T 01' PILOT SLGCESTS 1'd TALKIIIC Illi i. ?.iv.+ ? !: i ?. OVER TCT. PILOT FOLLOG'ZD 3RIr l-D FLIGHT PLAI1. L0'2AII I::CP.'~?!.TIVE (11. OT .' L'I:CTIOiiI C P.".O?EiLY). WEAVER WAS AS BRIEFED. -,t- cim-R ICE 'JAC COAL I': I? FO'.: FUTURE. '15L. S..C,".USE OF AAA LCC TICiI:C A.'i. :i,1:?;.~i`? U?C'. :!IC 035^_.2VATIOPS TIIE' Y~:ITIAL ASSUCI;!E1iT TARCI=T : - ^F '.'?`'T?= AIR "I'- AA" - R%tt? UAS A %1 0. END OF ACSSAGE +':r F; 0:1 AnZA DUE ::.1ST OF OSPITAL A^EA. ?LAIIIIED AXIS APPENDIX 7 D_DXY TARGET LIST APPENDIX 7 D-DAY TARGET LIST 0001 Hours, 16 April 1961 1. San Atnonio Base 2 B-26 2. Campo Libertad Air Base 2 B-26 3. Santiago de Cuba Air Base 2 B--26 4. Manac,ua Military Base 2 B-26 5. Santa Clara Air Base 5A. Camaguey Air Base 6. Playa Baracoa Air Base 6A. San Julian Air Base 7. Cienfuegos Air Base (Jaime Gonzales) 7A. Cienfuegos Naval Station (Gunboats only) 8. Nueva Gerona 8A. Batabana Naval Station SE 2252N 8231W Armament Red* 2305N 8227W Armament Red 1957N 7551W Armament Red 2258N 8218W Armaraent Green** 2229N 79556 2124x; 7752W 2302N 8235W 2205N 8411W 2209`N 8025W 220830N 802740W Armament Red 2155N 8248W 2242N 8218W Armament Red 9. Havana Power & Light Companies 2309N 8321W (2 Power Plants) 1 B-26 Armament Blue *** 10. Bauta International Broadcasting 2259N 8232W 1 B-26 Armament Blue 11. Topes de Collantes 2155N 8001W 1 B-26 Armament Blue * Armament Red: Full .50 caliber load, rockets, and light (260 lb.) bombs. ** Armament Green: Full .50 caliber load, rockets, and napalm. *** Armament Blue: Full .50 caliber load, rockets, and heavy (500 lb.) bombs. LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLAN FOR OPERATION PLAN 60 AD-5 APPENDIX 8 Logistics Support Plan for Operations Plan 60 AD-5 HQ Retalhuleu HQ DPD Office of Special Operations Dept. of Defense & Other Sources -4--3-4-9 Requisition Line Supply Line Note: No ordnance items will be handled through Eglin AFB. - 446 - ILI' POSSIBLE PUBLICITY ABOUT FLYERS KILLED AT THE BAY OF PIGS T07 RET FROM Bruce T. Johnson Assistant for Information, DDA SUBJECT Possible Publicity About Flyers Killed at the Bay of Pigs 1. On Sunday and Monday, 19 and 20 March, Gary Breneman of the Office of General Counsel will be in Alabama to pre- sent posthumous medals to the families of three of the pilots killed at the Bay of Pigs. Although we believe that we have arranged things in such a manner that no publicity will attend the private ceremony, we do know that a relative of one of the families works for the Birmingham News and must recognize the possibility that public notice will be given to the event. In order that you may be prepared for such an eventuality, we offer the attached publishable information for your use only if there is an inquiry. 2. The paragraph contains the name of "Pete" Ray, about whom publicity is most likely. The other two names are also provided in case they become the subject of inquiries. A fourth medal will be given out at a later date but not in Alabama, hence the reference to four pilots. 3. More details about the circumstances about Ray's death will be conveyed orally to his family. Because of their interest in recovering his body from Cuba and because they perceive that publicity linking Ray to the CIA would not facilitate their efforts, we expect that they will take the information provided as private and privileged and will not put it in the public domain. Should some of the details come out and lead, in turn, to questions of your office, we will endeavor to provide you with additional materials with which to satisfy those questions. Att: a/s r ' On 20 March 1978 a senior official of the Cent:ra-! y lba 1 e l-Iif Intelligence Agency visito ~~c~ TA ~l _~.~.~=1a to bes-o:.', on bps ~. of a grateful Government, the Distinguished Intelligence Cross on the widow and family of Mr. Thomas Willard Ray, killed during combat operations at the Bay of Pigs- Mr. Ray, an experienced pilot working with the Cuban brigade, volunteered to fly in aerial support of the brigade and was killed when his plane was shot down on 19 April 1961. idr. Ray was one of four American pilots killed at that time honored posthumously by the Government. Also: *Riley W. Shamburger, Jr. *Wade C. Gray DDS 78-1174 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Operations Group, DDO FROM Bruce T. Johnson Assistant for Information SUBJECT Information for the Daughter of Thomas Ray 1. On Sunday and Monday,.2-0' and 2I March, Gary Breneman of the Office of General Counsel will visit Alabama to present medals to the families of three of the Americans killed at the Bay of Pigs. Previous discussion with the daughter of Thomas Ray, supplemented by a series of written questions, led to a commitment to try to provide the daughter with a few more details about how her father died. Attached is a blind memo which will be used by Breneman in an effort to satisfy the daughter's curiosity. The memo will be retained by Breneman, not passed to Ray's daughter. 2. Also attached is a statement to be filed with the Public Affairs Office to be used in the unlikely event that the presentation of the medals results in publicity leading, in turn, to an inquiry about the Agency's involvement. Written to refer to Ray, the statement also includes the names of the other two recipients of the medals so it can be used to respond to questions. involving any of the three families. Attachments: a/s - 450 Following his recruitment early in 1961, Thomas Ray served as a B-26 instructor pilot. There was a general understanding on the part of the B-26 pilots that there might be an opportunity for voluntary participation in combat operations. On 19 April 1961, Ray was one of several Americans who volunteered to fly B-26's in strikes against targets in Cuba. Leo Baker, normally a radio operator on transport aircraft, accompanied Ray as his observer- Because of the emergency conditions which prevailed with B-26's being re- fueled, rearmed, repaired, and returned to action as rapidly as possible, there is no clear record of the tail number of the plane Ray was flying at the time of his death. As was4some of the other B-26's, Ray's aircraft was operating independently when he began his attack on a sugar mill near the Bay of Pigs which was being used as the Cuban military headquarters. The only information on what happened to Ray comes to us from Cuban sources, primarily monitored radio messages. At about 8:00 a.m. a single aircraft bombed and strafed the sugar mill_area. On its second or third pass, it was shot down by antiaircraft fire. It came down on or near the E-2 IMPDET CL BY 008564 grass airstrip which served the sugar mill. Only one boa;. was found in the wreckage; the other crewman was reported to have jumped from the wreck and run for cover. At about 11:00 a.m., Havana radio reported that the dead airman found in the plane was an American whom they identified with an alias known to have been used by Leo Baker. In a story which appeared in the Cuban press on 23 April 1961, the above reference to Leo Baker was repeated. In addition, the Cuban report, attributed to Cuban Major Fernandez Mel, stated that the airman who had survived the crash had been killed in a fight to escape capture. This fight reportedly took place in an orange grove 4-5 kilometers from the crash site. There were no identification papers found on the body, but it was claimed that the dead man had been armed with a pistol, knife, and hand grenades- Considering that the Cubans quickly announced the identity of the American found in the wrecked aircraft as Leo Baker, it is assumed that Thomas Ray was the one killed in the fight with his pursuers. The scene of this action was roughly 28 miles NNW (22?30'N/81?09'W) of the beach at Playa Giron, well behind Castro's lines. It is believed that a Cuban photo of an aircraft. showing tail No. 935 must be Ray's plane. The only other B-26 known to have landed on Cuban soil carried the No. 915; this plane crashed at the Playa Giron airstrip on 17 April 1961. Att: Photo 2 - 452 - --~z~- Y,+u.s;'~-,~r~~~:" yY-'T2 '.i;~.'.i:. ,:Yi::; Vic..- - t:'. _ _. a'i.:;..-'~~: .;~: ~eC;: ~::aJS __~ _ i~--::.;z ~-;~~r _ .1:-:~'? . ..?c, :- ?.:s~T~,-i ~~:z. -. ?3 ~ '- ?y'~'~: ~?:1-;T-%_?j-4: :_~. i.. i~-Y - -_`d ?~~y~,7_L.~r.~~1~,"~yly ;; ?y;- ~? ?~+~ '"^ i J~nu r F,r. Kfs~ t ' "c">7 !t.`. s'~,.,-.~1. t?_;^~; :~.c_ iti4, ir~'?" 4:_:_._. y_..rs~-C.~~,1-~.?i:,.r:f;=1 ~ = ::~ S.-:: y... ~'rs: ~i?F,ZL .:.~.~i: 'i =~r-v ~r" ? - ~"~" - Y = S _ _ ._- 57. ~ _ _ 'x ~~/- `risr.M~v y't=.7?`~ ~yy ',~-^.-+ ~f. +`~._w?_: ~.~+.Sti:-~? - ?~;'.S =r'~~L -.. h _~._.~. i.. ` ~ " r !>.'.t?-., ^c : _ i ~ '. j' y ^ :,-w - r t>?r; ^ `~~?_+.? ~''-??i ;-r ~- - y i'' ?-.?r. - t?'~?'?~+.i ~i.'~:J. _?.- +~. ^-=`?_? - V~~.J`i'Y j?-.:^.^ ,.:e 3-S..: ~?t?~,--:: _ =~'T'~-`.: r_?~ri? __ - _ z_~ `tam _ _. The Pevol?tlionarg Air Force and the anti-aircrcft ertil:?