SADDAM'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS FOR WAR: INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: SADDAM
• Keywords: PREPARATIONS FOR WAR
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001520654
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2011
• Case Number: F-2008-00585
• Publication Date: October 1, 2002

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Saddam's Military Preparations
for War: Intentions and Capabilities
APPROVED FOR RELEASE^
DATE: 10-11-2011
NIE 2002-17HC
October 2002
 Saddam's Preparations for War:
Intentions and Capabilities
This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board under the
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Prepared under the auspices of Major General John R. Landry USA (ret),
ational Intelligence Officer for Conventional Military Issues.
Tvinvirioc v?nv ho directed to the NIO
 TO
Scope Note
This National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) responds to a request from the Director of
Central Intelligence to examine Saddam's near-term military objectives, strategy, and
capabilities in a war against the US and Coalition forces. The Estimate also assesses what
Saddam probably knows about and how he probably would respond to US/Coalition preparations
for war. It considers the expected response of key regional states.
This Estimate does not cover specific weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or ballistic
missiles but does examine Iraq's likely incorporation of biological and chemical weapons and
ballistic missiles into military operations during a war.
 What Has Changed Since Our Last :Estimate On Iraq's Military ,
The assessments and projections in our last estimate, (U) Iraqi Military Capabilities
~h 2003 (NIE 99-04), SECRET/ which covered the;period between 1999 ~'
and 2003, were generally accurate and, in terms of depicting the systemic strengths and
weaknesses of Iraq's conventional military,: remain largely true today.
The. Iraqi military'remains less capable than the force the Coalition faced in 1991, though it is
still among the region's largest.
Weaknesses in personnel and procedures continue to hamper Iraq's military capability..
.Military morale and battlefield cohesion remain Iraq's Achilles heel.
Iraq's military equipment consists primarily of older models; much is obsolete by Western:
standards. Sanctions have'continued to`-limit Saddam's ability to'upgrade and'modernize the
bulk of his inventory.
Over the last four years, Saddam has had' more'success in ignoring; and undermining
UN-imposed 'sanctions than we anticipated in the 1999 NIE, allowing Iraq to stem a precipitous
decline in military readiness evident at low''points' in 1995 and'even in 1999. Saddam's forces
have begun slowly recovering some capabilities over the past several years; particularly since the
Oil-for-Food program was implemented. Saddam nevertheless will find it tough to sustain a
high intensity conventional conflict.
 ET/
 Key Judgments
Saddam's Preparations for War: Intentions and
Capabilities
Saddam is preparing for war while also trying to delay or prevent an attack by
manipulating the UN and the international community to apply pressure on the United
States.
? War preparations include protecting key elements of the regime from external attacks and
internal revolt, concealing and shielding critical national infrastructure, and readying the
military for combat.
? Iraq's diplomatic and information campaign includes economic incentives and threats; bribes
designed to secure favorable media support, particularly in Europe; attempts to exploit the
Palestinian intifadah; and portraying US operations as a war against the Arabs.
How Saddam Will Fight.
Saddam's aim will be to prevent the regime's destruction and to terminate a war
wit il~as many of his forces intact and as much of his territory under his control as possible.
He probably will seek to limit the damage from air and missile operations and defend-in-depth in
urban and other restricted terrain, particularly flooded areas along the Tigris and Euphrates river
basins, with final defenses arrayed in and around Baghdad. Saddam's intent will be to delay
defeat, inflict as many casualties as possible, and encourage international intervention to stop the
war before he is destroyed.
? The Iraqi military probably is preparing to flood the lower Tigris and Euphrates river basins
and is preparing to drop bridges in front of advancing US and Coalition forces.
? Preparations reportedly are underway to destroy power stations, oil wells, food supplies, and
other civil infrastructure in front of advancing US forces, to create a humanitarian emergency
and slow the attack.
? Iraqi leaders probably are planning to intensify and publicize US collateral damage. Some
options might involve deliberate Iraqi attacks on civilians, possibly with chemical or
biological weapons, disguised to appear as the result of US operations.
? The Regime reportedly is attempting to enlist individuals to conduct suicide missions,
coordinated by the Iraqi Intelligence Service.
