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February 13, 1964
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Y/7//:.. ,Z77/477/77-/-/-7 ? ."--,7/"/""1"1"1/7.4717:10".77/Z007/474, 'Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 '7 :e. TP PET / / / / / / _ AR 70-14 A I 7,, I A, A A A Z / frd / / / / r I rid I o/ei / 1/, fl_. 1 : \ I / I 14, t scacuiated , , , i ,l 0 , , , , , , r A / 0 RIZ DEVI Staff Study ,4 / .4 .4 tz. t, , ,:i." 04 7, / , t, , ft, , , THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS. CODE ,0 , /-id / 7.?, , , ',/,- / .4 te, , fri., 7, , TOP CRET APPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL RELEASE PROGRAM JUNE 2017 156 Pages Copy 93 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 FOREWORD This staff study of the Office of the Deputy Director (Intelligence) (DD/I) was prepared by the Office of Research and Reports. Its purpose is to review the evidence concerning the nature, scope, and timing of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba in 1962 and to discuss the implications of that evidence. The study is divided into two parts. Part One contains a compre- hensive review of the evidence, which is presented in considerable de- tail in order to provide as complete and factual a reconstruction of the buildup as possible. However, if the reader does not choose to read the detailed assessment of the evidence and is willing to accept the facts and judgments derived therefrom, he may proceed to Part Two, in which the Soviet program as a whole is examined and in which conclu- sions are drawn from the entire body of evidence as to the Soviet concept of the buildup, the timing of the decision to embark on the venture, and the probable Soviet policy considerations and objectives that shaped the decision. The conclusions drawn in the study regarding the implications of the manner in which the Cuban missile base venture was carried out cannot be proved absolutely. It was judged, however, that the major features of the Cuban venture were the result of deliberate, rational Soviet deci- sions that took into account the detailed knowledge of US reconnaissance capabilities acquired by the USSR in May 1960. It is believed, there- fore, that the conclusions represent the most likely interpretation in view of the totality and interrelationship of the evidence available more than a year after the crisis. Because the quality of the evidence ranges from conclusive to am- biguous, an effort has been made throughout the study to indicate clearly the degree of certainty surrounding the information and the judgments based on it. The time period covered begins in early 1960 and ends in November 1962 with the withdrawal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba. The review of evidence in Part One discusses Soviet military and economic relations with Castro's Cuba before 1962, recounts general evidence of the activity related to the buildup as a whole, sets forth on a - TOPS CRET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C01385902 mission basis the details of the deployment of Soviet military forces in Cuba, and concludes with a summary of the withdrawal of offensive weapons. Valuable assistance was provided in the preparation of the study by the Office of Scientific Intelligence, the Office of Current Intelligence, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center, The reader is directed to a complementary paper prepared by the DD/I Research Staff entitled The Soviet Missile Base Venture in Cuba. Although that study also discusses Soviet objectives, the timing of the decision, the Soviet estimate of risk, the course of the buildup, and the reasons for retreat, it is focused differently. Whereas this study collates and studies the hard facts of the buildup, drawing its principal conclusions therefrom, the Research Staff study examines the buildup within the broader con- text of a survey of Soviet foreign policy, placing primary emphasis on political factors, and considers the probable reasons why the USSR estimated that the Cuban venture would involve only a low degree of risk. In those areas where the studies overlap, they reach similar conclusions. Where the studies do not overlap, one study provides additional back- ground for the reader of the other. - iv - Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Summary and Conclusions Part One: The Evidence CONTENTS OOOOOO ? ? ? I. Soviet Military and Economic Relations with Castro's Cuba Before Mid-1962 . . . . . . A. Military Aid B. Economic Aid and Terms of Trade II. General Activity Relating to the Military Buildup A. Early Activity Pate 7 8 9 11 12 12 C. Soviet Merchant Shipping III. Air Defense Systems A. Early Warning and Target Acquisition Radar Capability 1. Before the Beginning of the Buildup 2. During and After the Buildup ? . 22 23 24 24 25 TOP SF1CBET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Aft. 3. Evidence on the Detection and Tracking of US Reconnaissance Overflights Page During 1962 27 B. Surface-to-Air Missile System 28 ? 1. Capability of an Individual Site to Take Action 30 2. Location and Timing of Offloading of SAM Units and Associated ? Equipment ........ . ? . 31 3. Problem of Operational Status 32 4. Timing of Establishment of Individual ? Sites and Support Facilities 33 5. Geographical Pattern of Deployment . . 35 h. Development of an SA-2 System IS Capability 37 C. Fighter Aircraft 38 IV. Naval and Ground Systems ? ? ... . . 41 A. Coastal Defense Missile Systems 41 1. Offloading of Coastal Defense Units and Equipment 41 2. Timing of Deployment of Individual Sites 42 3. Evidence of Intent to Deploy Additional Units 44 B. Komar-Class Patrol Boat Missile System . . 44 C. Submarines 46 D. Soviet Ground Units 47 41 V. Offensive Systems 50 A. MRBM System 51 1111. vi - TOP RET ? Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 1. Origin of the MRBM Units 2. Preparation of Sites and Delivery of Missiles 3. Delivery of Oxidizer and Fuel to Sites 4. Problem of Combat Readiness 5. Target Coverage Page 51 52 58 60 64 B. IRBM System . . ? . ........ 64 1. Timing of Construction Activity at Individual Sites 65 2. Intention to Construct Additional Sites . 66 C. Search for Nuclear Warheads 68 I. Equipment and Facilities . . . ..... 69 2. Shipment to Cuba 71 3. Soviet Statements 73 D. 11-28 Light Bombers ....... ? ? 74 E. Soviet Withdrawal of Offensive Systems 76 1. Week of Crisis, 22-28 October . . ? . 77 2. Pattern of Withdrawal 78 Part Two: Implications of the Evidence 81 I. Concept and Timing of the Soviet Venture in Cuba . 81 A. Defensive Systems 81 B. Offensive Systems 83 D. Implications of the Timing of the Program . . 84 II. Soviet Policy Considerations and Objectives . 85 A. Soviet View of the Risks 85 B. The Decision 88 vii - TOP.56kET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOP SFCRET AMIN Page C. Probable Soviet Objectives . . . . 91 D. The Withdrawal 92 Tables 1. Arrivals of Soviet Ships in Cuba with Holds Capable of Carrying Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles, July-October 1962 . . . . . 55 2. Estimated Time Phasing of Construction at IRBM Sites, August-December 1962 . 67 3. Soviet Withdrawal of MRBM's from Cuba. November 1962 79 Illustrations Following Page Figure 1. Proximity of Cuban Military Com- munications Facilities to Soviet Missile Sites (Map) . . . ..... 20 Figure 2. SAM Site at Caibarien with a Full Load of Missiles, 26 October 1962 (Photograph) 24 Figure 3. Types and Duration of Radar Illumina- tions Recorded During the Reconnais- sance Mission of 2 May 1962 (Map) . 28 Figure 4. Types and Duration of Radar Illumina- tions Recorded During the Reconnais- sance Mission of 5 September 1962 (Map) 28 TO>LRGkE Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Figure 5. Figure 6. Figure 7. Figure 8. Figure 9. Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOP SECRET Sketch of an SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missile Site Following Page 30 SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missiles on Dis- play in the Havana Parade of 2 January 1963 (Photograph) page 29 SAM Site at Los Angeles, Oriente Province, 26 September 1962 (Photograph) 30 SAM Site at Mariel, 23 October 1962 (Photograph) 30 SAM Containers and Ground-Support Equipment at the Santiago de las Vegas Assembly Area, 7 November 1962 (Photograph) Figure 10. Time Phasing of SAM Unit Emplacement (Chart) Figure 11. Time Phasing of SAM Support Facilities (Chart) . . . . ? ...... . . Figure 12. SAM Units Deployed in a Peripheral Defense Pattern During the Crisis Period (Map) Figure 13. SAM Deployment Pattern That Would Have Provided Maximum Defense of Principal Soviet Military Installa- tions During the Crisis Period (Map) Figure 14. Initial Redeployment of SAM Units in Early 1963 -- Emergence of a Point Defense (Map) TOP CRET 32 34 36 36 36 38 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C01385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOP RET Jo% OP Figure 15. MIG-21 Aircraft of the Type Deployed fa Following Page IP in Cuba (Photograph) page 39 Figure 16. MIG-21 Aircraft at Santa Clara Airfield Armed with AA-2 Missiles, 10 November 1962 (Photograph) . 40 Figure 17. Cruise Missile Site at Siguanea ? a Typical Unit Emplacement Pattern, 9 November 1962 (Photograph) . . . 42 Figure 18. Cruise Missiles on Display in the Havana Parade of 2 January 1963 (Photograph) 42 IR Figure 19. Cruise Missile Crates at the Probable Storage Area at Guerra, 9 February 1963 (Photograph) . . . 44 NO Figure 20. Komar-Class Patrol Boats Deployed 46 to Banes During the Crisis Period, 3 November 1962 (Photograph) . . . Figure 21, Soviet F-Class Submarine Under Sur- veillance by US Destroyers in the Vicinity of the Cuban Quarantine 1111 Zone, 11 November 1962 (Photo- graph) 46 Figure 22. Figure 23. Soviet Armored Combat Group En- campment at Remedios, 1 February 1963 (Photograph) . . . . . . . 48 dP x Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 `4000 Figure 24. Part of the Armored Equipment Located at the Remedios Encamp- ment During the Crisis Period, 25 October 1962 (Photograph) Following Page 48 Figure 25. FROG Missiles on Display in Moscow (Photographs) 48 Figure 26. Soviet MRBM on Display in the Moscow Parade of 7 November 1960 (Photo- graph) page 50 Figure 27. Soviet Large-Hatch Ship Kirnovsk Approaching Cuba on 21 September 1962 (Photograph) 54 Figure 28. Soviet Large-Hatch Ship Poltava Return- ing to the USSR on 31 October 1962 After Imposition of the US Quarantine (Photograph) 54 Figure 29. MRBM Launch Site 1 at San Cristobal, 15 October 1962 (Photograph) 58 Figure 30. MRBM Launch Site 1 at San Cristobal, 17 October 1962 (Photograph) 58 Figure 31. MRBM Launch Site 1 at San Cristobal, 23 October 1962 (Photograph) 58 Figure 32. Construction of the Nuclear Weapons Facility in Progress at MRBM Launch Site San Cr1stoba.1, 23 October 1962 (Photograph) 58 Figure 33. MRBM Launch Site 1 at Sagua la Grande, 17 October 1962 (Photograph) . . . . 58 Figure 34. MRBM Launch Site 2 at Sagua la Grande, 17 October 1962 (Photograph) . . . . 58 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TO? SECRET Figure 35. MRBM Launch Site 2 at Sagua la Grande, 23 October 1962 (Photograph) Figure 36. MRBM Launch Site 2 at Sagua la Grande, 23 October 1962 (Photograph) Following Page 58 58 Figure 37. MRBM Launch Site I at Sagua la Grande, 26 October 1962 (Photograph) 58 Figure 38. MRBM Launch Site 3 at San Cristobal, 27 October 1962 (Photograph) . . . . 58 Figure 39. MRBM Oxidizer Trailers Apparently Being Loaded at the Punta Gerardo Storage Facility, 27 October 1962 (Photograph) 60 Figure 40. MRBM Launch Site 1 at San Cristobal, 23 October 1962 (Photograph) . . . . 64 Figure 41. Target Coverage of the US That Would Have Been Provided by MRBM's and IRBM' s Deployed in Cuba (Map) . . 64 66 Figure 42. IRBM Launch Site 1 at Guanajay, 17 October 1962 (Photograph) . . . . Figure 43, IRBM Launch Site 1 at Guanajay, 23 October 1962 (Photograph) . . Figure 44. Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 66 70 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOPET Figure 45. Completed Drive-Through Nuclear Weapons Facility at IRBM Launch Site 1 at Guanajay, 1 November 1962 (Photographs) Figure 46. 11-28 Bombers Being Assembled at San Julian Airfield, 27 October 1962 (Photograph) Figure 47. MRBM Launch Site 1 at Sagua la Grande, 26 October 1962 (Photograph) Following_ Page 72 76 78 Figure 48.- MRBM Launch Site 3 at San Cristobal, 1 November 1962 (Photograph) . . . 78 Figure 49. Missile Equipment at the Port of Ma.riel, 2 November 1962 (Photo- graph) 78 Figure 50. Missiles and Missile Equipment Await- ing Shipment at the Port of Marie', 9 November 1962 (Photograph). . .? 80 Figure 51. The Soviet Freighter Kasimov Return- int 11-28's to the USSR, 5 December 1962 (Photographs) 80 Figure 52. Identifiable Milestones of the Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba (Chart) . . 82 TOP RET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 ?.16. TOPZET ..01%? 110 111. PA 110 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 CUBA 1962: KHRUSHCHEV'S MISCALCULATED RISK Summary and Conclusions During the period from the end of July through October 1962 the USSR delivered to Cuba and deployed large quantities of weapons, equipment, and personnel representing a broad spectrum of Soviet military strength. These forces, which comprised a complete air defense system, naval and ground defense units, and two strategic missile systems, were. equipped with some of the most advanced weapons available to the USSR. Although some of these forces were combat-ready during the critical week in October before Khrushchev announced the Soviet decision to draw back from direct military confrontation with the US, the original Soviet timetable apparently did not call for the completion of many of the major elements of the military establishment in Cuba, including the air defense system and medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) units, until some time during the first half of November. The concept and execution of the venture clearly indicate that the Soviet authorities made no appreciable effort to prevent or delay US detection by aerial reconnaissance of the offen- sive weapons during the deployment phase. It is believed that the most likely explanation is that they judged the risk of a US military reaction to be very slight. The chain of events that culminated in the Cuban crisis of October 1962 can be traced back to the visit of Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan to Cuba in February 1960. This visit constituted the first public endorsement of the Cuban revolution, after a. year of Soviet reserve following Castro's seizure of power and Soviet diplomatic recognition of the regime. It was followed by a series of economic assistance agreements and, in the third quarter of 1960, the first Soviet deliveries of land armaments. Soviet military aid to Cuba thereafter proceeded cautiously and deliberately, particularly when compared with assistance to other countries, as though the Soviet leaders were carefully testing both US reactions and their relations with the Castro regime. Deliveries of fighter aircraft to Cuba, TOSCRET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 ?616" TOIEC.,12ET probably planned before the Bay of Pigs invasion, were not made until about June 1961. Following the Bay of Pigs episode, there was a period of