NIE 13-7-70 - COMMUNIST CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL POSTURE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00024512
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2020
• Case Number: F-2016-01277
• Publication Date: November 12, 1970

Approved for Release: 2018/08/29 C00024512
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CONTENTS
Page
NOTE
CONCLUSIONS 1
DISCUSSION 4
I. FOREIGN POLICY: SOME PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES 4
A. The Ideological Base 4
B. The Military Ingredient 5
C. Domestic Constraints Affecting Foreign Initiatives 6
IL PROSPECTS AND CONTINGENCIES 8
A. Pelting's Activist Foreign Policy 8
B. ino-Soviet Relations
C. The Triangular Relationship: US/USSR/China 10
D. China's Regional Aims 11
E. China and the World Community 14
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Mk;
COMMUNIST CHINA'S
INTERNATIONAL POSTURE
NOTE
China's return to active diplomacy raises new questions about the
direction of Us foreign policy. After four years in which the internal
preoccupations of the Cultural Revolution thoroughly overshadowed
foreign relations, Peking is now moving to repair its international
image and to exploit new opportunities. In attempting to estimate how
China will play this new role in international politics over the next year
or so, this paper will examine Peking's options in terms of those policy
factors which are most likely to remain constant and those which are
eubfect to greater variations in response to domestic or external events.
It must be acknowledged at the outset that we have remarkably
little information on the decision-making processes is Peking. Thus,
estimates of short-run tactical moves are susceptible to considerable
error. iLs in the past, sudden twists and turns in Chinese policies will
probably continue to surprise us. But in the broader perspective of
long-range goals and basic capabilities, this paper attempts to set useful
guidelines on the course that China is likely to follow in adapting to
the outside world.
CONCLUSIONS
A. With the waning of the radical and frenetic phase of the Cul-
tural Revolution, Peking has substantially recouped its t,..;:lier diplo-
matic position and is moving to compete for influence in new areas.
Its successes to date�due in large part to the receptivity of other nations
to a more normal relationship with the Chinese�have been impressive,
especially in areas of secondary importance to Peking. In areas of prime
concern, i.e., the Soviet Union, the US, Southeast Asia and japan,
progress has been marginal and Peking's policy less sure.
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B. Many domestic and foreign obstacles stand in the way of achiev-
ing Peking's basic goals, whether these be China as a great power and
leader of the world revolution or as a more traditional but highly na-
tionalistic country concerned primarily with Asian interests.
C. On the domestic side, stability and steady growth in basic ele-
silents of Strength�economic, military, political�are far from assured.
Even in the best of circumstances, China's marginal economy will serve
to limit its maneuverability in foreign affairs. A great deal of work
remains to be done to restore effective government administration,
and to rebuild a communist party. So long as Mao lives, the possibility
of disruptive campaigns exist and his death could usher in a period
of leadership uncertainty and intense preoccupation with internal
affairs.
D. Externally, China's aspirations remain blocked directly or in-
directly by the realities of the international scene including: the vastly
superior power and hostility of the USSR, its most immediate threat
as well as rival for ideological leadership in the Communist world;
the US presence and US commitments around the periphery of China;
and the growth in economic strength and self-confidence of another
traditional rival, :Ivan.
E. Even should the Chinese regime wish to alter it; basic foreign
policy approach and use its growing military force aggressively in
peripheral areas, its options would be limited by the risk of provoking
one or another of the superpowers. From Peking's point of view, mili-
tary adventures in Southeast Asia, against Taiwan, in Korea, or in the
Soviet Far East would be needlessly risky and the potential prize not
worth the game. Peking does, however, have room, even in present
circor.itances, for some maneuver directly between the two great
pow as well as around their flanks or under their guard in South-
ear,.. Asia, the Near East, Africa, lull even in Eastern Europe.
F. At present, the Chinese see the USSR as their major military
thre.A. By accepting negotiations with the Soviets, cooling border
te}..-ehns, ea- 3 improving their diplomatic image, the Chinese apparently
they have reduced the risk of hostilities with the Soviets.
Ther, lit le prospect, however, of a genuine rapprochement emerging
from .f resent Sino-Soviet talks. But both sides are apparently
concer,y_i that their dispute not cnd in a military test. Thus, as long
as they brith continue to exercise the present degree of military caution,
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them , likely to be some improvement in diplomatic and trade rela-
tions but little movement ir. border talks. As long as Mao lives there
Is almost no chance of significant compromise on the ideological
questions.
C. With the US, Peking has moved from its previous intransigence
to a more flexible approach better designed to exploit the Sino-US re-
lationship for Chinese purposes. Tne Chine.e hope to unsettle the
Soviets by playing on their fears of a Sino-knerican rapprochement
as well as exploit the potential for changes in the balance of force:,
in East Asia resulting from the drawdown of th : US military piesence.
In pursuing hs new flexibility, however, Peking does not expect an
early major improvement in Sino-US relations and any small improve-
ments are likely to be limited to marginal issues.