-r j - shot doom several B-26 mercenary planes. The Arne scan-rnade bomber planes were fully eeptipped. with weapon.;, as shown below. On 20 March 1978 a senior official of the Central Intelligence Agency visited Alabama to bestow, on behalf of a grateful Government, the Distinguished Intelligence Cross on the widow and family of Mr. Thomas Willard Ray,* killed during combat operations at the Bay of Pigs. Mr. Ray, an experienced pilot working with the Cuban brigade, volunteered to fly in aerial support of the brigade and was killed when his plane was shot down on 19 April 1961. Ray was one of four American pilots killed at that time honored posthumously by the Government. Also: *Riley W. Shamburger, Jr. *Wade C. Gray Part I Initiation of Air Activity A. Organization and Management 1. Office memo from E. A. Stanulis, 29 Mar 60, sub: Estimates of Special Flight Requirements for FY 61 and 62. Memo for Chiefs of Support, Clandestine Services Divisions and Staffs from S. M. Hines, 1 Mar 60, sub: Estimates of Special Flight Requirements for FY 61 and 62. Memo for E. Stanulis from Adolf J. Lium, 16 Mar 60, sub: Estimates for Special Flight Requirements for FY 61 and 62. 2. Memo for C. T. Barnes from F. M. Hand, 28 Jun 60, sub: [Gen. Cabell's DISC Briefing, 22 Jun 60]. TS. WH/4/PM, PM Daily Log 5-7 Jul 60. MR from John F. Mallard, 25 Jul 60, sub: Meeting with DPD: Air Support for JMARC. 3. Memo for Chiefs Air Proprietary, Administrative, Materiel, and Operations Branch from Stanley W. Beerli [18 Jul 60?], sub: Assignment of DPD Responsibilities for Development of Tactical Air Capability for JMARC (JMC-2-60). 5. Memo for All Sections from George Gaines, Jr., 18 Jul 60, sub: Assignment of Cryptonym to DPD/ JMARC Project (JMC-1-60). * Unless otherwise specified all sources are SECRET. Copies of, or notes from all sources cited are filed under HS/CSG 2632. Memo for Acting Chief, DPD from Charles F. Quinette, 18 Jul 60, sub: Personnel for JMARC (DPD 5606-60). 6. MR from John F. Mallard, 25 Jul 60, op. cit. WH/4/PM, PM Daily Log, 7 Jul 60. 7. MR from John F. Mallard, 25 Jul 60, op. cit. 8. MR from Col. F. Mallard, William E. Eisemann, and Lt. Col. George Gaines, Jr., 10 Aug 60, sub: Weekly JMARC-JMCLEAR Coordination Meeting (JMC-0029). 10. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from J. Hawkins, 5 Oct 60, sub: Study on Organization and Command Relation- ships of Task Force JMARC for Air Operations. S/Eyes. 11. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 12 Oct 60, sub: Organization and Command Relation- ships: JMARC and DPD. C. 12. MR from John F. Mallard, 6 Sep 60, sub: Meeting with Mr. Tracy Barnes. 13. Oral History Interview: Richard M. Bissell, Jr. by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75, Tape 1, pp. 8-10.* 14. Oral History Interview: ,Stanley W. Beerli by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 2 Feb 76,-Tape 1A, pp. 2-7. 15. Ibid., Tape 1A, pp. 3-4. 16. Ibid., p. 5. 17. Ibid., pp. 6-7. 18. Ibid., Tape 1A, pp. 3-6, Tape 3B, pp. 57-58. * This and all other Oral History Interviews, all con- versations, and all correspondence conducted by Jack B.- Pfeiffer are UNCLASSIFIED. 19. Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 6, p. 79. 20. Ibid., Tape 7, p. 92. 21. Oral History Interview: Richard D. Drain by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 8 Jan 76, Tape 1A, pp. 11-12. 22. Ibid., Tape 1B, p. 23. 23. Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, p. 40. 24. Oral History Interview: George Gaines, Jr., by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 9 Feb 76, Tape 1A, p. 1 25. Ibid., p. 2. 26. Ibid., Tape 2B, pp. 3-4. 27. Oral History Interview: Billy B. Campbell by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 15 Jun 76, Tape 1A, pp. 6-7. 28. Ibid., p. 9. 29. Memo for Acting Chief, DPD from Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 12 Aug 60, sub: Tactical Air Requirements, Project JMARC. 30. Memo for Mr. Bissell from C. Tracy Barnes, 6 Oct 60, sub: JMARC and DPD Relationships. 31. Memo for DDP from Rudolph E. Gomez, 20 Sep 60, sub: Air Support of JMARC. S/Eyes. 32. Memo for Chief, WHD from Stanley W. Beerli, 23 Nov 60, sub: JMCLEAR Budget Estimates (JMC-0204). 33. Oral History Interview: William E. Eisemann by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 14 Nov 75, Tape 3, p. 32. I. B. Acquisition of Combat Aircraft 38. Memo for DDP from [Jacob D. Esterline], 16 Jul 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report for 13-15 July. S/Eyes. Daily Log - WH/4 PM, 13 Jul 60. 39. Special Group Meeting: Cuba, 21 Jul 60. S/Eyes. MR from Edward H. Hinkle, 15 Jun 60, sub: Meeting with Defense Representative. 40. Conversation between Sidney Stembridge and Jack B. Pfeiffer, 12 May 76, sub: BOP. 40a. Cable to Director from Guatemala, 30 Jul 60, GUAT 965 (IN 31262) 41. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from C. Tracy Barnes, 28 Jul 60, sub: B-26 Aircraft from JMARC (DDP 0-3942). 41a. [MR from Stanley W. Beerli or George Gaines, Jr.] n.d., sub: -Meeting with Col. Egan, Col. J. F. Mallard (USMC), [Cmdr. Norman] Imler, and [Sidney] Stembridge. (Job 73-767, Box 1, JMG MR's). 42. Cable to MASH from Director, 28 Jul 60, DIR 42259 (OUT 51849). 43. Memo for Asst. to the SecDef (Spl. Ops.) from James A. Cunningham, Jr., 29 Jul 60, sub: Air- craft for Support of Project CROSSPATCH (JMC- 0013-60). 44. Memo for ADDP/A from Jacob D. Esterline, 1 Aug 60, sub: B-26 Aircraft for JMARC. 45. Daily Log - WH/4/PM, 28-29 Jul 60. 46. Not Used. 47. Memo for Director of Materiel Management [USAF] from Lt. Col. George Gaines, 11 Aug 60, sub: B-26 Aircraft Configuration (JMC-0043-60). 48. Memo for DDP/CIA from Leroy F. Prouty, 9 Aug 60, sub: Aircraft for Support of Project CROSSPATCH _(JMC-0041) . TOECRET 49. Memo for DDP/CIA from Jerry D. Page, 26 Aug 60, sub: Aircraft for Support of Project CROSSPATCH (DPD 6643-60). 50. Memo for Asst. to SecDef (Spi. Ops.) from Stanley W. Beerli, 19 Sep 60, sub: Aircraft Support for Project CROSSPATCH (JMC-0098-60). 50a. Daily Progress Reports, WH/4 Support, 23-26 Sep 60. Cable to Director from MADD, 1 Oct 60, MADD 0121 (IN 21225). 51. Memo for DDP from Jerry D. Page, 31 Aug 60, sub: Project CROSSPATCH (DPD 6776-60). Ibid., 12 Oct 60 (DPD 7758-60). Memo for Asst. to SecDef from DDP, 19 Aug 60, sub: DOD Support of Project CROSSPATCH-26 (JMC-0038). 52. Memo for DDP/CIA from Leroy F. Prouty, 16 Jan 61, sub: Aircraft Support of Project CROSSPATCH. 53. Memo for Asst. [to] SecDef (OSO) from Jacob D. Esterline, 19 Jan 61, sub: Requirement for Aircraft for Support of Project CROSSPATCH. 54. Memo for Director of Logistics from C. F. Welch, 30 Mar 61, sub: Maintenance/Supply Support - Project CROSSPATCH (DPD-2116-61). 54a. Memo for Chief, JMCLEAR from Charles F. Quinette, 9 Feb 61, sub: B-26's for JMCLEAR (DPD 0640-61). MR from B. E. Reichardt, 31 Mar 61, sub: DPD Briefing, 31 Mar 61. 55. Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1A, p. 12. 56. Ibid., Tape 2B, p. 40. 57. Oral History Interview: Garfield M. Thorsrud by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 6 Feb 76, Tape 1B, p. 24. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid., Tape 2A, p. 26-27. 60. Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1B, p. 21. 61. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2B, p. 40. 62. Letter from C. W. Seigrist to Jack B. Pfeiffer, 20 May 76. 63. Cable to MADD from Director, 25 Nov 60, DIR 13327 (OUT 96176). 63a. Cable to Director from MADD, 26 Nov 60, MADD 0643 (IN 47941). 64. Cable to MADD from Director, 30 Nov 60, DIR 14000 (OUT 97713). 65. Ibid., 30 Nov 60, DIR 14105 (OUT 97992). Ltr. from Seigrist to Pfeiffer, 20 May 76. 66. MR from William E. Eisemann and George Gaines, Jr., 7 Sep 60, sub: Weekly JMARC/JMCLEAR Coordination Meeting (JMC-0077). [Memo for DDP et all from 7 Oct 60, sub: Activities Program (JMC-0134-60) (DDP 0-5259). 67. Ltr. from Seigrist to Pfeiffer, 20 May 76, op. cit. 67a. MR from William H. Koehler and 4 Nov 60, sub: Mon y aymen s (JMC-0185). 67b. Memo for Chief, WHD from Stanley W. Beerli, 12 Oct 60, sub: DPD Support of JMARC (JMC-0147). 67c. Memo for Directorate of Plans, Deputy Directorate of War Plans, Hq. USAF form Stanley W. Beerli, 2 Nov 60, sub: Loss of C-54G S.N.45-592 (DPD- 8042-60). 67d. Memo for Chief/WH/4/Ops from John F. Mallard, 27 Oct 60, sub: DPD Memo, JMC-0147, 12 Oct 60. 67e. Memo for Asst. to the SecDef (Spi. Ops.) from Stanley W. Beerli,.26 Oct 60, sub: Aircraft for Support of Project CROSSPATCH (JMC-0170). 67f. Memo for Richard Bissell from Brig. Gen. Lansdale, 28 Oct 60, sub: Aircraft. 68. Memo for DDP from Stanley W. Beerli, 4 Oct 60, sub: Attached Document (JMC-0132-60) (JMC-0049). MR from William Koehler and 4 Nov 60, sub: (JMC-0185). Monthly Payments Memo for DPD Maintenance Section from William H. Koehler, 7 Nov 60, sub: Cover of.Helios for Support of JMCLEAR (JMC-0189). 69. Memo for Chief, WH/4/Air (DPD) from J. D. Esterline, 6 Dec 60, sub: Estimated Requirements for Transport Aircraft Support of JMARC Paramilitary Activities (JMC-0227). Memo for Chief, WH/4/PM from 28 Nov 60, sub: Air Transportation Support of the Strike Force in Lodgment. 