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(b)(1) (b)(3) APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 03-Mar-201 0 USIB UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD ecret f,,jcnoHLMED Scientific Intelligence Committee Trends and Priorities in Soviet Military Research and Development To . cret THE SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE IS COMPRISED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF: The Central Intelligence Agency The Defense Intelligence Agency The National Security Agency The Atomic Energy Commission The Department of State The Department of Army The Department of Navy The Department of Air Force WA NING This document contains information Ming the national security of the United States within the meaning of th espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794 and 798. The law pro ibits its transmission or the reve- lation of its contents in any manner to unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the ety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign g t to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by perso el especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the 'grated control channels. Its se tv must be maintained in accordance regulations pertaining to the Controls. No action is to be taken on any ' ence which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantage to be ' ed, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence and n of the source, unless such action is first approved by the appropriate uthority. Scientific Intelligence Study TRENDS AND PRIORITIES IN SOVIET MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE VSRET TOP~ECRET RET I 1 I PREFACE This study updates a previous review of the scope and direction, of Soviet military research and development published in January 1967. (SIC.S-1-67 ) In this review we examine the Soviet military R&D system in some detail and attempt to describe its essential features. We have paid particular attention to areas in which significant R&D effort is being expended and is apt to be continued because of the promise of payoff or because of a need to correct existing deficiencies. We have looked for trends that have important implications for Soviet military capa- bilities over the next 5 to 10 years. But, recognizing that decisions to embark on weapons programs are not made on the basis of R&D programs alone, we have not set as a primary goal the forecasting of specific future weapons which might result in the next decade from present R&D programs. Such estimates are more properly made in the huger context of the National Intelligence Estimates dealing with the component elements of the Soviet military structure. Lastly, we recognize that significant military programs other than those discussed could be in an early R&D phase without our being able to identify them as such. Much of the subject matter discussed in this report has been covered in some detail in one or more of the recent National Intel- ligence Estimates, particularly NIE 11-12-72, NIE 11-3-72, and NIE 11-8-72. With respect to some weapons systems it was found that little new could be added to the coverage of the subject in the NIEs. In such cases we have presented only a brief discussion, highlighting R&D aspects, in order to provide readers with a comprehensive review of Soviet military R&D in a single publication. Thus, in such subjects as ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and naval warfare, the reader will find the detailed treatment in the NIEs while in this study we have confined our attention largely to R&D trends. For this study we have drawn heavily on contributions made by the participating subcommit- tees to the referenced NIEs. The following USIB Committees contributed to this interdepartmental study: Scientific Intelligence Committee Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee Guided Missile and Astronautic Intelligence Committee CONTENTS Page PREFACE ................................................... iii SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ............................ 1 DISCUSSION ............................................... 10 Organization, planning and control .......................... 10 Facilities .................................................. 15 Manpower ................................................ 19 Missile systems ............................................ 20 Military space ............................................. 31 .............................. . . Aeronautics ...."""""" 38 Ground warfare ........................................... 52 Naval warfare ............................................. 56 Military electronics ........................................ 64 Military electro-optics ...................................... 82 Military medicine .......................................... 89 Chemical and biological warfare ............................. 90 Nuclear R&D .............................................. 93 Long range threat .......................................... 96 FIGURE Page Organizations concerned with military R&D in the USSR ........ 11 TOP SE ET Im SECRET TRENDS AND PRIORITIES IN SOVIET MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS GENERAL The strong support that the Soviets have given to military research and development since World War II continues. The major portion of the total Soviet research and development effort continues to be devoted to military-or closely related- requirements, including space, with highest priority on strategic offensive and defensive systems. A stream of new and improved military hardware has emerged from this effort. Many facilities built during the 1950s and 1960s are still expanding, presaging additional invest- ments in coming years. It seems clear that the USSR intends to maintain a vigorous program to update its military capabilities. For the most part progress will come through gradual improvements in range, accuracy, reliability, and other critical parameters of present strategic offensive and defensive systems. There is always the chance, however, that radically new systems may evolve from work now in progress Centralization of responsibility, specialization of effort, and continuity in management and leader- ship are typical strengths of the Soviet military R&D environment. National-level management is marked by close partnership of the Party and Gov- ernment in defining short- and long-term directions and managing resource allocations. As a conse- quence, the decision-making process is in many cases less time-consuming than it is in the US. On the other hand, a number of shortcomings impose limitations on the effectiveness of the Soviet military R&D effort and at least some of these are not apt to be overcome for many years. The industrial base that supports Soviet military R&D lacks the sophistication of the US industrial sector. The full exploitation of very elaborate re- search, development, and testing resources is con- strained by rigid planning and control of programs and by compartmentation of research. Emphasis on program plan fulfillment and goal achievement, combined with the inherent inflexibility of the Soviet environment, often results in a certain amount of conservatism in systems design. And occasionally program goals are adhered to even after a lack of realism in the schedules related to the goals must have become apparent. Typical examples are the tardiness of the fast breeder reactor at Shevchenko and the nuclear power pro- grams as called for by the 6th Five Year Plan. spite the small size and closely knit c er of the Soviet policy summit and its good internal com- munications, there is little evidence to suggest that it is organized and staffed to do routine systems evaluations of new programs. In practice the policy- makers probably defer to professional military judgment in weapon program decisions. As long as the Soviet leaders perceive no overriding economic pressures toward restraint in military programs, the built-in biases of the decision-making system appear to lead to the pursuance of military pro- grams along lines which satisfy all or most of their military advocates. The Ministry of Defense and its subordinate agencies appear to exercise a major influence on which advanced military technologies are to be pursued. The apparent absence of elaborate mechanisms for systems analysis of new weapons and their cost- effectiveness is perhaps the more striking in a country which has for 15 years devoted so much effort to detailed defense planning. But it is rather consistent with the system we find in practice that Is, the basic features of a new weapon system are decided upon, the system is developed, deployed, and then modified as required on the basis of field experience. If we are correct in concluding that, compared to US practice, decision-making times are shorter and fewer people are involved, relatively less time would be spent on the decision to initiate a project and relatively more time on the production and deployment phases. Such an explanation would fit the widespread use of off-the-shelf components which tends to shorten the time in the pre- production phases. Whether the changed conditions brought about by arms limitations will cause the Soviets to do more systems analysis as a prerequisite for program initiation remains to be seen. The Soviets clearly have a large and growing capability to investigate new concepts and exploit promising avenues in the design and development of weapons systems. An ability to concentrate the resources needed to accomplish high-priority R&D expeditiously has been demonstrated, as has the willingness to build and deploy the highest priority systems where field experience hes indicated a likely need. Many of the Soviet test facilities are designed to accommodate needs well beyond those readily apparent at the time of their construction as, for example, in space vehicle and missile devel- opment. We therefore believe that the Soviet R&D program will continue to provide a wide range of military equipment generally capable of achieving the purpose for which it is designed. Much of the future effort will be concerned with the introduc- tion of new technology and techniques to achieve incremental improvements. Flow the Soviets will choose to direct their mili- tary R&D efforts in the next few years is a matter of prime interest. We have searched for indications such as a pattern of Soviet reactions to particular US actions. In general, we have been unable to detect reliable overall military R&D patterns. And now that the USSR has achieved near-parity with the US in military strength, the "defense of the homeland" theme may no longer dominate Soviet weapons choices as it has for so long. The uncer- tainties about where Soviet priorities in military that we could be confronted with a technological surprise. In a perhaps less awesome sense the prospective era of strategic arms limitations poses many dif- ficult questions for those who must analyze Soviet military R&D. In many cases the qualitative im- provements that seem likely to be allowed may be as difficult to detect as were the original systems. Moreover the Soviets can be expected to stress R&D that may lead to radically new-and uncon- In assessing the future of Soviet military R&D, it is useful to consider where Soviet science and technology stand today after more than two decades of concerted effort. First, the strong military tech- nology that has been developed, coupled with adequate production and operational resources, has enabled the USSR to attain the long-sought goal of military strength comparable with that of the US. Thus, the "catch-up" era that required the expendi- ture of vast resources during the 1950s and early 1960s has come to a close and the USSR is in a position to negotiate agreements to preserve its secure position. Second, a technological base the near equal of that of the US in most respects has been established enabling the Soviets virtually un- restricted freedom to move into areas of their own choosing. And third, as a result of the first two the TO'P"-5ECRET Soviets are in a position to focus their efforts on overcoming deficiencies that tend to inhibit their progress, notably persistent difficulties in areas of production that are highly dependent on advanced technology. These considerations suggest that Soviet military R&D may lose some of the conservatism, and hence some of the predictability, that we have considered to be characteristic of it. This Is not to say that Soviet scientists will suddenly swing to the other extreme. But the rather consistent pattern of re- liance on existing technology and components may increasingly give way to innovative approaches less easy to foresee and analyze. In this respect the threat of technological surprise, not so much in the form of a scientific breakthrough as in a development that stretches the limits of available technology, may increase over time. In a more conventional way the Soviets will un- doubtedly continue, even increase, the R&D effort aimed at improving existing weapons systems. Given the growing strength of their technology, they will probably be increasingly inclined to look for exploitable phenomena as a means of upgrading military capabilities in such difficult areas as submarine detection and tracking, increased surviv- ability of reentry vehicles, and advanced antibal- listic missile, antisatellite, and aircraft defense systems. To this end we expect to see vigorous pro- grams in electro-optics (infrared, long-wave in- frared, lasers), acoustics, electromagnetics, space electronics, signal processing and data transmission, and computer technology. MISSILE SYSTEMS Offensive ballistic missiles The Soviets have equipped themselves with a large and varied ICBM force based almost exclu- sively on liquid propellant technology. They have taken a conservative approach to ICBM develop- ment-in general using proven technology to up- grade each successive generation of ballistic mis- siles. This approach has resulted in a reliable ICBM force which is versatile enough to cope with a broad spectrum of potential threats. With the signing of the Interim Agreement limit- ing strategic offensive missiles, the Soviets have agreed to put numerical limits on their ICBM and SLBM forces. This suggests that they are confident that the size of their strategic missile force is suf- ficient which, in turn, suggests that their missile development efforts in the future will be focused on quality. This is not to say that the Soviets will not develop new missiles. On the contrary, they appear to be flight testing three new missile systems. And, as long as the provisions embodied in the Interim Agreement remain in effect, they probably will con- tinue to bring forth new ICBMs from time to time as replacements for older, obsolescent systems. Barring a breakdown in the follow-on SALT negoti- ations and a withdrawal from the Interim Agree- ment, the most dramatic technological changes in the character of Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces are likely to be qualitative improvements, especially the development of more accurate guidance and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The Soviets appear to be seeking grtater ac- curacy for their ICBM systems. One of the steps they might be expected to take would be the devel- opment of RVs with higher ballistic coefficients (betas). There has been a trend in that direction with some of their more recent ICBM modification programs-especially the SS-II Mods 2 and 3. The Soviets appear to be trying to upgrade the accuracy and reliability of the components used in ballistic missile guidance systems. To achieve very accurate systems, they almost certainly would have to develop a guidance system with additional features, such as midcourse guidance or terminal RV guidance. There is evidence that they are experimenting with more so histicated ixuidance technioues for naval systems. Over the past few years the Soviets clearly have been concerned with evolving US ABM defenses. Exoatmospheric decoys and multiple reentry vehi- cles have been tested and several modifications to ICBM systems apparently intended to enhance penetration in an ABM environment have been de- TOPP S?CRET veloped. These developments have been overtaken by the ABM Treaty, however, which limits both the US and USSR to low levels of ABM defense. While the Soviets may undertake programs to develop new and more sophisticated systems to penetrate ABM defenses as a hedge against abrogation of the Treaty, these programs probably will move forward at a more deliberate pace than would be the case without the Treaty. The Soviets have developed multiple reentry vehicles for the SS-9 and SS-11 which are not in- dependently targetable, however, and apparently were developed to attack ABM-defended soft tar- gets. The Soviets probably will develop MIRV systems for their ICBMs and possibly for future SLBMs. A MIRV payload could be part of the two new missiles under development at Tyuratam. If the Soviets decide to develop a "bus" type MIRV pay- load, the guidance system tested on their new large ICBM might provide the flexibility and accuracy required to attack hard targets. The USSR has a large and varied solid-propellant production capability. R&D programs concerned with solid-propellant ballistic missiles are con- tinuink. In 1972 a new solid-propellant ICBM was tested The USSR is judged to lag the US in thrust vector con- trol techniques and shutdown mechanisms as ap- plied to solid-propellant vehicles. The Soviets have the technological capacity to solve these problems and undoubtedly will do so if the development effort is accorded a high enough priority. Defensive missiles Truly integrated aerospace defense is believed to be an overriding Soviet military goal. High- priority R&D programs to accomplish the overall objective include early warning and tracking sys- tems against aircraft, missiles, and space objects; several complex air defense missile systems; new in- terceptor aircraft with higher performance; and ABM defenses. As these new systems are deployed, the Soviets must inevitably appreciate the need for integrating these total defenses through advanced means of command and control and the necessity for R&D in the areas of computers, displays, and communications. ANTIBALLISTIC anssis--The Soviet ABM R&D effort has been concentrated at the Sary Shagan Missile Test Center (SSMTC). Since the late 1950s, Soviet emphasis on radar and missile technology for ABM applications has resulted in the deployed Moscow ABM system and the network of Hen House early warning radars which support the system. The several very serious limitations of the system, among them vulnerability to exhaustion, saturation, and nuclear blackout, and an inability to discriminate real targets from false ones, appear to point the way for future Moscow system R&D. Soviet ABM R&D efforts elsewhere, however, prob- ably will be directed toward the development of an entirely new ABM system for the defense of ICBM silos. In addition, the Soviets probably will even- tually explore entirely different concepts which could improve their defense against ballistic mis- siles, such as synchronous satellite early warning systems or air or spaceborne laser ABM systems. The most severe limitation of the Moscow sys- tem-vulnerability to exhaustion-cannot be over- come within the terms of the recently signed ABM agreement. The Soviets are permitted an additional 35 ABM launchers for a total of 100 launchers. The lack of a large ABM interceptor force assures suc- cessful penetration of the system by a determined attacker. Soviet research directed toward allevia- tion of other limitations of the system is permitted, however, and with some restrictions the com- ponents developed may be deployed. For example, unconventional weaponry like lasers may be devel- oped but its inclusion in the Moscow ABM system would require renegotiation or abrogation of the ABM Treaty. Soviet efforts to reduce the vulnerability of the Moscow system to saturation apparently are con- centrated in the development of planar array radars. Such radars have better multiple target/interceptor handling capabilities than the presently deployed dish-type radars. Research on the problems of nuclear blackout and discrimination has not yet been identified. To reduce the system's vulnerabil- ity to nuclear blackout, the Soviets probably will develop "cleaner" nuclear warheads (or effective non-nuclear warheads) or increase radar operating frequencies. T E[PFT Future Soviet developments in optical devices, lasers, long wave infrared (LWIR) sensors and high resolution radar technology could contribute to the development of a capability to discriminate reentry vehicles from accompanying penetration aids. A more immediate Soviet approach, however, would probably include the use of simple atmos- pheric filtering and the development of a high acceleration interceptor. Such an interceptor, de- sirable for an ABM system designed to defend ICBM silos, as permitted by the ABM Treaty, ap- parently is not yet being developed. sURFACE-TO-AM MISSILES-The Soviets have been engaged in a well-conceived program of surface-to- air missile (SAM) system development. The sys- tems generally have been designed to counter a specific threat or a facet of an expected new threat. Over the years an attempt has been made to develop SAM defenses capable of coping with aircraft at low altitudes, primarily through incremental im- provements In all aspects of low-altitude defense. The use of older systems and the introduction of new systems have resulted in a diversity of equip- ment, redundancy of coverage, and improved capa- bility against all threats. All of the ground-based short-range Soviet SAMs (except the SA-1) are van- mounted and characterized by transportability. SAM design approach has typically used a com- mand guidance scheme with track-while-scan fire- control radars to minimize system complexity. During the period of our forecast, we expect the Soviets to employ R&D resources in the design of new equipment that would provide for shorter reaction times, lower vulnerability to electronic countermeasures, and better low-altitude defense capabilities. The reaction time problem is expected to be alleviated by the additional use of computer control equipment in SAM batteries and improved command-coordination-control data transmission systems which have been in limited use for some time. The vulnerability of Soviet SAM systems to electronic countermeasures is being reduced to some degree by the employment of straightforward techniques which include the use of frequency diverse radars and the addition of optical and electro-optical trackers to the fire-control radars. Improvements in the acquisition and fire-control . radars and SAM proximity fuses, which would pro- vide more efficient operation in a clutter environ- ment, could result in a better low-altitude capa- bility. Other expected improvements in Soviet SAM systems could include the development of multi- purpose radars optical trackers with most short-range SAM radars to complement the primary tracker. Antiship cruise missiles The USSR has been developing antiship cruise missile (ASCM) systems since the late 1940s. The Soviet ASCM developmental programs tend to re- flect two major concerns. These are the increasing number of US attack carriers (CVAs) which could be brought to bear against the USSR and the area and terminal defenses which their cruise missiles must penetrate to reach the primary target, the attack carrier. The result of Soviet developmental programs is an impressive family of cruise missile systems. As the CVA threat has evolved in terms of increasing numbers as well as sophistication, im- provements in the Soviet cruise missile capability have been phased in appropriately. Changes during recent years have included increased standoff range, supersonic cruise velocity, electronic counter- countermeasure (ECCM) features in the guidance systems, and greater numbers of cruise missiles per launch platform. Of particular significance was the recent introduction of the element of a possible surprise attack through the use of an underwater launch platform. a continuing Soviet antiship cruise missile development program. Such a program will con- tinue to be evolutionary in nature and focus on those limitations which significantly influence the effectiveness of the targeting system, cruise missile, and launch platform. Improvements expected to ap- pear -during the next decade include smaller cruise missiles, utilizing technological advances to increase the firepower of a single launch platform and to reduce the radar cross section, and greater standoff range to reduce launch platform vulnerability. A significant improvement in Soviet ASCM targeting capability could result from the development of an improved ocean surveillance system. Major ad- vances in technology would not be required for such a development. Also, the Soviets are expected to make greater use of advanced ECCM techniques, Increase missile maneuverability in the terminal en- counter, and develop better discrimination tech- niques for identification of high-value targets. Air-to-air missiles The Soviets have five basic operational air-to-air missile (AAM) systems, all except the earliest (AA-1) produced in both an infrared and semi- active radar guidance version. Their AAM develop- mental program has been well-planned; each new model introduced into service has reflected ad- vances in technology. A family of weapons has been developed which is capable of destroying targets in the medium- to high-altitude regimes by means of head-on or tail attack in all weather conditions. But all of the missiles lack the capabilities required for ,low-speed, low-altitude engagement in a ground-clutter environment. We expect the Soviets to develop a new, short- range missile with decreased minimum launch range, high maneuverability and good low- to medium-altitude capability against low-altitude penetrators and maneuvering targets. Such a mis- sile could probably be developed using current state-of-the-art technology for all major components and appear by the mid-1970s. Also a new, long- range AAM could be required if the postulated ad- vanced long-range, all-weather interceptor is de- veloped. MILITARY SPACE We expect the USSR to continue to emphasize military uses of space and to conduct active R&D programs in support of such uses. While the Soviet space program generally has been successful, it has been plagued with a succession of problems over the years both with spacecraft and launch vehicles. During the next several years better environmental ground testing, improved checkout procedures, and the use of improved technology should result in increased reliability in Soviet military-related space- craft. The Soviets probably will develop new or modified stages to the proven boosters to provide cost effective delivery of heavier payloads into varied orbits. Current Soviet technology is believed adequate to support the power, guidance, and atti- tude control requirements for military space systems over the next 10 years. In the long term, the Soviets could develop reusable launch systems should the launch rate demand them. To do so, however, ad- vances in the technologies associated with high temperature structures, lightweight heat protection, and hypersonic aerodynamics would be required. The development phase of a Soviet orbital satel- lite interceptor may be nearing completion. Anti- satellite capabilities could be extended to geosta- tionary altitudes during the next five years, based on existing technology. Advances in reconnaissance, surveillance, and meteorological satellites are pred- icated on advanced sensor development. We are not aware of any limitations of Soviet military research facilities that would hamper such development. Experiments with manned spacecraft indicate an interest in missile-launch detection/ surveillance sensors and photoreconnaissance. We expect the Soviets to pursue the development of new recon- naissance sensors and.systems to monitor US com- pliance with the strategic arms limitation (SAL) Soviet experimentation with ocean area observation could lead to ocean surveillance systems using multi-spectral sensors. AERONAUTICS For at least the past 10 years the Soviets have pursued vigorously a broad and uninterrupted pro- gram in practically all areas of aerodynamic R&D. They have increasingly emphasized use of experi- mental capabilities to support existing high-quality analytical and numerical capabilities. They are capable of addressing the complex development problems of more advanced system concepts. Re- search programs include studies intended to im- prove aerodynamic efficiency in all speed regimes and the examination of unique problems associated with specific vehicle types. The Soviets continue to devote extensive aero- nautical R&D resources to the development of tur- bine and jet engine concepts. Relatively short engine life continues to be a major shortcoming of the Soviet aircraft gas turbine industry. The Soviet turbine materials that have become available for exploitation continue to be "dirty" with inclusions and high porosity. This apparent inability to manu- facture high-quality turbine materials is the prob- able reason for low turbine Inlet temperatures and the short life of current Soviet engines. This short- coming is expected to be overcome through the use of more effective cooling schemes, better fabrica- tion techniques, and improved alloys. Despite the above shortcoming, Soviet engine technology has shown a number of strengths in inlet technology, positive expulsion tanks, and com- pressor design. The Soviets have been developing a turboramjet engine (which they define as an after- burning turbofan) since about 1964. They are also aggressively pursuing the technology necessary for the development of rocket-ramjet combined cycle engines. Various missiles and an airbreathing booster for a space shuttle vehicle are their in- dicated goals. The Soviets continue to build and fly an im- pressive number of prototype aircraft of all types. Additionally, progressive improvements have ap- peared in numerous new models. Three new and different types of fighter designs are currently' in flight testing; two of these are in the weapon sys- tems test stage. Continuing emphasis on VTOL and STOL developments is being supported by in- vestigation into flow field effects around such vehicles operating near the ground in hover or in transition to forward flight modes. Development of new bombers in addition to those now being tested does not present an insurmountable technological challenge to the Soviets. A unique Soviet vehicle which appears to have no Western counterpart is the 10-engine vehicle 300 feet in length which has been in existence at Kaspiysk on the west coast of the Caspian Sea since 1966. The vehicle appears capable of exploiting propulsion and lift interaction to provide several modes of operation and may be able to lift payloads comparable with those of the C-5A in STOL opera- tions from water or ice. there may be a family of vehicles of this type with lengths of 50, 75, 100, and 300 feet. GROUND WARFARE Efforts to modernize Soviet ground frees have been moderately successful. Since World War II roughly three generations of weapons and support TOPS RET X equipment have been furnished to the Soviet ground forces. Much of the old materiel is obsolete but usable and often effective. We see no trends in Soviet ground weapons R&D which would materially affect ground forces doctrine during