H. Japan poses special problems to Peking because it too is an
Asian power, is outstripping China in economic growth, and is strongly
resistent to Maoist subversion or Chinese threats. And the Chinese,
who remember Japanese imperialism in China during World War II,
wonder what threat the Japanese may become to their security over
the long term and fear Tokyo will one day take on the role of pro-
tector of Taiwan. The Chinese answer so far has been to continue
with a rather rigid and vituperative propaganda attack on Japan's
leaders, their policies, and their alleged ambitions in Asia. While this
may impress the North Koreans and some people in Southeast Asia,
It does little good for China's cause in japan itself. Nonetheless, and
despite the burgeoning growth in Sino-Japanese trade, any basic shifz
In China's approach to Japan seems unlikely in the present ideological
climate in Pekin
I. In Southeast Asia Peking... artier fear that the Indochinese war
might spill over into China seems to have lessened. Indeed, the Chinese
seem to believe that the US Is being forced gradually to withdraw its
military presence fro..n the region and that this process will eventually
Improve the prospects for Chinese influence. Rather: than use overt
military force to exploit possible developments in this area, Peking's
snore likely course will be to increase its support to subversive and
Insurgent activity. The Chinese will seek to maintain their role as revo-
lutionary leaders vOthout exposing themselves to undue cost or risk.
In addition they will rely on conventional diplomacy when this suits
their needs. There is abundant evidence that Peking feels no need to
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set deadlines and has no schedule to fulfill; it is clearly prepared for
the long haul.
La the longer run, if Mao's successors follow a more steady and
pragmatic course, they are likely to have greatPr success than Mao
In expanding China's political influence and acceptance. We cannot
be sure, of course, how future leaders will re their situation, and it
Is possible that they will be prepared to employ China's developing
power in o more aggressive manner., We think it more likely, however,
that they will continue to focus their foreign policy on diplomacy at
the overt level and on subversion at the covert level. The open use of
military force will probably be judged needlessly risky.
K. While we do not doubt that China would fight tenaciously if
Invaded, we see no compelling factors moving Peking toward a policy
of expansionism, or even a higher level of risk-taking. For all its verbal
hostility and latent aggressiveness, neither the present nor t.he probable
future leadership is likely to see foreign adventures as a solution to
China's problems.
DISCUSSION
I. FOREIGN POLICY: SOME PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES
A. The Ideological Base
1. In part, Peling still perceives the outside world in traditional ways. The
Sino-centric view of the Middle Kingdom has survived the advent of the com-
munists. The past century has left a residue of bitterness and frustration among
those Chinese�certainly the vast majority�whose sense of nationalism ai3d
patriotism has teen outraged by what they see as unfair treatment of China
by foreigners. This basic sense of injustice and frustration has facilitated the
people's acceptance of enormous sacrifices and has permitted the communists
to carry out revolutionary programs aimed at reaching grandiose�often un-
realistic�goals. While popular expectations hare been repeatedly disappointed,
the basic dynamism of Chinese nationalism remains to be exploited again and
again. Unlike the ideology of Maoism, which may not long survive its aeator,
the traditional sense of China's privii,i�ed role in the world will probably remain
a constant theme in this and any foreseeable Chinese government.
2, Maoist ideology, which emphasizes thc inevitability of class conflict and
world revolution, adds an ingredient of violence and militance to traditional
Chinese drives. It attempts to project the revolutionary experience of the Chi-
nese civil war onto the world stage by advocating the defeat of the affluent
Western Powers through the mobilization of the poor countries in the world.
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Peking recognizes the limits of the revolutionary line, however, and has accepted
and developed a policy of peaceful coexistence for application where this suits
its needs, Analogous to the domestic waited front policy which served the com-
munists well in the Chinese civil war, the peaceful coexistence line was originally
intended to be a temporary accommodation to the norms of international conduct
which would be replaced as other countries followed China's revolutionary path.
But as the prospects for world revolution have dimmed, peaceful coexistence
has assumed a larger role it Chinese foreign policy, even while propaganda
stress on the more orthodox policy of revolutionary struggle remains at a high
pitch.
3. Ideology continues to play an exceptionally important role in the formula-
tion of Chinese foreign policy. Although decision-makers may hold varying
degrees of faith in revolutionary dogma, al/ are required to justify their proposals
in its terms. Such justification has became particularly important as a result of
the Cultural Revolution during which the purge and counterpurge of a divided
leadership was rationalized by linking internal political deviations with external
heresies. Many domestic figures deposed during the Cultural Revolution, for in-
stance, were accused of following policies that were pro-Soviet or "social im-
perialist". As the excesses of the Cultural Revolution have subsided, even the
return to more conventional diplomacy has been clothed in the rhetoric of
Maoist ideology.