assimilation and assessment, after which arms shipments, including the first naval vessels, were resumed. By late 1961 or early 1962 the decision may have been made to provide obsolescent 11-28 (Beagle) jet light bombers, but the Soviet authorities continued through mid-1962 to withhold from Cuba more advanced weapons that were already being supplied to other countries and limited their deliveries to weapons intended for defensive purposes, including the maintenance of internal order. Although there is now available some evidence of a limited influx of Soviet personnel and increased activity in Cuba in the first half of 1962, probably foreshadowing subsequent manifestations of the drastic change in Soviet policy toward Cuba, the actual deployment of Soviet military forces to the Caribbean did not begin until the end of July. As it was unfolded over the next 3 months, the Soviet program for the establishment of a military base in Cuba was characterized by a high degree of concurrency in deploying and bringing to operational status both the major offensive and the major defensive systems. The Soviet concept of the venture obviously did not envision the initial establishment of an island defense in order to test US reaction and screen the subsequent introduction of strategic missile forces. Although increasingly advanced Soviet radars were added to those existing in Cuba before the buildup, although more than 60 early model MIG fighters and adequate communications facilities were already available, and although SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) units were emplaced in western Cuba during August and in eastern Cuba during September, an integrated, centrally directed air defense system was not brought into operation in Cuba until 27 October, the day before the Soviet decision to withdraw offensive missiles was announced. Moreover, the fact that this system expanded steadily for some time thereafter indicates that its activation at that time probably was earlier than planned. Command and control communications links between the USSR and Cuba had been activated only a few days earlier, also prematurely and in apparent response to US actions following detection of the strategic missile sites. Meanwhile, however, con- struction and preparation of the MRBM and intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites had been underway since early September, and the missiles and unique system equipment were delivered to M.RBM sites -Z - TOISCkE71 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOP from about mid-September through mid-October. Thus the SAM units and other air defense elements were not planned to become operational as a system for at least a month and a half after the presence of MRBM's in Cuba rendered Soviet intentions subject to detection. In addition, the geographical pattern of SAM deployment indicates that maximum protection of the strategic missile sites was not the govern- ing consideration. The SAM deployment pattern was planned to provide an islandwide area defense, affording no greater protection to the stra- tegic missile sites and other military installations than to all other locations on the island. The precise degree of combat readiness of the 24 MRBM launch positions in Cuba at the time of the crisis cannot be determined from available evidence, even in retrospect. The principal uncertainty con- cerns the presence or absence of nuclear warheads; the evidence on this aspect of the buildup is so ambiguous and inconclusive that it is not possible to reach a judgment based on factual information. It is clear, however, that the Soviet program for the MRBM units was not complete by the time of the crisis. These units were originally de- ployed in a field mode, following which work was begun on the prepa- ration of more permanent facilities. This work was not completed at any of the sites by the time dismantling began but probably would have been completed by about mid-November. Similarly, some of the sites may not have been fully equipped when the crisis occurred. If nuclear warheads were available, these shortcomings probably would not have prevented the launching of some missiles from all six sites during the critical week in October but might have affected significantly the time required to launch a salvo, as well as its effectiveness. On balance it remains uncertain whether the Soviet leaders could have considered the Cuban MRBM units sufficiently combat-ready to participate in a coordinated nuclear attack on the US at any time during the crisis. With respect to the IRBM sites, which required far more extensive preparation, there is conclusive evidence that construction had not been completed by the end of October, nor had the missiles and most system equipment arrived at the sites. The missiles were almost certainly en route to Cuba when the US quarantine was imposed. Although proceed- ing at a rapid pace, construction of all three IRBM sites that were under- way in October would not have been completed until about mid-December; if a fourth IRBM site was planned, as seems possible, it could not have been operational before some time in January 1963. TOPS.ICET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 The 42 11-28 jet light bombers and trainers delivered to Cuba be- ginning in late September were almost certainly not considered by the Soviet planners as an integral part of their offensive capability in Cuba but apparently were intended for the Cuban forces from the outset. / Moreover, at the rate at which they were being assembled after their delivery, they would not have been fully oper- ational until at least March 1963, thus being distinctly out of phase with the timing of the offensive missile systems. Although the Soviet authorities were fully aware of US photorecon- naissance capabilities by May 1960 and may have been aware of US overflights of Cuba by mid-1962, they made no effort in planning and executing the Cuban venture to reduce the risks of detection by US reconnaissance. This is evidenced not only by their concurrent deploy- ? ment of offensive and defensive systems but also by their failure to camouflage or conceal unique mRpm system equipment, particularly the missiles themselves, before the crisis. The measures taken after the crisis began probably were a reaction to the initiation of low- altitude reconnaissance. Furthermore, there was no apparent effort to minimize the length of time during which some MRBM units were detectable before all of the MRBM units were emplaced, equipped, and combat-ready. Hence there would have been a period of about 2 months between the arrival in about mid-September of the first MRBM's and the estimated completion in mid-November of the full MRBM deployment program. The conclusion seems inescapable that the Soviet leaders in their planning did not regard the possibility of US detection as critical to the success or failure of the Cuban venture. Unless the Soviet authori- ties were convinced that no measures could be taken to delay or prevent US detection, as seems unlikely, they must have chosen to disregard US reconnaissance, capabilities. Thus they probably judged with con- siderable assurance that the US would acquiesce in the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba or at least would not attempt to force their removal by reacting militarily. In any event, at some point in the process the Soviet leaders reached the conclusion that the advantages to be gained from the installation of Soviet nuclear striking power with- in 100 miles of US soil outweighed whatever risks they estimated were 4 TOP S ET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 involved. Moreover, in spite of some signs of Soviet