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November 5, 1959
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(b)(1) (b)(3) ~?d -corv~i~rr~ra~ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEE KLY SUMMARY COPY NO. OCI No. 5451/59 5 November 1959 i ecument No. _ ----_____5-___- No Change ^ D+clas, CIa Next Auth ew Date: ---- Date: - - - BYAO if Eccument No." - - ---------------- - No Change In Clase. ^ ^ Declassified Class. Changed to: TS S C 14 Next Review Date: --------+ --- Auth : HR 70-3 0 te: t Ij_c _t~-- INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CENTRAL C GE NCE OFFICE OF CURRENT IN MW APPROVED FOR RELEASE^ DATE: 13-Aug-2010 By: --------- THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. `WEB. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 T H E W E E K I N B R I E F OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST KHRUSHCHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 In his speech to the closing session of the Supreme Soviet on 31 October, Khrushchev reviewed the principal themes of his "peaceful coexistence" policy. Taking a moderate line, he observed that there had been a "notice- able improvement in the international situation" and reaf- firmed his desire for an early summit meeting which, he said, should give top priority to disarmament. The speech provided further evidence that the Soviet premier is en- countering difficulty in obtaining unqualified support from some bloc leaders, especially the Chinese, for his present foreign policy course. He sought to overcome reservations and doubts regarding the possible long-term effects of his peaceful coexistence line and issued a warning against "adventurism in politics." MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3 The Iraqi Government is expected to begin this month the trial of several Baathists and other pro-UAR national- ists for involvement in the attempt to assassinate Qasim. Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion has publicly warned the UAR that any attempt to stage an uprising in Iraq would compel Israel to reserve "freedom of action." Considera- tion of possible contingency action in connection with the Iraqi situation presumably also has high priority in cur- rent meetings. between the Shah of Iran and King Husayn in Jordan. The UAR and the Sudan have reached an accord on sharing the Nile waters which may pave the way for the granting of a World Bank loan to the Sudan for initiation of its Roseires Dam project; construction of the Soviet- engineered Aswan Hieh Dam in t is scheduled to begin next month. SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6 Peiping has informed the Indian ambassador that there can be no question of Chinese withdrawal from disputed border posts, thus rejecting Nehru's condition for negotia- tions'. The Chinese leaders probably feel a withdrawal would be interpreted as bowing to Indian pressure and would weaken their negotiating position. New Delhi, esti- mating that the Chinese will try to expand their occupation of the territory in dispute before agreeing to negotiations, apparently has decided to counter with the swiftest possi- ble expansion of "Indian presence" in frontier areas. eEnnS PON CI[1CAITIAI .. THE WEEK IN BRIEF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 PART I (continued) ANTI-US RIOTS IN PANAMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8 Panamanian politicians seeking to exploit public hos- tility toward US administration of the Canal Zone were responsible for the violent anti-US rioting in Panama on 3 November, the 56th anniversary of Panamanian independ- ence. Further disorders may result from the wounding of several Panamanian citizens by American troops defending Zone entrances. The intensification of political maneu- vering in anticipation of next May's presidential election is expected to provoke new oxnressions of ntment against the United States. ~ 7 NOTES AND COMMENTS SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 Only minor skirmishes have been reported in Laos recently. The Communists continue their efforts to pro- mote antigovernment sentiment through propaganda and terrorist attacks on government supporters. The trial of Prince Souphannouvong and 13 other pro-Communist leaders has again been postponed. The USSR has brought into the open its opposition, previously expressed only in private, to the establishment of a permanent UN mis- sion in Laos. Secretary General Hammarskjold still be- lieves, however, that he can find a formula for appointing a "personal" representative despite Soviet objections. THAI - NORTH VIETNAMESE REPATRIATION AGREEMENT . . . . . . Page 2 Thailand and North Vietnam are preparing to repatri- ate, starting in January 1960, those Vietnamese refugees in Thailand who wish to go to North Vietnam. Most of the 40,000 to 50,000 Vietnamese in Thailand favor the Hanoi regime, but it. is not known how many will agree to be repatriated. The Communists may try to prolong the repatriation process in order to extend the life and expand the role of their repatriation mission in Thailand. Bangkok has looked upon the presence of Vietnamese along its frontier adioinin? Laos as a serious security problem.. THE WEEK IN BRIEF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 PART II (continued) INDONESIA DISTURBED OVER ITS RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page The treatment received by Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio during his recent visit to Peiping apparently left him angered and frightened by Communist China's aggressiveness and power. Subandrio has told the American ambassador in Djakarta that while there could be no dras- tic change in Indonesia's policy of nonalignment there would probably be some "adjustments." These might include cautious moves to increase Indonesia's solidarity with its Southeast Asian n i hbors as a means of standing up to Communist China. PEIPING AGAIN OPTIMISTIC OVER ECONOMIC PROSPECTS . . . . . Page 5 The Chinese Communist leaders seem to have regained some of the exuberance they lost during the spring and summer months. They now predict that the 1959 economic goals, as revised last August, will be met ahead of sched- ule. This is possible insofar as industry is concerned, since the August targets were set deliberately low and since there has been improvement in the output of key items in the past two months. The predictions are unreal- istic for agriculture, however. The extensive summer drought makes it extremely unlikely that the country can exceed last year's crops, let alone achieve scheduled 10-percent increase in grain and cotton. JAPANESE - NORTH KOREAN REPATRIATION . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6 Preparations for the repatriation of Korean residents in Japan to North Korea, scheduled to begin in early December, are under way following approval by Chosen Soren, the pro-Communist Korean residents' organization, of modi- fications in procedures proposed by Tokyo. The lifting of Chosen Soren's boycott does not ensure smooth operation of the program, however, as the departure of a disappoint- ingly small number of repatriates could result in renewed Communist obstruction. Implementation of the program will further strain relations between South Korea and Japan and may influence Rhee to suspend the negotiations for a set- tlement of outstanding differences--talks which were re- sumed in Tokyo last August. INDIAN COMMUNIST PARTY FACES CRUCIAL POLICY DECISION . . . Page 6 The Indian Communist party, facing its most serious internal crisis in ten years, is scheduled to convene its national council on 10 November for a showdown on policy and leadership. The damage to Communist unity and pres- tige resulting from Sino-Indian border developments and loss of power in Kerala State has widened the rift between ECRAT iii THE WEEK IN BRIEF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 PART II (continued) extremist factions and brought the party to the point of an open break. The present leadership, which has the support of Moscow:in its moderate position on internal and external issues, probably will be able to contain the di._'idFnts by making some concessions. CEYLON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7 Ceylon's Dahanayake government remains in a vulner- able position despite its survival of a no-confidence motion in Parliament on 30 October. Cabinet dissension, the ruling group's dangerously slim parliamentary major- ity, and charges implicating leading government officials in the assassination of Bandaranaike make for instability. Prime Minister Dahanayake's concern over these factors probably was responsible for the adjournment of Parlia- ter only three days in session. UNREST INCREASING IN BELGIAN CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8 Severe rioting in the Belgian Congo interior near Stanleyville, which cost the lives of about 70 Africans during the week end of 31 October, marked the first spread of serious nationalist disorders outside the lower Congo. The clashes between natives and Belgian troops followed in the wake of attacks on Belgian policy by sev- eral nationalist groups. In Brussels the government has accepted opposition Socialist proposals for round-table conferences with Congolese leaders in November in an effort to ensure the holding of the communal and terri- torial elections in the Congo in December. FRENCH ALGERIAN PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10 In view of the broad public support De Gaulle has won for his Algerian program, announced on 16 September, his current "information" campaign appears primarily designed to overcome army dissatisfaction. He has felt it necessary to call for "absolute loyalty and discipline" in carrying out his policies, and the emphasis being placed by top military and civilian officials on France's long- term presence in Algeria seems aimed at army extremists who fear De Gaulle may "abandon" Algeria. This apparent hardening of the French position has distressed moderates who had hoped to see early and fruitful negotiations between Paris and the rebels. ITALY MAY GRANT TRADE CONCESSIONS TO USSR . . . Page 11 Pressure by Italian industrialists may lead the Segni government to grant the USSR substantial additional credits folio iny the comi I alian-Soviet trade talks in Rome. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 PART II (continued) RUMANIA ATTEMPTS TO STEP UP ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH WEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11 For the past several months Rumania has been striving to expand its economic relations with the West and, with a view to obtaining further Western credits, to build Western confidence in its financial soundness and international responsibility. To this end, the Rumanians have indicated a readiness to discuss settlement of nationalization claims and toexolore possibilities for expanded cultural rela- tions. CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN . . . . . . . . . . Page 12 Party instructions for the Czechoslovak Third Five- Year Plan (1961-65), which in tone and spirit recall Soviet economic policies of the Stalin era, stipulate a 60-percent rise in output for heavy industry, a 30-per- cent rise for light industry, and a 21-percent increase in agricultural production. The new program implies added strains on investment resources and only marginal improvements in the consumer's lot. Any serious public discontent as a result of slowness in improving the standard of living would probably be met with economic concessions, however, even if these involved some tempo- rary decline in the rate of industrial growth. EAST GERMAN CHURCH-STATE STRUGGLE INTENSIFIES . . . . . . Page 14 The Ulbricht regime is preparing to sever the East German Evangelical Church from its leadership in West Berlin, and there is some evidence that it is winning the cooperation of some high-ranking clergy in East Germany. In the event the Communists meet with further success among the clergy, the regime will probably move to set up a separate church and thus 1 one of the few remain- ing all-German organizations. THE SITUATION IN CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 In line with its drastic approach to economic reforms, many of which are badly needed, the Castro government has passed a new mining law severely restricting private mining enterprises and has seized the files of foreign oil com- panies. Castro's erratic conduct, as well as the revival of the revolutionary tribunals, has led to criticism in other Latin American countries. Havana may be planning to resume diplomatic relations with and open trade relations with East Germany. C ERE T v THE WEEK IN BRIEF PART II (continued) BOLIVIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 The presidential ambitions of two leading personali- ties in Bolivia's ruling party, the MNR, are causing serious unrest and outbreaks of armed violence. MNR leader and former President Paz, who apparently has President Siles' support, and Walter Guevara, leader of the party's right wing, are musterinsr armed militia units for a possible showdown. BRITAIN'S RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE . . . . . . . . . Page 16 Since re-election the Macmillan government has given priority to improving Britain's relations with the six European Economic Community (EEC) members. By hinting at greater willingness to participate in regional projects, London seeks to avert rapid extension of EEC activities which might further reduce British influence on the conti- nent. Foreign Secretary Lloyd will promote his plans in a visit to Paris on 11 and 12 November, and Chancellor Adenauer and Premier Segni will soon visit London in an endeavor to strengthen ties. PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES FACTORS IN THE PROBLEM OF NORTH AFRICAN UNITY . The independence secured in 1956 by Morocco and Tunisia and the struggle for independence under way in Algeria have led area leaders to serious consideration of the relations of North African political entities with rL'/?DCT W I RET Page 1 . Page 