KOREA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0002018080
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2010
• Case Number: F-2009-01320
• Publication Date: December 6, 1950

(b)(3)
KOREA
-Across -the table talks held only hope for peace -prime
Mj iste Nehru -has taken the :pos t~ion, in disc th
e
Koleanwcri~sis. with.. US Am.ssador Henderso "` eW
,
bel at
. , the only hope of reventing'.the onru~s war: 1, 0 lies in. across-the-table talks among the powers' :most
immediately concerned, such as the US, UK, USSR and
Communist. China. Nehru acknowleged. that co , ctiye;
opposition to aggression seemed in the-long, run i~.: a most
effective deterrent to war but: urged 'that when th house.:
is on fire, efforts for the moipe tt must be concentrated
on extinguishing -the fire rather an on Applying fire pre-
vention methods. He expressed the fear that perhaps it
is already too late for talks among the great, powers, that
war is perhaps inevitable, and that,' all that is left to ' do .is
for each. power to get into the war, or to keep out of war
as gracefully as possible. He also expressed concern .lest
the Chinese Communists had already decided that war was
inevitable and therefore could not be deflected from their
course.
2. Yugoslav estimate of of Chinese intentions--Yugoslav Foreign
Minister Kardelj, in assuring US Ambassador Allen in Bel-
grade that the Yugoslav delegation at the UN has been in-.
structed to seek passage by the General Assembly of the
Security Council resolution on Chinese intervention in. Korea,
expressed the hope that an honorable solution to the Korean
situation could be found which would prevent the extension of
hostilities. Kardelj said he had received no intimation, how-
ever, that the Chinese Communists had become `reasonable9-'
and attributed Chinese intervention in Korea primarily to the
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expansionist tendency of the Peiping regime and its
desire to detract Chinese attention from internal dif -
ficulties. Kardeij believes that the intervention, although
supported by the USSR, was primarily undertaken at
Peiping's initiative; he suspects that the Chinese may
have gone into Korea in larger force than Moscow wanted.
3. Information concerning Chinese Communist intentions
US Consul Bombay has forwarded a 19 November press
dispatch (reportedly suppressed by the Indian Government
and a British news agency) from an Indian journalist, re-
cently returned from China, who is considered by the Con-
sul to be an "unusually good observer." According to this
dispatch, Chinese Communist leaders had decided by 19 No-
vember to intervene deliberately in Korea, had completed plans
to throw half a million of their finest troops into Korea, were
fully prepared to face any consequences, and had received a
pledge of Soviet assistance in the event their campaign to
drive UN troops down the length of the Korean peninsula
should meet with reverses or defeat. The dispatch cites
(16 authoritative information" from Peiping indicating that
the Chinese Communists had signed a secret agreement with
the USSR in October to end the threat ofd imperialist aggres-
sion" and had accepted the Soviet views that the US intends to
destroy the Communist regime in China and therefore the best
defense was a well-timed and well-prepared offensive action
in Korea. The Indian journalist reportedly believes that Indian
Ambassador Panni.kar in Peiping now recognizes the true in-
tentions of the Chinese Communists but is still "sugar coating"
reports to New.Oeihi for fear he might lose prestige and the
confidence of Nehru.
 EUROPE
4. FRANCE-. Analysis of French reaction to Korean crisis--
US Embassy Paris reports that the feeling is being increas
ingly encountered among the French that it is incumbent upon
France, together with the UK, to exercise a moderating in-
fluence on the US in order to avoid a major war in the Far
East. The Embassy says that what the French fear at this
time is a spontaneous reaction of US public opinion to a
challenge and a quick, decisive response 'by the US Govern-
ment. The Embassy analyzes this fear as springing from
such latent feelings as. (a) geographic and political factors
might lead the US to decide more lightly than Western Europe
about war and peace; (b) the US might be impelled to make
military commitments not in its own interests and therefore
not in Europe's interests; (c) the US has not in the past listened
sufficiently to counsels of moderation from its allies; and
(d) France and Britain must now play the role of moderators
and detached advisers to their mighty and much-needed friend.
Underlying these feelings, the Embassy emphasizes, is to be
found the French belief that they are naked in the face of
possible Soviet aggression in Europe and the paramount French
fear of a Soviet military occupation, even of short duration.
The Embassy believes that despite these feelings,
the US can take at face value the recent statements by
Premier Pleven and Foreign Minister Schuman concerning
French unity with the West and firm adherence to the UN
and the principle of collective security. In the Embassy's
view, France can be counted on to make its contribution to
the building up of strength and unity in Europe and the defense
of Indochina. Concerning the Far East, however, the Embassy
warns that France's war is in Indochina, not Korea, and that
therefore the French would find comparatively palatable a
compromise solution which would involve a return to the 38th
Parallel and admission of Communist China to the UN.
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NEAR EAST-AFRICA
5. IRAN: Korean crisis causing loss of faith in US--US
Embassy Tehran reports that the reaction in Iran to the
current Korean situation is an increasing loss of faith
in the power of the US to resist Soviet aggression be-
cause the US cannot resist "satellite Communist forces."
According to the Embassy, there is also a stronger feeling
that Iran should remain entirely neutral, continuing en-
deavors to restore the balance of great powers in Iran,
according to former Iranian policy.
6. PAKISTAN: Anti-Western sentiment growing--US Ambas-
sador Warren reports rapidly growing restiveness in
Pakistan over the lack of progress in resolving differences
with India, particularly the Kashmir dispute. Warren points
out that as this frustration grows it will impair the domestic
political position of Prime Minister Liaquat, who has already
been under sporadic attack for fruitless "collaboration with
the Anglo-American bloc," which is accused of taking Pakistan
for granted and bending all its efforts to conciliate India` Warren
anticipates that Liaquat, even though he may see no imminent
threat to his leadership, may quite possibly find it expedient to
manifest greater independence of the Western Powers or even
take up a "third position."'
FAR EAST
7.
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