70. Memos for Record from James A. Cunningham, Jr., sub: Acquisition and Equipping Constellation Model, as follows: To DDP, 17 Jan 61, OXC-1241. MR, 23 Jan 61, OXC-1250. To Chief Contract Branch, DPD, 6 Feb 61, OXC 1291. 71. Memo for DDP from J. D. Esterline, 14 Sep 60, sub: Dissent to - SALA Contractual Agreement (DDP U-4761 AA 7.1 . MR from) 15 Sep 60, sub: Explana- tion of SALA maintenance Costs (JMC-0092-60). Me"Iv fov- 120? fa-o++, S' h/ey w. /V aGta0, j(/6 0-sanri&t- n Whd rund4 h% 'V It (JA G? 19~-6 a, 72. Summary Sheet on Air Operations Companies and Facilities. Undated. Origin unknown. S/Eyes. I. C. Relations with OSO/DOD and the Air National Guar 73. MR from John F. Mallard, 15 Sep 60, sub: Confer- ence with DPD Regarding Status of USAF Personnel. 74. Memo for Ch/WH/4 from E. A. Stanulis, 12 Sep 60, sub: Policy Approval for the Use of DOD Personnel in Project JMARC. 75. Memo for DDCI from J. C. King, 19 Oct 60, sub: Opalocka Air Base. S/Eyes. 76. MR from John F. Mallard, 15 Sep 60, sub: Weekly Meeting with OSO Reps. 77. Memo for Mr. Earman from Stanley J. Grogan, 8 Nov 60, sub: [Telegram from Andrew Berding to George Beebe]. U. Memo for the Director from Stanley J. Grogan, 8 Nov 60, sub: [Knight Newspapers Questions on Opalocka Naval Base]. Memo for C/JMCLEAR from J. D. Esterline, 2 Nov 60, sub: Cover Story for Use of Opalocka Marine Corps Air Station. 78. Memo for Acting Chief, DPD from J. D. Esterline, 12 Oct 60, sub: Vessels Required for Search and Rescue Purposes. Memo for Chief, JMARC from Stanley W. Beerli, 15 Sep 60, sub: Vessels for Search and Rescue (JMC-0081). 79. MR from John F. Mallard, 30 Nov 60, sub: Conference with Capt. Burns W. Spore, USN Rep of OSO/DOD. 80. Ibid. 81. Memo for Asst to the SecDef (Spl. Ops.) from Deputy Director (Plans), 29 Nov 60, sub: DOD Support of Project CROSSPATCH (DPD-8539-60). 82. Memo for Ch/WH/4 from George Gaines, Jr., 21 Dec 60, sub: JMCLEAR Personnel Requirements from DOD (lr1C`~~~'7~, Memo for Ch/WH/4 from Stanley W. Beerli, 25 Apr 61, sub: DOD Support for JMGLOW Activities (JMG-0367). 83. Memo for Ch/WH/4 from Stanley W. Beerli, 25 Apr 61, op. cit. 84._ Memo for DDP/EMB from Jacob D. Esterline, 6 Dec 60, sub: Four JMARC Problems for 8 Dec Meeting of Special Group. S/Eyes. MR from Thomas A. Parrott, 8 Dec 60, sub: Minutes of Special Group. Meeting, 8 Dec 60. S/Eyes. Memo for Ch/WH/4/Support, from Richard D. Drain, 12 Dec 60, sub: ZI Bases for Supply Missions. MR from with Ambassador Willauer. 23 Dec 60, sub: Meeting 85. MR from James A. Cunningham, Jr., 30 Dec 60, sub: USAF Personnel Withdrawal Plan Project CROSSPATCH (JMC-0241). 86. Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1A, p. 4. Stembridge-Pfeiffer conversation, 12 May 76, op. cit. 87. MR from Sidney Stembridge, Jr., 17 Aug 60, sub: Recruitment of Air National Guard Personnel (JMC-0037). 88. Job 73-767, Box 8, Folder "ANG Participation BOP." Two summary sheets: "State Representation" and "Overflight Crews." 89. Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1B, pp. 12-13. 90. Cable to MADD from Director, 2 Dec 60, DIR 14519 (OUT 98842). 91. Memo for Chief, JMCLEAR from Sidney Stembridge, Jr., 9 Jan 61, sub: ANG Personnel to Replace USAF Personnel (JMC-0250). 92. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 1 Mar 61, sub: Utilization of US Military Personnel by Project CROSSPATCH. S/Eyes. Memo for Act. Ch/DPD from James A. Cunningham, Jr., 1 Mar 61, sub: Status of Military Manning at Eglin AFB (JMC-0300). 93. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int., Tape 1A, p. 1. I. D. Initial Planning for Air Operations 94. MR, from Casimiro Barquin, 8 Apr 60, sub: Meeting Held on 6 April at PIC to Discuss Photographic Coverage of Cuba (DPD 2875). S/Eyes. 95. Memo for Acting Chief, DPD from George Gaines, Jr., 2 Aug 60, sub: Photo Coverage of Target Country (JMC-0017). S/Eyes. 96. Minutes of Special Group Meeting, Cuba, 20 Oct 60. S/Eyes. MR from Thomas A. Parrott, 12 Oct 60, Discussion between Mr. Merchant and Gen. Cabell. 97. MR from John F. Mallard, 28 Sep 60, sub: U-2 Photographic Reconnaissance of Cuba. S/Sen. 98. Minutes, Special Group Meeting, Cuba,' 27 Oct 60. S/Eyes. 98a. Memo for A/DDP/A from Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 24 Oct 60, sub: [Overflight Procedures]. 99. MR from Donald E. Songer, 3 Apr 61, sub: Handling of Take-Cuba (IDEA 0242). 100. Memo for DPD from J. D. Esterline, 13 Aug 60, sub: Air Support Requirements Project JMARC. S/Eyes. 104. MR from William E. Eisemann and George Gaines, Jr., 7 Sep 60, sub: Weekly JMARC/JMCLEAR Coor- dination Meeting (JMC-0077). Memo for Deputy Chief, WH/4 from J. Hawkins, 13 Oct 60, sub: Data on Air Strips and Seaplane Stations, etc. 105. Memo for Director, Office of Logistics from Rudolph E. Gomez, 14 Sep 60, sub: Logistical Support of JMARC Paramilitary Operations. S/Eyes. 106. Ibid., Att. 1. 107. Memo for Major General James H. Walsh from Allen W. Dulles, 23 Aug 60, sub: Status of the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force (ER 6656/A). 108. USIB Ad Hoc Committee, 9 Feb 61, sub: Military Buildup in Cuba (OCI 0592/61-C). 109. Memo for Major General James H. Walsh from Allen W. Dulles, 23 Aug 60, op. cit. 110. Not used. 111. Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1B, p. 15. 112. Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, p. 28. 113. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1B, p. 17. 114. Memo for Maj. Gen. James H. Walsh from Allen W. Dulles, 23 Aug 60, op. cit. 115. Armament of the Lockheed T-33 Jet Trainers in the Cuban Air Force, COG Files: Taylor Committee, Vol. II, Item W 1, 16 May 61. TOPN~CRET USAF, Staff Message Division, Incoming Message: AFIN; 33631 (31 Dec 60) R/WGS. C. 116. Taylor Committee: MR's of PM Study Group Meetings, 3rd meeting, 25 April 61, p. 9. U. 117. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit. Tape 2B, p. 50; Tape 3A, p. 53. 118. Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, p. 9. 119. Taylor Committee: MR's of PM Study Group Meetings, 6 May 61, sub: Conversation between General Taylor and Mr. Thorsrud, p. 3. U. 120. Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 7, p. 93. 121. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from C. Tracy Barnes, 16 Dec 60, sub: [Thoughts on JMATE]. Memo for DDP/EMB from Jacob D. Esterline, 6 Dec 60, sub: Four JMARC Problems for 8 Dec Mtg. of Spl. Group. 122. Memo for A/DDP/A from Jacob D. Esterline, 28 Dec 60, sub: Your Memorandum Dated 16 Dec 60. 123. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from C. Tracy Barnes, 28 Dec 60, sub: [Main Issues re JMARC] 124. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 8 Feb 61, sub: Injunc- tions from General Cabell Stemming from JCS Meeting on 7 Feb 61. Acquisition and Training of Air Crews A. Basic Plan for Flight Training 1. Memo for DDP from Stanley W. Beerli, 15 Sep 60, sub: Transmittal of Air Support Annex to Para- military Operations Plan No. 1. (JMC-0083): Annex I, Air Support Annex to Para- military Operations Plan No. 1, Opera- tions Plan 60 AD-5, p. 2. 2. Ibid., Appendix J, Concept of Operations to Opera- tions Plan 60 AD-5, p. 1. 3. Ibid., Ops Plan 60 AD-5, pp. 7-9; Appendix C, Supporting Forces to Ops Plan 60 AD-5, pp. 2-5; Appendix H, Logistics Support to Ops Plan 60 AD-5; Appendix K, Administration. 4. Ibid., Appendix L, Tab 1, B-26 Movement and Utili- zation; Tab 2, B-26 Training Syllabus. 5. Ibid., Appendix L, Tab 2, p. 3. 6. Ibid., p. 4. II. B. Trainers and Trainees 7. Persons, Albert C., Bay of Pigs (Birmingham, 1968), U.* 8. DPD, "Contract Records," Job 73-767, Box 2, 5x8 cards. 10. Memo for DDS from James A. Cunningham, Jr., 22 Oct 59, sub: Temporary Quarters Allowance - OSTIARY Contract Employees (DDS Chrono files, Nov 59. Job 65-97, Box 1). * All subsequent references to commercial publications (books, magazines, and newspapers) are UNCLASSIFIED. - 467 - TOPR ET Ferrer, Eduardo, Operacion Puma (Miami? Inter- national Aviation Consulta:nts,.Inc. 1975), p. 49. Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int. op.'cit., Tape 2A, p. 34. 11. MR from F. W. Barkley,.12 Aug 60, sub: Cuban pilots Trained at Pensacola. MR from Francis W. Barkley, 11 Aug 60, sub: Re- marks of Adm. Arleigh'Burke at JCS Briefing. S/Eyes. Bureau of Budget Route Slip to Gordon Gray from R. M. Macy, 7 Mar 60, sub: [Transmittal of Memo on Cuban MAP]. C. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library Clean-up Files, Box 6, Cuba, DAH, 11/74). 12. Ferrer, op. cit.,, pp. 33-38. 13. Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape lA, PP. 1-3. 14. Ferrer, op. cit.,. pp. 44-46. 15. Ibid., p. 46. 15a. Conversation between Garfield M. Thorsrud and Jack B. Pfeiffer, 28 Oct 77, sub: Review of Vol. I, BOP History: Air Operations. II. C. Air Training Base, Retalhuleu, Guatemala 16. Cable to Director from MADD, 23 Sep 60, MADD 0091 (IN 16948). 16a. Cable to from Director, 22 Sep 60, 3727 (OU Cable to JMADD/Guatemala from Director, 12 Jan 61, CLEAR 6623 (OUT 80202-C). 17. Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1B, p. 13. WH/4/PM, PM Daily Log, 12 Aug 60. 