CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001397782
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00355
• Publication Date: April 26, 1956

26 April 1956
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW ,
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Office of Current Intelligence.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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 TOP " ? CRET EIDER
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
26 April 1956
BULGANIN-KHRUSHCHEV VISIT
TO.BRITAIN
Bulganin and Khrushchev
appear to be surprised and
frustrated by the cool reception
they have been receiving, both
in their public appearances in
Britain and in private con-
ferences with British leaders.
Official British fears that
the visit would appear like
a triumphant tour have proved
to be groundless, as for the
most part crowds have greeted
the Soviet leaders in silence
or with more jeers than cheers.
Khrushchev has shown his
irritation by intemperate and
even threatening remarks which
appear to have been spontaneous
rather than deliberate and
which have in turn increased
the coolness of the British
reception. These remarks are
in, contrast with the care-
fully prepared statements read
by Khrushchev and Bulganin.
Labor Party Reaction
The dinner with top Labor
Party leaders on 23 April was
a fiasco from the Soviet point
of view which may undermine
the Soviet program to estab-
lish ties with West European
Socialists and to promote the
popular front concept. Khru-
shchev antagonized the Labor
leaders by repeating the
charges he made in India that
Britain and France had urged
Hitler to attack the USSR,
and by defending the Stalin-
Hitler pact. He further
angered them by warning that
if the West persisted in re-
arming West Germany, the USSR
would have no alternative but
to seek an alliance with those
forces in West Germany who
desire an alliance. He added
the threat that the USSR had
"plenty of space to experiment
with the hydrogen bomb."
The British Labor leaders
replied with a plea for the
release of Social Democrats
and trade unionists in the
USSR and the Satellites, which
Khrushchev angrily rejected.
Khrushchev was overheard to
say that he found it "much
easier to talk to the Con-
servatives than to the British
Labor Party." His surprise
and anger at the Laborites'
attitude was matched by their
disgust at his performance,
and one described him privately
as a "simple-minded" man who
would be capable of holding
only a secondary position in a
British trade union.
Germany and Disarmament
In the talks with British
officials on 19 April, Khru-
shchev's comments on German
reunification were completely
negative. He simply reiterated
the Soviet position at the
Geneva foreign ministers'
conference, contending that
there is no connection be-
tween t*erman unification and
European security and that
unification was a matter for
negotiation by the two German
states.
In the private discussions
of the disarmament problem,
the Soviet leaders have so
far made no new proposals for
the resolution of differences
between the Soviet and Western.
approaches in the UN Disarma-
ment Subcommittee in London.
The British representative on
the subcommittee, Anthony
Nutting, told his Western
colleagues on 23 April that
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
26 April 1956
the Russians appear to be
"fed up" with the subcommittee
and are very suspicious of the
Western position. Khrushchev
took the lead in attacking the
American aerial inspection
proposal] charging that it was
designed solely to take photo-
graphs of the USSR for target
and espionage purposes.
The Soviet leaders re-
peated Gromyko's explanation
to the subcommittee that nu-
clear disarmament provisions
had been omitted from the USSR's
27 March proposals because
previous negotiations had
proved it was impossible to
solve nuclear and conventional
problems simultaneously. They
showed no interest in any
Western ideas for a partial
approach to disarmament and
insisted that the Western
powers had made any agreement
more difficult by retreating
from their earlier positions.
Soviet Propaganda Treatment
Soviet propaganda organs
have viewed the visit through
rose-colored glasses, report-
ing thousands of cheering
Brit.ains welcoming Bulganin
and Khrushchev in-their public
appearances. The voluminous
propaganda coverage has ad-
mitted that they have been
greeted with "occasional
hostile shouts" and some anti-
Soviet posters carried by
"hooligans," and has attributed
this hostility to "certain
press organs." Nothing has
been reported in Moscow about
the Labor Party dinner. Al-
though Khrushchev's Birmingham
speech has received heavy play
in Soviet organs, his reference
to a missile with a hydrogen
warhead has been deleted from
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