B. The Military Ingredient
4. Military strength has been a major preoccupation of a leadership long at-
tuned to Mao's dictum that the 'barrel of a gunk was the source of all political
power, Moreover, the Chinese have been as sensitive to the needs of defense as
they have been to the role of violence in advancing world revolution. Political
concepts and programs are conceived in strategic and tactical military terms
and transmitted to the Chinese masses and the rest of the world in martial
rhetoric. The traditionally strong position of the military in Communist China
has assumed DCW importance as a result of its vital role in underpinning the
regime during the Cultural Revolution. As a by-product, the military appears to
have increased its influence over the formulation and execution of policy.
5, Communist China's military power is impressive by Asian standards tlut
remains markedly inferior to that of the superpowers. The People's Liberation
Army (PIA), whose basic strength lies in the size and fighting ability of its
ground forces, has the capability to put up a formidable defense of the main-
land ag. lust any invaders. However, while persistent efforts over the past 20
years to strengthen and modernize the Chinese Armed Forces have yielded
some creditable results, economic and political disruptic-ns have left the PLA.
'vulnerable in certain areas against a modern opponent. Some of its more evi-
dent problems are an apparent deficiency in motorized transport and heavy
armament, an air defense system which probably lacks adequate communica-
tions and data processing capabilities, and a navy which remains little more than
a coastal defense force.
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6. Since China's intervention in the Korean War, which Peking considered
a defensive move. China's military posture has remained basically cautious
and prudent. Moreover, after this experience Peking appeared somewhat more
restrained in the use of military threats to further its foreign policy objectives.
The abortive move against the off-shore islands in la58 and the defensive
reinforcement along the Formosa Strait in 1962 both reflected Peking's concern
over another confrontation with the US. Even against the demonstrably weaker
power of India, Peking was careful in 1962 not to become embroiled in a lengthy
campaign. Peking was probably satisfied to make the point that, in spite of
severe internal difficulties, China seas still ready and able to defend itself.
7. For all PeIcing's militance in e ..Ilogical field, the deployment of China's
military forces remains basically ? Maoist military doctrire emphasizes
defense in depth and the engage.merst of the entire civilian population to over-
come an attack. The fear of a VS attack has eased, in part because of a lessening
concern since 1965-1966 that the Southeast Asian war might spill over into
China, and is probably lower now than at any other time in the past .20 years. The
Chinese now view the Soviet Union as posing the most immediate military threat
and over the past year have been conducting an extensive campaign to prepare
for the possibility of an eventual war. In accordance with this altered threat,
there are indications that the Chinese are adjusting their military deployments,
although there has been no wholesale movement of troops to the northern border.
8. Even though the main approach to the defense of China still emphasizes
defense in depth--e.g., Mao's 'people's war"�there is more to its military pos-
ture than a readiness to fight a prolonged, defensive war within China. The
Peking leadership has clearly given a high priority to acquiring the military
symbols of a great power, especially strategic weapons, but also conventional
forces as well. Peking probably wants the strategic weapons primarily as a de-
terrent against a Soviet or US attack and to increase Chinese bargaining strength
on international issues. There is no evidence that the achievement of a strategic
capability will necessarily make the Chinese more aggressive. They will continue
to be deterred by overwhelmingly superior US and Soviet power both from out-
right attacks are: from engaging in 'nuclear blackmail" in East Asia. China
wants its views to have impact on the international scene and is willing to ex-
pend scarce resources to achieve this goal, but it can be expected to continue
to exercise caution in employing its conventional and nuclear strength. Peking
expects its political influence in Asia to grow, not from the open use of military
power, but through active diplomacy and the encouragement and support of
subversive and revolutionary activities, all backed by the looming presence and
growing power 9f immemorial China on the Asian scene.
C. Domestic Constraints Affecting foreign initiotives
9. in addition to the ideological and military preconditions cited above, do-
mestic factors determine and often severely restrict the range of foreign policy
tactics and inst-umentalities open to Peking. These domutic constraints operate
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to limit the economic, psychological, and bureaucratic resources available for
the conduct of foreign relations.
AO. The Chinese economy during the 1960s did not even approach the high
sustained growth rates of the 1950s. A combinadon of factors were responsible
for this failure�the distorted planning and bizarre management of the Great
Leap Forward at the end of 6:- 1950s; the cessation of Soviet aid; bad agricul-
tural conditions in the early years of the decade; and finally, the disruptions
of the Cultural Revolution. At the sae time, the proportion of resources de-
voted to the military sector increased, adding to China's technological capabilities,
but further hobbling development of the civilian economy.
11. This failure to maintain a high rate of growth in the dvilian economy
limits China's capability to use economic leverage for foreign policy goals.
China's image in the early 1950s as the economic model for Asia has been
largely destroyed. The fabled potential of the 'China marker has lost much
of its attraction to world traders, thereby reducing t political concessions
Peking can exact in exchange for trading ruivileges.