18. Persons, op. cit., pp. 19-25. Cable to Eglin Air Force Base from Director, 10 Feb 61, CLEAR 7683 (OUT 82974-C). Cable to Eglin from Director, 13 Feb 61, CLEAR 7756 (OUT 83176-C). No author. Undated. Info on Eglin AFB. S/Eyes. 18a. Same as Source 15a, above. 19. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 51-64. 20. Ibid., p. 61-62. 21. Ibid., p. 63. 22. Ibid., p. 72. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid., p. 73. 25. Ibid. pp. 73-74. 26. Ibid., pp. 74-75. 26a. Ibid., pp. 75-76. 27. Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1A, P. 4. 28. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 85-92. 29. Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int., Tape 1B, pp. 13-14. 30. Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Int., Tape 2, p. 29. 31. Cable to Director from MASH, 21 Sep 60, MASH 0772 (IN 16238). Cable to Director from JMADD, 22 Sep 60, MADD 0089 (IN 16675). Cable to Director from Guatemala, 24 Sep 60, GUAT 315 (IN 17871). 32. Memo for Chief, CI Staff from Stanley W. Beerli, 22 Sep 60; sub: Disposal of Cuban Air Crew Mem- bers. (JMC-0105). Memo for Chief, CI Staff from J. D. Esterline, 16 Nov 60, sub: Disposal of Cuban Air Crew Mem- bers. 33. Memo for Chief, WH/4/P&P from 1 Nov 60, sub: Progress Repo - - Oct ). Memo for Chief, Security Section, DPD from James A. Cunningham, Jr., 6 Dec 60, sub: Termination and Disposal of Unsatisfactory JMCLEAR Air Crew Members (JMC 0219). Memo for Assistant Chief, DPD from William J. Cotter, 16 Dec 60, sub: Termination and Disposal' of Unsatisfactory JMCLEAR Air Crew Members. (JMC- 0229). 34. Ferrer, op. cit., p. 105. 35. Cable to MADD from Director, 11 Dec 60, DIR 16050 (OUT 52021). 36. Cable to Director from MADD, 13 Dec 60, MADD 0811 (IN 16457). 37. Ibid.: 26 Nov 60, MADD 0644 (IN 47942); 29 Nov 60, MADD 0662 (IN 48901). 38. Ibid., 14 Dec 60, MADD 0818 (IN 16985). 39. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 105-107. 39a. Cable to MADD from BELL, 11 Jan 61, BELL 0419 (OUT 6326). 40. Cable to BELL from JMADD, 20 Mar 61, MADD 2125 (IN 4133). Cable to BELL from JMWAVE, 25 Mar 61, MADD[WAVE?] 2210 (IN 4964). Cable to BELL from JMADD, 20 Mar 61, MADD 2123 (IN 4135). Cable to BELL from JMADD, 31 Mar 61, MADD 2373 (IN 0974). Cable to BELL from JMWAVE, 13 Apr 61, WAVE 5579 (IN 3122). 41. Ltr. from Seigrist to Pfeiffer, 20 May 76. 42. Cable to BELL from JD4WAVE, 13 Apr 61, WAVE 55 79 (IN 3122). 43. Ltr. from Seigrist to Pfeiffer, op. cit. 44. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape 1A, p. 8. 45. Cable to Director from MADD, 27 Dec 60; MADD 0926 (IN 22711). 46. Memo for Acting Chief, DPD from George Gaines, Jr., 31 Oct 60, sub: Debriefing of Several Personnel Returned from TDY to JMADD - 27 Oct 60. 48. Cable to BELL from Guatemala-City, 12 Feb 61, GUAT 960 (IN 4728). 49. Cable to JMADD from Director, 2 Mar 61, CLEAR 8370 (OUT 84924-C). 50. Cable to BELL from JMADD,. 8 Mar 61, MADD 1907 _(IN 2596). 51. Cable to Eglin AFB from Director, 17 Nov 60, DIR 11993 (OUT 93298)_ 52. Memo for Gar M. Teegen [Garfield M. Thorsrud] from [Stanley W. Beerli], 24 Mar 61, Letter of Instruction. 53. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1A, p. 8. 54. Cable to BELL from MADD, 15 Jan 61, MADD 1110 (IN 1877). 56. Cable to Eglin AFB/JMADD from Director, 7 Nov 60, DIR 10279 (OUT 89703). 57. Cable to BELL from TRAY, 12 Feb 61, TRAV 0333 (IN 4711). 58. Memo for DDP/EMB from Jacob D. Esterline, 1 Sep 60, sub: Air and Maritime Support of Clandestine Para- military Operations. S/Eyes. Minutes of Special Group Meetings - Cuba, 1 Sep 60 [from T. A. Parrott]. S/Eyes. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 6 Sep 60, sub: Clandestine Air Support of Paramilitary Operations. (DDP-04628). S/Eyes. Memo for Chief, JMARC from George Gaines, Jr., 20 Sep 60, sub: Cover Story for C-46 Overflights. (JMC-0097). MR from Francis W. Barkley, 22 Sep 60, sub: Brief- ing on Proposed Air Operations. S/Eyes. 59. Memo for A/DDP/A et. al. from Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 24 Oct 60, sub: [Project JMARC Overflights]. S/Eyes. 60. Memo for C/WH/4/Prop, et. al. from Richard D. Drain, 12 Dec 60, sub: Overflights. 61. -Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 9 Nov 60, sub: Propaganda Air Drops over Cuba. 62. Cables to MADD from Director: 22 Nov 60, DIR 12731 (OUT 94995); 17 Nov 60, DIR 12093 (OUT 93511). 63. Cables: to Director from Guatemala City, 23 Nov 60, GUAT 593 (IN 47010); to MADD from Director, 25 Nov 60, DIR 13296 (OUT 96103); to MADD from Director, 3 Dec 60, DIR 14760 (OUT 99253); to Director from MADD, 11 Dec 60, MADD 0777 (IN 15374). 64. Cables: to Director from MADD, 5 Dec 60, MADD 0727 (IN 12156); to Havana from Director, 6 Dec 60, DIR 15063 (OUT 99989). 65. Cable to Director from MADD, 11 Dec 60, MADD 0771 (IN 15373). 66. Cables: to Director from MADD, 12 Dec 60, MADD 0796 (IN 15274); to MADD from Director, 17 Dec 60, DIR 17084 (OUT 54275). 67. Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape LA, p. 68. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from J. Hawkins, 4 Jan 61, sub: Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of Strike Operation Against Government of Cuba. 69. Richard D. Drain Personal Notes, 5 Jan 61. 70. Verde Olivo (Havana), 17 Apr 77, p. 31. U. 70a. Cables: to IADD from Director, 15 Feb 61, CLEAR 7829 (OUT 83372); to BELL from MADD, 18 Feb 61, MADD 1578 (IN 0476). 71. Cable to BELL from MADD, 18 Feb 61, MADD 1578 (IN 0476). 72. Cable to MADD from Director, 15 Feb 61, CLEAR 7829 (OUT 83372). 72a. Background paper on Propaganda for Taylor Committee. No date, no author. Presume prepared May-June 1960 by WH/4 Propaganda. 73. Memo for Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) from Stanley W. Beerli, 17 Mar 61, sub: Analysis of JMCLEAR Missions through 7 Mar 61. (JMC-0320). Cable to MADD from Director, 11 Mar 61, CLEAR 8674 (OUT 85806-C). 74. Cables: To BELL from MADD, 4 Mar 61, MADD 1842 (IN 2155); to from Director, 6 Mar 61, DIR 28242 (OUT to from Director, 8 Mar 61, DIR 28614 (OUT to from Director, 24 Mar 61, DIR 31505 (OUT Ferrer, op. cit., p. 135. 75. MR from of Trip 21 Mar 61, sub: Report 75a. Cables to from Director: 22 Nov 60, DIR 12860 (OU ; 24 Nov 60, DIR 13262 (OUT 95872); 25 Nov 60, DIR 13424 (OUT 96355); 26 Nov 60, DIR 13547 (OUT 96604); and 24 Feb 61, DIR 26698 (OUT 76764). 4 Nov 60, Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 6 Jan 61, sub: JMATE Progress Rept. for 3-6 Jan 61. Cable for Director from) 120 Feb 61, (IN 47929). 75b. Richard D. Drain, Personal Notes, 24 Mar 61. 76. Cable to BELL from MADD, 28 Mar 61, MADD 2276 (IN 0351). 77. Cable to Eglin, JMADD, JMTIDE, GUATEMALA from CLEAR, 29 Mar 61, CLEAR 9251 (OUT 87539-C). 77a. Cable to BELL from JMADD, 29 Mar 61, MADD 2320 -(IN 0621). 78. Cables to BELL from MADD; 21 Mar 61, MADD 2138 (IN 4244); 22 Mar 61, MADD 2161 (IN 4465). 79. Cable to BELL from MADD, 22 Mar 61, MADD 2161 (IN 4465). 80. Cables to BELL from MADD: 29 Mar 61, MADD 2335 (IN 0663); 30 Mar 61, MADD 2343 (IN 0736); 30 Mar 61, MADD 2362 (IN 0913). Cable to BELL from Guatemala City, 8 Apr 61, GUAT 1233 (IN 2348). II. D. JMTIDE: Strike Base, Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua 81. MR from James A. Cunningham, Jr., 1 Dec 60, sub: Conversation with DDS on 1 Dec 60 regarding ac- quisition of COB for JMTIDE. 82. Cables to Guatemala City from Director: 10 Dec 60, DIR 15939 (OUT 51680); 10 Dec 60, DIR 15940 [Out?]. Burwell, James, Logistics Support for Operations in Cuba, March 1960-October 1961. DDS Historical Series, OL-7, Apr 71. MR from 30 Jun 69, sub: Progress Report -- MT'ID (JMC-0274). MR from W. E. Eisemann, 1 Mar 61, sub: JMTIDE. 83. Memo for Gar M. Teegen from 24 Mar 61, op. cit. 84. Memo for Acting Chief, DPD from Lt. Col. Charles F. Quinette, 18 Jul 60, sub: Personnel for JMARC (DPD-6506-60). 85. Cable to 'MADD from Director, 23 Mar 61, CLEAR 9076 (OUT 87056). 87. Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2B, p. 37. 88. MR from George Gaines, Jr., 3 Feb 61, sub: Approval for Use of Brig. Gen. Doster as Tactical Element Chief, JMTIDE (JMC-0249). 89. Cable to BELL from MADD, 26 Mar 61, MADD 2240 (IN 0131). 90. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 31 Mar 61, TIDE 135 (IN 1062). Personal Notes, R. D. Drain, 6 Mar 61. 91. Cable to BELL from MADD, 13 Mar 61, 14-ADD 1990 (IN 3218). 92. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 31 Mar 61, TIDE 136 (IN 1064). 93. Cables: from Director: to MADD, 22 Mar 61, CLEAR 9027 (OUT 8692); to JMADD/Eglin, 28 Mar 61, CLEAR 9194 (OUT 87450); to JMADD/JMTIDE, 30 Mar 61, GLOW 9318 (OUT 87785G); to Managua, 31 Mar 61, GLOW 9375 (OUT 87930-G); to Havana, 24 Oct 60, DIR 07754 (OUT 84606); to Havana, 9 Nov 60, DIR 10607 (OUT 90529). From TIDE: to Eglin AFB, 14 Apr 61, TIDE 521 (IN 3269); to BELL, 14 Apr 61, TIDE 546 (IN 3322). From MADD to BELL, 13 Apr 61, MADD 2576 (IN 3178). From Havana to Director, 19 Nov 60, HAVA 6948 (IN 44801). 94. Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int.,-op. cit., Tape 2B, pp. 35-36. 