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January 10, 2008
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September 9, 1991
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT BRI"CC, UNITED STATES V. B-90-090(TFGD) B-86-59 (TGFD) ARIF DURRANI September 9, 1991 GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTION TO ARIF DURRANI'S SECOND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS The government objects to each of the seven requests for production contained in the defendant's Second Request for Production of Documents, received on July 25 and 26, 1991. No useful purpose could be served by requesting additional classified documents from the CIA until the Court has had an opportunity to consider the government's objections in light of the claims made in both the original and amended 2255 motions. It is clear from the requests the defendant has made that Mr. Durrani is on a fishing expedition wholly unrelated to the claims raised in his original 2255 Motion, l and the claims now raised in 1The suggestion in the defendant's July 21 Reply to the Government's First Response to his First Request for Production of Documents that there is a "possibility of [Manuel Pires'] indirect involvement with the United States government" raises a theory wholly at odds with the defendant's previously proffered versions of events and one which the Court, after all these months of delay by the defendant, should not permit him the latitude to pursue through unrestricted discovery. APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: NOV 2007 the Amended 2255 are even more amorphous than those advanced in the original Motion. The Original 2255 Claims In the original 2255 Motion, the defendant alleged that exculpatory evidence concerning the.following was suppressed at his trial: (1) Oliver North's presence in London between September 28 and October 2, 1986; (2) CIA efforts to procure Hawk missile'system parts for delivery to Iran from sources other than the Department of Defense; (3) The statement of a Belgian witness, Tony Van de Meersche, that Manuel Pires once told him that Pires was working for the U.S. government; (4) Involvement of his company, Merex, with the CIA in importing ammunition; list; (6) [same as (2)] (7) A memorandum from William Casey. Durrani also claimed in the 2255 Motion that the prosecutor suborned perjury at trial from Michael Sneddon of the National Security Council; Charles Moyer of the Central Intelligence Agency; and Brenda Carnahan of the Office of Munitions Control, U.S. Department of State. Finally, Durrani claimed that because he was induced to (5) Placement of Bell helicopter parts on the munitions 3 procure the Hawk parts he exported illegally by Manuel Pires, who was allegedly "requested and authorized to act on behalf of the United States government, the CIA and Oliver North of the NSC," his prosecution was barred by the concept of "due process estoppel," and that his sentence was disproportionately long compared to others convicted of violating the Arms Export Control Act. Durrani failed to support any of these claims with a single shred of admissible evidence, or any other showing which would have entitled him to a hearing on these claims. Notwithstanding this utter lack of evidence, the government requested that the matter be set down for a hearing on the suppression of exculpatory evidence and subornation of perjury claims, and that the defendant be required to produce competent evidence in support of the claims or abandon them. Although the original 2255 has been pending since March, 1990, and since then the defendant has had nearly 18 months to investigate and conduct some discovery, no affidavit or other similar statement of provable facts underlying his claims has ever been produced. Now the original 2255 has been amended, and the nature of the amended claims is even. broader and less specific than those in the original Motion. Scope of the Inquiry At trial, and since, the defendant has specifically claimed that his attempt to export Hawk system parts in October, 1986, without the required State Department license was specifically authorized by Oliver North of the National Security Council in a face-to-face meeting in London between September 28 and October 2, 1986, as part the hostage negotiations with Iran.2 Durrani also testified that his customer Manuel Pires set up the meeting with North, and that Pires had previously done business with Richard Secord and Albert Hakim, although Durrani disclaimed any involvement with any shipments made by Secord and Hakim. Because of this testimony, even though Durrani has produced no admissible evidence that Oliver North was in London during the September 28 - October 2, 1986 time period, the government agreed to provide at least the-Court with all available evidence concerning North's whereabouts for the relevant time period. The only evidence on this question which is in the undersigned's possession is the Oliver North notebooks. Other information has been identified by the Independent Counsel but cannot be made available until security procedures are completed. However, based on discussions with the responsible officials, no evidence discovered so far supports Durrani's claims. In light of Durrani's claims that Manuel Pires was an associate of North's and the charge that the CIA witness committed perjury concerning any resort by the CIA to third 2At one point in his testimony, Durrani said he learned Pires was buying Hawk missile system parts for the U.S. government in September, 1986 (3/24/87, 236-241). parties in procuring the Hawk system parts delivered to Iran, document searches have also been done in an attempt to discover any relationship between Pires and the Hawk procurement. No evidence