concern, the deployment of strategic missiles proceeded unscreened by an activated SAM system even after President Kennedy's statements of 4 and 13 September implied that the US possessed photographic evidence of the buildup to that time and explicitly warned the USSR of the grave consequences if the US detected offensive weapons in Cuba. Although it is not possible to trace the evolution of the Cuban plan or the specific decisions involved, the venture may have been con- ceived late in 1961 or at the beginning of 1962, when Khrushchev apparently was seeking some military means of rapidly and signifi- cantly improving the USSR's bargaining position in the German negoti- ations. There is some evidence that planning and initial preparations occurred in the USSR and Cuba during the first quarter of 1962. It is unlikely, however, that the final commitment was made until April or May, probably after Moscow had assessed and acquiesced in Castro's assertion of authority over the Cuban Communist movement in late March and early April. One element in the Soviet miscalculation of the risks may have been the Soviet view of the role and significance of foreign military bases. Having lived restively under the shadow of US strategic bases for more than a decade, the Soviet leaders probably have come to regard them, particularly in the age of the ICBM, as a disquieting but not major phenomenon of great power relations. Castro's Cuba presented Khrushchev with his first opportunity to establish an over- seas military base. He may have felt confident that the US would understand the rules as he did -- that military bases on the opponent's periphery are facts of great power life which fall far short of a prov- ocation to war. Although such a view may have been a factor in the miscalculation of the Soviet leaders, their over-all judgment of the risks in Cuba must have been based on a much broader assessment of Soviet-US relations. Khrushchev probably had a greater objective in sight than simply the establishment of a military base in the Western Hemisphere. In deciding to deploy offensive missiles in Cuba, the Soviet leaders prob- ably were seeking primarily to reduce the strategic imbalance against the USSR, calculating that the success of the venture would improve sharply the Soviet bargaining position in world affairs and also be advantageous in a host of other ways. While the Cuban missile bases 5 TOPS Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C01385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 would have increased Soviet missile strike capabilities against the US by more than 50 percent at the end of 1962, the Soviet leaders must have realized that their relative power gain would have been highly transitory in view of US ICBM and Polaris programs. /t is possible, therefore, that had the Cuban venture been successful, it would have been followed shortly by some further Soviet initiative to achieve a dramatic victory elsewhere for a long-standing policy objective, such as Berlin, which also could alter the long-term "world re.lation of forces." As it turned out, Khrushchev was faded with a direct military con- frontation at a point where the US was able to concentrate overwhelming conventional military force, backed up by a clear strategic nuclear superiority. This unexpected and probably shocking turn of events left him with only one feasible course of action: to insure that the Cuban crisis did not escalate; to test the US resolve; and, if it were found firm, to remove the strategic missiles as hastily as possible while attempting to salvage as much of the remainder of the venture as pos- sible. This appears to be precisely what occurred in the several weeks leading up to Khrushchev's announcement on 20 November of his decision to remove the I1r28's, which enabled both parties to allow the Cuban crisis to recede slowly and uneasily into history. - 6 - Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Noir PART ONE: THE EVIDENCE The evidence presented in this study was developed by examining information compiled on an all-source basis that related to the deploy- ment of Soviet forces in Cuba. The major part of the evidence consists of aerial photography of Cuba obtained by overhead and peripheral recon- naissance and by surface photography of Soviet shipping en route to Cuba. Within the limits of coverage and the art of photographic interpretation, such evidence is regarded as conclusive. It was particularly \ valuable in establishing the validity of information from other sources. Although information obtained from agents, refugees, and diplomats appeared initially to constitute a major source of evidence,* it was fre- quently proved to be unreliable. As a result, in almost all cases it could not be evaluated with confidence unless information was available from other types of sources against which it could be checked. For example, more than 200 reports contain references to the presence in Cuba of missiles before January 1962. Numerous reports also contain refer- ences to construction activity and equipment observed during the spring of 1962 in areas where SAM sites were located later. However, photog- raphy of these areas obtained during or after the reported period of observation failed to reveal any such activity or equipment. Reports originating from diplomatic sources in cuba were relatively sparse be- fore the crisis; thus they did not contribute significantly to the body of evidence used in this study, the time span of which ends with the with- drawal of offensive weapons. Nevertheless, in spite of these limitations, the vast body of collateral reporting provided some unique and valuable information that could not otherwise have been obtained. * Referred to in this study as collateral information. - 7 - TOP SPARET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C01385902 TO.171 Ada*. I. Soviet Military and Economic Relations with Castro's Cuba Before Mid-1962 Before the creation of their military establishment in Cuba in the latter half of 1962, the Soviet leaders extended military aid to Castro cautiously and gradually, remaining well within the limits set by the precedent of their aid to other countries in the Near East, Asia, and Africa. The USSR did not give Castro some of the more modern wea- pons, such as the SA-2 system, which it contracted to supply to Indo- nesia, Iraq, and Egypt during this period, nor was there anything ex- ceptional about the quantity of material or the terms under which it was supplied. Although the Bloc had come to account for about 80 percent of Cuban foreign trade by mid-1962 and although there was a steady rise in the amount of credit available to Cuba for economic development, there was no comparable pattern of growth in military shipments. Even in retrospect the military assistance provided by the USSR and other mem- bers of the Bloc from mid-1960 to early 1962 does not contain indications of any objective beyond improving the ability of the Castro regime to de- fend itself from an invasion or internal uprising. Soviet military assistance to Castro, when compared with that pro- vided to other revolutionary governments (for example, the regime of Qasim in Iraq), indicates that the Soviet leaders initially were somewhat reluctant to extend similar aid to Cuba. The first Soviet-Cuban military assistance agreement was reached some time between Mikoyan's visit to Cuba in February 1960 and Raul Castro's return visit to the USSR in the summer of 1960, or some 12 to 18 months after Castro had seized power. By contrast the Soviet agreement on aid to Iraq was concluded 4 months after the revolution that put Qasim in power. Whereas MIG aircraft and frequently naval vessels had been