12, Policy ineptitude also hinders the Chinese. U Peking's intense preo:cupa-
tion with internal politics had paid off in terms of rapid economic, social, and
political development, the Chinese re:glit now have a sounder domestic base for
the conduct of foreign affairs. In fact, the major experiments designed to push
China ahead, including both the C.-eat Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolu-
tion, have been disasters. Although the economy has largely recovered, party
organization remains disrupted, civil administration has been hampered, and
lasting tensions have been ceated within the leadership as a result of the
Cultural Revolution,
13, The foreign policy apparatus proved as vulnerable as other bureaucratic
organs to the impact of the Cultural Revolution. For nearly three years, the
formulation and execution of foreign policy were paralyzed by political in-
fighting. Red Guard activities in embassies abroad and within the foreign min-
istry itself brought constructive activity to a virtual standstill. All ambassadors
but one were recalled to Peking, embassy staffs were substantially reduced, and
militant posturing was offered as ,e substitute for traditional diplomacy.
14, This is not to say, of course, that China's presence was not felt in the
outside world during the Cultural Revolution. Trade and aid programs con-
tinued, as did support for subversion in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. And
China's potential as a great power was evident to the world as the development
of nurdear weapons continued despite domestic turmoil. Nonetheless, It was
Dot until 1969 that Chinese ambassadors began to trickle bacic to their posts,
and the current campaign to retrieve China's international status and influence
started in earnest. The return to pre-Cultural Revolution diplomacy has been
slow and uneven, and the balance between radical and more prapnatk Influences
remains delicate and potentially unstable.
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II. PROSPECTS AND CONTINGENCIES
A, Peking's Activist Foreign Policy
15. With .its foreign affairs apparatus largely restored, Peking is moving
quickly to recoup its pre-Cultural Revolution diplomatic position and to corn-
p:te for Influence in new areas. This drive has emphasized peaceful coexistence
and has sought influence through conventional, diplomatic means. Its successes
to date�due in large part to the receptivity of other nations to a more normal
relationship with the Chinese�have been impressive, especially when corn-
jeered to the almoat total isolation at the height of the Cultural Revolution.
Most of the gains, however, have come in areas of lesser concern to Peking and
under circurnstarces which have mede irnprovelient in relaticas easy and rela-
tively cheap.
16. In areas of prime interest to the Chinese, Peking's policy has been Ie.:
sure. Uncertainty and cautious experimentation have been character-item of
relations with the Soviet Union, the VS, Southeast Asia, and japali. In these
areas where policy decisicns are more difficult, differences within the leader-
ship apparently come to the fore and strain the entire decision-making process.
This was especially marked in the fluctuations of Chinese policy teward the
USSR during 1963 and the continuing holding operation pursued vis-�is the
Soviets in 1970. Peking's handling of the recent turmoil in Cambodia�and its
effect on Sino-Arnerican relations�also betrayed an initial hesitance which
underscored the regime's difficulties in formulating policies on major foreign
issues.
B. Sino-Soviet Relations
17. Though s.:irin of the immediate danger has been removed from the situa-
tion, the Sino-Soviet dispute remains the single most important bilateral con-
cern for 4V111g. M the same time, it conditions and determines many aspects
of the Chinese posture ta dealing with other Communist states, the Third
World, and the West,
18. Although relations between Moscow and Peking had been deteriorating
markedly ever the last decade, and the Soviet troop deployments along the
Sino-Soviet border had been building since the mid-1960s, the Chinese did not
appear to take the threat of Soviet military action seriously until after the
invasion of Czechoslovakia. Even then, Peking sought to deter the Soviets by
adopting a harshly militant posture, combining provocative behavior OD the
border with strident propaganda and an intensive war preparations campaign.
Soviet pressure continued to grow in 1969, however, and after bloody clashes on
the Vssuri in March and in Sinkiang during August. Soviet diplomats began to
drop broad hints about a possible pre-emptive strike against Chinese nuclear
and strategic weapons facilities. The Chinese, aware now that they might be
faced ,with the choice between backing down and risking their nuclear installa-
tions, finally agreed in September to the border negotiations which opened
In Peking October 20.
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19, The experience of that tesae summer moved the Chinese to reasses their
foreign policy tactics. Far from deterring the Soviets, their militant posture had
not only raised the possibility of broad conflict with the Soviets to an unaccept.
-nble level, hut also deepened Chinese diplomatic isolation. After what was ap-
parently a prolonged debate early in the fall, the leadership decided that border
talks offered the most viable means of defusing the dangerously tense situation.
At the were time, the decision was apparently taken to launch a wide-ranging
diplomatic campaign to restore China's world status and influence, both AS a
deterrent to the Soviets and in support of Chinese objectives outside the bilateral
Sino-Soviet framework.
20. Since the opcna,-e," of the border talks, there has been no evidence of
progress on any of toe basic issues confronting the negotiators. In spite of the
stalemate, however, there have been no specific reports of new border clashes,
which argues that the mere existence of talks has had some stabilizing effect.
For their part, the Chinese have der - ated their concern for maintaining
the talks at the highest possible level L., vigorously resisting any nree-e which
might lead to their downgrading. The Soviets seem to have conceded this
point, possibly bees ise of their preoccupation with events in Eastern Europe and
the Middle East, and a consequent unwillingness for now, to bigger skew com-
plications with China,
21, Despite the soothing effect of the talks, the border situation remains poten-
tially explosive. The Soviets have continued their force build up along the border.