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Iraq probably is preparing conventional preemptive options against US forces staging in
Kuwait, Turkey, or other regional bases; to attack in the north against the Kurds if US forces
move into the area or begin training opposition forces there; and to strike Israel, hoping to
provoke an Israeli response that would inflame Arab publics. .
Iraq's preemptive conventional attacks could include raids with SOF forces or Iraqi
Ground Force units or attempts to launch conventional air strikes or short-range ballistic missile
attacks against US forces building up in Kuwait or in other areas contiguous to Iraq's frontiers.
 TOP
We judge that Saddam probably would withhold such attacks until he concluded that his
diplomatic options to prevent war had vanished and that a US attack was inevitable and
imminent. Saddam's conventional preemptive attacks-are not likely to succeed significantly in
delaying or damaging US/Coalition operations except in the north where Iraqi attacks could
produce panic, significant refugee flows, and obstruction of Coalition operations.
We have low confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam might use WMD.
? Saddam could decide to use chemical and biological warfare (CBW) preemptively against
US forces, friends, and allies in the region in an attempt to disrupt US war preparations and
undermine the political will of the Coalition. The Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research believes that such an action is highly unlikely.
? Saddam might use CBW after an initial advance into Iraqi territory, but early use could
foreclose diplomatic options for stalling the US advance.
? He probably would use CBW when he perceived he irretrievably had lost control of the
military and security situation, but we are unlikely to know when he reaches that point.
? Saddam historically has maintained tight control over the use of WMD; however, he
probably has provided contingency instructions to his commanders to use CBW in specific
circumstances.
Will The Iraqi Military Fight And For How Long?
Unit Cohesion, Troop Morale and Saddam's Wrath: Keys to Iraq's Staying Power.
We assess that Saddam will have difficulty in maintaining the military's will to fight and that some
Iraqi military units may defect or even turn against the regime.
? Many Iraqi Regular Army (RA) personnel reportedly are planning either to surrender or
return home without.fighting ifthe United States invades Iraq.
Perceptions of US intentions for post-Saddam Iraq and the role of the opposition in a
post-conflict Iraq are critically important, particularly within the Republican Guard (RG) and the
Security Services, in determining how long and how hard Saddam's most elite units will fight.
Fears that the United States intends to end traditional Sunni Arab preeminence could give the
regime an opportunity to rally the support of key leaders to Saddam.
Some of Saddam's military leaders probably will struggle with carrying out orders to
use WMD. Their decision will hinge upon their assessment of the consequences of disobeying
orders and facing Saddam's wrath versus the prospects for the regime's eventual collapse. Some
of these leaders may choose not to carry out orders to use WMD, fearing possible personal
consequences after a Coalition victory.
? Based on historical precedent, we expect Saddam to take hostage families of senior military,
intelligence, and security officials to ensure they obey orders.
 Iraq's Military Capabilities and Readiness to Fight
Considerable Strengths. Iraq's military remains larger than that of the combined Gulf
ooperation Council states and other Arab neighbors, has greater combat experience and
logistical competence, and has proven able to implement technical and tactical innovations to
overcome specific obstacles.
But Enduring Vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, Iraq's military suffers from long-
standing, endemic vulnerabilities that undermine troop morale, impair unit cohesion, hinder
combat leadership, and limit Iraq's ability to exploit the full effectiveness of the relatively few
modern weapons it possesses. Iraqi logistics constraints are significant.
Iraq's Ground Forces are less than half the size of their 1990-1991 predecessors and
less capable, but they are strong enough to overwhelm Kuwait and Saudi Arabia absent
US/Coalition intervention.
? Iraq fields 23 divisions with 375,000 soldiers today compared to 70 divisions and over a
million soldiers in 1991. Six divisions-the Republican Guard Forces Command-are the
backbone of the Army, recruited from that part of the Iraqi population most loyal to Saddam.
? Republican Guard (RG) units almost certainly would provide greatest resistance to a US
attack. Three RG armor divisions and one infantry division guard the outer perimeter of
Baghdad; the two remaining RG divisions are deployed in the north. All Iraqi ground forces
stationed in the south are less well-trained and equipped Regular Army units.
Iraq's Air Defenses: Limited Threat to US/Coalition Forces. Saddam's air defenses
were severely attrited during Desert Storm and subsequent operations against Coalition air forces
in the No-Fly-Zones (NFZs). UN sanctions and arms embargoes have prevented significant
improvements. Despite determined and persistent Iraqi refurbishment campaigns, changes in
tactics, and some equipment modifications, Iraq's air defenses are far less capable today than in
1991.
