MEETING ON SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1100 HOURS, 28 NOVEMBER

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001403414
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00466
• Publication Date: November 28, 1964

APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
03-24-2009
28 N vember 1964
SUBJECT: Meeting on Southeast Asia, 1100 hours, 28 November
1. All Principals were present except Mr. Ball and Mr. McCone.
General Carter represented Mr. McCone.
2. Prior to the meeting, General Wheeler pointed out that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff felt strongly as a body that the MIG's and the POL
should be taken out first prior to any commencement of a long-range
program. Likewise, Secretary Rusk pointed out that the Presi&nt
was quite disturbed about what appeared to be continuing leaks of
policy discussions. Secretary Rusk, enjoined everyone present not
to talk to the Press in any way nor to give any backgrounders. In
other words, we must assiduously avoid any press contacts.
3. Papers were handed out as follows:
Tab A - Subject: "Scenario for Immediate Action Program. "
(Prepared by Bundy Working Group.)
Tab B - "Draft Statement to GVN. " (Prepared by. General
Taylor)
Tab C - "Military Annex. " (Prepared by Mr. McNaughton)
Tab D - List of Questions (Prepared by General Taylor)
4. Secretary Rusk pointed out that although planners and operators
wanted deci sions to cover_eriods several months in advance, we must
be careful not to back the Presiden~ nt aany suc co enr and to give him
maximum flexibility on a decision-by-decision basis as events occurred.
5. Mac Bundy pointed out this would be difficult but we must be sure
that the President was alerted to all problems that he would have to face
up to whether or not they might occur in the light of subsequent events.
 6. General Taylor pointed out that he was much encouraged over
events in the past 24 hours as indicative that the Huong government
seemed to be getting its feet on the ground. He stated that his p roposed
statement to the GVN would be made initially on a Top Secret basis and
only to Huong Suu, Vien, and Khahn. Bundy said Taylor's statement
should be so phrased that the GVN would know that if they did certain
things then we would follow by doing certain things, and that the opt
was ours, not theirs. Likewise, we should put a time schedule on
accomplishment of those things we wanted GVN to do.
7. Rusk was hesitant about any calling of a leadership meeting
because, of the high-noise level it would raise prior to the convening
of Congress and would create many problems. He stated that the
President ahad ruled against General Taylor seeing any of the Congres-
sional leadership (except Senator Humphrey) until after the President
had made his decisions, probably next week.
8. McNamara said we must take care of the critical problem of
how we surface the new developments on infiltration since this-,.could
be a political bomb shell. Wheeler pointed out that he understood
Phoumi was coming to this country before too long and hoped to make
a speech before the UN on infiltration.
9. Rusk said that the UN would probably meet long enough to
appoint a committe o study Article 19 and then to report to the
Assembly, and therefore Assembly activities would probably be pushed
over into March, and there might not even be an Assembly if the Article
19 matter is not cleared up.
10. Mac Bundy said we must make it clear to the President
exactly what our plans are and spell out clearly what the first month's
activities would be under these plans. He.stated that the President
had discussed the various options and was generally familiar with them.
Wheeler insisted that the President be informed that the JCS opted for
much faster, harder action and unanimously so, but they would, of
course, do whatever the President decided.
11. There was then discussion of greater participation by "other
flags," specifically on the part of the Philippines, and the Australians,
and possibly New Zealand, with more support from Thailand. These
would be in the form of combat advisors or possibly even small combat
units. McNamara said he wanted no Koreans and no Nationalist Chinese
and that what he is really looking for is symbolic support, particularly
under circumstances where some of these third country nationalists
get wounded and killed as is happening to the United States every day.
 McNamara said he told Hasluck that the United States had no intention
of going it alone in Southeast Asia and if the Australians did not help
more they might find us withdrawing.
12. There was a general discussion of the need for constructing
new permanent jet air fields, but the need was not validated and the
JCS are making further studies. Taylor, said he would prepare an
annex to his paper indicating explicitly in detail just what we expected
the GVN to do and the timetable on which" it should be done. He
mentioned such things as increases in armed forces, increased
diplomatic representatives overseas, improved police forces,
simplification of administration, removal of incompetents, etc., etc.
13. There was involved and lengthy discussion of the stoppage
of flow of dependents as well as the removal of dependents presently
in SVN. The various pros and cons were thrown back and forth and
it was decided that this was a major policy decision which they were
not yet prepared to consider.
14. A discussion then ensued.of Tab C, Option C (Graduated
Pressure) of the Military Annex. McNamara stated that the first
_foRr ,terns would probably take place during the first-3-0 days. He
also stated that the situation in SVN would not, in his opinion, remain
stable in its present condition -- it either had to get better or would
get worse, but we would not have the status quo. He also stated that
if the DESOTO patrols were resumed (and there was much discussion
of this) and they were attacked by air, he would propose to take out
the air fields. General Taylor stated that there were three reasons
for the DESOTO patrols, i.e., intelligence collection, assertion of
our maritime rights
and to provo ,e mci en s. We must weigh the
~- weigh
advantages and timing in t l i " e light of all three of these reasons.
(McNaughton mentioned the paper that he and the Joint Staff had prepared
on the value of DESOTO patrols for intelligence collection. Several
people mentioned that this was a fine study -- I was not familiar with
it so made no comment.
15. The following decisions were made:
a. Five papers were to be prepared for the President as
 (1) The general concept
(2) Actions during first 30 days
(3) What to say to GVN
(4) What to say to the public
INI
Bundy undertook to work on all of these during the weekend
A
with his staff.)
b. One man to work fulltime to prepare a report on infiltration
and to get the Jorden report ready. The problem here is how to present
both to the public. It was agreed that Chet Cooper would be assigned by
Bundy to do this job.
c. Prior to Tuesday, the Principals should agree on the
concept of Tab 1 of Military Annex, i.e., what type of reprisals would
be used against what type of VC provocatives.
d. The next meeting would be at 11:00 a. m. on Monday and
papers would be distributed by Bill Bundy as soon as they were completed.
Marshall S. Carter
'Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director
(5) What to say to third countries.