95. Cables from Director: to JMTIDE/JMADD, 29 Mar 61, CLEAR 9241 (OUT 87529-C); to Eglin AFB, 29 Mar 61, CLEAR 9242 (OUT 87530-C); to JMADD/JMTIDE/Eglin AFB, 30 Mar 61, GLOW 9365 (OUT 87880-G). Cables to BELL from TIDE: 1 Apr 61, TIDE 141 (IN 1101); 1 Apr 61, TIDE 143 (IN 1123). Cable to BELL from MADD, 31 Mar 61, MADD 2383 (IN 1003). 96. Ferrer, op. cit., p. 134. 97. Cables to BELL: from Managua, 2 Apr 61, MANA 3524 (IN 1289); from TIDE, 4 Apr 61, TIDE 212 (IN 1541). 98. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 6 Apr 61, TIDE 288 (IN 1975). 99. Ferrer, op. cit., 142-144. 100. Ibid., p. 144. 101. Cables: to Eglin AFB from Director, 7 Apr 61, GLOW 9618 (OUT 88755-G); to BELL from TRAV, 8 Apr 61, TRAV 0657 (IN 2377); to BELL'from MADD, 12 Apr 61, MADD 2565 (IN 3035); to MADD from Director, 16 Apr 61, GLOW 9891 (OUT 89582-G). 102. Bissell-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1, p. 12. 103. Cables to BELL: from TIDE, 5 Apr 61, TIDE 244 (IN 1703); from MADD, 26 Mar 61, MADD 2241 (IN 0132) and 10 Apr 61, MADD 2528 (IN 2712); from WAVE, 5 Apr 61, WAVE 5264 (IN 1845) and 7 Apr 61, WAVE 5378 (IN 2279). 104. Cables to BELL from TIDE: 5 Apr 61, TIDE 247 (IN 1735); 6 Apr 61, TIDE 288 (IN 1975); 10 Apr 61, TIDE 403 (IN 2664). Cable to GLOW from MADD, 15 Apr 61, MADD 2598 (IN 3624). 105. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 10 Apr 61, TIDE 403 (IN 2664). 106. Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, p. 26. 107. Ibid., p. 27. 108. -Cables to BELL: from Eglin AFB, 15 Apr 61, EGLI 3559 (IN 3594); 13 Apr 61, EGLI 3549 (IN 3248); from TIDE, 14 Apr 61, TIDE 555 (IN 3390); 13 Apr 61, TIDE 500 (IN 3139) Cable to Eglin/JMTIDE from GLOW, 10 Apr 61, GLOW 9667 (OUT 88923-G). 109. Cable to TIDE/EGLI/MADD from GLOW, 8 Apr 61, GLOW 9635 (OUT 88813-G). 110. Cables to BELL from TIDE: 12 Apr 61, TIDE 470 (IN 3024). TS; 14 Apr 61, TIDE 556 (IN 3399). 111. Cable to TIDE/Eglin from GLOW, 10 Apr 61, GLOW 9663 (OUT 88918-G). Cable to BELL from TIDE, 12 Apr 61, TIDE 457 (IN 2975). Source References Part III Initiation of Combat Air Operations A. D minus 2 1. Memo for Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs (M) from C. Tracy Barnes, 17 Jan 61, sub: Joint Planning Committee - Cuba. M ~ v n O ov / ) 0,7; / 4 ' 'a.-.,. C:7. r w 1 s 1-t 7* b' pecvai f/.lhn,nb ~r.?'_ DOD Staff Study, 16 Jan 61, sub: Evaluation of Possible Military Courses of Action in Cuba. TS. Memo for SecDef from JCS, 3 Feb 61, sub: Military Evaluation of the Cuban Plan (JCSM-57-61). TS. Briefing paper from Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 11 Mar 61, sub: Proposed Operation Against Cuba. TS. [Memo from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.], 15 Mar 61, sub: Revised Cuban Operation.. (TS 176622). Memo for SecDef from JCS, 15 Mar 61, sub: Evaluation of the Military Aspects of Alternate Concepts, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba (JCSM-166-61). TS. Briefing paper for Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 12 Apr 61, sub: Cuban Operation. TS. 2. MR from R. D. Drain, 4 Jan 61, sub: Meeting with A/DDP/A. S/Eyes. Memo for A/DDP/A from Jacob D. Esterline, 28 Dec 60, sub: Your Memorandum Dated 16 Dec 60. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from C. Tracy Barnes, 16 Dec 60, sub: [Considerations Concerning Project JMATE]. 3. MR from Col. J. Hawkins, 5 May 61, sub: Record of PM Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba, pp. 21-22. 4. Memo for the President from McGeorge Bundy, 15 Mar 61, sub: Meeting on Cuba, 4 p.m. Mar 15, 1961. TS 206273 (JFK Ly. Natl. Sec. Files: Countries: Box 35, Cuba, Gen'l. Vol. 1 5/61). Questions for Richard M. Bissell from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 23-24 Mar 77. 5. Memo for the President from McGeorge Bundy, 15 Mar 61, op. cit. 5a. MR from David W. Gray, 9 May 61, sub: Summary of White House Meetings (Taylor Committee papers, Part III, Item 16). Sc. MR from David W. Gray, 4 May 61, sub: Briefings of JCS on BUMPY ROAD. TS. (Taylor Committee papers, Part III, Item 13, p. 4). 5d. R. D. Drain, Personal Notes, 5-7 April 1961. 6. Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1B, pp. 19-21. 7. Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, pp. 36-38. 8. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1B, p. 17. 9. Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, pp. 34-35; Tape 1A, pp. 4-5. 10. Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1A, pp. 9-12. 11. Memo for Air Commander (Attn: TEEGEN) [Thorsrud] from [Stanley W. Beerli], 5 Apr'61, sub: Project JMGLOW. (JMG-0345). 12. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 12 Apr 61, TIDE 450 (IN 2969). TS. Cable to TIDE from GLOW, 11 Apr 61, GLOW 9727 (OUT 89091-G). Playa Giron, Derrota del Imperialismo (Habana: Ediciones R, 1961). (Hereinafter cited as Playa Giron,) I, 450, 453. 13. Cables to BELL from TIDE, 12 Apr 61, TIDE 469 (IN 3031); 13 Apr 61, TIDE 471 (IN 3133). TS. 14. Cable to JMWAVE from JMGLOW, 12 Apr 61, GLOW 9754 (OUT 89191-G). TS. 15. Cable to TIDE from GLOW, 14 Apr 61, GLOW 9825 (OUT 89439-G). TOP`SCRET 16. Cable to TIDE from Director, 14 Apr 61, GLOW 9826 (OUT 89440-G). TS. 17. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1B, p. 20. 18. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 13 Apr 61, TIDE 508 (IN 3165). TS. Cable to TIDE from Director, 16 Apr 61, GLOW 9898 OUT 89596-G). TS. Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1A, p. 3. 19. Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1B, p. 26. 20. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 13 Apr 61, TIDE 508 (IN 3165). TS. 21. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 13 Apr 61, TIDE 519 (IN 3197). TS. 22. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 149-153. 23. Letter from Seigrist to Pfeiffer, 20 May 76, op. cit. 24. Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 3A, p. 53. 25. Taylor Committee: MR's of PM Study Group Meetings: Third Meeting, 25 Apr 61, p. 9; Fourth Meeting, 26 Apr 61, p. 7. U. 25a. Taylor Committee, Final Report: Memo No. 3, p. 3. U. 26. Cable to TIDE from Director, 12 Apr 61, GLOW 9753 (OUT 89190-G). TS. 27. Office Memorandum for INBINDER from JMATE Headquarters, 11 Apr 61, sub: [Plans for D-2 Deception Operation]. S/Eyes. MR from tion OpCLu cl . 6 Apr 61, sub: Air Decep- 28. Office Memo to INBINDER, 11 Apr 61, op. cit. 481 - TOP,CRET 30. Phillips, David A., The Night Watch (New York: Atheneum, 1971), pp. 105-106. 31. Office Memo to INBINDER, 11 Apr 61, op. cit. 32. Memo for Chief, WH/4/Security from . 18 Apr 61, sub: JMFURY Deception Operation. 33. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 153-154. 34. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 14 Apr 61, TIDE 560 (IN 3361). TS. 35. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2B, pp. 43-44. 35a. Chronology of Bay of Pigs Operation submitted to Taylor Committee, 23 Apr 61. TS. 35b. R. D. Drain, Personal Notes, 14 and 23 Apr 61. 36. Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, p. 38. 37. Ibid., Tape 2A, p. 28. 38. Memo for DCI from1 129 Nov 73, sub: Photographic stuay r tnebay or Pigs Operation, pp. 1-2. (IAS/RSD-556/73). 39. Ibid., p. 2. 40. MR from Stanely W. Beerli, 15 Apr 61, sub: JMGLOW Combat Mission Report. TS. 41. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 16 Apr 61, TIDE 682 (IN 3834). TS. 42. Memo for DCI from op. cit., Table 1: 29 Nov 73, 43. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 453,485. -History of an Aggression (Havana: Ediciones Ven- ceremos, 1964), p. 243. 44. Memo for DCI from op. cit. , pp. 1-3, Table 1. 29 Nov 73, III. B. Post Strike Contretemps 45. Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2B, p. 48. 46. Cable to BELL from.MADD, 15 Apr 61, MADD 2596 (IN 3604). Conversation between Garfield M. Thorsrud and Jack B. Pfeiffer, 28 Oct 77. 47. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 15 Apr 61, TIDE 616 (IN 3618). 48. Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1B, pp. 9-11, 15-16. 49. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, p. 34. 50. Playa Giron, from cit. , I, 451-452. Memo for DCI 29 Nov 73, op. cit., 51. Lagas, Jacques, Memorias de un Capitan RebeZde, p. 98. 52. Playa Giron, op. cit., III. 388-389; I, 26-28, 35-36, 42.. 53. Ferrer, op. cit., pp.. 161-162. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, p. 33. 54. Thomas, Cuban Revolution, op. cit., p. 578. 55. MR from James A. Cunningham, Jr., 28 Apr 61, sub: Conversation with Mr. D. B. Schobinger ? . and Mr. Chester Emerick _.. Regarding JMGLOW B-26 Aircraft ... (JMG-0370). 56. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 161-162. Cable to BELL from WAVE, 15 Apr 61, WAVE 5659 (IN 3600) 57. Cable to BELL from WAVE, 15 Apr 61, WAVE 5679 (IN 3600). 58. Memo for Lt. Col. B. W. Tarwater from Stanley W. Beerli, 26 Apr 61, sub: Transmittal of Docu- ments, Att. C. TS. 59. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 45-77. 60. MR from 16 Apr 61, sub: JMFURY Deception Operation. S /Eyes. Playa Giron, I, op. cit., 449-450.. 61. MR from 16 Apr 61, op. cit. 62. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, p. 35. 63. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 20 Apr 61, TIDE 654 (IN 3752). TS. 64. Cable to TIDE from Director, 16 Apr 61, GLOW 9904 (OUT 89616-G). 65. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 17 Apr 61, TIDE 710 (IN 3903). TS. 66. Ferrer, op. cit., p. 155. 67. Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2B, p. 48. 68. Taylor Committee: MR's of PM Study Group Meetings: 18th Meeting, 19 May 61, p. 4. U. 69. Ibid., 17th Meeting, 18 May 61, pp. 9-11. U. 70. Ibid., 12th Meeting, 8 May 61, p. 33. U. 71. Ibid., 10th Meeting, 4 May 61, p. 3. S/Eyes. 71a. Ibid., p. 9. 71b.-Secretary of State Dean Rusk Briefing of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on World Situation,- 16 Jan 63, p. 87. 71c. Mosley, Leonard, Dulles (N.Y. Dial Press/James Wade, 1978), p. 470. U. 72. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 76-77. 72a. 19 May 61, sub: Reaction within a e empt to Overthrow Castro Regime. C. 73. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 368-373, 454-455. History of An Aggression, op. cit., p. 265. 74. Conversation between Clarence F. Welch and Jack B. Pfeiffer, 13 Jan 76. 75. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 144-147. III. C. The Stevenson Story and the Second Strike 76. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 8 Feb 61, sub: Injunc- tions from General Cabell. MR from R. D. Drain, 31 Jan 61, sub: JMATE PM briefing of JCS Representatives. 77. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 271. U. 77a. WH/4 Propaganda Notes for 15 Jul 61, par..6. 77b. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 11 Apr 61, sub: JMATE Progress Report for 4-10 Apr 61, Par. 2a. 78. Halperin, Maurice, The: Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro (Berkley, 1972), p. 98. 79. Murphy, Charles, "Cuba: The Record Set Straight," Fortune, Sep 61, p. 228. 80. Hunt, E. Howard, Give Us This Day (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1973), p. 147. 81. Letter to Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer from Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., 28 Apr 76. 82. Memo for Gordon Mason from C. Tracy Barnes, 12 May 64, sub: The Invisible Government. S/Eyes. 84. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 1 Apr 61, TIDE 162 (IN 1247). 84a. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 13 Apr 61, TIDE 508 (IN 3165). 85. Travel Voucher. T.O. Number DD/P 59-61, 21 Apr 61. 86. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, pp. 32-34. 87. Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape 4, pp. 48-49. 88. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, pp. 35-37. 89. US Delegation to the [UN] General Assembly, Press Release No. 3697, 15 Apr 61. U. 90. Department of State, Incoming Telegrams: from New York to SecState: No. 2881, 15 Apr 61, 7 p.m. (C); No. 2877, 15 Apr 61 (U). 91. Ibid., No. 2875, 15 Apr 61, noon. C. 92. Ibid., No. 2885, 15 Apr 61, 11 p.m. OUO. 93. Ibid., No. 2892, 16 Apr 61, 6 p.m. TS. 94. Ibid? No. 2894, 16 Apr 61, 7 p.m. S. 95. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op. cit., p. 271. Letter to Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer from Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 20 Jul 76. 95a. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram to USUN for Stevenson, 17 Apr 61, No. 7314. OUO. 96. Letter to Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer from Richard F. Pedersen, 19 Jul 76. 97. Letter to Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer from Francis T. P. Plimpton, 24 Jun 76. Letter to Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer from Francis T. P. Plimpton, 22 Jul 76. Doyle, Edward P. (Ed.), As We Knew AdZai (New York, 1966), p. 263. 98. Letter to Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer from Charles W. Yost, 8 Jul 76. 99. Letter to Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer from Charles P. Noyes, 23 Jul 76. 100. Memorandum for Adlai E. Stevenson from Harlan Cleveland, 12 Apr 61, sub: Transmittal of Proposed Speech on Cuba. 102. CIA Employee Bulletin, EB No. 598, 18 May 77, sub: Addresss by Ambassador Harlan Cleveland. U. 103. Letter to Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer from Walter Johnson, 3 Jun 76. 104. I;etter to Pfeiffer from Schlesinger, op. cit. 105. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op.,cit., p. 272. 106. Ibid. 107. Ibid. 108. Ibid., p. 273. 109. Ibid. 110. Alsop, Stewart, The Center' (New York, 1968), pp. 223-224. 111. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op. cit., p. 273. 112. Alsop, The Center, op. cit., p. 224. 113. Memo for the DCI from Walter Pforzheimer, 8 Apr 68, sub: Forthcoming Book: The Center by Stewart Alsop. 114. Memo for DDP from J. S. Earman, 9 May 61, sub: Memos for General Taylor. 114a. Travel Vouchers for Allen W. Dulles, Mrs. Dulles, and Walter Elder, 5, 11, 14, 18 Apr 61. T.O. #DCI-9-61. Routing and Record Sheet for Chief,I to Jack Pfeiffer, 11 Mar 77, sub: Pan tuaerzcarr s Flight Schedules, 1960-61. U. 115. Bissell Oral History for JFK Library, pp. 39-43. 116. Taylor Committee: MRs for PM Study Group Meetings, 10th Meeting, 4 May 61, p. 9. S/Eyes. 116a. Oral History Interview of Thomas C. Mann by Larry J. Hackman for the John F. Kennedy Library, 13 Mar 68 (OH 73-19), pp. 18-19. 117. Taylor Committee: MRs of PM Study Group Meetings, 7th Meeting, 1 May 61 (McGeorge Bundy Memo, 4 May 61). U. 118. Memorandum from WH/4 to Taylor Committee, 6 May 61, sub: Detailed Statement of all the Circumstances Surrounding the Cancellation of the D-Day Air- strike. 119. Cable to TIDE from Director, 17 Apr 61, GLOW 9923 (OUT 89669-G). 120. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 17 Apr 61, TIDE 710 (IN 3903). TS. TOP STET 111. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op. cit., 112. Alsop, The Center, op. cit., p. 224. 113. Memo for i 68, sub: Stewart A- 114. Memo for I Memos for 114a. Travel Voi and Walte, #DCI-9-61 Routing ai to Jack P: Flight Scl 115. Bissell 0: I/ ~'?. ' iH 6eXck X - ~ 4 , / ~i . /emus 5v., 9` ~ w 116. Taylor Comm. 10th Meeting, 4 May 61, p. 9. S/Eyes. 116a. Oral History Interview of Thomas C. Mann by Larry J. Hackman for the John F. Kennedy Library, 13 Mar 68 (OH 73-19), pp. 18-19. 117. Taylor Committee: MRs of PM Study Group Meetings, 7th Meeting, 1 May 61 (McGeorge Bundy Memo, 4 May 61). U. 118. Memorandum from WH/4 to Taylor Committee, 6 May 61, sub: Detailed Statement of all the Circumstances. Surrounding the Cancellation of the D-Day Air strike. 119. Cable to TIDE from Director, 17 Apr 61, GLOW 9923 (OUT 89669-G). 120. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 17 Apr 61, TIDE 710 (IN 3903). TS. 122. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1B, pp. 22-23. 123. Bissell-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 3, p. 39. 124. Conversation between Mr. Bissell and Jack B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75. 125. Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 7, pp. 97-98. 126. Taylor Committee: MR's of PM Study Group Meetings, 19th Meeting, 22-23 May 61, p. 11. S/Eyes. 127, MR, 11 May 61, sub: Telecon Between C/JMATE and William D. Pawley, 24 Apr 61. 128. Phillips, op. cit., p. 109. 129. Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 6, pp. 77-78. 130. Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1B, p. 22. 131. Ibid., p. 23. 132. Ibid., Tape 2A, p. 24. 133. Ibid., Tape 2A, p. 25. 134. Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, p. 40. 135. Ibid., Tape 3A, p. 50. 136. Charles P. Cabell, Handwritten notes on cancella- tion of second strike [after 9 May 61, presumably prior to 31 May 19611. 137. U.S. News and World Report, 28 Jan 63, p. 62. 139. Memorandum for Sterline J. Cottrell from Richard Helms, 25 Jan 63, sub: Reaction in the Cuban Exile Community and Brigade to the Attorney Gen- eral's No Air Support Statements. TS/Sensitive. TOP ECRET 139a. Washington Post, 12 Jan 63; U.S. News and World Report, 7 Jan 63, pp. 38-41. 139b. Cables to BELL from JMRIMM: 18 Apr 61: RIMM 4901 (IN 4253)(1333Z); RIMM 4919 (IN 4310)(1726Z); RIMM 4920 (IN 4311)(1730Z); RIMM 4921 (IN 4315) (1750Z); RIMM 4932 (IN 4330)(1901Z). 19 Apr 61: RIMM 4970 (IN 4117)(0100Z). Cables to BELL from: TIDE, 18 Apr 61, TIDE 832 (IN 4291)(1623Z); from BAYY, 19 Apr 61, BAYY (Unnumbered) (IN 4414)(0040Z). 140. Reader's Digest, Nov 64, pp. 283ff. 141. Washington Post, 21 Jan 63. New York Times (Western Edition), 23 Jan 63. U. S. News and World Report, 4 Feb 63, p. 32. 141a. Taylor Committee, MR's of PM Study Group Meetings, Conversation with Colonel Hawkins, undated [probably after 30 May 61]. S/Eyes. 142. Washington Post, 21 Jan 63. Source References Part IV Where Cuba Was Lost A. Over the Beach - 17 April 1961 1. Cables to TIDE from Director: 16 Apr 61, GLOW 9896 (OUT 88589-G), TS; 16 Apr 61, GLOW 9913 (OUT 89639-G). Attachment 1 to Appendix 2 to Annex B of Op Plan 200-1. la. Cable for BELL from TIDE, 16 Apr 61, TIDE 680 (IN 3811). TS. lb. Sorensen, Theodore C., Kennedy (New York, 1965), pp. 299-300. lc. Memo for Lt. Col. B. W. Tarwater from Stanley W. Beerli, 26 Apr 61, sub: Transmittal of Documents, Att. A. (TS 155685). ld. Memo for Brig. Gen. C. V. Clifton from Paul M. Kearney, 18 Apr 61, sub: Restrictions of Flights Over and in the Vicinity of Cuba. U. le. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 98. Memo for DCI from ~ 29 Nov 73, op. cit., pp. 1-2; Table 1. lf. Thomas, Hugh, Cuban Revolution (Harper & Rowe, 1977) p. 585. 2. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 91-115. 3. Ibid., pp. 97-101. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 191-192; 206. Cable to BELL from JMRIMM, 18 Apr 61, RIMM 4869 (IN 4156). 3a. Cables to BELL: from TIDE 18 Apr 61, TIDE 829 (IN 4263); from BAYY, 18 Apr 61, BAYY 023 (IN 4379). 4. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 200-203, 206. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 102. 5. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 200-203, 206. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 102, 105-106. 5a. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 18 Apr 61, TIDE 770 (IN 4076). TS. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 201-203, 206. Ferrer, op. cit., p. 192. 7. Cables to BELL: from JMWAVE, 19 Apr 61, WAVE 5754 (IN 4422); TIDE, 19 Apr 61,-TIDE 880 (IN 4457): 19 Apr 61, TIDE 889 (IN 4509); 21 Apr 61, TIDE 942 (IN 4804); for TIDE, WAVE, BELL from Director, 21 Apr 61, GLOW 0108 (OUT 90217); for Director from Managua, 2 Nov 61, MANA 3814 (IN 16335); for Eglin Air Force Base from Director, 3 Nov 61, DIR 22241 (OUT 66374); for Director from JMWAVE, 4 Nov 61, WAVE 9005 (IN 17639). Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 192, 205-206. 8. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 17, 91-115, 485. Memo for Lt. Col. B. W. Tarwater from Stanley W. Beerli, 26 Apr 61, op. cit. Andrade, Ramiro, Cuba, el vecino socialista (Bogota, 1961), pp. 240-245. History of an Aggression (Havana: Ediciones Ven- ceremos), June 1965, pp. 243-246. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 192, 205-206. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 18 Apr 61, TIDE 816 (IN 4237). TS. 9. Cable to BELL from JMWAVE, 18 Apr 61, WAVE 5739 (IN 4179). 10. Memo for DCI from op. cit. 29 Nov 73, 11. Taylor Committee Report: MR's of PM Study Group Meetings, Sixth Meeting, 28 Apr 61, Tab A, After Action Report on Operation PLUTO, 4 May 61, p. 9. (Grayston Lynch) S/Eyes. 12. Memo for Lt. Col. B. W. Tarwater from Stanley W. Beerli, 26 Apr 61, op. cit.' 13.. Cable to TIDE from GLOW, 17 Apr 61, BELL 4596 (OUT 6702). TS. 14. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 17 Apr 61, TIDE 738 (IN 3979). TS. 14a. Cables: To BELL from TIDE, 1 Apr 61, TIDE 147 (IN 1141); to TIDE from Director, 1 Apr 61, GLOW 9422 (OUT 88075-G). 14b. Cable to BELL from JMRIMM, 17 Apr 61, RIMM 4775 (IN 3938). 15. Cable to TIDE from Director, 15 Apr 61, GLOW 9856 (OUT 89492-G). TS. 16. Cable to TIDE from BELL, 17 Apr 61, BELL 4624 (OUT 6758). TS. 17. Memo for DCI from 29 Nov 73, 18. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 17 Apr 61, TIDE 759 (IN 4023). 'TS. 20. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 17 Apr 61, TIDE 753 -(IN 4036). Memo for Lt. Col. B. W.. Tarwater from Stanley W. Beerli, 26 Apr 61, op. cit., Attachment E. TS. 20a. Ferrer, op. cit., p. 159. 21. Memo for Lt. Col. B. W. Tarwater from Stanley W. Beerli. 26 Apr 61, op. cit., Att. E. TS. 22. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 100-101. 23. Ferrer, op. cit., p. 193. 24. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 169-170. 25. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 07[17] Apr 61, TIDE 693 (IN 3849). MR from William E. Eisemann, 28 Dec 60, sub: JMTIDE. Cable to BELL from MADD, 2 Feb 61, MADD 1311 (IN 3550); for BELL from MADD, 1 Feb 61, MADD 1296 (IN 3428). Cable to BELL from MADD, 4 Feb 61, MADD 1343 (IN 3827). 26. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, pp. 26-27. 27: Cable to TIDE from BELL, 18 Apr 61, BELL 4726 (OUT 7003). TS. 28. Lynch-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1, p. 10. 29. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 30. Ibid., Tape 2, pp. 19-21. 31. Ibid., Tape 5, pp. 52-55. 32. Lagas, op. cit., p. 104. 33. Cable to TIDE from BELL, 17 Apr 61, BELL 4668 (OUT 6843). TS. 34. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 97, 341. Lagas, op. cit., pp. 93-95. 34a. Oral History Interview: James A. Cunningham, Jr. by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 11 Oct 79, Tape 1B, pp. 27-29. 35. Cables to from Director: 17 Apr 61, DIR 35334 (OUT 96733 ; 19 Apr 61, DIR 35666 (OUT 97327); 19 Apr 61, DIR 35744 (OUT 97559). 36. Cable to GLOW from TIDE, 18 Apr 61, TIDE 780 (IN 4097). 36a. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape lA, pp. 18-19. R. D. Drain, Personal Notes, 17 Apr 61. Telecon between Walter Elder and Jack B. Pfeiffer, 30 Nov 77. IV. B. Day of Grace -- 18 April 1961 37. Lagas, op. cit., pp. 117-119. 38. MR from James A. Cunningham, Jr., 26 May 61, sub: Post D-Day Supply Drops from JMTIDE (JMG 0399). 39. Memo for Lt. Col. B. W. Tarwater from Garfield M. Thorsrud, 24 May 61, sub:. Resupply Sorties D-Day through D+2 (JMG-0395). - 40. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 209-211. 41. Memo for Lt. Col. B. W. Tarwater from Stanley W. Beerli, 26 Apr 61, op. cit., Att. D. TS. 42. MR from James A. Cunningham, Jr., 26 May 61, sub: Post-D-Day Supply Drops from JMTIDE. Cables to TIDE from BELL: 18 Apr 61, BELL 4730 (OUT 7011); 18 Apr 61, BELL 4754 (OUT 7056); -18 Apr 61, BELL 4767 (OUT 7085); 18 Apr 61, BELL 4776 (OUT 7109). TS. Cable to EGLIN/TIDE from GLOW, 18 Apr 61, GLOW 9982 (OUT 89913-G). TS. Cables to HQS Signal Center from Director: 18 Apr 61, GLOW 4681 (OUT 6882); 18 Apr 61, GLOW 4781 (OUT 7120), TS. 43. Cable to TIDE/MANAGUA from GLOW, 18 Apr 61, GLOW 9991 (OUT 89930-G). TS. 44. Cable to TIDE from BELL, 18 Apr 61, BELL 4784 (OUT 7123). TS. 45. Cable to TIDE from BELL, 18 Apr 61, BELL 4700 (OUT 6924). TS. 46. Taylor Committee: MR's of PM Study Group Mtgs, 2nd Meet., Afternoon Session, p. 1. U. 47. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 114. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 18 Apr 61, TIDE 833 (IN 4292). TS. 48. Cable to TIDE from BELL, 18 Apr 61, GLOW 4737 (OUT 7020). TS. 49. Cable to TIDE from BELL, 18 Apr 61, GLOW 4739 (OUT 7028). TS. Cables to BELL from TIDE, 18 Apr 61, TIDE 840 (IN 4293), TS; 18 Apr 61, TIDE 841 (IN 4304). Cable to BELL from RIMM, 18 Apr 61, RIMM 4922 (IN 4317). 50. Letter from Seigrist to Pfeiffer, 20 May 76, op. cit. 51. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 20 Apr 61, TIDE 895 (IN 4679). TS. --Cable to BELL from TIDE, 19 Apr 61, TIDE 874 (No IN number). TS. 52. 5 May 61, p. 39. 53. Ibid. 54. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 496; IV, 510. Playa Giron: Tumba de Za Invasion Mercenaria (Habana: Publicaciones Zitros, 1961?), pp. 31, 40-41. (Hereinafter as Playa Giron, Tumba.) 55. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 18 Apr 61, TIDE 788 (IN 4160). Cable to TIDE/MANAGUA from BELL, 18 Apr 61, BELL 4740 (OUT 7029). TS. Persons, op. cit., pp. 60-61. 55a. Cable to BELL from MANAGUA, 18 Apr 61, MANA 3589 (IN 4108). TS. 56. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 215-216. 57. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 18 Apr 61, TIDE 855 (IN 4374). TS. Cable to TIDE from BELL, 19 Apr 61, BELL 4807 (OUT 7168); 18 Apr 61, BELL 4749 (OUT 7047). TS. Cable to from Director, 18 Apr 61, DIR 35458 (0 ) . IV. C. Four for a Cause -- 19 April 1961 58. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 213-214. Job 73-767, Box 2, folder 1, "Contract Personnel." Memo for DDP from Casimiro Barquin, 12 Mar 63, sub: C-46 Landing on Playa Giron. 59. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 26 Apr 61, TIDE 1063 (IN 0466). Memo for Lt. Col. B. W.. Tarwater from Garfield M. Thorsrud, 24 May 61, sub: Resupply Sorties D-Day through D+2 (JMG-0395). Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 213-214. Cables to BELL from RIMM, 19 Apr 61; RIMN 4978 (IN 4441); RIMM 5015 (IN 4518); RIMM 4967 (IN 4427); RIMM 4968 (IN 4420). 59a. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 19 Apr 61, TIDE 893 (IN 4535). TS. 59b. Ibid., TIDE 899 (IN 4566). TS. 60. Cables to BELL from TIDE, 19 Apr 61: TIDE 879 (IN 4455); TIDE 893 (IN 4 535). TS. Cable to T IDE from BELL, 19 A pr 61, BELL 4840 (OUT 727 1) . TS. 61. Memo for L t. Col. B. W. T arwa ter fro m Stanley W. Beerli, 26 Apr 61, op. ci t. Review o f P ersons's book, Bay of Pig s, UAPT 4678, 23 May 6 8 (HS/CSG 1362). 62. UADP 467 8, 23 May 68, op . cit . 62a. MR from Gar Thorsrud, 2 Sep 61, sub: JMGLOW Bonuses (JMG-0470-61). Job 73-767, Box 2, File: ANG Participation, BOP. MR from 13 Sep 61, sub: Trip Report or Aug 61 to Birmingham, Ala. (DPD- 5594-61). 63. Ferrer, op. cit., p. 214. 