Although the arinese have not significantly beefed up force levels near the
border, there is some evidence that they have deployed troops north into areas
close enough to be readily available in an emergency. They sue also trying to
improve the effectiveness of their paramilitary forces. Chinese civil defense
campaigns to build air raid shelters, disperse population and stockpile food�
all of which are useful for domestic political reasons as well--reerein in effect.
22. There have been signs of some slow, halting normalization of state rela-
tions, although the ideological gulf remains as broad as ever and questions of
principle end substance are no closer to solution than before. After protracted
haggling an exchange of ambassadors is in the final stages of arrangement, and
diseussioes for the 1970 Sino-Soviet trade protocol have been compleicel.
23. The prospect of a genuine rapprochement growing out of the Sino-Soviet
talks now seems remote. As long as Mao lives there is almost no chance of
significant compromise on the ideological questions. Peking, seeing no prospect
of a military advantage over the Soviets, cppears committed to the long-term
process of keeping tensions below the flash point while attempting to pile up
political points in the communist world by embarrassing the Soviets at every
opportunity. Even with a continuation of the deep national antagonism and the
Ideological schism, both sides are apparendy concerned that the dispute not
end in a military test. Over the last year both sides lue,e had cause to estimate
the costs of a prolonged z'olitary confrontation, presumably a prospect that
neither finds particularly advantageous.
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C. The Triangular Relationship: US/USSR/China
24, The Chinese aproach to the US Las been strongly affected by their polit-
Seal conflict with the USSR. This was apparent earlier this year when Peking
moved from its previous intransigence against the US to a more flexible approach
better designed to exploit the Sino-VS relationship for Chinese purposes. The
primary aim was undoubtedly to unsettle the Soviets by playing on their fears
of a Sum-VS rapprochement. By demonstrating their concern over this possibility,
the Soviets have probably insured that the Chinese will continue to exploit
the "triangular relationship" wherever and whenever it suits their needs. Even
though events in Cambodia caused the Chinese to take a harder line against
the US, they have dearly maintained the option to return to a more flexible
posture when it serves their interest.
2$. The potential for changes in the balance of forces in East Asia resulting
from the drawdown of US military presence is another factor encouraging more
flexible Chinese tactics toward the US. The Chinese will hope to speed Ameri-
can troop withdrawals from the area, especially from Taiwan. At the same time,
they We possibilities for improving their relations with states now forced to rely
lm on American guarantees. Peking may also hope that it can exert its in-
fluence to eracerhate frictions caused by a reduction in the US posture. The
Chinese probably see the US-CRC relationship as particularly vulnerable in
this respect
26. There are no indications that Peking expects to bring about an early,
major improvement in Sino-US relations. The Chinese probably expect no far-
reaching US concessions on Taiwan, which remains the main test for Peking.
Nor are they likely to give up the US as the prime target in their ideological
offensives against the capitalist-imperialist enemy. Nonetheless, Peking will wish
to maintain sufficient flexibility to exploit the triangular relationship and to move
promptly in whatever direction offers the maximum benefits.
27. For these reasons any early improvement in Sino-US relations is likely
to be limited. For example, although recent US trade concessions have been
studiously ignored by the Chinese In public, they have privately shown some
Interest in how far the US might move in this direction. While likely to reject
any formal trading relationship, the Chinese seem ready to acoept more subtle,
Indirect trading through third parties. Similarly they are likely to show little
interest in formal diplomatic recognition so long as the US remains committed
to the CRC. At the same time, however, they will probably retain an interest
in keeping lines of communicition open through contacts such el those at Warsaw.
The pace of Chinese gestures will probably be slow and erratic, subject to pres-
sures felt in Peking from changes in Sino-Soviet and Soviet-US relations.
28. For some years to come, Sinn-Soviet relations will be Peking's major con-
cern in foreign affairs. Peking has already shown an acute sensitivity to the pos-
sibility that the VS and the USSR might find considerable common ground in
opposing China. In reaction, Peking will attempt to eitioerbate the existing
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suspicions between Moscow and Washington; %la increasingly portray itself
before the world as the innocent victim of "collusion behveen the superpowers;
and will throw out lines to other Western Powers and the Third World in an
effort to elicit new support. The more direct solution would be for Peking to
seek a rapprochement with Moscow, but there seems little likelibaxl that Mao
could accept the shifts required to move his regime closer toward the Soviets.
Thus, over the next few years, or until Mao's death, Peking will probably con-
centrate on keeping the Sino-VS-VSSR relationship as fluid as possible in order
to prevent any alliance against China.
