WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: COORDINATION OF WARSAW PACT NAVAL FORCES IN THE BLACK SEA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: WARSAW PACT
• Keywords: DOCTRINE
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001415856
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: June 11, 1974

kk
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AR 70-14
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
11 June 1974
MEMDRANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Coordination of Warsaw Pact
Naval Forces in the Black Sea
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on articles from a SECRET Soviet publica-
tion called Information Collection of the Headvarters and the Technical
Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This article, which was written by
the Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Navy, discusses the necessity of
creating a reliable system for controlling combined Warsaw Pact naval
actions. Among the recommendations are the expansion of the system of
communications among the command posts of the allied navies, the adoption
of more sophisticated equipment, and the establishment of communications
among computer centers. Since the Black Sea is entered by ships of the US
Sixth Fleet several times a year, he also considers it advisable to
introduce unified planning and control measures to detect enemy groupings
and maintain surveillance of them.
This journal is published by Warsaw Pact headquarters in Moscow, and
it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article appeared in
issue No. 4 (1972).
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For of r ference, from this publication have been
assigned the Cod rd
illiam . e n
Deputy Director for S erations
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Distribution:
The
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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ITYPIEC&Q.
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COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT
DATE CW
INFO. Late 1972
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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SUBJECT
DATE 11 June 1974
WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Some Problems of Improving the Control
of Naval Forces in Combined Combat Operations
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russtan of an article from
a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Head-
quarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This
article, which was written by the Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Navy,
discusses the necessity of creating a reliable system for controlling
combined Warsaw pact naval actions. Among the recommendations are: the
expansion of the system of communications among the command posts of the
allied navies, the adoption of more sophisticated equipment, and the
establishment of communications among computer centers. Since the Black
Sea is entered by ships of the US Sixth Fleet several times a year, he also
considers it advisable to introduce unified planning and control measures
to detect enemy groupings and maintain surveillance of them. This article
appeared in Issue No. 4 (1972). End of Summary
Comment:
Rear Admiral V. G. Yanakiyev became Commander-in-Chief of the
Bulgarian navy in January 1973. Formerly he was associated with the N.
Vappsarov Naval School in Bulgaria. The names of authors are given in
Russian transliteration. Ranks of one-star (general-mayor) and two-star
(general-leytenant) general officers are given in Russian for nationals of
countries following the Soviet system.
--TCYP-SECREL
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Some Problems of Improving the Control of Naval Forces
in Combined Combat Operations
by
Rear Admiral V. G. Yanakiyev, Chief of Staff
of the Navy of the Bulgarian People's Republic
The staffs of allied navies devote continuous attention to problems of
control. There are numerous reasons for this, first of all the fact that
modern types of armament and the nature of nuclear war have substantially
increased demands on the organization of control of naval forces and means.
In order to raise the control of naval forces to a level responsive to
modern requirements, we must conduct a series of essential measures to
improve the technical equipping and work methods of control organs.
Effective control of naval forces requires extensive adoption and
utilization of computer equipment and other means of mechanization and
automation, which leads to a series of additional problems requiring rapid
resolution.
It is also necessary to take into account the growing mutual economic
relations among the Black Sea socialist countries, which are making the
Black Sea into one of their primary mutual communications channels.
Naturally, this also determines to a considerable degree the role of
the allied navies in this theater. Destroying enemy naval forces in the
Black Sea, and barring the entry of NATO forces into it, will obviously be
a mission on whose fulfilment our navies must concentrate definite efforts.
The comprehensive development of combat equipment and the relatively
small size of the Black Sea have led to a situation in which, during
fulfilment of any particular combat mission under the conditions of the
Black Sea theater, the operational axes and the strike objectives of the
navies of the allied countries will, as a rule, coincide. In addition,
there are substantial capabilities of moving the naval forces of one allied
country into operating areas of the forces of another navy in order to
carryout dispel, buildup of efforts, etc. Under these conditions,
cOMBEed operations of allied naval forces in the Black Sea become
inevitable, which leads in turn to the necessity of creating a reliable
system for controlling combined allied naval actions.
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We usually understand the term "control of forces" to mean the sum
total of actions by commanders and staffs to prepare, organize, and conduct
combat actions for the fulfilment of assigned tasks. It is not the object
of this article to elucidate this entire procedure. We would like to limit
our discussion to some of the problems of organizing the control of allied
naval forces. These include problems of creating a single system for
controlling allied naval forces in a theater, problems of improving the
organization of coordination and control when maintaining an operating
routine and when forces of one navy are being relocated into the zone of
another navy, and some others.
In a separate category are the problems of forming elements to control
and organize ship groupings for the fulfilment of combined missions in an
operation (combat).
Of special attention to commanders and staffs of allied navies are
problems of establishing the necessary operating routine in a theater and
creating a synchronized system of controlling forces while the routine is
being maintained. It is well known that an operating routine in peacetime
represents a system of measures directed toward averting a surprise enemy
attack from the sea and creating favorable conditions for the actions of
friendly forces. These measures include establishing a reliable system of
communications, recognition, and warning among allied navies; providing for
all types of defense and protection in respective operating zones; main-
taining continuous combat readiness of large units and units and the
continuous duty status of forces and means; organizing uninterrupted
observation and reconnaissance; and establishing the sailing schedule for
combat ships and transports. Obviously the measures for controlling allied
naval forces while they are maintaining the necessary operating routine in
peacetime must correlate directly with the measures for implementing
control of forces during military actions.