6 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY PART III (continued) each other and with outside blocs. Some North African leaders have been seeking to bring about a united "Maghreb federation" in northwest Africa. Some go further and envisage an alliance of North African states with France or association with a European community. Intra-Maghreb frictions seem to rule out a closely knit federation, but some form of loose union which would extend North Africa's traditional ties with Western Europe might be possible and would provide diversification of contacts North Africans seek. FRENCH COMMUNITY IN EVOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11 President de Gaulle is guiding the development of the French Community toward a more flexible structure providing for varying degrees of autonomy in an effort to make the Community acceptable to African nationalism and possibly to attract new members. Negotiations for a looser relationship between Paris and the Federation of Mali--comprising the republics of Soudan and Senegal-- are likely to begin after the next meeting of the Commu- nity Executive Council, scheduled for December. French officials may also see the concept of an evolutionary Community as providing the legal framework for a solution of the Algerian problem. In view of increasing nation- alist aspirations throughout France's present and former possessions, however, it appears doubtful that any French- proposed association, however liberal can be attractive for long . SOVIET REACTION TO THE AMERICAN EXHIBITION IN MOSCOW . . . Page 14 Despite strenuous efforts by the Soviet regime to undermine the impact of the American exhibition in Moscow, the fair was the object of intense popular curiosity. Well over 2,000,000 Soviet citizens attended, which was some- what more than the number specified in the US-Soviet exhibition agreement. Their reaction appears to have been one of general approval, although there was some adverse comment on certain of the exhibits and on the organization of the fair. The impact of the fair has apparently been felt in the highest party circles and may have contributed to the recent government announcement of a slight increase in consumer goods production. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST KHRUSHCHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH Khrushchev's speech to the closing session of the Supreme Soviet on 31 October was the most comprehensive exposition to date of his policy of "peace- ful coexistence." Indicating satisfaction with the "notice- able improvement in the inter- national situation," he said the prospects for strengthen- ing peace "have become more fa- vorable." In his notably moderate and restrained speech, the Soviet premier claimed a major shift had occurred in Western pol- icy and attitudes toward the USSR. He attributed this to a "more sober evaluation" and "sensible understanding" in the West of the "position of forces in the international area." "Even some of the ac- tive conductors of the 'posi- tions of strength' policy see its futility," he said, and predicted that this more "sen- sible understanding" will lead to the abandonment of "calcu- lations of using military forces against the socialist world." Khrushchev's discussion contained no indication of any important changes in the Soviet position. He repeated his fa- vorable assessment of his US visit and talks with President Eisenhower and attempted to convey the impression that he had reached "mutual understand- ing" with both the President and Prime Minister Macmillan on a summit meeting. While he avoided direct criticism of De Gaulle's posi- tion on the timing of a meeting, he rejected the view of "some statesmen in the West" that the heads of government should meet only after agreement has been reached on major questions. He reaffirmed his preference for an early summit meeting and pro- posed an agenda which gave top priority to disarmament, fol- lowed by a German peace treaty, Berlin, and "other internation- al questions of general inter- est." Khrushchev expressed appre- ciation of the statements by De Gaulle and Premier Debrg on the "inviolability" of the Oder- Neisse frontier. He gave a cautious endorsement to De Gaulle's recent statement on Algeria, probably to appear re- sponsive to the French cabinet's communique of 21 October which stressed the importance an improvement in the "world climate" would. play in jus-; tifying French participation in a summit conference. At the same time, however, Khrushchev repeated the standard expression of Soviet sympathy for peoples who are "struggling for independence and national liberty." In Moscow's first authori- tative response to recent state- ments by American officials holding the USSR at least partially responsible for Pei- ping's actions, Khrushchev de- nounced these as a "psychological PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY attack against the Soviet Union" and accused the US of trying to distort the character of Sino- Soviet relations and cast doubt on Peiping's sovereignty. He repeated Moscow's view that the Taiwan question is a "purely internal affair of China" and expressed confidence that "Taiwan and the other is- lands will be reunited with the rest of China." Although he made no mention of the use of force, Khrushchev renewed So- viet pledges to support Peiping "until it has achieved settle- ment of this question because the legal and moral right is on its side." KhjL?ushchev carefully ad- hered to his neutral position on the Sino-Indian border dis- pute, expressing hope for a peaceful settlement satisfac- tory to both sides. The speech provided further evidence that Khrushchev is en- countering difficulties in ob- taining unqualified support from some bloc leaders, espec- ially the Chinese, for his pres- ent foreign policy course. Ap- parently in an effort to meet reservations and doubts about the long-range effects of his peaceful coexistence policy, Khrushchev gave a lengthy ex- position of the nature and limits of this concept and stoutly defended the need for "flexibility" in foreign policy without abandoning "principles." He cited Lenin's teaching that the "working class, before as well as after it has gained pow- er, must be able to pursue a flexible policy, compromise, and come to agreement whenever life and the interests of the cause demand it," He contended that "mutual concessions" are necessary in the present state of East-West relations, but added that "one must not confuse mutual conces- sions in the interest of peace- ful coexistence" with ideologi- cal concessions, Presumably in response to unnamed critics, Khrushchev emphasized "there cannot be any question of con- cessions or adaptation" in matters of ideology. The gravity of the prob- lem which apparently has been created by Peiping's coolness toward Khrushchev's present policy was underscored by his resort to the extraordinary device of resurrecting the episode of Trotsky's opposi- tion to Lenin's decision to make peace with Germany in 1918 "to ensure for the young Soviet state the possibility of peaceful construction of socialism." Except for passing references in Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th par- ty congress, this is the first mention of Trotsky by a top Soviet leader in many years. Khrushchev's denunciation of Trotsky's "adventurist pol- icy" of "neither peace nor war" almost certainly was aimed di- rectly at the Chinese Commu- nist leaders. He remarked pointedly that Trotsky's posi- tion had "played into the hands of the German im- perialists," recalled the dif- ficulties his policy had created for the "young so- cialist state," and conclud- ed with the observation that "such were the fruits of adventurism in olitics!' PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 9 Iraq Although the situation in Iraq remains calm outwardly, an underlying feeling of tension permeates the country, Nation- alists and Communists are ap- parently awaiting the opening of the trials of those charged with the assassination attempt on Premier Qasim--and the pre- mier's release from the hos- pital--before making new moves. Security authorities remain apprehensive about demonstra- tions tentatively scheduled for the day of Qasim's release. These are likely to lead to clashes between nationalists and Communists. The military governor, General Abdi, is said to be contemplating the cancellation of parades on that day. Along the Shatt al Arab river, the tension which exist- ed laet:. week over Iran'.s. ' cha.l- iengipg .of the rules of Iraqi - portt;Authorities:_.has eased. to somedegrpee :Several ships;-have made the trip to and from the Iranian port of Khosroabad with- out incident, despite the warn- ing by Iraqi port authorities that they would take action against ships using the port because they consider use of the port a menace to navigation. The next sailing from Khosroabad is scheduled for 8 November. Qasim appears to be slow- ly recovering from his wounds. He carries on state business from his hospital room and re- ceives visitors every day--in- cluding the Soviet and Turkish ambassadors on 1November. His full recovery may take several more weeks, and he has stated that he does not wish to leave the hospital until he is a "whole man" unencumbered by the cast on his left arm. The expulsion of the sec- ond secretary of the UAR Em- bassy in Baghdad on 1 November for subversive activities was a further blow to pro-UAR na- tionalists in Iraq. Mahdawi is likely to use this incident to build his charges of UAR im- plication in the Qasim assas- sination attempt. PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 3 of 9 The Shah has stated he will not insist at this time that ships destined for Ira nian part s use Iranian pilots and fly the Iranian flag. Iran, however, intends to continue to provide naval escorts for ships using Khosroabad to en- sure against interference by the Iraqis. The Shah has in- dicated that he is ready at any time to begin negotiations with Iraq over questions of sovereignty and navigation on the Shatt al Arab. The Shah's visit to Jor- dan from 2 to 6 November prob- ably is causing additional con- cern in Iraq. The Shah, how- ever, while discussing contin- gency plans regarding Iraq with Jordanian King Husayn, is probably cautioning him against intervention at this time in Iraqi affairs. The clandestine Soviet radio "The National Voice of Iran," located in the Caucasus, has warned meanwhile that the Shah's trip--which will be fol- lowed by visits to Tehran by Pakistani President Ayub and Turkish Premier Menderes--in- dicates that a plot "primarily directed against Iraq" is being hatched. The broadcast ad- vised Iranian Army officers to show that they will not be used in the "execution of the Shah's fabrications." The main issues in the long-standing Nile waters dis- pute between the Sudan and the UAR have been resolved, accord- ing to unofficial announcements, and the negotiators now are drafting a formal agreement. President Nasir personally set the tone for the talks, which have been under way in Cairo more than three weeks, and the UAR made concessions to meet most of the Sudanese demands. Egypt is to receive about 75 percent of the usable Nile flow, and the Sudan about 25 percent. A difficult issue was the amount of compensation the UAR is to pay for Sudanese lands which will be flooded by the SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 4 of 9 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 Aswan High Dam. There may be further wrangling on this point, but signature of a com- prehensive agreement is expect- ed within the next few days. This will pave the way for the grant of a $50,000,000-$60,- 000,000 World Bank loan to the Sudan for its Roseires Dam project. Construction of the first stage of the Soviet-engi- neered Aswan High Dam in Egypt is scheduled to begin next month. The UAR-Sudanese agreement may cause friction with Ethi- opia and with the United King- dom, speaking for Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. "These:" riparian states insisted on a voice in any final allocation of the Nile waters. The unstable and unpopu- lar Abboud military government is gaining new public support in the Sudan by emphasizing the favorable terms of the ac- cord, even though many Sudan- ese remain suspicious that somehow the UAR will get the best of the deal. The govern- ment urgently needs such sup- port to contend with coup plot- ting by disgruntled junior army officers and with pressures by political and religious lead- ers for an early return to ci- vilian government. The Israeli elections on 3 November increased the par- liamentary strength of David Ben-Gurion's Mapai party, but the increase was not sufficient for a majority of the 120 seats in the Knesset. Another coa- lition accordingly will be required to form a government, and Ben-Gurion, who has long chafed under coalition re- strictions, is expected to lead it again as prime minister. Mapai apparently will have 47 seats compared with 40 in the previous Knesset. Its most serious challenger, the ultra-: nationalist Herut party, also obtained an increased percent- age of the total vote which, in Israel's involved system of proportional representation, will go from 15 to 17 seats. The conservative General Zion- ists, the left-wing socialist Achdut Haavoda party, and the Communists all received small- er percentages of the vote. The votes obtained by the other established parties were about equal to their previous percentages. A plethora of new parties, five of which hoped to exploit the grievances of "ori- ental" Jews, failed to attract any significant voting support. The Israelis apparently e- lieve that UAR intervention in Iraq would result in widespread chaos in the area, which could lead to Nasir's domination of Jordan.. The latter possibility has consistently evoked concern in Istael. In a pre-election PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 interview, Ben-Gurion warned that any UAR attempt to stage a coup in Iraq would compel Israel to "reserve freedom of action." The apprehension in Israel and the UAR led on 4 November to an air clash along the Israe- li-Egyptian border. Tel Aviv radio claims four Egyptian MIG- 17s entered Israeli air space but were driven off after a short fight. Cairo radio as- serts that six Israeli Mysteres violated Egyptian territory The Chinese Communists have recently indicated that the major stumbling block to the start of negotiations with New Delhi on the border dispute is Nehru's insistence that Chinese troops must first be withdrawn from border out- posts in Indian-claimed terri- tory. Peiping's Foreign Min- istry officials told the In- dian ambassador in late October that these troops are occupying China's own territory and there could be no question of with- drawing before negotiations. Mao se- ung an Liu Shao-chi had stressed the Chi- nese view that there should be "no prior " negotiations. _7' "we want" the border problem to be solved and "we are ready to solve it at any moment as soon as possible." The Chinese leaders will probably stand firm on this po- sition. They apparently believe that acceptance of Nehru's re- and that in the ensuing battle one Israeli plane was hit. One or both of the forma- tions probably engaged in a reconnaissance of the border quest for withdrawals would be interpreted as bowing to Indian pressure. Peiping seems particularly concerned that withdrawal of its forces from the Ladakh area would preju- dice its claims to this area in future negotiations with New Delhi. Despite their firmness on the issue of troop with- drawals, the Chinese apparent- ly do not wish to appear ob- structionist n the mattAr of negotiations. PAIIT I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 6 of 9 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY k R~";firCoad constructed by 1 y r # Chinese in 1957 (., sin dis,! ) ~JCEASE-FigF tIN?E ..