the next decade. Future Soviet ground warfare R&D probably will be directed toward development of equipment which will improve river crossing, airborne, over- snow, and amphibious capabilities. Better self- propelled armored support weapons and close- range missile and artillery support weapons should be forthcoming. Soviet smoothbore technology is the most advanced in the world, and further devel- opment of smoothbore weapons for firing rocket- assisted and guided projectiles may be expected. The Soviets will continue their efforts to upgrade command and control systems and develop an effec- tive military operations research program which encompasses all areas-from electromagnetic prop- agation studies, communications devices and ADP usage to selection and training of technical person- nel. NAVAL WARFARE During the past several years the Soviets have developed a wide variety of new naval weapon sys- tems, including submarine-launched strategic bal- listic missile systems, improved antiship and anti- aircraft missile systems, and antisubmarine warfare ships and systems. While the new major surface combatant types have designations which indicate a main mission of antisubmarine warfare, surface- to-surface missile armament makes them formidable threats in ship-to-ship combat. Soviet naval R&D during the next 10 years will continue to be directed largely toward improvements in existing weapon systems. New naval systems, however, are possible. Soviet efforts to improve their submarine forces continue. Four modifications of existing ballistic missile submarine designs are in the experimental stage. Of these, a large nuclear-powered submarine, the newly designated D-class, has appeared and is assessed to be the platform for the SS-NX-8 missile. The speed of this submarine is unknown but pre- sumably will be comparable with that of the Y-class. The D-class submarine possibly will incorporate improved sound quieting features over those of the Y-class. As anticipated, the Soviets have developed a new and quieter second generation nuclear tor- pedo attack-class submarine, designated the V-class SSN, but they apparently have chosen not to sacri- fice speed in order to incorporate quieting features. In addition to noise reduction, Soviet submarine R&D during the next decade probably will con- tinue to emphasize precision navigation, command/ control systems, and improved steels and welding for deeper diving hulls. The new Krivak-class combatant probably will be used primarily in an ASW role and may be followed in the latter part of the decade by new surface combatants having a primary role of ASW. The new aircraft carrier under constniction at Nikolayev, designated the 444B, probably will be operational in several years. This ship is expected to carry V/STOL aircraft and probably will be used in an air support and/or air defense role. The ship may also carry ASW helicopters for surface ship ASW screening operations or be equipped with assault helicopters for projecting forces ashore. Soviet ASW has been largely dependent upon acoustic detection of submarines and has increased substantially over the past few years. Only one Soviet nonacoustic system-magnetic anomaly de- tection (MAD) equipment used in ASW aircraft- is known to be in operation, but the Soviets are well aware of a wide range of other nonacoustic tech- niques. The USSR can be expected to improve ASW capabilities through development of improved acoustic and nonacoustic detection/ classification equipment and more effective weapons for surface ships, submarines, aircraft, and helicopters. The Soviets probably will install improved acoustic de- tection devices on ships and submarines and deploy some improved fixed acoustic arrays and moored buoys. While we are unable to predict the precise direction of Soviet R&D in naval-associated acoustic detection systems, their research appears to be fol- lowing conventional avenues of US investigation. The Soviets may be attempting to develop ad- vanced types of detection/sonar systems, based upon infrasonic waves, bioacoustics, and nonlinear acoustics and possibly nonacoustic methods (MAD, radar and laser, infrared radiometers, radioactive detectors and others). For at least the next decade, however, nonacoustic method robably will con- tinue to complement acoustic de lion systems. MILITARY ELECTRONICS The USSR is expected to increase the use of those devices and techniques which will lead to more compact and reliable electronics equipment for military applications. Soviet capabilities in the theory of solid-state devices are good and will re- main so; improvements are expected in their capa- bility to produce quantities of such devices for use In military systems. Throughout the period, increased miniaturization, microminiaturization, and integrated circuit applications to weapons sys- tems electronics are expected. Based on a strong development program and past trends, spectrum utilization throughout the next 10 years probably will be toward lightly used frequency bands for numerous reasons and there will be considerable emphasis on t:!r use of shorter wavelengths. The trend in Soviet devices which could be applicable to both high-power and low-power use in military systems probably will be toward increased band width and stability and, where applicable, toward increased power and tunability. In radar applications the Soviets are expected to make increased use of advanced modulation tech- niques, Antenna designs, while conventional for the most part, will probably emphasize electronically steered phased arrays for applications in which beam agility is important. Techniques applicable to a synthetic aperture radar using optical process- ing are being developed, but there is no evidence to suggest that such a radar is now operational. Also, the Soviets are expected to continue their over-the-horizon (OTH) developmental effort. Future development in OTH systems may include an OTH radar designed to look through the north- ern auroral zone toward the US. The key problems facing the Soviets in future OTH development are avoidance of the high losses common in transpolar propagation and improvement of system reliability, Soviet communications efforts are currently di- rected toward the establishment of a unified auto- mated communications network. Development of electronic and semielectronic switching equipment will continue, but actual integrated service of such equipment is not expected before 1980. Improve- ments in electronic warfare capabilities, including electronic jamming and chaff to counter US radars and communications networks, should continue TOP ~,ECRET during the next 10 years. Emphasis will be placed on the development of advanced electronic coun- termeasures equipment which will provide for higher jamming power per pound, increased capa- bility for multiple target jamming, and quicker reaction times. The Soviets are expected to continue to use specially designed computers, generally selecting the lowest order of software and hardware sophis- tication consistent with systems needs for on-line military systems applications. Small-scale integrated circuits (IC) are available for design experiments, and prototypes of large-scale IC arrays have been employed in experimental work in military-related areas such as signal processing. It is unlikely, how- ever, that quantities of large-scale IC arrays will be used in military computers before 1978 because of insufficient amounts of quality components and the conservatism of Soviet military systems designers. Developers of computers for use in military systems probably will continue to employ proven circuit and component technology rather than depend on the concurrent development of new components and circuits to meet system needs. MILITARY ELECTRO-OPTICS A large effort is directed at developing and producing electro-optical systems for the Soviet armed forces. Their infrared (IR) optics technology is good and has found wide military application. Their laser program has expanded at a rapid rate over the past several years. All of the more useful types of lasers suitable for military applications are available or under development in the USSR. Future research is expected to focus on high energy pulsed and continuous wave lasers for application to new electro-optical systems for laser-induced fusion, communications, laser discrimination systems. and laser beam weapons. the probable existence of a major Soviet military R&D program involving high energy lasers. Although a number of aspects of this program re- main obscure, the goal may be to develop a laser weapon system. While the specific application for this weapon system is not yet known, air defense appears to constitute the earliest feasible strategic use. The development of a laser radar or discriminator which might be used in conjunc- tion with a missile defense system is an additional possibility. Based on their laser and optical pointing and tracking capabilities, in the near future the Soviets apparently could deny us photosatellite coverage of high-interest targets should they desire to place sufficient priority on such a laser application. Such interference with national means of verification, however, would be in violation of the SAL agree- ments. The Soviets probably could develop the essential elements of a laser antisatellite weapon system capable of damaging low-orbit satellites through thermal means by the early to mid-1980s. It is unlikely that the Soviets could develop a di- rected energy kill or other laser ABM weapon sys- tem during the next 10 years. Soviet IR optics technology is supported by a strong background in theoretical and applied op- tics. Their R&D of semiconductor radiation detec- tors has advanced considerably in the past few years. The USSR apparently has an across-the-board capability somewhat comparable with that of the MILITARY MEDICINE Soviet military medicine is steadily improving in terms of productivity and effectiveness. The Soviet R&D effort compares favorably with that of the US, but the capability to apply the results at the troop level continues to lag that of the US. Military medical research having priority in terms of money and manpower and which has had some successes includes that related to nuclear sub- marines, submersibles, and hyperbaric (deep div- ing) medicine; study of the adverse effects of nonionizing radiation in manned military enclos- ures; and development of radiation drugs for pre- and post-radiation exposure. Military pharmacolog- ical research continues to be directed toward the development of antihypoxic agents, antidotes for chemical warfare agents, and antiviral chemo- therapeutic agents for influenza. .oP\SECaET CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE Soviet CW research and development encom- passes all phases from basic research to field test- ing in the discovery and development of new agents and munitions. We expect the Soviets to continue during the 1970s their considerable research on the toxicological and physiological effects of old and candidate agents. New compounds for testing will continue to emerge from screening natural and synthetic toxic compounds. New types of lethal and incapacitating agents might be developed at any time from this work. Research to develop improved antidotes. prophylactics, and protective equipment will .^ontinue. We continue to believe that a Soviet research and development program in BW has been under way since perhaps as early as the 1930s. There is evidence that BW agents have been developed, but we are unable to determine which pathogens, if any, have been standardized for military use. We have no reliable information to confirm an offensive doctrine or the deployment of hardware for offen- sive BW purposes and are unable to determine the extent of Soviet BW testing. The recent convention signed by the US, USSR, and other nations would seem to negate the development and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxic weapons by the Soviets, but the convention lacks provisions for verifying compliance by the signatory countries. The un- certainties in our knowledge of Soviet BW accom- plishments and of the scope of their R&D effort preclude the making of valid predictions about future capabilities. NUCLEAR R&D Since the signing of the Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the USSR has continued to test underground and undoubtedly is carrying on R&D programs in weap- ons. The likely objectives and extent of the Soviet program are the development of thermonuclear warheads for new strategic systems, development of cleaner, lighter, and more flexible warheads for tactical applications, development of advanced war- heads for ABM applications, and the investigation of pure fusion techniques. In the area of controlled thermonuclear reaction (CTR) research, the experimental program of the USSR is the world's largest in terms of the invest- ment of equipment and manpower. At the outset the Soviet program concentrated on research with toroidal machines, with some work involving linear machines. More recently, however, the program has become more diversified and includes studies of fusion induced by laser and relativistic electron beams. In addition to the possible development of a fusion reactor, Soviet CTR R&D could result in such applications as the simulation of high-altitude nuclear weapons effects. Soviet nuclear technological development appears to be progressing at about the same pace as in the West. Unexpected advances leading to improved nuclear-powered military systems could result from the development of new materials permitting ad- vances in such areas as the miniaturization of con- trol systems, the design of magnets, and high- capacity energy storage systems. DISCUSSION ORGANIZATION, PLANNING AND CONTROL In their pursuit of long-range, worldwide objec- tives, the Soviets have placed heavy reliance on military R&D programs aimed at developing weap- ons systems to offset Western capabilities. For this reason, vigorous and increasingly competent Soviet military R&D programs are of extreme interest and concern at the highest levels of the Soviet govern- ment. Our knowledge of the organization and con- trol of Soviet military research and development programs is sketchy. Nevertheless, bits of organiza- tional information on the party and government, procedures used in the past, statements of need, and general policy directives on science and tech- nology provide some basis for deducing the prob- able mechanisms involved. (Figure) TO CRET CPSU SECRETARIAT TCRET CPSU POLITBURO CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEFENSE INDUSTRIES ? SECTORS FOR SCIENCE AND EDUCATIONAL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ? Poor Services and Ground. Naval, Al, Strategic Rocket, and Air Defense Forces ? Research Institutes, Laboratories and Test Ranges Medium Machine Building Electronics Industry Shipbuilding Industry REQUIREMENTS AND ACCEPTANCE Scientific and Technical Committees of the Ministries PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF R&D Organizations concerned with military R&D in the USSR General Machine Building DEFENSE COUNCIL STATE { COMMITTEE ' ? scientific, FOR SCIENCE ? Cod ting AND TECHNOLOGY The summit of Soviet weapons R&D policy-mak- ing appears to consist of the top-level people in the most important organizations involved in the weapons R&D policy process, with good representa- tion and communication by the defense industrial establishment and the military professionals. These organizations include the Politburo and D. F. Usti- nov, candidate member of the Politburo and over- seer of military R&D and production activities; the Defense Council-an advisory group to the Polit- buro chaired by Brezhnev which brings together top political and military leaders; the defense in- dustry section of the Central Committee headed by I. D. Serbin; and the Military-Industrial Com- mission (Voyenno Promyshlennaya Kommissiya- VPK), a group consisting of representatives of high ranking defense industrial ministries and Ministry of Defense officials chaired by L. V. Smirnov, a deputy minister of the Council of Ministers who reports to Ustinov. This small and closely knit group of policy-makers probably defers to professional military judgment in weapon program decisions. Although the pres- sures on limited national resources are considered at the summit as national priorities are defined, there is no evidence that weapon program decisions are routinely and systematically influenced by cost- effectiveness considerations as they are in the US. Despite an emergent systems analysis capability in the Soviet military establishment, it does not seem to be focused on cost-effectiveness appraisals. Soviet leaders are probably strongly inclined to accept weapons programs that the military profes- sionals say they need and that the engineers and economists agree are feasible. The built-in bias of the decision-making system appears to lend itself to the expansion of military technology efforts along lines which satisfy all or most military advocates of new programs, subject to budgetary restraints. Within the structure of the Council of Ministries, the VPK provides the framework for control and coordination at the national level of military-asso- ciated research and development plans, programs, and activities accomplished by the defense-indus- trial ministries for or in support of the Ministry of Defense. The members of the VPK appear to represent the ministries most concerned with mili- tary R&D including Defense, Defense Industry, General Machine Building, Medium Machine Build- ing, Machine Building, Aviation Industry, Radio Industry, Electronics Industry, and Shipbuilding Industry. These defense-industrial ministries bear the primary administrative responsibility for carry- ing out military R&D programs as well as produc- tion of weapons systems and components for dis- crete customer elements of the Ministry of Defense; for example, Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, Air Defense Forces, and Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). These customer elements are represented by Tech- nical Directorates which train and assign "military representatives" to monitor all military work being done within the civilian industries. Long-range plans and requirements for military systems are believed to be formulated, consolidated, and approved by a planning directorate of the Gen- eral Staff of the Ministry of Defense in conjunction with the respective operational forces. Military planning probably operates both downward and upward. Key requirements of national importance are probably initiated and approved from a general standpoint at the Politburo and Council of Ministers level, while less important requirements may be drawn up by individual forces and submitted up- ward for approval. Ideas from field commands are analyzed by academies, research institutes, labora- tories, and test centers controlled by technical direc- torates of the individual forces, and recommenda- tions are forwarded to higher authorities. The Ministry of Defense is essentially a customer for weapons and military materiel and does not itself perform much research. Each service has a tech- nical directorate whose responsibilities include the definition of systems requirements and the estab- lishment of priorities for weapons and equipment. Each technical directorate administers a limited number of research and test facilities, but the mis- sion of these facilities is mainly to explore the feasibility of new weapons, examine new projects, test new weapons and develop techniques for their tactical or strategic use. A directorate's main con- tribution to military R&D is the monitoring of re- search and development programs performed out- side the Ministry of Defense in the defense- industrial ministries; this is achieved by assigning military personnel to represent the customer ele- ments on Defense Industrial Ministry commissions which evaluate competitive design proposals and approve each phase of the development program. Military representatives are also assigned to the R&D and production facilities of the ministries that will provide the weapon system, as well as to facili- ties of other ministries providing subcontracted items. Product responsibilities of the eight industrial ministries most concerned with Soviet military R&D are as follows: Defense Industry .... Armored vehicles, artillery, rock- ets, small arms, and aircraft armament General Machine Ballistic missiles; space launch Building systems, upper stages, and non- recoverable spacecraft Aviation Industry .... Aircraft, aerodynamic missiles, defensve missiles, recoverable spacecraft Medium Machine Nuclear weapons and nuclear Building propulsion plants Radio Industry ...... Communication/navigational/ guidance equipment, computers Electronics Industry .. Electronic components Shipbuilding Industry Naval vessels, underwater weap- ons, fire control systems Machine Building .... Ammunition, explosives, fuses and projectiles, and solid propel. lants The defense-industrial ministries plan, initiate, and conduct the applied research programs needed to support military system developments. The min- istries generally strive for self-sufficiency, but part of their applied research programs is contracted to supporting agencies. Research planning is based largely on a ministry's understanding of future sys- tems requirements and established technology. Re- search programs of the defense-industrial ministries usually are initiated in anticipation of future sys- tems requirements. Only rarely is applied research initiated in response to explicit system require- ments. The applied research performed by the min- istries determines their capability to respond to specific customer requirements. The individual services within the Ministry of Defense define the specific requirements for weapons system develop- ments and initiate the design development phase through the administrative channels of the Council of Ministers. Within each defense-industrial ministry, actual responsibility for research and development is gen- erally divided between scientific research institutes which conduct applied research programs and de- sign bureaus which accomplish weapons system de- sign and development. Scientific research institutes play an important role in support of design bureaus and specific weapons development programs by conducting necessary applied research activities, preparing design handbooks and specifications, con- ducting ground environmental testing and proto- type testing activities, and evaluating design suit- ability during the various phases of the weapons development cycle. The actual development of spe- cific weapons systems, however, is the sole respon- sibility of the chief designer who has been awarded the development program after competition with one or more design bureaus. Research and develop- ment programs are financed from the operating budget of an institute or design bureau of a min- istry or from the State budget and occasionally by the Ministry of Defense. Series production costs are contracted with and paid directly by the mili- tary forces. Our most complete documentation of the R&D process concerns Soviet procedures used in the de- velopment of aircraft, cited here as an example. Although each weapons system goes through a similar R&D cycle, the detailed administrative pro- cedures used in handling its evolution vary with the type of system. During the development of a new aircraft, it is common practice within the Min- istry of Aviation Industry to form a commission responsible for making recommendations on each significant phase of the program from preliminary design through mock-up, detail design, prototype construction, and test. The commission normally is chaired by a deputy minister and includes repre- sentatives of the Ministry, the military customer, chief designers, key scientific research institutes, and representatives of other ministries that will pro- vide other subsystems and components. Mock-ups of the system are inspected by a military commis- sion for the purpose of ascertaining suitability and making recommendations to the industrial com- mission. Final tests are made by the Ministry to ensure that performance is in accordance with mili- tary customer requirements. Service operational tests are then conducted by military customer test organizations for decisions about series production and operational use. Design bureaus continue to remain responsible for design activities and modi- fications during series production of a system until it is obsolete and retired from operational service. Effective use is being made of military-related R&D resources as indicated by the steady succession of new and improved weapon systems and the large, continuing resource allocations that have been made to military product R&D facilities. Resource invest- ments for strengthening national-level scientific and technical capability are not being used as ef- ficiently as the Party and Government would like, however. Obstacles to full use of the national R&D potential include faulty management and planning, imbalance between theoretical and applied re- search, administrative barriers to the more timely Introduction of R&D achievements into production, security barriers, and the lack of interchange with East European S&T personnel. As the Soviets have become increasingly aware of the high costs of modern R&D, much concern is being expressed about devising ways to measure and improve the efficiency of R&D institutions and individual scien- tists and engineers. From the frequency with which the military R&D industries (for example, the aero- space industries) are identified as the "lead indus- try" whose management techniques and efficiency are to be emulated by other Soviet Industries, it is concluded that high-level dissatisfaction with the R&D effort is directed toward the general scientific and technical community. Some of the strengths and weaknesses of the na- tional-level S&T community are shared by the mili- tary-product R&D establishment; others are not. The features of the military-product R&D estab- lishment which set it apart from the rest of Soviet science and technology are organizational, manage- ment-related and motivational; other features which foster improved efficiency are the urgency of na- tional security demand for weaponry and the per- sistent demands of its customer, the Ministry of Defense, for quantitative and qualitative improve- ments in new generations of products. Organizational separation of R&D performers and customers and between basic and applied science has several beneficial aspects within each ministry. The clear identification of responsibilities, func- tions, and roles reduces duplication of effort; both national- and ministry-level control and administra- TOP 3 CRET lion are enhanced by the resulting dispersion of effort, and a more favorable span of control is achieved. The relative autonomy and cohesiveness of each industry or science area permit them to exercise initiative in determining the direction of R&D programs and, at the same time, result in a high degree of self-dependency in meeting customer demands. The higher level of R&D effectiveness of the mili- tary product ministries is also heavily influenced by the favored treatment received from Party/ Government decision-makers and planners in re- source allocations, higher wage levels, and prefer- ential motivational inducements. These ministrie have historically been nurtured with priority con- siderations to insure success in achieving Party and State military-related goals. Their effectiveness is frequently highlighted as an example to other ministries of the progress and capability that can be attained. In addition, their superior capabilities are occasionally used to satisfy critical gaps that arise in the non-military or consumer sector. The planning of military R&D is accomplished separately from other national-level R&D planning. This allows for identity and priority in planning the scope and direction of the nation's military R&D effort and adjustments to accommodate the highest priority projects of the defense industries. Further- more, the coordinative efforts of VPK and the supervision of high-ranking Politburo members lend the prestige and power of the Party and State to these plans to assure effective and timely imple- mentation. The majority of high-level decision-makers and managers associated with military product R&D have technical backgrounds or training which pro- vide some degree of technical expertise in R&D decision making. Their selection to positions of ministerial authority, although based in part on political suitability, is mainly the result of tech- nical and administrative competency and demon- strated professional accomplishment in their re- spective fields. Most have come up through the ranks .