Within the allied navies the necessary conditions have been
established for implementing control of forces both in resolving matters
regarding the maintenance of an operating routine in a theater and when
conducting combined combat actions.
However, in our opinion the system for controlling allied naval forces
can be improved still more.
The main role here must be played by organizational and technical
measures to establish a single system for controlling allied naval forces
in a theater. It is clearly more expedient to pursue the course of further
standardizing the equipment of command posts, expanding the system of
communications among the command posts of allied navies and simultaneously
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adopting more sophisticated equipment, establishing communications among
computer centers, etc.
It would be advisable, in establishing and developing the command
posts of national navies, to take into account the capability of ensuring
the control of all allied naval ship groupings from then. This would
significantly increase the viability of the entire control system.
The creation of a single document to regulate coordinated efforts,
mutual obligations, responsibility, and action procedures when maintaining
an operating routine and carrying out certain combined missions would also
contribute to increased effectiveness in controlling naval forces.
It would be advisable to improve the documentation regulating the
organization of the tactical coordination of forces when they are operating
as part of coalition groupings. This is especially important if it is kept
in mind that there is a certain language barrier for commanders of differ-
ent nationalities.
As is well known, sea communications lanes are very important for
maritime states, and consequently, so is the organization of a convoy
service in case of need. Without any previous groundwork, it is difficult
to count on being able to organize a convoy service at, or immediately
before, the onset of combat operations. In all instances this will be
improvisation, which cannot produce the necessary effect. In our opinion,
the convoy service and the defense of sea communications lanes in a theater
must be organized in advance and centrally, with a clear definition of the
responsibility and obligations of each of the allied navies.
An important stage in this process is the detailed working out of all
necessary documentation regulating sea communications and their control in
time of war. Thanks to the active sea communications among our countries,
it is already feasible to begin practical measures for working out the
control of forces to ensure the defense of sea communications lanes. For
this our commanders and staffs do not require any special preparatory
training.
The system of channels occupies an important place in the overall
organization of an operating routine. To ensure safe navigation of combat
ships and transports, there must be closer agreement of the channel systems
of the allied navies. This plan also includes the question of creating a
single system of navigational support for ship navigation.
. As is well known, the Black Sea has been an object of NATO attention
for many years. Profiting by certain provisions of the convention on the
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Black Sea straits, ships of the US Sixth Fleet, including missile-carrying
ships, enter the Black Sea several times a year. This cannot, of course,
fail to draw the attention of our allied navies, and we strive to monitor
all activities of NATO warships. Our experience in this connection
suggests that it would be advisable to introduce unified planning and
control measures to detect enemy groupings and track them. We should
develop and put into use general instructions to regulate action
procedures, the organization of coordinated efforts, communications, etc.
In our opinion, this would increase effectiveness in employing allied naval
forces and means.
It is well known that the military control system cannot function
without a reliable and systematic flow of information on the enemy. On the
whole, we have regulated the exchange of information among our staffs
regarding our probable enemies, but it seems to us that many additional
measures could be taken to improve the system of obtaining and analyzing
information. Paramount among these, in our view, are measures for closer
coordination of the measures taken by national navies to clarify the
situation in a theater, and measures to insure that the forces involved
receive necessary data on a direct and timely basis.
A very important question requiring the special attention of the
staffs of our navies is the improvement of the organization and conduct of
radio-electronic warfare. Since a great many of the radio-electronic
warfare measures taken by any one of our navies affect the activities of
the other navies to a greater or lesser degree, these measures must
obviously be coordinated carefully and in advance. Above all, it is
necessary that these measures be carried out according to a single plan and
concept and that their control be centralized. Otherwise their effect may
be minimal or in certain cases even unfavorable.
During the preparation and conduct of combined combat operations,
extensive relocation of forces of one navy to bases and dispersed mooring
areas of other navies may take place. Completely organizing the defense
and cover of allied naval forces which have been rebased to the zone of
another navy is possible only when there is a well thought out system of
control and a clearly worked out system of coordination among the navies in
general and between the rebased forces and the defense forces of the
pertinent navy in particular. One of the basic conditions for this is to
have direct and reliable radio communications between the rebased forces
and the forces providing their defense, cover, etc. Coordination among
them must be implemented by coordination radio networks which can be
deployed in conformity with unified communications documents.
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Regarding questions of movement routes, anchorages, organization of
defense and cover, organization of fire, etc., rebased forces of allied
navies should follow the special instructions or orders of the commander of
the large unit guarding the water area involved. As a rule, all of the
organization for the entry of allied forces into another zone, their
anchorage there, and their departure, should be worked out in advance. To
accomplish this, it is advisable to work out and obtain approval of several
variants providing for entry, anchorage, and departure, which will sub-
stantially simplify organizing the control of the forces.
