MAIL INTERCEPT PROGRAM (W/ATTACHMENTS0

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001420864
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00095
• Publication Date: January 21, 1975

APPROVED FOR RELEASED DATE:
05-Nov-2008
21 January 1975
SUBJECT: Mail Intercept Program
1. A program of intercepting mail between the
United States and the Soviet Union (HTLINGUAL) was
conducted in New York during the period 1952-1973.
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(b) (6)
3. New York Mail Intercept Program (HTLINGUAL):
The HTLINGUAL effort in New York was the only continuously
operating mail intercept unit. The project was initiated in
1952 by a request from the Chief of Operations Staff, ADSO
(predecessor to Office, DDP), to the Office of Security to
provide leads to SR Division on contacts between individuals
and organizations in the USSR and USA, to spot individuals in
the USSR who were disaffected and of potential help to the U.S.,
to acquire sources for names to be used as addressors of mail
to the USSR, to spot individuals in the U.S. who were sympathetic
to Soviet interests, and finally for possible positive intelli-
gence take from letters opened on a selective basis. The Chief
Postal Inspector in Washington approved the project in November
1952 before it was activated in New York City. Postmaster
General Summerfield was briefed generally on the program by
Mr. Helms in 1954, as was Postmaster General Edward Day in 1961.
The program including the fact for the first time that we were
conducting clandestine openings of the mail, was later briefed
to then Attorney General Mitchell and Postmaster General Blount
in June 1971. The FBI was informed of the HTLINGUAL operation
in 1958, several years after its inception. The FBI had contacted
U.S. Postal authorities in 1958
The Postal authorities
informed CIA of the CIA in turn then alerting the
FBI to the existence of our HTLINGUAL operation. The HTLINGUAL
project was suspended by DCI Schlesinger in February 1973 who
expressed his agreement with the desirability that the project
be passed to the FBI and his lack of conviction that the product
to CIA was worth the risk of our involvement.
Background: The HTLINGUAL project was initiated in 1952
as described above but was turned over to the CI Staff in 1955
and was managed by the latter unit until its suspension in 1973.
a. Following are the statistics on the number of letters
opened with contents photographed and the number of reports
which were disseminated to interested customers based on this
HTLINGUAL information:
Year
1-953-
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
Letters Opened and
Interiors Photographed
?Dissemination
FBI SR Others
Year
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
-3--
Letters Opened and
Interiors Photographed
TOTAL
Dissemination
FBI ?SR Others
b. As indicated above, the FBI received a grand total
of reports from HTLINGUAL information over the years
an ex r sed an interest in continuing to receive such reports
from this project.
c. The HTLINGUAL machine record indicates over
names of persons involved in U.S.-USSR contact were
acquired under the project during the years and have been used
for name traces and other counterintelligence purposes.
NOTE: The Office paid
for two or three years" and "payments of per
mont to a U.S. Post Office employee who worked closely with
CIA personnel for fifteen years or more at the HTLINGUAL mail
intercept site in New York City. There is no indication that
U.S. Post Office officials are aware of our payments to their
employee. At the beginning of his assignment to the mail
intercept program the employee was told by his U.S. Post Office
supervisor that our CIA personnel with whom he would be working
were from "Washington," the implication being that they were
from the Post Office Department.
5. Overall Evaluation of Project HTLINGUAL:
a. It is useful to keep in mind that at the origin
of this project in 1952, CIA lacked general background infor-
mation useful to mount positive intelligence collection
operations against the Soviet Union as well as for counter-
intelligence purposes. It was on this basis and within this
framework that the project was originated and appeared to acquire
significantly useful information over the years that followed.