-nm diversified assignments and are well versed in the operations of their industry. There is little rotation of high-level managers between industries. The tenure of the ministers who bead the military-product ministries averages 13 years. Tenure is enjoyed by most ministers who have been judged successful in operating their ministry, have met prescribed Party/Government goals, and have met standards of effective use of allocated resources. Similar criteria of technical administrative compe- tency prevail for managerial personnel down to the research institute and design bureau level. Promo- tion from within is normal practice when replace- ments become necessary, thus reinforcing the con- tinuity of leadership and minimizing perturbations in R&D programs. The frequency and diversity of awards and recognition given for professional and administrative accomplishments in fields allied to areas of importance to military R&D not only illus- trate the priority emphasis devoted to the military versus non-military sector but also the powerful motivational inducement given to spur future ad- vancement and plan achievement. Several deficiencies exist which are believed to counterbalance the above strengths and, to a degree, tend to constrain progress in military R&D fields. The mechanisms for administration and program control have tended to become highly centralized and rigid and require meticulous and exhaustive bureaucratic procedures in planning at all levels. Soviet policy minimizes the use of direct R&D com- petition as an instrument for advancement of science and technology. Officially, duplication of effort in S&T is generally considered a wasteful use of re- sources, and emphasis continues on refining organi- zational responsibilities to minimize competition and resultant duplication between organizations. In practice, duplication does occur between in- dustries, science agencies, and educational insti- tutions where similar areas are being researched even though the end prooact or goal is different. Since this effort is not directly competitive, it does not effectively stimulate R&D advancement. Ad- ministrative and bureaucratic barriers also generally complicate communication channels and retard the cross-fertilization and multi-application of research effort between industries. The separation between research, design/development, and production func- tions within ministries also tends to retard rapid assimilation of new technology advancements, thus stifling innovations in R&D problem solutions. This prevails to a greater degree in the non-military product industries where less extensive working relationships appear to exist between research, de- velopment, and production elements. A concerted effort is being made to solve these problems in both military and non-military sectors. Design competition is officially sanctioned as an important element for achieving progress in the military product industries where a dynamic tech- nology environment prevails, new generations of products require performance improvements over previous ones, and competition with Western ac- complishments are important milestones in achiev- ing national and international prestige. Even here, however, degrees of specialization exist which limit the numbers and interests of competing bureaus. Emphasis on program plan fulfillment and goal achievement combined with the previously dis- cussed aspects of the Soviet environment has gen- erally resulted in minimizing risks and tends to foster conservatism in systems design and per- formance. FACILITIES The extensive Soviet investment in military R&D facilities during the past decade which has con- tributed substantially to their technological achieve- ments noted to date has also provided them with a potential for conducting future R&D programs on advanced weapon systems during the period of our forecast. The growth trends in Soviet R&D investments during the 1960s indicate that the USSR will continue to program future system de- velopments of high national priority and ensure mo- mentum in the continuous process of providing new weapon systems. Because of the time lag between R&D resource investments and returns on those investments in the form of new and im- proved systems, the full impact of the Soviet in- vestments in military R&D complexes during the 1960s has not yet been realized. As a Soviet R&D program is completed, the resources involved in the program are immediately recycled for use on new design tasks. Hence, Soviet capital resource investments to date should result in continuing hardware improvements and new developmental trends well into the mid- to late-1970s, even if the capital investment trend were stopped abruptly in the near future. in~sEreFi The Soviet Ground Forces are supported by ex- tensive RTD&E and production facilities adminis- tered by the defense-industrial ministries, particu- larly the Ministry of Defense Industry and the Ministry of Machine Building, and the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building. The Ministry of Defense Industry (Ministerstoo Oboron- noy Promyshlennosti-MOP) has the major respon- sibility for ground force weapon systems, including infantry weapons, artillery, and armored vehicles. The ministry also performs supporting R&D in the areas of fire control, optics, infrared devices, tele- communications, radar, and metallurgy. Selected components for related systems and materiel devel- opment programs are provided by the facilities of the machine building industries. Design and de- velopment of ground force systems are responsi- bilities of both independent design groups and production plant teams such as the one believed to be at Tank Plant No 183, Nizhniy Tagil. It is believed that in certain categories of weapons R&D, for example, small arms, ad hoc groups of scientists and engineers are formed to do the work. The development of a major weapon system is always a multiministerial effort, with the Ministry of Defense Industry having overall responsibility. Of the approximately 30 new designs introduced in the last 15 years, most are out of MOP, with cooperation from the Ministries of Radio Industry and Electronics Industry and the machine building ministries. Testing of MOP items is accomplished at numerous test ranges probably subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. Air Forces The R&D facilities for the Soviet Ministry of Aviation Industry (Ministerstoo Aviatsionnoy Pro- myshlennosti-MAP) have undergone rapid growth, particularly during the last decade, to meet the requirements of both military and civil air fleets. The continuing expansion of many R&D facilities combined with probable new construction activities in progress reflect an enhanced Soviet abilit , to to conduct aerodynamic developmental programs in support of systems that will become operational during the 1970s and 1980s. Most of these facilities are controlled by the Ministry of Aviation Industry and supported in the areas of specialized equip- ment and components by the R&D facilities under other ministries, for example, the Ministry of De- fense Industry. Subordinate to MAP are key avia- tion research institutes, including the Central Aero- hydrodynamics Institute; the Siberian Research Institute for Aviation; and Institute- for Aircraft Engine Construction, Aviation Materials, Aviation Technology and Organization of Production, and Flight Testing. The estimated number of S&T per- sonnel in these institutes is about 8,000 and in- creasing at an annual average rate of approximately six percent. Thirteen aerodynamic-systems design bureaus supported by nine or ten propulsion bu- reaus and eight accessory equipment bureaus are responsible, under MAP, for new and improved system and subsystems developmental programs and experimental prototype construction activities. The design bureaus are similar in size and scope to those of the major aircraft producers in the US. Professional design staffs vary in size from about 300 to 1,300 individuals, representing ap- proximately 25 to 30 percent of the total work force at each bureau. Design staff stability together with the continuity of development programs and specialization of design effort by type or class of system has created a highly skilled, experienced pool cf designers at each bureau who are well qualified to undertake increasingly complex weapon systems developmental programs. Supporting aero- nautical R&D work is also acquired through con- tract arrangements with educational institutes of the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, particularly the aviation educational in- Naval Forces The post-World War II expansion of Soviet ship- building research, development, and design fa- cilities levelled off in the late 1960s. By 1971 these facilities had attained capabilities for high-quality research. The major facilities are located in the Leningrad area and are subordinate to the Min- istry of Shipbuilding Industry. The foremost of these facilities is the Krylov Shipbuilding Research Institute (also known as the Central Scientific Research Institute No. 45), where research on hydrodynamics, ship structures, marine engineer- ing, and shipbuilding materials is conducted. The professional staff at Krylov consists of about 1,800 individuals; the total staff numbers about 3,600 individuals. A group of non-Soviet hydrodynamicists was granted a rare opportunity to visit the hydro- dynamic facilities at Krylov in 1971. It was their judgment that, while the Soviets were lagging in hydrodynamic research, the extensiveness and quality of their research facilities and the high caliber of their professional personnel have put them in a position to make considerable gains in the near future in the performance and quieting of high-speed ships. The course of research in the departments of marine engineering and ship struc- tures is less clearly discernible, but it is evident that there is a definite and continuing effort di- rected toward increasing use of automation in ship control and propulsion systems. Other research fa- cilities in the Leningrad area subordinate to the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry are the Central Scientific Research Institute of Shipbuilding Tech- nology, which is primarily concerned with the in- troduction to shipyard use of new techniques de- veloped through research; and the Central Scientific Research Institute No 48, which works on naval metallurgical developments. A distinctive organi- zation is the Central Design Bureau for Naval Standards which approves new designs and ma- terials for the entire Shipbuilding Ministry after testing them for general use. The Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry has cen- tral design bureaus for the design of cruisers, sub- marines, coastal patrol craft, minesweepers, and other types of ships. It also has specialized design bureaus like the submarine propulsion Special De- sign Bureau No 143 and the Special Design Bureau for Boilers. Naval designers inclide such Soviet prize winners as D. Ye. Brill (naval ordnance), Z. A. Deribin (submarine design), and G. A. Oglobin (naval turbines). In addition to work carried out under the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, research of interest to the Soviet Navy is done at facilities subordinate to the Ministries of the Defense Industry, Electronics Industry, and Aviation Industry, Radio Industry, Medium Ma- chine Building, and General Machine Building. Supporting R&D is also conducted by such educa- tional institutions of the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education as the Leningrad TOP S CRET Shipbuilding Institute and the Nikolayev Ship- building Institute. Although Soviet naval research is concentrated in the Leningrad area, there are several naval research facilities in Moscow, such as the Scientific Research Institute No. 10 (fire control and missile guidance) and the Marine Scientific Research Institute No. 1 (electronics of fire control). Also of particular note is the Institute of Hydromechanics. Several prolific research workers of the Krylov Institute have been trans- ferred to this institute, and the new Director, G. V. Logvinovich, came from the Central Aerohydro- dynamics Institute in Moscow. The Institute's work tends to be theoretical and appears to complement the engineering-oriented efforts at Krylov. Its prin- cipal areas of effort are boundary layer control studies, the hydrodynamics of foils and lifting sur- faces near a plane surface, reactive propulsion systems, underwater rockets, and s,irface effect ve- hicles. The Institute of Hydromechanics also par- ticipates in an inter-institute program of hydro- bionics. Missiles and space The Ministry of General Machine Building (Ministerstvo Obskhestvennogo Mashinostroyenia- MOM) was created in 1965 and reportedly assigned the responsibility for the research, design, develop- ment, test, and production of ballistic missiles and space hardware, formerly the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense Industry and to a limited ex- tent the Ministry of Aviation Industry. The crea- tion of MOM probably resulted in the transfer of certain facilities from the Ministry of Defense In- dustry, the Ministry of Aviation Industry, and various defense-related ministries with the pro- vision of continued R&D support from these min- istries. Surface-to-air missiles and cruise missiles are developed and produced by the Ministry of Aviation Industry with support from the Ministry of General Machine Building. The Ministry of De- fense Industry develops and produces tactical and unguided rockets. Some of the research institutes and design bureaus under the Ministry of General Machine Building which support the Soviet bal- listic missile and space hardware programs have been identified. Known facilities have experienced a significant growth pattern in terms of physical resource investment. Major gaps still exist in our knowledge of several elements of the inustry, par- ticularly the design bureaus responsible for naval ballistic missiles and solid-propellant missiles. About 40 major facilities for research, development, test, and production of liquid- and solid-propellant missile/space launch systems and their components have been identified, however. In addition, the Ministry of General Machine Building receives con- siderable design support from the Ministry of Avia- tion and other industries. Some of the same facilities have also furnished the basic hardware for the Soviet space explora- tion program. The Ministry of General Machine Building has designed and developed space launch vehicles and space payloads, while the Tomilino Research and Development Complex of the Min- istry of Aviation Industry has apparently been the focal point for the design and development of manned space flight systems. Training facilities include a center in the Shchelkovo-Monion area near Moscow and the Zhukovskiy Air Military En- gineering Academy, where the cosmonauts receive their academic training. Adjacent to this academy is the Air Force Scientific Research Testing In- stitute for Aviation and Space Medicine, where much of the basic physiological R&D of manned space flight systems has been performed. Facilities of the Ministry of Health have provided R&D sup- port to the Tomilino Design Bureau and the In- stitute for Aviation and Space Medicine. The flight test activities under the Ministry of General Machine iuilding occur at three test range complexes: Kapustin Yar (vertical space probes and up through MR/IRBM-class ballistic missiles), Tyuratam (ICBMs and space) and Plesetsk (ICBMs and space). The large number of test launches that have occurred from these three complexes suggests that there has been a continuing increase in the number of launch sites available for flight test developmental programs for new Soviet mis- sile/space systems. Supporting research As indicated above, most of the Soviet military R&D effort is undertaken by facilities subordinate to defense-industrial ministries. Supporting R&D effort of a limited, specialized nature, however, is conducted by a number of other ministries and agencies, including industrial ministries, the Min- istry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Educa- tion, and Academy of Sciences institutes having specialized capabilities or facilities either not avail. able within the defense-industrial ministries or con- sidered necessary to augment or expedite existing research projects. Although this supporting re. search effort is well diversified and significant, it is not extensive. Several factors limit the R&D potential of these sources. Since the supporting activity is acquired directly through contract ar- rangements, it is generally of a problem-solving or short-term nature. Communications problems and administrative barriers to interaction limit the direction and applicability of research programs conducted independently by these agencies. The tendency for the defense-industrial ministries as well as all agencies in general to guard closely the R&D prerogatives of their assigned charter and maintain a posture of self-reliance is another major impediment. Some research conducted by the Academy of Sciences, USSR, has been of direct value to the armed services, and specific military-related re- search projects have been assigned to its leading research institutes. The academy has over 200 sub- ordinate institutes, observatories, and laboratories, employing over 30,000 scientists and a total staff of nearly 70,000. The Academy of Sciences has ex- panded in recent years with facilities being located in remote regions. Two new science centers were established in 1971, the Far East Science Center and the Urals Science Center. The purpose of these centers is to provide a focal point for the develop- ment of the natural resources of the area in which they are located. In addition, the republic academies have recently begun to establish science centers. Also the Soviets are continuing to expand their science city program that was begun in 1958. With 18 research institutes and a university, Novosibirsk is the most prominent of the science cities. A satel- lite city consisting of scientific research institutes and design bureaus has been established a short distance from Novosibirsk. By establishing the satellite city near the science city, the Soviets hope to reduce the time between research and produc- tion. The satellite city is only one of many pro- grams undertaken by the Soviets to bridge the gap between science and production. Another sci- FT ence city which is being developed is at Krasnaya Pakhra, near Moscow, where several institutes of the Academy of Sciences, USSR, and a facility of the Institute of Atomic Energy imeni Kurchatov, are located; these organizations are known to be engaged in military and space R&D. The center is expected to grow to accommodate a population of 40,000 to 50,000. The national and republic academies of the Academy of Sciences are undertaking more applied research projects. This will result in a greater im- pact of their contribution on the national economy. Some of the areas of scientific research which fall under the purview of the academy system and which have military significance include geo- magnetism, ionospheric studies, solar physics, acous- tics, communications, ocean science, and outer space. In many of these areas, institutes of the academies are working on specific projects for the Ministry of Defense. Another source of great potential for conducting scientific research relevant to military R&D are the schools of higher education (Vyssheye Ucheb- noye Zavedeniye-VUZ. A large share of the S&T trained manpower employed in higher education has in the past devoted its efforts primarily to teaching rather than to conducting research. Dur- ing the last 15 years, the Soviet Government has stressed the need for increasing the quantity and improving the quality of research in these schools. They have been called upon to intensify research on theoretical and experimental projects essential to the development of science and industry. More than 80 Problem Laboratories at leading VUZs have been established. Laboratory staffs are being increased and teaching duties lightened or re- moved, permitting more research to be done on selected problems in such areas as radiochemistry, nuclear physics, electronics, transistors, and com- puters. The facilities of most VUZ laboratories now appear to be adequate for research needs, and a few are equal or superior to those of most US uni- versities. In a few cases, the best and most ad- vanced research equipment is located at a VUZ rather than at an Academy of Sciences institute. In spite of the increase and improvement in VUZ research, this source will continue to play less of a role in the USSR than higher educational insti- tutions do in the US. MANPOWER No statistics are available on the numbers of sci- entists and engineers engaged in Soviet military R&D. It is possible, however, to indicate the size and the range of skills of the national scientific- engineering manpower pool available for employ- ment in such R&D programs. In asmuch as military R&D receives the highest national priority, the re- quired numbers of scientists and engineers could be diverted from lower priority programs to man these programs. There is no evidence that the avail- ability of qualified professional scientific and tech- nical manpower has constrained Soviet miiitary- product R&D. The best guage of the Soviet commitment to the rapid establishment of a research and development base for its industrial and military power is the increasing amounts of human resources involved in R&D. In 1950, the nation employed 714,000 blue and white collar workers in the "Science and Science Service" work force. This was about 1.8 percent of the total Soviet work force. By 1972 this same force had grown to 3,500,000 people, almost a five-fold increase in 22 years, and accounted for 3.5 percent of the total work force. Of this number, 635,000 full-time equivalent natural scientists and engineers were engaged in R&D. The USSR has given top priority to the training of engineers. Although the nation already employs twice as many engineers as the US, Soviet higher schools are still graduating five engineers for every engineer graduated in the US. In 1970, 227,000 graduating students were in fields considered to be engineering fields in the US. The number of en- gineering graduates was over two times greater than in 1955 and comprised .36.0 percent of the 1969 graduating class in contrast to about 28 per- cent of the class of 1955. In the natural sciences, however, the US is graduating two scientists for every natural scientist graduated in the USSR. The total number of natural scientists and engineers graduated annually in the Soviet Union is about twice the number of US graduates in these fields. Soviet planners articipate a large unsatisfied de- mand for engineers throughout the economy and particularly in consumer goods industries. The So- viet emphasis on the training of engineers is ex- TOP CRET Tfl0.5GfQFT pected to strengthen further the relative industrial and scientific potential of the Soviet Union. In the last decade the general quality of higher educa- tion in the USSR has been lowered somewhat, due mainly to the increase in part-time education. Other causes include an increase in the student-teacher ratio (faculty growth has not kept pace with en- rollment growth) and a trend toward lower state expenditures per student, although increasing amounts have been spent annually on higher edu- cation. In addition, inadequate classroom and lab- oratory space has affected the quality of education. The number of persons in the USSR holding ad- vanced degrees at the end of 1972 was over 290,000. Of this number, about 218,000 held scientific or technical advanced degrees: Physics and mathematics 30,230 Chemical sciences ....................... 17,164 Biological sciences ....................... 22,340 Technical sciences ....................... 81,786 Medical and pharmaceutical sciences ........ 38,254 Total ................................ 218,029 The Soviet advantage of having such a vast body of trained manpower has been neutralized some- what by ineffective use of that manpower. For example, as many as one-third of all engineers may be engaged in positions for which engineering training is not a necessary prerequisite. We do not know the extent to which poor manpower utilization affects military R&D, but we believe that utiliza- tion of trained personnel within the military sector is probably more effective than the utilization of such personnel generally in the USSR. The Soviets seek out and attract the top scientific and engineer- ing graduates to positions within the military R&D organizations which generally carry more prestige than their civilian counterparts. The highly spe- cialized training received by these graduates, who are acquired largely from a relatively concentrated nucleus of educational institutes having close ties with the defense irdustrial ministries, results in minimum retraining and expedites their utilization upon assignment. Workers in the military R&D organizations are provided superior laboratories and other facilities, better opportunities for advance- ment, and housing preferences. MISSILE SYSTEMS Offensive ballistic missiles The Soviets have been conducting R&D pro- grams on strategic missile systems for over 20 years. During the past 10 years the USSR has deve ope several new ICBM systems and deployed three of these. In the late 1960s their ICBM development generally was confined to modi- fications of and improvements to the SS-9, SS-11, and SS-13 systems. These have included the alter- ing of the size and shape of reentry vehicles and development of multiple RV systems and penetra- The large and varied ICBM force developed by the Soviets has been based almost exclusively on liquid propellant technology. As did the US, they began with liquid oxygen as an oxidizer and prog- ressed to storable liquids to improve missile re- action time and ease of handling. Recent ballistic missiles using liquid propellants (the SS-9, SS-11, SS-N-6, and SS-NX-8) are believed to employ a nitrogen-based oxidizer with an amine fuel. This propellant combination provides the highest energy of all common or "conventional" storable propel- lants. We do not know of any Soviet program to develop more advanced propellants for ballistic missiles, but the level of technology and state-of- the-art in this field are sufficient to permit such development if so desired. The most likely improve- ment in propellant performance would result from employing additives in conventional propellants. The use of "exotic" propellants such as fluorine is not expected because they greatly increase the toxicity and handling problems associated with a deployed missile force. Such propellants, however, will be used in the space program. Soviet liquid-propellant rocket-engine designers pioneered in two areas of technology-throttleable engines and high-chamber pressures. The guidance philosophy of these designers required the use of thrust control even on early ballistic missiles, and chamber pressures of about 1,000 psi were being used in the USSR before such pressures were used in the US. Evidence obtained from exhibits at the Paris Air Show indicates that the Soviets have stressed ease of fabrication, use of standard mate- rials, and relatively simple and rugged design con- cepts for reliability. For the most part, Soviet bal- listic missile propulsion systems have proven to be extremely reliable by the time the missile is ready for deployment. The Soviets will very likely continue their broad spectrum of ballistic missile R&D for the foresee- able future. They are likely to concentrate on those areas of technology in which they lag the US, such as the MIRVs. TOP ITCRET Tap,sEGRET Mmv sYSTEM-The Soviets have developed multi- ple reentry vehicles (MRVs) for the SS-9 and SS-11. They are not independently targetable, however, and apparently were developed to attack ABM- defended soft targets. The USSR probably will de- velop multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) systems for their ICBMs and pos- sibly for future SLBMs, as well. To date no testing of MIRVs has been identified. Some of these sys- tems probably will be accurate enough to provide a capability to attack hard targets. Increasing the number of available RVs by means of MIRVs would also be useful for penetrating ABM defenses and for enhancing the retaliatory capabilities of ICBMs surviving a pre-emptive attack. There have been various indications, some quite explicit, that the Soviets regard this as an important area of strategic weaponry in which they have need-for political, as well as military reasons-to catch up with the US. SOLm1-PROPELLANT sxsTEMS-Their large capacity for manufacturing solid propellants suggests that the Soviets have intended to stress the development of solid-propellant ballistic missiles. Moreover, sev- eral vehicles have been displayed in Moscow pa- rades that have been described by the Soviets as using solid propellants. Two of these, the three- stage SS-13 ICBM and the SS-14 MRBM (which is made up of the upper two stages of the SS-13), flight tested, and only a limited number of SS-13s are deployed. Solid-propellant missiles have some unique advantages-such as ease of handling and simplicity of construction-but they require strin- gent environmental controls and do not lend them- selves to the original guidance concept used in So- viet liquid-propellant missiles. Why the Soviets have not pursued development of solid-propellant ballistic missiles more inten- sively is not known. REENTRY vE me z..ES--The Soviet employment in the last few years of higher ballistic coefficients and multiple RVs shows an increased aware, e. s of ABM penetration problems. Exoatmospheric decoys and multiple reentry vehicles have been tested and experiments may have been conducted with other pen aids. The development of decoys or chaff is judged to be within the Soviet capabilities, however, and could become evident in future R&D programs. There is no firm evidence that Soviet RVs are hardened to withstand nuclear effects. In past test programs the Soviets have gained considerable ex- perience with blast and thermal effects, and harden- ing is implied by the relatively close spacing of the three RVs on the SS-11 Mod 3 and on the SS-9 Mod 4. Without hardening the RVs would not represent separate targets to the present Spartan ABM. There also is a considerable number of technical publica- tions devoted to technology that could be applied to RV hardening. On balance, therefore, we judge that Soviet RVs are hardened to a few hundred calories per cm2. Efforts to increase this hardness are likely to continue. Also, the Soviets can be ex- pected to develop high ballistic coefficients (1,000- 1,500 psf) on future RVs for increased penetrability against US defenses. Defensive missiles Soviet defensive missile development and testing have been accomplished at the Kapustin Yar, Emba, and Sary Shagan test ranges. The testing of the prototypes for the SA-1, SA-2, and SA-3 systems was accomplished at the Kapustin Yar range. The Emba test range was constructed between 1960 and 1962 to support the development of tactical defen- sive missile systems. The systems identified to date at that range are the SA-4 (Ganef), the SA-6 (Gainful), the SA-7 (Grail), and the SA-X-8. The Sary Shagan Missile Test Range is the most exten- sive of the Soviet defensive missile test ranges and is the site of the SA-5 and ABM developments as well as modifications to the SA-2. Construction started at that facility between 1953 and 1950, and it is now the most heavily instrumented test range in the world. ABM-Since the late 1950s, the Soviets have had a major ABM R&D program under way at the Sary Shagan Missile Test Center (SSMTC). The pro- gram has consisted of the development and testing of ABM radars and missile subsystems. R&D models or prototypes for each of the Moscow ABM Sys- tem components-Dog House, Chekhov and Try Add radars and the Galosh ABM interceptor-first appeared at Sary Shagan, as has a prototype of the Hen House radars which provide early warning support to the system. Current activities relate to the development of new ABM systems as well as to the improvement of the existing system. Under the terms of the ABM agreement, the Soviets are al- lowed to continue their ABM research and develop- ment effort at Sary Shagan. During the past nine years the Soviets have in- stalled the Moscow ABM system and a ballistic missile early warning system on the periphery of Under the terms of the ABM agreement, only 100 interceptors on launchers are allowed, and the development of a rapid reload capability is not permitted. TOP Developmental research addressing all facets of Vulnerability to nuclear blackout and in- ability to discriminate RVs from penetration aids are limitations which undoubtedly will be addressed. Present radar technology prohibits "seeing" through the fireball associated with a nuclear burst. Even propagation through nearby regions, such as those below the fireball as it rises, is distorted. Signal paths are refracted so that tracking accuracies are degraded and the signals themselves are attenuated. Signal attenuation and path refraction are reduced somewhat as operating frequencies are increased, however. Thus, the development of radars with capabilities similar to those associated with the Moscow ABM system but which operate at higher frequencies might be expected. Other approaches which might prove equally effective include the development of effective non-nuclear interceptor warheads (or at least "cleaner" nuclear warheads) or development of a firing doctrine or radar de- ployment pattern which would minimize the pos- sibility of a nuclear burst occurring in front of all radars simultaneously (that is, some radars would always be capable of "seeing" behind all sections of the battle space). Improved radar technology which would permit Soviet development of a high resolution radar in the near future could result in a capability to dis- criminate actual reentry vehicles from accompany- ing penetration aids. But the cost effectiveness of such an effort is questionable. An enormous com- puter capacity is required and only a slight modifi- cation of existing penetration aids would nullify