has been discovered so far to suggest that Pires had any involvement with the U.S. government's shipment of Hawk parts to Iran or with Oliver North. Groundless Discovery In his first Request for Production of Documents and through subpoenas, Durrani sought not only information about the whereabouts of Oliver North and the role of Manuel Pires, but also documents on a variety of subjects which have on their face no relevance to his claims. For example, Durrani subpoened George Cave, who served under contract to the CIA as an interpreter.in the hostage negotiations with Iran. He has also asked for documents concerning meetings Cave supposedly attended with Iranians in Washington, D.C. in July and September, 1986; in Frankfurt in July, and in London and Madrid in August, 1986. The CIA has found no documents responsive to these requests. In his trial testimony, Durrani claimed that a person he identified as his Iranian contact (Rahim Malekzadeh) told him in 1985 that he was dealing with George Cave and Oliver North. (3/24/87 Tr. 220) Since George Cave did not become involved with the Iranian hostage negotiations until March 5, 19863, it is obvious that this was simply another instance of Durrani name-dropping with no first hand knowledge.4 The only other mention of Cave during the Durrani trial was in a stipulation involving Exhibit 609, a list of parts delivered to Cave by an Iranian representative in Paris in April, 1986. This list was similar but not identical to the shopping list Durrani supplied to Radio Research in mid-1986. Now, Durrani has expanded his document request to seek records of meetings supposedly attended by Cave in Frankfurt in October, 1986 (after Durrani's arrest), as well as in Washington in September, 1986. Nowhere in the original 2255 or in the record of this case is there anything to support even the inference that Cave has anything useful to contribute to a resolution of the question of whether exculpatory evidence was withheld or perjury was committed at Durrani's trial. The Court recently denied the Motion to Quash the subpoena issued to George Cave as moot, presumably in light of the status conference at which counsel indicated they would attempt to handle the witnesses originally subpoened by the defendant 3Draper, A Very Thin Line, p. 291. Similarly, North's first contact with the Iranians was in Frankfurt on February 19, 1986. 4The Court will recall that Durrani also invented contact with Howard Teicher of the National Security Council during his trial testimony, and that Teicher appeared in the government's rebuttal case and denied any knowledge of Durrani. 7 through depositions. The undersigned has attempted to obtain from defense counsel a statement of the information about which he seeks to depose Mr. Cave, so that the, CIA can authorize Mr. Cave to testify. A deposition of Mr. Cave in lieu of his public appearance will be a waste of time unless the parameters of the deposition are established with enough specificity to permit the CIA to authorize Cave to testify. In August, defense counsel took the depositions of Barbara Studley and John Singlaub in Washington, D.C. Neither witness had any knowledge of Arif Durrani or his claims; neither has any known involvement in or knowledge of the "Iran" portion of the Iran-Contra affair; both have met Manuel Pires only within the last two years and neither provided any testimony suggesting any involvement by Pires with the U.S. government or Iran-Contra. Without some advance explanation to the Court of the relevant testimony defense counsel expects to elicit from George Cave, the Cave deposition offers no greater prospect of usefulness than the Studley-Singlaub examinations and, because of Mr. Cave's relationship with the CIA and exposure to classified information, the difficulties of conducting such an examination are extensive. Second Request for Documents Examination of the most recent Request for Production of Documents demonstrates how far afield Durrani is seeking to go from the allegations which the Court must address. Request #2/1: A memorandum from William Casey to the Chief of the Near East Bureau on October 8.1986, re ardin a meeting with Roy Furmark. Appended to this Response as Exhibit 1 is an excerpt from A Very Thin Line, p. 441, which describes the document the Request seeks. Furmark was fronting for a group of Canadian investors whose money had been used to fund Lake Resources' acquisition of the parts shipped to Iran from the CIA. There is no suggestion that they were at all involved in procuring the actual parts or that their involvement was relevant to the shipment made by Durrani on behalf of Pires; this money was used to pay the CIA for the parts. Moreover, this document was generated after Durrani's arrest. Request #2/2: Records of a meeting in Frankfurt. West Germany on October 6-8. Appended to this Response as Exhibit 2 is an excerpt from A Very Thin Line, p. 420-427, which describes the meeting the Request apparently references. Again, the Court can see that there is no apparent connection between this meeting and any claim made by Durrani, and it occurred after Durrani was in custody. Request #2/3': Records of a meeting in Washington, D.C. on September 19 21 1986. Appended to this Response as Exhibit 3 is an excerpt from A Very Thin Line, pp. 410-415, which describes the meeting the Request apparently references. There is no apparent relevance of this meeting to any claim by Durrani, either. Request #2/4: Report of a member of Hostage Location Task Force. Request #2/5. Delivery of Hawk spare parts by anyone affiliated with the United States on August 3 or 4, 1986. These references apparently comes from the Tower Commission Report, pp. B-144-148, and has to do with the August shipment of the parts