WESTERN EUROPE CANADA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0001246410
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RIPPUB
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U
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
June 23, 2015
Document Release Date:
March 15, 2010
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2005-01250
Publication Date:
August 20, 1974
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APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 03-02-2010
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Western Europe
Canada
International Organizations
99
August 20, 1974
No. 0229-74
WESTERN EUROPE -- CANADA - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by c
ffice of occasional co r u ons rom o or offices wi hin rren then Dir ctorate with
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the Individual articles.
August 20, 1974
Brnnr.-n
Peaceful Explosions and Regional Zones Pose
Nuclear Proliferation Problems
A second session will be held in Geneva
beginning next week of the; committee preparing
for next year's Non-proliferation Treaty Review
Conference. The US views the Conference as a means
of attracting more adherents to the NPT and otherwise
strengthening the, treaty. Some of the problems
confronting advocates of the NPT are examined in
the following report.
The Indian nuclear explosion of May 18 continues
to have repercussions, on the worldwide debate over
,nuclear proliferation. The failure of the US and
the USSR, in particular, to condemn the Indian
action has raised doubts among many countries about
the commitment of the major powers to nuclear non-
proliferation. Many now perceive no disadvantage
to keeping the nuclear option open
India's defense of its test as a peaceful
nuclear explosion has provided those countries
seeking to protect their nuclear development , options
with an increasingly attractive pretext for non-
accession to the NPT. Although it is doubtful
that these countries view the peaceful explosion
option as anything but a camouflage for their own
nuclear intentions,-the attention the concept has
attracted has resulted inincreased discussion
of the responsibility of the nuclear countries
to provide non-weapons technology to non-nuclear
states. The ensuing discussion has called into
question the future of the nonproliferation structure
established by the 1968 Treaty.
August 20, 1974
Confidence in the NPT itself as an instrument
to prevent nuclear proliferation is diminishing
and other arrangements, similar to the 1967 Latin
American Nuclear Free Zone, are being proposed
as adequate substitutes. Increased interest in
the concept of nuclear,free zones has led the Iranians
to revive their proposal to establish a nuclear
free zone in the Middle East. While the geographical
limits of the zone have deliberately been left
undefined, the Pakistanis.have already made known
their intention to submit a proposal for a South
East Asian nuclear free zone to the United Nations
if the Indian subcontinent is excluded from the
Iranian proposal.
At the CCD session earlier this year, the
Nigerian delegate suggested reconsideration of
the 1964 Declaration of the Organization of African
Unity regarding a nuclear free zone for Africa.
Most recently the Romanians, in their speech at
the Conference last week, promoted the concept
of nuclear free zones and declared that such regional
regimes should encourage peaceful uses of nuclear
energy.
August 20, 1974
The countries affected by these regional arrangements
are also claiming new rights for parties to such
nuclear-free zones.
P
(the organization re strating
the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone) has suggested
that parties to'regional arrangements should enjoy
the same benefits as NPT parties. While the NPT
has long been condemned by its critics as perpetuating
discriminatory arrangements in favor of the nuclear
powers, incentives for accession to the NPT itself
would be severely-diminished if the OPANAL interpretation
becomes widely accepted.
The US has consistently maintained that four
conditions must be met if a nuclear free zone is
to be recognized:
--the initiative should be taken by the states
in the region concernedt
--the zone should preferably include all states
in the area whose participation is deemed
importantt
--the creation of.a zone should not disturb
necessary security arrangements= and
--provision should be made for adequate veri-
fication.
The actual establishment of a nuclear free
zone and the interpretation of what this entails
are up to the countries in the region itself, however,
and it is thus possible that there would be provision
for conducting peaceful nuclear explosions. Under
the terms of the NPT, non-nuclear weapon states
are prohibited from conducting peaceful nuclear
explosions, although the US, UK, and USSR are obligated
to provide the benefits of such technology to non-
nuclear states when such benefits are proven.
August 20, 1974
Apart from these considerations, there has
been a general erosion of support for the NPT within
recent months. A number of countries formally
committed to NPT accession are now clearly dragging
their feet on actual ratification.
In Western Europe, a principal hold-out is
Italy which has consistently professed its intention
to ratify both the NPT and the separate agreement
under the NPT providing for IAEA verification of
EURATOM safeguards. Parliamentary action on both
agreements has been stalled for months, apparently
because of high-level opposition within the foreign
ministry to NPT accession. The related safeguards
agreement can come into force only when all EURATOM
members (except France, which will not sign the
NPT) have ratified it.
In Asia, there are increasing indications that
the South Koreans are reconsidering their options
with regard to the NPT, particularly in light of
Korea's intention to expand its nuclear power
capabilities significantly during the next decade.
toward NPT ratification within recent months.
Another NPT holdout, Japan, has also not moved,
August 20, 1974
ET