^. Srinagar McMAHON LINE Nyak Selected road ---Selected trail in Ladakh and at the Longlu EASTERN LADAKH AREA (Clash 21 October 1959) New Delhi's increasingly firm attitude was indicated by its strongly worded reply on 4 November to Peiping's state- ment of 26 October. The note denied China's claims to Indian territory and demanded the Chi- nese quit Indian soil, "va- cating their aggression" both In a press conference on 5 November, Nehru emphasized his desire for a peaceful solu- tion of the border dispute but did not rule out use of force to recover Indian territory under Chinese occupation. Shillong- `j that although Peiping does not intend to commit itself to large-scale military action against Indian territory it hopes to secure control of as much of the disputed Tibetan border areas as it can. Be- lieving that the Chinese will try to expand their occupation of the territory in dispute be- fore agreeing to negotiations, New Delhi apparently has de- cided on a policy of counter- ing Peiping's moves with the swiftest possible expansion of "Indian presence" in frontier areas. SEGRE4 Page 7 of 9 The violent demonstrations of 3 November against the Canal Zone and other US installations in Panama were touched off by nationalistic politicians seek- ing to exploit_Panamanian re- sentment of US policies in the Zone. The wounding of several demonstrators by US forces de- fending entrances to the Zone may provide extremists with a popular cause that could re- sult in fresh disorders. The Panamanian National Guard did little to prevent or control rioting and incursions into the Zone. Former Foreign Minister Aquilino Boyd, a presidential hopeful and an opposition dep- uty in the legislature, issued a call in July for the "peaceful occupation" of the Canal Zone by Panamanians bearing flags on 3 November, the 56th anniversary of Panamanian independence. He was supported by rabidly anti- US university professor Ernesto Castillero, who urged massive participation in a Gandhi-type civil resistance march into the Zone. Boyd and Castillero re- mained adamant in spite of pres- sure from government officials urging that the scheme be aban- doned or its scope reduced to that of a symbolic gesture. Student groups reportedly failed to endorse the demonstration PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 8 of 9 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 proposal because it was viewed as a political maneuver de- signed to win support for Boyd in his presidential campaign. Panamanians have continual- ly demanded their country re- ceive a greater share of canal revenues and be recognized as retaining sovereignty over the territory of the Canal Zone. They also charge that the US has failed to live up to its commitments under the 1955 treaty governing the adminis- tration of the Zone. Specific Panamanian complaints are that Panamanian workers in the Zone receive lower wages than Amer- icans performing identical tasks there and that US agencies in the Zone purchase products from foreign countries which, under terms of the treaty, should be purchased from Panama. Foreign Minister Miguel Moreno won enthusiastic Pana- manian approval when he un- sE GR Es T expectedly voiced these complaints at the August foreign ministers' meeting in Santiago and again at the opening session of the UN General Assembly in September. He repeated his accusations in a speech last week in Bogota. Elements of the corrupt ruling oligarchy find it con- venient to use anti-US senti- ments to distract popular at- tention from deep-seated eco- nomic and social discontent among Panama's lower income groups. An intensification of pre-election political ac- tivity prior to the national presidential election in May 1960 is expected to result in a more emphatic campaign for added canal benefits. Further, political exploitation of emotionally charged canal issues may lead to additional disorders simil o those of 3 November. PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 9 of 9 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 NOTES AND COMMENTS SITUATION IN LAOS Only minor skirmishing has been reported in Laos in the last few days, but the Communist dissidents continue their ef- forts to promote antigovernment sentiment through a combination of propaganda and terrorist at- tacks on supporters of the Phoui regime. Laotian Army elements advancing in the Ma River area of northeastern Sam Neua Province are encountering lit- tle resistance, but this lack of opposition probably re- flects a deliberate attempt by the dissidents to save their strength and is not due to any diminution of their capa- bilities in this area. The death of King Sisavong Vong caused Phoui and his par- ty to cut short their visit to Washington and New York and pre- vented the premier from keep- ing a previously arranged ap- pointment with UN Secretary Gen- eral Hammarskjold. Prince Re- gent Savang, who was proclaimed the new King on 1 November, is likely to play a more active role in government affairs than his father. Savang is strongly anti-Communist and a supporter of the Committee for the Defense of National Interests (CDNI), which is in an uneasy coalition with Phoui's Rally of the Lao People (RLP). The government has again postponed the trial of Prince Souphannouvong and- 13 other pro-Communist leaders of the Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ), this time until after 13 November; inadequacy of security arrange- ments was the reason given. Hanoi, and to a lesser de- gree Peiping and Moscow, con- tinue to protest against a trial. On 31 October and 2 November respectively, the foreign min- isters of North Vietnam and Com- munist China addressed formal protests to the British foreign secretary and to the Soviet for- eign minister as cochairmen of the Geneva Conference, calling for "urgent measures" to prevent the trial on the ground that it would violate the Geneva agree- ments of 1954 and the Vientiane agreements of 1957.and block a peaceful solution. The Chinese letter reiterated Peiping's view that the dispute should be settled through broad negotia- tions. On 30 October the USSR publicized its opposition to any action in the UN which would set up a-permanent mission in Laos. Soviet UN delegation press re- lease stated that there can be "no question of the Soviet Union supporting or even tacitly agree- ing to use the name of ;the :United PART TT NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 1 of 17 SUET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nations to cover up such unlaw- ion's opposition had previous- ful actions." The Soviet Un- ly been expressed in strong C H I N A SALY LUANG PRABANG uang Prabann SAYABOURY S 5 NOVEMBER 1959 UNCLASSIFIED 0 STATUTE MILES 200 30614 rn -a z D terms through private diplomatic discus- sions. Its present action, forcing deli- cate behind-the-scenes negotiations into the open, is probably in- tended to disabuse those who believe that the USSR will consent to make easy a smooth transition from the subcommittee to an- other, more permanent, UN presence. Hammarskj old still believes, however, that he can find a basis for his actions which will enable him to ap- point a "personal" representative despite Soviet objections. He now plans to leave for Vientiane on about 10 November. Meanwhile, the subcommittee has completed the report of its mission to Laos, but the date of formal presentation to the Security Council is still uncertain and may be deferred_F__ Bangkok and Hanoi have an- nounced preparations to imple- ment the agreement reached last August providing for repatria- tion of those Vietnamese refu- gees in Thailand who wish to go to North Vietnam. Thai Gov- ernment and Red Cross officials XIENG KHOUANG AL VIENTIANE W*IANE NORTH VIETNAM !iI Pakse 31? CHAMPASSAK MALAYA 1\ o $\~.S~NGAPCR have set up provincial commit- tees to process repatriates, and registration will take place between 2 and 20 November. In- cluded in the first contingent will be some 280 Vietnamese who have been detained by the Thai Government as suspected PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 17 pro-Communists, but who had been released recently so that they might dispose of their property. The first refugees are to be returned by ship in January 1960. Most of these. refugees fled to Thailand when the French resumed control of Indochina after World War II, and an es- timated 90 percent of them fa- vor North Vietnam. The Thai Government has long sought to effect at least a partial solu- tion to the serious internal security problem posed by their presence along the strategic northeast frontier adjoining Laos. Recent reports indicate that several hundred may have crossed the border to join rebel forces in southern Laos. North Vietnam has estab- lished an Overseas Vietnamese service to study repatriation policies, and the minister of interior recently led a two-day conference to discuss resettle- ment measures. These measures are intended to provide for re- patriates from New Caledonia and French Guiana, as well as those from Thailand. There are about 5,000 Vietnamese con- tract laborers in New Caledonia and 300 Vietnamese in French Guiana who were formerly politi- cal prisoners. The two North Vietnamese Red Cross representatives who will serve as "advisers" to the Thai Red Cross in connection with the repatriation sought but were refused permission to set up their mission in Bangkok in October, instead of early No- vember as scheduled. They left Hanoi on 24 October, however, and proceeded to Rangoon, where they remained until admitted to Thailand on 2 November. Hanoi will probably attempt to magni- fy the importance of the mission, in line with North Vietnam's policy of promoting official and semiofficial contacts with nonbloc nations. Although Hanoi is active- ly publicizing preparations to receive repatriates, it is un- certain how many of the 40,000 to 50,000 Vietnamese in Thai- land will actually agree to move. Ft he refu- gees have not disposed of prop- erty in anticipation of repatri- ation. Hanoi has instructed the refugees to de- lay repatriation. North Viet- nam may wish to draw out the repatriation process in order to extend the life and possibly ex- pand the role of its mission in Bangkok. Such action would also prolong the presence of a poten- tial fifth column in Thailand. Area Area where MR refugees are conce "'Bangkok Phnom Penh PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 3 of 17 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 INDONESIA DISTURBED OVER ITS RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA The experience of Indone- sian Foreign Minister Subandrio during his recent four-day visit to Peiping apparently left him angered and terrified by the revelation of Communist China's aggressiveness and power. In a conversation with the American ambassador in Djakarta, Suband- rio stated that his eyes had been opened to China's expan- sionist aims and, that,while there could be no drastic change in Indonesia's independent for- eign policy, "adjustments in degree and attitude" would cer- tainly take place. Subandrio's visit was prompted by strong Chinese Com- munist protests over an Indo- nesian Government decree re- quiring the withdrawal of alien retail merchants from rural areas by the beginning of 1960. Most of these merchants are Overseas Chinese. He reported that Chinese officials in dis- cussions-with the Indonesians were arrogant, patronizing, and abusive. They charged that harassment of the Overseas Chi- nese was American inspired, and, in an effort to force repeal or substantial modification of the ban, threatened economic retali- ation and other unspecified measures. Subandrio, who has long been a supporter of Indonesia's policy of nonalignment, told Ambassador Jones he would like to review Indonesia's policy, but that there could be no dras- tic change because Communist China is a close and powerful neighbor. He further implied that Indonesia could not afford to alienate Sino-Soviet bloc support for its claim to West Irian (Netherlands New Guinea). He asserted, however, that the Indonesian Government would not back down in implementing the ban on alien retailers and that his position had the full sup- port of President Sukarno. He pleaded for continued American support in the face of expected further Chinese pressures. China. During a Manila stopover