When the relocated forces are substantial, it will obviously be more
expedient to control them directly from a remote command post deployed
within the zone of the navy concerned. This will significantly facilitate
organizing coordination with these forces. These command posts could be
deployed separately or could be collocated with the command post of the
local commander.
When we examine the main tasks whose fulfilment requires the combined
efforts of allied navies, we see in the forefront certain problems
connected with organizing control organs, as well as questions concerning
the organizational structure of allied naval forces.
In the course of the operational-tactical training of allied navies, a
certain amount of experience has been accumulated in planning and
organizing combat actions for the fulfilment of tasks requiring combined
efforts.
This training most often consists of making one of the allied naval
headquarters responsible for planning and,organizing combat actions. At
the same time, each of the remaining navies deploys operations groups to
provide for more qualitative planning of combat actions and the
organization of coordination. This headquarters thus becomes the control
agency for the combined actions of the main body of the allied naval
forces. In this case it becomes unnecessary to create a separate control
organ with all of the control means it would need. The system under
discussion here for planning and organizing combat actions also has the
advantage that it is based on the work of a cohesive and adequately worked
out control organ.
We consider it expedient to broaden this practice, and we suggest
studying the possibility of exchanging permanent operations groups. This
will enable us, when governed by an actual situation that has developed, to
set up in a short time a single control organ for combined combat actions
based on any one of our headquarters. In peacetime the permanent
operations groups could coordinate the conduct of combined tasks involved
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in maintaining the established operating routine in the theater and could
also participate in planning, carrying out, and collating the experience of
all combined measures carried out by allied navies.
With such advance deployment, operations groups will have a better
opportunity to develop the required work habits and to "grow" into the
situation and work of the headquarters to which they are attached.
Permanent operations groups will also, in our opinion promote the exchange
of operational-tactical knowledge among staffs and, through them, also
among the officers of the allied navies.
The advantages of the proposed organization of a control organ may of
course be realized only if the operations groups receive high-quality
training and if their mutual activity is well established. It is precisely
this fact that allows us to raise the question of establishing permanent
operations groups which could take a continuous and active part in carrying
out operational-tactical training measures and in maintaining the necessary
operating routine in the theater.
The operation of the control system for combined allied naval actions
will depend to a considerable extent on the organizational structure
adopted for the forces participating in these actions.
In our view, the following forms of organizationally structuring the
forces are worthy of analysis.
A variant is sometimes adopted in which the forces assigned to perform
certain limited tasks are subordinated to their own command and act
independently only in a specific area. In this case the forces are
controlled by the appropriate naval headquarters. There is no provision
for their direct control by a coalition planning agency. Organizing
coordination in this case is simplified and reduced to distributing tasks
among the navies and to indicating the time and place of actions by the
forces of each navy.
This method of organizational structuring of forces can obviously be
justified only in particular instances, for example when supporting the
movement of small convoys or small detachments of combat ships across the
operating zone of a given navy. But even in such an instance, this
pertains primarily to the forces guarding a particular water area, and they
are assigned to a specific channel, a particular area of submarine search,
etc. In relation to the forces providing cover to a convoy or a detachment
of combat ships from the sea, however, such a form of organization is, in
our? view, unsuitable. The situation will very often require the creation
of fairly strong cover groups, whereas this structuring of forces allows
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the creation only of separate national tactical groups, without unified
control and consequently obliged to operate without coordination.
More advantageous, in our view, is an organization of forces under
which they retain their subordination to their national command but are
operationally subordinated to the agency that plans and organizes the
combined combat actions. This makes it easier to combine forces from the
same or different arms of separate navies into one powerful tactical or
operational-tactical grouping capable of accomplishing tasks with great
effectiveness and in great depth, since they are controlled more reliably
and flexibly. As a rule, the groups which allied navies may allocate to a
unified grouping include strike groups, search groups, sweeper groups, and
other tactical groups which are organizationally complete and are capable
of carrying out individual missions independently during combined combat
actions. This method of organizing forces may be employed during the
landing of an amphibious force, the destruction of enemy naval forces, etc.
The control system in this case is more orderly and effective.
The questions which we have raised can by no means cover all of the
problems facing allied navies in connection with the need to improve the
system of implementing control during the accomplishment of our common
tasks. Some of these questions have been examined and discussed at special
conferences, and we consider that the required conditions exist for putting
them into practice in the allied navies. The remaining items still await
resolution, which can come about only through combined staff efforts.
The operating effectiveness of the control system depends to a
considerable degree on its thoroughness and on complete mutual under-
standing among the individual commanders and staffs functioning within it.
It is a function of a control organ to coordinate the actions of separate
elements of cooperating forces, and this is achieved by working out
appropriate orders, maps, plans, coordination tables, etc. No document,
however, can replace the practical experience acquired by commanders and
staffs in training forces for combined operations in exercises, war games,
etc. We therefore consider that combined measures by allied naval forces
must be expanded; this must lead eventually to complete development of the
organization of actions of composite multinational tactical and
operational-tactical groupings.
lopsfic
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