SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001247369
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2010
• Case Number: F-2005-01250
• Publication Date: December 18, 1975

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APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 03-02-2010
Prospects for Further Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons
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 MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF
SN I E 4-1-74
PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
 THIS MEMORANDUM IS ISSUED BY THE DkECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT
AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWSt
The following Intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
the estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments
of State, Defense, and Treasury, the National Security Agency, and the Energy
Research and Development Administration,
Concurring:
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence
Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National. Security Agency
The Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, Department of the
Treasury
The Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and
Development Administration
Abstaining:
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
 CONTENTS
PRECIS , ,
Page
1
DISCUSSION
1, INTRODUCTION AND REAFFIRMATION OF SNIE 4.1.74 .
.3
A, Now Estimates
4
B. Key Technical Considerations ....... ..
4
C. Uncertainties and Principal Determinants , , ..
5
D, National Objectives in Developing a Nuclear Device
0
It. EARLIEST DATES OF THE TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF
POSSESSION OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE ..... , , .... .
0
A. The Republic of China . , , ... .. , -
B. Pakistan ...... H
C. South Africa , . , .. , . , f3
D. The Republic of Korea 41
E. Other Countries ....... ........ 9
 PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PRECIS
We reaffirm the major judgments of SNIE 4-1-74 which addresses
the problem of prospects for further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
It is concluded in the SNIE that in the 1980s the production of nuclear
weapons will be within the technological and economic capabilities of
many countries but that the principal determinant of the extent of nu-
clear weapons proliferation In the coming years will be political con-
siderations,
This Memorandum to Holders addresses the concept that some coun-
tries might seek to further their political, and even military, objectives
by the acquisition of a very modest nuclear explosive capability with-
out time-consuming "weaponization" efforts. It concludes that there are
a number of countries that could accumulate sufficient fissionable
material, complete the necessary nuclear explosive research and de-
velopment work, and thus be in a position to fabricate a nuclear ex-
plosive device without having violated the letter of the safeguard
provisions of the IAEA or NPT. The fabrication could take no more
than a few days. In virtually all cases, taking this step would involve
the violation of safeguard agreements.
The earliest technically feasible dates when various countries could
have a nuclear device in hand are shown in Table 1, page 6. The dates
are based on technical capability. They are not dates considered prob-
 S R!T
able, Any attempt to actually fabricate and/or test it i clear device
will come only after the country has considered the political and ,stra-
tegic situation and Is desperato enough to accept the consequences
of abrogating safeguard agreements,
In most cases, the fabrication of nuclear elerlem is referred to in
SNIE 4.1.74 as it step in it program aimed at the production of nuclear
weaponv. The level of effort and the amount of tittle required to pro-
ducer wealun x that are the focal concern of the SNIT would be
greater than that needed to fabricate the devices referred to in this
leiinn'aiuIulln, Thus olle Cannot necessarily compare the device or
ureape-el dates given in the SNI1' with the earliest technically feasiblo
dates for deuleev fit this 1llemo random, Here we are concerned with
single, unweaponl'ed nuclear explosives, Since they in themselves
may have it political impact, they may be the ultimate goal of the
program.
 DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION AND REAFFIRMATION
OP SNIE 4.1-74
1. SNIE 4.1.74 of August 16174 addresses the
problem of the prospects for further proliferation of
nuclear weapons. We reaffirm the major judgments
that It contains, Still valid is its discussion about
the "barriers" to proliferation, Including the tech-
nological requirements for developing a nuclear ex?
plosive and the international restrictions such ns
the safeguards of the international Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and provisions of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ( NPT).
2. The major judgments of SNIE 4.1-74, in es-
sence, are,
- In the 1980s, the production of nuclear weap-
ons will be within the technological and eco-
nomic capabilities of many countries. The prin-
cipal determinant of the extent of nuclear
weapons proliferation in coming years will,
however, be political cimsiderations-includ-
Ing the policies of the superpowers with re-
gard to proliferation, the policies of suppliers
of nuclear materials and technology, and re-
gional ambitions and tensions,
- It is likely that India will proceed to fabri-
cato weapons covertly. lint the US or the USSR
still might be able to dissuade its lenders, An
Indian decision to proceed with an overt
weapons program on any scale will be one
factor Inclining some other countries to fol-
low stuit,
-A large collection of frugnn i tars and partly
circumstantial evidence leads 114 to believe
that Israel already has produced nuclau'
weapons, We do not expect the Israelis to
provide confirtntttio n of widespread suspi-
cions of their capability, either by nuclear
testing or by threats of use, short of a grave
threat to the nation's existence,
- It would require very fundannental changes,
such as the breakup of major defense alliances
accompanied by a substantial Increase in strife
and tension throughout the world, to induce
countries like \Vcst Germany, Sweden, Can-
adn, and Italy to exercise their ocar-term
capability.