In public statements since his visit, Subandrio has main- tained a cautious appearance of friendly relations with Communist after his Peiping trip, he publicly stressed Indonesia's desire for closer ties with its Southeast Asian neighbors. Subandrio in- sisted to Ambassador Jones, how- ever, that his remarks in the Philippines were intended to stress the need for solidarity in standing up to Communist China, and he may hope to move cautiously in this direction within the framework of Indo- nraG;a' "nonalignment" policy. SECRET- PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 17 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY In the past few months the Chinese Communist leaders seem to have recovered some of the exuberance which had earlier characterized their approach to the "great leap forward." Party and government spokesmen are painting a picture of China's economic prospects for this year and next, which is brighter than that presented to the pub- lic last August, when sharp cuts had to be made in the targets for 1959. These spokesmen say that the party-initiated work drive led to a marked upswing in pro- duction during September and October, at least in industrial production and construction ac- tivity. Steel production, for example, is said to have jumped 20 percent in September and another 14 percent in October. Heartened by figures such as these, the leaders now con- fidently predict that most in- dustries will fulfill their re- vised 1959 goals some 10-15 days ahead of schedule, thus opening the way for a further "leap forward" during 1960. While fluctuations in the tone of public discussion of economic matters in Communist China have typically been great- er than the fluctuations in actual performance, an improve- ment does indeed appear to have taken place. This has been due only partly to the party's drive to revitalize the "leap." Sea- sonal and long-term factors-- including the normal increase in production which takes place in the second half of the year and the coming into production of new plant capacity--also con- tributed to the stepped up pace. The suspicion is strong, how- ever, that the Chinese leaders chose to ignore these factors so as to make the response to their call for harder work ap- pear more impressive. Peiping has in fact been using the recent upswing as ev- idence of the indispensability of the mass campaign to bring about such upsurges in produc- tion. It has engaged in a truc- ulent defense of this mechanism for extracting more work from the Chinese people in the face of attacks by critics who have labeled certain past campaigns "horrible disasters." The party is readying a massive rural work campaign for the coming winter which may approach in intensity the massive drive in the winter of 1957-58 which kicked off the "leap forward." The improvement in outlook thus far is largely confined to industry and does not extend to agriculture, although the re- gime's farm procurement programs show some improvement over last year. There is good reason to regard with considerable reserve the regime's professed belief that a 10-percent increase will be achieved in this year's out- put of grain and cotton. This claim is being advanced in the teeth of what one agricultural leader in Peiping has described as the worst natural calamities since the regime came to power ten years ago. Information from independent sources on weather in China con- firms there was a serious drought in key farm areas and suggests it covered a sufficiently large area and lasted long enough to make it doubtful that China can equal last year's actual pro- duction. In any case, the revised goals of 275,000,000 tons of grain and 2,300,000 tons of cotton remain well out of Peiping's reach, al= though the leaders will probably end by.claiming that the goals were met. 5T- PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 5 of 17 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Preparations for the re- patriation to North Korea of Korean residents in Japan sched- uled to begin early in December are under way following approval by Chosen Soren, the pro-Commu- nist Korean residents' organi- zation, of modifications in procedures proposed by Tokyo. The lifting of Chosen Soren's boycott does not ensure smooth operation of the program, how- ever, as the departure of a dis- appointingly small number of repatriates could result in renewed Communist obstruction. Implementation of the program will further strain relations between South Korea and Japan. The revised procedures will permit limited, controlled con- tacts between the repatriates and their relatives at railroad stations and at Niigata, the port of embarkation. Final interviews at Niigata to estab- lish the voluntary intentions of the repatriates will be con- ducted with families, rather than with individuals, in the presence of the International Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC) representative. Although these procedures would seem to give Chosen Soren additional opportunities to exert pressure on unwilling or wavering individuals, Tokyo claims they do not substantively affect the repatriates' "free- dom of choice." The ICRC probably will cooperate in the program, unless Chosen Soren creates an incident which flagrantly violates the prin- ciples the international body has established for guarantee- ing the Koreans voluntary choice of residence. The registration of pro- spective repatriates between 4 and 6 November should indi- cate roughly how many of the approximately 700,000 Korean residents in Japan desire to zo to North Korea. (Chosen Soren wiii se ect tne repatriates and screen them for political re- liability, presumably to satisfy North Korean requirements. While Pyongyang apparently wants re- patriation to proceed, it is likely to continue harassment of the Japanese by charging in- fractions of the agreement. Although announcement of the agreement with Chosen Soren prompted South Korean threats to break off talks now under way in Tokyo for a settlement of outstanding problems, this has not yet occurred and some re- sponsible officials hope the discussions will continue. The negotiations have made little substantive progress to date, largely because Seoul has not e policies. The Indian Communist party, facing its most serious internal crisis in ten years, is sched- uled to convene its national council on 10 November for a showdown on policy and leadef- ship. The damage to Communist unity and India re- sulting from recent Sino-Indian border developments--coming on top of the Communist set- back in Kerala State--has widened the rift between extrem- ist leaders on the right and left and brought the party fac- tions to the point of an open break. PART II NOTES AND COUNTS Page 6 of 17 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S RY Chinese Communist action along the Tibetan frontier has highlighted divisions in the Indian party along "nationalist" and "internationalist" lines, while the failure of the "Kerala experiment" emphasized the con- flict between proponents of a "peaceful, parliamentary" ap- proach to power and those advo- cating more aggressive tactics. Party Secretary Ajoy Ghosh, caught in the middle, leads a faction favoring a policy which in effect compromises differences between the extreme positions on both internal and external questions. The increasing isolation of the Communist party in In- dia, due to its inability to take an unequivocal stand for or against Peiping's actions, has caused a greater upheaval in Communist ranks than any previous issue. Alarmed over the prospect of losing much popular support, certain "na- tionalist" Communists, notably parliamentary party leader S. A. Dange, were impelled to side with the general Indian reaction against China and pub- licly air their disagreement with the official party position. The moderate leadership probably will manage to contain the extremists by making some concessions to their demands. The recent renewal of Sino- Indian border clashes in Ladakh has left the moderates with no alternative but to take a more critical stand against Peiping, thus narrowing the gap between them and the "nationalists." On internal policy, the moderate leadership probably will appease the proponents of aggressive tactics by allowing them to or- ganize a more extensive under- ground apparatus in case of future need, while outwardly the party maintains the parliamentary ap- proach. The present leadership will be aided in its efforts to keep the party on a moderate course by the numerous expressions of support Ghosh has recently re- ceived from top Soviet party lead- ers. Moscow apparently feels that Communist interests in In- dia--at least while Nehru is in power--will be best served by avoiding either the "nationalist" or "4nternatinna1ist" extremes. The Ceylonese Government is in a vulnerable position de- spite the defeat on 30 October of a no-confidence motion by 48 to 43 votes. Serious cabinet dissension, the ruling party's dangerously slim parliamentary majority, and rumors implicating leading government officials in the assassination of Prime Min- ister Randaranaike cast doubt on Dahanayake's Ability to maintain the government in power through the remaining 18 months of its term. PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 17 5 November 1959 During the vote the gov- ernment rallied its maximum strength, which had duced shortly beforehand by the dismissal of a cabinet' min- ister indirectly: implicated in the ..assassination and.-by the resignation of . a ernment Worker.., Two;oppbsition members were absent, and two abstained. The ruling group's success thus depended on the continued reluctance of a few opposition elements td'-force early elections and--for the first time since the present government was elected under Bandaranaike in April 1956-- on the votes of six nonelected appointees. Public awareness of charges implicating top govern- ment officials in Bandaranaike's assassination probably has in- creased considerably since the relaxation of press censorship on 20 October. The press has heaped ridicule and criticism on Dahanayake and the cabinet, and has supported opposition demands that Finance Minister De Zoysa.resign because of his association with one of several suspects and the rumored in- volvement of his two brothers. One government member during the no-confidence debate advo- cated De Zoysa's expulsion. At least six cabinet members also favor such a move, and it seems unlikely that the government can avoid dismissing or at least suspending him pending the out- come of the investigations. Dahanayake's concern over his government's position prob- ably was responsible for the adjournment of Parliament un- til 24 November, after only a three-day session. In the in- terim, Dahanayake presumably will try to consolidate his position as leader of the rul- ing party, to mend or at least suppress the government's rifts, and possibly to increase his parliamentary majority by bar- gaining with moderate opposi- tion elements. To accomplish this he would have to prove as able a tactician as Bandara- naike and possibly to improve on Bandaranaike's efforts to cope with the island's long- standing ecnnnmi n and enmm?na 1 problems. UNREST INCREASING IN BELGIAN CONGO Severe rioting in the in- terior of the Belgian Congo near Stanleyville, which cost the lives of about 70 Africans during the week end of 31 Oc- tober, marked the first spread of serious nationalist dis- orders outside the lower Con- go. The clashes between na- tives and Belgian troops, in the wake of attacks on Belgian policy by several nationalist groups, suggest that nation- alist -,extremism may. have reached proportions which will jeopardize territorial and communal elections scheduled for December. The Stanleyville disturb- ances were triggered by ing of the Congo National Move- ment (MNC) independence group, at which Patrice Lumumba, lead- er of one of its factions, called for a campaign of civil PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 17 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY A NAG 0 LEA AREA) MID - OCTOBER TRIBAL DISTURBANCES; K A,?f - -}Elisatpelhvil, disobedience and attacked Brus- sels' program for Congolese in- dependence in about four years. In rejecting the Belgian plan, the MNC followed the example of the Abako, the leading na- tionalist organization in the politically volatile lower Congo. The American Embassy in Brussels reports that the Abako's rejection of Congo Min- ister de Schrijver's four-year program was received with "gen- uine surprise" by Belgian offi- cials. In the absence of respon- sible nationalist leadership in the Congo, Brussels has sought to develop political stability through the support of certain tribal leaders. Prospects for such stability, however, have diminished late- ly as a result of a sharpening of tribal rivalries in several areas. In Elisabethville, con- cern over a possible national- ist boycott of European goods has been heightened by instances of increased friction among lo- cal African groups, and the American consul believes tension in the area to be higher than at any time since the Leopoldville riots of last January. Prior to the Stanleyville disturbances, Lumumba reported- ly demanded immediate Congolese independence, or his group would "face Belgium with a fait accompli." On 3 November, Brussels announced that a round- table conference would be held with Congo leaders in late No- vember, presumably to clarify Brussels' program for gradual independence. Such a conference may serve to mollify some Congo leaders, several of whom have complained that the De Schrij- ver program was adopted without consultation with the Congolese. The seriousness of the cur- rent situation has apparently caused the Belgian Government and the opposition Socialists to close ranks in an attempt to re-establish a common front on Congo policy. The scheduled round-table conference is in accordance with Socialist de- mands that Belgian officials negotiate directly with the Congolese leaders in an effort to assure that the December elections will be held. The government and the So- cialists