CPPG MEETING WITH IRAQ (W/ATTACHMENT)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001416448
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2008
• Case Number: F-1999-00204
• Publication Date: July 22, 1986

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National Intelligence Council
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
14-Jul-2008
NIC 03455-86
22 July 1986
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: CPPG Meeting on Iraq
1. After supplying a paper (Attachment A) and A briefing on the
Iran/Iraq war last week, the Director requested further information and
expanded recommendations in preparation for his weekly meeting with
Admiral Poindexter. I am forwarding the paper written in response to
that request (Attachment B) to provide our view of the situation before
the upcoming CPPG.
2. If we can be of any further assistance, please ask. I would also
like to take the opportunity to compliment the analysts in NESA covering
the war. They have always been cooperative and supportive of our efforts
but, more importantly, their analysis have been well ahead of
developments in the war and certainly ahead of the rest of the
community. I have found them anxious to "push the evidence" and
thoroughly professional.
3. I look forward to hearing the results of the CPPG.
Attachments:
As stated
S
 SJF'ET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director.of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
onal Intelligence Officer for
Near East and. South Asia
Developments in the Iran-Iraq War
1. A crisis in Iraq could be imminent. In our recent SNIE
(Attachment A) we judged that Baghdad would probably lose the war over
the longer term if it did not exploit its military advantages. Saddam
has not substantially altered his war policies and the possibility of a
collapse of Iraqi will is rapidly becoming''more plausible. Several
current developments are particularly disturbing:
-- Iraq is faring badly in what has become a major Iranian effort
(at least six Revolutionary Guard and tw
divisions) to take a strategic ridgeline
dramatically the vulnerability of Iranian oil and communications
facilities to its precision weapons, but they have not sustained
the attacks in a way that seriously impairs Iran's ability to
There is a confluence of factors leading Iran to conclude that
it must act now if it hopes to achieve a decisive victory. For
example the Iraqi Air Force has recently demonstrated
make war.
Iraqi cohesion and prospects in the
is
Iranian drive to Baghdad but a series of dramatic victories that
rrvL1 all
destroys Iraqi military and political cohesion. is right in
tryin to ratchet up the attention level ("we need to get in high
gear"). The war has lingered on for so long that there is a dangerous,
This Memo is led
SEC in its entirety.
waa3 simistic turn (Attachment C).
 but widely held, assumption that the situation will not change rapidly
and that there is little we can do anyway.
3. Recommend the following:
-- That we advise NSC and other senior policymakers of the gravity
with which we view the current situation and the prospects for
the remainder of 1986.
Attachments:
As Stated
 The Director of Central Intelligence
Wuhington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
NIC 03384-86
16 July 1986
an National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Troubling Developments in the Iran/Iraq War
FROM:
1. Saddam Husayn's grip may be slipping and his political fortunes
are closely linked to reversing recent trends in the war. On the Iranian
side, there is significant evidence that Iran has embarked on a major
effort to win the war in the near term.
2. Iraq has suffered two serious military setbacks in 1986--Al. Faw
and now Mehran. Al Faw was a strategic loss and Mehran was (so far) only
a tactical reversal, but both were major blows to Iraqi morale. By using
surprise, better planning, and improved coordination Iranian forces have
achieved success in limited attacks that have kept Iraq guessing and
preserved the initiative for Iran. Even with these improvements, Iran
could only impose a decisive strategic defeat on Iraq in conjunction with
a major collapse of morale within the Iraqi military. Unfortunately,
there are indications that Iranian efforts to erode morale are beginning
to bear fruit:
-- Iraqi casualties for this year (at least 30,000) are as high as
all of last year. Civilian morale is described as the "lowest
ever", with the first indications of widespread, open complaining
about Saddam's mismanagement of the war.
-- The Iraqi economy has continued to deteriorate with little hope
of improvement.
3. In spite of these problems, there is little threat from the
organized resistance elements such as the Iranian sponsored Da'wa.or
Kurdish groups. The more likely threat to Saddam'comes from the senior
 ranks of the military or from within the Bath party itself..
5. In short, the key element in preserving Iraqi stability will be
the performance of the military. A major defeat--especially in a large
campaign that inflicts significant casualties--would have a significant
impact. Short of a complete debacle, another tactical defeat in the near
term would not result in an unravelling of the military or a collapse of
the front, but would further undermine Saddam's position. Over the
longer term, a failure to develop and execute an effective strategy could
well result in an outright Iranian victory.
6. Recommend that we:
-- Advise NSC and other senior policymakers of the gravity with
which we view the current situation and the prospects for the
remainder of 1986.
 -- Reinvigorate efforts to cut off war materiel to Iran
 SUBJECT: CPPG Meeting on Iraq
NIC/A/NIO/NES/ (22 July 1986)
Distribution:
Orig - DDI
1 - AC/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - A/NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/NESA (
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