stockpiled in Israel while the North-McFarlane visit was undertaken in May, 1986, after the release of hostage Jenco. See A Very Thin Line, p.388, and footnotes, appended to this Response as Exhibit 4 along with the referenced pages of the Tower Commission Report. Request #2/6: List of snare parts for Hawk missile batteries given by Kangarlou in Frankfurt, Germany on February 24 or 25, 1986. Appended to this Response as Exhibit 5 is an excerpt from A Very Thin Line, pp. 284-289, which describes the meeting the Request apparently references. Not only is there no apparent connection between this meeting and any claim by Durrani; there is no reference to a list of spare parts, either. Request #2/7: Documents concerning the involvement of any of seven persons or one company with purchasing arms for or exporting or importing arms to Iran from any country from January 1. 1983 to December 31. 1987. Except for Manuel Pires and Richard Secord, none of the other names have ever been mentioned in connection with the Durrani case. 10 The government has already unsuccessfully searched for documents establishing.any connection between Manuel Pires and the U.S. government for the period up to August 1, 1987, which is the only question with any conceivable relevance to the 2255 Motion. While there is no dispute that Manuel Pires trafficked in arms with the Iranians during the period 1983 thorugh 1987, it would be irrelevant to this proceeding to document that fact. And Durrani at trial disclaimed any involvement in any of the Secord- Hakim shipments of weapons, which undermines any claim of relevance for Secord's activities. Effect of the Amended 2255 Durrani's claim of government authorization for his activities has all along been specifically grounded in the alleged directions provided to him personally by Oliver North and in the relationship he swore under oath that Pires had with North and the CIA. While it is a very interesting exercise to revisit the Iran-Contra affair in light of information which has come to light since Durrani's conviction, the defendant has failed to point to a single piece of evidence which supports his claims that exculpatory information was withheld from him and that the government knowingly presented perjured testimony. Nor has the defendant produced a single piece of evidence which suggests that the jury's assessment of his credibility was in error. Now, the 2255 Motion has been amended to eliminate the 11 original allegations that the prosecutor deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence and suborned perjury by the CIA and NSC witnesses. As will be more fully set forth in the Government's Response to the Amended Motion to Vacate and Set Aside ("Amended 2255"), which is being prepared for filing, this Office now opposes any hearing on the merits of this Amended 2255 because the defendant has utterly failed to comply with the requirements for obtaining a hearing. Certainly, the government opposes any further discovery until the defendant at a minimum makes the showing of competent evidence required before a hearing may be scheduled. Because of the-quasi-criminal but technically civil nature of a 2255 proceeding, the Court has broad discretion in authorizing discovery. It is unfair for an already-convicted defendant to be allowed to advance totally unsupported claims and then to be authorized to conduct wide-ranging discovery with no prospect that the discovery will accomplish anything other than to waste the attorneys' time and the public's money. Such a scenario undercuts the purposes of the criminal discovery rules and the rules of evidence, and would allow a convicted defendant much broader latitude to rummage through the government's investigative files than that afforded to any person awaiting trial. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Government opposes the 12 movant's Second Request for Production of Documents and asks that the Court review and limit the defendant's discovery demands to documents and witnesses demonstrably relevant to the proceedings pending before the Court. Respectfully submitted, RICHARD N. PALMER UNITED STATES ATTORNEY HOLLY B. ITZSI ONS ASSISTAN91 UNITBJY STATES ATTORNEY ct05086 915 Lafayette Blvd. Bridgeport, CT 06604 (203) 579-5596 CERTIFICATION A copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, this 9th day of September, 1991, to William B. Bloss, Esq., Jacobs, Grudberg, Belt & Dow, P.C., 350 Orange St., P.O. Box 606, New Haven, CT 06503. EXCE5 Fi"o 1 P(cH 0bR6 S C ITGD N TEx i 0 f= M IF-MCJAA,O-b L) ki Tom. F - cD F7OTlN Qi 3 !rsion as always just within reach and st hopes had been held out for 86, when at last a real Iranian and his entourage. For a while, garlou, was important enough n decisions. "' interested mainly in obtaining unable to commit himself on agreement to another meeting tcome of the Frankfurt discus- again within reach. This time a major Iranian figure, Speaker end and enable the Americans m Island meeting to take place er his return from Frankfurt. gotiator, was put on the alert lent. He waited three months. Dpeared that might have dis- 1. cord and Hakim on March a, who had led him to believe, of right for mtg [meeting] in ed Phoenixes. North quickly way we can delay this much pull out. all stops." 