also agree on the ne- cessity of extensive Belgian eco- nomic aid to the Congo, and plans call for the creation of a "development company" and for Belgian support of the Con- golese franc. The Socialists, however, differ with the gov- ernment on how to finance the additional costs involved, be- lieving that the large Congo companies should be made to as- sume a greater responsibility. It is not yet clear whether the Liberals in the government, who are always difficult on finan- cial questions, are in complete agreement with their cabi- net colleagues on these latest proposals. PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 9 of 17 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 FRENCH ALGERIAN PROGRAM In view of the broad pub- lic support De Gaulle has won for his Algerian program an- nounced on 16 September, his current "information" campaign appears primarily designed to overcome army dissatisfaction. He has felt obliged to call for "absolute loyalty and disci- pline" in carrying out his policies, and the emphasis being placed by,top military and ci- vilian officials on France's long-term presence in Algeria seems aimed at army extremists who fear De Gaulle may "abandon" Algeria. This apparent harden- ing of the French position has distressed moderates who had hoped to see early and fruit- ful negotiations between Paris and the rebels. Delegate General in Algeria Delouvrier's public explanation of the terms of the proposed two-stage referendum on Alge- ria's future has disturbed many Frenchmen and such interested foreigners as Tunisian Presi- dent Bourguiba, who had been hopeful of an early liberal solution. With army dissatis- faction increasingly apparent, Delouvrier's assurance that an. initial vote will be--as in 1958--on whether any tie should be maintained with France seems aimed at appeasing De Gaulle's rightist critics rather than merely elaborating on the de- tails pf a referendum which will probably not take place for several years. The second stage would permit a choice between autonomy and integra- tion with France. Military uneasiness ap- pears focused on whether the army will continue to play a major role in the administration of Algeria, whether the rebels will be granted a cease-fire on terms short of surrender, and whether the army will "lose face" with the Moslems because of the government's "oft" program. On 28 October au dec ared a ranee s policy is to pacify Algeria "completely and humanely," to assure its development, and to give the Algerians every reason to de- sire unity with France. Official concern over the army attitude is apparent in the manner in which Marshal Juin, France's highest military of- ficer, was censured by the minister-of the army for pub- licly charging on 26 October that De Gaulle's Algerian pol- icy would encourage the rebels. He was told that "it is the desire of the government that military chiefs remain entirely aside from political discus- sion." gerian issue. the center-left in case of a rightist rebellion on the Al- The French Communist party now has come out in favor of De Gaulle's Algerian program. This about-face probably re- flects Moscow's current inter- est in a French-Soviet detente, but it also gives the party a chance to avoid isolation from 'SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 10 of 17 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 The forthcoming Italian- Soviet trade talks in Rome will provide an opportunity for the USSR to secure additional cred- its in Western Europe. On 9 November, an Italian- Soviet commission is to meet in Rome to draw up commodity lists for 1960 under the four-year trade agreement of December 1957. According to press re-. ports, the new protocol will set a goal of $192,000,000 for total trade next year, as com- pared with a 1959 target of $160,000,000, which is not likely to be reached. The commission is also scheduled to examine the possi- bility of allowing the USSR to benefit, more extensively under existing legislation which permits four-year state guar- antees of up to 85 percent of the credit extended by Italian exporters. During the past year at least $35,000,000 worth of private short-term credits, some guaranteed by the Italian Gov- ernment, were extended. A high official in the Italian Foreign Ministry told the American Em- bassy late. in October: that Italian press reports that $100,000,000 had been requested were com- pletely without foundation. Since last spring, Soviet trade officials have asked Italian firms for substantial credits for purchases of chemical plants and equipment, threatening, if refused, to give the orders to other Western European firms. Italian Government offi- cials allege they are opposed to guaranteeing deals of private firms with the USSR and prefer to utilize the government's limited export credit resources to finance projects in under- developed areas. They fear, however, that domestic firms will overextend themselves in granting credits to the USSR, since other European traders continue to grant credits, fre- quently with government guaran- tees. Italian legislation is still pending to raise the ceiling on state guarantees for export credits on the grounds that Italian exporters must be aided to compete with more extensive export credit systems existing in other West- ern countries. (Concurred in by OkUt) RUMANIA ATTEMPTS TO STEP UP ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH WEST For the past several months Rumania has been striving to expand its economic relations with the West and--with'-a view to obtaining further Western credits--to build Western confi- dence in its financial sound- ness and international respon- sibility. To this end, the Rumanians have indicated a readiness to discuss settlement of nationalization claims and to explore possibilities for ex- panded cultural relations. US-Rumanian negotiations on war damages and nationaliza- tion claims will reopen in Wash- ington on 16 November. Similar meetings between British and Rumanian representatives are scheduled to start soon in SST PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 11 of 17 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 Bucharest. A mixed Greek-Ruman- ian commission has been evaluat- ing claims since March. France agreed to a claims settlement on 9 February; this was followed by an expansion of cultural and economic relations. Pointing to the French set- tlement as an example, Bucharest is pushing for expanded trade with Sweden, Greece, Britain, Italy, and. the. US. . Sweden signed a trade agreement with Rumania in August on the assur- ance that claims negotiations would be completed within a year. By holding out the pros- pect of settling claims, Bucha- rest. has been-endeavoring to obtain more Western credits for purchases of heavy machinery, complete factories, machine tools, and other technical equipment needed to help meet its capital requirements under the forthcoming Six-Year Plan (1960-1965). High-ranking Ru- manian economic officials made semiofficial visits this summer to Britain, France, the Benelux countries, Switzerland, Italy, and Greece to pave the way for expanded trade based on credit. The Rumanian policy of detente toward Western nations has so far had little substance outside the economic sphere. The possibility of increased cultural relations is held out by Bucharest as a consequence of the new "thaw" in East-West relations, but French, Swedish, and American experiences strong- ly suggest that cultural rela- tions will be stepped up only after trade has been substan- tially expanded. Surveillance and strict controls continue to be maintained over Western diplo- matic personnel stationed in Bucharest. The suddenly friend- ly official attitude toward American representatives in the Rumanian capital contrasts sharply with Bucharest's propa- ganda attacks on the US and its allies--attacks which follow the Soviet lead in every case. CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN As recently outlined by planning chief Simunek, direc- tives for drafting the Czecho- slovak Third Five-Year Plan (1961-65) express President Novotny's determination to con- tinue the rapid build-up of heavy industry, recalling in many respects' Soviet plans of the Stalin era. Rapid increas- es in industrial growth during the last three years have prompt- ed the regime to revise upward the preliminary estimate of over-all industrial possibili- ties made public at last year's 11th party congress. Under the new directives, industrial production in 1965 is to double the 1957 level. Czechoslovakia's advanced en- gineering industry is to expand twice as fast as originally con- templated, and higher targets are specified for commodities basic to industry: steels, fuels, electric power, and building materials. While output of producer goods is to rise 60 percent between 1961 and 1965, that of consumer goods will'in- crease only 30 percent. The annual rate of indus- trial growth during the five- year plan period will be 8.5 percent, compared with 10.2 percent during 1958-60, because of more extensive investment in PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 12 of 17 oR~ass,F,E~ CZECHOSLOVAKIA: ACTUAL AND PLANNED PRODUCTION OF SELECTED BASIC COMMODITIES (MILLION METRIC TONS EXCEPT WHERE NOTED) COMMODITY 1958 LEVEL 1965 PRELIMINARY TARGET Electric Power (BILLION KWH) 19.6 37.7 Hard Coal 25.8 35.5 Brown Coal 54, 3 73.2 Coke 7.4 11.6 Pig Iron 3.8 7.6 Crude Steel 5.5 10.5 Cement 4.1 8.6 Synthetic Fibers (THOUSAND METRIC TONS) 55.0 105.6 Meat (THOUSAND METRIC TONS) 415.0 583.1 Footwear (MILLION PAIRS) 68.0 101.0 91103 3 large-scale, long-term proj- ects whose full effect on pro- duction levels will not be felt: until after 1965. Investment will continue to account for a high share in the distribution of national income, while in- dustry's portion of total in- vestment will grow considerably. Great capital outlays will be tied up in vast new construc- tion projects for the metal.lur gicaland chemical industries, most notably in a giant metal- lurgical combine near Kosice in eastern Slovakia. This combine replaces the former "Huko" proj- ect initiated in 1950 and a- bandoned two years later as economically unsound. Planned industrial expan- sion relies'not only on this greater investment, but also on even larger ncreases in labor productivity than sched- uled under previous plans and seldom attained. Yet if labor productivity develops unsatis- factorily, as seems likely, the regime could resort, as in the past, to above-plan allocations of manpower to industry. These could, in turn, be damaging to the agricultural sector, which will probably need more labor and capital than the plan now provides in order to meet its production target of a 40-percent increase over 1957. Although the plan stipu- lates a 5.3-percent annual in- crease in personal consumption during 1961-65, it is doubtful the regime can fulfill this promise because it depends on success in the agricultural pro- gram. The determination with which the regime enforces heavy industrial priorities may lead to further stinting on invest- ment allocations for consumer- oriented sectors--including housing, where plans vastly more ambitious than in the past require large investment. The outlook for the consumer is now one of~harder work and slow gains in real wages. Czechoslovak economic pol icy, perhaps the Soviet bloc's most "orthodox" and hard-line, may promote industrial growth at the price of increasing consumer dissatisfaction. Any serious public discontent as a result of slowness in improving the level of living would prob- ably be met with economic con- cessions, however, even if these involved some temporary decline in the rate of industrial growth. (Pre- pared by ORR PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 13 of 17 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The Ulbricht regime is pre- , off travel by East German Prot- paring to sever the East Ger- man church from its leadership in West Berlin. Bishop Dibelius,. 79-year- old president of the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany and head of the Ber- lin-Brandenburg Diocese in East Germany, recently asserted in an open letter that a Chris- tian is not obliged to obey any laws of a totalitarian state-- including even such ordinances as traffic regulations on the Berlin autobahn, since they. might be intended for evil pur- poses such as starving out West Berlin. In consequence, he was summoned from his residence in West Berlin to an interview on 28 October with the acting may- or of East Berlin, Waldemar Schmidt. According to East Berlin newspapers, Schmidt charged Dibelius with seeking to undermine the legal order in East Berlin and stated that the bishop had "deprived him- self of grounds for further activity" in the Soviet sector of Berlin. The Evangelical Church leadership in Berlin-Brandenburg now is under heavy pressure to condemn Dibelius, and an East German broadcast of 23 October construed an equivocal state- ment by this group to mean that East German churchmen have pub- licly dissociated themselves from their bishop. In an effort to enlist sympathy from believ- ers in East Germany, the Commu- nists are accenting the tra- ditional Lutheran view that the "state is an expression of the will of God" and thus must not be resisted. The regime has also in- tensified its efforts to cut estants to West German church functions. It allowed only 2,000 persons to attend the Evan- gelical conference (Kirchentag) held in Munich in August, in contrast with the many thousands who were permitted to go in past years. The Communists are also promoting closer ties be- tween certain selected East Ger- man Protestant church leaders-- notably Bishop Moritz Mitzenheim of Thuringia--and Orthodox Church leaders in the USSR. Mitzenheim and other high churchmen visited Moscow in September, and Patri- arch Aleksey of Moscow is slated to come to East Berlin next East- er. In expectation of continued Communist efforts to divide the church, the Berlin-Brandenburg Synod last spring--with Dibelius' acquiescence--adopted an "empow- ering clause" designed to enable the