It should also be kept in mind that the project was essentially
a CI Staff operational tool and was not designed to produce
clearly measurable disseminable intelligence or information in
-4-
support of specific operational undertakings. Nonetheless,
the project was useful from a purely technical point of view
when used to ex,mine incoming mail from the USSR to determine
the following:
b. In late 1952 the Soviet agent as recruited
in Vienna. The biggest operational problem we raced after his
recruitment was determining how to communicate clandestinely
with him once he had returned to the Soviet Union.
c. The HTLINGUAL interce t material was used to acquire
operational information on
all of whic was use u in supporting
an' 4 ocumen ing coT- to be given to agents being sent
to the Soviet Union under the REDSOX or REDSKIN operational
-5-
programs. The HTLINGUAL material was also screened intensively
for leads to ?ossible legal travelers who might be approached
under the program and might also be useful as communi-
cation li agents inside the Soviet Union. Our overall
assessment of these efforts, however, is that the project was
not very useful for these purposes.
d. There were literally hundreds of what appeared
to be useful operational leads or background information passed
by the project over the years to the line divisions of the DDO
although the great majority of these proved to be of only
marginal value. (See Attachment "Nature and Utilization of
HTLINGUAL Material") SR Division at one point, however, did
find the HTLINGUAL information of some use for targeting pur-
poses. One SE officer recalls mail from
who would have been of target interest to us. In
?TtT?, the mail from the USSR to the United States provided
leads for SE Division and other DDO area divisions regarding
travel plans of target individuals in advance of our receiving
this information from other sources and also identified some
of their contacts in the United States who could then be targeted
by us as access agents to these Soviet and other foreign target
visitors.
e. The HTLINGUAL intercept information proved most
useful to the in monitoring contacts of United States citizens,
including some U.S. military and government officials, who
were in touch with Soviets and who had not reported these contacts
to their own parent organizations. There were many other
instances of very significant internal security information
acquired from the HTLINGUAL project which was passed to the
for their action. (Some random examples are attiftel to this
memorandum.) It is significant to note that the
contributed
broadly over the years to the project's Watch List of individuals
or categories of individuals whose mail would be of interest to
them, and has stated that the HTLINGUAL reports have been "of
assistance and continue to be of assistance to us". (As an
example of requests to be placed on the HTLINGUAL Watch List,
see Attachment, memorandumfrom
f. A recent check with our SE Division Reports Staff
-6-
indicates there were no positive intelligence disseminations
deriving from HTLINGUAL information over the life of the
project.
6. Conclusion:
Although project HTLINGUAL was quite useful in assisting OTS
p
o
nt
lchnical problems
and other technical problems to be encountered by our
7nAr_l_f
agents operating abroad, and also p ' ed specific internal
security counterintelligence to the on a continuing basis,
the overall evaluation of the project is that it was of
marginal value to our positive intelligence operational pro-
grams directed against the Soviet Union and was useful basically
as a CI Staff operational tool which had only occasional and
limited specific operational utility to the line divisions of
the Directorate of Operations.
Attachments:
1. "Random Examples of Production" of assistance to the
2. Memorandum from Director, OTS to ADDSU on Technical
Value of Mail Intercepts in the United States
3. Memorandum from
4. "Nature and Utilization of HTLINGUAL Material"
RANDOM EXAMPLES OF PRODUCTION
1.,
2.
ANTI-IMPERIALIST .DELEGATION
In
, Lne mail of eleven laajor WS. TaalCa).
This de
Pgatioq
leaders
wno were in was intercepted.
was enroute to
guests of the
This correspondence revealed (a) that the leaders were get-
ting ideological stimulus in and activist-revolutionary
support in guerilla training in , and. (h) the
whereabouts, unknown to. concerned U.S. agencies, of such
leftists as:
(c) the anti-U.S, manifesto of the group, contained in the:ir
jointly signed letter; (d) warning about plans to take
over after The
letter set forth justification for "events that will unft
in in the coming months. U This provided insight in
planning even though the intentions never
alized: (e) .establishment of the International Section
operating from
affairs and associates of in
(f) information
7 TRAVEL TO
In the past many dissident new ieLt
the Communist world via Moscow wher
These letters often provide U.S. ag
notice of their presence in Communi
constantly reports such travel, whi
as:
AND
activists have gone to
e they pause to write lett
encies the first and only
St countries. The Project
ch has included such notabl;
'2
1
6. On the
Washington, D.C.,.?orwarded a two-page circular letter .to
After expressing in strong terms its opposition to theConflict
the
the oUtlined its campaign
for mass tallies on, discussions with government workers,
harrassment of traffic to and. tram the etc.
This was to be followed on with- strikes, demonstrations,
and work stoppages ever where. n its letter the
urgently requested support in theform of
emonstrations-
in foreign capitals an major cities, protest cables addressed
to President NIXON, and work stoppages in American factories
abroad. This information Mr. Helms provided to Attorney General
MITCHELL.