any capability which might be developed. Other ap- proaches are considered more likely. For example, development of optical devices, lasers, and LWIR TOP SE RET sensors (although hampered by a necessity to oper- ate in relatively clear air mass conditions) might prove more fruitful. Hardware employing such tech- nolosty has yet to be deployed The use of nuclear weaponry or atmospheric filtering to disperse penetration aids and, thus, enable present radars to acquire and track a re- entry vehicle can also be considered as a means of providing discrimination. Employment of nu- clear weapons, although effective, presents a nu- clear blackout problem and, hence, probably would not be pursued unless the vulnerability of the system to blackout were reduced. Atmospheric filtering probably is the simplest, most reliable means of providing discrimination. Because the "filtering" occurs shortly before re- entry vehicle detonation, however, a very high acceleration interceptor is required for this means to be effective. Although development of such an interceptor apparently is not under way in the USSR, it is expected. The ABM Treaty allows for the deployment of ABMs for defense of ICBM silos. An ABM system for this purpose would almost certainly employ a high acceleration in- terceptor. In fact, during the SALT discussions, the Soviets stated that their ICBM defense system would be short range and employ an interceptor like the US Sprint. Soviet research related to the development of entirely different concepts which would improve their defense against ballistic missiles can also be expected. For example, an air or spaceborne laser ABM system could be developed if the Soviets could obtain laser output powers ranging from 100 to 1,000 Mw directed with pointing and track- ing accuracies of approximately 5 microradians at ranges of 20 to 40 km. Deployment of such systems under the present ABM Treaty, however, would be prohibited without prior consultation. On the other hand, deployment of early warning sensors, for example, synchronous satellites with sophisti- cated sensor systems, is not prohibited and prob- ably will be pursued. SURFACE-To--m missn.s-The Soviet SAM R&D program has resulted in the widely deployed PVO Strany systems (SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5), an entire family of tactical SAMs (SA-4, SA-6, SA-7, and the SA-X-8 presently under development), and systems for naval defense (including the SA-N-1, SA-N-3 and SA-N-4). The systems have for the most part been designed to counter a specific threat or a facet of an expected new threat. To do this, the Soviets have been content to develop and deploy as soon as possible a system of limited capability to counter an existing threat, and more satisfactory solutions to supplement the initial ca- pability are developed as soon as possible. The importance of the concept of mobility in Soviet air defenses has also been evident. The SAMs began with the permanent fixed sites of the SA-1, then progressed to the road-transportable SA-2 and SA-3 systems, and finally to the cross-country mobile SA-4 and SA-6 systems. In the past, Soviet SAM system engineers have shown a tendency to employ similar fundamental concepts in the various systems. For example, the SA-1, SA-2, SA-3 and SA-N-1 are similar in that they are command guided and employ pulse-type fire-control radars which use a track-while-scan technique. More recently, however, different con- cepts have been employed. For example, the SA-5 system uses homing-type guidance and a CW fire- control radar, the Square Pair. The present Soviet SAM system inventory is quite diverse. It ;:icludes long-range, radar-guided weapons (for example, the SA-5 missile), as well as a man-launched, short-range weapon that uses infrared homing (the SA-7). Also, SAMs capable of attacking high performance aircraft flying at both very high and very low altitudes are avail- able. For example, the SA-2 and SA-5 systems prob- ably can engage targets flying at altitudes of 80,000 to 90,000 feet. The SA-3, SA-8 and probably the principal naval SAMs can engage targets at 300 feet, possibly down to 150 feet, under favorable conditions. To improve a system's capabilities and to en- hance its usable life, the Soviets have undertaken extensive modification programs. The SA-2 sys- tem has been continually improved through field modification and follow-on systems. Development of the Fan Song E engagement radar and its asso- ciated Guideline missiles has provided the SA-2 system with an improved high- and low-altitude, high-speed intercept capability, and an increased ECCM capability. The SA-2 system is limited, how- ever, against high-speed (Mach 3), very high alti- tude targets. These limitations may have been overcome with the deployment of the SA-5 system. The low-altitude limitations of the SA-2 system are believed to have decreased with the develop- ment of the SA-2F (Fan Song F, and Guideline Mod 5 combination). This modification also pro- vides an increased ECCM capability. The SA-3 system, designed for low-altitude intercepts, has also undergone modifications to improve its capability. Soviet requirements for a mobile field force SAM system resulted in the development of the SA-4 and SA-6 systems. While the SA-4 provides the increased mobility desired, its low-altitude capa- bility is considered poor. The SA-6 is believed to be the low-altitude complement to the SA-4. These systems are not well known, and uncertainty exists as to their guidance, maximum range, and altitude. The SA-4 system has been noted in exercises where sin at fe' ti( Tl le: fe simulated target destructions have been reported at altitudes between approximately 1,300 and 41,000 feet. Target distances reported at times of destruc- tion have varied between about 6 nm and 43 nm. These figures represent extremes; the more preva- lent altitude and range figures are 3,500 to 35,000 feet and 13 to 25 nm, respectively. Soviet designers of future naval SAM missile systems could consider two new systems having increased range. The first would be a medium- range replacement for the SA-N-1 system, and the second could be a longer range system. It is be- lieved that the Soviets could build either or both of these types. An improved version of the SA-N-3 system possibly would meet an SA-N-1 replace- ment requirement. The longer range SAM system would likely be designed to operate at ranges of 50 to 100 nm and probably would use homing guidance for the terminal portion of the missile flight. It would appear, however, that for the pres- ent and immediate future, providing adequate point defense is a more achievable goal than providing area defense for Soviet ship formations. While the total Soviet SAM force represents a formidable deterrent to the penetration of Soviet air space in the vicinity of targets of strategic importance, it has several major deficiencies. These include long reaction times, vulnerability to elec- tronic countermeasures (ECM) and an inability to cope effectively with aircraft flying at very low altitudes. The reaction time problem is expected to be alleviated by the introduction of additional automatic equipment to SAM batteries and more expensive use of improved command-coordination- The vulnerability of Soviet SAM systems to elec- tronic countermeasures is being reduced to some degree by the employment of straight forward tech- niques which include the use of frequency diverse radars, such as the SA-N-3/Head Lights, and the addition of optical and electro-optical trackers to the SAM system fire-control radars. More emphasis on sophisticated electronic counter-countermeasure techniques is expected to be reflected in the newer SAM systems and in those to be developed. capability probably could a provided with im- proved acquisition and fire-control radars and im- proved proximity fuses. These improvements will provide far more efficient operation in a clutter- environment. Some future Soviet low-altitude SAM systems may employ pulse doppler radar equip- ment which exhibits improved inherent low-altitude tracking performance. Other future improvements might include the development of multipurpose radars that can per- form all of the required SAM system radar func- tions, that is, target acquisition, target tracking, missile tracking and missile command, and require computer-controlled subsystems including some type of scan-agile antenna. In addition, we esti- mate that most shoat-range Soviet SAM radars will eventually include electro-optical trackers to com- plement the primary tracker. These improvements are predicated to a great extent upon the capa- bility and willingness of the Soviets to devote a significant R&D effort to the development of fun- damental radar components and subsystems, espe- cially in relation to the automation of systems. Antiship cruise missiles The Soviets recognized the potential of antiship cruise missiles as early as 1947 as a means of countering Western naval strike forces. Soviet de- velopmental programs have resulted in an impres- sive family of cruise missile systems. Operational systems include five air-to-surface cruise missiles and eleven surface-to-surface cruise missiles (or modifications) launched from major surface com- batants, patrol craft, and submarines. The design and development of new cruise missile systems generally have proceeded concurrently with the development and deployment of a new type or class of launch platform or the modification of an earlier design. The driving force behind Soviet antiship cruise missile development program may be attributed to the relative inferiority of their surface naval forces to those of the US. In particular, the growing strength of the US attack carrier (CVA) force after World War II was a serious threat to the USSR. As the CVA threat evolved in terms of in- creasing numbers as well as sophistication, the Soviet ASCM development program also proceeded in an evolutionary way. Changes in recent years have included increased standoff range, supersonic cruise velocity, electronic counter-countermeasure (ECCM) features in the guidance systems, and greater numbers of cruise missiles per launch plat- form. The significant advance in capability rep- resented by the SS-N-7-the use of an underwater launch platform (C-class SSGN)-introduced the element of possible surprise. Soviet systems reflect sound design concepts and the use of proven tech- nology. Their high explosives warheads have been demonstrated under actual operating condition Soviet ASCM research and development will con- tinue to be directed toward correcting limitations and improving the effectiveness of systems against the CVA threat. Limitations inherent in present systems include: (i) targeting that requires a for- ward observer or trailer, or exposes the launch plat- form; (ii) cruise missile designs that limit the number of missiles carried by a launch platform; (iii) current standoff range that may leave the launch platform vulnerable to attack; (iv) non- autonomous cruise missile guidance systems; (v) large radar cross-sections; and (vi) ship and sub- marine launch platforms that are not compatible with the need for quick reaction. TARGETING sysrEM-Presently recognized limita- tions of the ASCM system may result in a reduction of its effectiveness in an engagement with a CVA task force. Targeting requirements for the SS-N-3, which constitutes a significant fraction of the total deployed cruise missile force, can be satisfied by surveillance aircraft, by a tattle-tale trailing ship or by use of a target-marking cruise missile. Sur- veillance aircraft play a vital role in providing to the launcher either a plan position indicator (PPI) presentation or the coordinate location of the CVA task force, but surveillance aircraft may serve to alert the targeted task force, allowing protective measures to be taken. Similarly, a tattle-tale trailing ship could be prevented from maintaining close proximity to the task force. Thus the necessary targeting information could be denied to a missile launch platform. Targeting also could be done directly from the launch platform, but aircraft and surface ship launch platforms would expose themselves to the intended target and thus become vulnerable to CVA task force counteraction prior to cruise missile launching. A submerged submarine using sonar could detect a CVA task force but would have difficulty in identifying the elements within it to aid the cruise missile in target discrimination. The greatest advance in targeting capability could come from the development of a global sur- veillance network. This network might rely on a set of orbiting satellites with real-time read out for providing targeting information to antiship cruise missile launch platforms. Among the prob- lems to be solved are those of target resolution and timeliness of data interpretation. Such a sys- tem, if developed and deployed, would eliminate some of the deficiencies of the present targeting methods. Multiple sensors covering the optical, microwave, and IR spectrum could be employed for an all-weather, day or night capability. Major advances in technology would not be required for TO SECRET this development. Most of the required develop- ment has already been demonstrated in Soviet satellite programs. attssitzFurther research and development ad- vances are possible in antiship cruise missile design which would minimize current limitations. The most serious of the latter may be the limited fire- power of individual launch platforms, especially that of the airborne platforms. Because of the large size of current operational cruise missiles, the launch platform is constrained by weight or volume considerations to carry only a few cruise missiles. By emphasizing high subsonic aerodynamics and modern structural concepts the size and weight of the ASCM could be significantly reduced without impairing its effectiveness against CVAs. Conse. quently, the number of missiles carried by a launch platform could be significantly increased. Designing for high supersonic cruise speeds does not appear necessary (or even desirable) High speed supersonic flight exacts a weight pen- alty which is proportional to the square of Mach number for a given flight time. Such a penalty would discourage the development of small cruise missiles for high speed supersonic flight. Small turbojet engine development would be required for compatibility with a reduced air-frame size and lower drag. Such a turbojet would pro- duce a thrust of approximately 500 lbs, weigh about 50 lbs, and project a small frontal area. Current Soviet capability in aircraft turbojet design and development is good by US standards. There is no fundamental technical reason why the Soviets could not develop a small turbojet engine for a cruise missile. An increase in the maximum standoff range would be beneficial, either to reduce the pre-launch vulnerability of the launch platform or to provide additional flexibility to the ASCM force. In keeping with a requirement for smaller antiship cruise mis- siles and, hence, increased firepower of the launch platform, normal standoff range could be increased as much as percent by using high density hydro- carbon fuels h greater increase could be o t ed by use of exotic fuels TON.SECRET Although development of high density hydro- carbon fuel and its use by turbojet engines would be neither difficult nor risky to undertake, the development of exotic, higher energy fuels, such and associated turbojet engines would be much riskier. Hence, the Soviets most likely would choose the less difficult and least risky fuel and engine development for their next genera- tion of antiship cruise missiles. As the ASCM is reduced in size and weight without a reduction in effectiveness, further bene. fits will accrue. One such benefit is a reduction in the radar cross-section of the cruise missile. A smaller radar cross-section reduces the range at which a defensive system search radar can sepa- rate signals from clutter to classify an attacking cruise missile. Reducing the detection range strains the defense by requiring extremely short reaction times to cope with the threat. Further reduction in the frontal aspect of radar cross-section could be obtained through the use of radar absorbing material (RAM) on the engine inlet surfaces and other areas where sharp contours exist. Available evidence indicates the Soviets are already employing RAM in their interceptor air- craft to reduce spurious radiations in their radomes. Through their writings they display an understand- ing of the principles of engine inlet cross-section reduction using RAM. Also, by utilizing non- resonant structural design techniques, the cross- section of an ASCM at L and S bands could be significantly reduced. To maintain the terminal accuracy required when an HE warhead is used, homing guidance will con- tinue to be preferred. Homing sensor operation at higher radio frequencies, such as J band, will con- tinue to be favored. of radar seek, rs could negate the icial effects of cross-sect.on reduction mentioned earlier. Con- sequently, other homing sensors operating in the optical and infrared spectrum also may be devel- oped for future cruise missile designs. Although these homing sensors will not permit all-weather operation, the problem of increased radar detect- ability will not occur as when radar homing sensors are employed. To complicate further the problems of the de- fense, a Soviet cruise missile attacking force imple- mented with a variety of homing sensors could be deployed. In addition to the types of sensors al- ready mentioned, the inclusion of an anti-radiation missile (ARM) capability in an attacking force would further complicate the defense of a CVA task force. Such developments are considered to be extremely likely for the next generation of cruise missiles. To cope with employment of potential electronic countermeasures (ECM) by the defense, cruise mis- sile homing sensors could be designed to have fre- quency agility, to home on jamming, and to track the leading edge of a pulse. These capabilities offer some protection against ECM, but development in this area will be dictated strongly by the concept of action and reaction and, hence, will be a con- tinuing process. As a hedge against successful ECM application by the defense, the Soviets may develop non-homing guidance techniques. The combination of inertial guidance and a small nuclear warhead payload could insure a high probability of kill against a CVA task force. Many potential problem areas pecu- liar to homing cruise missile development such as susceptibility to ECM, increased radar detectabil- ity when radar terminal homing sensors are used, weather restrictions, high value target discrimina- tion, and launch platform survivability simply dis- appear from serious consideration. Technology for the development of inertial guidance is already on hand. Nuclear warheads compatible with the re- quirements of the cruise missile are within the capa- bility of Soviet development. Evasive terminal maneuvers by the cruise missile could reduce the effectiveness of CVA defenses. The cruise missile could be designed to be respon- sive to random programmed commands and have the structural strength compatible with the imposed aerodynamic loads. This capability poses no special problems for Soviet development. LAUNCH rLATFonr s-Certain developments which would be compatible with the next generation of cruise missile designs could be undertaken with the objective of increasing the firepower and respon- TOP SECRET siveness of individual launch platforms. For air- launched cruise missile platforms, possible modifi- cations to current airplane platforms would permit an increase in the number of cruise missiles carried externally. New airplane designs could permit in- ternal stowage as well as external stowage of cruise missiles. Airplanes have the very desirable capabil- ity for responding faster than any other platform to any part of the ocean where a targeted CVA may be located. Therefore, future development of airplane platforms may be emphasized. For surface ship launch platforms, attainment of a rapid reload capability may be more effective than increasing the number of cruise missile launch tubes. With smaller and lighter weight cruise mis- siles possible, some difficult problems associated with the design of a rapid reloading missile launcher could be avoided. For submarine launch platforms providing an underwater launch capability, Soviet development programs could increase either the number of cruise missile launch tubes per sub- marine or the number of cruise missiles per launch tube. Another alternative would be to provide a capability to launch a cruise missile from the tor- pedo tubes of a submarine. The technology required for these developments is believed to be currently available to the Soviets, but direct evidence of such developments is lacking. Air-to-air missiles The Soviets have five basic operational AAM systems: the AA-1 beam rider; the AA-2, the AA-3, the AA-5, and the AA-6, which were all produced in infrared and semi-active radar guidance ver- sions. The AA-1 and AA-2 are limited to rear hemi- sphere attacks, while the AA-3 can be used in either a rear hemisphere or direct head-on attack. The AA-5 and the AA-6 are believed to have a 360-degree attack capability. The AA-6 became operational on the Foxbat in 1970. Its maximum launch range for head-on attack is believed to be limited by the 25-nm semi-active guidance lock-on capability. 1-1c mramr- to-air missiles Tactical air-to-surface missiles The first Soviet tactical ASM, the AS-7, is op- erational. Prior to identification of the AS-7, the only fighter-launched guided missiles used in an air-to-ground role were the AA-1 and AA-2 air- siles shows weapon performance tailored to the bomber threat and matched to the airborne radar capability of the carrier aircraft and Soviet GCI tactics. In general there exists a family of weapons capable of destroying targets in the medium- to high-altitude regimes from head-on or tail attack positions in all weather conditions. None of these missiles have the capabilities required for low- speed, low-altitude engagement in a ground clutter environment. Soviet requirements for the near f+:ture indicate the development of a new short-range missile with decreased minimum launch range, high maneuver- ability and good low- to medium-altitude capability for use against low-altitude penetrators and ma- neuvering targets. Such a missile could probably be developed using current state-of-the-art tech- nology for all major components and could appear by the mid-1970s. If the Soviets develop the postulated advanced long-range all weather interceptor (ALRAWI) for the 1980 time period, there would be a need for another missile development. A new, long-range missile is projected for this aircraft. The missile would be expected to incorporate improved pack- aging techniques and be of such size that it can be carried internally. A boost-sustain solid-propel lant propulsion system and command midcourse guidance with terminal homing are expected to be used. The postulated track capability of the ALRAWI's radar limits the head-on attack launch range to a maximum of 45 nm. Soviet AAM development has been consistent and each new model introduced into service has re- flected advances in technology. Continued develop- ment in guidance, propulsion, and fusing is ex- pected along with new materials having improved thermal characteristics and new packaging tech- niques which minimize component weight and volume and provide increased reliability under high-g loads and high temperatures. We would expect future developments to be the result of consistent and methodical R&D efforts. TOPECRETI although attacks in dives up to 45 degrees are con- sidered possible. The maximum launch range is about 6 nm with the normal operational launch ranges being 2 to 4 nm. With the beam-rider guid- ance system, the pilot is required to track the target in the dive until missile impact. Tactical ASMs bad been recognized as a Soviet uirement for many Years. Detection of the AS-7 re q the development of such a missile. In addition to the AS-7, there is evidence of a new tactical ASM under development. Additional weapons will be developed and will probably use laser, passive electro-optical, and infrared guidance systems. MILITARY SPACE The USSR continues to emphasize military uses of space. During 1970-71 sixty percent of all Soviet space launches had military objectives, mainly re- connaissance, and another 25 percent were for combined military and civil purposes (communi- cations, navigation, and meteorology). The Soviet space effort contains active R&D programs intended to meet military requirements. The Soviets appear to be developing an orbiting interceptor for the purpose of engaging satellites and have the poten- tial to develop a multiple orbit bombardment sys- tem (MOBS). The Soviets may research and de- velop the MOBS concept over the next few years. Improvements over current space systems, for ex- ample, a reliable, secure command link and guid- ance package, would be required, but the tech- noloyv is believed to be available in the USSR. The limited military utility of MOBS makes it unlikely, however, that it would be deployed in space in de- fian-,?e of existing international agreements. The SAL agreement probably has generated a Soviet requirement ? to upgrade R&D for military space programs. For such reasons as well as for crisis management and surveillance of China, the Soviets probably have a requirement to upgrade their satellite reconnaissance systems. Because of the lead times required to develop and perfect these complex spacecraft, the USSR may already have begun related R&D. Boosters and propulsion There is an active propulsion system R&D pro- gram aimed at augmenting Soviet proven space boosters. With the SL-12, a maximum of 50,000 pounds can be placed in low-earth orbit and about 7,000 pounds, in geostationary orbit. The J-vehicle (TT-05), the only other launch vehicle developed solely for the space program, will be capable of placing about 275,000 pounds in low-earth orbit if development is successful. A vehicle of this size and capability would enable the Soviets to carry out a wide variety of manned or unmanned missions which require very large payloads. The direction of follow-on work for the next several years would appear to be additions of new or modified stages to the proven boosters to provide cost effective de- livery of heavier payloads into varied orbits. To develop reusable launch systems, the Soviets would be required to make advances in the technologies associated with high temperature structures, light- weight heat protection, and hypersonic aero- dynamics. Both the SL-12 and the TT-05 have suffered from reliability problems during their early flight test programs. The SL-12 has improved to the point where it is now fairly reliable. In the early phase of the flight test program, the vehicle evi- denced failures in all stages. The high failure rate is believed to have been caused by inadequate checkout procedures and poor quality control. The problems encountered probably were compounded by the Soviet use of relatively low data rate telem- etry systems. The TT-05 has failed in its three tests. The first two failures occurred during first stage operation. It is believed that the troubles are anal- ogous to those that affected the SL-12. The third test failed when the second stage failed to ignite. Although not yet flight tested, hydrogen-fueled engines may have reached tL.