64. Memo for Lt. Col. B. W. T arwater from Stanley W. Beerli, 2 6 Apr 61, op. cit. 65. Cable to BEL L from TIDE, 19 Apr 61, TIDE 906 (IN 4603). Persons, op. cit., pp. 55-56. Ferrer, op. cit., p. 213. 66. Ferrer, op. cit., p. 214. Persons, op. cit., pp. 56-59. 67. Letter from Seigrist to Pfeiffer, 20 May 76. 68. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 19 Apr 61, TIDE 900 (No IN number). TS. Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 214-215. Persons, op. cit., pp. 57-58. 69. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 19 Apr 61, TIDE 896 (IN 4545). TS. 70. Ibid: 19 Apr 61 (1609Z), TIDE 899 [IN 4566 on hard copy at 1624Z]; 19 Apr 61 (1624Z), TIDE 900 (No IN number). TS. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 320. Playa Giron, Tumba, op. cit., p. 42. History of An Aggression, op. cit., p. 230. 70a. Cable to TIDE from BELL, 19 Apr 61, BELL 4851 (OUT 7294). TS. 71. History of An Aggression, op. cit.., pp. 230-231. 72. Playa Giron, op. cit., I, 320. Playa Giron, Tumba, op. cit., p. 42. 73. Thorsrud, Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 3A, p. 55. Conversation between Sidney Stembridge and Jack B. Pfeiffer, 12 May 76. Persons, op. cit., p. 71. 73a. Letter to Admiral Stansfield Turner from Peter H. Wyden, 20 Jun 78. 73c. MR from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 31 Dec 75, sub: Telephone call from Peter H. Wyden. 73d. Wyden, Peter, Bay of Pigs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 240. 73e. Washington Post, 5 Sep 79; Washington Star, 5 Sep 79. U. 73f. Wyden, op. cit. 74. Ferrer, op. cit., p. 213. Memo for Lt. Col. B. W. Tarwater from Stanley W. Beerli, 26 Apr 61, op. cit., Att. C. TS. IV. D. Bitter Recriminations: The Navy CAP, 19 April 1961 74a. USN, CINCLANT REPORT, Operation BUMPY ROAD, 5 May 61, (Naval History Division, Serial 000102). TS. Taylor Committee: MR's of PM Study Group Mtgs., 6th Mtg., 28 Apr 61. U. 75. MR from J. Scapa, 17 Apr 61, sub: Rules of Engagement. 75a. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 18 Apr 61 (1623Z), TIDE 832 (IN 4291). 75b. Memo for the President from McGeorge Bundy, 18 Apr 61, sub: [Cuban Situation]. TS 206273-L. (JFK Ly. Nat'l Security Files: Countries, Cuba - Gen'l 1/61-4/61, Box 35.) 75c. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op. cit., pp. 277-278. 76. Cable to TIDE from BELL, 19 Apr 61, BELL 4834 (OUT 7237). TS. 76a. Taylor Committee: MR's of PM Study Group Mtgs., 19th Mtg., 22-23 May 61, p. 20. S/Eyes. 77. Cable to BELL pass BAYY from TIDE, 19 Apr 61 (0815Z). TIDE 887 (No IN number). 78. Message for CINCLANTFLT, CTG 81.8, Exclusive to Adm. Dennison and RAdm Clark, 19 Apr 61 (0334R), sub: BUMPY ROAD (JCS 994369). TS. 79. Ferrer, op. cit., p. 214. 80. Message for CINCLANTFLT, CTG 81.8, 19 Apr 61. (JCS 994369) . op. cit. 81. Cable to BELL from BAYY, 19 Apr 61, (1128Z), BAYY UNN. (IN 4514). TS. 81a. Cable to JMRIMM from BAYY, 14 Apr 61, BAYY 001 (IN 3337). 82. Taylor Committee: MR's of PM Study Group Meetings, 6th Meeting, 28 Apr 61, p. 2. U. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, p. 37. 83. Cable to BELL from BAYY, 19 Apr 61, (1144Z), BAYY UNN. (No IN number). TS. 83a. Cable to LANT ESSEX from WASH, 19 Apr 61 [1405Z] [No DIR number],(OUT 7274). Cable to BELL from JMRIMM, 19 Apr 61, RIMM 5024 (IN 4527). 84. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 19 Apr 61, TIDE 894 (IN 4536). TS. 85. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 19 Apr 61, TIDE 899 (IN 4566). TS. 86. Cable to TIDE from Director, 19 Apr 61, BELL 4852 -(OUT 7295). TS. 87. Cable to BELL from BAYY, 19 Apr 61, (1642Z) BAYY UNN. (IN 4571). 88. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 19 Apr 61, TIDE 900 (No IN number). TS. 89. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 19 Apr 61, TIDE 914 (No IN number). TS. 90. Memos for the Record from: Gar Thorsrud, 7 Sep 61, sub: JMGLOW Bonuses (JMG-0470-61); Deputy Chief, DPD Air Support Branch, 7 Sep 61 (No subject) [JMG-0471-61/JMG-0472/62?]. MR from) 113 Sep 61, sub: Trip Report for 18 ug 61 to Birmingham, Ala_ (DPD- 5594-61). Job 73-767, Box 2, File: ANG Participation BOP. 91. Cable to BELL from BAYY, 19 Apr 61 (1901Z). BAYY UNN. 92. Cables to. Director from TIDE, 19 Apr 61; TIDE 902 (IN 38459); TIDE 904 (IN 38460). TS. 93. R. D. Drain, Personal Notes, 19 Apr 61. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op. cit. 93a. Thomas, Cuban Revolution, op. cit., p. 590; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op. cit., pp. 277-278. 94. Cable to TIDE from BELL, 19 Apr 61 [TIDE?] (OUT 7315). 94a. Cables to TIDE from BELL: 20 Apr 61 (No BELL numbers): OUT 7434, OUT 7449; 21 Apr 61 (No BELL number), OUT 7591. Cable to USS Essex/Miami SIG Center, Miami from -Director, 24 Apr 61 (No DIR number), OUT 90306. Cable to USS Essex from Director, 24 Apr 61 (No DIR number) OUT 90445-G. 95. Taylor Committee: MR's of PM Study Group Meetings, 7th Meeting, 1 May 61, p. 1. U. 96. Ibid., Meeting, 6 May 61, Conversation between General Taylor and Mr. Thorsrud, p. 3. U. 97. Memo for Lt. Col. B. W. Tarwater from Stanley Beerli. 26 Apr 61, op. cit. UAPT 4678, 23 May 68, HS/CSG 1362. 98. Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 3B, pp. 58-60. 99. Ibid., Tape 4B, p. 89. 99a. Thomas, Cuban Revolution, op. cit., p. 590. 100. Taylor Committee: MR's of PM Study Group Meet- ings, 7th Meeting, 1 May 61, p. 1. U. 101. Ltr. to Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer from P. E. Robinson, Jr. (Dept. of Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command) 24 Apr 79, sub: Radar Intercept Ranges of USS Essex, Nov 60-Jun 61 (SEA 62X/EFW/Ser 81). U. Telecons between Jack B. Pfeiffer and Represent- atives of Air Branch/SOG, 4 Jun 76, sub: Radar Intercept Range of Carrier Essex, April 1961. 102. Telecon between Jack B. Pfeiffer and Garfield M. Thorsrud, 24 Aug 76, sub: Navy CAP, 19 Apr 61. 103. Persons, op. cit., p. 57. 104. Telecon between Jack Pfeiffer and Stanley W. Beerli, 21 Sep 76, sub: Navy CAP, 19 Apr 61. 105. Conversation between Jack B. Pfeiffer and Capt. Lionel Krisel (USNR, Ret..), 23 Apr 75 and 9 Jun 78. 105a.-Pfeiffer-Beerli telecon, 21 Sep 76, op. cit. 105b. Pfeiffer-Krisel conversation, op. cit., 9.Jun 78. 105c. Telecon between Jack B. Pfeiffer and Garfield M. Thorsrud, 26 May 77, sub: Navy CAP, 19 Apr 61. 105d. Telecon between Jack B. Pfeiffer and Capt. Lionel Krisel (USNR, Ret.), 2 Jun 78, sub: USN Air CAP, 19 Apr 61. 105e. Notes by General Eisenhower on Luncheon Meeting, April 22, 1961, with President Kennedy at Camp David. IV. E. Jet Fighters -- the Last Hope 106. Memo for DPD/Contract Approving Office from George Gaines, Jr., 16 Feb 61, sub: US Crew Members for Overflights (JMC-0290). Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, p. 31. Cables to TIDE: from Director, 12 Apr 61, GLOW 9749 (OUT 89183-G); from BELL, 19 Apr 61, BELL 4845 (OUT 7281) , TS. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 13 Apr 61, TIDE 504 (IN 3150). 107. Cables to Eglin Air Force Base from GLOW, 18 Apr 61: GLOW 9977 (OUT 89903-G); GLOW 9981 (OUT 89912-G). Cable to Headquarters Signal Center from GLOW[?], 19 Apr 61, GLOW[?] 4844 (OUT 7280). 107a. Memo for DDP from C. F. Welch, 1 Apr 61, sub: Contingency Aviation Materiel Assets. 108. Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, pp. 31-33. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, p. 30. TOP SECRET Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2A, p. 28. Conversation between Jack B. Pfeiffer and Fred Welch, 13 Jan 76, sub: Bay of Pigs. Memorandum for WH/4 from Stanley W. Beerli, 7 Apr 61, sub: Contingency Operating Base, JMATE (JMG-0349-61). MR from C. F. Welch, 13 Apr 61, sub: Contingency ZI Operating Base. Memo for Comptroller/DPD from James A. Cunningham, Jr., 18 Apr 61, sub: Covert Checking Account for -- Project JMGLOW. Memo for To Whom it May Concern from Stanley W. Beerli, 18 Apr 61, sub: Letter of Instruction to Mr. (JMG-0363). C. 109. Cable to BELL from TIDE, 19 Apr 61 (1551Z), TIDE 898 (No IN Number). TS. 110. Letter from Seigrist to Pfeiffer, 20 May 76, op. cit. IV. F. Retrospective View of Air Operations 111. Playa Giron, op. cit.. I, 491. 112. Ibid., 492. 113. Conversation between David L. Phillips and Jack ,B. Pfeiffer, 11 Mar 75, sub: Bay of Pigs. 114. Lagas, op. cit., p. 141. 115. Reporting on Cuba, Havana: Book Institute, 1967, pp. 17-31. 116. Thorsrud-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1A, p. 3; Tape 1B, p. 14; Tape 3A, p. 54. Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 2B, pp. 39-40. Gaines-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1A, p. 13. Beerli-Pfeiffer. OH Int., op. cit., Tape 4B, p. 91. Memo for DPD from James A. Cunningham, Jr., 9 May 61, sub: Meeting with Maj. Gen. Maxwell B. Taylor (DPD 2767-61). TS 155687/A. 117. Bissell-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 1, pp. 10-11. 118. Richard M. Bissell OH Interview with Joseph E. O'Connor for John F. Kennedy Library, 25 Apr, 67, p. 19. 119. Ibid., pp. 12-14. 120. Beerli-Pfeiffer OH Int., op. cit., Tape 3B, pp. 65-67; Tape 4A,. pp. 68-69. ecess Controlled by CIA History Staff