7.
asked the Project to watchlist
In the
mail between L
e
.S. ?and and requested
any
an
all items from the past.
items, going back as
far
as
were retrieved
from
the ? files ?and passed to the
Two mon s later the informed the Project that the
items had scored four "hits", the quarry being illegal entrants.
The Project continues to furnish the regularly with
mail.
NOTE:
items are
correspondence either (a) forwarding
inquiries of U.S. ersons about rela-
tives lost or (b) reply-
ing to inquiries o citizens
about relatives who have iisappeared
and could be in the U.S. The latter
provide the clues which are taken up
by the The Project does not
see mail originated by the
c
it is believed to come b of-
fIaT pouch for passing to the
by the
8. CIA furnished the United States Secret
Service and the .tederal Bureau of Investigation information
extracted from Project materials. Two letters had been re-
ceived which had been authored by a person in
believed to be identical with one of the armed suspects
by the Secret Service in at
hotel at which stayed durin the
In writing ta students
the writer, 'Tho had recently
returned from a tour ot gave vent to his ardent wish
for the rise, in the United States, of a
seized 1
at
9.
made available to the
correspondence
and
Project files contained information
exchanged between
correspondence
correspondence of
it was also possible
who
as a tellow
thy the
named in
10.
concerning items of
and
in
to others in t e in
was also avai a. e.
to use.Project records to iden-I
had referred to but not
in in
4
11. Advance notice that a
attending
come to the
12.
ci e for ore
of interest to the FBI.
tn
13. The Project provided the first positive indication that
in the
the
atter
was
disappeared from
in
- 14. The Project has also provided information about the other
who fled to the
cerning the
in
who went to
and
and some-items con-
from
the
in
and
15. Correspondence between scientists and academicians
and the counterparts as een valuable in providing
insight into planning and interests with respect to
various
such as the Land
In particular ?tor example, corresponcteiice to and from ana about
when married?With collateral intormation nas Peen use-
tul in briefin and guiding
ct with in and
reported early
to collaborate wi
interest in
1.
f
continuing
5
when comes into -
eftorts
tn them and
2
, 0-14f (Itev. 10-16-70)
Federal Bureau of Investigation
:March 10 1972
Director - BY CIA COURIER
Central Intelligence Agency ?
Washington. D. C.. 20505
ATTENTION: Deputy Director for Plans, JAEES ATICLETaY 1
RE: HUUTER PROJECT
Dear Site
0
I. For your information. I am enclosing communications which may be-
of interest to you.
2. It will be appreciated if you will have the investigation conducted
as requested in the enclosed memorandum and furnish the results,.
3. No further investigation is conternpla:ed with regard to this matter
[J4. You will be advised of the pertinent developments in connection
with this inquiry.
5. Please note change in caption of this case.
ED 6. Status of case:
ROTH 1 .
Excluded rolt automatic
downgradin, .and
deulassifie:a. :Loa
Enc.
Reerer:c sr.ade
Eunter :3e2ort
Attached is a
would 1e to rec
ni Completed
Very truly yours,
Edgar How,
Director
:(C:poi2 tetnouar
.doC r -2 c
O.
eue.
_cnyz-
e
or:
f,i'ic we
would, .of course, ii;:e 'co rece-tue any ludjt
who are there for a short time if they have been .sponsored by
subversive organi2at7ons and subversive ? individ,uals or have
received special invitations or special treatment froM the
Soviets.
6. 7e have no interest in the hundreds of lecitimate travel
who visit the USSR on regular tours or go to see relatives._
r'S
knolfm communtsts, iew Lr't actiulsrs .e=tremists
and other subversives_;j
7. Co--J'nist ?cry- rnd Xrcnt crn.ani_7rItions (suck as iiericcn
iu.ssian institute, ::at:cnal Ccuci ?I J:7erican-Soviet Friendship
"u:-ratan cztreT.ist cn2 Le?.) ie.ft orcanizctions.
ROUP I -
Exciude,d -ra a tit cit-r!at-1 c
dav,r1.,:.; raj t mry.
e clasztf ti
8. Protest and peace organt2r7tions, such as Peoole Coaiiticn
for Peace and Justice, Yattonal Peace Action Coizzs.ittee and '
70men1s Strike for Peace.
