CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001397783
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00355
• Publication Date: April 12, 1956

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1.2 April 1956
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE- AGENCY
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 TOP ~CRET EIDER
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
12 April 1956 '
PART I I i
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
BRITISH POLICY TOWARD THE USSR
ON THE EVE OF THE BULGANIN-KHRUSHCHEV VISIT
The British government,
which has for some months shown
increasing concern over the new
tactics of Soviet foreign
policy, is treating the 18-27
April visit. of Bulganin and
Khrushchev as primarily an op-
portunity to probe Russian in-
tentions, particularly with
reference to the. Middle East.,
The recently concluded tour
of ex-premier Malenkov and the
preparations for the Bulganin-
Khrushchev visit have focused
the British public's attention '
to an unusual. extent on vela-~
tions with the USSR. Advance
arrangements have been exten-
sively debated in the press and
by the public; but except among
.fellow travelers and some Bevan-
ite elements, there so far ap-
pears to be no inclination to
assume that Soviet policy has
undergone more than a tactical
change. The arrival of security
chief Serov to make advance
preparations for the visit was
generally considered as confirm-
ing this.
Egyptian arms deals last Sep-
tember and becoming more in-
tensive after tie 20th Party
Congress in February.
The Foreign Office was
particularly disturbed by the
Soviet entry into areas of tra-
ditional British influence as
signalized by the Middle Eastern
.arms deals and the Bulganin-
Khrushchev visit to India and
Burma. It saw these moves as
meaning that Mo-scow, though re-
pudiating full-scale war as an
instrument of national policy,
was still .bent on Communist ex-
pansion through ways that might
lead to war.
The Soviet policy of com-
petitive coexistence through
the use of economic enticements
to underdeveloped areas~is seen
by London as,offering a special
threat to its own position in
these areas because of Bri:tain's
present
economic
inability to
compete
in kind.
As a result,
Britain
has been
informally
trying
to interest the United
States
in expanding economic
The efforts of certain
Eastern European refugee groups
to organize hostile demonstra-
tions have received no important
support from either Labor or
.Conservative Party circles, how-
ever, and the US Information
Service in London_beleves
Malenkov's performance as good-
will ambassador, which o~ca-
sioned favorable press comment
at a ratio of more than two to
one, greatly smoothed the way
for Bulganin and Khrushchev.
Re-examination of USSR Policy
This surge of public in-
terest in relations with the
USSR ha's been paralleled in
government circles by an ex-
tensive re-examination of Soviet
policy, starting with the Czech-
aid programs; partd~iarly to
the Baghdad pact countries.
British officials have also
been seeking ways in which Lon-
don can regain the initiative
on the diplomatic front.
Several aspects of the
20th Party Congress caused
British officials special con-
cern. ?One was the statement
that there. was more than one
way of~achieving socialism--
and indeed the emphasis .on
"socialism' rather than "com-
munism." This line, British.
officials fear, will be partic-
ularly-seductive iri colonial
areas and in neutral or un-
committod countries.
Another aspect was the,
de-emphasis of Stalin in favor
TOP ~~RET EIDER
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVE'S Page 1 of 14
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
12 April 1956
of Leninist collective leader-
ship. One official saw this
line as likely to delude seg-
ments of the British public,
and stated that the Foreign
Office planned a campaign t?
expose the dangers of .Leninism.
Prime Minister Eden evi-
dently shares the Foreign Of-
fice worries. ,In mid-March
he reportedly gave French pre-
mier Mollet his t'persona.l esti-
mate" that the present Soviet
diplomatic and economic tactics
are even more danger?us-than
those in use when NATO was
established.