church leadership in East Germany to issue emergency de- crees if its communications with Bishop Dibelius' office in West Berlin were cut off. The East German press hailed the move as recog- nition of East German sovereignty; West Berlin church officials said PART II NOTES AND C&)9MENTS Page 14 of 17 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY many synod members opposed the step because it served to under- mine one of the few remaining vestiges of German unity. Under steady regime pres- sure, East German Christians are having difficulty maintaining their opposition to the Com- munists. Enrollment for the Jugendweihe--the regime's athe- ist youth indoctrination pro- gram--has grown to include a large proportion of teen-age youth. Commenting on declining church membership, an East Ger- man attending the recent Kirch- entag in Munich declared: "Peo- ple are falling away like with- ered leaves." In the event the regime meets with further significant success in gaining the coopera- tion of the local clergy, it can be expected to take steps to establish a separate church in East Germany. The Castro government's new mining law and its seizure of oil companies' files are additional evidence of its dras- tic approach to economic reforms, many of which are badly needed. Most of the large and un- exploited petroleum and miner- al concessions, as well as the mining industry in general, are controlled by American interests which Cubans feel have not de- veloped their holdings rapidly enough to benefit the economy. Alienation of these private investors who have been consid- ered the only source of suffi- cient capital for developing the.subsoil resources, and in- creased government control over the economy will probably be accompanied by an intensified search for European--and pos- sibly Soviet bloc--technical and financial assistance. tions with East Germany. On 3 November the semiofficial daily Revolucion urged that Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan, who will inaugurate the Soviet exhibition in Mexico on 22 November, be invited to visit Cuba as the first step toward renewed relations and further trade with the USSR. Ambassador Bonsai in Havana has reported that East German economic officials are expected in Cuba soon, and he considers it quite likely that some rap- prochement may be contemplated. Castro's revival on 29 October of the revolutionary tribunals and the reintroduction of the death penalty are again arousing unfavorable comment in Latin America. Hemisphere leaders and newspapers sympa- thetic to Castro's planned re- forms and. aspirations for Cuba have been increasingly critical of his excessive and irrational Cuba may be planning to resume diplomatic relations with the USSR and open trade rela- actions. The conflicting presiden- tial ambitions of former Presi- dent Victor Paz Estenssoro and Walter Guevara Arze, right-wing leader of the ruling Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), are causing serious unrest in Bolivia. Moderate President Siles has apparently swung his support from Guevara to Paz; this is likely to give the June 1960 presidential election to Paz and the left wing. Left- wing leaders are frequently critical of the United States, although a recent oil discovery by a US-financed company in Bo- livia has apparently moderated some of their anti-US atti- tudes. PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 15 of 17 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Paz has hinted that he will choose leftist labor lead- er Juan Lechin--key opponent of the US- backed economic sta- bilization program-- as his running mate at the presidential nominating convention of the government party scheduled to open in late December or early January. Right-wing elements probably feel that a Paz-Lechin ticket will imply a more leftist administra- tion than Bolivia has ever had. Right-wingers in desperation could resort to an abortive coup attempt. Moreover, armed violence may break out because the police and the civilian militia are divided in loyalty. In an apparent move to placate right-wing elements, Siles in late October demanded that leftist Jose.Rojas, a principal leader of the rural militia, resign from the cabi- net. The threatened dismissal. of Rojas has provoked outbreaks of militia violence. Certain Since re-election the Mac- millan government has given priority to improving Britain's relations with the six European Economic Community (EEC) members. Foreign Secretary Lloyd will try to promote his plans in a visit to Paris on 11-12 November. Visits to London are planned by West German Chancellor Adenauer on 17-18 November and Italian Premier Segni on 1-3 December. London is apprehensive lest the continued strengthening of Rojas units have been surrounded by opposing forces under a right- wing rural leader. Each leader has the loyalty of 3,000 men. The basic militia unit consists of a company of about 100 men armed with rifles, submachine guns, a mortar, and a heavy- machine-gun section. Bolivian Army strength varies seasonally between 7,000 and 12,000. The army tends to be loyal to the Sue ; - ?overnment but would be unable to quell widespread violence. the EEC group further reduces British influence on the con- tinent. Lloyd wants to try to "bridge the gap" between the EEC and the proposed little free- trade area (Outer Seven) which the UK promotes, rather than wait several years as many ob- servers, including some of his own advisers, believe necessary. From London's viewpoint, the EEC Council of Ministers' decision in mid-October to pro- ceed with periodic political PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 16 of 17 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY consultations on a six-nation basis carries the threat to British interests one step fur- ther. Lloyd has suggested- sev-eral projects which would tend. to increase British partici- pation f in European endeavors short of making supranational commitments. His expressed de- sire for closer political coor- dination and for improved coor- dination of weapons development suggests that he may try to re- vive the Western European Union, the only European organization composed of the six EEC coun- tries plus Britain,. Lloyd also advocates con- centrating European institutions in one city, but this suggestion will be no more welcome now than it was three years ago when Europeans suspected that it cloaked a scheme,to disrupt progress on integration. The atmosphere for the coming visits nevertheless seems improved. In a recent Parlia- mentary debate Lloyd went out of his way to kill one source of French and German suspicions by heaping scorn upon European "disengagement." Macmillan's cordial response to Adenauer's message of congratulations on the Conservatives' election victory greatly pleased the chancellor. De Gaulle, for his part, has agreed to pay a state visit to the United Kingdom in early April. PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 17 of 17 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMIABY PART III PATTERNS AND. PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 18 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 2 of 18 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 CF/`R FT PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 18 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 18 -SEC-RE T PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 5 of 18 The independence secured in 1956 by Morocco and Tunisia and the struggle for independ- ence under way in Algeria are leading to serious considera- tion of the nature of the re- lations of North African polit- ical entities with each other and with outside blocs. Some North African leaders, recall- ing the medieval Maghreb em- pires--the Arab "western land" consisting of the larger part of northwest Africa--have been seeking to create a united and powerful "Maghreb federation." Some of these North Africans go further. Recognizing the dependence of North Africa on France, they envisage an al- liance between a confederation of North African states and France, or association with a Western European community. North Africans planning for a Maghreb federation must consider a variety of forces, attitudes,and traditions which, while partially favorable to unity, contain elements making for disunion. The major inter- national forces influencing such a development would seem to be the heritage of French control and the continuing French economic dominance throughout the area, the attrac- GUAR (SYRIA) S U D A N Kharto. , SAUDI ARABIA PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 6 of 18 SPANISH SAHARA tions and distractions provided by Middle Eastern Arab influences, and the vogue for neutralism and its concomitant tendency toward a relationship with the Soviet bloc. Within the Maghreb coun- tries, the principal currents affecting unity seem to stem from the appeal of the idea of "the Maghreb" as against dis- parate policies of the individ- ual North African governments, each of which is developing its own view of what its relations with other states ought to be. France--whose military con- quest of the Maghreb began in Algeria in 1830 and was not con- cluded until a century later in Morocco--imposed its language and to some extent its culture along the coastal areas. The French administrators who fol- lowed the army and colonists superimposed a Western veneer on the local subsistence econ- omies, built European cities outside the native quarters,and developed the whole area primar- ily as a source of raw materials and markets for France's industries. The European residents of North Africa--who numbered about TUNISIA SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUNKARY 1,500,000 in early 1956--con- trolled the most fertile land and held all but the lowliest government jobs. While excel- lent educational facilities were developed for Europeans, only a relatively few Moslems had access to such facilities. Although some North Afri- can Moslems adopted European customs, the mode of living of the average North African re- mained largely untouched by Western customs or thought un- til World War I, when North African recruits mingled with Western soldiers on European battlefields. About the same time, a few North African na- tionalists gained hope from the concept of self-determina- tion embodied in President Wilson's Fourteen Points. There- after, the concept of self- rule and independence snowballed, particularly in the early 1930s among the handful of North Af- rican students in Paris. These former students are today the governmental and po- litical leaders in Morocco and Tunisia and to a lesser extent are influential in the Algerian National Liberation Front. More- over, the military leaders of the Algerian rebellion arelarge- ly former noncommissioned offi- cers of the French Army, battle trained in Europe and Indo- china. The North African govern- ments retain strong ties to France in that their administra- tive structures are modeled af- ter that of France and to a large extent are staffed by French nationals. Their armies have been organized, officered, and trained by the French. French financial and technical investment still dominates the local economies. North African leaders, with few exceptions, conduct their business in French and wear Western dress. Their wives are fast becoming emanci- pated and are participating in public life, even in politics. By preference, Western modes of life--including television-- are becoming the norm, at least for the educated North African elite. Middle Eastern Influence The Arab invaders who over- ran the area in the seventh and eighth centuries quickly imposed their language and religion on the urbanized residents of the Maghreb. The common bond of blood, religion, and language between Maghrebian and Middle Eastern Arabs, however, now appears more imaginary than real. A North African Arab con- siders himself essentially a Moroccan, Algerian, or Tunisian and usually adopts a supercil- ious attitude toward an eastern Arab. Tunisians in particular consider themselves superior to all other Arabs. e Nor Africans rate their religious universities at Fez PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 7 of 18 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY and Kairouan higher than A1- Azhar in Cairo. The North African version of spoken Arabic is virtually unintelligible to a Middle Eastern Arab, but classical Arabic is taught in the sbhools and is the language of govern- mental documents in independent Tunisia and Morocco and of the Arabic-language press. Only a handful of the present Maghreb- ian leaders were educated in the Middle East. Many of this group may maintain ties and some degree of affinity toward their seat of learning, but others--notably Morocco's Allal E1-Fassi--have broken with Cairo. A greater number of North Afri- can youths may now be enrolled in Middle East universities than heretofore, but the Paris- or Western-trained youth still is the preferred employee. The young liberals in Mo- rocco and Tunisia are pushing their governments for closer relations with the Arab states. These efforts seem designed to broaden their countries' con- tacts and may also stem from their intense interest in Mid- dle Eastern socialistic experi- ments. One result of these ef- forts--and those of then Xt'agi Foreign Minister Jamali-was that in 1958 both Morocco and Tunisia joined the Arab League. Since then Morocco'has participated in most league ac- tivities and, in fact,was host to the league's most recent regular meeting early in Sep- tember. Morocco may also be taking the lead in an effort to increase the influence of non-UAR states in the league. Nevertheless, Moroccan leaders remain principally preoccupied with local problems. Tunisian President Bour- guiba apparently joined the league mainly as a gesture of. solidarity with Morocco. He immediately challenged Nasir's dominance over the league, how- ever, and when his maneuver was censured by the organization, used his long-standing quarrel with Nasir as an excuse to walk out. Bourguiba shows no indi- cations either of