2 now significantly increased its ;till considered the NSC staff could not resist getting more 7th out of trouble. THE DIVEt,,,ION [291] On March 5, the CIA contributed one more of its own to North's entourage. He was George Cave, a retired CIA veteran, who had been called back as a consultant on Iran owing to his fluency in Farsi. Cave had first known Ghorbanifar in 1980 and the following year had rec- ommended breaking off with him. Chorbanifar, Cave said, had provided information that did not check out and had demanded exorbitant financial payments. When Ghorbanifar was apparently taken on again in 1984, Caves suspicions had led to the polygraph tests which Chorbanifar had failed and to the "fabricator notice" which had warned all and sundry against any dealings with him. In January 1986, when he heard that Ghorbanifar was back again, Cave had again made his distrust known and had helped to design the new polygraph test, which Ghorbanifar had again failed. Cave thought that that was the end for Ghorbanifar-pre- maturely, as had been the case with so many other rumors of Ghorban- ifar's downfall.' The CIA was instrumental in putting Cave into North's operation. The Near East Division's Tom Twetten was disturbed by the use of Hakim, who had allegedly been involved in some illegal arms or tech- nology sales to Iran. Twetten went to Clair George, the Operations chief, to get Hakim out and Cave in; George went to.Casey; Cave came in, though Hakim was also a hard man to get rid of.4 With Cave, Allen, and Twetten working with North, the CIA had no trouble monitoring the Iran affair-and bearing more responsibility for it. When he was called in on March 5 and told about the Iran operation, Cave says that it was "quite a shock" and that he was "very alarmed."' He met that same day with North, whom he had not previously known, and came in for an even greater shock. Two days later, they were on a plane together heading for Paris-to meet with Ghorbanifar. On March 7, 1986, North, Cave, and Twetten met Ghorbanifar and Nir in the French capital. As usual, Ghorbanifar claimed to have everything under control and said that there was nothing to worry about. He was, Cave wrote in a memorandum that same night, "very relaxed and said that everything was arranged." He spent at least a half hour talking about how indispensable he was-."how careful we must be in dealing with these guys and how we needed such a person as him to guide the way he knew how to handle them. "6 Twetten recalled that in an early exchange of recriminations about which side had been most at fault in the past, Ghorbanifar was not abashed. The Americans were unhappy because no hostages had been released. Ghorbanifar countered that the Iranians were so unhappy with Fxfl ~6 ~ T e Fe.n c ed on P . c3 ~~ x + T ,,N LINE OUT OF C NTROL 11441] iat he was being cut out. Furmark : made the comment, you know, e contras. "85 ome up twice-once from Allen Furmark. The latter was more banifar, who had-according to diversion in the first place, now -e operation. asked Furmark to see Casey to plete the contract so Ghorbanifar t his money, and that is the basis a mutual friend, John Shaheen, s old comrade-in-arms from the firm. Furmark said that he. had November 1985 and apparently half an hour. Furmark's version Mr. Adnan Khashoggi and I ige financing for Ghorbanifar :ld that Mr. Ghorbanifar was to him the bridge financing can only be paid if the Amer- and then Iran. will pay Mr. en Khashoggi will be paid. ing vein: s) was in Khashoggi's mind. :anadians, which is what I was far was thinking of talking to committee. I mentioned two ian and Senator Leahy. i not give anything away: as paid into Lake Resources, :count. He said I don't think is not my operation. Sounds I told him that it was being I will look into it, and then to call Poindexter and have iot there. As Furmark was leaving, Casey asked him to "see one of my guys and give them all the details of everything that you know about it, which I said I would do."" As for the operation itself, Casey obviously knew better than to attribute it solely to the Israelis. We have Casey's memorandum of his meeting with Furmark. It pro- vides some additional details and shows that Casey was apparently most worried about the Canadian involvement: 1. A New York man whom I haven't seen in some years came in to tell me that he is currently working for Adnan Khashoggi and is involved in transactions involving Iran. 2. Khashoggi apparently got some Canadian investors to put S 15 million into a company called Lake Resources which was to acquire goods for shipment to Iran. The Canadians are said to have put up their money as a loan which was repayable in 3o days. As of now they have been waiting five months for their money and are very close to doing something to recover money put up since May 15 without any collateral or signatures. Credit Suisse in Geneva is in some way involved in this. Khashoggi put the group of Canadians together but feels their panic about their money is such that he will not be able to control it for long. He believes that members of the Canadian group have been talking to [Senators) Leahy, Cranston and Moynihan. They are claiming that the latest shipment was $10 million short because 63 pieces were defective and 299 were missing. 3. The final message was that the only way to handle this matter is to supply the rest of the equipment or agree on a refund of X number of dollars or repay $io million. 18 Furmark later said that he had told Casey that the loan from the Canadians was long overdue, not that it was repayable in thirty days, and not that it was without any collateral. Furmark also claimed that he had said that Ghorbanifar "was talking about talking" to the three senators, not that the Canadians were talking to them, and that the Canadians had put in $io million, not $15 million.89 But Casey was now forewarned. Furmark should have been enough to set alarm bells ringing. 6 If Furmark was not enough, Allen should have been more than enough. After Furmark had left on October 7, Allen and Gates came to see Casey. According to Allen, his purpose had been re jPe-c .ncec~ of Tek-t 2 T; rt x A .O+ T A T S~ fD '' O 7 6~ S ~~~ y A A nij y fD C9 2 y p? 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