D. China's Regional Aims
29. Bouthease Asia. Peking's early fears that the Indochinese war might spill
over into China seems to have lessened in recent years. Even though Peking
has expressed apprehension that US frustration in Vietnam might lead to further
escalation, the basic judgment of the Chinese seems to be that the US is bogged
down in an indecisive effort that is more likely to lead to a withdrawal than
to further expansion of the fighting Their confidence in this judgment must
have been shaken temporarily by the US move into Cambodia, but their calcula-
tion of the ensuing political costs for the VS has probably penuaded them that
it is still valid. Thus, what we believe to be their long-range estimate probably
remains unchanged; Le., in a protracted struggle Ranors patience will outlast
that of the VS.
30, Al regani, the likelihood of the PLA being sent into Southeast Asia for
offensive action, the evidence of the past 20 years suggests Peking would be
Inclined in this direction only if China's security is seen as threatened, as on
the Sno-Korean border in 1950, or if China is provoked, as on the Sinn-Indian
border in 1962. Thus, we continue to believe that China would use its military
forces to prop up North Vietnam if it appeared that there was a real danger
of that government collapsing. Similarly, China would no doubt react with the
PL A to a direct military threat elsewhere along its southern borders.
31. Peking's more likely response�and almost certainly its initial response�
to aggravation in this area would be to increase its support to subversive and
Insurgent activity. The fact that China continues its long-term improvement of
Its logistic capabilities along this border, including the current road building
In northern Laos, illustrates Peking's desire to have support realities ready for
whatever contingencies may develop. The character of the facilities, operational
considerations, and recent history all suggest that Chinese plans in this area
relate to the defense of south China and the assistance at nearby insurgencies
rather than to a massive push by the PLA into Southeast Asia. The objective,
as before, would be to bring into existence friendly governments responsive to
Peking's political influence; and, in Peking's view, this could be done better
by inclirection--including diplomatic pressure�than open aggression.
32. Thailand and Burma are already targets for a subversive effort. Tlaailancl's
..c.lose ties with the US guarantee China's continuing hostility. Thus far, Peking
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has had Little opportunity to apply diplomatic pressure op Bangkok and has
been relying on a long-term campaign to encourage insurgency against the gov-
ernment. There is no suggestion that Peking nes this as an easy task or one that
can be accomplished quickly even if given a high priority. On the contrary,
Peking is consistent in advocating local self-reliance and has given little mate-
rial aid to the active insurgents. Should there be a subaantial reduction in the
US presence in Southeast Asia, the Chinese may combine this low-level activity
with more positive diplomatic blandishments,
33. In Burma, Chinese propaganda is encouraging revolutionary activity, sup-
plemented by imall amounts of aid in arms and training to dissident ethnic
minorities. But diplomatic contacts with this neutralist government have been
damaged rather than broken, Peking's return to moderation in other areas of
Its diplomacy may eventually be extended to include improved relations with
Rangoon. Indeed, I now appears that both sides are prepared to resume more
normal relations. Even so, Peking is not likely to Aar, 1n its support of Burma's
insurgents.
34. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Chinese are likcq) to persist in encouraging
loCal revolutionaries, but in these relatively remote areas, significant material
assistance is unlikely to be provided. The Chinese will continue to find it diffi-
cult to refuse requests for aid from any source that claims an insurgent or revolu-
tionary capability, but they will continue to urge self-reliance rather than de-
pendence on outside aid. Thus, the Chinese will maintain their role as revolu-
tionary leaders but without exposing themselves to undue cost or risk. There
Is abundant evidence that Peking feels no Deed to set deadlines and has no
echeduie to fulfill; tt is clearly prepared for the long haul
35. South Asia. China's interest in India has a relatively low rank on Peking's
scale of priorities. China is concerned with Sino-Indian border issues, with per-
sistent rivalries vn'tli the Soviets over influence in South Asia, and with demon-
strating that India is incapable of playing the role of a leading Asian power.
Toward these ends Peking has sought to embarrass and intimidate New Delhi,
but without becoming deeply involved in the effort. For instance, Peking has
propagandized and provided limited arms and training to Naga and Mizo tribes-
men in eastern India without, however, attempting to turn this into a major
campaign.
38. On a larger scale, Peking's military aid to Pakistan�the major non-com-
munist recipient of euch Chinese aid�was born out of common enmity to India.
In the process the Pakistanis have become major clients of the Chinese and Peking
will probably seek to preserve and ranure this relationship even if Sino-Indian
relations should improve somewhat in the coming years. Tentative feelers between
Peking and New Delhi suggest both parties may be ready for a return to con-
ventional diplomacy. While formal ties may be restored, in line with Peking's
current effort to bolster its diplomatic image, the relationship will undoubtedly
remain 'cautious and cool for some time to come.
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37. The Man Communists. Peking now seems determined to consolidate the
currently improved ties with both North Vietnam and North Korea.. If only
because of the primacy of the Sitio-Soviet conflict, Peking is lz.kely to go to some
--lengths to improve its relations with Pyongyang and Hanoi, preferably at Moscow's
expense, The error of pushing Pyongyang and Hanoi, whether ideologically or
politically, now seems to be clear to Peking and is unlikely to be repeated in
the same gross forms as during the Cultural Revolution.