among the first items delivered to other recipients, Castro did not receive aircraft until the second quarter of 1961, and the first naval vessels did not arrive until January 1962. As far as can be determined, the equipment delivered before mid-1962 was limited to items useful primarily for defensive purposes. Furthermore, the equipment was composed of the more obsolescent items in the Bloc inventory. The total value of the arms supplied to Cuba before mid- 1962 is estimated at roughly $100 million, which probably ranked Cuba below only Indonesia, Iraq, and Egypt as a major recipient of Soviet military aid. - 8 - TOP YCRET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 001385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOP CRE7 A. Military Aid As Cuba's efforts to purchase military goods in the West be- . came increasingly difficult in 1959 and early 1960, the Cubans began to make military contacts with Bloc countries, mainly Czechoslovakia. Mikoyan's visit to Cuba in February 1960. when the USSR finally aban- cloned its reserved attitude toward the Cuban revolution and publicly en- dorsed the Castro regime, appears to have been an important milestone in the developing relationship. Mikoyan was followed in June 1960 by General M. A. Sergeychik, Deputy Chief of the Engineering Directorate of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, which has been associated with other typical Soviet arms agreements with underdeveloped countries. When Raul Castro visited the USSR in the summer of 1960, the first shipments of Soviet arms probably were being readied. There is no information available, however, on the details of the arms agreement or even the approximate date on which it was signed. 10 ? Although photography of Cuban militia carrying Czechoslovak rifles suggests that a shipment of small arms may have arrived in July or August 1960, the first major shipment of Bloc arms to Cuba arrived on 8 September 1960 aboard the Soviet freighter Ilya Mechnikov. The cargo reportedly included T-34 tanks, antiaircraft artillery, machine- guns, ammunition, electronic equipment, and other military materiel. Some Mi-1 (Hare) and/or Mi-4 (Hound) helicopters were delivered later in September 1960, and collateral sources reported the delivery of more than 8, 000 metric tons of equipment by three Soviet ships in October 1960. By mid-April 1961, at least 14 oviet s ips a ? e- livered to Cuba equipment and supplies, almost exclusively land arma- ments, estimated at 40, 000 metric tons. What effect, if any, the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 had ??? on Soviet arms shipments is conjectural. The first of a total of more than 60 MIG-15 (Fagot), MIG-17 (Fresco), and MIG-19 (Farmer) aircraft apparently arrived at the end of May, and all the aircraft were delivered Nap by mid-June. Although it is possible that delivery of these aircraft was expedited in response to urgent Cuban appeals engendered by the inva- sion, they probably had already been scheduled for delivery in 1961, inasmuch as Cuban pilots apparently were training in Czechoslovakia in the third quarter of 1960. No corresponding increase in shipments of other kinds of equipment was observed; in fact, no additional shipments Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 "1.4. TOISKRET Jose. of military equipment were detected until December 1961. Bloc military assistance to Cuba. in the second half of 1961 seems to have been focused on assimilation of new equipment, intensive training, and completion of reorganization of Cuba's military establishment along Soviet lines. Arms shipments were resumed at the very end of 1961, and the first naval Vessels appeared early in 1962. Two shiploads arrived at the end of 1961, and an average of two shiploads per month was noted from January through June 1962. However, collateral reports indicate that these shipments were confined to tanks, artillery, trucks, and other land armaments, with the exception of 12 torpedo boats and 6 Kronshtadt- class subchasers that were delivered between January and April 1962. Throughout the period of arms delivery, Cuban personnel were being trained in the Bloc and by a military training mission (principally Soviet and Czechoslovak) sent to Cuba. Collateral sources reported that Cubans were sent for military training in the Bloc as early as the summer of 1960,1 According to col- lateral information, more than 500 Cubans were sent to the USSR for naval training in 1961,1_ Collateral sources indicate that a hundred or more Bloc mili- tary technicians probably arrived in Cuba during the second half of 1960 as the first arms shipments were being received, and there are continuing reports of Bloc military personnel and technicians arriving during 1961. By the time the Soviet authorities began to create their military establish- ment in Cuba in mid-1962, it is estimated that at least 350 Bloc military aid personnel were engaged in training Castro's forces on the island. By mid-1962, Soviet Bloc military aid had turned the Cuban military establishment into one of the strongest in Latin America. The ground forces had acquired armored, artillery, antiaircraft, and antitank capabilities on a scale unprecedented in the Caribbean area. The Cuban air force was still a very limited organization, but even its small number of older Soviet jet fighters represented a vast improve- ment over previous capabilities. But the Soviet authorities had not pro- vided, or apparently even offered, some of the more modern weapons being supplied to other underdeveloped countries, and the aid was limited - 10 - TO>SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOPScRE to improving the Castro regime's ability to maintain internal order and defend itself against an invasion. B. Economic Aid and Terms of Trade Before mid-1962, lines of credit totaling at least $357 million, with $100 million in addition likely, were opened by the Bloc for Cuban basic economic development, although Cuba had actually used by that time only about 10 percent of these credits. As in the case of Bloc aid to other countries, the bulk of the credits were intended for basic indus- trial facilities and overhead investments, such as transportation. The terms given Cuba were identical or very similar to those for other re- cipient nations: low interest rates, medium-term and long-term credits, and provision to repay the debt with indigenous commodities. By the time the Soviet military buildup began in mid-1962, the Bloc had come to account for about 80 percent of Cuban foreign trade. Some trade concessions advantageous to Cuba were made. Bloc coun- tries generally paid a premium price for Cuban sugar, and Cuba was permitted to run substantial trade deficits. The terms of trade as re- flected by the balance between known prices set on Cuban exports to the Bloc versus prices set on Cuban imports of fuel, food, and raw and semifinished materials (which comprised more than 60 percent of im- ports from the Bloc) indicate a slight advantage for Cuba compared with world market prices for comparable items. Information on the terms under which the military aid was sup- plied is sketchy. The Chinese Communists provided an unknown number a. of machineguns, including 12.7-mm antiaircraft machineguns, as a gift. Soviet-supplied equipment probably did not involve payment in hard cur- rencies. Based on known Soviet practice and some collateral informa- tion, it is surmised that the initial agreements may have allowed a sub- stantial discount on the equipment with a repayment time of 10 years or more. The arms agreement, or agreements, with Czechoslovakia re- quired payment partially in pounds sterling, and at least $30 million (in sterling) has