- acceptance testing stage. In the future, hydrogen could be used as a fuel for the upper stages of the SL-12 and the TT-05. It is also possible that fluorine or fluoride oxidizers will appear in upper-stage applications in the 1980s, although the Soviets admit to severe problems with fluorine. The Soviets may use solid propellant technology for space booster applica- tions. They are currently testing large segmented solid motors that may ultimately be used as strap- ons similar to those on the US Titan III-C. In the long term the Soviets could develop reusable launch systems, should the launch rate demand them. The problems posed in this technology are very diffi- cult and may prove a barrier to early realization of such a system. Nuclear power and propulsion Nuclear energy sources suitable for aerospace applications include both radioisotopic generators and compact nuclear reactors. Various energy con- version processes may be employed to convert the heat from the above sources to auxiliary electric power: thermoelectrics, thermionics, magnetohydro- dynamics (MHD), and various heat engine cycles employing turbogenerators. To date the Soviets have relied almost exclusively on solar cells and batteries for electric power for their space missions. Nuclear radioisotopic power sources have been used rather sparingly in space. Most spectacular to date has been the use of a one- kilowatt polonium-210 isotopic heat source for the Lunokhod-1 vehicle. Soviet work on plutonium-238 sources is increasing, and it is expected that this source will receive more extensive use in the next few years. The level of Soviet technology is about on a par with that of the US, and more extensive use could be made of radioisotopic power sources with either thermoelectric or thermionic conver- sion if they choose to do so. The Soviets have not launched a nuclear reactor into space and probably will not do so until at least the late 1970s. They have operated two re- actor prototypes which could lead to space power sources. The first reactor, the Romashka, was a thermoelectric type of reactor that was operated in 1964. No further development of this type of re- actor seems to be taking place. The second was the Topaz thermionic reactor. An aggressive thermionic reactor program with about 300 people inyolved appears to be centered at the Obninsk Physics-Energetics Institute, and a sec- ond program is being carried out at the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy. For the past two years, the Obninsk Institute has been operating the Topaz thermionic reactor which generates 5-10 kilowatts Soviets could have a thermionic power source wit a power rating between 10 kilowatts and 100 kilo- watts available for space use in the last half of this decade. The Soviets have an intensive Closed-cycle MHD program which, if successful, would provide an extremely large (that is, megawatt) source of power for use in space. Studies which were initiated in 1969 are directed at coupling a nuclear reactor to a MHD generator. A major technical problem which must be overcome is the achievement of a sufficiently high temperature in the working fluid to attain the necessary Ionization and, at the same time, to match the operating pressure level of the reactor with that of the generator. The use of a nuclear reactor MHD power source in space by the Soviets is not expected until the early 1980s. There is no convincing evidence that the Soviets plan to use heat cycles employing turbogenerators in space. In fact, several Sovicts have said definitely that they will not. The requisite technologies, how- TOP ever, have been under continuous development since the early 1960s. Soviet work on electric propulsion engines has been in evidence since the late 1950s. Electric thrusters have been tested on selected space vehi- cles since 1964, were most recently used to main- tain a Meteor satellite in the prescribed orbit (1971), and will find increased application on both orbital and deep space probes as new electric power sources become available during the late 1970s. The USSR may have an active research and development program leading toward a nuclear space rocket propulsion capability, but we have no There is a concerted Soviet theoretical effort in progress which seems to be directed at the de- velopment of gas core reactors. There is no evidence that this effort has reached the hardware stage. We do not expect a nuclear gas core rocket engine to be developed before the mid-1980s. Subsystem support and technology Advances in reconnaissance, surveillance, and meteorological satellites and certain aspects of space defense are predicated on advanced sensor develop- ment. It is believed that Soviet technology will support straightforward development in these areas. We are not aware of any limitations of Soivet mili- tary research laboratories that would hamper such development. Multi-spectral observations of the earth are continuing in support of civilian research. The relationship of this work to military applica. tions is unknown. The missile-launch observation experiments conducted with Soyuz 6 and the Salyut station were probably using a sensor in the in- frared region. Soviet space power technology is adequate to support military missions over the next 10 years. The requirements for military space system guid- ance and attitude control over the next 10 years, including accuracy of weapon delivery to a point in space, accuracy of sensor pointing, and stability We believe that t e of sensor platforms, could also be met with cur- rent Soviet technology. For low-cost, reliable earth orientation, the Soviets have begun to use the gravity gradient principle. This approach will find increasing use in long-life systems. Antisatellite The Soviet antisatellite capability includes a net- work of detection and tracking radars and an orbiting interceptor. The radars are operational and give the Soviets a capability for detecting and tracking all satellites up to about 900 nm. With assistance from early warning Hen House radars, this network could detect satellites up to a 2,000 nm altitude. Using their optical detection and tracking network the Soviets probably can detect high- altitude satellites over the Eastern Hemisphere (such as the geostationary corridor) within a few days following injection. To avoid optical detection, satellites would have to be dimmer than the 14th- 15th magnitude. The Soviets could use any of several ICBM, IRBM, or ABM boosters to achieve a nuclear kill of satellites. They could also develop terminal hom- ing for an ABM interceptor and achieve a non- nuclear kill against low-orbit satellites. The tech- nogloy is available within the USSR, but there is no evidence that such a system is being developed. The Soviets have developed a satellite interceptor that is launched by the SL-11 booster from the Tyuratam Missile Test Center weapon will be employed on the operational sys- tem. At this time the Soviet system can probably engage all US satellites that pass over the USSR at an altitude less than 2,000 nm. Only a single kill attempt can be made by one interceptor in the present mode of attack. By 1975, the Soviets could develop an effective non-nuclear intercept system against geostationary targets with existing tech- nology. During the late 1970s the Soviets could enhance a high-orbit interceptor with inspection sensors and a multiple target kill capability. This possibility could be met with existing technology. Applied satellites RECONNAISSANCE-The Soviets currently have two photographic reconnaissance systems-a low-resolu- tion (10-20 ft) system for general search and a high-resolution (3-5 ft) system for technical intel. ligence. Significant performance improvements for the present systems are unlikely due to the space. craft size and configuration. Soviet technology, however, can provide improvements in ground resolution through the use of better films, incorpora. tion of an improved attitude control system, in- corporation of yaw programming, or the use of lower altitude orbits. We believe the Soviets have long devoted sub- stantial resources to the research and development of technologies pertinent to photographic recon- naissance. Using current technology, the Soviets could within the next two to five years introduce a system which is capable of resolutions on the order of 1 foot; contains multiple film recovery capsules; has a longer duration mission life; and has significantly improved targeting flexibility. By the late 1970s, the Soviets could have the tech- nology to develop a system to relay collected data to ground stations on a near-real-time basis. TOPS RET Sensors other than photographic and Elint have the potential for providing useful reconnaissance information from space. The Soviets are believed to be conducting research on such sensors as in- frared (IR), ultraviolet (UV), and radar. The longer wavelengths of IR and radar sensors make them amenable to the low-resolution requirements of search reconnaissance, night reconnaissance, and camouflage detection and discrimination. The So- viets are actively investigating the development and application of these types of sensors, particularly in their earth resources programs, and probably have flown individual experimental sensors. We believe that the Soviets are probably investigating the use- fulness of and techniques for integrating the results of individual sensors. The Soviet technology is prob- ably adequate to support the launch of such an experimental satellite at any time. SURVEILLANCE-The Soviets probably have a re- quirement to develop space surveillance capa- bilities. They have conducted activities which are indicative of an intent to develop and test the technologies applicable to this mission area; for example, early warning (missile launch detection experiments on the Soyuz and Salyut manned space missions). The Cosmos "scientific" satellites have been used to obtain the space environmental back- ground data needed for system development. It is likely that sensor tests have been carried out in this program. We believe the Soviets could at any time launch systems capable of detecting nu- clear detonations in space or in the upper atmos- phere. Within two to five years the Soviets could orbit sensor systems capable of detecting missile launches from high The Soviets prob- ably cannot develop operational sensor systems using this technology during the 1970s. The recon- naissance sensors technology that the Soviets could develop may also be used for military surveillance by the late 1970s. HEAVY MANEUVEBABLES-The Soviets have a heavy maneuverable satellite development program which began in 1965. The program has included Cosmos 198, 209, 367, 402, 469, 516 and two which failed to attain orbit. The mission for the heavy maneuverable satellites appears to be at least in part for coastline and ocean reconnaissance/sur- veillance purposes. Since Cosmos 198, when the SL-11 was first used as the booster for this program, all heavy maieuverables have followed the same general pro- file. Each has been launched from Tyuratam into a ballistic trajectory with an apogee of about 150 nm. At apogee each satellite has used an on- board propulsion system to inject itself into a nomina' 150 nm circular orbit. The satellites have remained in this orbit from one to 32 days at which time each satellite separated into at least three pieces with one of the pieces transferring to a 500 nm circular orbit. Once this major orbit ma- neuver was completed, each satellite is assessed TO RET L TOp,i;ECRET NAVIGATION-The USSR has developed a navi- gation satellite system using the doppler ranging technique. Analysis indicates a potential capability for a position fix accuracy of 0.05 urn for slow moving targets with a single satellite pass. For aircraft, the horizontal position uncertainty would be an order of magnitude larger. The Soviets will probably continue to use doppler navigation satel- lites for the next several years. During this same time period, they may also investigate the use of other concepts, such as direct ranging, for improved navigational capability. Eventual deployment of spacecraft at high altitude may occur and provide position accuracy to a few hundred feet in three dimensions and velocity to a few feet/second. Slower moving users could obtain position accu- racies on the order of a hundred feet. mcmRC't oclr-The Soviets currently use mete- orological satellites at nominal altitudes of 350- 500 nm. One sensor is a TV camera which scans across a 600 nm swath with a resolution of about 0.5 nm. Various UV-optical IR sensors view the earth in the 0.3-30 micrometer band with resolu. tion from 8 to 54 nm. These sensors (or slight mod- ifications thereof) will have utility for the next few years. We believe that the Soviets will attempt to improve sensor resolution and sensitivity. They have stated, for example, that they intend to use an IR spectrometer to improve wavelength reso- lution. Automatic picture transmission, with re- ception possible on inexpensive equipment, became available in 1972. Satellites probably will be placed in higher orbits to allow weather update every several hours. By the late 1970s, systems might be introduced into the geostationary and/or Mol- niya orbits for weather information with a resolu- tion of a mile or less in near real time. Lower alti- tude satellites with improved sensors may be used for detailed studies both of conditions of the atmos- phere at various altitude layers and of surface conditions. Tracking During the past few years the USSR has developed two extensive tracking networks. The first consists of installations deployed within the USSR which track and control cooperative spacecraft. These tracking sites are under the con- trol of the Soviet Rocket Forces (SRF). The other network, consisting primarily of the Hen House and Dog House radars, is used in a defensive role. One function of these radars is the detecting and tracking of foreign space objects. The network is believed to be under the control of the Air Defense Force. coopmtAIIVE sATELLrrEs-The SRF space track- ing network has been greatly expanded in recent years. It consists of range and angle tracking sys- tems, a doppler tracking system, and an inter- ferometer tracking system. The higher orbit satel- lites, the lunar and the planetary probes, use a. range and range rate system. These tracking sys- tems are adequate for both current and near-term programs. We do not believe that technical capa- bility will limit Soviet development of future track- ing systems. A major constraint of the Soviet space tracking network has been its geographic limitations. The Soviets have chosen not to expand their land-based r GFfRFT active tracking network beyond the limits of the USSR. In order to overcome this deficiency to some extent, the Soviets now have three large tracking and monitoring ships (Gagarin, Korolev and Koma- roo). These ships are capable of tracking space- craft to lunar distances. Their support of military spacecraft could be expanded to the Western Hemisphere. NON-COOPERATIVE SATELLITES--The Soviet net- work for detecting, tracking, and predicting the orbits of non-cooperative satellites consists of radars built for space operations and ballistic missile and space defense. The major components of this net- work are the Hen House, Dog House and Chekov radars; there are a total of 31 faces. Seventeen of these radars are in operation, and three more have begun transmitting but are not operational. In addition, eight radars are externally complete but not transmitting, and three more are in various stages of construction. Those that are externally complete could begin transmitting at any time. The portion of the network now in operation pro- vides almost complete tracking coverage for low- altitude satellites which pass over the USSR. The radars appear more than capable of pro- viding accurate orbit prediction after a number of orbits. For example, a typical single pass of it low- altitude satellite through a Hen House sector pro- vides data which allow a determination of the satellite's position with an error no greater than about 1 nm. These same data can be used to predict the satellite's position-at the end of the next revo- lution-with an error no greater than about 30 nm. A single-pass tracking by the Dog House radar allows the prediction of the position of the satellite to be made-for one revolution ahead-with an error of no greater than about 2 to 5 nm. Com- parable accuracy also can be achieved by Hgn House radars, but tracking data from two orbital passes are required, with prediction made about position at the end of the third revolution. In a similar way, If a satellite in a typical inclina- tion were tracked by the network on six consecu- tive revolutions, the prediction accuracy for the seventh revolution would be about 0.2 nm. Reliability During the past few years a continuing high reliability in some areas of Soviet military-related space hardware has been demonstrated. For ex- ample, the Soviet reconnaissance program has main- tained a high degree of reliability both in the space- craft and the SL-4 launch vehicle. Two areas of technology appear to account for most of the Soviet space missions that have failed: attitude control systems and zero gravity propulsion starts. Soviet failures indicate that inadequate check-out pro- cedures may be the primary Soviet reliability prob- lem. It is anticipated that over the next several years there will be a continuing increase in relia- bility in Soviet military-related spacecraft. Large Soviet launch vehicles have suffered from relia- bility problems during the first few years of their use. The SL-12 which was plagued by problems in all stages has now become somewhat more reliable. The new J-vehicle, as noted above, has failed on all launch attempts. Soviet efforts to im- prove spacecraft reliability are believed to be directed toward increased environmental ground testing, improved checkout procedures, and the use of improved technology. Bioastronautics Soviet space medicine R&D is mainly applications oriented toward the care and maintenance problems of long-term space station crews. Primary emphasis is on adaptation to and recovery from the weight- less state, potential chronic irradiation effects, de- velopment and testing of advanced biomedical monitoring and life support technology, crew re- liability and performance evaluation methodology, and habitability factors. The superoxide chemical gas exchange environ- mental control system (ECS) has been used suc- cessfully with continuous refinement on all Soviet manned spaceflights. The system proved to be ade- quate for the Salyut station but not without some recurrent cabin atmosphere problems with CO2 and relative humidity. The Soviets have developed a method which utilizes modular packaging for re- placement of superoxide chemical supplies by means of suitably sized canisters which can be ferried by the Soyuz, transferred to a Salyut sta- tion, and stored aboard in quantity. Soviet ground- test data have demonstrated that three men could be maintained in a closed cabin for a six-month period, using this superoxide system for the most part and utilizing urine and atmospheric conden- sation water recovery systems to provide nominal water requirements. The superoxide ECS/atmos- pheric condensation system approach is the opti- mum Soviet life support system for an SL-12 pay- load station such as the 40,000- to 45,000-pound Salyut class and will probably be used as the primary life support system for space stations launched within the next three to five years. Soviet development of physical chemical par- tially regenerative life support hardware is largely derived from similar US technology. This equip- ment has been used for a three-man, six-month, con- tinuous ground trial of a partially regenerative com- bination of catalytic hydrogenation of CO2 and water electrolysis. The fixed weight and power penalties of the Soviet test system make it of margi- nal use for the Salyut station. It probably is most applicable to long-duration multi-manned stations weighing 100,000 pounds or more and having very high power supply capabilities on board. This sys- tem may not be operational for at least 7 to 10 years. The USSR has life support technology and crew support and monitoring capabilities which have allowed the Soviets to plan manned earth orbital missions of up to six months or longer. But a number of man-related problems argue for a conservative Soviet approach beyond increments of one month at a time. Post-flight readaptation problems ex- perienced by Soviet cosmonauts following the 18- day, Soyuz-9 flight require resolution. The fire hazard, crew safety, and cabin integrity problems experienced during the tragic Soyuz 1I/Salyut sta- tion mission are additional major concerns. An un- precedented Soviet year-long confinement and life support ground trial identified significant medical, psychological, and nutritional problems which must be resolved before the USSR can keep the same crew in orbit beyond one month. Nevertheless, the USSR apparently intends to orbit two or more manned stations by 1975 based on the Salyut tech- nology and even larger stations by 1980. After the first Apollo moon landing, the Soviets put all manned space priorities on the space station program. Manned lunar landing missions have been delayed for at least several years. From the bio- medical and life support standpoint, there are no constraints on a Soviet attempt to perform a manned lunar landing. Soviet ground-based bioastronautic studies and biotechnological development are com- patible with support of both earth orbital stations and manned lunar landing missions. Furthermore, the Soviets appear to have developed an operational liquid-cooling system for space suits and a self- contained back-pack life support system which would be useful for brief lunar excursions. Aerodynamics The USSR is vigorously pursuing a broad, con- tinuous program in practically all areas of aero- dynamic R&D. Research is highly centralized, with the Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute imeni Zhukovskiy as the directing agency for virtually all important work. The programs of that institute are supported by the Moscow Physico-Technical Institute in its work on the chemical and physical aspects of problems, the Computer Center of the Academy of Sciences in the development of ana- lytical and numerical solutions, and the Moscow State University in work on almost all significant aerodynamic problems. The Soviets have increasingly emphasized use of their experimental capabilities to support an al- ready existing high-quality analytical and numerical capability. New subsonic wind tunnels with a low turbulence level, either recently completed or being planned, should greatly enhance the Soviet R&D capability in subsonic aerodynamics. Soviet re- searchers have demonstrated the technical capa- bility to produce a subsonic laminar flow control aircraft using suction; its development is dependent upon mission requirements and operational con- siderations. Further development of mathematical models for direct lift and vectored thrust V/STOL aerodynamics and correlation with flight-test data should provide them with an outstanding capability for V/STOL design. Soviet capability for handling transonic flow problems, including design of tran- sonic airfoils, is equal to that of the US. Current Soviet R&D in rotary-wing aerodynamics probably is directed toward the development of a rigid rotor system and synchronous advancing blade rotors, further flight tests and refinement of Homer (MI- 12) prototypes in preparation for series production, and continuation of Mil's heavy-lift developmental trend. TOP MFCRET Soviet work on hypersonic nonaxisymmetric lift- ing bodies Involves those with high lift/drag such as the waveriders and the more blunt bodies with a medium lift/drag such as the blunted half-cones. Soviet development of a slender, high-lift/drag body would be applicable to cruise, launch, or re- entry configurations. A hypersonic aircraft probably will not reach the final design stage before 1980. Use of a slender, high-lift/drag body as a launch or reentry vehicle probably will not occur before the 1975-80 period-the timing depending largely upon the mission of such vehicles. With a concen- trated effort, the Soviets could possibly have a final design of a blunt, medium-lift/drag body as a reentry vehicle by the 1973-75 period. For the past 10 years the Soviets have investigated the star bodies. Their analytical and experimental studies have shown that the total .drag of the star bodies at hypersonic velocities is as low as one-third to one-half of that for an equivalent cone. This program Implies the availability of such bodies in the near future for use on low-drag vehicles. The Soviets have sufficient aerodynamic technology for design of a supersonic cruise vehicle of about Mach 3 to 5 if the need such a vehicle arises. Actual development of aircraft with speeds in excess of Mach 3 is not expected before 1980. Propulsion The Soviets have continually emphasized the development of airbreathing propulsion systems. Throughout the 1960s, their facility for the study of mass air flow capacity at the Central Scientific Research Institute for Aviation Motor Construction was recognized as the world's leading test facility of its type. Soviet flight simulation capabilities for full-scale engine testing were further improved in 1971 through expansion of this facility. A most significant technical Innovation in the design and construction of the expanded test facility provided for high bypass turbofan engine testing at sea-level and to structural limits. The opportunity to obtain structural integrity data during development is a major stride In reducing the risk and time for air- breathing engine development. The flight simula- tion facilities at the Kuznetsov, Tumanskiy, and Lotarev propulsion design bureaus provide for the testing of components in a simulated flight environ- ment and the logging of empirical improvements tailored to individual designs. Such capabilities presage advances in system reliability and main- tenance. As in the West, the individual Soviet gas turbine engine design bureaus show considerable variance in deli techniques and in general level competence the Soviet designers to a highly Individualistic breed. They are obviously permitted much latitude in their design selections. It is equally evident, however, that the Soviet designer is guided by a strict set of general design objectives and design constraints relating to such factors as ease of manu- facture, mechanical simplicity, selection of ma- terials, and operational requirements. Based on intensive research of basic aerothermo- dynamics, the Soviets developed an inlet concept that provides excellent stability. In general, the propulsion cross sections and volumes were held to minimum levels, particularly for fighter-inter- ceptor propulsion systems. Integration of the nozzle with the airframe relied mainly on matching the airframe base area and the nozzle maximum area. Ejectors have been used to improve the nozzle- to-airframe match and the nozzle thrust coefficients. Soviet designers indicate that for specific applica- tions at speeds above Mach 8, the entire vehicle forebody will function as an inlet and the vehicle afterbody will function as a nozzle. Research studies are probably in progress to integrate propulsion with the star-shaped vehicle configurations for Mach 12-25 flights. Fuel system technology has Improved rapidly in recent years. Improved insulation methods and re. generative cooling techniques have been developed. Cruise propulsion at speeds above Mach 4 probably will use fuel-cooled engine components and at higher speeds probably will use fuel cooling of the airframe. To accommodate the high fuel temperatures and more difficult fuel pumping conditions, the Soviets probably used after about 1962 special positive ex- pulsion tanks with screen fuel-orientation valves. In the US, these special devices are usually re- stricted to spacecraft. Centrifugal pumps have also been used in Soviet air-breathing propulsion systems with remote electrical drives, local hydraulic (fuel) '--op SECRET drives, and engine-mounted pneumatic (compres- sor tapoff) pump drives. Higher feed system pres- sures and improved fuel will provide the Soviets a capability to use hydrocarbon fuels for cruise at about Mach 4.5 and dash to about Mach 6. Hy- drogen and methane will be used for the higher speed ranges beginning around Mach 4 and are the most probable fuels for cruise flight speeds above Mach 5. Soviet efforts to develop turboprop engines were reduced when low-bypass-ratio turbofans came into use in 1959. The development of small turboprop and turboshaft engines is expected to continue for future small transport and helicopter applica- tions. Turbofans with "bypass-ratios" on the order of 5, however, are expected to reach flight qualifi- cation status by 1974 for use on large subsonic cruiser transport aircraft. Compressor design prowess has been the van- guard of the Soviet aircraft turbine engine indus- try. Although the various Soviet engine design bu- reaus display varying levels of competence, the general level of demonstrated compressor. and fan technology has been excellent. During the early 1950s the Soviets elected to pursue vigorously tran- sonic compressor aerodynamics and aggressively applied this technology to developmental engines. Soviet compressors and fans usually are charac- terized by their low frontal area, compactness, and light weight which results from high stage work and flow capacity. This is particularly true m Although the technology is representative of e maximum Soviet capability of over a decade ago (R-37F was production-qualified in 1957/58), it is highly sig- nificant because the high pressure ratio per stage combined with a very high air flow capacity (for its diameter and good efficiency) makes the R-37F compressor technologically advanced by even 1969 Western standards. Appropriate improvements of injectors, aerody- namic combustion stabilizers and fuels have been accomplished by the Soviets. Combustion tempera- tures to 3,200?F probably will be available by 1975 and possibly 3,500?F m be reached by 1980. TOP SMEET The Soviets historically have operated their tur- bines at relatively modest temperature levels. Since higher engine cycle temperatures permit greater thrust per pound of airflow (specific thrust), lower engine weight, and lower specific fuel consumption during supersonic flight, the Soviets obviously have not purposely elected to restrict their turbine inlet temperature (TIT). Their modest temperature levels are a direct measure of their capability to manufacture turbine components. Soviet and West- ern nickel-base turbine materials have, in general, been of similar alloy composition. However, the quality of metallurgical processing in the turbine components of the USSR and the West differs sub- continue to be "dirty" with inclusions and high porosity. These parts do not meet Western stand- ards of quality and certainly must have poor thermal fatigue properties. This is considered a principal reason for the short life exhibited by Soviet turbine engines. This shortcoming is recognized and development is continuing to improve this deficiency. Various cooling schemes for turbine components have been evaluated which would permit application of airfoils at higher temperatures and with smaller thermal gradients than is possible from actual hardware available for analysis to date. Processing is also improving, as indicated by the directionally solidi- fied turbine buckets exhibited at the 1971 Paris Air Show. Research work has been published which in- dicates a capability to produce single crystal blades, at least on a laboratory scale. The most recent effort has been directed at a metallic composite based on the nickel-tungsten (Ni-W) system for use as a turbine vane material. The tungsten filament is embedded in a ZhS6-K matrix which produces a composite having marked improvement in high temperature strength (up to 1,900?F) over con- ventionally cast alloys. This effort is still experi- mental, however. The current maximum Soviet TIT for production engines is 2,060.2,080?F, as demonstrated by the D-30KU and D-30KP turbofans. This is 300?F lower espi a use TOP 'SECRET than current US production engines, such as the JT9D turbofan. The NK-144 SST powerplant is believed to have a cruise TIT of 2,060?F. It is esti- mated that the R-266 Foxbat turbojet has a maxi- mum TIT of 2,000?F. Soviet engine designers have in the past been successful in developing engines of low weight and volt' nc despite moderate TIT levels. Excellence in aerodynamic and mechanical design has largely offset the turbine temperature deficiencies. How- ever, overcoming deficiencies will become increas- ingly more difficult in the future. Although the Soviet turbine temperature picture does not appear bright, it must be cautioned that in the past Soviet reaction to a recognized deficiency has led to very vigorous and successful corrective action. Afterburners and ram burners are thoroughly integrated with the turbine diffuser cone and air- frame. Oxygen augmentation of altitude ignition is customary. The Soviets preferred integral injee- tor-flameholders through 1969, but unique low- drag flameholders have been researched for spe- cialized applications. Initially, Soviet nozzles were covergent-interleaved units that were actuated by pressure differentials. By 1962, positive hydraulic- ally actuated nozzles were in use in combination with ejectors. Since 1962, convergent-divergent regulated nozzles have been available. Blow-in- door ejectors may be used after 1972 although mechanical convergent-divergent nozzles might be used if improvements in existing units are required. Short engine life has historically been a major shortcoming of the Soviet aircraft gas turbine in- dustry. Although the Soviets have made excellent progress since 1962 in increasing the time between overhaul (TBO) of their commercial engines, a similar occurrence has not been observed with the military powerplants. In the past the Soviets have been satisfied with TBOs of less than 300 hours for their fighter engines. Although indeed a short time span, the TBOs are perhaps not as bad as they appear since there are indications that the Soviet standards of reliability upon which TBO is estab- lished are considerably more stringent than those used in the West. As a result, the number of pre- mature overhauls for Soviet engines is believed to be exceptionally small. The Soviet concept of very limited field maintenance is reflected in their engine designs. Maintenance in the field is generally limited to the replacement of externally mounted items only, such as controls, accessories and oil lines. Repair or replacement of internal engine components are accomplished at the engine produc- tion facilities. Soviet work on ramjet engines has covered a span of over 40 years. The first theoretical work was reported by B. S. Steehkin in 1929 and the first military-oriented experimental work was conducted in late 1933. Continued effort resulted in the flight test of an extreme-range cruise missile in the early 1960s. Design conditions were an altitude of 80,000 feet and a speed of about Mach 3. This effort was terminated due to the superior reliability of ballis- tic rockets. The technology from these ramjet pro- grams resulted in the development of the Ganef (SA-4), which was displayed in a 1964 parade, and the Gainful (SA-6), which was displayed in a 1967 parade. Both missiles have a flight speed of about Mach 2.5 to 3. Since 1960 the Soviets have developed the