9. Communists, Trotskyites and members of other 1.1ar=is.t-
Leninist, subversive and extremist !roups, such as the 37CC1r,
Panthers, 7hite Panthers, Black IJatonaiist and Liberation
os Organiza*tion, 7ecthermenx
croups, Venceremos Brigdds, Vencerem
-Proaressive Labor 'artu, 7orker's Student _Alliance-, Stu.dents -
for a Democratic Society, Resist, Revolutionary Union and ather_:: -
?few Left croups.
11. Traffic to .and from, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Isiands
showing anti-U.S. or subversive spathie3.
13. Ss,viet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots- -
?Abroad (contacts uith emigres and emigre organizations
- 2 -
SFFT
_
OTIZENTS ON TEE
In comparing the
newly received oneSwe?
707
r
771-7'' 4-7: 7 rr'''./-e
14 March 1972
1TPDAT STATEMENT OF R.E.QUIREE,:?ITS Fop,. CIOT.
previous rec_u-i2.-ements of October 1962 7.:-.7th
uhe following changes:
ADDITIONS: Protest and peace organizations, subversive and. extrr.,ist
groups, the New Left (many listed) ;
Traffic to and from the Virgin Islands showing anti?US or stibveriv
sympathies.
DELETIONS: None noted.
,m?
Cl/Project states with reasonable certainty that its po.,..icy
"
to dissaaination of its mato-I?la's to the during the period 1962 to.
February 1972 has su'ostanti=y 'oeen in accord tale 1972
re.statenent of its re:as...lire-Tents.
0'27=
ONLY
azET:g
n'mpi
rv
r?0,) -LINA
TEZERAMOM FOR THE T.ECORD.
.13JECT seature and Utilization of HTLEIGUAL
' Since 1957 the HILIUGUAL project supplied intelligelece data
to the a Staff components ? SB
Division, other area divisions when appropriate, DO/I0 FI Staff, oRa,
OCT, and al Staff.
2. Increased watchelisting and tration on persons of Cl
or operatioaal iaterest gradmallymirdmized the amount of materipl
of FT, ORR, or CCI interest, while dissemination to al Staff was or-
-edered curtailed at the time of the RPARTS and National Student ?
. Aseociation disclosures.
3. Present conenmers of HTLINGUL materiel- are given In the
following, pages with the types of data desired and regularly sup-
plied.
4. Apart from the reporting of cereent ieformaticm.to these
conseeers according to their requirements, an equally - if not more -
important marries ?the supply of data from the record,. dating back
to 1955, when the consuner requests a name-cbeck? further background,
or earlier activities of a given subject. The ETLINGUL machine rec-
ord includes names of persons involved in USA-USSR
contact.
ONLY
Th requests and receives information and leads from Pro-
ject materi to/from, identifying, or concerning:
? d. US defectors in the USSR, and contacts with US.
A. CTUSA meMbers and officials contacting USSR.
f. Contacts of radicals and subversives with USSR.
g. Contacts with USSR of militant, dissident, and protest groups.
N
1. Record material in name checks, supplying further identifi-
cation of aubjects, their background and activities.
?
.UN L7
SEES ONLY
CI STAFF
CI Staff components receive pertinent material of interest
to operational divisions, as well as the following:
SB DIVISION
SB Division uses Project material for operational leads,, for
augmenting operations, and for CI and operational files. It ex-
tracts and supplies information for asic files, 201/3, and imnut,
programs of SB interest. S3 has requested and gets materials to/
from or concerning the following types:
r17 ONIY
A7 DIVISION
. Africa Division receives Project material identifyin4 and concern4ng:
WH COG
Cuba Operations receives Project material which:
DO//
? DO/I receives - and gets operational leads from - Project_ materials
to/from, identifying, or concerning:
TZTD
PID/AU, and each division concerned (AP, NEI F7, WH, etc.,) receive
extracted material identifying foreign students in the USSR. This ?
goes nut under a blind memo not identifying the Project.
CA salyp
Though there is no current dissemination to CA StaXf, there is a
walth of material of Dotential rel aneand usefulness. Y,aterial
forn1 mt to GA, included:
si-TA,Rert757-77-LY .
(,