been paid by Cuba to the Czechoslovak State Bank. However, most if not all of Cuba's outstanding obligations for Bloc military aid may have been canceled subsequently, inasmuch as Castro stated publicly early in November 1962 that the USSR had canceled all of Cuba's military debts. TOir- SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOPnkET IL General Activity Relating to the Military Buildup Oft During the period from the end of July through October 1962, the Soviet authorities deployed a number of weapons systems and associated personnel to Cuba that constituted a small but complete Soviet military establishment with all the necessary organizational superstructure. This section examines the evidence on general activities not related to specific weapons systems and provides a framework for the subsequent assessment of the detailed information on the deployment of specific weapons systems. It covers evidence of preparatory activities before the weapons and Soviet troops arrived in Cuba; the establishment of the command, control, and communications structure; and the flow of Soviet shipping to Cuba. A. Early Activity Collateral reporting contains many references to the sighting, during the first half of 1962, of construction equipment, assorted vehicles, and Soviet personnel in the general locations where various Soviet mili- tary units were later identified. In several cases the reported locations corresponded closely to the actual locations. Nevertheless, later photog- raphy fails to contain evidence of visible activity in the areas mentioned until at least August and invalidates these reports as a basis for assum- ing that Soviet forces were present in significant quantities before the end of July. There is a strong possibility, however, that this reporting re- flected an influx into Cuba, beginning in early 1962, of Soviet personnel who were somehow associated with the militar buildu that be an physically in late July. Soviet personnel first began to appear in un- usua num urmg ebruary-March 1962 and that by March-April 1962 groups of Soviet personnel were present all over the island. that a plant ?riariufactured pre ab- ricated concrete beams and columns (specitications approved by the Soviet authorities) that were delivered to the Torrens reformatory, be- lieved to be the Soviet military headquarters in Cuba, in late February or early March. - 12 - Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOPSQET Other reporting generally supports thieL The Torrens area may have become a sensitive zone in June, an numer us reports, which substantiate one another, reflect a visit by Raul Castro to the re- formatory and the evacuation of its inmates about the middle of July, followed by an influx of Soviet personnel in late July. A similar pro- gression of events is suggested also by reports concerning the port of Banes. Twenty or 30 families allegedly were evacuated from the im- mediate port area in January 1962. Other reports indicate that the entire port area was evacuated sometime during the period between March and early July 1962, that a small number of Soviet personnel arrived almost immediately thereafter, and that large numbers of Soviet personnel moved in during the last week in August. The shadow of coming events also may have been cast by Cuban officials in June, when a number of Cuban naval officers were (later) reported to have made statements to the effect that in September Americans would respect the Cuban flag and that by September Cuba would be the "buckle" in the belt of NATO bases surrounding the USSR. Also in June a briefing reportedly took place at which officials in the city of Matanzas were advised that in the event of an attack by the US the USSR would come to the assistance of Cuba within a 7-day period. Based on the foregoing, it appears that the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba probably did begin to increase early in 1962 and that their very presence in any location could have generated the reports of activity observed during the January-July period. The influx of Soviet personnel at this time probably had some bearing on the later military buildup and may well have involved activity related to the planning and preparation required before the actual deployment of Soviet forces on the island. There is evidence regarding Soviet surveying activities in Cuba, but it does not provide any indication of activity that can be directly associated with the selection and preparation of the offensive missile sites. It seems clear, however, that the Soviet problem of locating the sites geodetically was simplified considerably by the avail- ability of earlier geophysical materials on Cuba. As in the case of Soviet economic aid programs to other underdeveloped countries, the Soviet aid program in Cuba included an intensive resource exploration survey. Such geological and geophysical survey activities necessarily include the utili- zation of large-scale topographic maps and associated triangulation control - 13 - TOISC, I / ,. , , -I \, -, -_ \ \_ .0 , . ____ ,, ,? 4 ,, / A SAM Ce.P.1 R IP AN SONG? / i \ % 1 , / I \ \ 11 \I / \ 1 Genorefer VP'S I , 1 C II 1 P. , Oi.pli.,.... Vs. f 1 r ;\ .1 1 Isolo L a? \ \ ,I ' I 1 V 1 ..?.1 / /' 4---.------; , \ -C..----,-......___:'?,.. -- ,---------'"--- /' 4- \ \ \ \'?.. . \ ?:-\74116110ii/r/ / ? ? '7 / / .9 ?, /1 i .???-'-' < C;,?'' ?-- --- N. N./ 4------ .?"...` ..,...... ..... , -7-- ?It tim-7..ii. keld At. rol, L * An individual SAM unit is estimated to be capable of engaging aircraft and cruise-type missiles out to distances of about 25 nm, most effectively be- tween the altitudes of 3,000 and 80,000 feet. The SAM control system radar (designated FAN SONG) performs both a tracking and a missile guidance function against a single target. An acquisition radar (designated SPOON- REST) is usually co-located. The FAN SONG is believed to be capable of tracking a target at ranges up to 64 inn, the SPOONREST at ranges up to 145 nm. Each launch position contains a single launcher and missile, and each hold position contains two missile transporters, each carrying a single mis- sile. In all, there are 12 missiles at each site, 6 on launcher and 6 ire re- serve. The central guidance area contains the following equipment that is interconnected by cabling and also is connected by cabling to the launchers: one SAM control system radar van, five electronics vans, and one or two generator vans. Typically the van-mounted target acquisition radar, with associated IFF (SCOREBOARD) equipment, is located outside the circle of launch positions but within the site area, which is surrounded by a security fence. It also is connected by cabling with the necessary power and electronics equipment in the central guidance area. A communications van (MERCURY GRASS) is located outside the security fence and provides the necessary command link between the site and control elements at higher echelons. A number of general-purpose vehicles and other auxiliary equipment also are required to support a site. Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Z0699?1.00 91./90/LI.OZ :aseaia Joi pancuddV Figure 7. SAM Site at Los Angeles, Oriente Province, 26 September 1962. An example of the ease with which a SAM unit may be deployed: all elements of the system are present. Z0699?1.00 91./90/LI.OZ :aseaia Joi pancuddV Z0699?1.00 91./90/LI.OZ :aseaia Joi pancuddV 45 COVERED FAN SONG RADAP, Figure 8. SAM Site at Mariel, 23 October 1962. Revetting in progress at an operational SAM site during the crisis period. Z0699?1.00 91./90/LI.OZ :aseaia Joi pancuddV Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOPEC42ET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TTECTZET reaction time becomes increasingly less critical and probably is not a controlling factor in successful target intercept. Because the U-2 is not a high-speed aircraft, the ability of an individual SA-2 site to launch missiles successfully against it is therefore dependent primarily on the ability of the radar components to provide accurate position data. 2. Location and Timing of Offloading of SAM Units and Associated Equipment It is not possible from photography or other evidence to determine the precise times and ports at which SA-2 missiles, associated equipment, and unit personnel arrived in Cuba. However, the first vessels carrying military shipments for the buildup began docking in Cuba during the last week in July, and the first firm evidence of SAM deployment was obtained from aerial photography of 5 August of vehicles at locations in western Cuba later identified as the Santa Lucia and Matanzas SAM sites and the Pinar del Rio SAM support facility. SAM equipment, therefore, must have begun flowing into Cuba from the very beginning of the Soviet buildup. Collateral reporting indicates that parts of a number of ports in western Cuba, including Matanzas, La Isabella, Punta Gerardo, Casilda, and Mariel, were restricted at various times during the month of August while Soviet ships were offloading. Presumably SAM equip- ment moved through some of these ports during August. According to these reports, some offloadings occurred at night, and all offloading of equipment was accomplished by Soviet personnel. Although the dates and ports of arrival of SA-2 missiles and related equipment cannot be specified, it appears that unit equipment other than the missiles probably moved directly from the ports to the site areas. For example, a number of informants have reported the off- loading and movement of equipment from Matanzas to the immediate area of the Matanzas SA-2 site a day or two before 5 August, when vehicles first appeared at the site on aerial photography. Moreover, 10 other SAM sites on the western half of the island that were observed in photog- raphy of 29 August or 5 September all had launchers, missile transporters, and electronic and other equipment present, indicating relatively rapid than 20 to 25 minutes, an independently acquired target traveling at this speed might well be out of range before a missile could be launched against it. - 31 - TOP C.ET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOP CRET movement of these units from the ports of debarkation to the site areas. With respect to the SA-2 missiles, however, the identification of large numbers of shipping containers of two different sizes at the SAM sup- port facilities in Cuba (see Figure 9) clearly indicates that the mis- siles were shipped from the USSR disassembled, the boosters and sus- tainers being subsequently mated and checked out at the support facili- ties before being delivered to the operational sites. This procedure is consistent with known Soviet practice in the USSR and East Germany. 3. Problem of Operational Status The most conclusive photographic indication that an SA-2 site has reached operational status -- that is, is capable of launching a missile -- is the positive identification of one or more missiles on launcher, assuming that all other necessary equipment is present and properly emplaced. If judged by this criterion, none of the SA-2 sites in Cuba can be demonstrated to be operational before mid-October 1962, when the first such identifications were made. In most cases, however, this timing reflects the lack of effective photographic coverage rather than the actual status of the sites. It is virtually certain, given the start of SAM deployment activity at the beginning of August and the level of activity evident in photography thereafter, that a number of SA-2 sites had the capability of launching missiles well before mid- October. Accordingly a more realistic means for defining an individual site as operational has been sought than that based on missiles on launcher. Most of the sites, when first observed in photography, had major items of equipment present, including guidance and other elec- tronic equipment and varying numbers of identifiable launchers and mis- sile transporters. Missiles could not be specifically identified, however, either on the launchers or on the transporters, both of which were canvas- covered. Although SA-2 missiles arriving in Cuba had to be processed through support facilities before delivery to sites, the evidence clearly indicates that support facilities were being established in Cuba and re- ceiving missiles concurrently with the deployment of SA-2 units. The rate at which operational units received their missiles was therefore governed by the length of time required to process them at the support facilities. Although there is no direct information available on the - 32 - TOIEGRET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C01385902, Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Figure 9. SAM Containers and Ground-Support Equipment at the Santiago de las Vegas Assembly Area, 7 November 1962 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOFET processing time that was actually required in Cuba, Soviet documents indicate that under favorable field conditions a support facility can pre- pare and check out 10 missiles and their airborne equipment in a 24- hour period. It is likely, therefore, that the SA-2 units in Cuba were receiving missiles within a relatively short time after they arrived on site with the rest of their unit equipment. Because it is not possible to determine the precise timing of missile deliveries to the individual SA-2 sites and hence their initial operational dates, for the purposes of this study a "unit emplacement date" has been established. This represents the date on which photo- graphic coverage indicates the presence and proper emplacement of all major items of equipment, with the possible exception, as indicated, of missiles. The actual operational date, if later than the "unit emplace- ment date," probably was reached within a week or two thereafter in most cases. 4. Timing of Establishment of Individual Sites and Support Facilities Virtually all of the evidence concerning the timing of SA-2 site and support facility development in Cuba is based on photography. Because of gaps in photographic coverage, it is not possible to derive a precise, time-phased, sequential deployment pattern for a typical site. Instead, judgments with respect to timing must be based on the apparent status of sites observed sporadically and, in most cases, in an apparently completed status at the time of first observation. The chart, Figure 10,4= presents the evidence available from photography on the timing of each of the 24 SAM sites in Cuba from 5 August, when SAM deployment activity was first observable, to 27 October, when the capability of the SAM system as a whole was first demonstrated. Four distinct time frames have been indicated, when pos- sible, for each site as determined by (a) the latest date on which photog- raphy indicates that no activity was present at the location later occupied by a site ("negation date"), (b) the earliest date on which activity was first observed but major equipment was not yet in place ("earliest activity date"), (c) the earliest date on which all major equipment (with the pos- sible exception of missiles) is known to have been present and properly * Following p. 34, below. - 33 - TO.PEC4:4FT Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOFECRET emplaced ("unit emplacement date"), and (d) the actual operation of the integrated network as a system. The time relationships between these dates provide critical insights into the Soviet planning and programing of the entire Cuban buildup. The following general conclusions may be drawn from this evidence: a. There was no visible activity at any of the sites before 5 August. Although activity at two site areas apparently was just beginning on 5 August, there was no visible activity at any of the other sites by that time. b. In all but four cases the SA-2 units were emplaced on site when first observed. Unit emplacement, therefore, could have occurred at any time between the negation date and the time the sites were first observed and cannot be fixed more precisely. Of the 20 such cases, only 3 had gaps in coverage of 10 or fewer days; the remaining 17 had gaps of 23 to 61 days. c. Eleven, and possibly 12, units were emplaced on the western half of Cuba between 5 August and 5 September.