- The Director of Central Intelligence, the Cen?
tral intelligence Agency, the l)e pmirtment of
State, and the Assistant (Thief of Staff for in-
telligence, Department of the Army believe
that Japan would not embark on it program of
nuclear weapons development in the absence
of a major adverse shift In great power rela-
tionships which presented Japan with a clear-
cut threat to its security,' The Director of Naval
Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and
the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligenc(,, 1)e-
t The Energy Rew,arch and Devvlnpnu'nl Acnhtistra-
tiun now nsnoclntes Itself with this position, The Defense
Intelligence Agency was associated with this position, but
it is now annaciated with the positlno of the i)Ir'etor of
Naval Intelliuents', I)eparlmmot of the Navy, and the As-
sisUnlt (.hied of SIaif, Inielligmxue, I)tgatrtment of the Air
force, Sets the SNIT for the develuptit, t of this position
and for the expansina it[ thew and the other iudguamts,
 partment of the Air Force, we it strong chance
that Japan's leaders will conclude that they
must have nuclear weapons if they are to
achieve their national objectives in the devel-
oping Asian power balance. Such it decision
could come In the early 1080%
Less sweeping Cht111geN could liltllice one or
another of the loss-atlvancotl nations to mount
the sort of nuclear effort India and Israel have
made.
A, New Estimates
3. The possibility that sobee countries might seek
to further their political and even military objectives
by the acquisition of a very modest nuclear explo-
sive capability, without time-consuming "weapon.
ization" efforts, Is referred to In SNIT. 4.1.74 (set,
Conclusion J), but It iv not explored in depth. In
the past year, additional analysis has refined esti-
mates about the facilities and the time that are
required for development of an unweaponized de-
vice by certain countries. This Memorandum to
Holders is intended to supplement the SNIT by
presenting the estimates derived from the results
of this analysis. The criteria used in making these
estimates are:
(a)
(b)
a nuclear device based on the possession of
about 10 kilograms or more of chemically
separated plutonium' or a somewhat larger
amount of uranium highly enriched In U-2.35,
and the completion of high explosive (HE)
weapon research for the design of an implo-
sion system and fabrication of a device, It
would be capable of being delivered to a
target only by a transport aircraft or some
form of surface transport; or, in the extreme,
it would be so large that it would he suitable
only for a demonstration test.
an Indigenous development program to in-
clude contracted assistance from outside
sources. Neither national, or subnational,
theft nor purchase of nuclear weapons is
a Separated plutanfum is plutonium (either weapon-grade
or reactor-grade) that has been removed by chemical re-
processing from irradiated reactor fuel. Reactor-grade phi.
tonIum IN "dirty" plutonium (i.e., high Pit-240 content)
produced In a power reactor in normal operation. Wrapon-
grade plutonium is "clean" plutonium (i.e., low Pu-240
content) produced In it power reactor or research reactor
where the irradiation tiros' of the fuel IN limited,
(e)
considered, Also not considered are rho use
of nuclear material owned by other countries
or the "crash" construction of nuclear re-
actors designed only for the production of
plutonium.
a production eapabllitit that would not neces-
sarlly violate the letter of the safeguard pro-
visions of the lAlrA or NP'1', Nil' safeguards
prohibit the manufacture of nuclear explo-
sives. iAEA safeguards that apply to non-
NPT parties do not necessarily preclude the
development of peaceful nuclear explosives.
The Director General of the IAEA bus stated,
however, that the safeguards involve an
obligation that the nuclear materials should
not be used for the development, munufac?
tore or testing of nuclear explosives of any
kind. Neither set of safeguards addressor
high explosive research or nuclear explosive
design work. A treaty or safeguard violation
would not occur until fissionable material
was diverted to prohibited nuclear explosive
use. A violation would be confirmed if an
unauthorized device were to be exploded
or if the possession of illegal nuclear explo-
sives were officially acknowledged.
4. Based on the foregoing criteria, our evidence
on the plans and activities of the various countries,
and our assessment of their technical capabilities,
we have estimated an earliest technically feasible
date that a country could have an.unwetponized
nuclear device in hand. No allowances are made
for possible delays in decisionmaking that might
stern from poor technical planning and execution,
or for delays generated by external obstacles and
pressures, It is an earliest date based on technical
feasibility, not it date considered probable.
B. Key Technical Considerations
5. Our estimates are based for the most part on
the availability of plutonium that is produced by
power or research reactors and the assumption that
it is usable in it nuclear vxplosive.? In the case of
3 This relatively crude assessment stands In uai