38, China's present call for 'militant malty" is probably designed, in the first
instance, to squeeze out the Soviet Union. It also serves to give the impression
of a more active role in the "anti-imperialist" struggle than Chiaa's cautious
actions warrant Indeed, it seems likely that China will continue to tailor its rote
toward propaganda and material support of those on the front lines rather than
expose itself to greater risk This apparent effort to write itself belatedly into
any possible settlement in Indochina, together with its sponsorship of Si/aanouk,
will require careful diplomacy if it is not to alienate Hanoi. Having borne the
burden of the fighting, the Vietnamese are likely to be especially sensitive to
any Chinese attempt to dictate strategy or tactics. Currently the Chinese are
moving with finesse but their natural bent toward chauvinism is nearly as likely
to erupt against the Vietnamese as against Westerners.
a
39. Japan represents a special case for Peking. Because of Japan's remarkable
econcnnic performance and US encouragement for it to assume a more active
role In Asia, Peking is showing concern over Japan's potential military power,
and its possible designs on another Greater East Asia Co-pioepciity Sphere.
This concern was heightened last fall by the signing of the Nixon-Sato com-
munique on the reversion of Okinawa. Peking has always been apprehensive
over Japan's expanding influence In Asia, particularly in Taiwan, and has taken
the view that the Nixon-Sato communiqu�ignaled a more assertive and direct
role for the Japanese in the area. Peking's reaction has been marked by indigna-
tion and by an unsettling conviction that as the US disengages from Asia, Japan
will fill the void both economically and militarily and will assume the lead role
In cotmtering China. Adding to Peking's dilemma is the awareness that its
political assets and leverage in Japan have markedly dwindled and its image
has suffered from the extremes of the Cultural Revolution.
40. Despite its limitations�and past failures--Peking ...-ams to have decided
to continue on a course of limited meddling in Japan's internal affairs. Peking
has also launched an intensive propaganda campaign which raises the specter
of a remilitarizecl, imperialistic Japan, a foreign policy ploy designed to fan
traditional Asian fears and to undercut Japanese influence. Moreover, the Chinese
are attempting to build a case against VS-USSR-Japanese "collusion,' which
Is also intended to strengthen Peking's hand in its competition for infuence in
Asia. SQ far this approach has been successful in helping improve China's relations
with North Korea, but has not had a significant impact on Peking's non-com-
munist neighbors. Furthermore, the campaign has not been allowed to affect
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materially China's burgeoning trade with japan, which is expected to reach
^ecord levels epie: this year,
41. Taiwan. The continued existence�indeed thriving�of the Nationalist
Chinese Covarnmex t in Taiwan remains a central Issue in Chinese foreign policy.
This symbol of the unfinished revolution remains a highly emotional issue even
after two decades. The Peking leadership faces the general frustration of knowing
that they cannot take Taiwan by force, that it will not fall to them by default,
and that the growing strength of the independence-minded Taiwanese could
weaken Pelcing's. claim to the island and perpetuate the issue indefinitely. The
continued recognition of the CRC by many countries in the world and its presence
In the UN and other international bodies blocks Peking from full international
participation and remains a major irritant to the Chinese Communist leadership.
Finally, the Taiwan issue is a complex obstacle to Improved relations with both
the US and Japan, thus severely limiting Pelting's freedom to maneuver on
international Issues.
42. Korea continues to attract Chinese interest be. of the strategic role
of the peninsula, the quadrilateral competition for uniuence there, and the
volatile relationship between the north and the south. Peking has worked as-
siduously to regain its Influence in Pyongyang and has succeeded in reviving
warm displays of friendship. While attempting to limit the role of the US, USSR,
and japan, however, Peking will also seek to limit North Korean advarturism,
The outlook is for tough political support for Kim ll-song's propaganda out-
bursts combined with quiet restraint on his military excesses to avoid drawing
China into another military confrontation on the peninsula.
F.. China and the World Community
43. Where Peking's security interests are not directly engaged, Chinese diplo-
matic activity over the last year has involved fax more tactical flexibility than
has been shown vis-�is the VS and the USSR. The face shown the world once
again broadly resembles that displayed prior to the Cultural Revolution, a care-
fully nurtured image of reasonableness, but entailing little or no change in long-
term goals. Sino-Soviet considerations are part of the equation in most if this
diplomatic activity, and in some cases, notably in Eastern Europe� tend to
dominate the Chinese approach.
44. Eastern Europe has become an attractive target for Peking bemuse Soviet
problems there seem to draw Soviet attention away from China. In addition
to its close ties with Albania, Peking has been actively cultivating the RvirnardArts,
and more recently has shown real flexib;lity in shelving ideology and improving
long-frigid relations with Yugoslavia. Ambassadors have returned to Hungary,
Poland, and East Per-many. Peking is clearly preparing for long-term competition
with the Soviet Union and for this reason alone is likely to give greater attention
to the East Europeans. Much will of course depend on the subtlety and finesse
of Peldng's approach, but at this point the Chinese have apparently assessed the
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opportunities as worth pursuing. In this effort as in other diplomatic endeavors
DOW underway, Peking will likely recover ground lost during the Cu!tura] Revolu-
tion, and, If it can hold to its new pragmatic diplomacy, achieve some forward
movement.