* One addi- tional unit on the western half of the island was not emplaced until mid- October. Two units (at Sagua la Grande and Sancti Spiritus) are known to have been emplaced within a 6-day period. d. SAM units generally were emplaced on the western half of the island before they were emplaced on the eastern half. On 29 August, for example, when at least 8 units were emplaced in the west, at least 6 units, or about 50 percent, were not present in the east; by 5 September, when at least 11 units were emplaced in the west, at least 4 units were not on site in the east. e. All units were emplaced and are known to have had missiles on launcher by 23 October at the latest. Most of them probably had missiles on launchers long before this time, but they cannot be iden- tified in available photography. With respect to SAM support facilities, the evidence on time-phasing is even less complete than it is on the sites. The chart, * The twelfth, Siguanea, is a special case; it is located on the Isle of Pines and was not covered by photography from 5 August until 29 September. - 34 - TO73ENG.13?ET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C01385902, WEST TO EAST EMPLACEMENT 34592 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOISCRET TIME PHASING OF SAM UNIT EMPLACEMENT SAN JULIAN SANTA LUCIA LA COLOMA BAHIA HONDA SIGUANEA MARIEL HAVANA MATANZAS DELEITE CIENFUEGOS SAGUA LA GRANDE CAIBARIEN SANCTI SPIRITUS CHAMBAS CIEGO DE AVILA ESMERALDA SENADO MANZANILLO MANATI CHAPARRA JIGUANI SANTIAGO DE CUBA LOS ANGELES CABANAS NEGATION DATE BEGINNING OF MILITARY BUILDUP Figure 10 AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER 5 10 15 20 25 5 10 15 20 25 5 10 15 20 25 1 I I ' ? 1 : I I I 1 IL I I I NO DATA Th UNIT EMPLACEMENT DATE TOP...11161W EARLIEST ACTIVITY DATE Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOP RET Figure 11,* presents the negation date, the earliest known activity date, and the first demonstrable operational date for each facility. The criterion for the operational dates was the presence of missile transporters and missile containers, indicating that the facility was already functioning. The long time intervals between most of the dates reflect the lack of photographic coverage of these facilities. There is good evidence that two and probably three SAM support facilities were established and functioning at the same time that SA-2 units were being emplaced on the western half of the island. The support facility at Santiago de las Vegas, which was not present in photography of 5 August, was operational by 29 August, when photog- raphy revealed the presence of missile transporters, missile containers, and other support equipment. Collateral sources reported that about the end of July or early August the civilian population in the area of the Pinar del Rio support facility was evacuated and that Soviet personnel, vehicles, and construction equipment were observed moving in. On 5 August, oblique, partly cloud-covered photography of the area revealed the presence of a few unidentified vehicles. It seems likely, therefore, that the Pinar del Rio support facility was actually established slightly earlier than the one at Santiago de las Vegas, although both were definitely operational on 29 August. In addition, a third support facility, at Cifuentes, was observed to be operational on 29 August. On the eastern half of the island, two support facilities, at Santiago de Cuba and Victoria de las Tunas, also could have been func- tioning during the period after 5 September when SA-2 units were being emplaced in that area. Photography of 5 September revealed four SAM support vehicles at the Santiago de Cuba facility. When covered again on 26 September, this facility was clearly operational. There is no photo- graphic coverage of the Victoria de las Tunas facility during this period, however, and its presence cannot be determined from other evidence. The remaining two support facilities were established during the first half of October; one of them, at Manzanillo, was set up in less than 10 days. 5. Geographical Pattern of Deployment As can be seen on the map, Figure 12,* which indicates the location and effective coverage of the Cuban SA-2 sites at the time of the * Following p. 36, below. - 35 - TOP ET Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TOPCEET crisis, there was a continuous string of sites along the northern coast providing island-wide coverage from the western end of Cuba as far as the port of Banes in the east. Although the coverage along the southern coast was much less complete, the major gaps occurred in areas that are sparsely populated and contained few targets of strategic interest to either the Soviet authorities or the Cubans. Curiously, Havana, the capital city and presumably one of the areas of greatest defense interest to the Cubans, was defended by only one SAM site, even though capital cities throughout the Bloc are ringed by as many as six individual sites. Even more revealing, however, was the pattern of deployment as re- lated to the Soviet military presence on the island. On the western half of the island, two and perhaps three of the San Cristobal MRBM sites were covered by only a single SAM site, at Bahia Honda, and probably only one of the San Cristobal sites had as much as double overlapping SAM coverage. All four of these MRBM sites appear to have been extremely vulnerable to approaches from off the southern coast. The same is true for the two Guanajay IRBM sites, only one of which appears to have had double overlapping coverage; both sites appear to have been extremely vulnerable to ap- proaches from the south. Farther east the area of the two MRBM sites at Sagua la Grande and the area of the IRBM site at Remedios were each covered by only a single SAM site. The four Soviet armored groups, at Artemisa, Santiago de las Vegas, Remedios, and Holguin, also were poorly defended, in each case by only one SAM site. In the Santa Clara area, where initially all the MIG-21's were deployed, no specific missile defense was provided. The same is true for the important transport junction and the Eastern Military Headquarters site at Camaguey. For comparative purposes, the map, Figure 13, illustrates how the same number of SAM sites might have been deployed had maximum defense of the principal Soviet military installations been the major objec- tive of SA-2 deployment. Although this type of point defense leaves open several areas, at least overlapping coverage would have been provided for all important Soviet military installations, including triple overlaps of some, in addition to a limited interdefense of the individual SAM sites themselves. Had the Soviet authorities originally intended to provide - 36 - TOir"'"E.C.?E T Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 C01385902. WEST TO EAST EMPLACEMENT 34593 Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO1385902 TC)INE