tech- nology needed for aft-mounted inlets, including external and mixed compression types ranging from axisymmetric to two-dimensional. The aft-mounted inlets improve the propulsion airframe integration by reducing the front cross-section and by smooth- ing the axial profile. Advances in materials, tempera- ture capability, cooling techniques, and coatings have made it possible to reduce further the engine diameters. Research and development are also con- tinuing on injectors, combustors, and afterburners, and associated disciplines such as cooling tech- niques. The technology is available for upstream injectors for engines to the Mach 4 range and down- ward-facing injectors for ramjet engines operating in the supersonic combustions mode (scramjet ). Analytical combustion models have been developed for homogeneous mixtures in the Mach 5-6 regimes, and detonated-controlled combustion research is under way for hypersonic flight in the Mach 9-20 range. much of the Soviet ramjet researc or u e de- velopments will be used in combined cycle (rocket- ramjet) engines. In this concept the rocket acts as an ejector when the vehicle is at low-flight velocities. As the flight velocity increases, the rocket engine acts as a compressor. The exhaust products of the rocket are fuel rich and burned TSECRET with air in the ?nain combustor. The Soviets have identified several modes for the rocket-ramjet cycle including the first stage of a reusable launch ve- hicle, hypersonic cruising/booster aircraft, and supersonic cruise missiles. The two primary modes of the rocket-ramjet engine for supersonic missiles are terminal maneuvering for AAMs and low-level run-in for ASMs. Structural mechanics The Soviet Union, one of the world leaders in structural mechanics, has since the mid-1950s con- tinued a broad and ever-increasing effort in R&D applicable to aerospace structures. Recent advances have been in the development of new fundamental methods of analysis for stress concentration and shell stability, and in theories for predicting the load-carrying capability of composite materials and structural components. Although few new related results have emerged, it is likely that in the next few years new developments of engineering value will result from these theories. There is strong Soviet emphasis on the develop- ment of strength criteria for polymerics, fiber glass- reinforced plastic, and filament-wound composite structures. Recent Soviet contributions to the funda- mentals of mathematical theory of thin shells have been heavily pointed in the direction of expanding earlier theories to encompass situations which in- clude both plain and reinforced polymeric ma- terials. Effects of anisotropy, inhomogeneity, creep, and bimodularity have been studied in detail. Ad- vances in thermoel:usticity have been of value in the analysis of filament-reinforced plastics and layered plates where the layers are of different materials. Elasto-plastic analysis of structures has been directed toward the development of design criteria for filament-wound composite structures, and strength criteria for predicting the behavior of plates made of composite materials have been pre- sented in simplified form attractive to designers. The Soviets have placed considerable emphasis on digital computer solutions of thin shells, turbine components, and dynamic problems in general. The recently introduced analysis methods for shells of arbitrary curvature with many stress concentration holes are well suited to digital computer solutions. The computer solution techniques are not new, however, to Western designers. Since 1967, the Soviets have exhibited increased interest in the design of multilayered sandwich shells indicative of the probable use of such shells in aircraft and missiles. The Soviets are placing more emphasis on optimal design than previously, but their achievements are still considerably less than those in the West. Efforts in this area have considered plates and shells under aircraft and missile loading. Specific boundary value problems have been treated for minimum-weight cylindrical tanks subject to internal pressure, minimum weight of rib-stiffened plates, and minimum weight of a variable thickness plate bent to a cylindrical con- figuration. The Kazan Aviation Institute recently exhibited concern for minimum weight design of structures subject to random loadings comparable with some 1962 US design work. Materials The mechanical behavior of materials is receiving considerable attention in the USSR. There is cur- rently a concerted effort on metal fatigue of alloys known to be used in the airframes and engines of their operational aircraft. Thermal fatigue re- search has been concerned primarily with material properties and processing effects aimed at improv- ing the life of engine components. Refractory re- search has included strength and endurance testing to 3,000? and 2,500?C, respectively. The Soviets have a strong capability in both weldable and nonweldable light metal alloys gen- erally applicable to aircraft structures. A wide range of titanium compositions is available in the USSR which should satisfy the requirements for most applications requiring corrosion resistance, low-temperature ductility and toughness, and high- temperature strength. Of particular interest is the Soviet effort to develop alloys for increasingly higher temperature capability, undoubtedly for use in the compressor section of jet engines. In this area, the ST series of alloys appear to be favored. The Soviet effort reflects a chief concern with beat resistance, while the US effort is directed at a combined beat resistance-stability goal. Present capability is probably in the 540? to 600?C range. Soviet magnesium alloys have essentially the same capability as those used in the West and in many cases are direct copies. Research is continuing on the Mg-Li system and has recently included the effects of thermal mechanical treatment. Investiga- tions are also under way on Mg.Y-Zn and Mg-Y-Mn systems, apparently to replace the high-tempera- ture Mg-Th alloys. The beryllium effort in the USSR has been very small compared to that of the US. Although little has been published on this effort, the work has apparently continued, as evi- denced by the beryllium items exhibited at the 1971 Paris Air Show. Work is also continuing on Be-Al alloys, but the results are similar to those seen in the original US counterpart, Lockalloy. The most significant effort in high-strength low- alloy steels is the selection of materials for thin- wall (0.060-0.080 inch) missile casing. The available data indicate the Soviets are attempting to satisfy an immediate requirement for thin-walled casings at a strength level of 260,000-270,000 psi. The So- viets also have a significant effort in the research and development of another class of steels, the maraging steels; these are the materials of the future and may be in limited use now. Maraging steels are being evaluated with yield strengths rang- ing from 250,000-350,000 psi. There has been little significant Soviet research in stainless steels in recent years. The Soviets have a large number of austenitic, martensitic, and precipitation hardenable (PH) stainless steels for high-temperature (480?- 760?C) and/or corrosion-resistant applications. Little effort other than processing improvements is expected since titanium- and nickel-base alloys have largely replaced stainless steels outside of the tem- perature range noted. Concerning superalloys, the Soviets continue to concentrate on nickel-base alloys to the virtual ex- clusion of cobalt which is in short supply. The cast and wrought alloys available for propulsion systems generally have the same temperature capability as This situation, however, is changing, as indicated by the Soviet display of directionally solidified buckets and vanes at the 1971 Paris Air Show. The blades apparently were of excellent quality and should go far in reducing or eliminating premature failure induced by thermal fatigue. The Soviets are conducting research on thermal stress in an arbitrary shell with consideration to coupled thermo-elasticity involving extremely rapid applications of thermal fluxes to structures. Possible application of this research would be the response of a thin shell to a laser pulse. The extensive re- search being conducted in the area of thermal fatigue, stress concentration, and vibration damping of turbine engine blades and disks could be indica- tive of engine failure problems. Fatigue research of aluminum alloys used on current Soviet aircraft is being emphasized. Soviet materials research through 1975 will con- tinue to focus on the optimal design of lightweight composite structure for aerodynamically heated air- craft in the Much 4 regime. Proven Soviet capa- bility in theoretical and applied mechanics and current research on the mechanical behavior of materials at temperatures to 3,000?C portend the development of hypersonic cruise vehicle struc- tures by 1985. Studies devoted to niobium and molybdenum alloys outnumber by far those devoted to the other refractory metal alloys. Much of the effort on molybdenum and niobium appears to be in sup- port of aerospace interests, while the tungsten and tantalum effort is in support of the electronics in- dustry. A comparison of Soviet alloys with Western counterparts indicates that a similar capability exists at least with respect to high-temperature strength. However, strength improvements are of little value unless satisfactory coating systems are developed. The Soviets have developed coatings for niobium alloys that will provide oxidation pro- tection for short periods (30 hours) up to 1,100?C. For molybdenum alloys, the trend is toward devel- oping complex silicide coatings for temperatures above 1,200?C and a chromium and/or boron-base coating for applications below 1,200?C. Of interest is a recent Soviet investigation which evaluated an MoSi2+HfO2 coating on TsM-5 molybdenum alloy. The coating appeared to offer good protection up to 2,130?C for 300 seconds, which may be suf- ficient time for some weapon requirements. Recent tantalum, tungsten, vanadium, and chromium re- search has been of little aerospace significance. The Soviet tantalum and vanadium work is still in its infancy, and the tungsten alloys available are similar to those in the West, with little originality shown. In chromium alloy development, the Soviets have not done any original work in recent years but have followed promising US leads in dispersion strengthening. The Soviets have glass-reinforced materials which have been used to fabricate such rocket and missile components as heat shields, leading edges, skirts, motor cases, nozzles, and pressure bottles. Although limited material development continues, most of the current effort is concerned with improving the aohesion between binders and reinforcing materials. Tho Soviets are also interested in glass filament- wound structures and filament winding techniques. In addition, they have an- nounced ';a new a esive, designated V-23, which produces vacuum tight (10'6 mm) seams in the -196? to 300?C range. Within 10 years, the Soviets may have stable polymeric adhesives capable of 650?C application for long periods. Polymethyl- methacrylatir (PMMA) is used widely in aircraft in the USSR. Where hig`i Mach conditions are main- tained, the Soviets use high-strength, stress-relieved plate glass or- glass laminated by polymer c inter- layers bonded by adhesives. In addition, special heat-resistant zinc-borosilicate glasses have been developed. The Soviets appear to be approaching the West in the growth and handling of whiskers, but in the production of continuous filaments, they are prob- ably two years behind the West, particularly with respect to mass production of high-quality filament. The availability of both carbon and boron filaments has been noted. Based on available information, the Soviet effort on metal matrices might be categorized as exploratory; selected Western experiments are being repeated and some original work is being done, but there is no concentrated effort along a particular material line, Tungsten fibers in both copper and nickel matrices have been evaluated, but the effort is of a basic nature, though both ma- terials have long-range potential for aerospace hard- ware. Powder metallurgy, diffusion bonding, in- filtration with molten matrix, and explosive bonding have been evaluated as methods of preparing com- posites. The Soviets are keeping a close watch on Western developments in this area so as not to fall behind. The Soviet efforts on nonmetallic composites include polymeric composites reinforced by nylon, carbon cloth, metallic wire, hollow glass fibers, as- bestos, and organic textiles. The Soviet prepregging capability is currently adequate to produce tape and broad goods of the graphite/resin and boron/ resin variety. The Soviets apparently can produce continuous carbon filaments, but whether this is an industrial production capability is not known. Work has been reported on graphitization of cellulose and of polyacrylonitrile fibers. Production technology Production technology development has paral- leled that of materials and design, and the processes necessary to build future operational systems of advanced performance levels are now available. The appearance of integral structures in both high- and low-performance aircraft indicates common usage. This usage, together with the continuing expansion of Soviet heavy press resources, indicate that future Soviet aircraft systems will make more use of integral structures (for example, panels, spars, frames, and carrythrough structures). Evidence of bonded honeycomb and foamed fill- ers in low-performance aircraft for secondary struc- tural applications indicates that the Soviets are easing into the use of sandwich construction. Their continuous research program in high-temperature adhesives, diffusion bonding, brazing, welding, and application of high-temperature materials indicates that limited applications of sandwich construction for primary structural application will be found in future high-performance vehicle systems. Pre- cipitation-hardened stainless steel sandwich or high- strength titanium sandwich are now believed to be available for aerodynamic systems. This applies pri- marily to large aerodynamic vehicles where sig- nificant weight advantages accrue. Initial applica- tions will probably be limited to simple curvature or flat panels and be broadened later to include more complex, three-dimensional, contoured shapes. The use of refractory materials for either airframe or propulsion design is not expected until the late IO~ECBQ 1970s and will depend to a large degree on the suc- cess of Soviet developmental work in fabrication techniques. The Soviets are using all types of welding. A com- bination of spot welding and adhesive bonding, called glue welding, has been accepted by a number of design bureaus, and the process is now employed in the production of several aircraft. Development of both diffusion bonding and adhesive bonding processes continues, and more composite structure is expected on future designs. Soviet efforts in metal forming, forging, casting, and extruding, with particular emphasis on titanium, have kept abreast of requirements. Metal removal has received considerable attention, but numerical control machine technology and its use lag the West. Chemical milling is being used, and laser machining is under development. Trends in Soviet production technology develop- ments for the past two years reflect continuing re- search in materials and manufacturing. Perhaps most pronounced has been the improvement and commitment to production of some of the processes that have been developed previously. Titanium in numerous extruded shapes, including steppedex- trusion, is available and being used in production aircraft. Casting of complex shapes in titanium and nickel-base alloys has been vastly improved. Weld- ing process reliability in production has improved to the point where designers are beginning to use more welding in high-strength structural parts. Forging techniques have permitted sophisticated aluminum forgings and titanium forgings that were not possible several years ago. In short, the Soviets are now making parts that result in reduction of manufacturing costs and, in addition, are making parts for aircraft that operate in the high-tempera- ture regimes. Interceptor aircraft In the last six years the Soviets have introduced new interceptors into the Air Defense Force. These have been the large, long-range Fiddler (1966), the Mach 2.5 dash Flagon A (1967), and the super- sonic cruise Foxbat (1970). In addition, the Soviets have introduced improved variants of existing de- signs, such as the Fishpot C and Firebar B. Present soviet operational interceptors, with the exception of the Foxbat, have speeds of about Mach 2 to 2.3. Speeds of about Mach 3.0 have occasionally been noted for Foxbat; however, most of its flights have been in the Mach 2.3 to 2.6 regime. Foxbat carries externally four new, large AAMs which are dt:sig- nated AA-6. The Flagon A carries the IR and semi-active homing Anab (AA-3) missile and uses a version of the Firebar/Skip Spin radar. This interceptor is powered by two Type 37 engines that are also used for the Fishbed (MiG-21). The Flagon is assessed as basically a Mach 2.3 interceptor, although it is credited with a maximum capability to Mach 2.5. The normal operating radius of Flagon is estimated to be 370 nm. The data link system is estimated to be interconnected to the autopilot for automatic ground-controlled intercepts. There is some evi- dence that the Soviets are interested in improving the low-altitude intercept capability of Flagon A. The development of Flagon was undertaken to improve on the relatively limited radar and missile capability of the Fishpot B, which was limited to rear-hemisphere attacks with beam-rider missiles. The Fiddler aircraft is the largest fighter ever produced by the Soviets. The aircraft progressed from that observed in the 1961 Tushino Airshow, configured with two missiles, to the present configu- ration with four externally mounted AA-5 missiles, usually carried in mixed loads of IR and semi-active radar-guided versions. The Fiddler has frequently operated in conjunction with the Moss (airborne warning and control) aircraft. The Fiddler s air- gives it the best capability of the Soviet _ ters (with the possible exception of the Foxbat) to find targets without good height-finding information. With a radius of action of 865 nm, Fiddler was developed as the first Soviet long-range intercep- tor; interceptors developed earlier have a radius of about one-third to one-half that of the Fiddler. A large, twin-engine subsonic cruise, supersonic (Mach 2.0-2.5) interceptor of Sukhoy design, desig- nated the Ram E, is under development and could be operational by 1975. Its engines are believed to be of the same type as those used on the Flogger. Development of air intercept capabilities at low and medium altitudes, regions where the Soviet probably desire improvements, probably is being emphasized; such capabilities for current Soviet aircraft are best represented in the Firebar. The Ram E's size will allow it to use the new fire- control technology of the Foxbat and the new AA-6 missile carried on that aircraft. Another more likely possibility, however, is a new AAM believed to be in flight test for use against penetrators flying at low and medium altitudes. Although there, is no firm evidence that the So- viets are developing a supersonic cruise interceptor with a radius of about 1,000 nm, a definite trend toward developing aircraft with greater speed, alti- tude, and weapon system capabilities is indicated. The Soviets may possibly have a requirement for such a system during the next 10 years. Also indi? cated are subsystem developments and R&D efforts in materials, propulsion, and electronics which in- dicate technical interest in more advanced high- speed aircraft. Vigorous efforts in design techniques and materials would be required to achieve the low specific fuel consumption necessary, but this ob- jective could be realized, technically, by the So- viets before 1980. Tactical fighters Most Soviet advances in tactical air weaponry have been a byproduct of developmental work aimed at improving strategic air defense capability. In tactical weaponry, the Soviets have stressed re- liability, mobility, and strength through numbers rather than sophistication. Emphasis has been on modification of existing systems to meet tactical requirements rather than on designing new systems to perform tactical missions. The introduction of Fishbeds J and K into Soviet tactical air units and the initial production of both the Mikoyan-designed variable-geometry wing Flogger and Sukhoy's vari- able-geometry wing Fitter B indicate increased Soviet interest in improving their tactical warfare capability. The trend evident in the evolution of the various MiG-21 models is toward increased com- plexity in electronics and armament with a resultant increase in capability. The Flogger entered Soviet tactical air units in 1970. With its improved combat radius and all- weather intercept capability, this system is expected to increase the effectiveness of the Soviet Tactical Air Forces. With its variable-geometry wings, the Flogger should be capable of operating from secon- dary and unimproved forward airfields. The installs. tiou of variable-geometry wings on the older Fitter may have been primarily to improve its known poor low-speed flying characteristics. There is evidence that the Soviets are departing from their past practice of basing tactical fighter designs on defensive requirements. Flight tests were started in early 1970 of an advanced variable- geometry wing fighter. This aircraft is more like a fighter-bomber because its estimated gross takeoff weight is approximately twice that of the Flogger. Weapons testing has emphasized activities asso- ciated with ASM launches at low and medium alti- tudes, which suggest interdiction and close support roles. Development has progressed to the point where an IOC of about 1974-75 can be predicted with reasonable confidence. Future Soviet efforts in tactical aircraft probably will include the devel- opment of designs specifically for an air superiority mission. Additional resources probably will be ex- panded toward improved avionics, air-to-air mis- siles, and guided air-to-surface missiles. V/STOL aircraft Soviet interest in decreasing takeoff and landing distances was evident from the number and types of aircraft at the 1967 Moscow Air Show. The ap- pearance of three STOL fighters equipped with lift engines-the Flagon B, Faithless, and Fishbed G- and two variable-geometry wing aircraft and the VTOL aircraft, the Freehand, represents signifi- cant Soviet V/STOL developmental trends. Work on the first Soviet vertical takeoff and landing air- craft is estimated to have started in the mid-1950s. These efforts resulted in the development of the Yakovlev-designed Freehand which is believed to have been built for the purpose of investigating the engineering problems of vertical takeoff and landing, using deflected thrust principles. The first flight of this vehicle is estimated to have occurred in 1964, but its testing activity ceased in 1967. There is some evidence that the program may have been reactivated in late 1970. None of the V/STOL de- signs observed in 1967 resulted in an operationally suitable design, apparently because Soviet pro- pulsion technology was not sufficiently advanced to permit the design of an aircraft with suitable radius/payload capability. Another VTOL fighter-type aircraft of Yakovlev design, the Ram C, appeared at Ramenskoye during 1971. We do not know whether the expected im- provements in the Ram G over the older Freehand have been incorporated. We believe that Yakovlev is developing a dual-propulsion system which in- dudes one or two direct lift engines in addition to one or two deflected-thrust cruise engines. This system cannot be related to a propulsion system on any known aircraft at this time. Despite the high level of past and present Soviet activity in the development and testing of STOL and VTOL fight- ers, little definitive information on the details of their powerplants has been obtained. Soviet interest in the STOL and VTOL fighter concept will continue to grow as propulsion tech- nology advances. The efforts in the next few years are expected t- be concentrated primarily on com- binations of pure lift engines and lift/cruise-type engines for VTOL aircraft. A satisfactory lift or lift/ cruise powerplant for a VTOL aircraft must have a very high thrust-to-weight ratio, probably on the order of 22 for the direct lift engine and 10 for the lift/cruise type. The Soviets are not expected to reach this capability with production-qualified en- gines before 1975. A Soviet VTOL fighter is not expected to become operational prior to 1977. Bombers Soviet bomber design philosophy over the past 20 years has been based on an evolutionary ap- proach to weapon system development. The prac- tical effect has been that secondary mission objec- tives did not dictate design-rather, existing designs were modified, or "tailored," to suit subse- quint mission objectives. This practice; together with the appearance of a new prototype on the average every 2 years during the past 20 years, reflects an established long-range policy of con- tinually upgrading overall bomber capability by incorporating subsystem technological advances as they occur. The Soviets have been very successful in denying intelligence on new designs at least until prototype rollout. Therefore, the fact that no pro- totypes beyond Ram-H have been detected is not TAP-. ECRET to say that none are in design and development. If past practice continues, it is most likely that undetected designs are presently in development and should appear within 2 years. The Backfire has been in flight test at the Ramen- skoye Flight Test Center in excess of 3 years and in weapons compatibility testing at Vladimirovka for about 1% years. There are four instrumented prototypes at Ramenskoye, and the program ap- pears to be progressing well. Backfire is a variable- geometry wing, Tupolev-designed aircraft weighing about 270,000 pounds. It will probably be intro. duced both as a bomber and ASM carrier and be operational by 1974. The maximum unrefueled range of Backfire is estimated to be 5,600 nm, and it can reach speeds of Mach 2.0 with its wings swept. The Soviets also continue to express interest in sustained supersonic cruise aircraft. A large (300,000 lb takeoff gross weight) double-delta winged prototype designated Ram-H has been ob- served at Ramenskoye. This aircraft is probably either a bomber/reconnaissance prototype or a re- search vehicle and may be of high temperature alloy construction. If it is of aluminum construction it could have an unrefueled combat range of 3,000 nm cruising at Mach 2.2. If Ram-H is constructed of high temperature materials, it could have a unre- fueled combat range of about 2,600 nm cruising at Mach 3.0. The Backfire and Ram-H developments are not, in themselves, reliably indicative of future develop- ments. Innovations in aeronautical design, at least within the next 10 years, will most likely consist of developments in lightweight structures, lighter, more efficient turbine engines; and improved avion- ics. The only aerodynamic innovation we foresee is the incorporation of supercritical wing technology. This range-enhancing development could be ex- pected to appear in a transport design. Aerodynamic development such as that discussed above could be expected to appear in a replacement for the TU-95/Bear bomber. Such a design could feature a high aspect ratio wing and power pro- vided by four high bypass-ratio turbofan engines. The appearance of such a replacement aircraft within the next 10 years is questionable in view of the Soviet's continued reliance on the eminently successful Bear airframe. Approximately 20 Bear F aircraft have now been produced. This aircraft in- corporates so many departures from the original design that the Soviets may plan to employ the newer design for many years to come. The Backfire development removes any doubt about Soviet capability to design and build a larger variable-geometry wing aircraft or extend this type of wing design to a four-engine bomber with greater. payload and range than the Backfire. A Soviet strategic bomber with supersonic pene- tration capability at low altitude is not expected within 10 years. Innovations in low-altitude oper- ation will most likely consist of developments in terrain-following radar, gust-response technology, low-level launch, low-level cruise ASMs, and super- critical wing technology. The Brewer tactical bomber, due to its limited range and payload capability, is a likely candi- date for replacement. A good possibility is a vari- able-geometry wing aircraft in the 60,000-pound category. The Ram-F could easily be the basis of such a design, just as the Firebar was the basis of the Brewer design. Ram-F has superior range and payload capability and is capable of Mach 1.2 op- eration at sea level. The Ram-H, if it is a Mach 2.2 design, merely reflects Charger technology and has no clear im- plication for future bomber development. If the aircraft is a Mach 3.0 design, it incorporates the high-speed technology characterized by Foxbat but in a much larger aircraft and is, in this sense, an extension of existing technology. Again however, implications for future long-range bomber develop- ment are negative-the low lift-to-drag ratio and high specific fuel consumption of a supersonic cruise vehicle continue to severely limit range ca- pability. The vulnerability of a high-altitude pene- tration mission at speeds less than hypersonic can be expected to be substantially greater than that of a low-level, subsonic penetration mission. Neverthe- less, there may be an application of a Mach 3.0 design as a limited-range bomber. Transports The Charger (TU-144) is the only supersonic cruise transport known to be under development in the Soviet Union. Design objectives claimed,for the Charger are Mach 2.35 cruise with 121 passengers over a 3,500-nm range. It is powered by four NK- 144 turbofan engines rated at 38,600 lbs thrust with afterburning. On 31 December 1968, Charger became the first supersonic transport to fly when it completed a 38-minute maiden flight. By the end of 1971, it had accumulated more than 100 hours of flight tests. Sporadic interruptions throughout the flight program including three lengthy periods of inactivity indicate modifications, repairs, and equip- ment changes probably took place. Based on a com- parison with the Concorde SST, the prototype Charger is estimated to weigh considerably more than is claimed by the Soviets, and it is doubtful that it could meet the original range objective at a cruise speed of Mach 2.2. This aircraft had a longer fuselage, larger wing, and apparently some modification to the en- gine nacelles. The TU-144 could begin limited oper- ational service on internal routes in late 1973. The Soviets are not expected to develop another SST design in the near future; however, a Mach 3.0 cruise SST is a long-term possibility. The Soviets are currently flight testing the Candid (IL-76), which was exhibited at the 1971 Paris Air Show. This new transport resembles the C-141 and is the first Soviet turbojet heavy transport. The air- craft has been noted para-dropping personnel and equipment and is expected to have a military appli- cation. Future efforts in transports are expected to be