45. Elsewhere in the world, Peking is showing revived interest in fostering
better relations where the cost is cheap and the opportunities tempting. This
does not rule out support for revolutionary activity, as is evident in the Near
East. In contrast to the heavy arms aid from the Soviets to the Arab world, the
Chinese apparently hope to sway the Arabs by concentratine their aid on the
fedayeen. This will probably be mainly propaganda on 'people's wa, with
some training and small-arms aid. This also serves to keep the pot boiling and
the Soviets distracted. But while 7.:tonwacing the wasefire as an American-
instigated 'Munich` and declaring strong support for the fedayeen in the Jor-
danian cries, the Chinese have carefully refrained from attacks on the Arab
governments involved, apparently unwilling to compromise future state relations
in the area.
48. In Africa, the Chinese will be concerned to restore diplomatic loe,--; to
the CRC in recent years. This will require more professional diplomacy and less
proselytizing. Indeed, China's Foreign Ministry already seems to have aocapted
this retreat from Maoist missionary work. For ti.ie most part, aid projects are
likely to remain modest but with special efforts to make them practical and
highly visible. The construction of the $400 rr �itoia Tanzania-Zambia rail line
appears to be China's prestige project for Africa; the Chinese apparently also
Lope, through the provision of military aid, to ooeverr Tanzania into a major
beachhead in Africa.
47. In an effort which may be intended iresin;-;. :7.1:Alight Peking's return
to the world scene, the Chinese have also been ciispla;.ing enprecedented
to-
tere5t in UN membership. In earlier years, Peking put. precond tions on its mem-
bership which were clearly unacceptable to the interne* i body. More recently,
Chinese officials have dropped their extreme demands oad have sent out a
number of cautious feelers for support in the UN. Wiierce Chinese diplomat:
formerly spurned such support, now they go out of their se. I to cap ws appre-
ciation for it. Despite all of this activity. Peking has not se-. teaed its opposition
to any Iwo-Chine formulation, and has continued to it clear that the
CRC must either withdraw or be dismissed before Peking would accept UN
membership. Widened diplomatic recognition of Peking, such as by Canada and
Italy, is steadily improving the dances fo: its admission to the UN; such an
outcome aeems likely within the next few yews,
4 in general, sux1 barring the contingency of military attack by the USSR,
China's future international posture is likely to depend more on Chinese internal
developments than on external factors. U domestic political and economic
�problems accumulate, so will the pressure to give them even higher priority,
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with a concomitant lessening in foreign interests, Mao Tse-tung remains the key
variable. So long as he retains his dominance within the leadership, Mao could
attempt to reverse the present relatively moderate trends. In the past, his
Impatience has grown as his goals for China have been frustrated by economic
reality and reoalcitrant human nature, His ability to retreat and consolidate is
still evident, but it is questionable whether his age and health will permit
another major push toward his visionary aims. In any event, despite his deep
concern over the ideological conflict with the Soviets, Mao's attention is likely
to remain primarily on developments within China. Nor is be likely to abandon
his caution and risk the destruction of China by provocative moves against either
the US or the USSR.
49. Mao's death during this period could create succession problems that could
give Peking reason to project a low posture on the international scene for some
time. Almost any foreseeable combination of successors�even presumably hard-
core Maoists like Lin Pao, the designated successor�would probably play for
time to consolidate their positions and to strengthen China to meet possible
challenges. In the longer run, RS those who follow Mao lc ce up to the needs of
-China, the trend is likely to be away from the ideological excesses of Maoism,
toward a more realistic adjustment to the difficulties�as well as the opportu-
nities�facing China. Indeed, if the successors persist in the present movement
toward greater flexibility and pragmatism, they are likely to have greater suc-
cess than Mao in expanding China's political influence abroad. And for elre longer
run, China's traditional ethnocentrism will continue to fuel an assertive and
potentially aggressive nationalism.
50. Presumably they will continue to focus their foreign policy on diplomacy
at the overt level and on subversion and insurrection at the covert level This
could include 'war by proxy" as well as efforts to exacerbate US relations with
Its Asian allies and to erploit internal tension within these countries. We can-
not be sure, of course, how future leaders will see their situation, and it is pos-
sible that they will be prepared to employ China's developing power in a
more aggressive manner, It now seems likely, however, that the open and offen-
sive use of military power will continue to be judged needlessly risky and
therefore counterproductive. Even the development of an operational strategic
weapons system may reinforce Chinese caution rather than encourage a more
reckless policy. While we do not doubt that China would fight tenaciously if
Invaded, or if threatened directly with invasion, we fee no compelling factors
moving Peking toward a policy of expansionism, or even a higher level of risk-
taking. For all its verbal hostility and latent aggressiveness, neither the present
nor the probable future leadership is likely to see foreign adventures as a solu-
tion to China's problems.
16
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