? We judge that some Iraqi air defense commanders likely will adopt at the outset of a conflict
amore aggressive posture than we have observed during most of 2000-2002, trading
survivability to achieve potentially greater lethality. At the same-time, others will emphasize
mobility and reduced radar emissions where possible to limit damage, complicate
US/Coalition operations, and restrict the operational freedom of air power for as long as
possible.
? Iraq has stepped up efforts to acquire Global Positioning System (GPS) jammers in
anticipation of US military action according to a variety of reporting.
 We expect the Iraqi Air Force would not be a significant factor in a war with the
United States. Iraq has fewer than half the number of fighters today than during the Gulf war,
and only about 260 of 300 aircraft in the Air Force are flyable. A small cadre of experienced
pilots remain capable of executing core air defense, ground attack, maritime strike, and
reconnaissance but would face severe challenges carrying them out in the presence of Coalition
power.
The Iraqi Navy remains the smallest of Saddam's military forces and is incapable
of defending Iraq's territorial waters. Saddam has been able to maintain a small inventory of
coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs) as well as possibly over a thousand contact and
influence mines. Despite severe deficiencies, these capabilities could be directed at disrupting
Coalition maritime operations; mines would pose the greatest challenge once deployed.
Regional Support for A US-Led War Against Iraq
Most Gulf Arab leaders quietly will provide support for US combat
operations from Kuwait and Qatar to topple Saddam, even without UN or Saudi approval.
 Regional Dynamics Once Military Operations Begin
Once hostilities are under way high civilian casualties broadcast on independent Arab
media would put significant public pressure on US Arab allies to withhold all but the most
clandestine support for US military operations. If the war is prolonged, these difficulties will
increase.
Implications for US and Coalition Forces
Potential Challenges to Coalition Cohesion. Saddam almost certainly will seek to
ex~p oit vulnerabilities he perceives in the Coalition to disrupt operations, dissuade further
deployments, or force early withdrawal of partners. We believe all potential US partners would
respond favorably to a US commitment to revive the Arab-Israeli peace process, preserve Iraq's
borders, and compensate neighboring states for economic losses from an invasion.
Humanitarian Requirements. Even before the end of a war, US and .Coalition forces
will face enormous requirements to meet the humanitarian needs of Iraqi civilians. If Saddam
adopted a scorched earth policy-and some intelligence reporting suggests he will-advancing
forces will be confronted with large-scale destruction of oil and power facilities, the
contamination of food supplies and other potential environmental devastation.
? We estimate that as many as several million civilians may need food, shelter, and medical
assistance.
? Decontamination and medical requirements among civilian CBW casualties if Saddam employed
WMD could produce, enormous strains on US/Coalition logistics.
POWs and Hostages. The Iraqi regime's actions related to the continuing DoD
investigation of Navy Captain Speicher's fate suggest Saddam and his key leaders may try to use
tactics and techniques learned from the Speicher case to deceive or confuse US or Coalition
10
 efforts to fully account for missing, captured, or detained personnel during a conflict. Saddam
would hope to extract value in return for the release of any personnel he might hold.
? Saddam also probably will use POWs-as well as other captives,. hostages, or international
guests-as human shields to protect him and the assets he values most.
onfidence Levels for Selected Key Judgments in the Estimate.
High. Confidence:
Saddam's preparation of Iraq for war while continuing to diplomatically delay, or prevent a
US-led attack against him.
Saddam's aims: prevent the regime's destruction and preserve as manymilitary forces and
as much territory under his control as possible!.
The current'status and readiness',of Saddarn's,military
Moderate Confidence:
Iraq's likely defensive orientation: defense-in-depth using urban areas and flooded river
basins.
Support the United States is likely to receive from Arab states and Turkey; expected
reactions of Iran. and Syria'in the-event of wari
The level of resistance that Saddam's military.. and security forces would mount against a
US/Coalition attack.
Our ability to assess'when` Saddam might use WMD and whether. Saddam's key military
leaders would obey orders to use WMD.
Expected reactions of keyregional states-and likely follow-on conflict dynamics-if Iraq
used CBW weapons. against Israel.
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