desiring to cooperate closely with other Arab states or of improving re- lations with Cairo. HABIB BOURGHISA The Algerian rebels, mean- while, have depended largely on the eastern Arab states for fi- nancial and material support in their struggle for independence. Like the Moroccans and Tunisians, however, the Algerians look a- skance at what they consider the more backward Arabs and espouse Western concepts and admire West- ern techniques. Maghrebian Neutralism The Moroccan and Tunisian governments and the Algerian rebels have adopted neutralist foreign policies. Morocco, taking the lead in establishing diplomatic relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc last fall,says it has a policy of nondependence or nonalignment. It recently confirmed the imminent exchange of ambassadors with Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, raising the number of bloc es- tablishments in Rabat to five. Despite increasing exchanges of visits with the bloc and a fas- cination with economic developments PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 8 of 18 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY in Communist China, which many Moroccans seek to emulate, Mo- rocco's contacts are still pre- dominantly with the West. Tunisia, on the other hand, adopted a policy of non- engagement after President Bourguiba had repeatedly de- clared himself on the side of the West. Bourguiba persisted in this policy long after the "young Turks" in his entourage had pointed out the advantages of playing East against West to gain essential economic de- velopment assistance. He di- rectly tied his policy shift to prolonged difficulties with France, most of which evolved from Tunisia's support of the Algerian rebellion. Thus far Tunisia has per- mitted only the establishment of a Czech Embassy, with a non- resident ambassador. There are indications, however, that it may soon accept a Soviet ambas- sador. Earlier this year two Tunisian secretaries of state visited the Soviet Union. Bour- guiba considers these moves merely demonstrations of his independence from Western con- trols, however, and he probably will continue to go slow in contacts with the bloc. Both Morocco and Tunisia have substantially increased their foreign trade with the bloc. Nonetheless, this ex- panded exchange of commodities still remains a small fraction of the countries' foreign. trade. The Algerian rebels, whose provisional government has been recognized by Communist China and the Asian satellites: but not by the-Soviet bloc, maintain.- contacts with the bloc. The present moderate rebel leaders justify their acceptance of bloc training, relief supplies, and possibly some materiel as es- sential'.to continu&ng their struggle, in view of the lack of Western support. Prospects for Federation and experience as French col- lonial areas have been forces for cohesion in the Maghreb. The leaders, who initially shared classrooms and dormi- tories in Paris, have long plotted together to achieve their objectives. In 1958, two years after Morocco and Tunisia achieved independence, a conference of North African political lead- ers at Tangier created an em- bryo Maghreb federation and established a permanent secre- tariat in an effort to lay the foundations for intra-Maghre- bian collaboration. Although the unity given expression at Tangier has not been maintained, and although serious rivalries and dissensions have developed which impede the development of a strong and unified Maghreb federation, North African poli- ticians not infrequently extol Maghreb solidarity. The King and those who seek to develop a constitution- al monarchy in Morocco fear that antimonarchist forces in Morocco were encouraged by the abolition of the Tunisian mon- archy in 1957. They regard with suspicion all efforts by Bourguiba to expand his influ- ence within the Maghreb or to pose as the principal North African spokesman. The Tuni- sians, on the other hand, re- gard with dismay the disunity among Moroccan political groups. The Tunisians see the forces for instability in Morocco as an invitation for the extension of Communist influence. Both governments are also jealously watchful of each other's relations with France. Mohamed V, maintaining a more harmonious relationship with Paris than the outspoken Bour- guiba, was notably piqued last year when Tunisia obtained a commitment from France to evacu- ate all its bases in Tunisia save Bizerte. French troops remain scattered throughout Morocco, and Rabat still presses for total evacua- Common bonds of geographic tion. proximity, language, _:A94 D1?rr PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 9 of 18 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The Moroccans and partic- ularly the Tunisians--despite massive assistance to the Al- gerian rebels--fear the crea- tion of a powerful, indepen- dent Algeria which might seek to dominate its neighbors. For that reason Bourguiba has pressed the rebels to follow his example in accepting less than total independence and in keeping close ties with France. The Algerians, for their part, are irritated by Bour- guiba's pressures, his unso- licited advice, and the fact that he has occasionally been swayed by Tunisia's national interests to take steps con- trary to their interests. They have not forgiven his agree- nment giving a French company transit rights for a pipeline transporting Saharan oil, and they resent Tunisian and Mo- roccan pretensions to portions of the Sahara. In light of these consid- erations, therefore, the fed- eration set up 18 months ago in Tangier seems unlikely to iievelop soon into a meaningful boc' Y. Its existence, however, has a symbolic utility which may on occasion be exploited ,y Maghreb politicians. A united Maghreb, closely tied to Parts, has a certain appeal to French officials groping for a solution to the, Algerian problem and desiring to retain France's dominant role in Morocco and Tunisia. A. union would also complete the north-south axis between the African members of the French Community and continent- al France and would round out a large sphere of French culture and economic leadership. Regard- less of these potential bene- fits, Paris does not appear. to be pushing for a united Maghreb, French relations with Morocco and Tunisia have improved some- what from their recent low points, but mutual distrust is still strong. Before he came to power, De Gaulle was believed to fa- vor the establishment of a North African federation linked to France in a manner that would permit French control of the federation's military and foreign policies. He has not pushed this idea, and his pro- gram of 16 September for Al- geria-seems to point toward a separate identity outside the Maghreb for the Algerian de- partments--possibly in associa- tion with the French Community or conceivably even as an in- dependent state.- The possi- bility remains, however, that the question of Maghreb soli- darity may be reconsidered by the French after the promised Algerian referendum. North African leaders, recognizing their indebtness to and dependence on France, have also envisioned a loose union with France. President Bourguiba, with doubtful sin- cerity, has even gone one step further and offered to relin- quish some of Tunisia's sover- eignty if France would recog- nize an independent Algeria within a Maghreb federation allied with France. The North Africans' sensi- tivities to anything remotely resembling a negation of their sovereignty and independence, however, probably would inhibit an alliance with France alone. The Moroccans and Tunisians, in applying for affiliation with the Organization for Euro- pean Economic Cooperation and the Common Market, have indi- cated a desire to diversify their contacts by dealing with all the West. Both Morocco and Tunisia have strongly resented French financial and military pressures and seek to thwart the continuance of France's strangle over their economies and armies by diversification of their independence among, main- ly, all Western sources. Any new kind of relationship would seem to be for the more distant rather fu- ture. PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 10 of 18 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 THE FRENCH COMMUNITY IN EVOLUTION The French Community, just over a year old, seems about to undergo far-reaching struc- tural changes which the French hope Will encourage present members to remain and perhaps will even attract new ones. In the face of rising African nationalism, Paris has recent- ly officially accepted the con- cept of an evolving Community in which powers now exercised by France through the Community machinery will eventually be turned over to the individual member states. A Community of states with varying degrees of autonomy but oriented toward France and the West may ultimately pro- vide a legal frame- work for solving the problem of Algeria if De Gaulle's pre- ference for a loose French-Algerian as- sociation is real- ized. Prospects for lasting politi- cal ties in the Com- munity are not good, however. Even before coming to power, De Gaulle charac- terized his colonial views as "midway In the official communique following the last Community Executive Council meeting on 10 and 11 September, however, De Gaulle underlined the "evo- lutionary character" of the Com- munity, noting that the develop- ment of the structure of the states would determine the evo- lution. This publicly confirmed a new tack in French official thinking since the previous council meeting in July, when leaders of the Mal. Federa- tion--comprising the republics of Senegal and Soudan--began Leaders of some autonomous republics with President de Gaulle at September 1959 meeting of the Executive Council of the French Community: (left to right) Tombalbaye (Chad), Youlou (Congo), Maga (Dahomey), French Minis- ter of State Jacquinot, Mba (Gabon), French Premier Debre, De Gaulle, Tsiranana (Malgache Republic), Keita (Soudan), Houphouet - Boigny (Ivory Coast), and Dia (Niger). between those who want to change nothing and those who want to abandon everything," and his original concept of the French Community--which has replaced the old French Union--was de- signed to embody this. Never- theless, De Gaulle's initial preoccupation with Community institutions and his reportedly highhanded brushing aside of African nationalist leaders who publicly advocated a more flexible organization seemed designed to freeze the Commu- nity's original structure for an indefinite period. pressing for independence but found De Gaulle unwilling even to discuss the possibility of the Community's evolution. The fact that the sharp cleavages among West-African Community leaders earlier in the summer now have been smoothed over is the best evidence that a top-level decision has been made in Paris on the evolution of the Community. Senegal Pre- r:ier Mamadou Dia set the new tone in an article in the in- fluential Paris daily Le Monde, and his moderate program was s?,~D'a'~"rT PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 11 of 18 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY accepted by the more nationalistic Modibo Keita, who is both premier of Soudan and President of Mali. Even Ivory Coast Premier Hou phouet-Boigny,orig- inally the leading African advocate of a strong federal community, stated after the September meeting: "If certain states consider ther.;- selves able to assume responsibility for common affairs, that is their business." Nat,-are of Evolved Community Although many of the details of how a community of states enjoying differing relations with France could function have prob- ably not yet receiv- FRENCH AFRICA Autonomous Republic (French Community) overseas territory lowing the 11 December Execu- tive Council meeting in Sene- gal, when powers now exercised by the Community, including control of foreign affairs, may be transferred to Senegal and Soudan and, by them, to the Mali Federation. Other Community members, particularly the more developed states of West Africa, will probably soon be under native national- ist pressure to seek similar accommodations with France. ed high-level consideration, the broad lines of development are already apparent. In the Community as now constituted, all the West African states and Madagascar (the Malgache Republic)are alike in respect to their own powers and those-- notably in the fields of for- eign policy, defense, and economic and financial policy-- reserved to the Community and in practice exercised by Paris. The French apparently envisage granting certain of the Community powers to the member states on an individ- ual basis under Article 78 of the French Constitution, which provides that "special agree- ments may create other common jurisdictions or regulate any transfer of jurisdiction from the Community to one of its members." This experiment will probably first be tried fol- New Members The constitution also provides for new Community members. Among the most likely prospects would be the French trust territories of Togo and Cameroun, which are scheduled to gain their independence in 1960. There is also evidence that France may hope ultimately to attract Morocco and Tunisia. In these cases, however, the ties would probably amount to little more than economic car .