directed toward the development of a high- capacity subsonic "jumbo jet" and vertical and short takeoff and landing designs. Helicopters The Mil Design Bureau and the Kamov Design Bureau have the primary responsibility for heli- copter design and development in the Soviet Union. In addition to its successful development of con- ventional piston-powered and turbine-powered heli- copters in the light- and medium-weight categories, the Mil Design Bureau has designed and developed the world's largest heavy-lift helicopter. In the medium-weight category, Mil's most recent heli- copter development Is the Hind A, which com- pares favorably in size and weight with the French Puma (SA-330). This new helicopter, probably to be used as a tactical assault and transport heli- copter, reflects the first significant Soviet develop- ment of rotary wing aircraft for specific use in a combat environment. In the heavy-lift category, the Hook (MI-6) and the Harke (MI-10) are opera- tional, and the Homer (MI-12) is currently in the flight-test stage. The Homer is basically a conven- tional-winged helicopter. As with previous Soviet rotary-wing aircraft, the development of Homer indicates no major state-of-the-art developments or breakthroughs. The impressive capabilities of So- viet helicopters are the result of administrative pro- gramming and design optimization rather than sig- nificant aerodynamic research. The first factor is the administrative trend of specialization, that is, de- signing a vehicle for specific operations without considering secondary or alternate mission roles. The second factor is close attention to minor aero- dynamic detail and fundamentals and optimization of existing state-of-the-art, using off-the-shelf com- ponents with minor modifications. Sophisticated analytical procedures are being developed to opti- mize existing hardware. Of significance in the de- velopment of the Homer was the extensive, high- priority computerized simulation of the vehicle in various flight modes. It is speculated that the So- viets have developed the capability for modeling unsteady flow fields to a high degree of accuracy. As a result of this capability, simulators have been developed primarily for analytical design work. This enables Soviet engineers to simulate all flight modes, including autorotation which has typically been a difficult area to model According to leading Soviet heli- copter designers, the Homer reflects solutions to problems the US will not encounter for another 10 to 15 years. The Kamov Design Bureau has historically been associated with helicopter coaxial designs. Current design activity centers around the continued devel- opment of the Hormone (KA-25), which is In serv- ice with Soviet Naval Forces, and the Hoodlum (KA-26), which is oriented to civil uses. Both heli- copters are unique because of their coaxial rotor system, although design techniques and materials are conventional when compared with the present state-of-the-art in helicopter design. Future Soviet research and development in rotary wing aerodynamics will probably be directed to- ward the development of a rigid rotor system and synchronous advancing blade rotors, further weight tests, refinement of Homer prototypes in prepara- tion for series production, and continuation of Mil's heavy-lift development trend. If the established heavy-lift helicopter trend continues, significant de- partures from existing designs can be expected. Analysis of TIP jet propulsive systems could receive extensive support in the interest of developing a craft larger than the Homer. Such a project would probably involve the development of a 400,000-lb craft which could appear during the 1980-86 time period. Further refinement and development of the Hind A assault helicopter will also continue during the 1972-80 period. Because of Kamov's expertise in the coaxial rotor field, his design bureau is most probably cor,: ucting studies and analysis of the advancing blade concept (ABC), as developed by Sikorsky, for incorporation into their designs. Kamov is particularly well suited to this development and could possibly have a prototype developed before Sikorsky. A possible Kamov development of an en- tirely new helicopter design for an integrated weap- ons platform employing rigid or semirigid ABC rotors and forward thrust engines could be realized by 1975-80. Ground effect machines The major air cushion vehicle (ACV) develop- mental work in the USSR is probably conducted at the Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute, Mos- cow, and at about five other research institutes and shipyards. While no single agency is known to direct this work, I. Khanzhonkov probably is the leading Soviet researcher in the ACV field; he is associated with the Central Aerohydrodynmics Institute. The Soviets still lag the West in applied ACV developments but are improving as the result of an intensified and expanding program. Their past R&D in this field has encountered major problems in skirt and air distribution design, power train, and fan design. During the 1970s their design efforts will be directed toward the development of improved skirt design and related materials and overall simplification of construction materials for a stronger and more desirable structure. Any resulting machines that may appear in the 1980s will probably be designed as high-speed (50 to 70 knots) patrol craft with light missile armament and larger over-the-beach logistic craft. The im- portance of arctic use of ACVs has not been ignored in the USSR, and related developmental work prob- ably will be emphasized in the 1975-80 period. If the Soviets can maintain their current R&D mo- mentum in this field, which seems likely, they will match the West in conventional ACV technology within five years. The USSR may already be far ahead of the US in the development of unconven- tional hybrid ground effect technology, such as that reflected in the ram wing vehicles. Unique vehicles An extremely large aerohydrodynamic vehicle, first known as the Caspian Sea Monster but now The precise purpose of these craft is not known. A recent hypothesis, to which engineering studies and wind tunnel tests lend credence, suggests that the Monster 300 may be a considerably more ca- pable and flexible logistics carrier or platform than first estimated. If it is postulated that eight of its ten turbofan engines are used to direct engine exhaust under the wing/flap sy^tem, the vehicle appears capable of hovering and accelerating to reasonably efficient ground effect vehicle condi- tions as an augmented ram wing; if the exhaust is directed over the wings, it can cruise highly effi- ciently at altitude. Speeds in excess of 300 knots and ranges exceeding 2,000 nm are estimated. Under these conditions, the Monster 300 appears to be capable of C-5A-like payload capacity but with the advantage of short take off and landing on calm water or ice. Soviet fighter aircraft began to appear in about 1960 with two definite types of armament con- figurations. One type is strictly an interceptor with only missile armament and fire-control equipment consisting of a data link, airborne intercept radar, and missile-launch computers. The other is more of the air superiority type of fighter; some aircraft of this type have missiles as prime armament while others have both missile and gun armament. The second type of fighter uses as its fire-control equip- ment, radars (either range-only or airborne inter- cept), missile-release computers, and optical sights. Both types can carry and deliver other ordnance such as rockets and bombs. No basic changes are expected in the armament configuration of future Soviet fighters employed strictly as interceptors. Missiles will remain as the only armament. Improvements in existing missiles as well as the possible introduction of new missiles can be expected. Increased use of infrared search/ track sets and improvements in detection range can be expected as the Soviets make advancements in interceptor fire-control systems. The trend of armament configurations for the air superiority fighters is toward a reduction in the use of guns with total reliance on missiles to perform air intercepts; however, the recent intro- duction of the Fishbed J with a permanent new gun installation and the possible use. of gun pods on the gunless Fishbed Ds and Fs reflect a re- versal in this trend. New tactical or air superiority fighters introduced by the Soviets in the next 10 years are expected to have both missiles and guns. In addition, these new fighters will have optical sights and be capable of carrying ordnance for air-to-ground delivery to support a secondary ground support role. Any new Soviet guns would most likely retain the Soviet preference for large caliber and exhibit increased muzzle velocity over their existing aircraft cannons. The Soviets have four types of unguided rockets in their operational inventory, and future rocket developments are expected to be modest. As in the past the Soviets will continue to improve the design of their bombs. Improvements are ex- pected in bomb ballistics and fuzing. In addition, a retardation system will probably be developed to permit low-level delivery of bombs. To improve a limited store carriage capability, the Soviets may well develop multiple ejection racks (MERs). The MERs would probably be designed to carry two or three bombs each. This could increase the num- ber of stores carried and may also increase the total-per-station load capacity of Soviet fighters by as much as 300 percent. When delivering munitions against ground tar- gets, Soviet tactical fighters use a simple fixed- collimating sight, a gyroscopic-lead computing gun- sight, or a gyroscopic-lead computing gunsight mated with an automatic bomb release computer. Some tactical fighters have the capability to release munitions either manually or automatically. Soviet tactical fighters still rely mainly on the dive tech- nique for attacking ground targets with cannon, rockets, or bombs. Cannon and rocket attacks are performed from a dive. Bombing is performed from dive or low-level flight. Low-level bombing is em- ployed during low cloud base conditions or when target antiaircraft defenses are heavy. The loft and toss bomb methods are also used to deliver bombs. These two methods of delivery are used to deliver large conventional or tactical nuclear bombs. Loft bombing is performed from a 106? pull-up angle and toss is performed from a 45? pull-up angle. In all three methods (level, toss, and loft), bombs can be released manually or automatically. The Soviets have not yet employed an automatic release com- puter which receives range to target inputs. But, a system of this type is necessary and will prob- ably be developed in the next 5 years. possibly using radiation homing guidance is being developed for probable use on the Ram F by 1974- 75. Launches would be just above the radar line-of- sight with maximum launch ranges out to 20-30 nrn. In the past several years, the Soviets have de- ployed aircraft fitted with an abundance of radomes. The electronics associated with these aircraft are mostly passive and hence are probably used for Sigint collection and DF purposes. One particular configuration is the 8-GHz-band radar believed to be fitted under the 25-foot belly radome of the naval Bear D aircraft. While its exact function is not yet known, the radar appears to have at least a good long-range surface search capability. It transmits at times on two RFs (within the same band) simultaneously, a technique which the So- viets have used for lobe pattern control but which in highly advanced systems could be used for clut- ter suppression. This radar has also been tentatively associated with the Hook helicopter. RET There is no evidence to indicate that the Soviets possess a side-looking radar for military reconnais- sance use; however, a side-looking radar on an AN-24 has been used for ice-field reconnaissance in the Arctic. It is believed that future development of Soviet electronic reconnaissance equipment will be di- rected toward battlefield support as well as naval surveillance and target spotting. The equipment will in all probability use the 14-GHz-band portion of the spectrum as well as the 9-GHz-band areas. GROUND WARFARE The Soviet ground forces are supported by exten- sive development, design, and test facilities. Ex- cluding CBR, the number of known major ground weapons R&D facilities exceeds 60. These facilities have successfully designed and developed approxi- mately three generations of ground force equip- ment since World War II, and the recent models emerging appear quite improved in design and per- formance. Changes in equipment to be developed over the next five years, at least, probably will not be drastic, but will be mostly evolutionary. Prod- ucts now in blueprint probably include a new me- dium tank, a new amphibious armored personnel carrier, antitank guided missiles with improved guidance, close support artillery and associated am- munition, and mobile SAMs. Soviet ground force materiel is based on sound design principles, and needs are derived from re- quirements as determined by Soviet army planners. In many respects, the materiel lacks the refinement of comparable Western developments; and of the three major general purpose forces, Soviet ground force equipment best exemplifies an adherence to the philosophy of "The better is the enemy of the good." This has resulted in the identification of fairly well defined patterns of constraint in weapons and equipment development, albeit, not without meeting the basic Soviet requirements of tactical firepower, over-the-ground mobility, and command and control. The most notable shortcomings appear to be in some types of logistical support equipment and in the lagging development of suitable fixed and rotary wing aircraft for effective ground force air mobility. Armored vehicles Soviet medium tank design work is directed to. ward the development of more mobile and flexible combat vehicles with improved main armament and fire-control equipment. Design concepts essentially reflect a future main battle tank approach of prod- uct modification of existing tanks. The medium tank will continue to be the Soviet main battle tank. It is believed that a new Soviet tank (tentatively designated Medium Tank M-1970) is currently in production and will be added to the inventory. This tank is similar in appearance to the T-62, having the same low silhouette and weighing perhaps slightly more than 40 tons. The main armament probably consists of the same or somewhat im. proved 115-mm smoothbore gun. A noticeable dif- ference is the suspension system which features smaller road wheels and flat track system than used on previous Soviet medium tanks. The most probable advance in Soviet main battle tank development anticipated within the next 10 years is the fielding of a follow-on to the Medium Tank M-1970, possibly equipped with a combina- tion gun and missile system which would retain the advantages of the high-velocity smoothbore gun for short ranges and provide a high-velocity guided missile capability at extended ranges. Current Soviet preference for smoothbore guns, especially for direct fire roles (that is, tank and antitank), is expected to continue during most of the 1970s because of their advantages. Such weap- ons are devoid of rifling and projectile velocities for hypervelocity armor-piercing (HVAP) rounds are higher than for comparable rifled versions since there are no engraving and torque forces to over- come. Likewise, the gun design permits the use of non-spin high-explosive antitank (HEAT) ammuni- tion, resulting in more efficient terminal ballistics. Further development of smoothbore weapons for firing rocket-assisted and guided projectiles may be expected by the end of the forecast period. attenuation liners for the interior of tank turrets have appeared. Pre- liminary estimates indicate that these liners are of limited effectiveness against radiation, but exact details are lacking. The Soviets have the techno- logical capability to develop devices and features which would provide a higher degree of protec- on for tank crews In contaminated areas. The most likely achievements expected in the next few years are the use of collective protector filtration And over-pressurization for defense against chemi- cal and biological attack, as well as protection from alpha and beta particulates. Since tank mobility adds to protection, improved speed and cruising range of the medium tank are anticipated. By the end of the 1970s, the cruising range with on-board fuel may be extended to 500 miles through higher horsepower-to-weight ratios, the use of improved suspension systems, and im- proved power conversion devices. The Soviets are expected to continue efforts to increase off-road speeds with an objective of as much as 30 mph for favorable terrain. Armored personnel carriers (APCs), armored re- connaissance vehicles, and armored amphibious infantry combat vehicles (AAICVs) are found in Soviet inventories. These include a full-tracked, wheeled 'APC in three versions; 4 x 4-wheeled armored amphibious reconnaissance vehicle in two versions, plus a modified version to act as the carrier for three different antitank guided missiles (ATGM) systems; and a full-tracked armored am- phibious infantry combat vehicle. In addition, two older nonamphibious wheeled APCs are still in service. In late 1967, the appearance of a new vehicle, the BMP, marked a major departure in armament and interior layout design from earlier Soviet armored carriers. This full-tracked vehicle features a turret-mounted 76-mm smoothbore gun with a 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun and a superposed Sagger ATGM launcher over the gun. The BMP has a crew of three-driver, commander, and gunner. The squad seen mounted in this vehicle consists of eight men armed with a RPG-7, RPK- type machinegun and 6 AKMs. The 76-mm smooth- bore gun combined with the Sagger ATGM repre- sents a new Soviet concept in armored vehicle arma- ment and is indicative of the direction of related future Soviet developments. The BMP Is the first Soviet APC to have the troop entrance-exit doors In the rear, thus providing more protection than previous APCs which had hatches on the sides or tops of the vehicles. Current Soviet wheeled APCs and reconnais- sance vehicles mounting 14.5-mm machineguns will be retained for many years. Two types of armored personnel carriers will continue to be required-an APC vehicle with a large caliber machinegun and an infantry combat vehicle which can fight in close proximity to main battle tanks and is armed with a weapons system for engaging tanks. Product- improved or new versions of current vehicles prob- ably will be fielded prior to the end of the decade. Improvements probably will include better pro- tective features, more effective gun ammunition, and a newer model antitank guided missile sys- tem. During the latter part of the forecast period a replacement vehicle, either wheeled or tracked, is expected to appear. This vehicle probably will have a combination gun and missile system in one version and an automatic weapon in a second ver- sion, a minimum of one-inch equivalent armor pro- tection over the frontal arc, and CBR collective protection for the crew. Artillery Towed light, medium, and heavy antiaircraft guns produced since the end of World War II have demonstrated a continued effort by the Soviets in the development of air defense weapons. Although only antiaircraft heavy machineguns and light AA artillery are currently considered to be standard, quantities of larger caliber. weapons through 130 mm are available in reserve stocks. The S-60 57-mm AA gun system has been modified over the years, with the latest known improvement being the gradual replacement of the radar/director by an updated/modernized integrated fire-control sys- tem. Exploitation reports indicate that the current Soviet D-130 howitzer is perhaps the best weapon of its class in existence. The introduction of the ZSU-23-4 quad 23-mm self-propelled antiaircraft gun system into the Soviet inventory in the mid- 1960s dearly indicates an effort devoted toward increased capability in air defense. With an on- board integrated fire-control system (radar-optical- director), this weapon system is considered a major threat to attacking aircraft. The Soviets are ex- pected to retain antiaircraft artillery weapons in active use by field forces and to continue to im- prove their weapons, ammunition, and fire-control equipment. The Soviets have also made significant strides within the ipast decade in tube field artillery weapons. the latest Soviet tube artillery about 1963 showed excellent design and engineering, and performance that is on a par with that of comparable artillery of any nation. The Soviets have also developed and produced in the last decade a series of smoothbore weapons (anti- tank artillery, tank armament, and infantry weap- ons) that, from the standpoint of production state- of-the-art and technology and possibly engineering and design, may have surpassed related weapons of Free World nations. Recent information indi- cates that the Soviets are experimenting with high- speed rotary forging and electro-slag remelt steel processing for the production of artillery and tank gun barrels. Artillery rockets The Soviets have developed and used multiple- and single-launch, free-flight rocket systems to pro- vide fire support for their ground forces. They have been innovative and for some systems have made a minimum application of technology with good re- sults; for example, in the design of aerodynamic baffle-type devices to shape the rocket trajectory. They have mounted a crane on a rocket launcher vehicle which has eliminated the requirement for a separate crane truck. Most evident is their philos- ophy of adopting a basic rocket system, then up- grading the performance and reliability through a series of product improvements. Infantry weapons There exists a Soviet family of small-arms that are simple in design, extremely reliable, sufficiently accurate at combat ranges. and easily manufactured. All contemporary Soviet small arms (except pistols) are designed around the Kalashnikov rotary-bolt system mechanism and use one of two cartridges- either the 7.62 x 39 M43 or the 7.62 x 54 rimmed cartridge. Squad-level weapons use the low-recoil M43 round; sniper rifles and machineguns use the more powerful 7.62 x 54 cartridge. The Soviets ap- pear content with their current weapons and for the next few years, until 1980 at least, only minor product improvements are expected to evolve. So- viet troops now have second-generation infantry antitank weapons employing rocket-assisted projec- tiles. These consist of the squad 40/85-mm recoiless grenade launcher, the RPG.7; the battalion 73-mm recoiless gun; and possibly a new squad antitank weapon, the RPG-15. The Soviets are well advanced in this field and have introduced a number of sig- nificant features such as in-bore spinning of projec- tiles that will function in both closed- and open- breech smoothbore weapons, thus meeting a re- quirement for uniform thrust alignment of rocket- assisted projectile; wave-shaping techniques that have reportedly achieved six-cone diameter pene- tration; and simple but high-quality optical sights that enhance hit probability. Ammunition The Soviets are expected to continue their con- siderable research effort in improving ammunition effectiveness. Although new items to be developed will be greater casualty producers, they will be the result of evolution, and no major breakthrough in design technology is anticipated within the next five years. The USSR is at present slightly ahead of the US in the penetration capability of armor- piercing ammunition, but Soviet state-of-the-art for fuses and antipersonnel ammunition is well behind that pf the US. It can be expected that the Soviet R&D effort will be accelerated to close these gaps. Mine detection equipment Soviet mine detection equipment has received continued attention. The Soviet Ground Forces are equipped with electronic detectors capable of de- tecting metallic mines. Ongoing R&D is directed toward providing a reliable means of detecting non- metallic mines. Infrared and trace gas analysis tech- niques under investigation may result in the intro- duction of a nonmetallic mine detector into the Ground Forces within the next five years. Soviet mine field-breaching equipment consists principally of mine rollers, plows, and rigid explosive line charges. These devices are expected to remain in the Ground Forces inventory and may be aug- mented by fuel-air explosives if current R&D ef- forts in this field produce promising results. Transport vehicles Soviet transport vehicle RDT&E is under the direction of the Scientific Research Automotive and Engine Institute. Current efforts are aimed at con- TO ECRET tinued Improvements of vehicle configurations, per- formance, and mobility. These goals are being at- tained by concentrating design efforts on the de- velopment of such improved components as propul- sion, suspension, braking, steering, and electrical systems for both wheeled and tracked vehicles. The Soviets have also evaluated the prototypes of such special purpose vehicles as the Archimedian screw, marginal terrain (air-roll), wheeled 5- and 15-ton amphibians for ship-to-shore operation, and electric- powered vehicles. Additionally, a highly mobile, tracked, self-propelled field kitchen designed to support armored and mechanized units has been developed and field tested. A new family of cab-over-engine, diesel-powered vehicles in the payload category of 8 tons and over are currently undergoing prototype evaluation. The vehicles are intended for future production (1975- 80) at the new Kama River Plant which is now under construction. Additionally, the Scientific Re- search Automotive and Engine Institute is currently evaluating two high-performance diesel engine pro- totypes of 75 and 125 hp. The successful develop- ment of these prototypes coupled with the produc- tion of larger diesel engines for the future Kama vehicles will provide the Soviet Union with the capability of converting all military vehicles to diesel power, if so desired. Development of 8 x 8 vehicles in the payload category of 10 tons and over will continue. A re- designed version of the ZIL-135 (8 x 8) and a replacement vehicle for the one-half ton CAZ-69 (4 x 4) possibly incorporating diesel engines are anticipated in the 1975-80 period. A prototype ve- hicle incorporating the Archimedian screw principle with a 4 x 4-wheeled vehicle may appear in the early 1980s. Concepts of this design have been re- cently published. By the mid-1970s, improved PMP-type ponton bridge equipment probably will make its appear- ance along with helicopter-emplacement short-gap bridging. Development of a multiple-span, scissors- type, tank-launched assault bridge is likely in the 1975-80 period. By 1985, Soviet multipurpose am- phibious bridges will be available to supplement or replace the PMP-type equipment. Reconnaissance drones There has been a conspicuous lack of informa- tion on Soviet activities and thinking on this sub- ject; however, four Soviet drone developments have become known. Two, the LA-17 radio-controlled ramjet target drone launched from aircraft inflight and the LA-17M ground-launched reconnaissance drone, are subsonic. The third, which appeared as a sketch in an East German publication, is a recon- naissance drone mounted on a launching rack on top of an eight-wheeled amphibious vehicle. The caption stated that the drone has a piston engine and carries cameras. The fourth drone, known as the Luggage, is about 84 feet in length, pilotless, and believed to be a surfaced-launched tactical reconnaissance aircraft. The concept of employing small pilotless aircraft for battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance, par- ticularly in nuclear warfare, has distinct advantages. Fabrication and deployment of large numbers of such drone aircraft are entirely within the Soviet capability with respect to airframe, powerplant, and sensor components. Consequently, a steady advance of the Soviet drone program may be expected dur- ing the 1972-80 period. Such aircraft would be rela- tively unsophisticated, reflecting current military requirements and state-of-the-art for this period. By 1980 the Soviet drone program might be in full stride, and by this time a number of special-purpose, high-performance (probably supersonic) aircraft could be in operation. Nuclear power supply The Soviets are making a concerted effort to de- velop nuclear power supplies for military use on land as well as in space. Small nuclear reactor power plants were begun to be developed before 1956; however, by 1963 only two types of nuclear plants had entered the testing stage. These were the TES-3, a water-cooled reactor, and the Arbus, an organic liquid-cooled reactor. Because of problems asso- ciated with fouling of the fuel element heat transfer surfaces, development of the Arbus was discon- tinued in 1969. The follow-on to the TES-3 is the Sever, which is an air-transportable plant that gen- erates 1500 We and can operate for four years between refuelings. NAVAL WARFARE Organizations within the staff of the Naval Head- quarters in Moscow appear to have overall supervi- sion of Soviet naval research and development. The Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Shipbuilding and Armaments and subordinate directorates probably have the largest share of this responsibility. The most significant of these directorates are the Direc- torate of Shipbuilding, the Mine and Torpedo Di- rectorate, and the Rocket and Artillery Directorate. One other naval directorate known only as the Fifth Directorate is important in Soviet naval re- search and development but may not be subordi- nate to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Ship- building and Armament. The Fifth Directorate is clearly concerned with naval electronics, particu- larly fire-control electronics and electronics for sub- marine detection including sonar. Coordination of the research activities of the various directorates is probably accomplished through the Naval Scien- tific and Technical Committee, of which the Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Shipbuilding and Arma- ment is chairman. In addition to the naval R&D and design facilities noted earlier in the Facilities section, including re- search organizations subordinate to the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry and other military-industrial ministries, direct support work for naval R&D in the fields of hydroacoustics and radio wave propa- gation has also been identified in the Academy of Sciences. Hydroacoustics R&D support work for the Navy has been conducted at the Acoustics Institute, and the radio wave propagation work has been con- ducted at the Institute of Terrestrial Magnetism, the' Ionosphere and Radio Wave Propagation (IZMIRAN), Krasnaya Pakhra. In addition, some unidentified research in the field of terrestrial mag- netism is currently being carried out for an uniden- tified naval organization by personnel of the Mag- netic Measurements Laboratory of IZMIRAN. Other unidentified research possibly related to subma- rine detection is being carried out for the Fifth Directorate of the Navy by a group within the De- partment of Plasma Energetics at Krasnaya Pakhra which is subordinate to the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow. Surface ships A substantial number of the major Soviet surface combatants which have appeared in the past 5 years have Russian designations