CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001397785
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00355
• Publication Date: April 12, 1956

(b)(3)
COPY NO.
I NO. 1777/56
12 April 1956
p p cia i#led
Class. C nged
,
Next low Date: ----
Auth.: HR 70-3
Date: --4-T-1- 0
- _-_
~Attth.: HR 70-3
Next Review pate: -__---
W4
ge hi Gias$. El
0 Reclassified
Class. Changed to: TS S
No Chan
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^DATE:
26-Sep-2009
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CIJUENT INTELLIGENCE
BY:
~
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 April 1956
SOVIET EXPECTATIONS
FOR VISIT TO BRITAIN
During their visit to
Britain, starting on 18 April,
Khrushchev and Bulganin will
probably want to hold conversa-
tions on trade and disarmament
and will perhaps propose a,
friendship treaty with Britain,
as well as restate the Soviet
desire to take part in a con-
ference on the Middle East.
A Pravda statement of 9 April
expressing the disappointment
of the Soviet leaders that the
British were limiting their
opportunities for contacts with
British people suggests that a
major goal of the trip is to
make a favorable impression on
the population as Malenkov did
during his recent trip.
Soviet resentment over the
British arrangements, which
will keep to a minimum the
number of cities and institu-
tions the Soviet leaders will
visit, had led Bulganin to sug-
gest on 3 April that the trip
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 6 of 7
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 April 1956
be postponed. The next day,
however, he agreed to Prime
Minister Eden's request that
he come as scheduled.
Topics for Discussion
The British have scheduled
much of Bulganin's and Khru-
shchev's time for substantive
discussions. Moscow, while
expressing a desire for such:,
talks, has given few clues as
to the subjects it favors for
discussion.
Disarmament will probably
be the major topic stressed by
the Soviet leaders. They will
presumably seek to prove that
the USSR's position has been
brought close to the British
stand, emphasizing particularly
the similarity of the Soviet
plan for a zone in central
Europe subject to armaments
limitation and inspection and
the Eden plan presented at the
summit conference. The Soviet
plan assumes the continued
division, of Germany, and has
been rejected by Britain as well
as the United States on this
ground., The Soviet leaders
may use the occasion to make,
some additions to the 27 March
Soviet disarmament proposal.
Bulganin and Khrushchev
are likely to take a cautious
attitude toward.most of the
issues that come up, being
careful not to antagonize the
British on.such matters as
colonialism and probably not
making obvious efforts to
weaken the Great.Britain-Uni.td.d-
States al.limucee. T.hei.r, interest
in discussing various issues
may be limited because of.a
belief that such divisive tac-
tics would not be particular-
ly profitable at this time.
With respect to the Middle
East, one of the subjects the
British particularly want to
discuss, the Soviet leaders will
probably do,little more than,
reaffirm their eagerness to take
part in a conference on the area
and their belief that the Bagh-
dad pact is the real cause of
tension there.
Possibly in-preparation
for discussions of the.problem
of .Vietnam elections, a meeting
was scheduled on 11 April be-
tween A. A. Gromyko and Lord
Reading, representing the co-
chairmen of the 1954 Geneva
conference. The USSR has re-
portedly agreed to postpone the
July 1956 date for all-Vietnam
elections while pushing for a
new Geneva conference on Indo-
china.
Bilateral Issues
There are few outstanding
bilateral issues between Brit-
ain and the USSR. Premier Bul-
ganin, in an interview on 11
April, said that the USSR was
interested in expanding trade
with Britain considerably, and
in particular stressed the advan-
tages that would result if
Britain was willing to abandon
strategic trade controls. Bul-
ganin is likely to propose a
friendship treaty such as that
which he suggested to President
Eisenhower. His second letter
to the President on 1 February
stated that the USSR was willing
to conclude similar treaties
with Britain and France.
The two sides should have
no trouble in agreeing to in-
creased cultural exchanges, al-
though the USSR will probably
resist, as it did at Geneva, any
agreement to remove obstacles to
the free flow of information
such as the jamming of broad-
casts. (Also see PART III,,
p.1)
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
Page 7 of 7