(EST PUB DATE) CHINA: CAN LARGE ARMS SALES BE SUSTAINED?

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001287103
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2009
• Case Number: F-2006-00532
• Publication Date: June 1, 1987

Directorate of
Intelligence
et
China: Can Large Arms Sales
Be Sustained?
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Office of Global Issues. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to
the Chief,
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APPROVED FOR
RELEASED DATE:
10-Sep-2009
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GI 87-10049
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 31 March 1987
was used in this report.
China: Can Large Arms Sales
Be Sustained?
UI
GI 87-1 . 49
June 1987
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
in
Introduction
1
1980s Arms Sales: A Booming Record
1
Limitations Through the Early'1990s
3
Limited Customer Base 4
Inferior Technology 4
5
7
Implications
7
10
12
14
? 14
C. .
D.
Reverse Blank
17
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21
Pocket
in back
China: Can Large Arms Sales
Be Sustained?
399010 536
During the 1983-85 period, Iran gradually replaced
Iraq as Beijing's primary customer.
During the last two years, China was able to make
more sales to Iraq and Iran as Baghdad resumed
purchases of Chinese equipment and materiel, and
Tehran added to its purchases by buying major
2
?;-
Figure 3. HO-2 SA-2 surface-to-air missile of the type sold to
Iran la 1983.
Chinese equipment for the first time. We estimate
Iraq signed contracts worth more than in
1986. China's large sales to Iran apparently resulted
from Beijing's decision _o deal with Iran
directly. These orders from Iraq and Iran came as
new Chinese contracts with other customers dwindled
to almost insignificant levels.
Chinese weapons and ammunition helped Iran and
Iraq continue the war, and recent deliveries have
enhanced Iranian capabilities.
(figure 3). The limited quantities of HQ-2s delivered
to Iran will not seriously impede Iraqi air attacks on
vital oil terminals and refineries, in our judgment,
Limitations Through the Early 1990s
/China's large sales volume so far in the 1980s
has resulted primarily from Iraq's, and more recently
Iran's, need for inexpensive, easy-to-use weapons.
Without large Iranian and Iraqi purchases, we believe
Chinese arms sales will be significantly reduced until
at least 1990 by a limited customer base, inferior
technology, and marketing weaknesses.
I'M
in sales to Iran: a seal in 198 or ?-2
surface-to-air misst es, antis tp missiles, field artil-
lery, and ammunition; and up to in sales
in 1986 for various weapons systems and ammunition
3
Iran is more likely to continue its large purchases
from China, eijing
is trying to arrange more sales?possibly including
tanks, fighter aircraft, and air-to-air missiles. We
believe Iran's purchases are not likely to equal the
scale of Iraq's past purchases, however, either during
or after the war:
? Tehran's war strategy is based on infantry-artillery
offensives that do not require large quantities of
equipment other than artillery, munitions, and small
arms.
? After the war, we believe that the Iranian military
will seek higher technology non-Communist equip-
ment and that a number of suppliers will be avail-
able.
4
ma soes not hesitate
to o er raining on i s more sophisticated systems,
however; more than 100 Iranians trained in China on
antiship missiles in 1985.
7
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