Attitude Toward the Visit
Against this background,
the British government evidently
sees the Bulganin-Rhrushchev
visit, initiated at the. summit
conference last Jut1y, as both
adiplomatic opportunity and a
propaganda hazard. "
Every effort is being made
to keep the visit as much as
possible in a purely diplrrmatic
context, avoiding the "triumphal
tour" aspects which character-
ized Br~;'gariin-''s .and;:Khxushehe~v's
visit to India and Burma and
Malenkov's trip to Britain, Of
the eight full days in their
scheduled stay, three provide
for talks at 10 Downing Street
and two others for dining, with
Eden--one of them including'., an
overnight stay at the Chequers
estate, A trip to only one im-
portant industrial center,
Birmingham,' will be made. At
the same time,the Foreign Of-
fice has endeavored to dissuade
the leaders of .Eastern European
refugee groups from causing any
disturbances, and London twice
sought to dissuade Moscow from
sending Serov to superintend
the security arrangements.
Diplomatically, on the
other hand, Britain has evi-
dently tried to capitalize to
some extent on the fact that it
is the first Western country to
receive the top Soviet leaders.
Possibly seeing some parallel
with the-1954 Geneva conference
where he won-great prestige as
a "bridge'? between East and
West, Prime Minister Eden dis-
cussed the impending visit with
French premier Mollet during
their 10-11 March conference.
Foreign Secretary"Lloyd will
report on it afterward,: to Mol-
let and Foreign Minister Pineau
before they undertake their
own trip to Moscow.
Conduct of the Talks
In the talks themselves,
Eden-and other top leaders seem
to see mainly an opportunity to
probe the intentions and mutual
relationships of the top Soviet
leaders. This idea was an im-
portant part of Churchill's ari.g-
i~$al_. 1953 proposal for summit
talks and has appeared again.
in the comments of some of the
British leaders--mainly on the
Labor side--who talked.with
Malenkov: "There is also a
general British-hope of correct-
ing at least some of the Soviet
leaders' dangerous misconcep-
,?ions about the West.
The agenda for substantive
discussions is extremely loose.,.
and the British have emphasized
that they have. no intention of
turning the "serious talks" in-
to negotiations on any question
t5f ~nuitilateral interest. T?pics
of bilateral concern mentioned
by 'the Foreign Office e5f f icial
arranging the details of the
visit.: include such matters as
radii damming and cultural ex-
changes
British officials have
made clear, however,. that they.
hip for an exchange of views-
cn several matters of key im-
po~tance. According to the.
.A.rnerican embassy; both Edenn
and Lloyd told Ma~lenkov on I6
March that they were anxious
to discuss the Middle East.
While Britain apparently
has no proposals tc~ offer, it
would be interested in any
.T?.P CARET EIDER.
PART III PATTERNS AT~TD PERSPECTIVES Page 2 .of ;14
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVTEW
12 April 1956
Soviet overtures that would ap-
pear to lessen the prospects of
war between Israel and the Arab
states ~,,.
The British also anticipate
a serious exchange of views on
disarmament:', presumably-because.
Malenkov said that disarmament
was the only subject he knew
would be on his colleagues'
mindso As of late February,
the Foreign Office expected the
Russians to offer a new friend-
ship treaty--which Britain
planned to reject on the grounds
that there had been insufficient
time, since their 1955 abroga-
tion of the 194 pact9,to see
how~coexistence,workedo
Nervousness About US Attitude
Several recent remarks by
British officials about the
Bulganin-Khrushchev visit have
T
indicated some anxiety lest
'Anglo-American co-operation be
imperiled bg~ too great an aura
of "good will'' toward the Soviet
guestso The British ambassador
in Moscow, for example, in tell-
ing his American colleagues of
London's advice that Serov.be
kept. at home, remarked that he
hoped the Rutssians would send
Serov anyway as a "grim reminder"
of Soviet realitya
Foreign Office officials
have expressed to the American
embassy in London a hope for
some "clumsy''' Khrushchev re-
mark that would serve to
further cement ,Q;nglo~-A~nea~i.?
can solidarity o 't'hey ~xav~e e~re~
suggested that Eden intends to
receive the Russians as leaders
of a hostile state--a plan
scarcely compatible with the
schedule nreAared for themo
CRET' EIDER
FART III PATTERNS ANU PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of ~,4