-ART 1 PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 12 of 18 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY agreements or a more formal- ized membership in the franc zone. A Place for Algeria The concept of a Communi- ty embodying a variety of re- lationships appeals to some Frenchmen as a possible way out of the increasingly harsh dilemma posed by the Algerian situation. Having previously promised Algeria a "choice place" in the Community, De Gaulle in his 16 September proposal of three possible alternatives included inde- pendence and integration among them but laid special emphasis on a form of French-Algerian association which could be adapted to the Community. He envisaged "a government of Al- geria by Algerians, bolstered with French aid and in close union with France for economic educational, defense, and for- eign affairs," Under this alternative, De Gaulle also noted the "ne- cessity of organizing Algeria internally along federal lines "so that the various communi- ties can have a framework for cooperation." Such a federal state within a multirelation- ship Community would maintain Algeria as a political entity while simultaneously providing the legal framework for firm French control of certain parts --e.g,, the coastal cities and the oil-rich Sahara. this process, however, would run the risk of irritating the African member states to the point that some would decide on complete withdrawal from the Community. Furthermore, only a relatively solid Community,with safeguards on continued French control of key areas of Algeria should it become a member,would have a chance of gaining accept- ance of French rightists. Prospects Even the French leaders who favor a loose Community of varying relationships as the only means of retaining French influence in Africa may not be as sanguine about its dura- bility as they profess. They are apparently gambling, how- ever, that native nationalist forces will be satisfied with the new arrangements long enough to allow the economic benefits of Community member- ship to become apparent and thus engender continued and willing native participation. There may also be the hope that if such future states as Togo and Cameroun choose to associate with the French Community, this will counter- act some of the other external African nationalist influences on the Community states. If, however, De Gaulle moves too rapidly to tie his preferred Algerian solution to the Community,it would exacer- bate long-standing disagree- ments among the French on the extent to which native nation- alist aspirations can be satis- fied without losing effective control over the African areas. Proponents of a place for Algeria in the Community'would probably feel this problem ob- liged them to prove slowly in implementing the planned trans- fer of Community powers to the individual states. Prolonging SECRET Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that African nation- alist fervor can be dampened more than temporarily by any French-proposed association, however liberal. Furthermore, the cost of an economic aid program sufficient to en- courage continued membership in the Community would be prohibitive for France alone. With the French budget already strained to meet present commitments, Paris can be ex- pected to look for outside contributions that would be channeled through expanded-- and French-controlled--pro-- grams such as the Constan- tine Plan and the other African investment rograms. PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 13 of 18 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY SOVIET REACTION TO THE AMERICAN EXHIBITION IN MOSCOW The American exhibition. which concluded its six-week showing in Moscow's Sokolniki Park on 4 September, was the object of continuous intense interest and curiosity, despite strenuous Soviet efforts to undermine its impact. Well over two million Soviet citizens attended. Their reaction ap- pears to have been one of general approval, although there was some disappointment about the organization of the fair and the type and quality of some of the goods displayed. Those who came, whether or not they liked all they saw, by and large went away with a greater understanding of the United States. The fair's success in this respect appears to have been due as much to the contacts between American guides and Soviet visitors as to the exhibits themselves. The exhibition was the most exciting and talked-about event in Moscow during the sum- mer. There was an intense de- sire among all levels of Soviet society to attend. The people were proud of having seen it themselves or of knowing some- one who had. The US exhibition lapel pins immediately became a prestige symbol and are still frequently worn in public. Many people were exposed for the first time to something other than the propaganda mono- logue of their own regime. Re- gardless of whether reactions were negative or positive, each visitor carried away an impres- sion of a different type of society from his own. Given the Russians' limitless curiosity about all things American, it can be assumed that the fair whetted their craving for more information about the United States and closer contacts with Americans. The impact of the fair was felt throughout the Soviet Union. Exhibition pins have been seen in such distant places as eastern Siberia, Estonia, and Armenia. There are also numerous reports that exhibition pamphlets, frayed and dog-eared, are being cir- culated in widely scattered areas. The exhibition unquestion- ably added impetus to the gen- eral desire of the Soviet public for more and better consumer goods. It is widely rumored in Moscow that the American exhibi- tion was responsible for the recent introduc- tion of installment buying in Moscow. It is said that after the exhibition opened, thousands of letters poured into municipal offices demanding that installment buying be introduced. There is no basis to this rumor, since credit buying has been on its way--by ex- perimental stages--since last February; it is in- teresting, however, that so many Muscovites are associating the innova- tion with the fair. PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 14 of 18 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Demonstrations of Ready Mixes and Frozen Foods. Official recognition of the demand for consumer goods has already been evident in the sudden, increased attention given to Western display tech- niques and American-style ap- pliances. The recent govern- ment decree calling for the improvement and increased pro- duction of certain consumer goods seems clearly to carry the stamp of the fair's influ- ence. Efforts to Discredit Fair The regime's attitude toward the fair remained of- fically correct throughout, but unofficially every effort was made to discredit it and divert public atten- tion. The main at- tack--waged in the Soviet press--got under way well be- fore the exhibition opened. Day after day the press hammered away at unemployment and at job, educa- tion, and race dis- crimination in the United States. The carping tone contin- ued into the opening weeks of the fair, as the press endeav- ored to "correct" the "false" picture presented of life in the United States. The announcement on 3 August of the im- pending exchange of visits between Premier Khrushchev and Presi- dent Eisenhower marked a turning point. The disparagement campaign slackened in the face of the effort to em- phasize the prospects for improved US-Soviet relations. Press criticism continued but usually was placed in a setting which stressed the advantage of in- creased exchanges. Criticism of the fair and harassment of its officials was carried on inside the fair- grounds by thousands of party and Komsomol members who served as agitators. Apparently they were instructed to criticize specific aspects of the exhibi- tion, express their disappoint- ment over the lack of technolog- ical displays, and laugh at the modern art. More serious, how- ever, were their efforts to neutralize the effectiveness of the Russian-speaking guides by bombarding them with provocative questions, tying them up in involved technical discussions, and generally con- founding their work. Sewing Demonstration. CFCRET Page 15 of 18 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY "SUU&RY 5 November 1959 During the first few days,, over half of the visitors ap- peared to be-agitators. They were quickly spotted, however, and the reaction of the other Soviet visitors more often than not was hostile toward them. The number of agitators soon decreased markedly, prob- ably due as much'.to the realiza- tion that their efforts were backfiring as to the improved climate of US-Soviet relations. Competitive Attractions With the opening of the exhibition, Moscow blossomed with new attractions of its own, designed to distract the public from the fair. The Soviet Government apparently felt it necessary to show that. it could do as well as.the Americans. A Soviet consumer goods display was opened in an adjacent section of Sokolniki Park the day before the US exhibition opened. The Soviet counterpart was an obvious and almost ludicrous copy, complete with its own aluminum roof and smiling girls demonstrating electric stoves and shining cars. It was so located as to catch the attention-of those waiting in line to get tickets to the US exhibition. A giant bazaar, where scarce consumer goods were offered for sale, was opened in another part of Moscow at about the same time.. Control of Soviet Visitors Distribution of tickets to the fair was tightly con- trolled by the regime. Initial- ly, all tickets were distributed to district party committees, which in turn allotted them to the factories and offices under their jurisdiction. Numerous reports indicate that the bulk of tickets went to party mem- bers and various.other favored groups. The demand for tickets far surpassed the supply, and the discriminatory distribution policy was a source of frustra- tion and bitterness to many Russians. Some tickets were eventually put on "public".sale each day at Sokolniki Park. A person trying to avail himself to this service, however, had to line up for a screening check before proceeding to -the ticket office. This procedure could take as long as five hours, and there was no guarantee that tickets would still be available. Inside the fair a careful watch was maintained over . the citizenry. Security of- ficials circulated among the crowd, and it was not unusual to see someone who had been "indiscreet" tapped on the shoulder and called aside for a little "chat." One of the methods the regime used to harass visitors was to prohibit the installation of any toilet facilities in the exhibition building. Effects of These Measures The opinions of many visitors were molded by the line taken in the press, but there is strong evidence that the belittling propaganda and control measures were in many important respects backfiring. One-.Soviet citizen remarked that here was an example of a high-level decision overzeal- ously carried out by second-. level officials. The campaign helped hold the ideological line, but it was not successful in imposing' a negative image of the United States upon the Soviet public at. large. There appears to have been in some instances a direct correlation between press criticism of certain displays and public interest in.them. The popularity of the Family of Man photographic dis-- p a was assured after_Izvestia ran an article objecting o tsme. of the photographs. s4 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 16 of 18 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The constant harping in the Soviet press on such American problems as unemployment prompted Soviet visitors to ask questions which enabled the American guides to reply with the American side of the ques- tion. An explanation of un- employment insurance, for in- stance, took most people by surprise and probably shook a few misconceptions. Popular Reactions Popular reactions to the fair varied widely, depending Shoe Display, on prior expectations and the level of education and degree of knowledge of the West. In general, the people were im- pressed but not ecstatic over what they saw. While numerous individuals were obviously de- lighted and amazed, there is also good evidence that in many others appreciation was mixed with disappointment. Many people had developed such extravagant expectations of what the Americans would show them that the real thing was bound to fall short. There was apparently a widespread craving to see the full panoply of American luxuries--an element which was deliberately muted. Many visitors were heard to com- plain, "Why haven't you shown us your best?" While the constant criticism of the lack of examples of Ameri- can technology was in large meas- ure officially inspired, there appears to have been some genuine disappointment. Most visitors were well aware of American technological achievements and had expected to be impressed. Many visitors were bewildered by what seemed to be the fair's lack of direction, focus, and ex- planation. The Soviet people are accustomed to hard selling and heavy-handed exhibitions where visitors are carefully herded, told what they are looking at, why they are looking at it, and what they should think about it. Many members of the Soviet intelligentsia, however, found the light holiday mood and freedom to wander and discover for themselves refresh- ing and the feature which im- pressed them most. Reaction to Specific Displays The most popular displays were the automobile, Circarama --the 360-degree screen tour of the US, and color television and the Family of Man. By all accounts, however, the American guides ranked as high or even higher than the exhibits. The craving of Soviet citizens.for contact with Americans made the guides focal points of interest. Their ability to speak Russian, their candor and general knowledge won them unstinting praise. "Wonderful lads are your guides," reads one entry in the remark book. There is no question about the appeal of the American auto- mobiles. Individuals who could otherwise find nothing PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 17 of 18 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 November 1959 complimentary to say about the fair made an exception in this case. Among the "technical marvels" which the average vis- itor had so hoped to see, Cir- carama impressed almost every- one with both its mechanical perfection and its content, and color television was a smash hit. The Family of Man exhibi- tion may have had the greatest and book corner. impact, particularly with the better educated. Nearly every- one was moved by the human appeal of the photographs, and there is reason to believe that this exhibit's message became associated with US pol- icy as a whole. Other well- received exhibits were the mod- el house, demonstration kitchen sEGRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 18 of 18 PART IV PAGE 1 OF 1