which indicate a main mission of antisubmarine warfare. The Kresta-I, Kresta-II, Kanin, and probably the Krivak classes of ships are designated Bolshoy Protivolodochnyy Korabl =BPK (large antisubmarine ships), the Moskva is designated Protivolodochnyy Kreyser- PKR (for antisubmarine cruiser), and the Grisha is designated Maliy Protivolodochnyy Korabl'-MPK (small antisubmarine ship). The one exception to this pattern is the Nanuchka class which is desig- nated Raketnyy Korabl' Maliy-.RKM (small rock- et ship). This designation is similar to that for the older Kildin and Krupnyy classes which were designated RKB (large rocket ship) but are now being converted to BPKs. While the new com- batant types are apparently oriented toward anti- submarine warfare, their surface-to-surface missile armament renders them formidable threats in ship- to-ship combat. In this respect there is some evi- dence to suggest that the SAM systems on some of these ships-Kresta-I and -II, Moskva, and Kanin- may have a surface-to-surface capability. The continuing Soviet capability to design and construct good-quality surface ships armed with a variety of missile systems is demonstrated by the new Kara-class CLGM. This ship is larger than the Kresta-I and -II. It has surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and appears to be the first Soviet combatant equipped with both short- and long-range SAMs. The precise missile systems on this ship are not yet clearly defined, but they ap- pear to be the SS-N-10, SA-N-3, and SA-N-4. The multilayer air defense capabilities associated with this ship suggest it may be intended as a task force command cruiser, but it could also be a new and larger ASW ship (BPK). The large ship under construction at Nikolayev, designated the 444B, was launched in December 1972. This ship may represent a new direction in Soviet surface combatants. It is about 890 feet long and has a waterline beam of about 110 feet. An angled flight deck some 600 feet long, 84 feet wide, and angled about 4? to port has been installed. The widest part of the ship is about 155 feet. An island type of superstructure is under construction T(I~0.5ECRET amidships on the starboard side. Weapons or elec- tronic positions occupy an area just beyond the for- ward edge of the flight deck, probably restricting flight operations to the angled deck. Most likely connected with this ship is the de- velopment program of the Ram-G V/STOL aircraft. The guided-missile helicopter ship Moskva is be- lieved to have conducted flight operations with the Ram-C on 18 November 1972. These tests probably were to determine relative wind conditions over the flight deck for launch and recovery operations while It is expected that the Ram-C will continue its test program aboard the Moskva and eventually be deployed aboard the 444B when it is completed. The 444B with its embarked V/STOL aircraft probably will be used to provide air support to amphibious forces or air defense for surface task forces. It may also have an ASW or amphibious assault mission if helicopters are embarked. It is estimated that the 444B will begin operating in early 1975. There are indications that construc- tion of a second unit commenced in January 1973. No large new amphibious support ships have appeared in the past five years. The most signifi- cant new craft for amphibious forces are the ACVs of the Gus and Aist classes. The 30-ton Gus class appears to be in limited series production. The 120- to 180-ton Aist class is temporarily, at least, the largest military air cushion vehicle (ACV) in the world, though it is roughly comparable in size to the British SRN-4 passenger and vehicle ferry. Further Soviet accomplishments in amphibious ACVs are suggested by the fact that in the past five years new shipyard facilities have been built in Leningrad apparently dedicated largely to ACV construction. A significant new naval auxiliary, the Boris Chilikin-a large under way replenishment ship- appeared in 1971. It appears to be the first Soviet auxiliary to be equipped with modern gear for the efficient and rapid transfer of liquids and dry stores to warships under way at sea. Only one unit exists at present; however, others may be built later. Such ships will increase the effectiveness of fleet operations in the Mediterranean Sea and other areas far from Soviet bases. Submarines Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, the pro- duction of a Soviet strategic counterpart to the UIO Polaris force was authorized. The very limited capability of the first generation of Soviet ballistic missile submarines (H-class SSBN, G-class SSB, and Z-conversion SSB), taken together with Soviet statements avowing their rejection of an inferior posture in the strength of SLBM forces, made it virtually certain that a submarine like the new Y-class with its 1,300-nm SS-N-6 missile would appear. Construction on the first of these 16-tube submarines began at Severodvinsk in 1964. This lead unit was launched in 1966. In 1969 the first Y-class submarine was launched at a second yard- Komsomolsk-in the Soviet Far East. While this class of submarine was predictable, we were sur- prised at the intensity and speed of construction of these enormously complex and expensive ships. At the beginning of 1972, evidence was avail- able on the development of four new Soviet bal- listic missile submarines. Three of these-the H-III, the 402M, and 402K-are modifications of existing ballistic missile types. The oldest, the H-III, has been observed since 1967 and is the test platform for the SS-NX-8, the new 4,150-nm naval missile. The 402M is a lengthened G-class diesel-powered ballistic missile submarine whose modification re- sembles that of the H-III. The reason for the 402M modification is unknown. It could be the beginning of a program to modify the remaining Golf-I sub- marines to carry the SS-NX-8 missile, or it could represent a test platform for a new, as yet un- identified, missile. The program to convert 15 G-I class units (which carry the 350-nm SS-N-4 missile) to G-IIs (which carry the 750-nm SS-N-5 missile), however, appears to be continuing, and only eight G-I class units remain to be converted. The third modification involves another modi- fied G-I, designated the 402K. This also is a length- ened G class but is of quite different configura- tion from the 402M and H-III. The original length of the sail on the 402K has been retained but made narrower, and its original missile tubes appear to have been removed. Aft of the old sail a low "turtle back" containing four missile-launch tubes has been added, and the overall length of the ship is 58 feet greater than the original G class. There is no E logical explanation for the retention of the same length of sail without missile tubes, but this fact suggests that the 402K is an experimental effort. In December 1969 a new missile, designated the KY-9, was0 at the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range. There is tenuous evidence that it may be a naval missile and that the missile transporters and support equipment are similar to those used for the SS-N-6 missile carried by the Y class. This suggests that KY-9 may have dimensions close to those of the SS-N-6. It is estimated that the tubes in the low "turtle back" on the 402K submarine could probably accommodate a missile of about the same length as the SS-N-6, and this leads to speculation that the 402K may be a test platform for the KY-9. In addition to the foregoing three modifications of existing ballistic missile submarines, a new, large nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, desig- nated the D class, has appeared. This ship is similar to but longer than the Y class and is fitted with 12 instead of 16 missile tubes. It seems virtually certain that this submarine is the long sought plat- form on which the SS-NX-8 missile will be de- ployed. The D class is 24 to 26 feet longer than the Y class. Its speed is unknown but presumably will be comparable with that of the Y class and possibly will incorporate improved sound quieting features over those of the Y class. In the torpedo attack class submarines we had anticipated during the past 5 years a follow-on, quieter submarine than the N-class SSN. The new V-class SSN, as predicted, is quieter in many re- spects than the older N class but not nearly as quiet at comparable speeds as the quietest US nuclear submarines. One of the reasons why the V-class (and the other second-generation Soviet nuclear submarines) is not as quiet as US sub- mar'nes apparently is because the Soviets delib- erately chose to give it a very high speed (32 knots) capability. This evidently led to the omission, to any significant degree, of sound isolation mounting of machinery in order to pack a large amount of power into the limited hull volume. The quieting that was accomplished appears to be related pri- marily to improved hydrodynamic design of the hull and the use of larger, slower turning propellers. This insistence on high speed at the expense of quietness is a significant peculiarity of Soviet sub- marine design philosophy. There is little indica. tion at present that speed will be sacrificed for quietness. Also appearing during the past few years was the B-class, diesel-powered submarine. While not unexpected, it is not considered a significant threat as a combatant. Only four of these were built, and they are widely dispersed in the Pacific, Northern and Black Sea fleets. It is speculated that they are intended as very quiet target submarines for use in ASW exercises and development. If this is correct, the B-class represents another Soviet R&D effort to improve ASW capabilities. The A-class SSN, the third new Soviet torpedo attack submarine appearing in the past few years, is unique in that it is the smallest Soviet nuclear- powered submarine and has had nearly a 3-year period of fitting out and shipyard availability fol- lowing its launching in 1969. The long delay in its becoming operational suggests there is some- thing special about it. Possible explanations of this based on very tenuous evidence are: a. Difficulties with a new type of nuclear propulsion plant, possibly incorporating more advanced noise control features; b. Difficulties with a new type of "rocket torpedo" weapon system or a counter to such a system; c. Difficulties entailed in the possible first use on this submarine of a substantial quantity of hull or machinery components made of advanced new materials such as titanium alloys. d. Some combination of the above. Concerning Soviet cruise missile submarine de- velopments, the C-class SSGN with its revolu- tionary, short-range, submerged-launched, antiship- dence of Soviet interest in and tenuous evidence of the possible testing of a submerged-launched cruise missile of unidentified characteristics in 1966. The evidence, however, was judged insufficient as a basis for predicting the early appearance of such a weapon system. The C-class submarine and its weapon system is a startling example of the Soviet capability to conceive and execute unique new weapons in virtually complete secrecy. Tn;\ Spt FT Like the A-class torpedo attack submarine, the P-class SSCN (which also appeared in 1969) was thought to be in series production. The conspicuous absence after nearly 3 years of any additional units, however, suggests that the P class is also a de- velopmental prototype. The P class appears to have become operational, but little is known about its weapon systems. It appears to have 10 or 12 missile tubes in its bow in an arrangement similar to that in the C class. This suggests that it also is intended to launch cruise missiles from a submerged posi- tion. On the other hand, the P class is much larger than the C class and has twin rather than single screw propulsion. Also, there is some evidence that the A-class submarine launches a missile having a greater range than that of C class by a factor of 3 to 5. There is no evidence to explain how target acquisition and fire-control data could be obtained for the submerged launching of a missile having this great range. Of particular note in Soviet submarine-related R&D during the past 5 years have been develop- ments in navigation and communications systems and the appearance of a "submersible" project. De- velopments bearing on the navigation of ballistic missile submarines include the appearance of radio- metric sextants (Cod Eye) on the H- and Y-class submarines. The navigation satellite system may have become operational only in early 1972. Under- water communications equipment has been firmly identified in Soviet submarines and surface ships, and it is highly probable that the Soviets have been developing improved underwater communications systems. Such systems can greatly facilitate joint submarine and surface ship ASW operations.. During the past 15 years Soviet open literature has-revealed a significant interest on the part of the shipbuilding industry in titanium alloys. Two known applications of titanium alloys by the ship- building industry have been in the manufacture of some components of torpedoes and in the manu- facture of sonar domes. Some aspects of the open literature after 1965, however, have suggested that the Soviets may be about to introduce titanium as a hull structural material. There were indications in 1970 of Soviet use of titanium at a submarine ship- yard, but this evidence does not permit a deter- mination of how and for what purpose the material was used. Although titanium alloys are generally expensive and difficult to weld, these disadvantages are rapidly being overcome and the high strength- to-weight ratio of these materials can have very significant effects on the capabilities of surface ships or submarines where they are used extensively in the hull structure. It should not be a surprise if some Soviet shipbuilding use of titanium alloys in the hull structure of surface ships or submarines is identified in the next few years. Soviet literature also has revealed continuing re- search activity related to industrial noise control leading to improved understanding of vibrations, with particular applications to marine structures. The quantitative evaluation of actual Soviet prog- ress in noise reduction, however, must await obser- vation of ships and submarines at sea. In this re- spect, as previously mentioned, the new A-class submarine is of particular interest. anti-sonar coatings have previously been identified on Soviet submarines, and this new thicker coating indicates continued Soviet development in this field. It is considered most likely that a coating of this thickness is intended to reduce the reflected energy of sonar signals from torpedoes with active acoustic homing systems. The thicker coating also would probably be more effective than the earlier thin coating against the lower frequency active sonars on the more modern surface ASW ships. There is some possibility that the coating could be designed to reduce the radiated noise of the submarine at some of the higher radiated noise frequencies, but this is considered a less likely intended purpose. Aircraft The Soviets have continued to emphasize devel- opment of naval airborne systems. During the past 5 years the Bear D (TU-95R) reconnaissance ver- sion of the Bear aircraft, equipped with the Dram- buie target acquisition data link and serving anti- ship cruise missile launching ships and submarines of the various fleets, has appeared in the Soviet Naval Air Force. In addition, the Hormone B heli- copter equipped with Drambuie has appeared on the Kresta-I class ship. Three new ASW aircraft also made their appearance: the May (IL-38), which is a land-based turboprop equipped with sono- buoys, a J-band surface-search radar (Wet Eye), magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) gear, and ASW weapons; an ASW version of the Bear (TU-142), apparently equipped similarly to the May but without a MAD boom; and the Hormone TOP- CRET A helicopter, equipped with dipping sonar and de- ployed on the Moskva and Leningrad ASW heli- copter carriers. Another development has been the appearance of the LRAF Blinder B aircraft equipped with the AS-4 in naval exercises. The missile on the Blinder B has probably been modified and provided with a homing capability and conventional warhead. Par- ticipation of this aircraft in naval exercises probably will continue. The appearance of the new swing-wing super- sonic bomber, the Backfire, in a naval context is estimated. There is no evidence of its intended de- ployment in the navy, but past experience (as with the Blinder B, Bear, and the Badger) shows that aircraft apparently developed for the LRAF even- tually are used in a naval role, either within the naval air force or in joint operations in support of the navy. Another development, referred to above, is that the Soviet V/STOL aircraft, the Ram C, has been observed on the Moskva helicopter carrier. Soviet naval missiles which became operational in the past 5 years include one ballistic, four antiship cruise, two surface-to-air, and two air-to-surface weapons. A third air-to-surface missile, the AS-4, is the one carried by Blinder 3, but its naval role is not firmly identified. Of particular note is the pre- ponderance of new Soviet antishipping missile de- velopments during the past 5 years; four of the weapons are ship or submarine launched and two are aircraft launched. The chief significance of the new antishipping weapons lies more in diversity added to the antiship cruise missile threat than in an across-the-board improvement in any particular aspect of performance. Nevertheless, there is much that is new in these systems. Probably the most im- portant single development has been the sub- merged-launched capability of the SS-N-7 with its introduction of the element of surprise. Also of im- portance is the fact that the AS-6 has twice the speed of previous air-to-surface missiles (except for the AS-4), and other new systems have higher speeds and probably improved homing systems. Among the new missiles known or suspected to be under development during 1972, only one is firmly identified as an antiship cruise missile, ~gsecaFx Available information on the KY-9 missile as- sociates it with the Soviet Navy. If intended for naval use, it could, be an unusual new type of ASW weapons Perhaps the most significant new Soviet ASW weapon identified in the past 5 years is the rocket- assisted probable antisubmarine nuclear depth charge designated FRAS-1 (free flight antisub- marine rocket), which is launched from the SUW-N-1 launcher. To date this weapon has been identified only on the Moskva-class antisubmarine helicopter carriers. The SUW-N-1 launcher has been sighted on one unit of the Petya class destroyer escort in the Black Sea, but no further installations have been noted. No data on the actual range and payload of FRAS-1 have been obtained. Its esti- mated maximum range is 32,000 yards. Several new air-dropped weapons were identified during the past few years. The E45-70A is a new 18-inch acoustic homing antisubmarine torpedo. Two aviation depth bomb weapons, called PLAB by the Soviets, have been identified. One is a small aviation depth bomb intended to be dropped in clusters of 5 to 20 and the other, the PLAB-50, is a 250-pound high-explosive bomb that is dropped singly. Two new antisubmarine mines) Called rising mines, one of these apparently is laid from surface ships and submarines and the other, laid from aircraft. These weapons, which are in- tended to be anchored in water having depths to 2,000 feet, float at depths from 150 to 1,150 feet at the end of a cable. Upon receipt of an acoustic signal in a specific frequency range, the mine is released and rises toward the target. The air- dropped version incorporates a rocket that propels the mine up toward the target. These weapons in- coporate features which prevent them from attack- ing surface ships. No evidence of widespread de- ployment of such mines has appeared, but this is as would be expected in peace-time. Mines such as these could be stockpiled without our knowledge. Because it has been so long since the Soviet intro- duction (in 1960) of its latest known acoustic homing antisubmarine torpedo intended to be launched from submarines and surface ships, it is estimated that a new improved torpedo of this Am -,ng the types of torpedoes under development was what was called a "rocket torpedo." This was a weapon that could be launched from surface ships and submarines and propelled through the air by a rocket to a point where it would enter the water. A "rocket torpedo" or a countermeasure to such a weapon may be in In addition to firing the FRAS-1, the SUW-N-1 launcher on the single Petya unit and on Moskva- class helicopter carriers could also fire this kind of rSECaEi It is thought that the weapon pay- may be the E45-70A air- dropped acoustic antisubmarine torpedo. This tor- pedo has been seen on the Moskva class and could be delivered either by the Hormone A helicopter or an Ikara-like weapon. Finally, although the Kresta-II is currently thought to carry the SS-N-10 antishipping cruise missile, the absence on this ship of clearly identifiable guidance radar for the SS-N-10 misfile suggests that its missile launchers are possibly for an ASW weapon like the Ikara. ASW detection systems With the expansion of the Soviet Navy over the years, there has also been a marked increase in Soviet ASW activity, most of which has depended upon acoustic detection of submarines. The Soviets are known to have in operation only one non- acoustic system-MAD equipment in their ASW aircraft-but are fully aware of a wide range of other nonacoustic techniques. New Soviet active sonars and ASW radar identi- fied during the past 5 years and the ships on which they are deployed where known are as follows: 3 kHz sonar (submarines) 3 and 4.5 kHz sonar (Moskva) Possible 4 kHz sonar (Krivak) 8 kHz bull-mounted sonar (Karin and Brenta-11) 14-16 kHz dipping sonar 11-18 kHz sonar (Petya) BM-1 sonobuoy Moored acoustic buoy Ingul device J-band ASW radar These new, lower frequency sonars are deployed mainly in the newer Soviet ships and submarines, whereas the majority of the fleet is equipped with sonars operating in the 15 to 30 kHz frequency range, characteristic of technology between World War II and 1955. The identification of the lower frequency sets, however, clearly illustrates Soviet efforts to increase the range of sonar systems. Back- fitting of older ships with new lower frequency sonars continues slowly.' In addition to using the lower sonar frequencies, the Soviets also first used dipping sonar and variable depth sonar (VDS) during the past five years. The dipping sonar is used mainly by the Hormone helicopters on the Moskva- and Lenin- grad-class ships, but it also has been noted in a few Mirka- and Petya-class ships and on at least one hydrographic ship. The Hormone sonar is an active-passive type with active frequencies in the 14-18 kHz range. There are as yet insufficient data to estimate with confidence the initial detection A reasonable initial detection range of the Moskva VDS under good conditions with the transducer and target on the same side of the layer would be between 4,500 and 7,500 yards. The use of dipping sonar by sur- face ships is not particularly significant since the ship must be practically at rest in the water before it can be used, but it does provide a type of "quick- and-dirty" variable depth capability useful in some special situations. Towed VDSs have appeared on the Moskva and Leningrad, the Krivak class, one unit of the Petya class, and there is some evidence that it is to be back-fitted in units of the Kashin class. In general it appears that the Soviets are "push- ing" their designers of acoustic antisubmarine de- tection devices. There is some evidence that the Moskva and Leningrad helicopter antisubmarine ships were possibly intended to be able to make use of the theoretically high search rates provided by bistatic operations; however, there is little evidence of use of this method, possibly because of difficul- ties with the complex signal processing techniques required by such a system. It is anticipated that the Soviets may pursue this development, however, with an eventual measure of success. New Soviet ASW detection systems for aircraft have included an improved sonobuoy, designated BM-1; a high-resolution radar, designated Wet Eye; and possibly an improved magnetic anomaly de- tector. These new systems do not significantly extend detection ranges of ASW aircraft, but they improve the probability of accurate localization of a submarine contact. The Wet Eye ASW radar and the BM-1 sonobuoy are part of the new ASW de- tection system of the IL-38 and Tu-142. Wet Eye is 77e SECRET a J-band search radar with a range of up to 75 miles against a surfaced submarine. In addition, Wet Eye can transmit coded pulses to interrogate a BM-1 buoy. The BM-1 is the first Soviet sonobuoy to use an FM radio carrier. It is a passive, omni- directional buoy, but several buoys together ap- parently can provide target bearing. An unusual feature of the BM-1 is its restricted audio range of 6 to 7.5 kHz, a narrower bandwidth than any other Soviet accomplishments in fixed submarine detec- tion systems generally have been unspectacular, and there is no evidence that they are anywhere near an effective ocean surveillance system. Soviet devel- opment of fixed (shore-based) hydroacoustic sys- tems has continued during the past 5 years with the installation of a second limited range, acoustic device, designated the Ingul device and the intro- duction of a moored hydroacoustic buoy, designated Cluster Sand by the US. The medium-range Ingul device has been under development since at least 1963. Two of these devices are known to exist, both in the Pacific. The Ingul device is a large cylinder, 65 feet in diameter, probably bottom moored in the deep sound channel which could probably provide detection ranges of less than 100 miles when fully operational against a modern submarine. intended for surveillance of the Kamchatka basin to augment other defenses. It probably would not be effective in most Soviet coastal waters where geographic factors, coupled with limitations in Soviet cable technology, preclude the exploitation of the deep sound channel. Since the spring of 1970, several Cluster Sand buoys have been recovered in widely separate locations in the Barents/ Norwegian Sea area. The buoys are strong, well-made, expen- sive devices that are capable of being moored at considerable depth (to about 4,000 feet) for a long period. a preliminary estimate is that detection ranges against a 'modern nuclear submarine would be less than 10 miles in most areas. Thus, the Cluster Sand system would probably have little effectiveness against SSBNs, unless it was to monitor choke points or other restricted areas. Other uses of the Cluster Sand might be for defense of the sea approaches to the USSR and as delouse points for transiting Soviet submarines. Because of the requirements to protect their own forces and coastal areas from submarine intruders as well as the existence of US Polaris/ Poseidon ballistic missile submarines, it is virtually certain that the Soviets will vigorously pursue research on acoustic and nonacoustic submarine detection sys- tems. For the long term, the Soviet may be at- tempting to develop a revolutionary type of detec- tion/sonar system based upon infrasonic waves, bio- acoustics, or nonlinear acoustics. The Soviets possess a vigorous program for the in situ study of physics of sound in the sea. This type of investiga- tion is costly and tedious but, in the long term is fundamental to prediction of the acoustic environ- ment. Soviet research in array design and signal processing is more or less evolutionary in nature. Progress in array design is suggested by the chap es in the sonar domes appearing on naval chins. For over a decade the Soviets have carried out research and development in a number of areas either directly applicable to or related to the non- acoustic detection of submarines. The full potential of nonacoustic techniques for submarine detection is not yet generally understood, and there is no indication that the Soviets have made greater progress than any other country in developing these techniques. While there is no evidence of a com- prehensive, coordinated R&D program in the USSR for the overall problem of nonacoustic submarine detection, some pertinent research activities are undoubtedly receiving military support and direc- tion. The Soviets have been investigating a number of technologies which have potential application to submarine detection. These include work in such fields as electro-o tics and nuclear and magnetic detection devices EGRET an infrared submarine detection device is being developed. None of these have been developed suf- ficiently for deployment in an ocean surveillance system. Very little evidence of R&D in this and other nonacoustic areas, however, is available. MILITARY ELECTRONICS Communications Soviet communications efforts are currently di- rected toward the creation of a unified automated communications network with the majority of the stated goals of the 1971-75 Five Year Plan having this as their end. Electronic and semi-electronic switching equipment will continue to be developed with actual service not contemplated before 1980. When the problems in developing and producing quality multiplexing equipment are solved, the Soviets can be expected to make full use of the recently developed Voskhod and Druzhba high- capacity radio relay systems. These systems will replace the medium-capacity R-60/120 and R-600 systems In main trunk routes with such new equip- ment as the R-300 and fully transistorized low- capacity links being used on branches and in rural systems. Development of these systems in quantity should not materialize until 1975. Frequency di- vision multiplexing will continue to be heavily used with the emphasis on reliability, miniaturization, and better filter techniques. By 1975, pulse ampli- tude and pulse width modulation will be possible in voice communications. Multichannel laser com- munications have been tested and could come into operational military use in the next few years. Waveguides also have been tested, but the prob- lems inherent in installing and maintaining such a system make its use doubtful. Troposcatter systems will continue to be widely deployed, mainly across inaccessible and rugged terrain. Increased use can be expected of mountain diffraction and passive relay systems for microwave communications beyond the horizon. The USSR has been using buried antennas operating in the lower portion of the HF spectrum since about 1961. These antennas have a high degree of survivability and probably will be used to assure the availability of strategic communica- tions In the period after a nuclear attack. Communi- cations blackout in a nuclear environment would probably exist for an unknown period of time, al- though there is evidence to indicate that the Soviets consider this blackout to be less disruptive and to last for a shorter period of time than predicted in the US. Such antennas were first deployed within the USSR, but they are now appearing in East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, with the total number exceeding 370 antennas at some 150 facilities. Most of the antennas are 16-element arrays of two basic sizes which are usually deployed in pairs on the same azimuth to broaden the frequency range. The gain of the array is about 10 db below that of an aboveground vertical monopole. Even though these antennas launch surface waves that are usable at very short distances (