SOVIET TACTICS CONCERNING VIETNAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: Vietnam
• Keywords: SOVIET TACTICS
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001467194
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2010
• Case Number: F-2010-01830
• Publication Date: July 15, 1965

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OFFIC ' OOP IT-O'I:ONAL ESTIM4T ES
15 July 1965
SPECIAL NEmnnuumm NO, 13?65
ISUBJECT : Soviet Tactics Concernini, Vietna?
c
The new Soviet-DRV economic and military aid agreement implies
a stepup in Soviet arms shipments and will have the effect of
deepening the Soviet commitment in Vietnam. Partly in order to
contain the risks of this commitment, the USSR has of late inten-
sified private approaches to the US, indicating continued interest
in a negotiated settlement. At the same time, it has threatened
in low key to make trouble in Berlin if the US remains unyielding
in Vietnam. We believe that this combination of tactics is intended
to deter further US escalation in Vietnam. It is also meant to
prepare for the time when negotiations might become feasible and,
the USSR can play a larger role in Vietnam.
GROUP 1
Excluded from omatic
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE - CIA INFOL DATE: 28-Oct-2010 JFK LIBRARY
MANDATORY R
CASE # NLk DOCUMENT#
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1. The USER seems to have agreed to step up its arms ship-
ments to the DRV. As announced by Hanoi on 12 July, a new economic
and military aid agreement was recently signed in Moscow; among
other things, it calls for the "strengthening of the DRV's national
defense potential" and specifies the additional aid to be provided.
2. The signing of this agreement followed a mouth or more
of public Soviet hints that something of this nature was impending.
Departing from the usual formula on the subject, Pravda in mid-June,
for example, declared that the USSR would give "the DRV government
and the republic's armed forces all the assistance considered
necessary by the. DRV for the defense of the achievements.of peoples
rule and the repulse of aggression."
3. The Chinese seem to have agreed to the transshipment of
additional Soviet arms. The Soviet ambassador in Peiping, for
example, is reported to have told the Cambodian ambassador that
China had recently given its agreement to let the USSR transport
war material destined for North Vietnam across China. Similar
statements have been attributed to other Soviet sources. Moscow's
recent public emphasis on the failure of the Chinese to coordinate
their Vietnamese policies with the Soviets suggests, however, that
a permanent solution to the transshipment problem has yet to be found.
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4.
The extent of Soviet military aid program for the DRV is
not, of course, spelled out in announcements of the new agreement,
and it is not entirely clear to us what the Soviets have in mind.
In general, however, we think the Soviets are likely to provide
weapons of an essentially defensive nature. Specifically, under
the terms of the new agreement, we think further deliveries of
Soviet air defense equipment are likely: SAMs, AAA, radar, and
fighters. The SAM system will probably be extended to cover more
than the Hanoi area.
5. The USSR. apparently agreed last spring to strengthen the
DRV's coastal defenses; thus far, it does not seem to have done
so. The new agreement may spell out this commitment, and for
example, provide for the strengthening of the MTB fleet and perhaps
the delivery of Komar missile boats and coastal defense missiles.
6. It is possible that more IL-28's will be delivered. The
lack of a specific response to the delivery of eight of these
aircraft in late May, together with the public airing of the issue
in the US, may have convinced the USSR and the DRV that more of
these aircraft could be safely delivered.
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Soviet A roaches to the US
7. While increasing their involvement in the Vietnamese crisis,
the Soviets have made it a point to keep in touch with the US.
Gromyko told Ambassador Kohler in Moscow last month that it was
"fundamental Soviet policy" to seek an improvement in US-Soviet
relations. He also seemed to say that further overtures to the
DRV should be made. Kosygin, in rejecting the British Commonwealth
mission, was careful not to rule out negotiating and merely dis-
claimed any authorization to negotiate for the DRV or Viet Cong.
A Soviet official in Vienna, who expected that his remarks would
reach Washington, claimed on 1 July that his government foresaw
an armistice as a possible basis for Vietnam negotiations. Most
recently, the Soviets have agreed to early resumption of disarmament
talks in Geneva, abandoning the line that Vietnam made such talks
useless. This could have symbolic import as the first positive
Soviet move in East-West relations after many months of deterioration.
8. In addition to these approaches, Ambassador Kohler has
reported that on 27 June a Soviet official, privy to high level
policy, told one of Kohler's diplomatic colleagues that the US
and USSR had the same strategic aim in Southeast Asia -- to prevent
the area from falling under Chinese domination. He said the most
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feasible solution would be an independent, neutralized Vietnam,
guaranteed by the US and USSR as in Laos. He added that negotiations
were exceedingly difficult for the Soviets because they could not
be kept secret and, if they become known, the Chinese would lambaste
the Soviets for a sellout.
9. But this same Soviet official also stated that the policy
choices for the USSR were becoming increasingly painful; if the
situation continues along present lines, he said, the Soviets would
be forced to "counterattack" in the area of the greatest US vul-
nerability, Germany. This pointedly declared warning is the first
of its kind. Previous East German moves affecting West Berlin
might have been partly intended to convey the same warning, though
Soviet officials on the scene disavowed any intention of creating
another Berlin crisis.
10. We continue to think that the Soviets want to avoid
sharp crises on two fronts simultaneously. The new leaders have
shown themselves willing, however, to put some pressure on West
Berlin while the war continues in Vietnam. We believe that they
will further develop the line that the US faces trouble in Berlin
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if it remains unyielding in Vietnam, perhaps underscoring it from
time to time with controlled harassmentsfalling short of a major
challenge to the Allied position there.
11. All these recent Soviet moves, in our view, illustrate
and are explained by the major dilemmas of Soviet policy. The
USSR naturally desires the victory of communism in Vietnam, yet
it does not want to see such a victory as would magnify the prestige
and power of Communist China. At the same time, in the circum-
stances of the Sino-Soviet controversy Moscow cannot afford to
appear laggard in supporting the DRV and the Viet Cong. Yet it is
highly apprehensive of the consequences of expanded war in the
Far East, a major military confrontation between the US and Communist
China, and the extremely dangerous world crisis that would result
therefrom. Finally, the situation is one over which Moscow has
little control; it cannot manage the DRV, or the Chinese Communists,
or the US..
12. The feasible options open to Moscow are thus limited and
unsatisfactory. It is giving more aid to North Vietnam because
practically speaking, it cannot avoid giving such aid and because
it wishes to strengthen its presence and influence in Hanoi.
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It is putting some pressure on the US through low-keyed threats
about Berlin. Yet it is also keeping open its lines of communication
with the US, endeavoring somewhat to soften the crisis, to keep
alive the possibilities of negotiation at some future time, and
to persuade the US not to carry military operations to a degree of
extreme aeverity. We continue to believe that the Soviets desire
a negotiated settlement, because such a settlement would bring
least profit to the Chinese, would dampen the dangers of extended,
war, and. yet would not necessarily surrender Communist objectives
in Vietnam. At the moment there is little the Soviets can do to
bring about negotiation. They can only temporize, and lay what
fomdations they may for the time when negotiations become feasible
and they can hope to influence them.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHERMA1 KE NT
Chairman
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